← Volver a la ficha del textoTAHAFUT AL-TAHAFUT
(The Incoherence of the
Incoherence)
AVERROES
(IBN RUSHD)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface
INTRODUCTION
THE FIRST DISCUSSION: Concerning the Eternity of the World
THE FIRST PROOF
THE SECOND PROOF
THE THIRD PROOF
THE FOURTH PROOF
THE SECOND DISCUSSION: The Refutation of their Theory of the Incorruptibility of
the World and of Time and Motion
THE THIRD DISCUSSION: The demonstration of their confusion in saying that God
is the agent and the maker of the world and that the world in His product and act, and
the demonstration that these expressions are in their system only metaphors without
any real sense
THE FOURTH DISCUSSION: Showing that they are unable to prone the existence of
a creator of the world
THE FIFTH DISCUSSION: To show their incapacity to prove God's unity and the
impossibility of two necessary existents both without a cause
THE SIXTH DISCUSSION: To refute their denial of attributes
THE SEVENTH DISCUSSION: To refute their claim that nothing cars share with the
First its genus and be differentiated from it through a specific difference, and that with
respect to its intellect the division into genus and specific difference cannot be
applied to it
THE EIGHTH DISCUSSION: To refute their theory that the existence of the First is
simple, namely that it is pure existence and that its existence stands in relation to no
quiddity and to no essence, but stands to necessary existence as do other beings to
their quiddity
THE NINTH DISCUSSION: To refute their proof that the First is incorporeal
THE TENTH DISCUSSION: To prove their incapacity to demonstrate that the world
has a creator and a cause, and that in fact they are forced to admit atheism
THE ELEVENTH DISCUSSION: To show the incapacity of those philosophers who
believe that the First knows other things besides its own self and that it knows the
genera and the species in a universal way, to prone that this is so
THE TWELFTH DISCUSSION: About the impotence of the philosophers to prone
that Cod knows Himself
THE THIRTEENTH DISCUSSION: To refute those who arm that Gad is ignorant of
the individual things which are divided in time into present, past, and future
THE FOURTEENTH DISCUSSION: To refute their proof that heaven is an animal
mowing in a circle in obedience to God
THE FIFTEENTH DISCUSSION: To refute the theory of the philosophers about the
aim which moves heaven
THE SIXTEENTH DISCUSSION: To refute the philosophical theory that the souls of
the heavens observe all the particular events of this world
ABOUT THE NATURAL SCIENCES
THE FIRST DISCUSSION: The denial of a logical necessity between cause and
effect
THE SECOND DISCUSSION: The impotence of the philosophers to show by
demonstrative proof that the soul is a spiritual substance
THE THIRD DISCUSSION: Refutation of the philosophers’ proof for the immortality of
the soul
THE FOURTH DISCUSSION: Concerning the philosophers’ denial of bodily
resurrection
The End
PREFACE
| wish to express my warmest thanks to the Trustees of the Gibb Memorial
Fund for making the publication of this work possible, and especially to
Professor Sir Hamilton Gibb, who asked me to undertake the work and
who has not only read the proofs but has continually given me his interest
and encouragement. | am also deeply indebted to Dr. R. Walzer, who has
read the proofs, carefully checked the references in my notes, and
composed the indexes and the Greek-Arabic and Arabic-Greek
vocabularies. | have also to thank Dr. S. M. Stern for his help in
completing the subject-index. Finally, | wish to pay a tribute to one who is
no longer amongst us, Father Maurice Bouyges, without whose admirable
text the work could never have been undertaken.
The marginal numbers in Vol. | refer to the text of Father Bouyges’s
edition of the Tahafut al Tahafut in his Bibliotheca Arabica Scholasticorum,
vol. fii, Beyrouth, 1930.
The asterisks indicate different readings from those to be found in
Bouyges’s text: cf. the Appendix, Vol. |, pp, 364 ff.
INTRODUCTION
If it may be said that Santa Maria sopra Minerva is a symbol of our
European culture, it should not be forgotten that the mosque also was built
on the Greek temple. But whereas in Christian Western theology there
was a gradual and indirect infiltration of Greek, and especially Aristotelian
ideas, so that it may be said that finally Thomas Aquinas baptized
Aristotle, the impact on Islam was sudden, violent, and short. The great
conquests by the Arabs took place in the seventh century when the Arabs
first came into contact with the Hellenistic world. At that time Hellenistic
culture was still alive; Alexandria in Egypt, certain towns in Syria-Edessa
for instance-were centres of Hellenistic learning, and in the cloisters of
Syria and Mesopotamia not only Theology was studied but Science and
Philosophy also were cultivated. In Philosophy Aristotle was still ‘the
master of those who know’, and especially his logical works as interpreted
by the Neoplatonic commentators were studied intensively. But also many
Neoplatonic and Neopythagorean writings were still known, and also, very
probably, some of the old Stoic concepts and problems were still alive and
discussed.
The great period of translation of Greek into Arabic, mostly through the
intermediary of Christian Syrians, was between the years 750 and 850,
but already before that time there was an impact of Greek ideas on
Muslim theology. The first speculative theologians in Islam are called
Mu'tazilites (from about A. D. 723), an exact translation of the Greek word
(the general name for speculative theologians is Mutakallimun,
dialecticians, a name often given in later Greek philosophy to the Stoics).
Although they form rather a heterogeneous group of thinkers whose
theories are syncretistic, that is taken from different Greek sources with a
preponderance of Stoic ideas, they have certain points in common,
principally their theory, taken from the Stoics, of the rationality of religion
(which is for them identical with Islam), of a /umen naturale which burns in
the heart of every man, and the optimistic view of a rational God who has
created the best of all possible worlds for the greatest good of man who
occupies the central place in the universe. They touch upon certain
difficult problems that were perceived by the Greeks. The paradoxes of
Zeno concerning movement and the infinite divisibility of soace and time
hold their attention, and the subtle problem of the status of the
nonexistent, a problem long neglected in modern philosophy, but revived
by the school of Brentano, especially by Meinong, which caused an
endless controversy amongst the Stoics, is also much debated by them.
A later generation of theologians, the Ash‘arites, named after Al Ash‘ari,
born A. D. 873, are forced by the weight of evidence to admit a certain
irrationality in theological concepts, and their philosophical speculations,
largely based on Stoicism, are strongly mixed with Sceptical theories.
They hold the middle way between the traditionalists who want to forbid all
reasoning on religious matters and those who affirm that reason unaided
by revelation is capable of attaining religious truths. Since Ghazali founds
his attack against the philosophers on Ash‘arite principles, we may
consider for a moment some of their theories. The difference between the
Ash‘arite and Mu'tazilite conceptions of God cannot be better expressed
than by the following passage which is found twice in Ghazali (in his
Golden Means of Dogmatics and his Vivification of Theology) and to which
by tradition is ascribed the breach between Al Ash‘ari and the Mu'tazilites.
‘Let us imagine a child and a grown-up in Heaven who both died in
the True Faith, but the grown-up has a higher place than the child.
And the child will ask God, “Why did you give that man a higher
place?” And God will answer, “He has done many good works.” Then
the child will say, “Why did you let me die so soon so that | was
prevented from doing good?” God will answer, “I knew that you would
grow up a sinner, therefore it was better that you should die a child.”
Then a cry goes up from the damned in the depths of Hell, “Why, O
Lord, did you not let us die before we became sinners?” ’
Ghazali adds to this: ‘the imponderable decisions of God cannot be
weighed by the scales of reason and Mu'tazilism’.
According to the Ash‘arites, therefore, right and wrong are human
concepts and cannot be applied to God. ‘Cui mali nihil est nec esse potest
quid huic opus est dilectu bonorum et malorum?’ is the argument of the
Sceptic Carneades expressed by Cicero (De natura deorum, iii. 15. 38). It
is a dangerous theory for the theologians, because it severs the moral
relationship between God and man and therefore it cannot be and is not
consistently applied by the Ash‘arites and Ghazali.
The Ash‘arites have taken over from the Stoics their epistemology, their
sensationalism, their nominalism, their materialism. Some details of this
epistemology are given by Ghazali in his autobiography: the clearness of
representations is the criterion for their truth; the soul at birth is a blank on
which the sensations are imprinted; at the seventh year of a man’s life he
acquires the rational knowledge of right and wrong. Stoic influence on
Islamic theology is overwhelming. Of Stoic origin, for instance, are the
division of the acts of man into five classes; the importance placed on the
motive of an act when judging its moral character; the theory of the two
categories of substance and accident (the two other categories, condition
and relation, are not considered by the Muslim theologians to pertain to
reality, since they are subjective); above all, the fatalism and determinism
in Islam which is often regarded as a feature of the Oriental soul. In the
Qur'an, however, there is no definite theory about free will. Muhammad
was not a philosopher. The definition of will in man given by the Ash‘arites,
as the instrument of unalterable fate and the unalterable law of God, is
Stoic both in idea and expression. (| have discussed several other theories
in my notes.)
Sometimes, however, the theologians prefer to the Stoic view the view of
their adversaries. For instance, concerning the discussion between
Neoplatonism and Stoicism whether there is a moral obligation resting on
God and man relative to animals, Islam answers with the Neoplatonists in
the affirmative (Spinoza, that Stoic Cartesian, will give, in his Ethica, the
negative Stoic answer).
The culmination of the philosophy of Islam was in the tenth and eleventh
centuries. This was the age also of the great theologians. It was with
Greek ideas, taken in part from Stoics and Sceptics, that the theologians
tried to refute the ideas of the philosophers. The philosophers themselves
were followers of Aristotle as seen through the eyes of his Neoplatonic
commentators. This Neoplatonic interpretation of Aristotle, although it
gives a mystical character to his philosophy which is alien to it, has a
certain justification in the fact that there are in his philosophy many
elements of the theory of his master Plato, which lend themselves to a
Neoplatonic conception. Plotinus regarded himself as nothing but the
commentator of Plato and Aristotle, and in his school the identity of view of
these two great masters was affirmed. In the struggle in Islam between
Philosophy and Theology, Philosophy was defeated, and the final blow to
the philosophers was given in Ghazali’s attack on Philosophy which in
substance is incorporated in Averroés’ book and which he tries to refute.
Ghazali, who was born in the middle of the eleventh century, is one of
the most remarkable and at the same time most enigmatic figures in
Islam. Like St. Augustine, with whom he is often compared, he has told us
in his autobiography how he had to pass through a period of despair and
scepticism until God, not through demonstration but by the light of His
grace, had given him peace and certitude. This divine light, says Ghazali,
is the basis of most of our knowledge and, he adds, profoundly, one
cannot find proofs for the premisses of knowledge; the premisses are
there and one looks for the reasons, but they cannot be found. Certitude is
reached, he says, not through scholastic reasoning, not through
philosophy, but through mystical illumination and the mystical way of life.
Still Ghazali is not only a mystic, he is a great dogmatist and moralist. He
is regarded as Islam’s greatest theologian and, through some of his
books, as a defender of Orthodoxy. It is generally believed that the
Tahafut, the book in which he criticizes Philosophy, was written in the
period of his doubts. The book, however, is a Defence of Faith, and
though it is more negative than positive, for it aims to destroy and not to
construct, it is based on the theories of his immediate predecessors, many
of whose arguments he reproduces. Besides, he promises in this book to
give in another book the correct dogmatic answers. The treatise to which
he seems to refer does not contain anything but the old theological articles
of faith and the Ash‘arite arguments and solutions. But we should not look
for consistency in Ghazali; necessarily his mysticism comes into conflict
with his dogmatism and he himself has been strongly influenced by the
philosophers, especially by Avicenna, and in many works he comes very
near to the Neoplatonic theories which he criticizes. On the whole it would
seem to me that Ghazali in his attack on the philosophers has taken from
the vast arsenal of Ash‘arite dialectical arguments those appropriate to the
special point under discussion, regardless of whether they are destructive
also of some of the views he holds.
Averroés was the last great philosopher in Islam in the twelfth century,
and is the most scholarly and scrupulous commentator of Aristotle. He is
far better known in Europe than in the Orient, where few of his works are
still in existence and where he had no influence, he being the last great
philosopher of his culture. Renan, who wrote a big book about him,
Averroes et Il’‘Averro’‘asme, had never seen a line of Arabic by him. Lately
some of his works have been edited in Arabic, for instance his Tahafut al
Tahafut, in a most exemplary manner. Averroés’ influence on European
thought during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance has been immense.
The name of Ghazali’s book in which he attacks the philosophers is
Tahafut al Falasifa, which has been translated by the medieval Latin
translator as Destructio Philosophorum. The name of Averroés’ book is
Tahafut al Tahafut, which is rendered as Destructio Destructionis (or
destructionum). This rendering is surely not exact. The word ‘7ahafuf has
been translated by modern scholars in different ways, and the title of
Ghazali’s book has been given as the breakdown, the disintegration, or
the incoherence, of the philosophers. The exact title of Averroés’ book
would be The Incoherence of the Incoherence.
In the Revue des Deux Mondes there was an article published in 1895
by Ferdinand Brunetiere, ‘La Banqueroute de la Science’, in which he tried
to show that the solutions by science, and especially by biology, of
fundamental problems, solutions which were in opposition to the dogmas
taught by the Church, were primitive and unreasonable. Science had
promised us to eliminate mystery, but, Brunetiere said, not only had it not
removed it but we saw clearly that it would never do so. Science had been
able neither to solve, nor even to pose, the questions that mattered: those
that touched the origin of man, the laws of his conduct, his future destiny.
What Brunetiere tried to do, to defend Faith by showing up the audacity of
Science in its attempt to solve ultimate problems, is exactly the same as
Ghazali tried to do in relation to the pretensions of the philosophers of his
time who, having based themselves on reason alone, tried to solve all the
problems concerning God and the world. Therefore a suitable title for his
book might perhaps be ‘The Bankruptcy of Philosophy’.
In the introduction to his book Ghazali says that a group of people
hearing the famous names Socrates, Hippocrates, Plato, and Aristotle,
and knowing what they had attained in such sciences as Geometry, Logic,
and Physics, have left the religion of their fathers in which they were
brought up to follow the philosophers. The theories of the philosophers are
many, but Ghazali will attack only one, the greatest, Aristotle; Aristotle, of
whom it is said that he refuted all his predecessors, even Plato, excusing
himself by saying ‘amicus Plato, amica veritas, sed magis amica veritas’. |
may add that this well-known saying, which is a variant of a passage in
Plato’s Phaedo and in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, is found in this form
first in Arabic. One of the first European authors who has it in this form is
Cervantes (Don Quijote, ii, c. 52). | quote this saying-Ghazali adds-to
show that there is no surety and evidence in Philosophy. According to
Ghazali, the philosophers claim for their metaphysical proofs the same
evidence as is found in Mathematics and Logic. But all Philosophy is
based on supposition and opinion. If Metaphysics had the same evidence
as Mathematics all philosophers would agree just as well in Philosophy as
in Mathematics. According to him the translators of Aristotle have often
misunderstood or changed the meaning and the different texts have
caused different controversies. Ghazali considers Farabi and Avicenna to
be the best commentators on Aristotle in Islam, and it is their theories that
he will attack.
Before entering into the heart of the matter | will say a few words about
Ghazali’'s remark that Metaphysics, although it claims to follow the same
method as Mathematics, does not attain the same degree of evidence.
Neither Aristotle nor his commentators ever asked the question whether
there is any difference between the methods of Mathematics and
Metaphysics (it is a significant fact that most examples of proof in the
Posterior Analytics are taken from Mathematics) and why the conclusions
reached by Metaphysics seem so much less convincing than those
reached by Mathematics. It would seem that Metaphysics, being the basis
of all knowledge and having as its subject the ultimate principles of things,
should possess, according to Aristotle, the highest evidence and that God,
as being the highest principle, should stand at the beginning of the
system, as in Spinoza. In fact, Aristotle could not have sought God if he
had not found Him. For Aristotle all necessary reasoning is deductive and
exclusively based on syllogism. Reasoning-he says-and | think this is a
profound and true remark-cannot go on indefinitely. You cannot go on
asking for reasons infinitely, nor can you reason about a subject which is
not known to you. Reason must come to a stop. There must be first
principles which are immediately evident. And indeed Aristotle
acknowledges their existence. When we ask, however, what these first
principles are, he does not give us any answer but only points out the
Laws of Thought as such. But from the Laws of Thought nothing can be
deduced, as Aristotle acknowledges himself. As a matter of fact Aristotle is
quite unaware of the assumption on which his system is based. He is what
philosophers are wont to call nowadays a naive realist. He believes that
the world which we perceive and think about with all it contains has a
reality independent of our perceptions or our thoughts. But this view
seems so natural to him that he is not aware that it could be doubted or
that any reason might be asked for it. Now I, for my part, believe that the
objectivity of a common world in which we all live and die is the necessary
assumption of all reasoning and thought. | believe indeed, with Aristotle,
that there are primary assumptions which cannot be deduced from other
principles. All reasoning assumes the existence of an objective truth which
is sought and therefore is assumed to have an independent reality of its
own. Every thinking person is conscious of his own identity and the
identity of his fellow beings from whom he accepts language and thoughts
and to whom he can communicate his own ideas and emotions. Besides,
all conceptual thought implies universality, i.e. belief in law and in
objective necessity. | can only infer from Socrates being a man that he is
mortal when | have assumed that the same thing (in this case man in so
far as he is man) in the same conditions will always necessarily behave in
the same way.
In his book Ghazali attacks the philosophers on twenty points. Except for
the last two points which are only slightly touched by Averroés, Averroés
follows point for point the arguments Ghazali uses and tries to refute them.
Ghazali’s book is badly constructed, it is unsystematic and repetitive. If
Ghazali had proceeded systematically he would have attacked first the
philosophical basis of the system of the philosophers-namely their proof
for the existence of God, since from God, the Highest Principle, everything
else is deduced. But the first problem Ghazali mentions is the philosphers’
proof for the eternity of the world. This is the problem which Ghazali
considers to be the most important and to which he allots the greatest
space, almost a quarter of his book. He starts by saying rather arbitrarily
that the philosophers have four arguments, but, in discussing them, he
mixes them up and the whole discussion is complicated by the fact that he
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gives the philosophical arguments and theological counter arguments in
such an involved way that the trend is sometimes hard to follow. He says,
for instance, page 3, that to the first arguments of the philosophers there
are two objections. The first objection he gives on this page, but the
second, after long controversy between the philosophers and theologians,
on page 32. | will not follow here Ghazali and Averroés point for point in
their discussions but will give rather the substance of their principal
arguments (for a detailed discussion | refer to my notes).
The theory of the eternity of the world is an Aristotelian one. Aristotle
was, as he says himself, the first thinker who affirmed that the world in
which we live, the universe as an orderly whole, a cosmos, is eternal. All
the philosophers before him believed that the world had come into being
either from some primitive matter or after a number of other worlds. At the
same time Aristotle believes in the finitude of causes. For him it is
impossible that movement should have started or can continue by itself.
There must be a principle from which all movement derives. Movement,
however, by itself is eternal. It seems to me that this whole conception is
untenable. If the world is eternal there will be an infinite series of causes
and an infinite series of movers; there will be an infinite series, for
instance, of fathers and sons, of birds and eggs (the example of the bird
and egg is first mentioned in ‘Censorinus, De die natali, where he
discusses the Peripatetic theory of the eternity of the world), and we will
never reach a first mover or cause, a first father or a first bird. Aristotle, in
fact, defends the two opposite theses of Kant’s first antinomy. He holds at
the same time that time and movement are infinite and that every causal
series must be finite. The contradiction in Aristotle is still further
accentuated in the Muslim philosophers by the fact that they see in God,
not only as Aristotle did, the First Mover of the movement of the universe,
but that they regard Him, under the influence of the Plotinian theory of
emanation, as the Creator of the universe from whom the world emanates
eternally. However, can the relation between two existing entities qua
existents be regarded as a causal one? Can there be a causal relation
between an eternally unchangeable God and an eternally revolving and
changing world, and is it sense to speak of a creation of that which exists
eternally? Besides, if the relation between the eternal God and the eternal
movement of the world could be regarded as a causal relation, no prior
movement could be considered the cause of a posterior movement, and
dil
sequences such as the eternal sequence of fathers and sons would not
form a causal series. God would not be a first cause but the Only Cause of
everything. It is the contradiction in the idea of an eternal creation which
forms the chief argument of Ghazali in this book. In a later chapter, for
instance, when he refutes Avicenna’s proof for God based on the
Aristotelian concepts ‘necessary by itself, i.e. logical necessity, and
‘necessary through another’, i.e. ontological necessity, in which there is
the usual Aristotelian confusion of the logical with the ontological,
Ghazali’s long argument can be reduced to the assertion that once the
possibility of an infinite series of causes is admitted, there is no sense in
positing a first cause.
The first argument is as follows. If the world had been created, there
must have been something determining its existence at the moment it was
created, for otherwise it would have remained in the state of pure
possibility it was in before. But if there was something determining its
existence, this determinant must have been determined by another
determinant and so on ad infinitum, or we must accept an eternal God in
whom eternally new determinations may arise. But there cannot be any
new determinations in an eternal God.
The argument in this form is found in Avicenna, but its elements are
Aristotelian. In Cicero’s Academics we have a fragment of one of
Aristotle's earlier and more popular writings, the lost dialogue De
philosophia, in which he says that it is impossible that the world could ever
have been generated. For how could there have been a new decision, that
is a new decision in the mind of God, for such a magnificent work? St.
Augustine knows this argument from Cicero and he too denies that God
could have a novum consilium. St. Augustine is well aware of the difficulty,
and he says in his De civilate dei that God has always existed, that after a
certain time, without having changed His will, He created man, whom He
had not wanted to create before, this is indeed a fact too profound for us.
It also belongs to Aristotle’s philosophy that in all change there is a
potentiality and all potentiality needs an actualizer which exists already. In
the form this argument has in Avicenna it is, however, taken from a book
by a late Greek Christian commentator of Aristotle, John Philoponus, De
aeternitate mundi, which was directed against a book by the great
Neoplatonist Proclus who had given eighteen arguments to prove the
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eternity of the world. Plato himself believed in the temporal creation of the
world not by God Himself but by a demiurge. But later followers of Plato
differed from him on this point. Amongst the post-Aristotelian schools only
the Stoics assumed a periodical generation and destruction of the world.
Theophrastus had already tried to refute some of the Stoic arguments for
this view, and it may well be that John Philoponus made use of some
Stoic sources for his defence of the temporality of the world.
The book by Proclus is lost, but John Philoponus, who as a Christian
believes in the creation of the world, gives, before refuting them, the
arguments given by Proclus. The book by Philoponus was translated into
Arabic and many of its arguments are reproduced in the Muslim
controversies about the problem (arguments for the temporal creation of
the world were also given by Philoponus in a work against Aristotle’s
theory of the eternity of the world, arguments which are known to us
through their quotation and refutation by Simplicius in his commentary on
Physics viii; one of these arguments by Philoponus was well known to the
Arabs and is also reproduced by Ghazali, see note 3. 3). The argument |
have mentioned is the third as given by Proclus. Philoponus’ book is
extremely important for all medieval philosophy, but it has never been
translated into a modern language and has never been properly studied.
On the whole the importance of the commentators of Aristotle for Arabic
and medieval philosophy in general has not yet been sufficiently
acknowledged.
To this argument Ghazali gives the following answer, which has become
the classic reply for this difficulty and which has been taken from
Philoponus. One must distinguish, says Philoponus, between God’s
eternally willing something and the eternity of the object of His Will, or, as
St. Thomas will say later, ‘Deus voluit ab aeterno mundus esset sed non
ut ab aeterno esset’. God willed, for instance, that Socrates should be
born before Plato and He willed this from eternity, so that when it was time
for Plato to be born it happened. It is not difficult for Averroés to refute this
argument. In willing and doing something there is more than just the
decision that you will do it. You can take the decision to get up tomorrow,
but the actual willing to get up can be done only at the moment you do it,
and there can be no delay between the cause and the effect. There must
be added to the decision to get up the impulse of the will to get up. So in
God there would have to be a new impulse, and it is just this newness that
has to be denied. But, says Averroés, the whole basis of this argument is
wrong for it assumes in God a will like a human will. Desire and will can be
understood only in a being that has a need; for the Perfect Being there
can be no need, there can be no choice, for when He acts He will
necessarily do the best. Will in God must have another meaning than
human will.
Averroés therefore does not explicitly deny that God has a will, but will
should not be taken in its human sense. He has much the same
conception as Plotinus, who denies that God has the power to do one of
two contraries (for God will necessarily always choose the best, which
implies that God necessarily will always do the best, but this in fact annuls
the ideas of choice and will), and who regards the world as produced by
natural necessity. Aristotle also held that for the Perfect Being no
voluntary action is possible, and he regards God as in an eternal blissful
state of self-contemplation. This would be a consequence of His
Perfection which, for Averroés at least, involves His Omniscience. For the
Perfect the drama of life is ended: nothing can be done any more, no
decision can be taken any more, for decisions belong to the condition of
man to whom both knowledge and ignorance are given and who can have
an hypothetical knowledge of the future, knowing that on his decisions the
future may depend and to whom a sure knowledge of the future is denied.
But an Omniscient Being can neither act nor decide; for Him the future is
irremediable like the past and cannot be changed any more by His
decisions or actions. Paradoxically the Omnipotent is impotent. This
notion of God as a Self-contemplating Being, however, constitutes one of
the many profound contradictions in Aristotle's system. And this profound
contradiction is also found in all the works of Aristotle’s commentators.
One of Aristotle's proofs for the existence of God-and according to a
recent pronouncement of the Pope, the most stringent -is the one based
on movement. There cannot be an infinite series of movers; there must be
a Prime Agent, a Prime Mover, God, the originator of all change and
action in the universe. According to the conception of God as a Self-
Contemplating Being, however, the love for God is the motive for the
circular motion of Heaven. God is not the ultimate Agent, God is the
ultimate Aim of desire which inspires the Heavens to action. It is Heaven
which moves itself and circles round out of love for God. And in this case
14
it is God who is passive; the impelling force, the efficient cause, the spring
of all action lies in the world, lies in the souls of the stars.
Let us now return to Ghazali. We have seen that his first argument is not
very convincing, but he now gives us another argument which the Muslim
theologians have taken from John Philoponus and which has more
strength. It runs: if you assume the world to have no beginning in time, at
any moment which we can imagine an infinite series must have been
ended. To give an example, every one of us is the effect of an infinite
series of causes; indeed, man is the finite junction of an infinite past and
an infinite future, the effect of an infinite series of causes, the cause of an
infinite series of effects. But an infinite series cannot be traversed. If you
stand near the bed of a river waiting for the water to arrive from an
infinitely distant source you will never see it arriving, for an infinite distance
cannot be passed. This is the argument given by Kant in the thesis of his
first antimony. The curious fact is that the wording in Kant is almost
identical with that of John Philoponus.
The answers Averroés gives are certainly not convincing. He repeats the
Aristotelian dictum that what has no beginning has no end and that
therefore there is never an end of time, and one can never say that at any
moment an infinite time is ended: an infinite time is never ended. But this
is begging the question and is surely not true, for there are certainly finite
times. He denies that an infinite time involves an infinite causal series and
the negation of a First Cause. The series involved is but a temporal
sequence, causal by accident, since it is God who is its essential cause.
Averroés also bases his answer on the Aristotelian theory that in time
there is only a succession. A simultaneous infinite whole is denied by
Aristotle and therefore, according to Aristotle, the world must be limited in
space; but in time, according to him, there is never a whole, since the past
is no longer existent and the future not yet.
But the philosophers have a convincing argument for the eternity of the
world. Suppose the world had a beginning, then before the world existed
there was empty time; but in an empty time, in pure emptiness, there
cannot be a motive for a beginning and there could be nothing that could
decide God to start His creation. This is Kant’s antithesis of his first
antinomy. It is very old and is given by Aristotle, but it is already found in
the pre-Socratic philosopher Parmenides. Ghazali’s answer is that God’s
io)
will is completely undetermined. His will does not depend on distinctions in
outside things, but He creates the distinctions Himself. The idea of God’s
creative will is of Stoic origin. According to the Neoplatonic conception
God’s knowledge is creative. We know because things are; things are
because God knows them. This idea of the creative knowledge of God has
a very great diffusion in philosophy (just as our bodies live by the eternal
spark of life transmitted to us by our ancestors, so we rekindle in our
minds the thoughts of those who are no more); it is found, for instance, in
St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Spinoza, and Kant-who calls it
intellektuelle Anschauung, intellectual intuition, and it is also used by the
Muslim philosophers when it suits them. Against Ghazali’s conception,
however, Averroés has the following argument: If God creates the world
arbitrarily, if His Will establishes the distinctions without being determined
by any reason, neither wisdom nor goodness can be attributed to Him. We
have here a difficulty the Greeks had seen already. Either God is beyond
the laws of thought and of morals and then He is neither good nor wise, or
He Himself stands under their dominion and then He is not omnipotent.
Another argument for the eternity of the world is based on the eternity of
time: God cannot have a priority to time, as the theologians affirm,
because priority implies time and time implies movement. For the
philosophers God’s priority to the world consists solely in His being its
simultaneous cause. Both parties, however, seem to hold that God’s
existence does not imply time, since He exists in timeless eternity. But in
this case, what neither of the parties has seen, no causal relation between
God and the world can exist at all, since all causation implies a
simultaneous time.
We come now to the most important argument which shows the basic
difference between the philosophical and theological systems. For
Aristotle the world cannot have come to be because there is no absolute
becoming. Everything that becomes comes from something. And, as a
matter of fact, we all believe this. We all believe more or less
unconsciously (we are not fully aware of our basic principles: a basement
is always obscure) in the dictum rien ne se crée, rien ne se perd. We
believe that everything that comes to be is but a development, an
evolution, without being too clear about the meaning of these words
(evolution means literally ‘unrolling’, and Cicero says that the procession
16
of events out of time is like the uncoiling of a rope-quas/ rudentis
explicatio), and we believe that the plant lies in the seed, the future in the
present. For example: when a child is born we believe it to have certain
dispositions; it may have a disposition to become a musician, and when all
the conditions are favourable it will become a musician. Now, according to
Aristotle, becoming is nothing but the actualization of a potentiality, that is
the becoming actual of a disposition. However, there is a difficulty here. It
belongs to one of the little ironies of the history of philosophy that
Aristotle’s philosophy is based on a concept, i.e. potentiality, that has been
excluded by a law that he was the first to express consciously. For
Aristotle is the first to have stated as the supreme law of thought (or is it a
law of reality?) that there is no intermediary between being and non-being.
But the potential, i.e. the objective possible, is such an intermediary; it is
namely something which is, still is not yet. Already the Eleatics had
declared that there is no becoming, either a thing is or it is not. If it is, it
need not become. If it is not-out of nothing nothing becomes. Besides,
there is another difficulty which the Megarians have shown.
You say that your child has a disposition to become a musician, that he
can become a musician, but if he dies as a child, or when conditions are
unfavourable, he cannot become a musician. He can only become one
when all the conditions for his being a musician are fulfilled. But in that
case it is not possibly that he will be a musician, necessarily he will be
one. There is in fact no possibility of his being a musician before he
actually is one. There is therefore no potentiality in nature and no
becoming of things out of potencies. Things are or are not. This Megarian
denial of potentiality has been taken over by the Ash‘arites, and Ghazali in
this book is on the whole, although not consistently, in agreement with
them. | myself regard this problem as one of the cruces of philosophy. The
Ash‘arites and Ghazali believed, as the Megarians did, that things do not
become and that the future does not lie in the present; every event that
occurs is new and unconnected with its predecessor. The theologians
believed that the world is not an independent universe, a self-subsistent
system, that develops by itself, has its own laws, and can be understood
by itself. They transferred the mystery of becoming to the mystery of God,
who is the cause of all change in the world, and who at every moment
creates the world anew. Things are or are not. God creates them and
annihilates them, but they do not become out of each other, there is no
UTE
passage between being and non-being. Nor is there movement, since a
thing that moves is neither here nor there, since it moves-what we call
movement is being at rest at different space-atoms at different time-atoms.
It is the denial of potentiality, possibility in rerum natura, that Ghazali uses
to refute the Aristotelian idea of an eternal matter in which the
potentialities are found of everything that can or will happen. For,
according to Aristotle, matter must be eternal and cannot have become,
since it is, itself, the condition for all becoming.
It maybe mentioned here that the modern static theory of movement is
akin to the Megarian-Ash‘arite doctrine of the denial of movement and
becoming. Bertrand Russell, for instance, although he does not accept the
Megarian atomic conception, but holds with Aristotle that movement and
rest take place in time, not in the instant, defines movement as being at
different places at different times. At the same time, although he rejects
the Megarian conception of ‘jumps’, he affirms that the moving body
always passes from one position to another by gradual transition. But
‘passing’ implies, just as much as ‘jumping’, something more than mere
being, namely, the movement which both theories deny and the identity of
the moving body.
On the idea of possibility another argument for the eternity of the world is
based. It is affirmed that if the world had been created an infinite number
of possibilities of its creation, that is, an eternal duration of its possibility,
would have preceded it. But nothing possible can be eternal, since
everything possible must be realized. The idea that everything possible
has to be realized is found in Aristotle himself, who says that if there could
be an eternal possible that were not realized, it would be impossible, not
possible, since the impossible is that which will never be realized. Aristotle
does not see that this definition is contrary to the basic idea of his own
philosophy-the reality of a possibility which may or may not become real-
and that by declaring that the possible will have to happen he reduces it to
a necessity, and by admitting that everything that happens had to happen
he denies that the possibility of its not happening could precede it, i.e. he
accepts, in fact, the Megarian conception of possibility which he himself
had tried to refute. Averroés, who agrees with his master on this point, is
not aware either of the implication of the definition. On the other hand, the
Ash‘arites, notwithstanding their denial of potentiality, maintain that for
18
God everything is possible, a theory which implies objective possibility (the
same inconsistency was committed by the Stoics). Both philosophers and
theologians, indeed, hold about this difficult problem contradictory
theories, and it is therefore not astonishing that Ghazali’s and Averroés’
discussion about it is full of confusion (for the details | refer to my notes).
In the second chapter Ghazali treats the problem of the incorruptibility of
the world. As Ghazali says himself; the problem of the incorruptibility of
the world is essentially the same as that of its being uncreated and the
same arguments can be brought forward. Still, there is less opposition
amongst the theologians about its incorruptibility than about its being
uncreated. Some of the Mu'tazilites argued, just as Thomas Aquinas was
to do later, that we can only know through the Divine Law that this world of
ours will end and there is no rational proof for its annihilation. Just as a
series of numbers needs a first term but no final term, the beginning of the
world does not imply its end. However, the orthodox view is that the
annihilation of the world, including Heaven and Hell, is in God’s power,
although this will not happen. Still, in the corruptibility of the world there is
a new difficulty for the theologians. If God destroys the world He causes
‘nothingness’, that is, His act is related to ‘nothing’. But can an act be
related to ‘nothing’? The question as it is posed seems to rest on a
confusion between action and effect but its deeper sense would be to
establish the nature of God’s action and the process by which His creative
and annihilating power exercises itself. As there cannot be any analogy
with the physical process through which our human will performs its
function, the mystery of His creative and annihilating action cannot be
solved and the naive answers the theologians give satisfy neither
Averroés nor Ghazali himself. Averroés argues that there is no essential
difference between production and destruction and, in agreement with
Aristotle, he affirms that there are three principles for them: form, matter,
and privation. When a thing becomes, its form arises and its privation
disappears; when it is destroyed its privation arises and its form
disappears, but the substratum of this process, matter, remains eternally. |
have criticized this theory in my notes and will only mention here that for
Aristotle and Averroés this process of production and destruction is
eternal, circular, and reversible. Things, however, do not revolve in an
eternal cycle, nor is there an eternal return as the Stoics and Nietzsche
held. Inexorably the past is gone. Every ‘now’ is new. Every flower in the
ue)
field has never been, the up-torn trees are not rooted again. ‘Thou’ll come
no more, Never, never, never, never, never!’ Besides, Averroés, holding
as he does that the world is eternally produced out of nothing, is
inconsistent in regarding with Aristotle production and destruction as
correlatives.
In the third chapter Ghazali maintains that the terms acting and agent
are falsely applied to God by the philosophers. Acting, according to him,
can be said only of a person having will and choice. When you say that
fire burns, there is here a causal relation, if you like, but this implies
nothing but a sequence in time, just as Hume will affirm later. So when the
philosophers say that God’s acting is like the fire’s burning or the sun’s
heating, since God acts by natural necessity, they deny, according to
Ghazali, His action altogether. Real causation can only be affirmed of a
willing Conscious being. The interesting point in this discussion is that,
according to the Ash‘arites and Ghazali, there is no causation in this world
at all, there is only one extra-mundane cause which is God. Even our acts
which depend on our will and choice are not, according to the Ash‘arites,
truly performed by ourselves. We are only the instruments, and the real
agent is God. But if this is true, how can we say that action and causation
depend on will and choice? How can we come to the idea of any causal
action in God depending on His Will if we deny generally that there is a
causal relation between will and action? The same contradiction is found
in modern philosophy in Mach. Mach holds that to speak of causation or
action in material things-so to say that fire burns-is a kind of fetishism or
animism, i.e. that we project our will and our actions into physical lifeless
things. However, at the same time he, as a follower of Hume, says that
causation, even in acts caused by will, is nothing but a temporal sequence
of events. He denies causation even in voluntary actions. Therefore it
would follow that the relation of willing and acting is not different from the
relation of fire and burning and that there cannot be any question of
fetishism or animism. According to such a theory there is no action at all in
the universe but only a sequence of events.
Then, after a second argument by which Ghazali sets out to show that
an eternal production and creation are contradictions in terms, since
production and creation imply the generation of something after its non-
existence, he directs a third argument against the Neoplatonic theory, held
20
by the philosophers, of the emanation of the world from God’s absolute
Oneness.
Plotinus’ conception of God is prompted by the problem of plurality and
relation. All duality implies a relation, and every relation establishes a new
unity which is not the simple addition of its terms (since every whole is
more than its parts) and violates therefore the supreme law of thought that
a thing is what it is and nothing else. Just as the line is more than its
points, the stone more than its elements, the organism transcending its
members, man, notwithstanding the plurality of his faculties, an identical
personality, so the world is an organized well-ordered system surpassing
the multitude of the unities it encloses. According to Plotinus the Force
binding the plurality into unity and the plurality of unities into the all-
containing unit of the Universe is the Archetype of unity, the ultimate,
primordial Monad, God, unattainable in His supreme Simplicity even for
thought. For all thought is relational, knitting together in the undefinable
unity of a judgement a subject and a predicate. But in God’s absolute and
highest Unity there is no plurality that can be joined, since all joining needs
a superior joining unit. Thus God must be the One and the Lone, having
no attribute, no genus, no species, no universal that He can share with
any creatures of the world. Even existence can be only referred to Him
when it expresses not an attribute, but His very Essence. But then there is
no bridge leading from the stable stillness of His Unity to the changing and
varied multiplicity of the world; all relation between Him and the world is
severed. If the One is the truly rational, God’s rationality can be obtained
only by regarding His relation to the world as irrational, and all statements
about Him will be inconsistent with the initial thesis. And if God is
unattainable for thought, the very affirmation of this will be self-
contradictory.
Now, the philosophers in Islam hold with Plotinus that although
absolutely positive statements are not admissible about God, the positive
statements made by them can be all reduced to negative affirmations (with
the sole exception, according to Averroés, of His possessing intellect) and
to certain relative statements, for neither negations nor external relations
add anything to His essence.
In this and several following chapters Ghazali attacks the philosophers
from two sides: by showing up the inanity of the Plotinian conception of
21
God as pure unity, and by exposing their inconsistency in attributing to
Him definite qualities and regarding Him as the source of the world of
variety and plurality.
The infinite variety and plurality of the world does not derive directly from
God according to the philosophers in Islam, who combine Aristotle’s
astronomical view of animate planets circling round in their spheres with
the Neoplatonic theory of emanation, and introduce into the Aristotelian
framework Proclus’ conception of a triadic process, but through a series of
immaterial mediators. From God’s single act-for they with Aristotle regard
God as the First Agent-only a single effect follows, but this single effect,
the supramundane Intellect, develops in itself a threefoldness through
which it can exercise a threefold action. Ghazali objects in a long
discussion that if God’s eternal action is unique and constant, only one
single effect in which no plurality can be admitted will follow (a similar
objection can be directed against Aristotle, who cannot explain how the
plurality and variety of transitory movements can follow from one single
constant movement). The plurality of the world according to Ghazali
cannot be explained through a series of mediators. Averroés, who
sometimes does not seem very sure of the validity of mediate emanation,
is rather evasive in his answer on this point.
In a series of rather intricate discussions which | have tried to elucidate
in my notes, Ghazali endeavours to show that the proofs of the
philosophers for God’s uniqueness, for their denial of His attributes, for
their claims that nothing can share with Him His genus and species, that
He is pure existence which stands in no relation to an essence, and that
He is incorporeal, are all vain. The leading idea of the philosophers that
all plurality needs a prior joining principle, Ghazali rejects, while Averroés
defends it. Why-so Ghazali asks, for instance-since the essence in
temporal things is not the cause of their existence, should this not be the
case in the Eternal? Or why should body, although it is composite
according to the philosophers, not be the First Cause, especially as they
assume an eternal body, since it is not impossible to suppose a
compound without a composing principle? From the incorporeality of God,
the First Principle, Avicenna had tried to infer, through the disjunction that
everything is either matter or intellect, that He is intellect (since the
philosophers in Islam hold with Aristotle and in opposition to Plotinus that
22
God possesses _ self-consciousness). Ghazali does not admit this
disjunction and, besides, argues with Plotinus that self-consciousness
implies a subject and an object, and therefore would impede the
philosophers’ thesis of God’s absolute unity.
The Muslim philosophers, following Aristotle's | Neoplatonic
commentators, affirm that God’s self-knowledge implies His knowledge of
all universals (a line of thought followed, for instance, by Thomas Aquinas
and some moderns like Brentano). In man this knowledge forms a
plurality, in God it is unified. Avicenna subscribes to the Quranic words
that no particle in Heaven or Earth escapes God’s knowledge, but he
holds, as Porphyry had done before, that God can know the particular
things only in a universal way, whatever this means. Ghazali takes it to
mean that God, according to Avicenna, must be ignorant of individuals, a
most heretical theory. For Averroés God’s knowledge is neither universal
nor particular, but transcending both, in a way unintelligible to the human
mind.
One thing, however, God cannot know according to Avicenna (and he
agrees here with Plato’s Parmenides) and that is the passing of time, for in
the Eternal no relation is possible to the fleeting ‘now. There are two
aspects of time: the sequence of anteriority and posteriority which remains
fixed for ever, and the eternal flow of the future through the present into
the past. It will be eternally true that | was healthy before | sickened and
God can know its eternal truth. But in God’s timeless eternity there can be
no ‘now’ simultaneous with the trembling present in which we humans live
and change and die, there is no ‘now in God's eternity in which He can
know that | am sickening now. In God’s eternal stillness the fleeting facts
and truths of human experience can find no rest. Ghazali objects,
erroneously, | think, that a change in the object of thought need not imply
a change in the subject of consciousness.
In another chapter Ghazali refutes the philosophers’ proof that Heaven is
animated. He does not deny its possibility, but declares that the
arguments given are insufficient. He discusses also the view that the
heavens move out of love for God and out of desire to assimilate
themselves to Him, and he asks the pertinent question-already posed by
Theophrastus in his Metaphysics, but which scandalizes Averroés by its
prosaicness-why it is meritorious for them to circle round eternally and
23
whether eternal rest would not be more appropriate for them in their desire
to assimilate themselves to God’s eternal stability.
In the last chapter of this part Ghazali examines the philosophers’
symbolical interpretation of the Qur’anic entities ‘The Pen’ and ‘The Tablet’
and their theories about dreams and prophecy. It is interesting to note
that, although he refutes them here, he largely adopts them in his own
Vivification of Theology. [?]
In the last part of his book Ghazali treats the natural sciences. He
enumerates them and declares that there is no objection to them
according to religion except on four points. The first is that there exists a
logical nexus between cause and effect; the second, the selfsubsistent
spirituality of the soul; the third, the immortality of this subsistent soul; the
fourth, the denial of bodily resurrection. The first, that there exists between
cause and effect a logical necessity, has to be contested according to
Ghazali, because by denying it the possibility of miracles can be
maintained. The philosophers do not deny absolutely the possibility of
miracles. Muhammad himself did not claim to perform any miracles and
Hugo Grotius tried to prove the superiority of Christianity over Islam by
saying ‘Mahumetis se missum ait non cum miraculis sed cum armis’. In
later times, however, Muhammad's followers ascribed to him the most
fantastic miracles, for instance the cleavage of the moon and his
ascension to Heaven. These extravagant miracles are not accepted by the
philosophers. Their theory of the possibility of miracles is based on the
Stoic-Neoplatonic theory of ‘Sympathia’, which is that all parts of the world
are in intimate contact and related. In a little treatise of Plutarch it is shown
how bodily phenomena are influenced by suggestion, by emotion and
emotional states, and it is claimed by him, and later also by Plotinus, that
the emotions one experiences cannot only influence one’s own body but
also other bodies, and that one’s soul can exercise an influence on other
bodies without the intermediary of any bodily action. The phenomena of
telepathy, for instance the fascination which a snake has on other animals,
they explained in this way. Amulets and talismans can receive through
psychological influences certain powers which can be realized later. This
explanation of occult phenomena, which is found in Avicenna’s
Psychology, a book translated in the Middle Ages, has been widely
accepted (for instance, by Ghazali himself in his Vivification of Theology),
24
and is found in Thomas Aquinas and most of the writers about the occult
in the Renaissance, for instance Heinricus Cornelius Agrippa, Paracelsus,
and Cardanus. It may be mentioned here that Avicenna gives as an
example of the power of suggestion that a man will go calmly over a .plank
when it is on the ground, whereas he will hesitate if the plank be across an
abyss. This famous example is found in Pascal's Pensées, and the well-
known modern healer, Coué, takes it as his chief proof for the power of
suggestion. Pascal has taken it from Montaigne, Montaigne has borrowed
it from his contemporary the great doctor Pietro Bairo, who himself has a
lengthy quotation from the Psychology of Avicenna. Robert Burton in his
Anatomy of Melancholy also mentions it. In the Middle Ages this example
is found in Thomas Aquinas. Now the philosophers limit the possibility of
miracles only to those that can be explained by the power of the mind over
physical objects; for instance, they would regard it as possible that a
prophet might cause rain to fall or an earthquake to take place, but they
refuse to accept the more extravagant miracles | have mentioned as
authentic.
The theologians, however, base their theory of miracles on a denial of
natural law. The Megarian-Ash‘arite denial of potentiality already implies
the denial of natural law. According to this conception there is neither
necessity nor possibility in rerum natura, they are or they are not, there is
no nexus between the phenomena. But the Greek Sceptics also deny the
rational relation between cause and effect, and it is this Greek Sceptical
theory which the Ash‘arites have copied, as we can see by their examples.
The theory that there is no necessary relation between cause and effect is
found, for instance, in Galen. Fire burns but there is, according to the
Greek Sceptics, no necessary relation between fire and burning. Through
seeing this happen many times we assume that it will happen also in the
future, but there is no necessity, no absolute certainty. This Sceptical
theory is quasi-identical with the theory of Hume and is based on the
same assumptions, that all knowledge is given through sense-impression;
and since the idea of causation cannot be derived from sense experience
it is denied altogether. According to the theory of the theologians, God
who creates and re-creates the universe continually follows a certain habit
in His creation. But He can do anything He desires, everything is possible
for Him except the logically impossible; therefore all logically possible
miracles are allowed. One might say that, for the theologians, all nature is
25
miraculous and all miracles are natural. Averroés asks a good question:
What is really meant by habit, is it a habit in man or in nature? | do not
know how Hume would answer this question. For if causation is a habit in
man, what makes it possible that such a habit can be formed? What is the
objective counterpart of these habits? There is another question which has
been asked by the Greek opponents of this theory, but which is not
mentioned by Averroés: How many times must such a sequence be
observed before such a habit can be formed? There is yet another
question that might be asked: Since we cannot act before such a habit is
formed-for action implies causation-what are we doing until then? What,
even, is the meaning of ‘I act’ and ‘I do’? If there is nothing in the world but
a sequence of events, the very word ‘activity’ will have no sense, and it
would seem that we would be doomed to an eternal passivity. Averroés’
answer to this denial of natural law is that universals themselves imply
already the idea of necessity and law. | think this answer is correct. When
we speak, for instance, of wood or stone, we express by those words an
hypothetical necessity, that is, we mean a certain object, which in such-
and-such circumstances will necessarily behave in a certain way that the
behaviour of wood, for example, is based on its nature, that is, on the
potentialities it has.
| may remark here that it seems to me probable that Nicholas of
Autrecourt, ‘the medieval Hume’, was influenced by Ghazali’s Ash‘arite
theories. He denies in the same way as Ghazali the logical connexion
between cause and effect: ‘ex eo quod aliqua res est cognita esse, non
potest evidenter evidentia reducta in primum principium vel in certitudinem
primi principii inferri, quod alia res sit’ (cf. Lappe, ‘Nicolaus von
Autrecourt’, Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. M. B.vi, H.2, p. 11); he gives the
same example of ignis and stupa, he seems to hold also the Ash‘arite
thesis of God as the sole cause of all action (cf. op. cit., p. 24), and he
quotes in one place Ghazali’s Metaphysics (cf. N. of Autrecourt, ‘Exigit
ordo executionis’, in Mediaeval Studies, vol. i, ed. by J. Reginald
O'Donnell, Toronto, 1931, p. 208). Now Nicholas’s works were burnt
during his lifetime in Paris in 1347, whereas the Latin translation of the
Tahatut al Tahafut by Calo Calonymus was terminated in Arles in 1328.
The second point Ghazali wants to refute are the proofs for the
substantiality and the spirituality of the soul as given by the philosophers.
26
He himself does not affirm that the soul is material, and as a matter of fact
he holds, in other books, the contrary opinion, but the Ash‘arites largely
adopted the Stoic materialism. The ten arguments of the philosophers for
the spirituality of the soul derive all from arguments given by the Greeks. It
would seem to me that Ghazali’s arguments for the soul’s materiality may
be based on the Stoic answers (which have not come down to us) against
the proofs of Aristotle and the later Platonists for the immateriality of the
soul. There is in the whole discussion a certain confusion, partly based on
the ambiguity of the word ‘soul’. The term ‘soul’ both in Greek and Arabic
can also mean ‘life’. Plants and animals have a ‘soul’. However, it is not
affirmed by Aristotle that life in plants and animals is a spiritual principle.
‘Soul’ is also used for the rational part, the thinking part, of our
consciousness. It is only this thinking part, according to Aristotle, that is
not related to or bound up with matter; sensation and imagination are
localized in the body, and it is only part of our thinking soul that seems to
possess eternity or to be immortal. Now, most of the ten arguments derive
from Aristotle and mean only to prove that the thinking part of our soul is
incorporeal. Still the Muslim philosophers affirm with Plato and Plotinus
that the whole soul is spiritual and incorruptible, and that the soul is a
substance independent of the body, although at the same time they adopt
Aristotle’s physiological explanations of all the non-rational functions of the
soul and accept Aristotle’s definition of the ‘soul’ as the first entelechy of
an organic body. On the other hand, the Muslim philosophers do not admit
the Platonic theory of the pre-existence of the soul. Aristotle’s conception
of a material and transitory element in the soul and an immaterial and
immortal element destroys all possibility of considering human personality
as a unity. Although he reproaches Plato with regarding the human soul
as a plurality, the same reproach can be applied to himself. Neither the
Greek nor the Muslim philosophers have ever been able to uphold a
theory that does justice to the individuality of the human personality. That
it is my undefinable ego that perceives, represents, wills, and thinks, the
mysterious fact of the uniqueness of my personality, has never been
apprehended by them. It is true that there is in Aristotle’s psychology a
faint conception of a functional theory of our conscious life, but he is
unable to harmonize this with his psycho-physiological notions.
| have discussed in my notes the ten arguments and will mention here
only two because of their importance. Ghazali gives one of these
(Ay
arguments in the following form: How can man’s identity be attributed to
body with all its accidents? For bodies are continually in dissolution and
nutrition replaces what is dissolved, so that when we see a child, after
separation from its mother’s womb, fall ill a few times, become thin and
then fat again, and grow up, we may safely say that after forty years no
particle remains of what there was when its mother was delivered of it.
Indeed, the child began its existence out of parts of the sperm alone, but
nothing of the particles of the sperm remains in it; no, all this is dissolved
and has changed into something else and then this body has become
another. Still we say that the identical man remains and his notions remain
with him from the beginning of his youth although all bodily parts have
changed, and this shows that the soul has an existence outside the body
and that the body is its organ. Now the first part of this argument, that all
things are in a state of flux and that of the bodily life of man no part
remains identical, is textually found in Montaigne’s Apologv of Raymond
de Sebond. Montaigne has taken it from Plutarch, and the Arabic
philosophers may have borrowed it from the same source from which
Plutarch has taken it. The argument of the philosophers that matter is
evanescent, but the soul a stable identity, which is also given by the
Christian philosopher Nemesius in his De natura hominis (a book
translated into Arabic), who ascribes it to Ammonius Saccas and
Numenius, is basically Platonic and Neoplatonic, and strangely enough,
although he refutes it here, it is adduced by Ghazali himself in his
Vivification of Theology. Socrates says in the Platonic dialogue Cratylus:
‘Can we truly say that there is knowledge, Cratylus, if all things are
continually changing and nothing remains? For knowledge cannot
continue unless it remains and keeps its identity. But if knowledge
changes its very essence, it will lose at once its identity and there will be
no knowledge.’ Plotinus (Enn. iv. 7. 3) argues that matter, in its continual
changing, cannot explain the identity of the soul. And he says in a
beautiful passage (Enn. iv. 7. 10) the idea of which Avicenna has copied:
‘One should contemplate the nature of everything in its purity, since
what is added is ever an obstacle to its knowledge. Contemplate
therefore the soul in its abstraction or rather let him who makes this
abstraction contemplate himself in this state and he will know that he
28
is immortal when he will see in himself the purity of the intellect, for he
will see his intellect contemplate nothing sensible, nothing mortal, but
apprehending the eternal through the eternal.’
This passage bears some relation to Descartes’s dictum cogito ergo
sum, but whereas Plotinus affirms the self-consciousness of a stable
identity, Descartes states only that every thought has a subject, an ego.
Neither the one, nor the other shows that this subject is my ego in the
sense of my undefinable unique personality, my awareness who | am: that
| am, for instance, John and not Peter, my consciousness of the continuity
of my identity from birth to death, my knowledge that at the same time |
am master and slave of an identical body, whatever the changes may be
in that body, and that as long as | live | am a unique and an identical
whole of body and soul. Plautus’ Sosia, who was not a philosopher,
expresses himself (Amphitruo, line 447) in almost the same way as
Descartes-‘sed quom cogito, equidem certo idem sum qui fui semper’-but
the introduction of the words semper and idem renders the statement
fallacious; from mere consciousness the lasting identity of my personality
cannot be inferred.
Ghazali answers this point by saying that animals and plants also,
notwithstanding that their matter is continually changing, preserve their
identity, although nobody believes that this identity is based on a spiritual
principle. Averroés regards this objection as justified.
The second argument is based on the theory of universals. Since
thought apprehends universals which are not in a particular place and
have no individuality, they cannot be material, since everything material is
individual and is in space. Against this theory of universals Ghazali
develops, under Stoic influence, his nominalistic theory which is probably
the theory held by the Ash‘arites in general. This theory is quasi-identical
with Berkeley's nominalistic conception and springs from the same
assumption that thinking is nothing but the having of images. By a strange
coincidence both Ghazali and Berkeley give the example of a hand: when
we have an idea of a hand as a universal, what really happens is that we
have a representation of a particular hand, since there are no universals.
But this particular hand is capable of representing for us any possible
zg
hand, just as much a big black hand as a small white one. The fallacy of
the theory lies, of course, in the word ‘representing’, which as a matter of
fact assumes what it tended to deny, namely, that we can think of a hand
in general which has neither a particular shape, nor a particular colour, nor
is localized in space.
The next point Ghazali tries to refute is the argument of the philosophers
for the immortality of the soul. According to the philosophers, the fact that
it is a substance independent of a body and is immaterial shows that a
corruption of the body cannot affect it. This, as a matter of fact, is a truism,
since the meaning of substantiality and immateriality for the philosophers
implies already the idea of eternity. On the other hand, if the soul is the
form of the body, as is also affirmed by them, it can only exist with its
matter and the mortality of its body would imply its own mortality, as
Ghazali rightly points out. The Arabic philosophers through their
combination of Platonism and Aristotelianism hold, indeed, at the same
time three theories inconsistent with each other, about the relation of body
and soul: that the soul is the form of the body, that the soul is a substance,
subsistent by itself and immortal, and that the soul after death takes a
pneumatic body (a theory already found in Porphyry). Besides, their denial
of the Platonic idea of pre-existence of the soul vitiates their statement
that the soul is a substance, subsistent by itself, that is, eternal,
ungenerated, and incorruptible. Although Averroés in his whole book tries
to come as near to the Aristotelian conception of the soul as possible, in
this chapter he seems to adopt the eschatology of the late Greek authors.
He allows to the souls of the dead a pneumatic body and believes that
they exist somewhere in the sphere of the moon. He also accepts the
theory of the Djinn, the equivalent of the Greek Daimones. What he
rejects, and what the philosophers generally reject, is the resurrection of
the flesh.
In his last chapter Averroés summarizes his views about religion. There
are three possible views. A Sceptical view that religion is opium for the
people, held by certain Greek rationalists; the view that religion expresses
Absolute Truth; and the intermediate view, held by Averroés, that the
religious conceptions are the symbols of a higher philosophical truth,
symbols which have to be taken for reality itself by the non-philosophers.
30
For the unphilosophical, however, they are binding, since the sanctity of
the State depends on them.
When we have read the long discussions between the philosophers and
theologians we may come to the conclusion that it is sometimes more the
formula than the essence of things which divides them. Both philosophers
and theologians Arm that God creates or has created the world. For the
philosophers, since the world is eternal, this creation is eternal. Is there,
however, any sense in calling created what has been eternally? For the
theologians God is the creator of everything including time, but does not
the term ‘creation’ assume already the concept of time? Both the
philosophers and theologians apply to God the theory that His will and
knowledge differ from human will and knowledge in that they are creative
principles and essentially beyond understanding; both admit that the
Divine cannot be measured by the standards of man. But this, in fact,
implies an avowal of our complete ignorance in face of the Mystery of
God. Still, for both parties God is the supreme Artifex who in His wisdom
has chosen the best of all possible worlds; for although the philosophers
affirm also that God acts only by natural necessity, their system, like that
of their predecessors, the Platonists, Peripatetics, and Stoics, is
essentially teleological. As to the problem of possibility, both parties
commit the same inconsistencies and hold sometimes that the world
could, sometimes that it could not, have been different from what it is.
Finally, both parties believe in God’s ultimate Unity.
And if one studies the other works of Ghazali the resemblance between
him and the philosophers becomes still greater. For instance, he too
believes in the spirituality of the soul, notwithstanding the arguments he
gives against it in this book; he too sometimes regards religious concepts
as the symbols of a higher philosophical or mystical truth, although he
admits here only a literal interpretation. He too sometimes teaches the
fundamental theory of the philosophers which he tries to refute so
insistently in our book, the theory that from the one supreme Agent as the
ultimate source through intermediaries all things derive; and he himself
expresses this idea (in his Alchemy of Happiness and slightly differently in
his Vivification of Theology) by the charming simile of an ant which seeing
black tracings on a sheet of paper thinks that their cause is the pen, while
it is the hand that moves the pen by the power of the will which derives
31
from the heart, itself inspired by the spiritual agent, the cause of causes.
The resemblances between Ghazali and Averroés, men belonging to the
same culture, indeed, the greatest men in this culture, seem sometimes
greater than their differences.
Emotionally the difference goes deep. Averroés is a philosopher and a
proud believer in the possibility of reason to achieve a knowledge of ‘was
das Innere der Welt zusammenhalt’. He was not always too sure, he knew
too much, and there is much wavering and hesitation in his ideas. Still, his
faith in reason remains unshaken. Although he does not subscribe to the
lofty words of his master that man because of the power of his intellect is a
mortal God, he reproaches the theologians for having made God an
immortal man. God, for him, is a dehumanized principle. But if God has to
respond to the needs of man’s heart, can He be exempt from humanity?
Ghazali is a mu’min, that is a believer, he is a Muslim, that is he accepts
his heart submits to a truth his reason cannot establish, for his heart has
reasons his reason does not know. His theology is the philosophy of the
heart in which there is expressed man’s fear and loneliness and his feeling
of dependence on an understanding and loving Being to whom he can cry
out from the depths of his despair, and whose mercy is infinite. It is not so
much after abstract truth that Ghazali strives; his search is for God, for the
Pity behind the clouds.
SIMON VAN DEN BERGH
IN THE NAME OF THE MERCIFUL AND COMPASSIONATE
GOD: AND AFTER PRAISE TO GOD AND BENEDICTION UPON ALL
HIS MESSENGERS AND PROPHETS:
The aim of this book is to show the different degrees of assent and
conviction attained by the assertions in The Incoherence of the
Philosophers, and to prove that the greater part has not reached the
degree of evidence and of truth.
THE FIRST DISCUSSION
32
Concerning the Eternity of the World
Ghazali, speaking of the philosophers’ proofs for the eternity of the world,
says:
Let us restrict ourselves in this chapter to those proofs
that make an impression on the mind.
This chapter contains four proofs.
THE FIRST PROOF
The philosophers say: It is impossible that the temporal
should proceed from the absolutely Eternal. For it is clear if
we assume the Eternal existing without, for instance, the
world proceeding from Him, then, at a certain moment, the
world beginning to proceed from Him-that it did not proceed
before, because there was no determining principle for its
existence, but its existence was pure possibility. When the
world begins in time, a new determinant either does or does
not arise. If it does not, the world will stay in the same state
of pure possibility as before; if a new determinant does arise,
the same question can be asked about this new determinant,
why it determines now, and not before, and either we shall
have an infinite regress or we shall arrive at a principle
determining eternally.
| say: This argument is in the highest degree dialectical and does _ not
reach the pitch of demonstrative proof. For its premisses are common
notions, and common notions approach the equivocal, whereas
demonstrative premisses are concerned with things proper to the same
genus.
For the term ‘possible’ is used in an equivocal way of the possible that
happens more often than not, of the possible that happens less often than
33
not, and of the possible with equal chances of happening, and these three
types of the possible do not seem to have the same need for a new
determining principle. For the possible that happens more often than not is
frequently believed to have its determining principle in itself, not outside,
as is the case with the possible which has equal chances of happening
and not happening. Further, the possible resides sometimes in the agent,
i.e. the possibility of acting, and sometimes in the patient, i.e. the
possibility of receiving, and it does not seem that the necessity for a
determining principle is the same in both cases. For it is well known that
the possible in the patient needs a new determinant from the outside; this
can be perceived by the senses in artificial things and in many natural
things too, although in regard to natural things there is a doubt, for in most
natural things the principle of their change forms part of them. Therefore it
is believed of many natural things that they move themselves, and it is by
no means self-evident that everything that is moved has a mover and that
there is nothing that moves itself.; But all this needs to be examined, and
the old philosophers have therefore done so. As concerns the possible in
the agent, however, in many cases it is believed that it can be actualized
without an external principle, for the transition in the agent from inactivity
to activity is often regarded as not being a change which requires a
principle; e.g. the transition in the geometer from non-geometrizing to
geometrizing, or in the teacher from non-teaching to teaching.
Further, those changes which are regarded as needing a principle of
change can sometimes be changes in substance, sometimes in quality, or
in quantity, or in place.
In addition, ‘eternal’ is predicated by many of the eternal-by-itself and
the eternal-through-another. According to some, it is permissible to admit
certain changes in the Eternal, for instance a new volition in the Eternal,
according to the Karramites, and the possibility of generation and
corruption which the ancients attribute to primary matter, although it is
eternal. Equally, new concepts are admitted in the possible intellect
although, according to most authors, it is eternal. But there are also
changes which are inadmissible, especially according to certain ancients,
though not according to others.
Then there is the agent who acts of his will and the agent which acts by
nature, and the manner of actualization of the possible act is not the same
34
for both agents, i.e. so far as the need for a new determinant is
concerned. Further, is this division into two agents complete, or does
demonstration lead to an agent which resembles neither the natural agent
nor the voluntary agent of human experience?
All these are multifarious and difficult questions which need, each of
them, a special examination, both in themselves and in regard to the
opinions the ancients held about them. To treat what is in reality a plurality
of questions as one problem is one of the well known seven sophisms,
and a mistake in one of these principles becomes a great error by the end
of the examination of reality.
Ghazali says:
There are two objections to this. The first objection is to
say: why do you deny the theory of those who say that the
world has been created by an eternal will which has decreed
its existence in the time in which it exists; that its non-
existence lasts until the moment it ceases and that its
existence begins from the moment it begins; that its
existence was not willed before and therefore did not
happen, and that at the exact moment it began it was willed
by an eternal will and therefore began? What is the objection
to this theory and what is absurd in it?
| say:
This argument is sophistical: although it is not allowable for him to admit
the possibility of the actual effect being delayed after the actual cause,
and in a voluntary agent, after the decision to act, he regards it as possible
that the effect should be delayed after the will of the agent. It is possible
that the effect should be delayed after the will of the agent, but its being
delayed after the actual cause is impossible, and equally impossible is its
being delayed after a voluntary agent’s decision to act. The difficulty is
thus unchanged, for he must of necessity draw one of these two
conclusions: either that the act of the agent does not imply in him a
change which itself would need an external principle of change, or that
there are changes which arise by themselves, without the necessity of an
agent in whom they occur and who causes them, and that therefore there
are changes possible in the Eternal without an agent who causes them.
35
And his adversaries insist on these two very points: ( 1 ) that the act of the
agent necessarily implies a change and that each change has a principle
which causes it; (2) that the Eternal cannot change in any way. But all this
is difficult to prove.
The Ash’arites are forced to assume either a first agent or a first act of
this agent, for they cannot admit that the disposition of the agent, relative
to the effect, when he acts is the same as his disposition, when he does
not act. This implies therefore a new disposition or a new relation, and this
necessarily either in the agent, or in the effect, or in both? But in this case,
if we posit as a principle that for each new disposition there is an agent,
this new disposition in the first agent will either need another agent, and
then this first agent was not the first and was not on his own account
sufficient for the act but needed another, or the agent of the disposition
which is the condition of the agent’s act will be identical with the agent of
the act. Then this act which we regarded as being the first act arising out
of him will not be the first, but his act producing the disposition which is the
condition of the effect will be anterior to the act producing the effect. This,
you see, is a necessary consequence, unless one allows that new
dispositions may arise in the agents without a cause. But this is absurd,
unless one believes that there are things which happen at haphazard and
by themselves, a theory of the old philosophers who denied the agent,; the
falsehood of which is self-evident.
In Ghazali’s objection there is a confusion. For our expressions ‘eternal
will’ and ‘temporal will’ are equivocal, indeed contrary. For the empirical
will is a faculty which possesses the possibility of doing equally one of two
contraries and then of receiving equally one of the two contraries willed.
For the will is the desire of the agent towards action. When the agent acts,
the desire ceases and the thing willed happens, and this desire and this
act are equally related to both the contraries. But when one says: ‘There is
a Wilier who wills eternally one of two contraries in Himself, the definition
of the will is abandoned, for we have transferred its nature from the
possible to the necessary. If it is objected that in an eternal will the will
does not cease through the presence of the object willed, for as an eternal
will has no beginning there is no moment in it which is specially
determined for the realization of the object willed, we answer: this is not
obvious, unless we say that demonstrative proof leads to the existence of
36
an agent endowed with a power which is neither voluntary nor natural,
which, however, the Divine Law calls ‘will, in the same way as
demonstrative proof leads to middle terms between things which seemed
at first sight to be contrary, without being really so, as when we speak of
an existence which is neither inside nor outside the world.
Ghazali answers, on behalf of the philosophers:
The philosophers say: This is clearly impossible, for
everything that happens is necessitated and has its cause,
and as it is impossible that there should be an effect without
a necessitating principle and a cause, so it is impossible that
there should exist a cause of which the effect is delayed,
when all the conditions of its necessitating, its causes and
elements are completely fulfilled. On the contrary, the
existence of the effect, when the cause is realized with all its
conditions, is necessary, and its delay is just as impossible
as an effect without cause. Before the existence of the world
there existed a Wilier, a will, and its relation to the thing
willed. No new wilier arose, nor a new will, nor a new relation
to the will-for all this is change; how then could a new object
of will arise, and what prevented its arising before? The
condition of the new production did not distinguish itself from
the condition of the non-production in any way, in any mode,
in any relation-on the contrary, everything remained as it
was before. At one moment the object of will did not exist,
everything remained as it was before, and then the object of
will existed. Is not this a perfectly absurd theory?
| say:
This is perfectly clear, except for one who denies one of the premisses
we have laid down previously. But Ghazali passes from this proof to an
example based upon convention, and through this he confuses this
defence of the philosophers.
Ghazali says:
This kind of impossibility is found not only in the
necessary and essential cause and effect but also in the
37
accidental and conventional. If a man pronounces the
formula of divorce against his wife without the divorce
becoming irrevocable immediately, one does not imagine
that it will become so later. For he made the formula through
convention and usage a cause of the judgement, and we do
not believe that the effect can be delayed, except when the
divorce depends on an ulterior event, e.g. on the arrival of
tomorrow or on someone’s entering the house, for then the
divorce does not take place at once, but only when tomorrow
arrives or someone enters the house; in this case the man
made the formula a cause only in conjunction with an ulterior
event. But as this event, the coming of tomorrow and
someone's entering the house, is not yet actual, the effect is
delayed until this future event is realized. The effect only
takes place when a new event, i.e. entering the house or the
arrival of tomorrow, has actually happened. Even if a man
wanted to delay the effect after the formula, without making it
dependent on an ulterior event, this would be regarded as
impossible, although it is he himself who lays down the
convention and fixes its modalities. If thus in conventional
matters such a delay is incomprehensible and inadmissible,
how can we admit it in essential, rational, and necessary
causal relations? In respect of our conduct and our voluntary
actions, there is a delay in actual volition only when there is
some obstacle. When there is actual volition and actual
power and the obstacles are eliminated, a delay in the object
willed is inadmissible.; A delay in the object willed is
imaginable only in decision, for decision is not sufficient for
the existence of the act; the decision to write does not
produce the writing, if it is not, as a new fact, accompanied
by an act of volition, i.e. an impulse in the man which
presents itself at the moment of the act. If there is thus an
analogy between the eternal Will and our will to act, a delay
of the object willed is inadmissible, unless through an
obstacle, and an antecedent existence of the volition is
equally inadmissible, for | cannot will to get up tomorrow
except by way of decision. If, however, the eternal Will is
38
analogous to our decision, it does not suffice to produce the
thing decided upon, but the act of creation must be
accompanied by a new act of volition, and this brings us
again to the idea of a change. But then we have the same
difficulty all over again. Why does this impulse or volition or
will or whatever you choose to call it happen just now and
not before? There remain, then, only these alternatives:
either something happening without a cause, or an infinite
regress. This is the upshot of the discussion: There is a
cause the conditions of which are all completely fulfilled, but
notwithstanding this the effect is delayed and is not realized
during a period to the beginning of which imagination cannot
attain and for which thousands of years would mean no
diminution; then suddenly, without the addition of any new
fact, and without the realization of any new condition, this
effect comes into existence and is produced. And this is
absurd.
| say:
This example of divorce based on convention seems to strengthen the
argument of the philosophers, but in reality it weakens it. For it enables the
Ashiarites to say: In the same way as the actual divorce is delayed after
the formula of divorce till the moment when the condition of someone’s
entering the house, or any other, is fulfilled, so the realization of the world
can be delayed after God’s act of creation until the condition is fulfilled on
which this realization depends, i.e. the moment when God willed it. But
conventional things do not behave like rational. The Literalists, comparing
these conventional things to rational, say: This divorce is not binding and
does not become effective through the realization of the condition which is
posterior to the pronouncement of the divorce by the divorcer, since it
would be a divorce which became effective without connexion with the act
of the divorcer. But in this matter there is no relation between the concept
drawn from the nature of things and that which is artificial and
conventional.
Then Ghazali says, on behalf of the Ash’arites:
39
The answer is: Do you recognize the impossibility of
connecting the eternal Will with the temporal production of
anything, through the necessity of intuitive thought or
through a logical deduction, or-to use your own logical
terminology-do you recognize the clash between these two
concepts through a middle term or without a middle term? If
you Claim a middle term-and this is the deductive method-
you will have to produce it, and if you assert that you know
this through the necessity of thought, why do your
adversaries not share this intuition with you? For the party
which believes in the creation of the world in time through an
eternal Will includes so many persons that no country can
contain them and no number enumerate them, and they
certainly do not contradict the logically minded out of
obstinacy, while Knowing better in their hearts. A proof
according to the rules of logic must be produced to show this
impossibility, as in all your arguments up till now there is only
a presumption of impossibility and a comparison with our
decision and our will; and this is false, for the eternal Will
does not resemble temporal volitions, and a _ pure
presumption of impossibility will not suffice without proof.
| say:
This argument is one of those which have only a very feeble persuasive
power. It amounts to saying that one who claims the impossibility of delay
in an effect, when its cause with all its conditions is realized, must assert
that he knows this either by a syllogism or from first principles; if through a
syllogism, he must produce it-but there is none; if from first principles, it
must be known to all, adversaries and others alike. But this argument is
mistaken, for it is not a condition of objective truth that it should be known
to all. That anything should be held by all does not imply anything more
than its being a common notion, just as the existence of a common notion
does not imply objective truth.
Ghazali answers on behalf of the Ash’arites:
If it is said, ‘We know by the necessity of thought that,
when all its conditions are fulfilled, a cause without effect is
40
inadmissible and that to admit it is an affront to the necessity
of thought,’ we answer: what is the difference between you
and your adversaries, when they say to you, ‘We know by
the necessity of thought the impossibility of a theory which
affirms that one single being knows all the universals,
without this knowledge forming a plurality in its essence or
adding anything to it, and without this plurality of things
known implying a plurality in the knowledge’? For this is your
theory of God, which according to us and our science is
quite absurd. You, however, say there is no analogy
between eternal and temporal knowledge. Some of you
acknowledge the impossibility involved, and say that God
knows only Himself and that He is the knower, the
knowledge and the known, and that the three are one. One
might object: The unity of the knowledge, the knower, and
the known is clearly an impossibility, for to suppose the
Creator of the world ignorant of His own work is necessarily
absurd, and the Eternal-who is far too high to be reached by
your words and the words of any heretics-could, if He knows
only Himself, never know His work.
| say
This amounts to saying that the theologians do not gratuitously and
without proof deny the admitted impossibility of a delay between the effect
and its cause, but base themselves on an argument which leads them to
believe in the temporal creation of the world, and that they therefore act in
the same way as the philosophers, who only deny the well-known
necessary plurality of knowledge and known, so far as it concerns their
unity in God, because of a demonstration which, according to them, leads
them to their theory about Him. And that this is still more true of those
philosophers who deny it to be necessary that God should know His
own work, affirming that He knows only Himself. This assertion belongs to
the class of assertions whose contrary is equally false., For there exists no
proof which refutes anything that is evidently true, and universally
acknowledged. Anything that can be refuted by a demonstrative proof is
only supposed to be true, not really true.] Therefore, if it is absolutely and
evidently true that knowledge and known form a plurality, both in the
41
visible and in the invisible world, we can be sure that the philosophers
cannot have a proof of this unity in God; but if the theory of the plurality of
knowledge and known is only a supposition, then it is possible for the
philosophers to have a proof. Equally, if it is absolutely true that the effect
of a cause cannot be delayed after the causation and the Ash’arites claim
that they can advance a proof to deny it, then we can be absolutely sure
that they cannot have such a proof. If there is a controversy about
questions like this, the final criterion rests with the sound understanding’
which does not base itself on prejudice and passion, when it probes
according to the signs and rules by which truth and mere opinion are
logically distinguished. Likewise, if two people dispute about a sentence
and one says that it is poetry, the other that it is prose, the final judgment
rests with the ‘sound understanding’ which can distinguish poetry from
prose, and with the science of prosody. And as, in the case of metre, the
denial of him who denies it does not interfere with its perception by him
who perceives it, so the denial of a truth by a contradictor does not trouble
the conviction of the men to whom it is evident.
This whole argument is extremely inept and weak, and Ghazali ought not
to have filled his book with such talk if he intended to convince the
learned.
And drawing consequences which are irrelevant and beside the point,
Ghazali goes on to say:
But the consequences of this argument cannot be
overcome. And we say to them: How will you refute your
adversaries, when they say the eternity of the world is
impossible, for it implies an infinite number and an infinity of
unifies for the spherical revolutions, although they can be
divided by six, by four, and by two.’ For the sphere of the sun
revolves in one year, the sphere of Saturn in thirty years,
and so Saturn’s revolution is a thirtieth and Jupiter’s
revolution-for Jupiter revolves in twelve years-a twelfth of the
sun’s revolution. But the number of revolutions of Saturn has
the same infinity as the revolutions of the sun, although they
are in a proportion of one to thirty and even the infinity of the
sphere of the fixed stars which turns round once in thirty-six
thousand years is the same as the daily revolution which the
42
sun performs in twenty-four hours. If now your adversary
says that this is plainly impossible, in what does your
argument differ from his? And suppose it is asked: Are the
numbers of these revolutions even or uneven or both even
and uneven or neither even nor uneven? If you answer, both
even and uneven, or neither even nor uneven, you say what
is evidently absurd. If, however, you say ‘even’ or ‘uneven’,
even and uneven become uneven and even by the addition
of one unit and how could infinity be one unit short? You
must, therefore, draw the conclusion that they are neither
even nor uneven.
| say:
This too is a sophistical argument. It amounts to saying: In the same way
as you are unable to refute our argument for the creation of the world in
time, that if it were eternal, its revolutions would be neither even nor
uneven, so we cannot refute your theory that the effect of an agent whose
conditions to act are always fulfilled cannot be delayed. This argument
aims only at creating and establishing a ; doubt, which is one of the
sophist’s objectives.
But you, reader of this book, you have already heard the arguments of
the philosophers to establish the eternity of the world and the refutation of
the Ash’arites. Now hear the proofs of the Ash’arites for their refutation
and hear the arguments of the philosophers to refute those proofs in the
wording of Ghazali!
[Here, in the Arabic text, the last passage of Ghazali, which previously was given only in an
abbreviated form, is repeated in full.]
| say:
This is in brief that, if you imagine two circular movements in one and the
same finite time and imagine then a limited part of these movements in
one and the same finite time, the proportion between the parts of these
two circular movements and between their wholes will be the same. For
instance, if the circular movement of Saturn in t the period which we call a
year is a thirtieth of the circular movement of the sun in this period, and
you imagine the whole of the circular movements of the sun in proportion
to the whole of the circular movements of Saturn in one and the same
43
period, necessarily the proportion between their wholes and between their
parts will be the same. If, however, there is no proportion between two
movements in their totality, because they are both potential, i.e. they have
neither beginning nor end but there exists a proportion between the parts,
because they are both actual, then the proportion between the wholes is
not necessarily the same as the proportion between the parts-although
many think so, basing their proof on this prejudice -for there is no
proportion between two magnitudes or quantities which are both taken to
be infinite. When, therefore, the ancients believed that, for instance, the
totality of the movements of the sun and of Saturn had neither beginning
nor end, there could be no proportion between them, for this would have
implied the finitude of both these totalities, just as this is implied for the
parts of both. This is self-evident. Our adversaries believe that, when a
proportion of more and less exists between parts, this proportion holds
good also for the totalities, but this is only binding when the totalities are
finite. For where there is no end there is neither ‘more’ nor ‘less’. The
admission in such a case of the proportion of more and less brings with it
another absurd consequence, namely that one infinite could be greater
than another. This is only absurd when one supposes two things actually
infinite, for then a proportion does exist between them. When, however,
one imagines things potentially infinite, there exists no proportion at all.
This is the right answer to this question, not what Ghazali says in the
name of the philosophers.
And through this are solved all the difficulties which beset our
adversaries on this question, of which the greatest is that which they
habitually formulate in this way: If the movements in the past are infinite,
then no movement in the actual present can take place, unless an infinite
number of preceding movements is terminated., This is true, and
acknowledged by the philosophers, once granted that the anterior
movement is the condition for the posterior movement’s taking place, i.e.
once granted that the existence of one single movement implies an infinite
number of causes. But no philosopher allows the existence of an infinite
number of causes, as accepted by the materialists, for this would imply the
existence of an effect without cause and a motion without mover. But
when the existence of an eternal prime mover had been proved, whose
act cannot be posterior to his being, it followed that there could as little be
a beginning for his act as for his being; otherwise his act would be
44
possible, not necessary, and he would not be a first principle.’ The acts of
an agent who has no beginning have a beginning as little as his existence,
and therefore it follows necessarily that no preceding act of his is the
condition for the existence of a later, for neither of them is an agent by
itself and their sequence is accidental. An accidental infinite, not an
essential infinite, is admitted by the philosophers; nay, this type of infinite
is in fact a necessary consequence of the existence of an eternal first
principle., And this is not only true for successive or continuous
movements and the like, but even where the earlier is regarded as the
cause of the later, for instance the man who engenders a man like himself.
For it is necessary that the series of temporal productions of one individual
man by another should lead upwards to an eternal agent, for whom there
is no beginning either of his existence or of his production of man out of
man. The production of one man by another ad infinitum is accidental,
whereas the relation of before and after in it is essential. The agent who
has no beginning either for his existence or for those acts of his which he
performs without an instrument, has no first instrument either to perform
those acts of his without beginning which by their nature need an
instrument .
But since the theologians mistook the accidental for the essential, they
denied this eternal agent; the solution of their problem was difficult and
they believed this proof to be stringent. But this theory of the philosophers
is clear, and their first master Aristotle has explained that, if motion were
produced by motion, or element by element, motion and element could not
exists For this type of infinite the philosophers admit neither a beginning
nor an end, and therefore one can never say of anything in this series that
it has ended or has begun, not even in the past, for everything that has an
end must have begun and what does not begin does not end. This can
also be understood from the fact that beginning and end are correlatives.
Therefore one who affirms that there is no end of the celestial revolutions
in the future cannot logically ascribe a beginning to them, for what has a
beginning has an end and what has no end has no beginning, and the
same relation exists between first and last; i.e. what has a first term has
also a last term, and what has no first term has no last term, and there is
in reality neither end nor beginning for any part of a series that has no last
term, and what has no beginning for any of its parts has no end for any of
them either. When, therefore, the theologians ask the philosophers if the
45
movements which precede the present one are ended, their answer is
negative, for their assumption that they have no beginning implies their
endlessness. The opinion of the theologians that the philosophers admit
their end is erroneous, for they do not admit an end for what has no
beginning.’ It will be clear to you that neither the arguments of the
theologians for the temporal creation of the world of which Ghazali
speaks, nor the arguments of the philosophers which he includes and
describes in his book, suffice to reach absolute evidence or afford
stringent proof. And this is what we have tried to show in this book. The
best answer one can give to him who asks where in the past is the
starting-point of His acts, is: The starting-point of His acts is at the starting-
point of His existence; for neither of them has a beginning.
And here is the passage of Ghazali in which he sets forth the defence of
the philosophers against the argument built on the difference in speed of
the celestial spheres, and his refutation of their argument.
Ghazali says:
If one says, ‘The error in your argument consists in your
considering those circular movements as an aggregate of
units, but those movements have no real existence, for the
past is no more and the future not yet; “aggregate” means
units existing in the present, but in this case there is no
existence.’
Then he says to refute this:
We answer: Number can be divided into even and
uneven; there is no third possibility, whether for the
numbered permanent reality, or for the numbered passing
event. Therefore whatever number we imagine, we must
believe it to be even or uneven, whether we regard it as
existent or non-existent; and if the thing numbered vanishes
from existence, our judgement of its being even or uneven
does not vanish or change.
| say:
This is the end of his argument. But this argument-that the numbered
thing must be judged as even or uneven, whether it exists or not-is only
46
valid so far as it concerns external things or things in the soul that have a
beginning and an end. For of the number which exists only potentially, i.e.
which has neither beginning nor end, it cannot truly be said that it is even
or uneven, or that it begins or ends; it happens neither in the past nor in
the future, for what exists potentially falls under the law of non-existence.
This is what the philosophers meant when they said that the circular
movements of the past and the future are non-existent. The upshot of this
question is: Everything that is called a limited aggregate with a beginning
and an end is so called either because it has a beginning and end in the
world exterior to the soul, or because it is inside, not outside, the soul.
Every totality, actual and limited in the past, whether inside or outside the
soul, is necessarily either even or uneven. But an unlimited aggregate
existing outside the soul cannot be other than limited so far as it is
represented in the soul, for the soul cannot represent unlimited existence.
Therefore also this unlimited aggregate, as being limited in the soul, can
be called even or uneven; in so far, however, as it exists outside the soul,
it can be called neither even nor uneven. Equally, past aggregates which
are considered to exist potentially outside the soul, i.e. which have no
beginning, cannot be called even or uneven unless they are looked upon
as actual, i.e. as having beginning and end. No motion possesses totality
or forms an aggregate, i.e. is provided with a beginning or an end, except
in so far as it is in the soul, as is the case with time.’ And it follows from
the nature of circular movement that it is neither even nor uneven except
as represented in the soul. The cause of this mistake is that it was
believed that, when something possesses a certain quality in the soul, it
must possess this quality also outside the soul, and, since anything that
has happened in the past can only be represented in the soul as finite, it
was thought that everything that has happened in the past must also be
finite outside the soul. And as the circular movements of the future are
regarded by the imagination as infinite, for it represents them as a
sequence of part after part, Plato and the Ash’arites believed that they
might be infinite, but this is simply a judgement based on imagination, not
on proof. Therefore those who believe-as many theologians have done-
that, if the world is supposed to have begun, it must have an end, are truer
to their principles and show more consistency.
Ghazali says after this:
47
And we say moreover to the philosophers: According to
your principles it is not absurd that there should be actual
units, qualitatively differentiated, which are infinite in number;
| am thinking of human souls, separated through death from
their bodies. These are therefore realities that can neither be
called even nor uneven. How will you refute the man who
affirms that this is necessarily absurd in the same way as
you claim the connexion between an eternal will and a
temporal creation to be necessarily absurd? This theory
about souls is that which Avicenna accented. and it is
perhaps Aristotle’s.
| say:
This argument is extremely weak. It says, in brief, “You philosophers
need not refute our assertion that what is a logical necessity for you is not
necessary, aS you consider things possible which your adversaries
consider impossible by the necessity of thought. That is to say, just as you
consider things possible which your adversaries consider impossible, so
you consider things necessary which your adversaries do not consider so.
And you cannot bring a criterion for judging the two claims.’ It has already
been shown in the science of logic that this is a weak rhetorical or
sophistical kind of argument., The answer is that what we claim to be
necessarily true is objectively true, whereas what you claim as necessarily
absurd is not as you claim it to be. For this there is no other criterion than
immediate intuitive apprehension, just as, when one man claims that a line
is rhythmical and another denies it, the criterion is the intuition of the
sound understanding.
As for the thesis of a numerical plurality of immaterial souls, this is not a
theory acknowledged by the philosophers, for they regard matter as the
cause of numerical plurality and form as the cause of congruity in
numerical plurality. And that there should be a numerical plurality without
matter, having one unique form, is impossible. For in its description one
individual can only be distinguished from another accidentally, as there is
often another individual who participates in this descriptions but only
through their matter do individuals differ in reality. And also this: the
impossibility of an actual infinite is an acknowledged axiom in
philosophical theory, equally valid for material and immaterial things. We
48
do not know of any one who makes a distinction here between the spatial
and the non-spatial, with the single exception of Avicenna. | do not know
of any other philosopher who affirms this, it does not correspond with any
of their principles and it makes no sense, for the philosophers deny the
existence of an actual infinite equally for material and for immaterial
things, as it would imply that one infinite could be greater than another.
Perhaps Avicenna wanted only to satisfy the masses, telling them what
they were accustomed to hear about the soul. But this theory is far from
satisfactory. For if there were an actual infinite and it were divided in two,
the part would equal the whole; e.g. if there were a line or a number
actually infinite in both directions and it were divided in two, both the parts
and the whole would be actually infinite; and this is absurd. All this is
simply the consequence of the admission of an actual and not potential
infinite.
Ghazali says:
If it is said, ‘The truth lies with Plato’s theory of one
eternal soul which is only divided in bodies and returns after
its separation from them to its original unity’, we answer:
This theory is still worse, more objectionable and more apt to
be regarded as contrary to the necessity of thought. For we
say that the soul of Zaid is either identical with the soul of
Amr or different from it; but their identity would mean
something absurd, for everyone is conscious of his own
identity and knows that he is not another, and, were they
identical, their knowledge, which is an essential quality of
their souls and enters into all the relations into which their
souls enter, would be identical too. If you say their soul is
unique and only divided through its association with bodies,
we answer that the division of a unity which has no
measurable volume is absurd by the necessity of thought.
And how could the one become two, and indeed a thousand,
and then return to its unity? This can be understood of things
which have volume and quantity, like the water of the sea
which is distributed into brooks and rivers and flows then
back again into the sea, but how can that which has no
quantity be divided? We seek to show by all this that the
49
philosophers cannot shake the conviction of their
adversaries that the eternal Will is connected with temporal
creation, except by claiming its absurdity by the necessity of
thought, and that therefore they are in no way different from
the theologians who make the same claim against the
philosophical doctrines opposed to theirs. And out of this
there is no issue.
| say:
Zaid and Amr are numerically different, but identical in form. If, for
example, the soul of Zaid were numerically different from the soul of Amr
in the way Zaid is numerically different from Amr, the soul of Zaid and the
soul of Amr would be numerically two, but one in their form, and the soul
would possess another soul. The necessary conclusion is therefore that
the soul of Zaid and the soul of Amr are identical in their form. An identical
form inheres in a numerical, i.e. a divisible, multiplicity, only through the
multiplicity of matter. If then the soul does not die when the body dies, or if
it possesses an immortal element, it must, when it has left the bodies,
form a numerical unity. But this is not the place to go deeper into this
subject.
His argument against Plato is sophistical. It says in short that the soul
of Zaid is either identical with the soul of Amr or different from it; but that
the soul of Zaid is not identical with the soul of Amr and that therefore it is
different from it. But ‘different’ is an equivocal term, and ‘identity’ too is
predicated of a number of things which are also called ‘different’. The
souls of Zaid and Amr are one in one sense and many in another; we
might say, one in relation to their form, many in relation to their
substratum. His remark that division can only be imagined of the
quantitative is partially false; it is true of essential division, but not of
accidental division, i.e. of those things which can be divided, because they
exist in the essentially divisible. The essentially divisible is, for example,
body; accidental division is, for instance, the division of whiteness, when
the bodies in which it is present are divided, and in this way the forms and
the soul are accidentally divisible, i.e. through the division of the substrate.
The soul is closely similar to light: light is divided by the division of
illuminated bodies, and is unified when the bodies are annihilated, and this
same relation holds between soul and bodies. To advance such
50
sophistical arguments is dishonest, for it may be supposed that he is not a
man to have overlooked the points mentioned. What he said, he said only
to flatter the masses of his times, but how far removed is such an attitude
from the character of those who seek to set forth the truth! But perhaps
the man may be forgiven on account of the time and place in which he
lived; and indeed he only proceeded in his books in a tentative way.
And as these arguments carry no evidence whatsoever, Ghazali says:
We want to show by all this that the philosophers cannot
shake the conviction of their adversaries that the eternal Will
is connected with temporal creation, by claiming its absurdity
by the necessity of thought, and that therefore they do not
distinguish themselves from the theologians, who make the
same claim against the philosophical doctrines opposed to
theirs. And out of this there is no issue.
| say:
When someone denies a truth of which it is absolutely certain that it is
such-and-such, there exists no argument by which we can come to an
understanding with him; for every argument is based on known premisses
about which both adversaries agree. When each point advanced is denied
by the adversary, discussion with him becomes impossible, but such
people stand outside the pale of humanity and have to be educated. But
for him who denies an evident truth, t because of a difficulty which
presents itself to him there is a remedy, i.e. the solution of this difficulty.
He who does not understand evident truth, because he is lacking in
intelligence, cannot be taught anything, nor can he be educated. It is like
trying to make the blind imagine colours or know their existence.
Ghazali says:
The philosophers may object: This argument (that the
present has been preceded by an infinite past) can be turned
against you, for God before the creation of the world was
able to create it, say, one year or two years before He did,
and there is no limit to His power; but He seemed to have
patience and did not create. Then He created. Now, the
duration of His inactivity is either finite or infinite. If you say
51
finite, the existence of the Creator becomes finite; if you say
infinite, a duration in which there is an infinite number of
possibilities receives its termination. We answer: Duration
and time are, according to us, created, but we shall explain
the real answer to this question when we reply to the second
proof of the philosophers.
| say:
Most people who accept a temporal creation of the world believe time
to have been created with it. Therefore his assertion that the duration of
His inactivity was either limited or unlimited is untrue. For what has no
beginning does not finish or end. And the opponent does not admit that
the inactivity has any duration at all. What one has to ask them about the
consequences of their theory is: Is it possible, when the creation of time is
admitted, that the term of its beginning may lie beyond the real time in
which we live? If they answer that it is not possible, they posit a limited
extension beyond which the Creator cannot pass, and this is, in their view,
shocking and absurd. If, however, they concede that its possible beginning
may lie beyond the moment of its created term, it may further be asked if
there may not lie another term beyond this second. If they answer in the
affirmative-and they cannot do otherwise-it will be said: Then we shall
have here a possible creation of an infinite number of durations, and you
will be forced to admit-according to your argument about the spherical
revolutions-that their termination is a condition for the real age which
exists since them. If you say what is infinite does not finish, the arguments
you use about the spherical revolutions against your opponents your
opponents will use against you on the subject of the possibility of created
durations. If it is objected that the difference between those two cases is
that these infinite possibilities belong to extensions which do not become
actual, whereas the spherical revolutions do become actual, the answer is
that the possibilities of things belong to their necessary accidents and that
it does not make any difference, according to the philosophers, if they
precede these things or are simultaneous with them, for of necessity they
are the dispositions of things. If, then, it is impossible that before the
existence of the present spherical revolution there should have been
infinite spherical revolutions, the existence of infinite possible revolutions
is equally impossible. If one wants to avoid these consequences, one can
Oe
say that the age of the world is a definite quantity and cannot be longer or
shorter than it is, in conformity with the philosophical doctrine about the
size of the world. Therefore these arguments are not stringent, and the
safest way for him who accepts the temporal creation of the world is to
regard time as of a definite extension and not to admit a possibility which
precedes the possible; and to regard also the spatial extension of the
world as finite. Only, spatial extension forms a simultaneous whole; not so
time.
Ghazali expounds a certain kind of argument attributed to the
philosophers on this subject against the theologians when they denied that
the impossibility of delay in the Creator’s act after His existence is known
by primitive intuition:
How will you defend yourselves, theologians, against the
philosophers, when they drop this argument, based on the
necessity of thought, and prove the eternity of the world in
this way, saying that times are equivalent so far as the
possibility that the Divine Will should attach itself to them is
concerned, for what differentiates a given time from an
earlier or a later time? And it is not absurd to believe that the
earlier or the later might be chosen when on the contrary you
theologians say about white, black, movement, and rest that
the white is realized through the eternal Will although its
substrate accepts equally black and white. Why, then, does
the eternal Will attach itself to the white rather than to the
black, and what differentiates one of the two possibles from
the other for connexion with the eternal Will? But we
philosophers know by the necessity of thought that one thing
does not distinguish itself from a similar except by a
differentiating principle, for if not, it would be possible that
the world should come into existence, having the possibility
both of existing and of not existing, and that the side of
existence, although it has the same possibility as the side of
non-existence, should be _ differentiated without a
differentiating principle. If you answer that the Will of God is
the differentiating principle, then one has to inquire what
differentiates the Will, i.e. the reason why it has been
53
differentiated in such or such way. And if you answer: One
does not inquire after the motives of the Eternal, well, let the
world then be eternal, and let us not inquire after its Creator
and its cause, since one does not inquire after the motives of
the Eternal! If it is regarded as possible that the Eternal
should differentiate one of the two possibles by chance, it
will be an extreme absurdity to say that the world is
differentiated in differentiated forms which might just as well
be otherwise, and one might then say that this has
happened by chance in the same way as you Say that the
Divine Will has differentiated one time rather than another or
one form rather than another by chance. If you say that such
a question is irrelevant, because it refers to anything God
can will or decide, we answer that this question is quite
relevant, for it concerns any time and is pertinent for our
opponents to any decision God takes.
We answer: The world exists, in the way it exists, in its
time, with its qualities, and in its space, by the Divine Will
and will is a quality which has the faculty of differentiating
one thing from another,’ and if it had not this faculty, power
in itself would suffice But, since power is equally related to
two contraries’ and a differentiating principle is needed to
differentiate one thing from a similar, it is said that the
Eternal possesses besides His power a quality which can
differentiate between two similars. And to ask why will
differentiates one of two similars is like asking why
knowledge must comprehend the knowable, and the answer
is that ‘knowledge’ is the term for a quality which has just this
nature. And in the same way, ‘will’ is the term for a quality
the nature or rather the essence of which is to differentiate
one thing from another.
The philosophers may object: The assumption of a
quality the nature of which is to differentiate one thing from a
similar one is something incomprehensible, nay even
contradictory, for ‘similar means not to be differentiated, and
‘differentiated’ means not similar. And it must not be believed
54
that two blacks in two substrates are similar in every way,
since the one is in one place and the other in another, and
this causes a distinction; nor are two blacks at two times in
one substrate absolutely similar, since they are separated in
time, and how could they therefore be similar in every way?
When we say of two blacks that they are similar, we mean
that they are similar in blackness, in their special relation to
it-not absolutely. Certainly, if the substrate and the time were
one without any distinction, one could not speak any more of
two blacks or of any duality at all. This proves that the term
‘Divine Will is derived from our will, and one does not
imagine that through our will two similar things can be
differentiated.’ On the contrary, if someone who is thirsty has
before him two cups of water, similar in everything in respect
to his aim, it will not be possible for him to take either of
them. No, he can only take the one he thinks more beautiful
or lighter or nearer to his right hand, if he is right-handed, or
act from some such reason, hidden or known. Without this
the differentiation of the one from the other cannot be
imagined.
| say:
The summary of what Ghazali relates in this section of the proofs of the
philosophers for the impossibility of a temporal proceeding from an eternal
agent is that in God there cannot be a will. The philosophers could only
arrive at this argument after granting to their opponents that all opposites-
opposites in time,b like anterior and posterior, as well as those in quality,
like white and black-are equivalent in relation to the eternal Will. And also
non-existence and existence are, according to the theologians, equivalent
in relation to the Divine Will. And having granted their opponents this
premiss, although they did not acknowledge its truth, they said to them: It
is of the nature of will that it cannot give preponderance to one thing rather
than to a similar one, except through a differentiating principle and a
cause which only exist in one of these two similar things; if not, one of the
two would happen by chance-and the philosophers argued for the sake of
discussion, as if they had conceded that, if the Eternal had a will, a
temporal could proceed from an eternal. As the theologians were unable
59
to give a satisfactory answer, they took refuge in the theory that the
eternal Will is a quality the nature of which is to differentiate between two
similar things, without there being for God a differentiating principle which
inclines Him to one of two similar acts; that the eternal Will is thus a quality
like warmth which gives heat or like knowledge which comprehends the
knowable. But their opponents, the philosophers, answered: It is
impossible that this should happen, for two similar things are equivalent
for the wilier, and his action can only attach itself to the one rather than to
the other through their being dissimilar, i.e. through one’s having a quality
the other has not. When, however, they are similar in every way and when
for God there is no differentiating principle at all, His will will attach itself to
both of them indifferently and, when this is the case-His will being the
cause of His act-the act will not attach itself to the one rather than to the
other, it will attach itself either to the two contrary actions simultaneously
or to neither of them at all, and both cases are absurd. The philosophers,
therefore, began their argument, as if they had it granted to them that all
things were equivalent in relation to the First Agent, and they forced them
to admit that there must be for God a differentiating principle which
precedes Him, which is absurd. When the theologians answered that will
is a quality the nature of which is to differentiate the similar from the
similar, in so far as it is similar, the philosophers objected that this is not
understood or meant by the idea of will. They therefore appear to reject
the principle which they granted them in the beginning.’ This is in short the
content of this section. It waves the argument from the original question to
the problem of the will; to shift one’s ground, however, is an act of
sophistry.
Ghazali answers in defence of the theological doctrine of the Divine Will:
There are two objections: First, as to your affirmation that
you cannot imagine this, do you know it by the necessity of
thought or through deduction? You can claim neither the one
nor the other. Your comparison with our will is a bad
analogy, which resembles that employed on the question of
God’s knowledge. Now God’s knowledge is different from
ours in several ways which we acknowledge. Therefore it is
not absurd to admit a difference in the will. Your affirmation
is like saying that an essence existing neither outside nor
56
inside the world, neither continuous with the world nor
separated from it, cannot be understood, because we cannot
understand this according to our human measure; the right
answer is that it is the fault of your imagination, for rational
proof has led the learned to accept its truth. How, then, will
you refute those who say that rational proof has led to
establishing in God a quality the nature of which is to
differentiate between two similar things? And, if the word
‘will’ does not apply, call it by another name, for let us not
quibble about words! We only use the term ‘will’ by
permission of the Divine Law. It may be objected that by its
conventional meaning ‘will’ designates that which has desire,
and God has no desire, but we are concerned here with a
question not of words but of fact. Besides, we do not even
with respect to our human will concede that this cannot be
imagined. Suppose two similar dates in front of a man who
has a strong desire for them, but who is unable to take them
both. Surely he will take one of them through a quality in him
the nature of which is to differentiate between two similar
things. All the distinguishing qualities you have mentioned,
like beauty or nearness or facility in taking, we can assume
to be absent, but still the possibility of the taking remains.
You can choose between two answers: either you merely
say that an equivalence in respect to his desire cannot be
imagined-but this is a silly answer, for to assume it is indeed
possible or you say that if an equivalence is assumed, the
man will remain for ever hungry and perplexed, looking at
the dates without taking one of them, and without a power to
choose or to will, distinct from his desire. And this again is
one of those absurdities which are recognized by the
necessity of thought. Everyone, therefore, who studies, in
the human and the divine, the real working of the act of
choice, must necessarily admit a quality the nature of which
is to differentiate between two similar things.
| say:
Oi
This objection can be summarized in two parts: In the first Ghazali
concedes that the human will is such that it is unable to differentiate one
thing from a similar one, in so far as it is similar, but that a rational proof
forces us to accept the existence of such a quality in the First Agent. To
believe that such a quality cannot exist would be like believing that there
cannot exist a being who is neither inside nor outside the world. According
to this reasoning, will, which is attributed to the First Agent and to man, is
predicated in an equivocal way, like knowledge and other qualities which
exist in the Eternal in a different way from that in which they exist in the
temporal, and it is only through the prescription of the Divine Law that we
speak of the Divine Will. It is clear that this objection cannot have anything
more than a dialectical value. For a proof that could demonstrate the
existence of such a quality, i.e. a principle determining the existence of
one thing rather than that of a similar, would have to assume things willed
that are similar; things willed are, however, not similar, but on the contrary
opposite, for all opposites can be reduced to the opposition of being and
not being, which is the extreme form of opposition; and opposition is the
contrary of similarity. The assumption of the theologians that the things to
which the will attaches itself are similar is a false one, and we shall speak
of it later. If they say: we affirm only that they are similar in relation to the
First Wilier, who in His holiness is too exalted to possess desires, and it is
through desires that two similar things are actually differentiated, we
answer: as to the desires whose realization contributes to the perfection of
the essence of the wilier, as happens with our desires, through which our
will attaches itself to the things willed-those desires are impossible in God,
for the will which acts in this way is a longing for perfection when there is
an imperfection in the essence of the wilier; but as to the desires which
belong to the essence of the things willed, nothing new comes to the wilier
from their realization. It comes exclusively to the thing willed, for instance,
when a thing passes into existence from non-existence, for it cannot be
doubted that existence is better for it than non-existence. It is in this
second way that the Primal Will is related to the existing things, for it
chooses for them eternally the better of two opposites, and this essentially
and primally. This is the first part of the objection contained in this
argument.
In the second part he no longer concedes that this quality cannot exist in
the human will, but tries to prove that there is also in us, in the face of
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similar things, a will which distinguishes one from the other; of this he
gives examples. For instance, it is assumed that in front of a man there
are two dates, similar in every way, and it is supposed that he cannot take
them both at the same time. It is supposed that no special attraction need
be imagined for him in either of them, and that nevertheless he will of
necessity distinguish one of them by taking it. But this is an error. For,
when one supposes such a thing, and a wilier whom necessity prompts to
eat or to take the date, then it is by no means a matter of distinguishing
between two similar things when, in this condition, he takes one of the two
dates. It is nothing but the admission of an equivalence of two similar
things; for whichever of the two dates he may take, his aim will be attained
and his desire satisfied. His will attaches itself therefore merely to the
distinction between the fact of taking one of them and the fact of leaving
them altogether; it attaches itself by no means to the act of taking one
definite date and distinguishing this act from the act of leaving the other
(that is to say, when it is assumed that the desires for the two are equal);
he does not prefer the act of taking the one to the act of taking the other,
but he prefers the act of taking one of the two, whichever it may be, and
he gives a preference to the act of taking over the act of leaving.’ This is
self-evident. For distinguishing one from the other means giving a
preference to the one over the other, and one cannot give a
preponderance to one of two similar things in so far as it is similar to the
other-although in their existence as individuals they are not similar since
each of two individuals is different from the other by reason of a quality
exclusive to it. If, therefore, we assume that the will attaches itself to that
special character of one of them, then it can be imagined that the will
attaches to the.-one rather than the other because of the element of
difference existing in both. But then the will does not attach itself to two
similar objects, in so far as they are similar. This is, in short, the meaning
of Ghazali’s first objection. Then he gives his second objection against
those who deny the existence of a quality, distinguishing two similar
objects from one another.
Ghazali says:
The second objection is that we say: You in your system
also are unable to do without a principle differentiating
between two equals, for the world exists in virtue of a cause
59
which has produced it in its peculiar shape out of a number
of possible distinct shapes which are equivalent; why, then,
has this cause differentiated some of them? If to distinguish
two similar things is impossible, it is irrelevant whether this
concerns the act of God, natural causality, or the logical
necessity of ideas. Perhaps you will say: the universal order
of the world could not be different from what it is; if the world
were smaller or bigger than it actually is, this order would not
be perfect, and the same may be asserted of the number of
spheres and of stars. And perhaps you will say: The big
differs from the small and the many from the few, in so far as
they are the object of the will, and therefore they are not
similar but different; but human power is too feeble to
perceive the modes of Divine Wisdom in its determination of
the measures and qualities of things; only in some of them
can His wisdom be perceived, as in the obliquity of the
ecliptic in relation to the equator, and in the wise contrivance
of the apogee and the eccentric sphere.’ In most cases,
however, the secret is not revealed, but the differences are
known, and it is not impossible that a thing should be
distinguished from another, because the order of the world
depends on it; but certainly the times are absolutely
indifferent in relation to the world’s possibility and its order,
and it cannot be claimed that, if the world were created one
moment later or earlier, this order could not be imagined;
and this indifference is known by the necessity of thought.-
But then we answer: Although we can employ the same
reasoning against your argument in the matter of different
times, for it might be said that God created the world at the
time most propitious for its creation, we shall not limit
ourselves to this refutation, but shall assume, according to
your own principle, a differentiation in two points about which
there can be no disagreement: (1) the difference in the
direction of spherical movement; (2) the definite place of the
poles in relation to the ecliptic in spherical movement. The
proof of the statement relating to the poles is that heaven is
a globe, moving on two poles, as on two immovable points,
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whereas the globe of heaven is homogeneous and simple,
especially the highest sphere, the ninth, which possesses no
stars at all, and these two spheres move on two poles, the
north and the south. We now say: of all the opposite points,
which are infinite, according to you philosophers, there is no
pair one could not imagine as poles. Why then have the two
points of the north and south pole been fixed upon as poles
and as immovable; and why does the ecliptic not pass
through these two poles, so that the poles would become the
opposite points of the ecliptic? And if wisdom is shown in the
size and shape of heaven, what then distinguishes the place
of the poles from others, so that they are fixed upon to serve
as poles, to the exclusion of all the other parts and points?
And yet all the points are similar, and all parts of the globe
are equivalent. And to this there is no answer.
One might say: Perhaps the spot in which the point of the
poles is, is distinguished from other points by a special
quality, in relation to its being the place of the poles and to
its being at rest, for it does not seem to change its place or
space or position or whatever one wishes to call it; and all
the other spots of the sphere by turning change their position
in relation to the earth and the other spheres and only the
poles are at rest; perhaps this spot was more apt to be at
rest than the others. We answer: If you say so, you explain
the fact through a natural differentiation of the parts of the
first sphere; the sphere, then, ceases to be homogeneous,
and this is in contradiction with your principle, for one of the
proofs by which you prove the necessity of the globular
shape of heaven, is that its nature is simple, homogeneous,
and without differentiation, and the simplest shape is the
globe; for the quadrangle and the hexagon and other figures
demand a salience and a differentiation of the angles,’ and
this happens only when its simple nature is added to. But
although this supposition of yours is in contradiction with
your own theory, it does not break the strength of your
opponents’ argument; the question about this special quality
still holds good, namely, can those other parts accept this
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quality or not? If the answer is in the affirmative, why then is
this quality limited to a few only of those homogeneous
parts? If the answer is negative, we reply: the other parts, in
so far as they constitute bodies, receiving the form of bodies,
are homogeneous of necessity, and there is no justification
for attributing this special quality to this spot exclusively on
account of its being a part of a body and a part of heaven,
for the other parts of heaven participate in this qualification.
Therefore its differentiation must rest on a decision by God,
or on a quality whose nature consists in differentiating
between two similars. Therefore, just as among philosophers
the theory is upheld that all times are equivalent in regard to
the creation of the world, their opponents are justified in
claiming that the parts of heaven are equivalent for the
reception of the quality through which stability in position
becomes more appropriate than a change of position. And
out of this there is no issue.
| say:
This means in brief that the philosophers must acknowledge that there is
a quality in the Creator of the world which differentiates between two
similars, for it seems that the world might have had another shape and
another quantity than it actually has, for it might have been bigger or
smaller. Those different possibilities are, therefore, equivalent in regard to
the determination of the existence of the world. On the other hand, if the
philosophers say that the world can have only one special shape, the
special quantity of its bodies and the special number of them it actually
has, and that this equivalence of possibilities can only be imagined in
relation to the times of temporal creation-since for God no moment is more
suitable than another for its creation-they may be told that it is possible to
answer this by saying that the creation of the world happened at its most
propitious moment. But we, the theologians say, want to show the
philosophers two equivalent things of which they cannot affirm that there
exists any difference between them; the first is the particular direction of
the spherical movement and the second the particular position of the
poles, relative to the spheres; for any pair whatever of opposite points,
united by a line which passes through the centre of the sphere, might
62
constitute the poles. But the differentiation of these two points, exclusive
of all other points which might just as well be the poles of this identical
sphere cannot happen except by a quality differentiating between two
similar objects. If the philosophers assert that it is not true that any other
place on the sphere might be the seat for these poles, they will be told:
such an assertion implies that the parts of the spheres are not
homogeneous and yet you have often said that the sphere is of a simple
nature and therefore has a simple form, viz. the spherical. And again, if
the philosophers affirm that there are spots on the sphere which are not
homogeneous, it will be asked how these spots came to be of a
heterogeneous nature; is it because they are a body or because they are
a celestial body? But the absence of homogeneity cannot be explained in
this way. Therefore-Ghazali says just as among philosophers the theory is
upheld that all times are equivalent in regard to the creation of the world,
the theologians are justified in claiming that the parts of heaven are
equivalent in regard to their serving as poles, and that the poles do not
seem differentiated from the other points through a special position or
through their being in an immovable place, exclusive of all other places.
This then in short is the objection; it is, however, a rhetorical one, for
many things which by demonstration can be found to be necessary seem
at first sight merely possible.’ The philosophers’ answer is that they assert
that they have proved that the world is composed of five bodies: a body
neither heavy nor light, i.e. the revolving spherical body of heaven and
four other bodies, two of which are earth, absolutely heavy, which is the
centre of the revolving spherical body, and fire, absolutely light, which is
seated in the extremity of the revolving sphere; nearest to earth is water,
which is heavy relatively to air, light relatively to earth; next to water
comes air, which is light relatively to water, heavy relatively to fire. The
reason why earth is absolutely heavy is that it is farthest away from the
circular movement, and therefore it is the fixed centre of the revolving
body; the reason why fire is absolutely light is that it is nearest to the
revolving sphere; the intermediate bodies are both heavy and light,
because they are in the middle between the two extremes, i.e. the farthest
point and the nearest. If there were not a revolving body, surely there
would be neither heavy nor light by nature, and neither high nor low by
nature, and this whether absolutely or relatively; and the bodies would not
differ by nature in the way in which, for instance, earth moves by nature to
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its specific place and fire moves by nature to another place, and equally
so the intermediary bodies. And the world is only finite, because of the
spherical body, and this because of the essential and natural finiteness of
the spherical body, as one single plane circumscribes it.’ Rectilinear
bodies are not essentially finite, as they allow of an increase and
decrease; they are only finite because they are in the middle of a body
that admits neither increase nor decrease, and is therefore essentially
finite. And, therefore, the body circumscribing the world cannot but be
spherical, as otherwise the bodies would either have to end in other
bodies, and we should have an infinite regress, or they would end in
empty space, and the impossibility of both suppositions has been
demonstrated. He who understands this knows that every possible world
imaginable can only consist of these bodies, and that bodies have to be
either circular-and then they are neither heavy nor light-or rectilinear-and
then they are either heavy or light, i.e. either fire or earth or the
intermediate bodies; that these bodies have to be either revolving, or
surrounded by a revolving periphery, for each body either moves from,
towards, or round the centre; that by the movements of the heavenly
bodies to the right and to the left all bodies are constituted and all that is
produced from opposites is generated; and that through these movements
the individuals of these four bodies never cease being in a continual
production and corruption. Indeed, if a single one of these movements
should cease, the order and proportion of this universe would disappear,
for it is clear that this order must necessarily depend on the actual number
of these movements-for if this were smaller or greater, either the order
would be disturbed, or there would be another order-and that the number
of these movements is as it is, either through its necessity for the
existence of this sublunary world, or because it is the best .
Do not ask here for a proof for all this, but if you are interested in
science, look for its proof, where you can find it. Here, however, listen to
theories which are more convincing than those of the theologians and
which, even if they do not bring you complete proof, will give your mind an
inclination to lead you to proof through scientific speculation. You should
imagine that each heavenly sphere is a living being, in so far as it
possesses a body of a definite measure and shape and moves itself in
definite directions, not at random. Anything of this nature is necessarily a
living being; i.e. when we see a body of a definite quality and quantity
64
move itself in space, in a definite direction, not at random, through its own
power, not through an exterior cause, and move in opposite directions at
the same time, we are absolutely sure that it is a living being, and we said
only ‘not through an exterior cause’ because iron moves towards a
magnet when the magnet is brought to it from the outside-and besides,
iron moves to a magnet from any direction whatever., The heavenly
bodies, therefore, possess places which are poles by nature, and these
bodies cannot have their poles in other places, just as earthly animals
have particular organs in particular parts of their bodies for particular
actions, and cannot have them in other places, e.g. the organs of
locomotion, which are located in definite parts. The poles represent the
organs of locomotion in animals of spherical form, and the only difference
in this respect between spherical and non-spherical animals is that in the
latter these organs differ in both shape and power, whereas in the former
they only differ in power. For this reason it has been thought on first sight
that they do not differ at all, and that the poles could be in any two points
on the sphere. And just as it would be ridiculous to say that a certain
movement in a certain species of earthly animal could be in any part
whatever of its body, or in that part where it is in another species, because
this movement has been localized in each species in the place where it
conforms most to its nature, or in the only place where this animal can
perform the movement, so it stands with the differentiation in the heavenly
bodies for the place of their poles. For the heavenly bodies are not one
species and numerically many, but they form a plurality in species, like the
plurality of different individuals of animals where there is only one
individual in the species.
Exactly the same answer can be given to the question why the heavens
move in different directions: that, because they are animals, they must
move in definite directions, like right and left, before and behind, which are
directions determined by the movements of animals, and the only
difference between the movements of earthly animals and those of
heavenly bodies is that in the different animals these movements are
different in shape and in power, whereas in the heavenly animals they
only differ in power. And it is for this reason that Aristotle thinks that
heaven possesses the directions of right and left, before and behind, high
and low. The diversity of the heavenly bodies in the direction of their
movements rests on their diversity of species, and the fact that this
65
difference in the directions of their movements forms the specific
differentia of their species is something proper to them. Imagine the first
heaven as one identical animal whose nature obliges it-either by necessity
or because it is for the best-to move with all its parts in one movement
from east to west. The other spheres are obliged by their nature to have
the opposite movement. The direction which the body of the universe is
compelled to follow through its nature is the best one, because its body is
the best of bodies and the best among the moving bodies must also have
the best direction. All this is explained here in this tentative way, but is
proved apodictically in its proper place. This is also the manifest sense of
the Divine Words, ‘There is no changing the words of God’, and ‘There is
no altering the creation of God’. If you want to be an educated man,
proceeding by proof, you should look for the proof of this in its proper
place.
Now if you have understood all this, it will not be difficult for you to see
the faults in Ghazali’s arguments here about the equivalence of the two
opposite movements in relation to each heavenly body and to the
sublunary world. On first thoughts it might be imagined that the movement
from east to west might also belong to other spheres besides the first, and
that the first sohere might equally well move from west to east. You might
as well say that the crab could be imagined as having the same direction
of movement as man. But, as a matter of fact, such a thought will not
occur to you about men and crabs, because of their difference in shape,
whereas it might occur to you about the heavenly spheres, since they
agree in shape. He who contemplates a product of art does not perceive
its wisdom if he does not perceive the wisdom of the intention embodied in
it, and the effect intended. And if he does not understand its wisdom, he
may well imagine that this object might have any form, any quantity, any
configuration of its parts, and any composition whatever. This is the case
with the theologians in regard to the body of the heavens, but all such
opinions are superficial. He who has such beliefs about products of art
understands neither the work nor the artist, and this holds also in respect
of the works of God’s creation. Understand this principle, and do not judge
the works of God’s creation hastily and superficially-so that you may not
become one of those about whom the Qur’an says: ‘Say, shall we inform
you of those who lose most by their works, those who erred in their
endeavour after the life of this world and who think they are doing good
66
deeds?’ May God make us perspicacious and lift from us the veils of
ignorance; indeed He is the bounteous, the generous! To contemplate the
various actions of the heavenly bodies is like contemplating the kingdom
of heaven, which Abraham contemplated, according to the words of the
Qur'an: ‘Thus did we show Abraham the kingdom of heaven and of the
earth, that he should be of those who are sure.’ And let us now relate
Ghazali’s argument about the movements.
Ghazali says:
The second point in this argument concerns the special
direction of the movement of the spheres which move
partially from east to west, partially in the opposite direction,
whereas the equivalence of the directions in relation to their
cause is exactly the same as the equivalence of the times. If
it is said: If the universe revolved in only one direction, there
would never be a difference in the configuration of the stars,
and such relations of the stars as their being in trine, in
sextile, and in conjunction would, never arise, but the
universe would remain in one unique position without any
change; the difference of these relations, however, is the
principle of all production in the world-we answer: Our
argument does not concern the difference in direction of
movement; no, we concede that the highest sohere moves
from east to west and the spheres beneath it in the opposite
direction, but everything that happens in this way would
happen equally if the reverse took place, i.e. if the highest
sphere moved from west to east and the lower spheres in
the opposite direction. For all the same differences in
configuration would arise just as well. Granted that these
movements are circular and in opposite directions, both
directions are equivalent; why then is the one distinguished
from the other, which is similar to it?’ If it is said: as the two
directions are opposed and contrary, how can they be
similar?-we answer: this is like saying ‘since before and after
are opposed in the existing world, how could it be claimed
that they are equivalent?’ Still, it is asserted by you
philosophers that the equivalence of times, so far as the
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possibility of their realization and any purpose one might
imagine in their realization is concerned, is an evident fact.
Now, we regard it as equally evident that spaces, positions,
situations, and directions are equivalent so far as concerns
their receiving movement and any purpose that might be
connected with it. If therefore the philosophers are allowed to
claim that notwithstanding this equivalence they are
different, their opponents are fully justified in claiming the
same in regard to the times.
| say:
From what | have said previously, the speciousness of this argument and
the way in which it has to be answered will not be obscure to you. All this
is the work of one who does not understand the exalted natures of the
heavenly bodies and their acts of wisdom for the sake of which they have
been created, and who compares God’s knowledge with the knowledge of
ignorant man.
Ghazali says:
If it is said: as the two directions are opposed and
contrary, how can they be similar?-we answer: this is like
saying ‘since before and after in the existing world are
opposed, how could it be claimed that they are equivalent?’
Still, it is asserted by you philosophers that the equivalence
of times so far as the possibility of their realization, and any
purpose one might imagine in their realization is concerned,
is an evident fact. Now, we regard it as equally evident that
spaces, positions, situations, and directions are equivalent
so far as concerns their receiving the movement and any
purpose that might be connected with it.
| say:
The falsehood of this is self-evident. Even if one should admit that the
possibilities of man’s existence and non-existence are equivalent in the
matter out of which he has been created, and that this is a proof for the
existence of a determining principle which prefers his existence to his non-
existence, still it cannot be imagined that the possibilities of seeing and not
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seeing are equivalent in the eye. Thus no one can claim that the opposite
directions are equivalent, although he may claim that the substratum for
both is indifferent, and that therefore out of both directions similar actions
result. And the same holds good for before and after: they are not
equivalent, in so far as this event is earlier and that event later; they can
only be claimed to be equivalent so far as their possibility of existence is
concerned. But the whole assumption is wrong: for essential opposites
also need essentially opposite substrata and a unique substratum giving
rise to opposite acts at one and the same time is an impossibility. The
philosophers do not believe that the possibilities of a thing’s existence and
of its non-existence are equivalent at one and the same time; no, the time
of the possibility of its existence is different from the time of the possibility
of its non-existence, time for them is the condition for the production of
what is produced, and for the corruption of what perishes. If the time for
the possibility of the existence of a thing and the time for the possibility of
its non-existence were the same, that is to say in its proximate matter, its
existence would be vitiated, because of the possibility of its non-existence,
and the possibility of its existence and of its non-existence would be
dependent only on the agent, not on the substratum.
Thus he who tries to prove the existence of an agent in this way gives
only persuasive, dialectical arguments, not apodictic proof. It is believed
that Farabi and Avicenna followed this line to establish that every act must
have an agent, but it is not a proof of the ancient philosophers, and both of
them merely took it over from the theologians of our religion. In relation,
however, to the temporal creation of the world-for him who believes in it-
before and after cannot even be imagined, for before and after in time can
only be imagined in relation to the present moment, and as, according to
the theologians, there was before the creation of the world no time, how
could there be imagined something preceding the moment when the world
was created? A definite moment cannot be assigned for the creation of the
world, for either time did not exist before it, or there was an infinite time,
and in neither case could a definite time be fixed to which the Divine could
attach itself. Therefore it would be more suitable to call this book
‘Incoherence’ without qualification rather than ‘The Incoherence of the
Philosophers’, for the only profit it gives the reader is to make him
incoherent.
69
Ghazali says:
If, therefore, the philosophers are allowed to claim that,
notwithstanding this equivalence, they are different, their
opponents are fully justified in claiming the same in regard to
times.
| say:
He wants to say: If the philosophers are justified in claiming a difference
in the direction of movement, the theologians have the right to assert a
difference in times, notwithstanding their belief in their equivalence. This is
only a verbal argument, and does not refer to the facts themselves, even if
One admits an analogy between the opposite directions and the different
times, but this is often objected to, because there is no analogy between
this difference in times and directions. Our adversary, however, is forced
to admit that there is an analogy between them, because they are both
claimed to be different, and both to be equivalent! These, therefore, are
one and all only dialectical arguments.
Ghazali says:
The second objection against the basis of their argument
is that the philosophers are told: ‘You regard the creation of
a temporal being by an eternal as impossible, but you have
to acknowledge it too, for there are new events happening in
the world and they have causes. It is absurd to think that
these events lead to other events ad infinitum, and no
intelligent person can believe such a thing. If such a thing
were possible, you need not acknowledge a creator and
establish a necessary being on whom possible existences
depend. If, however, there is a limit for those events in which
their sequence ends, this limit will be the eternal and then
indubitably you too acknowledge the principle that a
temporal can proceed from an eternal being.’
| say:
If the philosophers had introduced the eternal being into reality from the
side of the temporal by this kind of argument, i.e. if they had admitted that
the temporal, in so far as temporal, proceeds from an eternal being, there
70
would be no possibility of their avoiding the difficulty in this problem. But
you must understand that the philosophers permit the existence of a
temporal which comes out of a temporal being ad infinitum in an
accidental way, when this is repeated in a limited and finite matter-when,
for instance, the corruption of one of two things becomes the necessary
condition for the existence of the other. For instance, according to the
philosophers it is necessary that man should be produced from man on
condition that the anterior man perishes so as to become the matter for
the production of a third. For instance, we must imagine two men of whom
the first produces the second from the matter of a man who perishes;
when the second becomes a man himself, the first perishes, then the
second man produces a third man out of the matter of the first, and then
the second perishes and the third produces out of his matter a fourth, and
sO we can imagine in two matters an activity continuing ad infinitum,
without any impossibility arising. And this happens as long as the agent
lasts, for if this agent has neither beginning nor end for his existence, the
activity has neither beginning nor end for its existence, as it has been
explained before. And in the same way you may imagine this happening in
them in the past: When a man exists, there must before him have been a
man who produced him and a man who perished, and before this second
man a man who produced him and a man who perished, for everything
that is produced in this way is, when it depends on an eternal agent, of a
circular nature in which no actual totality can be reached. If, on the other
hand, a man were produced from another man out of infinite matters, or
there were an infinite addition of them, there would be an impossibility, for
then there could arise an infinite matter and there could be an infinite
whole. For if a finite whole existed to which things were added ad infinitum
without any corruption taking place in it, an infinite whole could come into
existence, as Aristotle proved in his Physics. For this reason the ancients
introduce an eternal absolutely unchanging being, having in mind not
temporal beings, proceeding from him in so far as they are temporal, but
beings proceeding from him as being eternal generically, and they hold
that this infinite series is the necessary consequence of an eternal agent,
for the temporal needs for its own existence only a temporal cause. Now
there are two reasons why the ancients introduce the existence of an
eternal numerically unique being which does not suffer any change. The
first is that they discovered that this revolving being is eternal, for they
al
discovered that the present individual is produced through the corruption
of its predecessor and that the corruption of this previous individual
implies the production of the one that follows it, and that it is necessary
that this everlasting change should proceed from an eternal mover and an
eternal moved body, which does not change in its substance, but which
changes only in place so far as concerns its parts, and approaches certain
of the transitory things and recedes from certain of them, and this is the
cause of the corruption of one half of them and the production of the other
half. And this heavenly body is the being that changes in place only, not in
any of the other kinds of change, and is through its temporal activities the
cause of all things temporal; and because of the continuity of its activities
which have neither beginning nor end, it proceeds from a cause which has
neither beginning nor end. The second reason why they introduce an
eternal being absolutely without body and matter is that they found that all
the kinds of movement depend on spatial movement, and that spatial
movement depends on a being moved essentially by a prime mover,
absolutely unmoved, both essentially and accidentally, for otherwise there
would exist at the same time an infinite number of moved movers, and this
is impossible. And it is necessary that this first mover should be eternal, or
else it would not be the first. Every movement, therefore, depends on this
mover and its setting in motion essentially, not accidentally. And this
mover exists simultaneously with each thing moved, at the time of its
motion, for a mover existing before the thing moved-such as a man
producing a man-sets only in motion accidentally, not essentially; but the
mover who is the condition of man’s existence from the beginning of his
production till its end, or rather from the beginning of his existence till its
end, is the prime mover. And likewise his existence is the condition for the
existence of all beings and the preservation- of heaven and earth and all
that is between them. All this is not proved here apodictically, but only in
the way we follow here and which is in any case more plausible for an
impartial reader than the arguments of our opponents.
If this is clear to you, you certainly are in no need of the subterfuge by
which Ghazali in his argument against the philosophers tries to conciliate
them with their adversaries in this matter; indeed these artifices will not do,
for if you have not understood how the philosophers introduce an eternal
being into reality, you have not understood how they settle the difficulty of
the rise of the temporal out of the eternal; they do that, as we said, either
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through the medium of a being eternal in its essence but generable and
corruptible in its particular movements, not, however, in its universal
circular movement, or through the medium of what is generically eternal-
i.e. has neither beginning nor end-in its acts.
Ghazali answers in the name of the philosophers:
The philosophers may say, ‘we do not consider it
impossible that any temporal being, whatever it may be,
should proceed from an eternal being, but we regard it as
impossible that the first temporal should proceed from the
eternal, as the mode of its procession does not differ from
that which precedes it, either in a greater inclination towards
existence or through the presence of some particular time, or
through an instrument, condition, nature, accident, or any
cause whatever which might produce a new mode. If this
therefore is not the first temporal, it will be possible that it
should proceed from the eternal, when another thing
proceeds from it, because of the disposition of the receiving
substratum, or because the time was propitious or for any
other reason.
Having given this reply on the part of the philosophers, Ghazali answers
it:
This question about the actualization of the disposition,
whether of the time and of any new condition which arises in
it, still holds good, and we must either come to an infinite
regress or arrive at an eternal being out of which a first
temporal being proceeds.
| say:
This question is the same question all over again as he asked the
philosophers first,’ and this is the same kind of conclusion as he made
them draw then, namely that a temporal proceeds from an eternal, and
having given as their answer something which does not correspond with
the question, i.e. that it is possible that a temporal being should proceed
from the Eternal without there being a first temporal being, he turns the
same question against them again. The correct answer to this question
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was given above: the temporal proceeds from the First Eternal, not in so
far as it is temporal but in so far as it is eternal, i.e. through being eternal
generically, though temporal in its parts. For according to the philosophers
an eternal being out of which a temporal being proceeds essentially’ is not
the First Eternal, but its acts, according to them, depend on the First
Eternal; i.e. the actualization of the condition for activity of the eternal,
which is not the First Eternal, depends on the First Eternal in the same
way as the temporal products depend on the First Eternal and this is a
dependence based on the universal, not on individuals.
After this Ghazali introduces an answer of the philosophers, in one of the
forms in which this theory can be represented, which amounts to this: A
temporal being proceeding from an eternal can only be represented by
means of a circular movement which resembles the eternal by not having
beginning or end and which resembles the temporal in so far as each part
of it is transient, so that this movement through the generation of its parts
is the principle of temporal things, and through the eternity of its totality the
activity of the eternal.
Then Ghazali argues against this view, according to which in the opinion
of the philosophers the temporal proceeds from the First Eternal, and says
to them:
Is this circular movement temporal or eternal? If it is
eternal, how does it become the principle for temporal
things? And if it is temporal, it will need another temporal
being and we shall have an infinite regress. And when you
say that it partially resembles the eternal, partially the
temporal, for it resembles the eternal in so far as it is
permanent and the temporal in so far as it arises anew, we
answer: Is it the principle of temporal things, because of its
permanence, or because of its arising anew? In the former
case, how can a temporal proceed from something because
of its permanence? And in the latter case, what arises anew
will need a cause for its arising anew, and we have an
infinite regress.
| say:
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This argument is sophistical. The temporal does not proceed from it in
so far as it is eternal, but in so far as it is temporal; it does not need,
however, for its arising anew a cause arising anew, for its arising anew is
not a new fact, but is an eternal act, i.e. an act without
obeginning or end. Therefore its agent must be an eternal agent, for an
eternal act has an eternal agent, and a temporal act a temporal agent.
Only through the eternal element in it can it be understood that
movement has neither beginning nor end, and this is meant by its
permanence, for movement itself is not permanent, but changing.
And since Ghazali knew this, he said:
In order to elude this consequence the philosophers have
a kind of artifice which we will expose briefly.
Ghazali says:
THE SECOND PROOF OF THE PHILOSOPHERS
CONCERNING THIS PROBLEM
They assert that he who affirms that the world is posterior
to God and God prior to the world cannot mean anything but
that He is prior not temporally but essentially like the natural
priority of one to two, although they can exist together in
temporal existence, or like the priority of cause to effect, for
instance the priority of the movement of a man to the
movement of his shadow which follows him, or the
movement of the hand to the movement of the ring, or the
movement of the hand in the water to the movement of the
water, for all these things are simultaneous, but the one is
cause, the other effect, for it is said that the shadow moves
through the movement of the man and the water through the
hand in the water, and the reverse is not said although they
are simultaneous. If this is what you mean by saying that
God is prior to the world, then it follows that they must both
either be temporal or eternal, for it is absurd that the one
7s)
should be temporal and the other eternal. If it is meant that
God is prior to the world and to time, not essentially, but
temporally, then there was, before the existence of the world
and of time, a time in which the world was non-existent,
since non-existence preceded the world and God preceded it
during a long duration which had a final term but no initial
one, and then there was before time an infinite time, which is
self-contradictory. Therefore the assertion that time had a
beginning is absurd. And if time-which is the expression of
the measure of movement -is eternal, movement must be
eternal. And the necessity of the eternity of movement
implies the necessity of the eternity of the thing in motion,
through the duration of which time endures.
| say:
The mode of their reasoning which he reproduces does not constitute a
proof. It amounts to saying that the Creator, if He is prior to the world,
must either be prior not in time, but in causation, like the priority of a man
to his shadow, or prior in time, like a builder to a wall. If He is prior in the
same way as the man is prior to his shadow, and if the Creator is eternal,
then the world too is eternal. But if He is prior in time, then He must
precede the world by a time which has no beginning, and time will be
eternal, for if there is a time before the actual, its starting-point cannot be
imagined. And if time is eternal, movement too is eternal, for time cannot
be understood without motion. And if motion is eternal, the thing in motion
will be eternal, and its mover will necessarily be eternal too. But this proof
is unsound, for it is not of the nature of the Creator to be in time, whereas
it belongs to the nature of the world to be so; and for this very reason it is
not true that He is either simultaneous with it or prior to it in time or in
causation.
Ghazali says
The objection to this is: Time is generated and created,
and before it there was no time at all. The meaning of our
words that God is prior to the world and to time is: He
existed without the world and without time, then He existed
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and with Him there was the world and there was time. And
the meaning of our words that He existed without the world
is: the existence of the essence of the Creator and the non-
existence of the essence of the world, and nothing else. And
the meaning of our words that He existed and with Him there
was the world is: the existence of the two essences, and
nothing else. And the meaning of priority: the uniqueness of
His existence, and nothing else. And the world is like a
singular person; if we should say, for instance: God existed
without Jesus, then He existed with Jesus-these words
contain nothing but, first, the existence of an essence and
the non-existence of an essence, then, the existence of two
essences, and there is no need to assume here a third
essence, namely time, although imagination cannot desist
from assuming it. But we should not heed the errors of the
imagination.
| say:
These words are erroneous and mistaken, for we have already proved
that there are two kinds of existence: one in the nature of which there is
motion and which cannot be separated from time; the other in the nature
of which there is no motion and which is eternal and cannot be described
in terms of time. The first is known by the senses and by reason; the
existence of the second-in the nature of which there is neither motion nor
change-is known by proof to everyone who acknowledges that each
motion needs a mover and each effect a cause, and that the causes which
move each other do not regress infinitely, but end in a first cause which is
absolutely unmoved. And it has also been established that the entity in the
nature of which there is no movement is the cause of the entity in the
nature of which there is movement. And it has been proved also that the
entity in the nature of which there is motion cannot be separated from
time, and that the entity in the nature of which there is no movement is
entirely free from time. Therefore the priority of the one entity over the
other is based neither on a priority in time, nor on the priority of that kind of
cause and effect, which belongs to the nature of things in motion, like the
priority of a man to his shadow. For this reason anyone who compares the
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priority of the unmoved being to the thing in motion to the priority existing
between two things in motion is in error; since it is only true of each one in
pairs of moving things that, when it is brought in relation to the other, it is
either simultaneous with it or prior or posterior in time to it. It is the later
philosophers of Islam who made this mistake, since they enjoyed but
slight comprehension of the doctrine of the ancients. So the priority of this
one being to the other is the priority of the unchanging timeless existence
to the changing existence which is in time, and this is an altogether
different type of priority. It is therefore not true of these existences that
they are simultaneous, or that the one precedes the other, and Ghazali’s
observation that the priority of the Creator to the world is not a temporal
priority is true. But the posteriority of the world to the Creator, since He
does not precede the world in time, can only be understood as the
posteriority of effect to cause,’ for posteriority and priority are opposites
which are necessarily in one genus, as has been shown in the sciences.’
Since therefore this priority is not in time, the posteriority also cannot be in
time, and we have the same difficulty all over again: how can the effect be
delayed after the cause when the conditions of acting are fulfilled? The
philosophers, however, since they do not recognize a beginning in the
totality of this existence in moti/n, are not touched by this difficulty, and it is
possible for them to indicate in what way the temporal beings proceed
from the eternal. One of their proofs that existence in motion has no
beginning, and that in its totality it does not start, is that, when it is
assumed to start, it is assumed to exist before its existence, for to start is
a movement, and movement is of necessity in the thing in motion, equally
whether the movement is regarded as taking place in time or at an
instants Another proof is that everything that becomes has the potentiality
of becoming before it actually becomes, although the theologians deny
this (a discussion with them on this point will follow); now potentiality is a
necessary attribute of being in motion, and it follows necessarily that, if it
were assumed to become, it would exist before its existence. What we
have here are only dialectical arguments; they have, however, a much
greater plausibility than what the theologians advance.
As for Ghazali’s words:
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If we should say, for instance, that God existed without
Jesus, and then He existed with Jesus, these words contain
nothing but, first, the existence of an essence and the non-
existence of an essence, then, the existence of two
essences, and there is no need to assume here a third
essence, namely time.
| say:
This is true, provided that Jesus’ posteriority is not regarded as an
essential temporal posteriority, but, if there is a posteriority, it is an
accidental posteriority, for time precedes this posterior entity, i.e. it is a
necessity of Jesus’ existence that time should precede Him and that His
existence should have begun, but the world is not subject to such a
necessity, except in so far as it is a part of a moving existence beyond
which time extends in two directions, as happens to Jesus and other
transitory individuals.z Nothing of this is proved here; here it is simply
explained that the objection is not valid. In addition, what he says
afterwards of the proofs of the philosophers is untrue.
Answering in the name of the philosophers, Ghazali says:
One might say that our expression ‘God existed without
the world’ means a third thing, besides the existence of one
being and the non-existence of another, because, if we
should suppose that in the future God should exist without
the world, there would be in the future the existence of one
being and the non-existence of another, still it would not be
right to say ‘God existed without the world’, but we should
say ‘God will exist without the world’, for only of the past do
we say ‘God existed without the world’; and between the
words ‘existed’ and ‘will exist’ there is a difference, for they
cannot replace each other. And if we try to find out where the
difference between the two sentences lies, it certainly does
not lie in the words ‘existence of one being’ and ‘non-
existence of another being’, but in a third entity, for if we say
of the non-existence of the world in the future ‘God was
without the world’, it will be objected: this is wrong, for ‘was’
refers only to the past. This shows therefore that the word
i)
‘was’ comprises a third entity, namely the past, and the past
by itself is time, and through another existent it is movement,
for movement passes only through the passing of time. And
so it follows necessarily that, before the world, a time
finished which terminated in the existence of the world.
| say:
In this in brief he shows that when it is said ‘such-and-such was without
such-and-such’ and then ‘such-and-such was with such-and-such’ a third
entity is understood, namely time. The word ‘was’ shows this, because of
the difference in the meaning of this concept in the past and in the future,
for if we assume the existence of one thing with the non-existence of
another in the past, we say ‘such a thing existed without such a thing’, but
when we assume the non-existence of the one with the existence of the
other in the future, we say ‘such a thing will exist without such a thing’, and
the change in meaning implies that there is here a third entity. If in our
expression ‘such-and-such existed without such-and-such’ the word
‘existed’ did not signify an entity, the word ‘existed’ would not differ from
‘will exist’. All this is self-evident, but it is only unquestionable in relation to
the priority and posteriority of things which are by nature in time.
Concerning the timeless the word ‘was’ and the like indicate in such a
proposition nothing but the copula between predicate and subject, when
we say, for example, ‘God was indulgent and compassionate’;’ and the
same holds when either predicate or subject is timeless, e.g. when we say
‘God was without the world, then God was with the world’. Therefore for
such existents the time-relation to which he refers does not hold. This
relation is, however, unquestionably real when we compare the non-
existence of the world with its existence, for if the world is in time, the non-
existence of the world as to be in time too. And since the non-existence
and the existence of the world cannot be in one and the same time, the
non-existence must precede; the non-existence must be prior and the
world posterior to it, for priority and posteriority in the moving can only be
understood in this relation to time. The only flaw in this argument is to
assume this relation between God and the world. Only in this point is the
argument which Ghazali relates faulty and does it fail to constitute a proof.
Then Ghazali gives the theologians’ objection to this argument of the
philosophers:’
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The primitive meaning of the two words is the existence
of one thing and the non-existence of another. The third
element which is the connexion between the two words is a
necessary relation to us. The proof is that, if we should
suppose a destruction of the world in the future and
afterwards a second existence for us, we should then say
‘God was without the world’, and this would be true, whether
we meant its original non-existence or the second non-
existence, its destruction after its existence. And a sign that
this is a subjective relation is that the future can become
past and can be indicated by the word ‘past’.’ All this is the
consequence of the inability of our imagination to imagine
the beginning of a thing without something preceding it, and
this ‘before’ of which the imagination cannot rid itself is
regarded as a really existing thing, namely time. This
resembles the inability of the imagination to admit a limited
body, e.g. overhead, without anything beyond its surface, so
that it is imagined that behind the world there is a space
either occupied or empty; and when it is said there is above
the surface of the world no beyond and no farther extension,
this is beyond the grasp of the imagination. Likewise, when it
is said that there is no real anterior to the existence of the
world, the imagination refuses to believe it. But the
imagination may be called false in allowing above the world
an empty space which is an infinite extension by our saying
to it: empty space cannot be understood by itself, for
extension is the necessary attribute of a body whose sides
comprise space; a finite body implies the finiteness of
extension, which is its attribute and the limitation of occupied
space; empty space is unintelligible, therefore there is
neither empty nor occupied space behind the world,
although the imagination cannot admit this. And in the same
way as it is said that spatial extension is an attribute of body,
temporal extension is an attribute of motion, for time is the
extension of movement just as the space between the sides
of a body is the extension of space. And just as the proof
that the sides of a body are finite prevents the admission of a
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spatial extension behind the world, so the proof of the finite
character of movement in both directions prevents the
supposition of a temporal extension behind the world,
although the imagination, subject to its illusion and
supposition, admits it and does not hold back from it. There
is no difference between temporal extension, which is
apprehended as divided through the relation of before and
after, and spatial extension, which is apprehended as
divided through the relation of high and low. If it is therefore
permissible to admit a highest point above which there is
nothing, it is equally permissible to admit a beginning, not
preceded by anything real, except through an illusion similar
to that which permits a beyond for the highest space. This is
a legitimate consequence; notice it carefully, as the
philosophers themselves agreed that behind the world there
is neither empty nor occupied space.
| say:
There are two parts to this objection; the first is that, when we imagine
the past and the future, i.e. the prior and the posterior, they are two things
existing in relation to our imagination, because we can imagine a future
event as becoming past and a past event as having been future. But if this
is SO, past and future are not real things in themselves and do not possess
existence outside the soul; they are only constructs of the soul. And when
movement is annihilated, the relation and measure of time will not have
sense any more.
The answer is that the necessary connexion of movement and time is
real and time is something the soul constructs in movement, but neither
movement nor time is annihilated: they are only abolished in those things
which are not subject to motion, but in the existence of moving things or in
their possible existence time inheres necessarily. For there are only two
kinds of being, those that are subject to motion and those that are not, and
the one kind cannot be converted into the other, for otherwise a
conversion of the necessary into the possible would become possible. For
if movement were impossible and then afterwards occurred, the nature of
things which arc not subject to motion would have changed into the nature
of things subject to motion, and this is impossible. This is a consequence
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of the fact that motion inheres necessarily in a substratum. If movement
were possible before the existence of the world, the things which are
subject to movement would be necessarily in time, for movement is only
possible in what is subject to rest,’ not in absolute non-existence, for in
absolute non-existence there is no possibility whatever, or one would have
to admit that absolute non-existence could be converted into existence.
Therefore, the non-existence or privation which necessarily precedes the
occurrence of a thing has to be connected with a substratum, and will be
disconnected from it when the substratum actually receives this
occurrence, as happens with all contraries. For instance, when a warm
thing becomes cold, the essence of warmth does not change into
coldness; it is only the receptacle and the substratum of warmth that
exchange their warmth for coldness.
The second part of this objection-and it is the most important of these
objections-is sophistical and malicious. It amounts to saying that to
imagine something before the beginning of this first movement (which is
not preceded by any moving body) is like the illusion that the end of the
world, for example, its highest part, ends necessarily either in another
body or in empty space, for extension is a necessary attribute of body, as
time is a necessary attribute of movement. And if it is impossible that there
should be an infinite body, it is impossible that there should be an infinite
extension, and, if it is impossible that there should be infinite extension, it
is impossible that every body should end in another body or in something
which has the potentiality of extension, i.e. for instance, emptiness, and
that this should continue without end. And the same applies to movement
which has time as a necessary attribute, for if it is impossible that there
should be infinite past movements and there exists therefore a first
movement with a finite initial term, it is impossible that there should exist a
‘before’ before it, for, if so, there would be another movement before the
first.
This objection is, as we said, malicious, and belongs to the class of
sophistical substitutions-you will recognize what | mean if you have read
the book On sophistic refutations. In other words, Ghazali treats the
quantity which has no position and does not form a totality, i.e. time and
motion, as the quantity which possesses position and totality, i.e. body. He
makes the impossibility of endlessness in the latter a proof of its
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impossibility in the former, and he deals with the act of the soul when it
imagines an increase in the one quantity which is assumed to be actual,
i.e. body, as if it concerned both quantities. This is a manifest error. For to
imagine an increase in actual spatial magnitude, so that it must end in
another actual spatial magnitude, is to imagine something which does not
exist in the essence and definition of spatial magnitude, but to imagine
priority and posteriority in a movement that occurs is to imagine something
that belongs to its essence. For a movement can only occur in time, i.e.
time has to pass beyond its beginning. For this reason one cannot
represent a time the initial term of which is not the final term of another
time, for the definition of ‘the instant’ is that it is the end of the past and the
beginning of the future,’ for the instant is the present which necessarily is
the middle between the past and the future, and to represent a present
which is not preceded by a past is absurd. This, however, does not apply
to the point, for the point is the end of the line and exists at the same time
as the line, for the line is at rest. Therefore one can imagine a point which
is the beginning of a line without its being the end of another line, but the
instant cannot exist without the past and tile future, and exists necessarily
after the past and before the future, and what cannot subsist in itself
cannot exist before the existence of the future without being the end of tile
past. The cause of this error is the comparison of the instant with the
point. The proof that each movement which occurs is preceded by time is
this: everything must come to exist out of a privation, and nothing can
become in the instant-of which it can be truly said that its becoming is a
vanishing-and so it must be true that its privation must be in another
moment than that in which it itself exists, and there is time between each
pair of instants, because instant is not continuous with instant, nor point
continuous with point. This has been proved in the sciences. Therefore
before the instant in which the movement occurs there must necessarily
be a time, because, when we represent two instants in reality, there must
necessarily be time between them.
And what is said in this objection that ‘higher’ resembles ‘before’ is not
true, nor does the instant resemble the point, nor the quantity which
possesses position the quantity which does not possess position.’ He who
allows the existence of an instant which is not a present, or of a present
which is not preceded by a past, denies time and the instant, for he
assumes an instant as having the description which we have mentioned,
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and then assumes a time which has no beginning-which is a self-
contradictory assumption. It is, therefore, wrong to ascribe to an act of
imagination the fact that there is a prior event for every occurrence, for he
who denies priority denies the event in time. The contrary is the case with
the man who denies the real character of the high, for he denies the
absolutely high and, when he denies the absolutely high, he denies also
the absolutely low,’ and when these two are denied, also the heavy and
the light are denied’, and the act of the imagination that a body with
straight dimensions must end in another body is not false; no, this is a
necessary truth, for the body with straight dimensions has the possibility of
increasing, and what has this possibility is not limited by nature. Therefore
the body with straight surfaces must end in the circumscribing circular
body, since this is the perfect body which is liable neither to increase nor
to decrease. Therefore when the mind seeks to imagine that the circular
body must end in another body, it imagines the impossible. These are all
matters of which the theologians and those who do not start their inquiry in
the proper scientific order are unaware.
Further, the relation between time and motion is not the same as that
between spatial limit and spatial magnitude, for the spatial limit is an
attribute of spatial magnitude, in so far as it inheres in it, in the way that
the accident inheres in its substratum and is individualized by the
individuality of its substratum and is indicated by pointing at its substratum
and by its being in the place in which its substratum is. But this is not the
case with the necessary relation between time and motion. For the
dependence of time on motion is much like the dependence of number on
the thing numbered: just as number does not become individualized
through tire individuation of the thing numbered, nor pluralized through its
plurality, so it stands with the relation between time and movement. Time,
therefore, is unique for all movement and for each thing moving, and
exists everywhere, so that if we should suppose people confined from
youth in a cave in the earth, still we should be sure that they would
perceive time, even if they did not perceive any of the movements which
are perceived in the world. Aristotle therefore thought that the existence of
movements in time is much like the existence of the things numbered in
numbers for number is not pluralized through the plurality of the things
numbered, nor is it localized through the individuation of the places
numbered. He thought, therefore, that its specific quality was to mesaure
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the movements and to measure the existence of moving things, in so far
as they are moving, as number counts the individual moving things, and
therefore Aristotle says in his definition of time that it is the number of
movement according to the relations of anterior and posterior.’ Therefore,
just as the supposition that a thing numbered occurs does not imply that
number comes into existence, but it is a necessary condition for the
occurrence of a thing numbered that number should exist before it, so the
occurrence of movement implies that there was time before it. If time
occurred with the occurrence of any individual movement whatever, time
would only be perceived with that individual movement. This will make you
understand how different the nature of time is from the nature of spatial
magnitude.
Ghazali answers on behalf of the philosophers:
It may be said: This comparisons is lame, for there is
neither above nor below in the world; for the world is
spherical, and in the sphere there is neither above nor
below; if the one direction is called above, because it is
overhead, and the other below, because it is under foot, this
name is always determined in relation to you, and the
direction which is below in relation to you is above in relation
to another, if you imagine him standing on the other side of
the terrestrial globe with the sole of his foot opposite the sole
of your foot. Yes, these parts of heaven which you reckon
above during the day are identical with what is below during
the night, and what is below the earth comes again above
the earth through the daily revolution. But it cannot be
imagined that the beginning of the world becomes its end. If
we imagined a stick with one thick and one thin end and we
agreed to call the part nearest the thin end ‘above’ and the
other ‘below’, there would not arise from this an essential
differentiation in the parts of the world; it would simply be
that different names would have been applied to the shape
of the stick, so that if we substituted the one name for the
other, there would be an exchange of names, but the world
itself would remain unchanged. So ‘above’ and ‘below’ are a
mere relation to you without any differentiation in the parts
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and places of the world. The non-existence, however,
preceding the world and the initial term of its existence are
essential realities, a substitution or a change of which cannot
be imagined. Nor can it be imagined that the non-existence
which is supposed to occur at the disappearance of the
world and which follows the world can become the non-
existence preceding it. The initial and final terms of the
world’s existence are permanent essential terms, in which no
change can be imagined through the change of the
subjective relation to them, in contrast with ‘above’ and
‘below’. Therefore we philosophers, indeed, are justified in
saying that in the world there is neither ‘above’ nor ‘below’,
but you theologians have not the right to assert that the
existence of the world has neither a ‘before’ nor an ‘after’.
And when the existence of ‘before’ and ‘after’ is proved,
time cannot mean anything but what is apprehended through
the anterior and the posterior.
| say:
This answer given in the name of the philosophers is extremely
unsound. It amounts to saying that ‘above’ and ‘below’ are relative to us
and that therefore imagination can treat them as an infinite sequence, but
that the sequence of ‘before’ and ‘after’ does not rest on imagination-for
there is here no subjective relation-but is a ~ purely rational concept. This
means that the order of above and below in a thing may be reversed in
imagination, but that the privation before an event and the privation after
an event, its before and its after, are not interchangeable for imagination.
But by giving this answer the problem is not solved, for the philosophers
think that i there exists a natural above; to which light things move and a
natural below to which heavy things move, or else the heavy and the light
would be relative and exist by convention, and they hold that in
imagination the limit of a body, having by nature its place above, may end
either in occupied or in empty space. And this argument is in- valid as a
justification of the philosophers for two reasons. First, that the
philosophers assume an absolute above and an absolute below, but no
absolute beginning and no absolute end; secondly that their opponents
may object that it is not the fact of their being relative that causes the
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imagination to regard the sequence of low and high as an infinite series,
but that this happens to the imagination because it observes that every
spatial magnitude is continuous with another spatial magnitude, just as
any event is preceded by another event. n Therefore Ghazali transfers the
question from the words ‘above’ and ‘below’ to ‘inside’ and ‘outside’s and
he says in his answer to the philosophers:
There is no real difference in the words ‘above’ and
‘below’, and therefore there is no sense in defining them, but
we will apply ourselves rather to the words ‘inside’ and
‘outside’. We say: The world has an inside and an outside;
and we ask: Is there outside the world an occupied or empty
space? The philosophers will answer: There is outside the
world neither occupied nor empty space, and if you mean by
‘outside’ its extreme surface, then there is an outside, but if
you mean anything else, there is no outside. Therefore if
they ask us theologians if there is anything before the
existence of the world, we say: If you mean by it the
beginning, i.e. its initial term, then there is a before, just as
there is an outside to the world according to your explanation
that that is its ultimate limit and its final plane, but if you
mean anything else, then there is not, in analogy with your
answer.
If you say: A beginning of existence, without anything
preceding it, cannot be understood, we say: A limit of a body
existing without anything outside it cannot be understood.’ If
you say: Its exterior is its furthest plane and nothing else, we
say: Its before is the beginning of its existence, nothing else.
The conclusion is that we say: We affirm that God has an
existence without the world’s existing, and this assumption
again does not force us to accept anything else. That to
assume more rests on the act of imagination is proved by
the fact that imagination acts in the same way in regard to
time as in regard to place, for although our opponents
believe in the eternity of the world, their imagination is willing
to suppose it created; whereas we, who believe in its
creation, are often allowed by our imagination to regard it as
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eternal. So much as far as body is concerned; but to revert
to time, our opponents do not regard a time without a
beginning as possible, and yet in opposition to this belief
their imagination can represent it as a possible assumption,
although time cannot be represented by the imagination in
the way that body is represented, for neither the champion
nor the opponent of the finitude of body can imagine a body
not surrounded by empty or occupied space; the imagination
simply refuses to accept it. Therefore one should say: a clear
thinker pays no attention to the imagination when he cannot
deny the finitude of body by proof, nor does he give attention
to the imagination when he cannot deny the beginning of an
existence without anything preceding it, which the
imagination cannot grasp. For the imagination, as it is only
accustomed to a body limited by another body or by air,
represents emptiness in this way, although emptiness, being
imperceptible, cannot be occupied by anything. Likewise the
imagination, being only accustomed to an event occurring
after another event, fears to suppose an event not preceded
by another event which is terminated. And this is the reason
of the error.
| say:
Through this transference, by his comparing the time-limit with the
spatial limit in his argument against the philosophers, this argument
becomes invalid and we have already shown the error through which it is
specious and the sophistical character of the argument, and we need not
repeat ourselves.
Ghazali says:
The philosophers have a second way of forcing their
opponents to admit the eternity of time. They say: You do
not doubt that God was able to create the world one year, a
hundred years, a thousand years, and so ad infinitum, before
He created it and that those possibilities are different in
magnitude and number. Therefore it is necessary to admit
before the existence of the world a measurable extension,
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one part of which can be longer than another part, and
therefore it is necessary that something should have existed
before the existence of the world. If you say the word ‘years’
cannot be applied before the creation and revolution of
heaven, let us drop the word ‘years’ and let us give another
turn to our argument and say: If we suppose that from the
beginning of the world till now the sphere of the world has
performed, for instance, a thousand revolutions, was God
able to create a second world before it, which, for example,
would have performed eleven hundred revolutions up to
now? If you deny it, it would mean that the Eternal had
passed from impotence to power or the world from
impossibility to possibility, but if you accept it, and you
cannot but accept it, it may be asked if God was able to
create a third world which would have performed twelve
hundred revolutions up to now and you will have to admit
this. We philosophers say: Then, could the world which we
called by the order of our supposition the third, although as a
matter of fact it is the first, have been created at the same
time as the world we called the second, so that the former
would have performed twelve hundred revolutions and the
latter eleven hundred revolutions, it being understood that
both, in revolving, complete the same distance at the same
speed? If you were to admit this, you would be admitting
something absurd, for it would be absurd that in that case
the number of the two revolutions, having the same speed
and finishing at the same moment, should be different. But, if
you answer that it is impossible that the third world which
has up to now performed twelve hundred revolutions could
have been created at the same time as the second world
which has up to now performed eleven hundred revolutions,
and that on the contrary it must have been created the same
number of years earlier than the second, as the second has
been created before the first-we call it first, as it comes first
in order, when in imagination we proceed from our time to it-
then there exists a quantity of possibility double that of
another possibility, and there is doubtless another possibility
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which doubles the whole of the others. These measurable
quantitative possibilities, of which some are longer than
others by a definite measure, have no other reality than time,
and those measurable quantities are not an attribute of the
essence of God, who is too exalted to possess measure,’
nor an attribute of the non-existence of the world, for non-
existence is nothing and therefore cannot be measured with
different measures. Still, quantity is an attribute which
demands a substratum, and this is nothing other than
movement, and quantity is nothing but the time which
measures movement. Therefore also for you theologians
there existed before the world a substratum of differentiated
quantity, namely time, and according to you time existed
before the world.’
| say:
The summary of this argument is that, when we imagine a movement,
we find with it an extension which measures it, as if it were its
measurement, while reciprocally the movement measures the extension,
and we find that we can assume in this measure and this extension a
movement longer than the first supposed movement, and we affirm
through the corresponding and congruous units of this extension that the
one movement is longer than the other.’ If therefore for you theologians
the world has a certain extension from its beginning till now-let us
suppose, for instance, a thousand years and since God according to you
is able to create before this world another world, we may suppose that the
extension He can give it will be longer than the extension of the first world
by a certain definite quantity, and that He can likewise create a third world
before this second and that the existence of each of them must be
preceded by an extension through which its existence can be measured. If
this is true, and there is an infinite regress of this possibility of anterior
worlds, there is an extension which precedes all these worlds. And this
extension which measures all of them cannot be absolute nonexistence,
for non-existence cannot measure; it has, therefore, to be a quantity, for
what measures a quantity has to be quantity itself, and the measuring
quantity is that which we call time. And it is clear that this must precede in
existence anything we imagine to occur, just as the measure must
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precede the measured in existence. If this extension which is time were to
occur at the occurrence of the first movement, then it would have to be
preceded by an extension which could measure it, in which it could occur,
and which could be like its measurement. And in the same way any world
which could be imagined would have to be preceded by an extension
which measures it. Therefore this extension has no beginning, for if it had
a beginning it would have to have an extension which measured it, for
each event which begins has an extension which measures it and which
we call time.
This is the most suitable exposition of this argument, and this is the
method by which Avicenna proves infinite time, but there is a difficulty in
understanding it, because of the problem that each possible has one
extension and each extension is connected with its own possible and this
forms a point of discussion;’ or one must concede that the possibilities
prior to the world are of the same nature as the possible inside the world,
i.e. as it is of the nature of this possible inside the world that time inheres
in it, so also with the possible which is prior to the world. This is clear
concerning the possible inside the world, and therefore the existence of
time may be imagined from it.
Ghazali says:
The objection is that all this is the work of imagination,
and the most convenient way of refuting it is to compare time
with place; therefore we say: Was it not in God’s power to
create the highest sphere in its heaven a cubit higher than
He has created it? If the answer is negative, this is to deny
God’s power, and if the answer is affirmative, we ask: And
by two cubits and by three cubits and so on ad infinitum?
Now we affirm that this amounts to admitting behind the
world a spatial extension which has measure and quantity,
as a thing which is bigger by two or three cubits than another
occupies a space bigger by two or three cubits, and by
reason of this there is behind the world a quantity which
demands a substratum and this is a body or empty space.
Therefore, there is behind the world empty or occupied
space. And how can you answer this? And likewise we may
ask, whether God was not able to create the sphere of the
oA
world smaller than He has created it by a cubit or two cubits?
And is there no difference between those two magnitudes in
regard to the occupied space taken away from them and the
space they still occupy, for the occupied space withdrawn is
bigger when two cubits are taken away than when one cubit
is taken away? And therefore empty space has measure.
But emptiness is nothing; how can it have measure? And our
answer is: ‘It belongs to the illusion of imagination to
suppose possibilities in time before the existence of the
world’, just as your answer is: ‘It belongs to the illusion of
imagination to suppose possibilities in space behind the
existence of the world.’ There is no difference between those
two points of view.’
| say:
This consequence is true against the theory which regards an infinite
increase in the size of the world as possible, for it follows from this theory
that a finite thing proceeds from God which is preceded by infinite
quantitative possibilities. And if this is allowed for possibility in space, it
must also be allowed in regard to the possibility in time, and we should
have a time limited in both directions, although it would be preceded by
infinite temporal possibilities. The answer is, however, that to imagine the
world to be bigger or smaller does not conform to truth but is impossible.
But the impossibility of this does not imply that to imagine the possibility of
a world before this world is to imagine an impossibility, except in case the
nature of the possible were already realized and there existed before the
existence of the world only two natures, the nature of the necessary and
the nature of the impossible? But it is evident that the judgement of reason
concerning the being of these three natures is eternal, like its judgement
concerning the necessary and the impossible.
This objection, however, does not touch the philosophers, because they
hold that the world could not be smaller or bigger than it is,
If it were possible that a spatial magnitude could infinitely increase, then
the existence of a spatial magnitude without end would be possible and a
spatial magnitude, actually infinite, would exist, and this is impossible and
Aristotle has already shown the impossibility of this.’ But against the man
93
who believes in this possibility, because the contrary would imply a denial
of God’s power, this argument is valid, for this spatial possibility is just as
much a purely rational concept as the possibility of temporal anteriority
according to the philosophers. Therefore, he who believes in the temporal
creation of the world and affirms that all body is in space, is bound to
admit that before the creation of the world there was space, either
occupied by body, in which the production of the world could occur, or
empty, for it is necessary that space should precede what is produced.’
The man who denies empty space and affirms the finiteness of body-like
certain later Ash’arites who, however, separated themselves from the
principles of the theologians; but | have not read it in their books and it
was told to me by some who studied their doctrines-cannot admit the
temporal production of the world. If the fact of this extension which
measures movement and which stands in relation to it as its measurement
were indeed the work of an illusion-like the representation of a world
bigger or smaller than it really is-time would not exist, for time is nothing
but what the mind perceives of this extension which measures movement.
And if it is self-evident that time exists, then the act of the mind must
necessarily be a veracious one, embodying reason, not one embodying
illusion.
Ghazali says:
It has been objected: we declare that what is not possible
is what cannot be done and increase or decrease in the size
of the world is impossible, and therefore could not be
brought about .
| say
This is the answer to the objection of the Ash’arites that to admit that
God could not have made the world bigger or smaller is to charge Him
with impotence, but they have thereby compromised themselves, for
impotence is not inability to do the impossible, but inability to do what can
be done.
Ghazali, opposing this, says:
This excuse is invalid for three reasons: The first is that it
is an affront to reason, for when reason regards it as
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possible that the world might be bigger or smaller than it is
by a cubit, this is not the same as regarding it as possible to
identify black with white and existence with non-existence;
impossibility lies in affirming the negative and the positive at
the same time, and all impossibilities amount to this. This is
indeed a silly and faulty assertion.’
| say:
This statement is, as he says, an affront to reason, but only to the
reason of him who judges superficially; it is not an affront to true reason,
for a statement about its being possible or not’ requires a proof. And
therefore he is right when he declares that this is not impossible in the way
in which the assumption that black might be white is impossible, for the
impossibility of the latter is self-evident. The statement, however, that the
world could not be smaller or larger than it is is not self-evident. And
although all impossibilities can be reduced to self-evident impossibilities,
this reduction can take place in two ways. The first is that the impossibility
is self-evident; the second is that there follows sooner or later from its
supposition an impossibility of the same character as that of self-evident
impossibilities.’ For instance, if it is assumed that the world might be larger
or smaller than it is, it follows that outside it there would be occupied or
empty space. And from the supposition that there is outside it occupied or
empty space, some of the greatest impossibilities follow: from empty
space the existence of mere extension existing by itself; from occupied
space a body moving either upward or downward or in a circle which
therefore must be part of another world. Now it has been proved in the
science of physics that the existence of another world at the same time as
this is an impossibility and the most unlikely consequence would be that
the world should have empty space: for any world must needs have four
elements and a spherical body revolving round them. He who wants to
ascertain this should look up the places where its exposition is demanded-
this, of course, after having fulfilled the preliminary conditions necessary
for the student to understand strict proof .
Then Ghazali mentions the second reason:
If the world is in the state it is, without the possibility of
being larger or smaller than it is, then its existence, as it is, is
95
necessary, not possible. But the necessary needs no cause.
So say, then, as the materialists do that you deny the creator
and that you deny the cause of causes! But this is not your
doctrine.
| say:
To this the answer which, Avicenna gives in accordance with his
doctrine is quite appropriate.’ According to him necessity of existence is of
two kinds: the necessary, existent by itself, and the necessary, existent
through another. But my answer on this question is still more to the point:
things necessary in this sense need not have an agent or a maker; take,
for example, a saw which is used to saw wood-it is a tool having a certain
determined quantity, quality, and matter, that is, it is not possible for it to
be of another material than iron and it could not have any other shape
than that of a saw or any other measure than the measure of a saw. Still
nobody would say that the saw has a necessity of being= See, therefore,
how crude this mistake is! If one were to take away the necessity from the
quantities, qualities, and matters of things produced by art, in the way the
Ash’arites imagine this to happen concerning the created in relation to the
creator, the wisdom which lies in the creator and the created would have
been withdrawn, any agent could be an artificer and any cause in
existence a creator. But all this is a denial of reason and wisdom.
Ghazali says:
The third reason is that this faulty argument authorizes its
opponent to oppose it by a similar one, and we may say: The
existence of the world was not possible before its existence,
for indeed possibility-according to your theory-is coextensive
with existence, neither more nor less. If you say: ‘But then
the eternal has passed from impotence to power’, we
answer:
‘No, for the existence was not possible and therefore
could not be brought about and the impossibility of a thing’s
happening that could not happen does not indicate
impotence.’ If you say: ‘How can a thing which is impossible
become possible?’ We answer: ‘But why should it be
impossible that a thing should be impossible at one moment
96
and possible at another?’ If you say: ‘The times are similar,’
the answer is: ‘But so are the measures, and why should
one measure be possible and another, bigger or smaller by
the width of a nail, impossible?’ And if the latter assumption
is not impossible, the former is not impossible either.’ And
this is the way to oppose them.
But the true answer is that their supposition of
possibilities makes no sense whatever. We concede only
that God is eternal and powerful, and that His action never
fails, even if He should wish it. And there is nothing in this
power that demands the assumption of a_ temporal
extension, unless imagination, confusing God’s power with
other things, connects it with time.
| say:
The summary of this is that the Ash’arites say to the philosophers: this
question whether the world could be larger or smaller is impossible
according to us; it has sense only for the man who believes in a priority of
possibility in relation to the actualization of a thing, i.e. the realization of
the possible. We, the Ash’arites, however, say: ‘Possibility occurs together
with the actuality as it is, without adding or subtracting anything.’
Now my answer is that he who denies the possibility of the possible
before its existence denies the necessary, for the possible is the contrary
of the impossible without there existing a middle term, and, if a thing is not
possible before its existence, then it is necessarily impossible.’ Now to
posit the impossible as existing is an impossible falsehood, but to posit the
possible as existing is a possible, not an impossible, falsehood.’ Their
assertion that possibility and actuality exist together is a falsehood, for
possibility and actuality are contradictory, and do not exist together in one
and the same moment. The necessary consequence for them is that
possibility exists neither at the same time as the actuality nor before it.
The true consequence for the Ash’arites in this discussion is not that the
eternal passes from impotence to power, for he who cannot do an
impossible act is not called impotent, but that a thing can pass from the
nature of the i impossible to the nature of existence, and this is like the
changing of the necessary into the possible. To posit a thing, however, as
97,
impossible at one time and possible at another does not cut it off from the
nature of the possible, for this is the general character of the possible; the
existence of anything possible, for instance, is impossible at the moment
when its contrary exists in its substratum. If the opponent concedes that a
thing impossible at one time is possible at another, then he has conceded
that this thing is of the nature of the absolutely possible’ and that it has not
the nature of the impossible. If it is assumed that the world was impossible
for an infinite time before its production, the consequence is that, when it
was produced, it changed over from impossibility to possibility. This
question is not the problem with which we are concerned here, but as we
have said before, the transference from one problem to another is an act
of sophistry.
And as to his words:
But the true answer is that their supposition of
possibilities makes no sense whatever. We concede only
that God is eternal and powerful and that His action never
fails, even if He should wish it. And there is nothing in this
power that demands the assumption of a _ temporal
extension, unless imagination confusing God’s power with
other things connects with it time.
| say:
Even if there were nothing in this supposition-as he says-that implies
the eternity of time, there is something in it that demands that the
possibility of the occurrence of the world and equally of time should be
eternal. And this is that God never ceases to have power for action, and
that it is impossible that anything should prevent His act from being
eternally connected with His existence; and perhaps the opposite of this
statement indicates the impossibility better still, namely, that He should
have no power at one time but power at another, and that He could be
called powerful only at definite limited times, although He is ark eternal
and perpetual being. And then we have the old question again whether the
world may be either eternal or temporal, or whether the world cannot be
eternal, or whether the world cannot be temporal, or whether the world
may be temporal but certainly cannot be eternal, and whether, if the world
is temporal, it can be a first act or not. And if reason has no power to
98
pronounce for one of these opposite propositions, let us go back to
tradition, but do not then regard this question as a rational one! We say
that the First Cause cannot omit the best act and perform an inferior,
because this would be an imperfection; but can there be a greater
imperfection than to assume the act of the Eternal as finite and limited, like
the act of a temporal product, although a limited act can only be imagined
of a limited agent, not of the eternal agent whose existence and action are
unlimited? .All this, as you see, cannot be unknown to the man who has
even the slightest understanding of the rational. And how can it be thought
that the present act proceeding from the Eternal cannot be preceded by
another act, and again by another, and so in our thinking infinitely, like the
infinite continuation of His existence? For it is a necessary consequence
that the act of Him whose existence time cannot measure nor comprehend
in either direction cannot be comprehended in time nor measured by a
limited duration. For there is no being whose act is delayed after its
existence, except when there is an impediment which prevents its
existence from attaining its perfection,’ or, in voluntary beings, when there
is an obstruction in the execution of their choice. He, therefore, who
assumes that from the Eternal there proceeds only a temporal act
presumes that His act is constrained in a certain way and in this way
therefore does not depend on His choice.
THE THIRD PROOF FOR THE ETERNITY OF
THE WORLD
Ghazali says:
They insist on saying: The existence of the world is
possible before its existence, as it is absurd that it should be
impossible and then become possible; this possibility has no
beginning, it is eternally unchangeable and the existence of
the world remains eternally possible, for at no time whatever
can the existence of the world be described as impossible;
and if the possibility never ceases, the possible, in
conformity with the possibility, never ceases either; and the
meaning of the sentence, that the existence of the world is
possible, is that the existence of the world is not impossible;
and since its existence is eternally possible, it is never
og
impossible, for if it were ever impossible, it would not be true
that the existence of the world is eternally possible; and if it
were not true that the existence of the world is eternally
possible, it would not be true that its possibility never
ceases; and if it were not true that its possibility never
ceases, it would be true that its possibility had begun; and if
it were true that its possibility had begun, its existence before
this beginning would not be possible and that would lead to
the assumption of a time when the world was not possible
and God had no power over it.
| say:
He who concedes that the world before its existence was of a never-
ceasing possibility must admit that the world is eternal, for the assumption
that what is eternally possible is eternally existent implies no absurdity.
What can possibly exist eternally must necessarily exist eternally, for what
can receive eternity cannot become corruptible, except if it were possible
that the corruptible could become eternal. Therefore Aristotle has said that
the possibility in the eternal beings is necessary.’
Ghazali says:
The objection is that it is said that the temporal becoming
of the world never ceased to be possible, and certainly there
is no time at which its becoming could not be imagined. But
although it could be at any time, it did not become at any
time whatever, for reality does not conform to possibility, but
differs from it. You yourself hold, for instance, in the matter
of place, that the world could be bigger than it is or that the
creation of an infinite series of bodies above the world is
possible, and that there is no limit to the possibilities of
increase in the size of the world, but still the actual existence
of absolutely infinite occupied space and of any infinite and
limitless being is impossible. What is said to be possible is
an actual body of a limited surface, but the exact size of this
body, whether it is larger or smaller, is not specified. In the
same way, what is possible is the coming into existence of
the world in time, but the exact time of its coming into
100
existence whether earlier or later, is not specified. The
principle of its having come into being is specified and this is
the possible, nothing else.’
| say:
The man who assumes that before the existence of the world there was
One unique, never-ceasing possibility must concede that the world is
eternal. The man who affirms, like Ghazali in his answer, that before the
world there was an infinite number of possibilities of worlds, has certainly
to admit that before this world there was another world and before this
second world a third, and so on ad infinitum, as is the case with human
beings, and especially when it is assumed that the perishing of the earlier
is the necessary condition for the existence of the later. For instance, if
God had the power to create another world before this, and before this
second world yet another, the series must continue infinitely, or else we
should arrive at a world before which no other world could have been
created (however, the theologians do not affirm this nor use it as a proof
for the temporal production of the world). Although the assumption that
before this world there might be an infinite number of others does not
seem an impossible one, it appears after closer examination to be absurd,
for it would follow from it that the universe had the nature of an individual
person in this transitory world, so that its procession from the First
Principle would be like the procession of the individual person from Him-
that is to say, through an eternal moving body and an eternal motion. But
then this world would be part of another world, like the transient beings in
this world, and then necessarily either we end finally in a world individually
eternal or we have an infinite series. And if we have to bring this series to
a standstill, it is more appropriate to arrest it at this world, by regarding it
as eternally unique.
THE FOURTH PROOF
Ghazali says:
The fourth proof is that they say everything that becomes
is preceded by the matter which is in it, for what becomes
cannot be free from matter.’ For this reason matter never
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becomes; what becomes is only the form, the accidents and
the qualities which add themselves to matters The proof is
that the existence of each thing that becomes must, before
its becoming, either be possible, impossible, or necessary: it
cannot be impossible, for the essentially impossible will
never exist; it cannot be necessary, for the essentially
necessary will never be in a state of non-existence, and
therefore it is the essentially possible.’ Therefore, the thing
which becomes has before its becoming the possibility of
becoming, but the possibility of becoming is an attribute
which needs a relation and has no subsistence in itself.’ It
needs, therefore, a substratum with which it can be
connected, and there is no substratum except matter, and it
becomes connected with it in the way in which we say this
matter receives warmth and coldness, or black and white, or
movement and rest, i.e. it is possible that these qualities and
these changes occur in it and therefore possibility is an
attribute of matter. Matter does not possess other matter,
and cannot become; for, if it did, the possibility of its
existence would precede its existence, and possibility would
subsist by itself without being related to anything else,
whereas it is a relative attribute which cannot be understood
as subsisting by itself. And it cannot be said that the
meaning of possibility amounts to what can be done and
what the Eternal had the power to do, because we know only
that a thing can be done, because it is possible, and we say
‘this can be done because it is possible and cannot be done
because it is not possible’; and if ‘this is possible’ meant ‘this
can be done’, to say ‘this can be done because it is possible’
would mean ‘this is possible because it is possible’, and this
is a circular definition; and this shows that ‘this is possible’ is
a first judgement in the mind, evident in itself, which makes
the second judgement ‘that it can be done’ intelligible. It
cannot be said, either, that to be possible refers to the
knowledge of the Eternal, for knowledge depends on a thing
known, whereas possibility is undoubtedly an object of
knowledge, not knowledge; further, it is a relative attribute,
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and needs something to which it can be related, and this can
only be matter, and everything that becomes is preceded by
matter.
| say:
The summary of this is that everything that becomes is possible before
it becomes, and that possibility needs something for its subsistence,
namely, the substratum which receives that which is possible. For it must
not be believed that the possibility of the recipient is the same as the
possibility of the agent. It is a different thing to say about Zaid, the agent,
that he can do something and to say about the patient that it can have
something done to it. Thus the possibility of the patient is a necessary
condition for the possibility of the agent, for the agent which cannot act is
not possible but impossible. Since it is impossible that the possibility prior
to the thing’s becoming should be absolutely without substratum, or that
the agent should be its substratum or the thing possible-for the thing
possible loses its possibility, when it becomes actual-there only remains
as a vehicle for possibility the recipient of the possible, i.e. matter. Matter,
in so far as it is matter, does not become; for if it did it would need other
matter and we should have an infinite regress. Matter only becomes in so
far as it is combined with form. Everything that comes into being comes
into being from something else, and this must either give rise to an infinite
regress and lead directly to infinite matter which is impossible, even if we
assume an eternal mover, for there is no actual infinite; or the forms must
be interchangeable in the ingenerable and incorruptible substratum,
eternally and in rotation.’ There must, therefore, be an eternal movement
which produces this interchange in the eternally transitory things. And
therefore it is clear that the generation of the one in each pair of generated
beings is the corruption of the other; otherwise a thing could come into
being from nothing, for the meaning of ‘becoming’ is the alteration of a
thing and its change, from what it has potentially, into actuality. It is not
possible that the privation itself should change into the existent, and it is
not the privation of which it is said that it has become. There exists,
therefore, a substratum for the contrary forms, and it is in this substratum
that the forms interchange.
Ghazali says:
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The objection is that the possibility of which they speak is
a judgement of the intellect, and anything whose existence
the intellect supposes, provided no obstacle presents itself to
the supposition, we call possible and, if there is such an
obstacle, we call it impossible and, if we suppose that it
cannot be supposed not to be, we call it necessary. These
are rational judgements which need no real existent which
they might qualify. There are three proofs of this. The first is:
If possibility needed an existent to which it could be related,
and of which it could be said that it is its possibility,
impossibility also would need an existent of which it might be
said that it is its impossibility; but impossibility has no real
existence, and there is no matter in which it occurs and to
which it could be related.
| say:
That possibility demands an existing matter is clear, for all true
intellectual concepts need a thing outside the soul, for truth, as it has been
defined, is the agreement of what is in the soul with what is outside the
soul. And when we say that something is possible, we cannot but
understand that it needs something in which this possibility can be. As
regards his proof that the possible is not dependent on an existent,
because the impossible is not dependent on an existent, this is sophistical.
Indeed the impossible demands a substratum just as much as the
possible does, and this is clear from the fact that the impossible is the
opposite of the possible and opposite contraries undoubtedly require a
substratum. For impossibility is the negation of possibility, and, if
possibility needs a substratum, impossibility which is the negation of this
possibility requires a substratum too, e.g. we say that the existence of
empty space is impossible, because the existence of independent
dimensions outside or inside natural bodies is impossible, or that the
presence of opposites at the same time in the same substratum is
impossible, or that the equivalence of one to two is impossible, i.e. in
reality. All this is self-evident, and it is not necessary to consider the errors
here committed.
Ghazali says:
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The second proof is that the intellect decides that black
and white are possible before they exist.’ If this possibility
were related to the body in which they inhere, so that it might
be said that the meaning is that this body can be black and
white, then white would not be possible by itself and
possibility would be related only to the body. But we affirm,
as concerns the judgement about black in itself, as to
whether it is possible, necessary, or impossible, that we,
without doubt, will say that it is possible. And this shows that
the intellect in order to decide whether something is possible
need not admit an existing thing to which the possibility can
be related.
| say
This is a sophism. For the possible is predicated of the recipient and of
the inherent quality. In so far as it is predicated of the substratum, its
opposite is the impossible, and in so far as it is predicated of the inherent,
its opposite is the necessary.’ Thus the possible which is described as
being the opposite of the impossible is not that which abandons its
possibility so far as it is actualized, when it becomes actual, because this
latter loses its possibility in the actualizing process.’ This latter possible is
only described by possibility in so far as it is in potency, and the vehicle of
this potency is the substratum which changes from existence in potency
into existence in actuality.’ This is evident from the definition of the
possible that it is the nonexistence which is in readiness to exist or not to
exists This possible non-existent is possible neither in so far as it is non-
existent nor in so far as it is actually existent. It is only possible in so far as
it is in potency, and for this reason the Mu’tazilites affirm that the
nonexistent is a kind of entity. For non-existence is the opposite of
existence, and each of the two is succeeded by the other, and when the
non-existence of a thing disappears it is followed by its existence, and
when its existence disappears it is succeeded by its non-existence. As
non-existence by itself cannot change into existence, and existence
by itself cannot change into non-existence, there must be a third entity
which is the recipient for both of them, and that is what is described by
‘possibility’ and ‘becoming’ and ‘change from the quality of non-existence
to the quality of existence’. For non-existence itself is not described by
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‘becoming’ or ‘change’; nor is the thing that has become actual described
in this way, for what becomes loses the quality of becoming, change, and
possibility when it has become actual. Therefore there must necessarily
be something that can be described by ‘becoming’ and ‘change’ and
‘transition from nonexistence to existence’, as happens in the passage of
opposites into opposites; that is to say, there must be a substratum for
them in which they can interchange-with this one difference, however, that
this substratum exists in the interchange of all the accidents in actuality,
whereas in the substance it exists in potency.’
And we cannot think of regarding what is described by ‘possibility’ and
‘change’ as identical with the actual, i.e. which belongs to the becoming in
so far as it is actual, for the former again vanishes and the latter must
necessarily be a part of the product. Therefore there must necessarily be
a substratum which is the recipient for the possibility and which is the
vehicle of the change and the becoming, and it is this of which it is said
that it becomes, and alters, and changes from non-existence into
existence. Nor can we think of making this substratum of the nature of the
actualized, for if this were the case the existent would not become, for
what becomes comes into being from the non-existent not from the
existent.’ Both philosophers and Mu'tazilites agree about the existence of
this entity; only the philosophers are of the opinion that it cannot be
exempt from a form actually existent, i.e. that it cannot be free from
existence, like the transition, for example, from sperma to blood and the
transition from blood to the members of the embryo. The reason is that if it
were exempt from existence it would have an existence of its own, and if it
had an existence of its own, becoming could not come from it. This entity
is called by the philosophers ‘lyle’, and it is the cause of generation and
corruption. And according to the philosophers an existent which is free
from Kyle is neither generable nor corruptible.
Ghazali says:
The third proof is that the souls of men, according to the
philosophers, are substances which subsist by themselves’
without being in a body or in matter or impressed on matters
they had a beginning in time, according to the theory of
Avicenna and the acknowledged philosophers, they had
possibility before their beginning, but they have neither
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essence nor matter’ and their possibility is a relative
attribute, dependent neither on God’s power nor on the
Agent;’ but on what then is it dependent? The difficulties are
therefore turned against them themselves.
| say:
| do not know any philosopher who said that the soul has a beginning in
the true sense of the word and is thereafter everlasting except -as Ghazali
relates-Avicenna. All other philosophers agree that in their temporal
existence they are related to and connected with the bodily possibilities,
which receive this connexion like the possibilities which subsist in mirrors
for their connexion with the rays of the suns According to the philosophers
this possibility is not of the nature of the generable and corruptible forms,
but of a kind to which, according to them, demonstrative proof leads, and
the vehicle of this possibility is of another nature than the nature of the
Kyle. He alone can grasp their theories in these matters who has read
their books and fulfilled the conditions there laid down by them, and has
besides a sound understanding and a learned master. That Ghazali
should touch on such questions in this way is not worthy of such a man,
but there are only these alternatives: either he knew these matters in their
true nature, and sets them out here wrongly, which is wicked; or he did not
understand their real nature and touched on problems he had not
grasped, which is the act of an ignoramus. However, he stands too high in
our eyes for either of these qualifications. But even the best horse will
stumble’ and it was a stumble of Ghazali’s that he brought out this book.
But perhaps he was forced to do so by the conditions of his time and his
situation.
Ghazali says, speaking on behalf of the philosophers:
It may be said: To reduce possibility to a judgement of
the intellect is absurd, for the meaning of ‘judgement of the
intellect’ is nothing but the knowledge of possibility, and
possibility is an object of knowledge, not knowledge itself;
knowledge, on the contrary, comprises possibility and
follows it and depends on it as it is, and if knowledge
vanished the object of knowledge would not, but the
disappearance of the object of knowledge would imply the
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disappearance of knowledge. For knowledge and the object-
known are two things, the former dependent on the latter,
and if we supposed rational beings to turn away from
possibility and neglect it, we should say: ‘It is not possibility
that is annulled, for the possibilities subsist by themselves,
but it is simply that minds neglect them or that minds and
rational beings have disappeared; but possibility remains,
without any doubt.’ And the three proofs are not valid, for
impossibility requires an existent to which it can be related,
and impossibility means identifying two opposites, and if the
substratum were white it could not become black as long as
the white existed, and therefore we need a substratum,
qualified by the quality during the inherence of which its
opposite is spoken of as impossible in this substratum, and
therefore impossibility is a relative attribute subsistent in a
substratum and related to it. And where the necessary is
concerned it is evident that it is related to necessary
existence.
As concerns the second proof, that black is in itself
possible, this is a mistake, for if it is taken, abstracted from
the substratum in which it inheres, it is impossible, not
possible; it only becomes possible when it can become a
form in a body; the body is then in readiness for the
interchange, and the interchange is possible for the body;
but in itself black has no _ individuality, so as to be
characterizable by possibility.
As concerns the third proof about the soul, it is eternal for
one school of philosophers, and is only possible in the
attaching of itself to bodies, and therefore against those
philosophers the argument does not apply= But for those
who admit that the soul comes into existence-and one
school of philosophers has believed that it is impressed on
matter and follows its temperament, as is indicated by Galen
in certain passages-it comes into existence in matter and its
possibility is related to its matter.’ And according to the
theory of those who admit that it comes into existence,
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although it is not impressed on matter-which means that it is
possible for the rational soul to direct matter-the possibility
prior to the becoming is relative to matter , and although the
soul is not impressed on matter, it is attached to it, for it is its
directing principle and uses it as an instrument, and in this
way its possibility is relative to matters
| say
What he says in this section is true, as will be clear to you from our
explanation of the nature of the possible.
Then Ghazali, objecting to the philosophers, says:
And the answer is: To reduce possibility, necessity, and
impossibility to rational concepts is correct, and as for the
assertion that the concepts of reason form its knowledge,
and knowledge implies a thing known, let them be answered:
it cannot be said that receptivity of colour and animality and
the other concepts, which are fixed in the mind according to
the philosophers-and this is what constitutes the sciences-
have no objects ; still these objects have no real existence in
the external world, and the philosophers arc certainly right in
saying that universals exist only in the mind, not in the
external world, and that in the external world there arc only
particular individuals, which arc apprehended by the senses,
not by reason; and yet these individuals arc the reason why
the mind abstracts from them a concept separated from its
rational matter; therefore receptivity of colour is a concept,
separate in the mind from blackness and whiteness,
although in reality a colour which is neither black nor white
nor of another colour cannot be imagined,’ and receptivity of
colour is fixed in the mind without any specification-now, in
the same way, it can be said that possibility is a form which
exists in minds, not in the exterior world, and if this is not
impossible for other concepts,, there is no impossibility in
what we have said.
| say:
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This argument is sophistical because possibility is a universal which
has individuals outside the mind like all the other universals, and
knowledge is not knowledge of the universal concept, but it is a knowledge
of individuals in a universal way which the mind attains in the case of the
individuals, when it abstracts from them one common nature which is
distributed among the different matters. The nature, therefore, of the
universal is not identical with the nature of the things of which it is a
universal. Ghazali is here in error, for he assumes that the nature of
possibility is the nature of the universal, without there being individuals on
which this universal, i.e. the universal concept of possibility, depends. The
universal, however, is not the object of knowledge; on the contrary through
it the things become known, although it exists potentially in the nature of
the things known;’ otherwise its apprehension of the individuals, in so far
as they are universals, would be false. This apprehension would indeed
be false if the nature of the object known were essentially individual, not
accidentally individual, whereas the opposite is the case: it is accidentally
individual, essentially universal. Therefore if the mind did not apprehend
the individuals in so far as they are universal, it would be in error and
make false judgements about them. But if it abstracts those natures which
subsist in the individual things from their matter, and makes them
universal, then it is possible that it judges them rightly; otherwise it would
confuse those natures, of which the possible is one.
The theory of the philosophers that universals exist only in the mind, not
in the external world, only means that the universals exist actually only in
the mind, and not in the external world, not that they do not exist at all in
the external world, for the meaning is that they exist potentially, not
actually in the external world; indeed, if they did not exist at all in the
outside world they would be false. Since universals exist outside the mind
in potency and possibilities exist outside the soul in potency, the nature of
universals in regard
to this resembles that of possibilities. And for this reason Ghazali tried
to deceive people by a sophism, for he compared possibility to the
universals because of their both being potentially in reality, and then he
assumed that the philosophers assert that universals do not exist at all
outside the soul; from which he deduced that possibility does not exist
outside the soul. What an ugly and crude sophism!
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Ghazali says:
As regards their assertion that, if it were assumed that
rational beings had vanished or had neglected possibility,
possibility itself would not have disappeared, we answer: ‘If it
were assumed that they had vanished, would not the
universal concepts, i.e. the genera and species, have
disappeared too?’ and if they agree to this, this can only
mean that universals are only concepts in the mind; but this
is exactly what we say about possibility, and there is no
difference between the two cases; if they, however, affirm
that they are permanent in the knowledge of God,’ the same
may be said about possibility, and the argument is valid, and
our aim of showing the contradiction in this theory has been
attained.
| say:
This argument shows his foolishness and proneness to contradiction.
The most plausible form in which it might be expressed would be to base it
on two premisses: the first, that the evident proposition that possibility is
partially individual, namely, outside the soul, partially universal, namely,
the universal concept of the individual possibles, is not true; and the
second, that it was said that the nature of the individual possibles outside
the soul is identical with the nature of the universal of possibility in the
mind; and in this case the possible would have neither a universal nor an
individual nature, or else the nature of the individual would have to be
identical with that of the universal. All this is presumptuous, and how
should it be else, for in a way the universal has an existence outside the
soul.
Ghazali says:
And as regards their subterfuge where the impossible is
concerned, that it is related to the matter qualified by its
opposite, as it cannot take the place of its opposite this
cannot be the case with every impossible, for that God
should have a rival is impossible, but there is no matter to
which this impossibility could be related. If they say the
impossibility of God’s having a rival, means that the solitude
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of God in His essence and His uniqueness are necessary
and that this solitude is proper to Him, we answer: This is not
necessary, for the world exists with Him, and He is therefore
not solitary. And if they say that His solitude so far as a rival
is concerned is necessary, and that the opposite of the
necessary is the impossible, and that the impossible is
related to Him, we answer: In this case the solitude of God in
regard to the world is different from His solitude in regard to
His equal and in this case His solitude in regard to His rival
is necessary, and in regard to the created world not
necessary.’
| say:
All this is vain talk, for it cannot be doubted that the judgments of the
mind have value only in regard to the nature of things outside the soul. If
there were outside the soul nothing possible or impossible, the judgment
of the mind that things are possible or impossible would be of as much
value as no judgment at all, and there would be no difference between
reason and illusion. And that there should be a rival to God is just as
impossible in reality as God’s existence is i necessary in reality. But there
is no sense in wasting more words on this question.
Ghazali says:
The subterfuge concerning the becoming of the souls is
worthless too, for they have individual essences and a
possibility prior to their becoming, and at that time there is
nothing with which they could be brought into relation. Their
argument contends that it is possible for matter that the
souls direct it is a remote relation and, if this satisfies you,
you might as well say that the possibility of the souls
becoming lies in the power of Him who can on His own
authority produce them, for the souls are then related to the
Agent-although they are not impressed on Him-in the same
way as to the body, on which they are not impressed either.
And since the imprint is made neither on the one substrate
nor on the other, there is no difference between the relation
to the agent and that to the patient.
112
| say:
He wants to force those who assume the possibility of the soul's
becoming without there being an imprint in matter to concede that the
possibility in the recipient is like the possibility in the agent, because the
act proceeds from the agent and therefore these two possibilities are
similar. But this is a shocking supposition, for, according to it, the soul
would come to the body as if it directed it from the outside, as the artisan
directs his product, and the soul would not be a form in the body, just as
the artisan is not a form in his product. The answer is that it is not
impossible that there should be amongst i the entelechies which conduct
themselves like formsb something that is separate from its substratum as
the steersman is from his ships and the artisan from his tool, and if the
body is like the instrument of the
soul, the soul is a separate form, and then the possibility which is in the
instrument is not like the possibility which is in the agent; no, the
instrument is in both conditions, the possibility which is in the patient and
the possibility which is in the agent, and therefore the instruments are the
mover and the moved, and in so far as they are the mover, there is in
them the possibility which is in the agent, and in so far as they are moved,
the possibility which is in the recipient.’ But the supposition that the soul is
a separate entity does not force them into the admission that the
possibility which is in the recipient is identical= with the possibility which is
in the agent. Besides, the possibility which according to the philosophers
is in the agent is not only a rational judgement, but refers to something
outside the soul. Therefore his argument does not gain by assimilating
one of these two possibilities to the other. And since Ghazali knew that all
these arguments have no other effect than to bring doubts and perplexity
to those who cannot solve them-which is an act of wicked sophists, he
says:
And if it is said you have taken good care in all your
objections to oppose the difficulties by other difficulties, but
nothing of what you yourself have adduced is free from
difficulty, we answer: the objections do show the falsity of an
argument, no doubt, and certain aspects of the problem are
solved in stating the opposite view and its foundation. We
have not committed ourselves to anything more than to
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upsetting their theories, and to showing the faults in the
consequence of their proofs so as to demonstrate their
incoherence. We do not seek to attack from any definite
point of view, and we shall not transgress the aim of this
book, nor give full proofs for the temporal production of the
world, for our intention is merely to refute their alleged
knowledge of its eternity. But after finishing this book we
shall, if it pleases God, devote a work to establishing the
doctrine of truth, and we call it ‘The Golden Mean in
Dogmatic Beliefs’, in which we shall be engaged in building
up, as in this book we have been in destroying.
| say:
To oppose difficulty with difficulty does not bring about destruction, but
only perplexity and doubts in him who acts in this way, for why should he
think one of the two conflicting theories reasonable and the opposite one
vain? Most of the arguments with which this man Ghazali opposes the
philosophers are doubts which arise when certain parts of the doctrine of
the philosophers come into conflict with others, and when those
differences are compared with each other; but this is an imperfect
refutation. A perfect refutation would be one that succeeded in showing
the futility of their system according to the facts themselves, not such a
one as, for instance, his assumption that it is permissible for the
opponents of the philosophers to claim that possibility is a mental concept
in the same way as the philosophers claim this for the universal. For if the
truth of this comparison between the two were conceded, it would not
follow that it was untrue that possibility was a concept dependent on
reality, but only either that the universal existed in the mind only was not
true, or that possibility existed in the mind only was not true. Indeed, it
would have been necessary for him to begin by establishing the truth,
before starting to perplex and confuse his readers, for they might die
before they could get hold of that book, or he might have died himself
before writing it. But this book has not yet come into my hands’ and
perhaps he never composed it, and he only says that he does not base
this present book on any doctrine, in order that it should not be thought
that he based it on that of the Ash’arites. It appears from the books
ascribed to him that in metaphysics he recurs to the philosophers. And of
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all his books this is most clearly shown and most truly proved in his book
called The Niche for Lights.
THE SECOND DISCUSSION
THE REFUTATION OF THEIR THEORY OF THE
INCORRUPTIBILITY OF THE WORLD AND OF TIME AND
MOTION
Ghazali says:
Know that this is part of the first question, for according to
the philosophers the existence of the world, having no
beginning, does not end either; it is eternal, without a final
term. Its disappearance and its corruption cannot be
imagined; it never began to exist in the condition in which it
exists’ and it will never cease to exist in the condition in
which it exists.
Their four arguments which we have mentioned in our
discussion of its eternity in the past refer also to its eternity in
the future, and the objection is the same without any
difference. They say that the world is caused, and that its
cause is without beginning or end, and that this applies both
to the effect and to the cause, and that, if the cause does not
change, the effect cannot change either; upon this they build
their proof of the impossibility of its beginning, and the same
applies to its ending. This is their first proof.
The second proof is that an eventual annihilation of the
world must occur alter its existence, but ‘after’ implies an
affirmation of time.
115
The third proof is that the possibility of its existence does
not end, and that therefore its possible existence may
conform to the possibility.’ But this argument has no force,
for we regard it as impossible that the world should not have
begun, but we do not regard it as impossible that it should
last eternally, if God should make it last eternally, for it is not
necessary that what begins has also an end, although it is
necessary for an act to have a beginning and an initial term.
Only Abu Hudhail al-Allaf thought that the world must needs
have an end, and he said that, as in the past infinite circular
movements are impossible, so they are in the future s but
this is wrong, for the whole of the future never enters into
existence either simultaneously or successively, whereas the
whole of the past is there simultaneously but not
successively.’ And since it is clear that we do not regard the
incorruptibility of the world as impossible from a rational
point of view-we regard indeed its incorruptibility and
corruptibility as equally possible-we know only through the
Divine Law _ which of the two possibilities will be realized.
Therefore let us not try to solve this problem by mere
reason!
| say:
His assertion that the argument of the philosophers for the eternity of
the world in the past applies also to its eternity in the future is true, and
equally the second argument applies to both cases. But his assertion that
the third argument is not equally valid for the future and for the past, that
indeed we regard the becoming of the world in the past as impossible, but
that with the exception of Abu Hudhail al-Allaf, who thought that the
eternity of the world was impossible in either direction, we do not regard
its eternity in the future as absolutely impossible, is not true. For when it
was conceded to the philosophers that the possibility of the world had no
beginning and that with this possibility a condition of extension, which
could measure this possibility, was connected in the same way as this
condition of extension is connected with the possible existent, when it is
actualized, and it was also evident that this extension had no initial term,
the philosophers were convinced that time had no initial term, for this
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extension is nothing but time, and to call it timeless eternitys is senseless.
And since time is connected with possibility and possibility with existence
in motion, existence in motion has no first term either. And the assertion of
the theologians that everything which existed in the past had a first term is
futile, for the First exists in the past eternally, as it exists eternally in the
future. And their distinction here between the first term and its acts
requires a proof, for the existence of the temporal which occurs in the past
is different from the existence of the eternal which occurs in the past. For
the temporal which has occurred in the past is finite in both directions, i.e.
it has a beginning and an end, but the eternal which has occurred in the
past has neither beginning nor end.’ And therefore, since the philosophers
have not admitted that the circular movement has a beginning, they
cannot be forced to admit that it has an end, for they do not regard its
existence in the past as transitory, and, if some philosopher does regard it
as such, he contradicts himself and therefore the statement is true that
everything that has a beginning has an end. That anything could have a
beginning and no end is not true, unless the possible could be changed
into the eternal, for everything that has a beginning is possible. And that
anything could be liable to corruption and at the same time could be
capable of eternity is something incomprehensible’ and stands in need of
examination. The ancient philosophers indeed examined this problem, and
Abu Hudhail agrees with the philosophers in saying that whatever can be
generated is corruptible, and he kept strictly to the consequence which
follows from the acceptance of the principle of becoming. As to those who
make a distinction between the past and the future, because what is in the
past is there in its totality, wnereas the future never enters into existence
in its totality (for the future enters reality only successively), this is
deceptive, for what is in reality past is that which has entered time and that
which has entered time has time beyond it in both directions and
possesses totality. But that which has never entered the past in the way
the temporal enters the past can only be said in an equivocal way to be in
the past; it is infinitely extended, with the past rather than in the past, and
possesses no totality in itself, although its parts are totalities. And this, if it
has no initial term beginning in the past, is in fact time itself. For each
temporal beginning is a present, and each present is preceded by a past,
and both that which exists commensurable with time, and time
commensurable with it, must necessarily be infinite. Only the parts of time
LTE
which are limited by time in both directions can enter the past, in the same
way as only the instant which is everchanging and only the instantaneous
motion of a thing in movement in the spatial magnitude in which it moves
can really enter the existence of the moved.’ And just as we do not say
that the past of what never ceased to exist in the past ever entered
existence at an instant-for this would mean that its existence had a
beginning and that time limited it in both directions-so it stands with that
which is simultaneous with time, not in time. For of the circular movements
only those that time limits enter into represented existence,’ but those that
are simultaneous with time do not afterwards enter past existence, just as
the eternally existent does not enter past existence, since no time limits it.
And when one imagines an eternal entity whose acts are not delayed after
its existence-as indeed must be the case with any entity whose existence
is perfect-then, if it is eternal and does not enter past time, it follows
necessarily that its acts also cannot enter past time, for if they did they
would be finite and this eternal existent would be eternally inactive and
what is eternally inactive is necessarily impossible. And it is most
appropriate for an entity, whose existence does not enter time and which
is not limited by time, that its acts should not enter existence either,
because there is no difference between the entity and its acts. If the
movements of the celestial bodies and what follows from them are acts of
an eternal entity, the existence of which does not enter the past, then its
acts do not enter past time either. For it is not permissible to say of
anything that is eternal that it has entered past time, nor that it has ended,
for that which has an end has a beginning. For indeed, our statement that
it is eternal means the denial of its entering past time and of its having had
a beginning. He who, assuming that it entered past time, assumes that it
must have a beginning begs the question. It is, therefore, untrue that what
is coexistent with eternal existence, has entered existence, unless the
eternal existence has entered existence by entering past time. Therefore
our statement ‘everything past must have entered existence’ must be
understood in two ways: first, that which has entered past existence must
have entered existence, and this is a true statement; secondly, that which
is past and is inseparably connected with eternal existence cannot be truly
said to have entered existence, for our expression “entered existence’ is
incompatible with our expression “connected with eternal existence’. And
there is here no difference between act and existence. For he who
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concedes the existence of an entity which has an eternal past must
concede that there exist acts, too, which have no beginning in the past.
And it by no means follows from the existence of His acts that they must
have entered existence, just as it by no means follows from the past
permanency of His essence that He has ever entered existence. And all
this is perfectly clear, as you see.
Through this First Existent acts can exist which never began and will
never cease, and if this were impossible for the act, it would be
impossible, too, for existence, for every act is connected with its existent in
existence. The theologians, however, regarded it as impossible that God’s
act should be eternal, although they regarded His existence as eternal,
and that is the gravest error. To apply the expression ‘production’ for the
world’s creation as the Divine Law does is more appropriate than to use it
of temporal production, as the Ash’arites did,’ for the act, in so far as it is
an act, is a product, and eternity is only represented in this act because
this production and the act produced have neither beginning nor end. And
| say that it was therefore difficult for Muslims to call God eternal and the
world eternal, because they understood by ‘eternal’ that which has no
cause. Still | have seen some of the theologians tending rather to our
opinion.
Ghazali says:
Their fourth proof is similar to the third, for they say that if
the world were annihilated the possibility of its existence
would remain, as the possible cannot become impossible.
This possibility is a relative attribute and according to them
everything that becomes needs matter which precedes it and
everything that vanishes needs matter from which it can
vanish, but the matter and the elements do not vanish, only
the forms and accidents vanish which were in them.
| say:
If it is assumed that the forms succeed each other in one substratum in
a circular way and that the agent of this succession is an eternal one,
nothing impossible follows from this assumption. But if this succession is
assumed to take place in an infinite number of matters or through an
infinite number of specifically different forms, it is impossible, and equally
Le)
the assumption is impassible that such a succession could occur without
an eternal agent or through a temporal agent. For if there were an infinite
number of matters, an actual infinite would exist, and this is impossible. It
is still more absurd to suppose that this succession could occur through
temporal agents, and therefore from this point of view it is only true that a
man must become from another man, on condition that the successive
series happens in one and the same matter and the perishing of the curlier
men can become the matter of the later. Besides, the existence of the
earlier men is also in some respect the efficient cause and the instrument
for the later-all this, however, in an accidental way, for those men are
nothing but the instrument for the Agent, who does not cease to produce a
man by means of a man and through the matter of a man. The student
who does not distinguish all these points will not be able to free himself
from insoluble doubts. Perhaps God will place you and us among those
who have reached the utmost truth concerning what may and must be
taught about God’s infinite acts. What | have said about all these things is
not proved here, but must be examined by the application of the
conditions which the ancients have explained and the rules which they
have established for scientific research. Besides, he who would like to be
one of those who possess the truth should in any question he examines
consult those who hold divergent opinions.’
Ghazali says:
The answer to all this has been given above. | only single
out this question because they have two proofs for it.
The first proof is that given by Galen, who says: If the
sun, for instance, were liable to annihilation, decay would
appear in it over a long period. But observation for
thousands of years shows no change in its size and the fact
that it has shown no loss of power through such a long time
shows that it does not suffer corruption.’ There are two
objections to this: The first is that the mode of this proof-that
if the sun suffers corruption, it must suffer loss of power, and
as the consequence is impossible the antecedent must be
impossible too-is what the philosophers call a conjunctive
hypothetical proposition, and this inference is not
conclusive, because its antecedent is not true, unless it is
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connected with another condition. In other words the
falsehood of the consequence of the proposition ‘if the sun
suffers corruption, it must become weaker’ does not imply
the falsehood of the antecedent, unless either (z) the
antecedent is bound up with the additional condition that, if it
suffers corruption through decay, it must do so during a long
period, or () it is seriously proved that there is no corruption
except through decay. For only then does the falsehood of
the consequence imply the falsehood of the antecedent.
Now, we do not concede that a thing can only become
corrupt through decay; decay is only one form of corruption,
for it is not impossible that what is in a state of perfection
should suddenly suffer corruption.
| say:
He says in his objection here to this argument that there is no
necessary relation between antecedent and consequent, because that
which suffers corruption need not become weaker, since it can suffer
corruption before it has become weaker. The conclusion, however, is quite
sound, when it is assumed that the corruption takes place in a natural
way, not by violence, and it is assumed besides that the celestial body is
an animal, for all animals super corruption only in a natural way-they
necessarily decay before their corruption. However, our opponents do not
accept these premisses, so far as they concern heaven, without proof.
And therefore Galen’s statement is only of dialectical value. The safest
way to use this argument is to say that, if heaven should suffer corruption,
it would either disintegrate into the elements of which it is composed or,
losing the form it possesses, receive another, as happens with the four
elements when they change into one another. If, however, heaven passed
away into the elements, those elements would have to be part of another
world, for it could not have come into being from the elements contained in
this world, since these elements are infinitely small, compared with its
size, something like a point in relation to a circle.’ Should heaven,
however, lose its form and receive another there would exist a sixth
element opposed to all the others, being neither heaven, nor earth, nor
water, nor air, nor fire. And all this is impossible. And his statement that
heaven does not decay ; is only a common opinion, lacking the force of
etl
the immediately evident axioms; and it is explained in the Posterior
Analytics of what kind these premisses area
Ghazali says:
The second objection is that, if it were conceded to Galen
that there is no corruption except through decay, how can it
be known that decay does not affect the sun? His reliance
on observation is impossible, for observations determine the
size only by approximation, and if the sun, whose size is said
to be approximately a hundred and seventy times that of the
earth, decreased, for instance, by the size of mountains the
difference would not be perceptible to the senses. Indeed, it
is perhaps already in decay, and has decreased up to the
present by the size of mountains or more; but perception
cannot ascertain this, for its knowledge in the science of
optics works only by supposition and approximation. The
same takes place with sapphire and gold, which, according
to them, are composed out of elements and which are liable
to corruption. Still, if you left a sapphire for a hundred years,
its decrease would be imperceptible, and perhaps the
decrease in the sun during the period in which it has been
observed stands in proportion to its size as the decrease of
the sapphire to its size in a hundred years. This is
imperceptible, and this fact shows that his proof is utterly
futile.
We have abstained from bringing many proofs of the
same kind as the wise disdain. We have given only this one
to serve as an example of what we have omitted, and the
have restricted ourselves to the four proofs which demand
that their solution should be attempted in the way indicated
above.
| say:
If the sun had decayed and the parts of it which had disintegrated
during the period of its observation were imperceptible because of the size
of its body, still the effect of its decay on bodies in the sublunary world
would be perceptible in a definite degree, for everything that decays does
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so only through the corruption and disintegration of its parts, and those
parts which disconnect themselves from the decaying mass must
necessarily remain in the world in their totality or change into other parts,
and in either case an appreciable change must occur in the world, either in
the number or in the character of its parts. And if the size of the bodies
could change, their actions and affections would change too, and if their
actions and affections, and especially those of the heavenly bodies, could
change, changes would arise in the sublunary world. To imagine,
therefore, a dissipation of the heavenly bodies is to admit a
disarrangement in the divine order which, according to the philosopher,
prevails in this world. This proof is not absolutely strict.
Ghazali says:
The philosophers have a second proof of the impossibility
of the annihilation of the world. They say: The substance of
the world could not be annihilated, because no cause could
be imagined for this and the passage from existence to non-
existence cannot take place without a cause. This cause
must be either the Will of the Eternal, and this is impossible,
for if He willed the annihilation of the world after not having
willed it, He would have changed; or it must be assumed that
God and His Will are in all conditions absolutely the same,
although the object of His Will changes from non-existence
to existence and then again from existence to non-existence.
And the impossibility of which we have spoken in the matter
of a temporal existence through an eternal will, holds also for
the problem of annihilation. But we shall add here a still
greater difficulty, namely, that the object willed is without
doubt an act of the wiper, for the act of him who acts after
not having acted-even if he does not alter in his own nature-
must necessarily exist after having not existed: if he
remained absolutely in the state he was in before, his act
would not be there. But when the world is annihilated, there
is no object for God’s act, and if He does not perform
anything (for annihilation is nothing), how could there be an
action? Suppose the annihilation of the world needed a new
act in God which did not exist before, what could such an act
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be? Could it be the existence of the world? But this is
impossible, since what happens is on the contrary the
termination of its existence. Could this act then be the
annihilation of the world? But annihilation is nothing at all,
and it could therefore not be an act. For even in its slightest
intensity an act must be existent, but the annihilation of the
world is nothing existent at all; how could it then be said that
he who caused it was an agent, or he who effected it its
cause?
The philosophers say that to escape this difficulty the
theologians are divided into four sects and that each sect
falls into an absurdity.
| say:
He says here that the philosophers compel the theologians who admit
the annihilation of the world to draw the consequence that from the
Eternal, who produced the world, there proceeds a new act, i.e. the act of
annihilation, just as they compelled them to draw this consequence in
regard to His temporal production. About this problem everything has
been said already in our discussion of temporal production, for the same
difficulties as befall the problem of production apply to annihilation, and
there is no sense in repeating ourselves. But the special difficulty he
mentions here is that from the assumption of the world’s temporal
production it follows that the act of the agent attaches itself to non-
existence, so that in fact the agent performs a non-existing act and this
seemed to all the parties too shocking to be accepted,’ and therefore they
took refuge in theories he mentions later. But this consequence follows
necessarily from any theory which affirms that the act of the agent is
connected with absolute creation-that is, the production of something that
did not exist before in potency and was not a possibility which its agent
converted from potency into actuality, a theory which affirms in fact that
the agent created it out of nothing. But for the philosophers the act of the
agent is nothing but the actualizing of what is in potency, and this act is,
according to them, attached to an existent in two ways, either in
production, by converting the thing from its potential existence into
actuality so that its non-existence is terminated, or in destruction, by
converting the thing from its actual existence into potential existence, so
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that it passes into a relative non-existence. But he who does not conceive
the act of the agent in this way has to draw the consequence that the
agent’s act is attached to non-existence in both ways, in production as in
destruction; only as this seems clearer in the case of destruction, the
theologians could not defend themselves against their opponents. For it is
clear that for the man who holds the theory of absolute annihilation the
agent must perform something non-existent, for when the agent converts
the thing from existence into absolute non-existence, he directs his first
intention to something non-existent, by contrast with what happens when
he converts it from actual existence into potential existence; for in this
conversion the passage into non-existence is only a secondary fact. The
same consequence applies to production, only here it is not so obvious,
for the existence of the thing implies the annulment of its non-existence,
and therefore production is nothing but the changing of the non-existence
of a thing into its existence; but since this movement is directed towards
production, the theologians could say that the act of the agent is attached
solely to production. They could not, however, say this in regard to
destruction, since this movement is directed towards non-existence. They
have, therefore, no right to say that in production the act of the agent
attaches itself only to production, and not to the annulment of non-
existence, for in production the annulment of non-existence is necessary,
and therefore the act of the agent must necessarily be attached to non-
existence. For according to the doctrine of the theologians, the existent
possesses only two conditions: a condition in which it is absolutely non-
existent and a condition in which it is actually existent., The act of the
agent, therefore, attaches itself to it, neither when it is actually existent,
nor when it is non-existent . Thus only the following alternatives remain:
either the act of the agent does not attach itself to it at all, or it attaches
itself to non-existence,’ and non-existence changes itself into existence.
He who conceives the agent in this way must regard the change of
nonexistence itself into existence, and of existence itself into non-
existence, as possible, and must hold that the act of the agent can attach
itself to the conversion of either of these opposites into the other. This is
absolutely impossible in respect to the other opposites, not to speak of
non-existence and existence.
The theologians perceived the agent in the way the weaksighted
perceive the shadow of a thing instead of the thing itself and then mistake
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the shadow for it. But, as you see, all these difficulties arise for the man
who has not understood that production is the conversion of a thing from
potential into actual existence, and that destruction is the reverse, i.e. the
change from the actual into the potentials It appears from this that
possibility and matter are necessarily connected with anything becoming,
and that what is subsistent in itself can be neither destroyed nor produced.
The theory of the Ash’arites mentioned here by Ghazali, which regards
the production of a substance, subsistent in itself, as possible, but not so
its destruction, is an extremely weak one, for the consequences which
apply to destruction apply also to production, only, it was thought, because
in the former case it is more obvious that there was here a real difference.
He then mentions the answers of the different sects to the difficulty which
faces them on the question of annihilation.
Ghazali says:
The Mu’tazilites say: the act proceeding from Him is an
existent, i.e. extinction, which He does not create in a
substratum; at one and the same moment it annihilates the
whole world and disappears by itself, so that it does not
stand in need of another extinction and thus of an infinite
regress.
And mentioning this answer to the difficulty, he says:
This is wrong for different reasons. First, extinction is not
an _ intelligible existent, the creation of which can be
supposed. Moreover, why, if it is supposed to exist, does it
disappear by itself without a cause for its disappearance?
Further, why does it annihilate the world? For its creation
and inherence in the essence of the world are impossible,
since the inherent meets its substratum and exists together
with it if only in an instant; if the extinction and existence of
the world could meet, extinction would not be in opposition to
existence and would not annihilate it’ and, if extinction is
created neither in the world nor in a substratum, where could
its existence be in order to be opposed to the existence of
the world? Another shocking feature in this doctrine is that
God cannot annihilate part of the world without annihilating
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the remainder; indeed He can only create an extinction
which annihilates the world in its totality, for if extinction is
not in a substratum, it stands in one and the same relation to
the totality of the world.
| say:
The answer is too foolish to merit refutation. Extinction and annihilation
are synonymous, and if God cannot create annihilation,
He cannot create extinction either. And even if we suppose extinction to
be an existent, it could at most be an accident, but an accident without a
substratum is absurd. And how can one imagine that the non-existent
causes non-existence? All this resembles the talk of the delirious.
Ghazali says:
The second sect, the Karramites, say that the act of God
is annihilation, and annihilation signifies an existent which
He produces in His essence and through which the world
becomes non-existent. In the same way, according to them,
existence arises out of the act of creation which He produces
in His essence and through which the world becomes
existent. Once again, this theory is wrong as it makes the
Eternal a substratum for temporal production . Further it is
incomprehensible, for creation and likewise annihilation
cannot be understood except as an existence, related to will
and power, and to establish another entity besides the will
and the power and their object, the world, is inconceivable.
| say:
The Karramites believe that there are here three factors: the agent, the
act-which they call creation-and an object, i.e. that to which the act
attaches itself, and likewise they believe that in the process of annihilation
there are three factors: the annihilator, the act-which they call annihilation-
and a non-existent. They believe that the act inheres in the essence of the
agent and according to them the rise of such a new condition’ in the agent
does not imply that the agent is determined by a temporal cause, for such
a condition is of a relative and proportional type, and a new relation and
proportion does not involve newness in the substratum; only those new
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events involve a change in the substratum which change the essence of
the substratum, e.g. the changing of a thing from whiteness to blackness.
Their statement, however, that the act inheres in the essence of the agent
is a mistake; it is only a relation which exists between the agent and the
object of the act which, when assigned to the agent, is called ‘act’ and
when assigned to the object is called ‘passivity’ Through this assumption
the Karramites are not obliged to admit that, as the Ash’arites believed,
the Eternal produces temporal reality’ or that the Eternal is not eternal, but
the consequence which is forced upon them is that there must be a cause
anterior to the Eternal, for, when an agent acts after not having acted, all
the conditions for the existence of his object being fulfilled at the time he
did not act, there must have arisen a new quality in the agent at the time
when he acts, and each new event demands a new causes So there must
be another cause before the first, and so on ad infinitum.
Ghazali says:
The third sect is that of the Ash’arites, who say that
accidents pass away by themselves and cannot be imagined
to persist, for if they persisted they could not, for this very
reason, be imagined ever to pass away.b Substances do not
persist by themselves either, but persist by a persistence
added to their existence. And if God had not created
persistence, substances would have become non-existent
through the nonexistence of persistence. This too is wrong,
in so far as it denies the evidence of the senses by saying
that black and white do not persist and that their existence is
continually renewed; reason shrinks from this, as it does,
too, from the statement that the body renews its existence at
each moment, for reason judges that the hair which is on a
man’s head today is identical with, not similar to, the hair that
was there yesterday, and judges the same about the black
and the white.’ There is yet another difficulty, namely, that
when things persist through persistence, God’s attributes
must persist through persistence and this persistence
persists through persistence and so on ad in finitum.
| say:
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This theory of the flux of all existing things is a useless one, although
many ancients held it, and there is no end to the impossibilities it implies.
How could an existent come into existence, when it passes away by itself
and existence passes away through its passing away? If it passed away
by itself, it would have to come into existence by itself, and in this case
that by which it becomes existent would be identical with that by which it
passes away and this is impossible. For existence is the opposite of
passing away, and it is not possible that two opposites should occur in the
same thing in one and the same connexion. Therefore in a pure existent
no passing away can be imagined, for if its existence determined its
passing away, it would be non-existent and existent at one and the same
moment, and this is impossible. Further, if the existents persist through the
persistence of an attribute by itself, will this absence of change in them
occur through their existence or through their non-existence? The latter is
impossible, so it follows that they persist because of their existence. If,
then, all existents must persist because they are existent, and non-
existence is something that can supervene upon them, why in Heaven’s
name do we need this attribute of persistence to make them persist? All
this resembles a case of mental disorder. But let us leave this sect, for the
absurdity of their theory is too clear to need refutation.
Ghazali says:
The fourth sect are a group of Ash’arites who say that
accidents pass away by themselves, but that substances
pass away when God does not create motion or rest or
aggregation and disintegration in them, for it is impossible
that a body should persist which is neither in motion nor at
rest, since in that case it becomes non-existent. The two
parties of the Ash’arites incline to the view that annihilation is
not an act, but rather a refraining from acting, since they do
not understand how non-existence can be an act. All these
different theories being false---say the philosophers -it
cannot any longer be asserted that the annihilation of the
world is possible, even if one were to admit that the world
had been produced in time; for although the philosophers
concede that the human soul has been produced, they claim
the impossibility of its annihilation by means of arguments
129
which are very close to those we have mentioned. For,
according to the philosophers, nothing that is self-subsistent
and does not inhere in a substratum’ can be imagined as
becoming non-existent after its existence, whether it is
produced or eternal.’ If one objects against them, that when
water is boiled it disappears, they answer that it does not
disappear, but is only changed into steam and the steam
becomes water again, and its primary matter, i.e. its hyle, the
matter in which the form of water inhered, persists when the
water has become air, for the hyle only loses the form of
water and takes up that of air; the air, having become cold
again, condenses into water, but does not receive a new
matter, for the matter is common to the elements and only
the forms are changed in it.
| say:
He who affirms that accidents do not persist for two moments, and that
their existence in substances is a condition of the persistence of those
substances, does not know how he contradicts himself, for if the
substances are a condition of the existence of the accidents-since the
accidents cannot exist without the substances in which they inhere-and
the accidents are assumed to be a condition for the existence of the
substances, the substances must be necessarily a condition for their own
existence; and it is absurd to say that something is a condition for its own
existence. Further, how could the accidents be such a condition, since
they themselves do not persist for two moments? For, as the instant is at
the same time the end of their privation and the beginning of their period
of existence, the substance mint be destroyed in this instant, for in this
instant there is neither anything of the privative period nor anything of the
existent. If there were in the instant anything of the privative period or of
the existent, it could not be the end of the former and the beginning of the
latter.’ And on the whole, that something which does not persist two
moments should be made a condition for the persistence of something for
two moments is absurd. Indeed, a thing that persists for two moments is
more capable of persisting than one which does not persist for two
moments, for the existence of what does not persist for two moments is at
an instant, which is in flux, but the existence of what persists for two
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moments is constant, and how can what is in flux be a condition for the
existence of the constant, or how can what is only specifically persistent
be a condition for the persistence of the individually persistent? This is all
senseless talk. One should know that he who does not admit a Kyle for
the corruptible must regard the existent as simple and as not liable to
corruption, for the simple does not alter and does not exchange its
substance for another substance. Therefore Hippocrates says ‘if man
were made out of one thing alone, he could not suffer by himself’ ,’ i.e. he
could not suffer corruption or change. And therefore he could not have
become either, but would have to be an eternal existent. What he says
here about Avicenna of the difference between the production and the
destruction of the soul is without sense.
Ghazali says, answering the philosophers:
The answer is: So far as concerns the different sects you
have mentioned, although we could defend each of them
and could show that your refutation on the basis of your
principle is not valid, because your own principles are liable
to the same kind of objection, we will not insist on this point,
but we will restrict ourselves to one sect and ask: How will
you refute the man who claims that creation and annihilation
take place through the will of God: if God wills, He creates,
and if He wills, He annihilates, and this is the meaning of His
being absolutely powerful, and notwithstanding this He does
not alter in Himself, but it is only His act that alters? And
concerning your objection that, inasmuch as an act must
proceed from the agent, it cannot be understood which act
can proceed from Him, when He annihilates, we answer:
What proceeds from Him is a new fact, and the new fact is
non-existence, for there was no non-existence; then it
happened as something new, and this is what proceeds from
Him. And if you say: Non-existence is nothing, how could it
then proceed from Him? we reply: If non-existence is
nothing, how could it happen? Indeed, ‘proceeding from
Him’ does not mean anything but that its happening is
related to His power. If its happening has an intelligible
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meaning, why should its relation to His power not be
reasonable?
| say:
All this is sophistical and wrong. The philosophers do not deny that a
thing becomes non-existent when a destroying agent destroys it; they only
say that the destroying act does not attach itself to it, in so far as the thing
becomes non-existent, but in so far as it changes from actual being to
potential being, and non-existence results from this change, and it is in
this way that non-existence is related to the agent. But it does not follow
from the fact that its non-existence occurs after the act of the agent that
the agent performs it primarily and essentially. For when it was conceded
to Ghazali during the discussion of this problem that the non-existence of
the corrupting thing will necessarily occur after the act of the corrupting
agent, he drew the conclusion that its non-existence would follow
essentially and primarily from the act, but this is impossible. For the
agent’s act does not attach itself to its non-existence in so far as it is non-
existent, i.e. primarily and essentially. And therefore , if the perceptible
existences were simple, they could neither be generated nor destroyed
except through the act of the agent being attached to their nonexistence
essentially and primarily. But the act of the agent is only attached to non-
existence accidentally and secondarily through its changing the object
from actual existence into another form of existence in an act followed by
non-existence, as from the change of a fire into air there follows the non-
existence of the fire. This is the philosophical theory of existence and non-
existence.
Ghazali says:
And what is the difference between you and the man who
denies absolutely that non-existence can occur to accidents
and forms, and who says that non-existence is nothing at all
and asks how then it could occur and be called an
occurrence and a new event? But no doubt non-existence
can be represented as occurring to the accidents, and to
speak of it as occurring has a sense whether you call it
something real or not. And the relation of this occurrence,
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which has a reasonable sense, to the power of the
Omnipotent, also has an intelligible meaning.’
| say:
That non-existence of this kind occurs is true, and the philosophers
admit it, because it proceeds from the agent according to a second
intention and accidentally; but it does not follow from its proceeding or
from its having a reasonable meaning that it happens essentially or
primarily, and the difference between the philosophers and those who
deny the occurrence of non-existence is that the philosophers do not
absolutely deny the occurrence of non-existence, but only its occurring
primarily and essentially through the agent. For the act of the agent does
not attach itself necessarily, primarily, and essentially to non-existence,
and according to the philosophers non-existence happens only
subsequently to the agent’s act in reality. The difficulties ensue only for
those who affirm that the world can be annihilated in an absolute
annihilation.
Ghazali says:
Perhaps the philosophers will answer: This difficulty is
only acute for those who allow the non-existence of a thing
after its existence, for those may be asked what the reality is
that occurs. But according to us philosophers the existing
thing does not become non-existent, for we understand by
the fact that the accidents become non-existent the
occurrence of their opposites, which are existing realities,
and not the occurrence of mere non-existence which is
nothing at all, and how could what is nothing at all be said to
occur? For if hair becomes white, it is simply whiteness that
occurs, for whiteness is something real; but one cannot say
that what occurs is the privation of blackness.’
| say:
This answer on behalf of the philosophers is mistaken, for the
philosophers do not deny that non-existence occurs and happens through
the agent, not, however, according to a primary intention as would be the
consequence for one who assumes that a thing can change into pure
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nothingness; no, non-existence, according to them, occurs when the form
of the thing that becomes non-existent disappears, and the opposite form
appears. Therefore the following objection which Ghazali makes is valid.
Ghazali says:
This is wrong for two reasons. The first is: Does the
occurrence of whiteness imply the absence of blackness? If
they deny it, this is an affront to reason, and if they admit it, it
may be asked: Is what is implied identical with that which
implies? To admit this is a contradiction, for a thing does not
imply itself, and if they deny it, it may be asked: Has that
which is implied an intelligible meaning? If they deny it, we
ask, “How do you know, then, that it is implied, for the
judgement that it is implied presupposes that it has a
sensible meaning?’ If they admit this, we ask; ‘Is this thing
which is implied and has a sensible meaning, i.e. the
absence of blackness, eternal or temporal?’ The answer
‘eternal’ is impossible; if they answer ‘temporal’, how should
what is described as occurring temporally not be clearly
understood? And if they answer ‘neither eternal nor
temporal, this is absurd, for if it were said before the
occurrence of whiteness that blackness was non-existent, it
would be false, whereas afterwards it would be true.’ It
occurred, therefore, without any doubt, and this occurrence
is perfectly intelligible and must be related to the
Omnipotent.
| say:
This is an occurrence which is perfectly intelligible and must be related
to the Omnipotent, but only accidentally and not essentially, for the act of
the agent does not attach itself to absolute non-existence, nor to the non-
existence of anything, for even the Omnipotent cannot bring it about that
existence should become identical with nonexistence. The man who does
not assume matter cannot be freed from this difficulty, and he will have to
admit that the act of the agent is attached to non-existence primarily and
essentially. All this is clear, and there is no need to say more about it. The
philosophers, therefore, say that the essential principles of transitory
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things are two: matter and form, and that there is a third accidental
principle, privation, which is a condition of the occurrence of what
becomes, namely as preceding it: if a thing becomes, its privation
disappears, and if it suffers corruption, its privation arises.’
Ghazali says:
The second objection is that according to the
philosophers there are accidents which can become non-
existent otherwise than through their contrary, for instance,
motion has no contrary, and the opposition between motion
and rest is, according to the philosophers, only the
opposition of possession and non-possession, i.e. the
opposition of being and not-being, not the opposition of one
being to another being,’ and the meaning of rest is the
absence of motion, and, when motion ceases, rest does not
supervene as its contrary, but is a pure non-existence.’ The
same is the case with those qualities which belong to the
class of entelechies, like the impression of the sensible
species on the vitreous humour of the eyes and still more the
impression of the forms of the intelligibles on the soul; they
become existent without the cessation of a contrary, and
their non-existence only means the cessation of their
existence without the subsequent occurrence of their
opposites, and their disappearance is an example of pure
nonexistence which arises. The occurrence of such a non-
existence is an understandable fact, and that which can be
understood as occurring by itself, even if it is not a real
entity, can be understood as being related to the power of
the Omnipotent. Through this it is clear that, when one
imagines an event as occuring through the eternal Will, it is
unessential, whether the occurring event is a becoming or a
vanishing.
| say:
On the contrary, when non-existence is assumed to proceed from the
agent as existence proceeds from it, there is the greatest difference
between the two. But when existence is assumed as a primary fact and
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non-existence as a secondary fact, i.e. when non-existence is assumed to
take place through the agent by means of a kind of existence, i.e. when
the agent transforms actual existence into potential existence by removing
the actuality-which is a quality possessed by the substrate-then it is true.
And from this point of view the philosophers do not regard it as impossible
that the world should become non-existent in the sense of its changing
into another form, b for non-existence is in this case only a subsequent
occurrence and a secondary fact. But what they regard as impossible is
that a thing should disappear into absolute nothingness, for then the act of
the agent would have attached itself to non-existence, primarily and
essentially.
Throughout this discussion Ghazali has mistaken the accidental for the
essential, and forced on the philosophers conclusions which they
themselves regard as impossible. This is in general the character of the
discussion in this book. A more suitable name, therefore, for this book
would be “The Book of Absolute Incoherence’, or “The Incoherence of
Ghazali’, not “The Incoherence of the Philosophers’, and the best name
for my book ‘The Distinction between Truth and Incoherent Arguments’.’
THE THIRD DISCUSSION
THE DEMONSTRATION OF THEIR CONFUSION IN SAYING
THAT GOD IS THE AGENT AND THE MAKER OF THE
WORLD AND THAT THE WORLD IS HIS PRODUCT AND
ACT, AND THE DEMONSTRATION THAT THESE
EXPRESSIONS ARE IN THEIR SYSTEM ONLY METAPHORS
WITHOUT ANY REAL SENSE
Ghazali says:
All philosophers, except the materialists, agree that the
world has a maker, and that God is the maker and agent of
the world and the world is His act and His work. And this is
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an imposture where their principle is concerned, nay it
cannot be imagined that according to the trend of their
principle the world is the work of God, and this for three
reasons, from the point of view of the agent, from the point of
view of the act, and from the point of view of the relation
common to act and agent. As concerns the first point, the
agent must be willing, choosing, and knowing what he wills
to be the agent of what he wills, but according to them God
does not will, He has no attribute whatever, and what
proceeds from Him proceeds by the compulsion of
necessity. The second point is that the world is eternal, but
‘act’ implies production. And the third point is that God is
unique, according to their principles, from all points of view,
and from one thing-according to their principles-there can
only proceed one thing. The world, however, is constituted
out of diverse components; how could it therefore proceed
from Him?
| say:
Ghazali’s words ‘The agent must be willing, choosing, and knowing what
he wills to be the agent of what he wills’ are by no means self evident and
cannot be accepted as a definition of the maker of the world without a
proof, unless one is justified in inferring from the empirical to the divine.
For we observe in the empirical world two kinds of agents, one which
performs exclusively one thing and this essentially, for instance warmth
which causes heat and coldness which causes cold; and this kind is called
by the philosophers natural agents. The second kind of agents are those
that perform a certain act at one time and its opposite at another; these,
acting only out of knowledge and deliberation, are called by the
philosophers voluntary and selective agents. But the First Agent cannot be
described as having either of these two actions, in so far as these are
ascribed to transitory things by the philosophers. For he who chooses and
wills lacks the things which he wills, and God cannot lack anything He
wills. And he who chooses makes a choice for himself of the better of two
things, but God is in no need of a better condition. Further, when the willer
has reached his object, his will ceases and, generally speaking, will is a
passive quality and a change, but God is exempt from passivity and
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change. God is still farther distant from natural action, for the act of the
natural thing is a necessity in its substance, but is not a necessity in the
substance of the willer, and belongs to its entelechy. In addition, natural
action does not proceed from knowledge: it has, however, been proved
that God’s act does proceed from knowledge. The way in which God
becomes an agent and a willer has not become clear in this place, since
there is no counterpart to His will in the empirical world. How is it therefore
possible to assert that an agent can only be understood as acting through
deliberation and choice? For then this definition is indifferently applied to
the empirical and the divine, but the philosophers do not acknowledge this
extension of the definition, so that from their refusal to acknowledge this
definition as applying to the First Agent, it cannot be inferred that they
deny that He acts at all.
This is, of course, self-evident and not the philosophers are impostors,
but he who speaks in this way, for an impostor is one who seeks to
perplex, and does not look for the truth. He, however, who errs while
seeking the truth cannot be called an impostor, and the philosophers, as a
matter of fact, are known to seek the truth, and therefore they are by no
means impostors. There is no difference between one who says that God
wills with a will which does not resemble the human will, and one who
says that God knows through a knowledge which does not resemble
human knowledge; in the same way as the quality of His knowledge
cannot be conceived, so the quality of His will cannot be conceived.
Ghazali says:
We will now test each of these three reasons at the same
time as the illusory arguments which the philosophers give in
their defence.
The first reason. We say: ‘Agent’ means someone from
whom there proceeds an act with the will to act according to
choice and with the knowledge of the object willed. But
according to the philosophers the world stands in relation to
God as the effect to the cause, in a necessary connexion
which God cannot be imagined to sever, and which is like
the connexion between the shadow and the man, light and
the sun, but this is not an act at all. On the contrary, he who
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says that the lamp makes the light and the man makes the
shadow uses the term vaguely, giving it a sense much wider
than its definition, and uses it metaphorically, relying on the
fact that there is an analogy between the object originally
meant by it and the object to which it is transferred, i.e. the
agent is in a general sense a cause, the lamp is the cause of
the light, and the sun is the cause of luminosity; but the
agent is not called a creative agent from the sole fact that it
is a cause, but by its being a cause in a special way, namely
that it causes through will and through choice. If, therefore,
one said that neither a wall, nor a stone, nor anything
inanimate is an agent, and that only animals have actions,
this could not be denied and his statement would not be
called false. But according to the philosophers a stone has
an action, namely falling and heaviness and a centripetal
tendency, just as fire has an action, namely heating, and a
wall has an action, namely a centripetal tendency and the
throwing of a shadow, and, according to them each of these
actions proceeds from it as its agent; which is absurd.’
| say:
There are in brief two points here, the first of which is that only those
who act from deliberation and choice are regarded as acting causes, and
the action of a natural agent producing something else is not counted
among acting causes, while the second point is that the philosophers
regard the procession of the world from God as the necessary connexion
obtaining between shadow and the person, and luminosity and the sun,
and the downward rolling in relation to the stone, but that this cannot be
called an action because the action can be separated from the agent.
| say:
All this is false. For the philosophers believe that there are four causes:
agent, matter, form, and end. The agent is what causes some other thing
to pass from potency to actuality and from nonexistence to existence; this
actualization occurs sometimes from deliberation and choice, sometimes
by nature, and the philosophers do not call a person who throws a shadow
an agent, except metaphorically, because the shadow cannot be
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separated from the man, and by common consent the agent can be
separated from its object, and the philosophers certainly believe that God
is separated’ from the world and according to them He is not to be classed
with this kind of natural cause. Nor is He an agent in the sense in which
any empirical agent, either voluntary or involuntary, is; He is rather the
agent of these causes, drawing forth the Universe from non-existence to
existence and conserving it, and such an act is a more perfect and
glorious one than any performed by the empirical agents. None of these
objections therefore touch them, for they believe that God’s act proceeds
from Him through knowledge, not through any necessity which calls for it,
either in His essence or outside His essence, but through His grace and
His bounty. He is necessarily endowed with will and choice in their highest
form, since the insufficiency which is proper to the empirical willer does
not pertain to Him. And these are the very words of Aristotle in one of his
metaphysical treatises: We were asked how God could bring forth the
world out of nothing, and convert it into something out of nothing, and our
answer is this: the Agent must be such that His capacity must be
proportionate to His power and His power proportionate to His will and His
will proportionate to His wisdom, if not, His capacity would be weaker than
His power, His power weaker than His will, and His will weaker than His
wisdom. And if some of His powers were weaker than others, there would
be no difference between His powers and ours, and imperfection would
attach to Him as to us-a very blasphemous theory. But in the opposite
case each of these powers is of the utmost perfection. When He wills He
has the power, and when He has the power He has the capacity and all
this with the greatest wisdom. And He exists, making what He wants out of
nothing. And this is only astonishing through this imperfection which is in
us. And Aristotle said also: Everything that is in this world is only set
together through the power which is in it from God; if this power did not
exist in the things, they could not last the twinkling of an eyes
| say:
Composite existence is of two classes; in the one class the composition
is something additional to the existence of the composed, but in the other
the composition is like the existence of matter and form and in these
existents the existence cannot be regarded as anterior to the composition,
but on the contrary the composition is the cause of their existence and
140
anterior to it. If God therefore is the cause of the composition of the parts
of the world, the existence of which is in their composition, then He is the
cause of their existence and necessarily he who is the cause of the
existence of anything whatever is its agent. This is the way in which
according to the philosophers this question must be understood, if their
system is truly explained to the student.
Ghazali says, speaking on behalf of the philosophers:
The philosophers may say: we call an object anything
that has no necessary existence by itself, but exists through
another, and we call its cause the agent, and we do not mind
whether the cause acts by nature or voluntarily, just as you
do not mind whether it acts by means of an instrument or
without an instrument, and just as ‘act’ is a genus subdivided
into ‘acts which occur by means of an instrument’ and ‘acts
which occur without an instrument’, so it is a genus
subdivided into ‘acts which occur by nature’ and ‘acts which
occur voluntarily’. The proof is that, when we speak of an act
which occurs by nature, our words ‘by nature’ are not
contradictory to the term ‘act’; the words ‘by nature’ are not
used to exclude or contradict the idea of act, but are meant
only to explain the specific character of the act, just as, when
we speak of an act effected directly without an instrument,
there is no contradiction, but only a specification and an
explanation. And when we speak of a ‘voluntary act’, there is
not a redundancy as in the expression a ‘living being-man’;’
it is only an explanation of its specific character, like the
expression, ‘act performed by means of an instrument’. If,
however, the word ‘act’ included the idea of will, and will
were essential to act, in so far as it is an act, our expression
‘natural act’ would be a contradiction.
| say:
The answer, in short, has two parts. The first is that everything that is
necessary through another thing is an object of what is necessary by
itself,z but this can be opposed, since that through which the ‘necessary
through another’ has its necessary existence need not be an agent, unless
141
by ‘through which it has its necessary existence’ is meant that which is
really an agent, i.e. that which brings potency into act. The second part is
that the term ‘agent’ seems like a genus for that which acts by choice and
deliberation and for that which acts by nature; this is true, and is proved by
our definition of the term ‘agent’. Only this argument wrongly creates the
impression that the philosophers do not regard the first agent as endowed
with will. And this dichotomy that everything is either of necessary
existence by itself or existent through another is not self-evident.
Ghazaili, refuting the philosophers, says:
This designation is wrong, for we do not call any cause
whatsoever an agent, nor any effect an object; for, if this
were so, it would be not right to say that the inanimate has
no act and that only the living exhibit acts-a statement
generally admitted.
| say:
His assertion that not every cause is called an agent is true, but his
argument that the inanimate is not called an agent is false, for the denial
that the inanimate exhibits acts excludes only the rational and voluntary
act, not act absolutely, for we find that certain inanimate things have
powers to actualize things like themselves; e.g. fire, which changes
anything warm and dry into another fire like itself, through converting it
from what it has in potency into actuality. Therefore fire cannot make a
fire like itself in anything that has not the potency or that is not in
readiness to receive the actuality of fire. The theologians, however, deny
that fire is an agent, and the discussion of this problem will follow later.
Further, nobody doubts that there are in the bodies of animals powers
which make the food a part of the animal feeding itself and generally
direct the body of the animal. If we suppose them withdrawn, the animal
would die, as Galen says. And through this direction we call it alive,
whereas in the absence of these powers we call it dead.
Ghazali goes on:
If the inanimate is called an agent, it is by metaphor, in
the same way as it is spoken of metaphorically as tending
and willing, since it is said that the stone falls down, because
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it tends and has an inclination to the centre, but in reality
tendency and will can only be imagined in connexion with
knowledge and an object desired and these can only be
imagined in animals.
| say:
If by ‘agent’ or ‘tendency’ or ‘willing’ is meant the performance of an act
of a willer, it is a metaphor, but when by these expressions is meant that it
actualizes another's potency, it is really an agent in the full meaning of the
word.
Ghazali then says:
When the philosophers say that the term ‘act’ is a genus
which is subdivided into ‘natural act’ and ‘voluntary act’, this
cannot he conceded; it is as if one were to say that ‘willing’ is
a genus which is subdivided into willing accompanied by
knowledge of the object willed, and willing without
knowledge of the object willed. This is wrong, because will
necessarily implies knowledge, and likewise act necessarily
implies will.
| say:
The assertion of the philosophers that ‘agent’ is subdivided into
‘voluntary’ and ‘non-voluntary agent’ is true, but the comparison with a
division of will into rational and irrational is false, because in the definition
of will knowledge is included, so that the division has no sense. But in the
definition of ‘act’ knowledge is not included, because actualization of
another thing is possible without knowing it. This is clear, and therefore
the wise say that God’s word: ‘a wall which wanted to fall to pieces” is a
metaphor.
Ghazali proceeds:
When you affirm that your expression ‘natural act’ is not a
contradiction in terms you are wrong; there is as a matter of
fact a contradiction when ‘natural act’ is taken in a real
sense, only this contradiction is not at once evident to the
understanding nor is the incompatibility of nature and act felt
143
acutely, because this expression is employed
metaphorically; for since nature is in a certain way a cause
and the agent is also a cause, nature is called an agent
metaphorically. The expression ‘voluntary act’ is as much
redundant as the expression ‘he wills and knows what he
wills’.
| say:
This statement is undoubtedly wrong, for what actualizes another thing,
i.e. acts on it, is not called agent simply by a metaphor, but in reality, for
the definition of ‘agent’ is appropriate to it. The division of ‘agent’ into
‘natural’ and ‘voluntary agent’ is not the division of an equivocal term, but
the division of a genus. Therefore the division of ‘agent’ into ‘natural’ and
‘voluntary agent’ is right, since that which actualizes another can also be
divided into these two classes.
Ghazali says:
However, as it can happen that ‘act’ is used
metaphorically and also in its real sense, people have no
objection in saying ‘someone acted voluntarily’, meaning that
he acted not in a metaphorical sense, but really, in the way
in which it is said ‘he spoke with his tongue’, or ‘he saw with
his eye’. For, since one is permitted to rise ‘heart’
metaphorically for ‘sight’, and motion of the head or hand for
word-for one can say ‘He nodded assent’-it is not wrong to
say ‘He spoke with his tongue and he saw with his eye’, in
order to exclude any idea of metaphor. This is a delicate
point, but let us be careful to heed the place where those
stupid people slipped.
| say:
Certainly it is a delicate point that a man with scientific pretensions should
give such a bad example and such a false reason to explain the
repugnance people seem to have in admitting the division of ‘act’ into
‘natural’ and ‘voluntary act’. No one ever says ‘He saw with his eye, and
he saw without his eye’ in the belief that this is a division of sight; we only
say ‘He saw with his eye’ to emphasize the fact that real sight is meant,
144
and to exclude the metaphorical sense of ‘sight’. And the intelligent in fact
think that for the man who understands immediately that the real meaning
is intended, this connecting of sight with the eye is almost senseless. But
when one speaks of ‘natural’ and ‘voluntary act’, no intelligent person
disagrees that we have here a division of ‘act’. If, however, the expression
‘voluntary act’ were similar to ‘sight with the eye’ the expression ‘natural
act’ would be metaphorical. But as a matter of fact the natural agent has
an act much more stable than the voluntary agent, for the natural agent’s
act is constant-which is not the case with the act of the voluntary agent.
And therefore the opponents of the theologians might reverse the
argument against them and say that ‘natural act’ is like ‘sight with the eye’
and ‘voluntary act’ is a metaphor-especially according to the doctrine of
the Ash’arites, who do not acknowledge a free will in man and a power to
exercise an influence on reality. And if this is the case with the agent in the
empirical world, how can we know that it is an accurate description of the
real Agent in the divine world to say that He acts through knowledge and
will?
Ghazali says, speaking on behalf of the philosophers:
The philosophers may reply: The designation ‘agent’ is
known only through language. However, it is clear to the
mind that the cause of a thing can be divided into voluntary
and non-voluntary cause, and it may be disputed whether or
not in both cases the word ‘act’ is used in a proper sense,
but it is not possible to deny this since the Arabs say that fire
burns, a sword cuts, that snow makes cold, that scammony
purges, that bread stills hunger and water thirst, and our
expression ‘he beats’ means he performs the act of beating,
and ‘it burns’ it performs the act of burning, and ‘he cuts’ he
performs the act of cutting; if you say, therefore, that its use
is quite metaphorical, you are judging without any evidence.
| say:
| This, in short, is a common-sense argument. The Arabs indeed call that
which exerts an influence on a thing, even if not voluntary, an agent, in a
proper, not in a metaphorical, sense. This argument, however, is
dialectical and of no importance.
145
Ghazali replies to this:
The answer is that all this is said in a metaphorical way
and that only a voluntary act is a proper act. The proof is
that, if we assume an event which is based on two facts, the
one voluntary, the other involuntary, the mind relates the act
to the voluntary fact. Language expresses itself in the same
way, for if a man were to throw another into a fire and kill
him, it is the man who would be called his killer, not the fire.
If, however, the term were used in the same sense of the
voluntary and the non-voluntary, and it were not that the one
was a proper sense, the other a metaphorical, why should
the killing be related to the voluntary, by language, usage,
and reason, although the fire was the proximate cause of the
killing and the man who threw the other into the fire did
nothing but bring man and fire together? Since, however, the
bringing together is a voluntary act and the influence of the
fire non-voluntary, the man is called a killer and the fire only
metaphorically so. This proves that the word ‘agent’ is used
of one whose act proceeds from his will, and, behold, the
philosophers do not regard God as endowed with will and
choice.
| say:
This is an answer of the wicked who heap fallacy on fallacy. Ghazali is
above this, but perhaps the people of his time obliged him to write this
book to safeguard himself against the suspicion of sharing the
philosophers’ view. Certainly nobody attributes the act to its instrument,
but only to its first mover. He who killed a man by fire is in the proper
sense the agent and the fire is the instrument of the killing, but when a
man is burned by a fire, without this fact's depending on someone's
choice, nobody would say that the fire burned him metaphorically. The
fallacy he employs here is the wellknown one a dicto secundum quid ad
dictum simpliciter, e.g. to say of a negro, because his teeth are white, that
he is white absolutely. The philosophers do not deny absolutely that God
wills, for He is an agent through knowledge and from knowledge, and He
performs the better of two contrary acts, although both are possible; they
only affirm that He does not will in the way that man wills.
146
Ghazali says, answering in defence of the philosophers:
If the philosophers say: We do not mean anything by
God’s being an agent but that He is the cause of every
existent besides Himself and that the world has _ its
subsistence through Him, and if the Creator did not exist, the
existence of the world could not be imagined. And if the
Creator should be supposed non-existent, the world would
be non-existent too, just as the supposition that the sun was
non-existent would imply the non-existence of light. This is
what we mean by His being an agent. If our opponents
refuse to give this meaning to the word ‘act’, well, we shall
not quibble about words.
| say:
Such an answer would mean that the philosophers would concede to
their opponents that God is not an agent, but one of those causes without
which a thing cannot reach its perfection; and the answer is wrong, for
against them it might be deduced from it that the First Cause is a principle,
as if it were the form of the Universe, in the way the soul is a principle for
the body; no philosopher, however, affirms this.
Then Ghazali says, answering the philosophers:
We say: Our aim is to show that such is not the meaning
of ‘act’ and ‘work’. These words can mean only that which
really proceeds from the will. But you reject the real meaning
of ‘act’, although you use this word, which is honoured
amongst Muslims. But one’s religion is not perfect when one
uses words deprived of their sense. Declare therefore openly
that God has no act, so that it becomes clear that your belief
is in opposition to the religion of Islam, and do not deceive
by saying that God is the maker of the world and that the
world is His work, for you use the words, but reject their real
sense!
| say:
This would indeed be a correct conclusion against the philosophers, if
they should really say what Ghazali makes them say. For in this case they
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could indeed be forced to admit that the world has neither a natural nor a
voluntary agent, nor that there is another type of agents besides these
two. He does not unmask their imposture by his words, but lie himself
deceives by ascribing to them theories which they do not hold.
Ghazali says:
The second reason for denying that the world is
according to the principle of the philosophers an act of God
is based on the implication of the notion of an act. ‘Act’
applies to temporal production, but for them the world is
eternal and is not produced in time. The meaning of ‘act’ is
‘to convert from not-being into being by producing it’ and this
cannot be imagined in the eternal, as what exists already
cannot be brought into existence. Therefore ‘act’ implies a
temporal product, but according to them the world is eternal;
how then could it be God’s act?
| say:
If the world were by itself eternal and existent (not in so far as it is
moved, for each movement is composed of parts which are produced),
then, indeed, the world would not have an agent at all. But if the meaning
of ‘eternal’ is that it is in everlasting production and that this production
has neither beginning nor end, certainly the term ‘production’ is more truly
applied to him who brings about an everlasting production than to him who
procures a limited production. In this way the world is God’s product and
the name ‘production’ is even more suitable for it than the word ‘eternity’,
and the philosophers only call the world eternal to safeguard themselves
against the word ‘product’ in the sense of ‘a thing produced after a state of
nonexistence, from something, and in time’.
Then Ghazali says, on behalf of the philosophers:
The philosophers may perhaps say: The meaning of
‘product’ is ‘that which exists after its non-existence’. Let us
therefore examine if what proceeds from the agent when He
produces, and what is connected with Him, is either pure
existence, or pure non-existence, or both together. Now, it is
impossible to say that previous non-existence was
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connected with Him, since the agent cannot exert influence
upon non-existence, and it is equally impossible to say ‘both
together’, for it is clear that nonexistence is in no way
connected with the agent, for non-existence qua non-
existence needs no agent at all. It follows therefore that what
is connected with Him is connected with Him in so far as it is
an existent, that what proceeds from Him is pure existence,
and that there is no other relation to Him than that of
existence. If existence is regarded as everlasting, then this
relation is everlasting, and if this relation is everlasting, then
the term to which this relation refers is the most illustrious
and the most enduring in influence, because at no moment
is non-existence connected with it. Temporal production
implies therefore the contradictory statements that it must be
connected with an agent, that it cannot be produced, if it is
not preceded by non-existence, and that non-existence
cannot be connected with the agent.
And if previous non-existence is made a condition of the
existent, and it is said that what is connected with the agent
is a special existence, not any existence, namely an
existence preceded by non-existence, it may be answered
that its being preceded by non-existence cannot be an act of
an agent or a deed of a maker, for the procession of this
existence from its agent cannot be imagined, unless
preceded by non-existence; neither, therefore , can the
precedence of this non-existence be an act of the agent and
connected with him, nor the fact that this existence is
preceded by non-existence. Therefore to make non-
existence a condition for the act's becoming an act is to
impose as a condition one whereby the agent cannot exert
any influence under any condition.’
| say:
This is an argument put forward on this question by Avicenna from the
philosophical side. It is sophistical, because Avicenna leaves out one of
the factors which a complete division would have to state.
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For he says that the act of the agent must be connected either with an
existence or with a non-existence, previous to it and in so far as it is non-
existence, or with both together, and that it is impossible that it should be
connected with non-existence, for the agent does not bring about non-
existence and, therefore, neither can it effect both together. Therefore the
agent can be only connected with existence, and production is nothing but
the connexion of act with existence, i.e. the act of the agent is only
bringing into existence, and it is immaterial whether this existence be
preceded by non-existence or not. But this argument is faulty, because the
act of the agent is only connected with existence in a state of non-
existence, i.e. existence in potentiality, and is not connected with actual
existence, in so far as it is actual, nor with non-existence, in so far as it is
non-existent. It is only connected with imperfect existence in which non-
existence inheres. The act of the agent is not connected with non-
existence, because non-existence is not actual; nor is it connected with
existence which is not linked together with non-existence, for whatever
has reached its extreme perfection of existence needs neither causation
nor cause. But existence which is linked up with non-existence only exists
as long as the producer exists. The only way to escape this difficulty is to
assume that the existence of the world has always been and will always
be linked together with non-existence, as is the case with movement,
which is always in need of a mover. And the acknowledged philosophers
believe that such is the case with the celestial world in its relation to the
Creator, and a fortiori with the sublunary world. Here lies the difference
between the created and the artificial, for the artificial product, once
produced, is not tied up with non-existence which would be in need of an
agent for the continued sustenance of the product.’
Ghazali continues:
And your statement, theologians, that what exists cannot
be made to exist, if you mean by it, that its existence does
not begin after its nonexistence, is true; but if you mean that
it cannot become an effect at the time when it exists, we
have shown that it can only become an effect at the time
when it exists, not at the time when it does not exist. For a
thing only exists when its agent causes it to exist, and the
agent only causes it to exist at the time when, proceeding
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from it, it exists, not when the thing does not exist; and the
causation is joined with the existence of the agent and the
object, for causation is the relation between cause and
effect. Cause, effect, and causation are simultaneous with
existence and there is no priority here, and therefore there is
causation only for what exists, if by ‘causation’ is meant the
relation through which the agent and its object exist. The
philosophers say: It is for this reason that we have come to
the conclusion that the world, which is the work of God, is
without beginning and everlasting, and that never at any
moment was God not its agent, for existence is what is
joined with the agent and as long as this union lasts
existence lasts, and, if this union is ever discontinued,
existence ceases. It is by no means what you theologians
mean, that if the Creator were supposed to exist no longer,
the world could still persist; you, indeed, believe that the
same relation prevails as between the builder and the
building, for the building persists when the builder has
disappeared. But the persistence of the building does not
depend on the builder, but on the strength of the structure in
its coherence, for if it had not the power of coherence-if it
were like water, for example-it would not be supposed to
keep the shape which it received through the act of the
agent.’
| say:
Possibly the world is in such a condition, but in general this argument is
not sound. For it is only true that the causing agent is always connected
with the effect , in so far as the effect actually exists without this actuality’s
having any insufficiency and any potency, if one imagines that the
essence of the effect lies in its being an effect, for then the effect can only
be an effect through the causation of the agent. But if its becoming an
effect through a cause is only an addition to its essence, then it is not
necessary that its existence should cease when the relation between the
causing agent and the effect is interrupted. If, however, it is not an
addition, but its essence consists in this relation of being an effect, then
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what Avicenna says is true. However, it is not true of the world, for the
world does not exit on account of this relation, but it exists on account of
its substance and the relation is only accidental to it. Perhaps what
Avicenna says is true concerning the forms of the celestial bodies, in so
far as they perceive the separate immaterial forms; and the philosophers
affirm this, because it is proved that there are immaterial forms whose
existence consists in their thinking, whereas knowledge in this sublunary
world only differs from its object because its object inheres in matter.’
Ghazali, answering the philosophers, says:
Our answer is that the act is connected with the agent
only in so far as it comes into being, but not in so far as it is
preceded by non-existence nor in so far as it is merely
existent. According to us the act is not connected with the
agent for a second moment after its coming to be, for then it
exists; it is only connected with it at the time of its coming to
be in so far as it comes to be and changes from non-
existence into existence. If it is denied the name of
becoming, it cannot be thought to be an act nor to be
connected with the agent. Your statement, philosophers, that
a thing’s coming to be means its being preceded by non-
existence, and that its being preceded by non-existence
does not belong to the act of the agent and the deed of the
producer, is true; but this prior non-existence is a necessary
condition for the existent’s being an act of the agent. For
existence not preceded by non-existence is everlasting, and
cannot be truly said to be an act of the agent. Not all
conditions necessary to make an act an act need proceed
from the agent's act; the essence, power, will, and
knowledge of the agent are a condition of his being an
agent, but do not derive from him. An act can only be
imagined as proceeding from an existent, and the existence,
will, power, and knowledge of the agent are a condition of
his being an agent, although they do not derive from him.’
| say:
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All this is true. The act of the agent is only connected with the effect, in
so far as it is moved, and the movement from potential to actual being is
what is called becoming. And, as Ghazali says, nonexistence is one of
the conditions for the existence of a movement through a mover.
Avicenna’s argument that when it is a condition for the act of the agent to
be connected with the existence, the absence of this connexion implies
that the agent is connected with its opposite, i.e. non-existence, is not
true. But the philosophers affirm that there are existents whose essential
specific differences consist in motion, e.g. the winds and so on; and the
heavens and the sublunary bodies belong to the genus of existents
whose existence lies in their movement, and if this is true, they are
eternally in a continual becoming. And therefore, just as the eternal
existent is more truly existent than the temporal, similarly that which is
eternally in becoming is more truly coming to be than that which comes to
be only during a definite time. And if the substance of the world were not
in this condition of continual movement, the world would not, after its
existence, need the Creator, just as a house after being completed and
finished does not need the builder’s existence, unless that were true
which Avicenna tried to prove in the preceding argument, that the
existence of the world consists only in its relation to the agent; and we
have already said that we agree with. him so far as this concerns the
forms of the heavenly bodies.
Therefore the world is during the time of its existence in need of the
presence of its agent for both reasons together, namely, because the
substance of the world is continually in motion and because its form,
through which it has its subsistence and existence, is of the nature of a
relation, not of the nature of a quality, i.e. the shapes and states which
have been enumerated in the chapter on quality. A form which belongs to
the class of quality, and is included in it, is, when it exists and its
existence is finished, in no need of an agent. All this will solve the
problem for you, and will remove from you the perplexity which befalls
man through these contradictory statements.’
Ghazali says, on behalf of the philosophers:
The philosophers might say: If you acknowledge that it is
possible that the act should be simultaneous with the agent
and not posterior to it, it follows that if the agent is temporal
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the act must be temporal, and if the agent is eternal the act
must be eternal. But to impose as a condition that the act
must be posterior in time to the agent is impossible, for when
aman moves his finger in a bowl of water, the water moves
at the same time as the finger, neither before nor after, for if
the water moved later than the finger, finger and water would
have to be in one and the same space before the water
disconnected itself, and if the water moved before the finger,
the water would be separated from the finger and
notwithstanding its anteriority would be an effect of the
finger performed for its sake. But if we suppose the finger
eternally moving in the water, the movement of the water will
be eternal too, and will be, notwithstanding its eternal
character, an effect and an object, and the supposition of
eternity does not make this impossible. And such is the
relation between the world and God.
| say:
This is true in so far as it concerns the relation of movement and mover,
but in regard to the stable existent or to that which exists without moving
or resting by nature (if there exist such things ) and their relation to their
cause, it is not trues Let us therefore admit this relation between the agent
and the world only in so far as the world is in motion. As for the fact that
the act of every existent must be conjoined with its existence, this is true,
unless something occurs to this existent which lies outside its nature, or
one or another accident occurs to it,b and it is immaterial whether this act
be natural or voluntary. See, therefore, what the Ash’arites did who
assumed an eternal existent, but denied that He acted during His eternal
existence, but then, however, allowed this agent to act eternally in the
future, so that the eternal existence of the Eternal would become divided
into two parts, an eternal past during which He does not act and an eternal
future during which He acts! But for the philosophers all this is confusion
and error.
Ghazali answers the philosophers on the question of priority:
We do not say that the simultaneity of agent and act is
impossible, granted that the act is temporal, e.g. the motion
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of the water, for this happens after its non-being and
therefore it can be an act, and it is immaterial whether this
act be posterior to the agent or simultaneous with him. It is
only an eternal act that we consider impossible, for to call an
act that which does not come into being out of not-being is
pure metaphor and does not conform to reality. As to the
simultaneity of cause and effect, cause and effect can be
either both temporal or both eternal, in the way in which it
may be said that the eternal knowledge is the cause of the
fact that the Eternal is knowing; we are not discussing this,
but only what is called an act. For the effect of a cause is not
called the act of a cause, except metaphorically. It can only
be called an act on condition that it comes into being out of
non-being. And if a man thinks he may describe the
everlasting Eternal metaphorically as acting on something,
what he thinks possible is only the use of a metaphor. And
your argument, philosophers-that if we suppose the
movement of the water to be eternal and everlasting with the
movement of the finger, this does not prevent the movement
of the water from being an act-rests on a confusion, for the
finger has no act, the agent is simply the man to whom the
finger belongs, that is the man who wills the movement; and,
if we suppose him to be eternal, then the movement of the
finger is his act, because every part of this movement comes
out of not-beings and in this sense it is an act. So far as the
motion of the water is concerned, we do not say that it
occurs through the act of this man-it is simply an act of God.
In any case, it is only an act in so far as it has come to be,
and if its coming to be is everlasting, it is still an act, because
it has come to be.
Then Ghazali gives the philosophers’ answer:
The philosophers may say: ‘If you acknowledge that the
relation of the act to the agent, in so far as this act is an
existent, is like the relation of effect and cause and you
admit that the causal relation may be everlasting, we affirm
that we do not understand anything else by the expression
155
“that the world is an act” than that it is an effect having an
everlasting relation to God. Speak of this as an “act” or not
just as you please, for do not let us quibble about words
when their sense has once been established.’
Ghazali says:
Our answer is that our aim in this question is to show that
you philosophers use those venerable names without
justification, and that God according to you is not a true
agent, nor the world truly His act, and that you apply this
word metaphorically-not in its real sense. This has now been
shown.
| say:
In this argument he supposes that the philosophers concede to him that
they only mean by God’s agency that He is the cause of the world, and
nothing else, and that cause and effect are simultaneous. But this would
mean that the philosophers had abandoned their original statement, for
the effect follows only from its cause, in so far as it is a formal or final
cause, but does not necessarily follow from its efficient cause, for the
efficient cause frequently exists without the effect’s existing. Ghazali acts
here like a guardian who tries to extract from his ward the confession of
having done things he did not allow him to do. The philosophers’ theory,
indeed, is that the world has an agent acting from eternity and everlasting,
i.e. converting the world eternally from non-being into being. This question
was formerly a point of discussion between Aristotelians and Platonists.
Since Plato believed in a beginning of the world, there could not in his
system be any hesitation in assuming a creative agent for the world. But
since Aristotle supposed the world to be eternal, the Platonists raised
difficulties against him, like the one which occupies us here, and they said
that Aristotle did not seem to admit a creator of the world. If was therefore
necessary for the Aristotelians to defend him with arguments which
establish that Aristotle did indeed believe that the world has a creator and
an agent. This will be fully explained in its proper place.
The principal idea is that according to the Aristotelians the celestial
bodies subsist through their movement, and that He who bestows this
movement is in reality the agent of this movement and, since the
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existence of the celestial bodies only attains its perfection through their
being in motion, the giver of this motion is in fact the agent of the celestial
bodies. Further, they prove that God is the giver of the unity through which
the world is united, and the giver of the unity which is the condition of the
existence of the composite; that is to say, He provides the existence of the
parts through which the composition occurs, because this action of
combining is their cause (as is proved), and such is the relation of the First
Principle to the whole world. And the statement that the act has come to
be, is true, for it is movement, and the expression ‘eternity’ applied to it
means only that it has neither a first nor a last term. Thus the philosophers
do not mean by the expression ‘eternal’ that the world is eternal through
eternal constituents,s for the world consists of movement. And since the
Ash’arites did not understand this, it was difficult for them to attribute
eternity at the same time to God and to the world. Therefore the term’
eternal becoming’ is more appropriate to the world than the term ‘eternity’.
Ghazali says:
The third reason why it is impossible for the philosophers
to admit according to their principle that the world is the act
of God is because of a condition which is common to the
agent and the act, namely, their assertion that out of the one
only one can proceed. Now the First Principle is one in every
way, and the world is composed out of different constituents.
Therefore according to their principle it cannot be imagined
that the world is the act of God.
| say:
If one accepts this principle, and its consequences, then indeed the
answer is difficult. But this principle has only been put forward by the later
philosophers of Islam.’
Then Ghazali says, on behalf of the philosophers:
The philosophers may say perhaps: The world in its
totality does not proceed from God without a mediator; what
proceeds from Him is one single existent, and this is the first
of the created principles, namely, abstract intellect, that is a
substance subsisting by itself, not possessing any volume,
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knowing itself and knowing its principle, which in the
language of the Divine Law is called ‘angel’. From it there
proceeds a third principle, and from the third a fourth, and
through this mediation the existent beings come to be many.
The differentiation and multiplicity of the act can proceed
either from a differentiation in active powers, in the way that
we act differently through the power of passion and through
the power of anger; or through a differentiation of matters, as
the sun whitens a garment which has been washed,
blackens the face of man, melts certain substances and
hardens others; or through a differentiation of instruments,
as one and the same carpenter saws with a saw, cuts with
an axe, bores with an awl;’ or this multiplication of the act
can proceed through mediation, so that the agent does one
act, then this act performs another act, and in this way the
act multiplies. All these divisions are impossible in the First
Principle, because there is no differentiation nor duality, nor
multiplicity in His essence, as will be proved in the proofs of
His unity. And there is here neither a differentiation of
matters-and the very discussion refers to the first effect,
which is, for example, primary matter, nor a differentiation of
the instrument, for there is no existent on the same level as
God-and the very discussion refers to the coming into
existence of the first instrument. The only conclusion
possible is that the multiplicity which is in the world proceeds
from God through mediation, as has been stated previously.
| say:
This amounts to saying that from the One, if He is simple, there can
proceed only one. And the act of the agent can only be differentiated and
multiplied either through matters (but there are no matters where He is
concerned), or through an instrument (but there is no instrument with
Him). The only conclusion therefore is that this happens through
mediation, so that first the unit proceeds from Him, and from this unit
another, and from this again another, and that it is in this way that plurality
comes into existence.
Then Ghazali denies this, and says:
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We answer: The consequence of this would be that there
is nothing in the world composed of units, but that everything
that exists is simple and one, and each unit is the effect of a
superior unit and the cause of an inferior, till the series ends
in an effect which has no further effect, just as the ascending
series ends in a cause which has no other cause. But in
reality it is not like this, for, according to the philosophers,
body is composed of form and Kyle, and through this
conjunction there arises one single thing; and man is
composed out of body and soul and body does not arise out
of soul, nor soul out of body: they exist together through
another cause. The sphere, too, is, according to them, like
this, for it is a body possessing a soul and the soul does not
come to be through the body, nor the body through the soul;
no, both proceed from another cause. How do these
compounds, then, come into existence? Through one single
cause? But then their principle that out of the one only one
arises is false. Or through a compound cause? But then the
question can be repeated in the case of this cause, till one
necessarily arrives at a point where the compound and the
simple meet. For the First Principle is simple and the rest are
compound, and this can only be imagined through their
contact. But wherever this contact takes place, this principle,
that out of the one only one proceeds, is false.
| say:
This consequence, that everything which exists is simple, is a necessary
consequence for the philosophers, if they assume that the First Agent is
like a simple agent in the empirical world. But this consequence is binding
only upon the man who applies this principle universally to everything that
exists. But the man who divides existents into abstract existents and
material, sensible existents, makes the principles to which the sensible
existent ascends different from the principles to which the intelligible
existent ascends, for he regards as the principles of the sensible existents
matter and form, and he makes some of these existents the agents of
others, till the heavenly body is reached, and he makes the intelligible
substances ascend to a first principle which is a principle to them, in one
159
way analogous to a formal cause, in another analogous to a final cause,
and in a third way analogous to an efficient cause. All this has been
proved in the works of the philosophers, and we state this proposition
here only in a general way. Therefore these difficulties do not touch them.
And this is the theory of Aristotle.’
About this statement-that out of the one only one proceeds-all ancient
philosophers were agreed, when they investigated the first principle of the
world in a dialectical way (they mistook this investigation, however, for a
real demonstration), and they all came to the conclusion that the first
principle is one and the same for everything, and that from the one only
one can proceed. Those two principles having been established, they
started to examine where multiplicity comes from. For they had already
come to the conclusion that the older theory was untenable. This theory
held that the first principles are two, one for the good, one for the bad; for
those older philosophers did not think that the principles of the opposites
could be one and the same; they believed that the most general opposites
which comprehend all opposites are the good and the bad, and held
therefore that the first principles must be two. When, however, after a
close examination, it was discovered that all things tend to one end, and
this end is the order which exists in the world, as it exists in an army
through its leader, and as it exists in cities through their government, they
came to the conclusion that the world must have one highest principle;
and this is the sense of the Holy Words ‘If there were in heaven and earth
gods beside God, both would surely have been corrupted’. They believed
therefore, because of the good which is present in everything, that evil
occurs only in an accidental way, like the punishments which good
governors of cities ordain; for they are evils instituted for the sake of the
good, not by primary intention. For there exist amongst good things some
that can only exist with an admixture of evil, for instance, in the being of
man who is composed of a rational and an animal soul. Divine Wisdom
has ordained, according to these philosophers, that a great quantity of the
good should exist, although it had to be mixed with a small quantity of evil,
for the existence of much good with a little evil is preferable to the non-
existence of much good because of a little evidence.
Since therefore these later philosophers were convinced that the first
principle must of necessity be one and unique, and this difficulty about the
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one occurred, they gave three answers to this question. Some, like
Anaxagoras and his school, believe that plurality is only introduced
through matter,’ some believe that plurality is introduced through the
instruments, and some believe that plurality comes only through the
mediators; and the first who assumed this was Plato. This is the most
convincing answer, for in the case of both the other solutions one would
have to ask again; from where does the plurality come in the matters and
in the instruments? But this difficulty touches anyone who acknowledges
that from the one only one can proceed: he has to explain how plurality
can derive from the one. Nowadays, however, the contrary of this theory,
namely, that out of the one all things proceed by one first emanation, is
generally accepted, and with our contemporaries we need discuss only
this latter statement.
The objection which Ghazali raises against the Peripatetics, that, if
plurality were introduced through mediators, there could only arise a
plurality of qualitatively undifferentiated agglomerates which could only
form a quantitative plurality, does not touch them. For the Peripatetics hold
that there exists a twofold plurality, the plurality of simple beings, those
beings namely that do not exist in matter, and that some of these are the
causes of others and that they all ascend to one unique cause which is of
their own genus, and is the first being of their genus, and that the plurality
of the heavenly bodies only arises from the plurality of these principles;
and that the plurality of the sublunary world comes only from matter and
form and the heavenly bodies. So the Peripatetics are not touched by this
difficulty. The heavenly bodies are moved primarily through their movers,
which are absolutely immaterial, and the forms of these heavenly bodies
are acquired from these movers and the forms in the sublunary world are
acquired from the heavenly bodies and also from each other, indifferently,
whether they are forms of the elements which are in imperishable prime
matters or forms of bodies composed out of the elements, and, indeed,
the composition in this sublunary world arises out of the heavenly bodies.
This is their theory of the order which exists in the world. The reasons
which led the philosophers to this theory cannot be explained here, since
they built it on many principles and propositions, which are proved in many
sciences and through many sciences in a systematic way. But when the
philosophers of our religion, like Farabi and Avicenna, had once conceded
to their opponents that the agent in the divine world is like the agent in the
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empirical, and that from the one agent there can arise but one object (and
according to all the First was an absolutely simple unity), it became
difficult for them to explain how plurality could arise from it. This difficulty
compelled them finally to regard the First as different from the mover of
the daily circular movement; they declared that from the First, who is a
simple existent, the mover of the highest sphere proceeds, and from this
mover, since he is of a composite nature, as he is both conscious of
himself and conscious of the First, a duality, the highest sphere, and the
mover of the second sphere, the sphere under the highest can arise. This,
however, is a mistake,’ according to philosophical teaching, for thinker and
thought are one identical thing in human intellect and this is still more true
in the case of the abstract intellects. This does not affect Aristotle’s theory,
for the individual agent in the empirical world, from which there can only
proceed one single act, can only in an equivocal way be compared to the
first agent. For the first agent in the divine world is an absolute agent,
while the agent in the empirical world is a relative agent, and from the
absolute agent only an absolute act which has no special individual object
can proceed. And thereby Aristotle proves that the agent of the human
intelligibles is an intellect free from matter, since this agent thinks all
things, and in the same way he proves that the passive intellect is
ingenerable and incorruptible,s because this intellect also thinks all things.
According to the system of Aristotle the answer on this point is that
everything whose existence is only effected through a conjunction of parts,
like the conjunction of matter and form, or the conjunction of the elements
of the world, receives its existence as a consequence of this conjunction.
The bestower of this conjunction is, therefore, the bestower of existence.
And since everything conjoined is only conjoined through a unity in it, and
this unity through which it is conjoined must depend on a unity, subsistent
by itself, and be related to it, there must exist a single unity, subsistent by
itself, and this unity must of necessity provide unity through its own
essence. This unity is distributed in the different classes of existing things,
according to their natures, and from this unity, allotted to the individual
things, their existence arises; and all those unities lead upwards to the
First Monad, as warmth which exists in all the individual warm things
proceeds from primal warmth, which is fire, and leads upwards to it? By
means of this theory Aristotle connects sensible existence with intelligible,
saying that the world is one and proceeds from one, and that this Monad
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is partly the cause of unity, partly the cause of plurality. And since Aristotle
was the first to find this solution, and because of its difficulty, many of the
later philosophers did not understand it, as we have shown. It is evident,
therefore, that there is a unique entity from which a single power
emanates through which all beings exist. And since they are many, it is
necessarily from the Monad, in so far as it is one, that plurality arises or
proceeds or whatever term is to be used. This is the sense of Aristotle’s
theory, a sense very different from that in which those thinkers believe
who affirm that from the one only one can proceed. See therefore how
serious this error proved among the philosophers! You should, therefore,
see for youself in the books of the ancients whether these philosophical
theories are proved, not in the works of Avicenna and others who changed
the philosophical doctrine in its treatment of metaphysics so much that it
became mere guessing.
Ghazali says, on behalf of the philosophers:
It may be said: If the philosophical theory is properly
understood, the difficulties disappear. Existents can be
divided into what exists in a substratum, like accidents and
forms, and what does not exist in a substratum. The latter
can be divided again into what serves as a substratum for
other things, e.g. bodies, and what does not exist in a
substratum, e.g. substances which subsist by themselves.
These latter again are divided into those which exert an
influence on bodies and which we call souls, and those
which exert an influence not on bodies but on souls, and
which we call abstract intellects. Existents which inhere in a
substratum, like accidents, are temporal and have temporal
causes which terminate in a principle, in one way temporal,
in another way everlasting, namely, circular movement. But
we are not discussing this here. Here we are discussing only
those principles which exist by themselves and do not inhere
in a substratum, which are of three kinds: (i) bodies, which
are the lowest type, (ii) abstract intellects, which are not
attached to bodies, either by way of action or by being
impressed upon them, which are the highest type, and (iii)
souls, which are the intermediate agencies, attached to the
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bodies in a certain way, namely, through their influence and
their action upon them, and which stand midway in dignity;
they undergo an influence from the intellects and exert an
influence upon the bodies.
Now the number of bodies is ten. There are nine
heavens, and the tenth body is the matter which fills the
concavity of the sphere of the moon. The nine heavens are
animated; they possess bodies and souls, and they have an
order in existence which we shall mention here. From the
existence of the First Principle there emanates the first
intellect-an existent which subsists by itself, immaterial, not
impressed on body, conscious of its principle and which we
philosophers call First Intellect, but which (for we do not
quibble about words) may be called angel, or intellect, or
what you will. From its existence there derive three things,
an intellect, the soul, and the body of the farthest sphere, i.e.
the ninth heaven. Then from the second intellect there derive
a third intellect and the soul and the body of the sphere of
the fixed stars, then from the third intellect there derive a
fourth intellect and the soul and the body of the sphere of
Saturn, then from the fourth intellect there derive a fifth
intellect and the soul and the body of the sphere of Jupiter,
and so on till one arrives at the intellect from which there
derive the intellect, the soul and the body of the sphere of
the moon, and this last intellect is that which is called the
active intellect. Then there follows that which fills the sphere
of the moon, namely, the matter which receives generation
and corruption from the active intellect and from the natures
of the spheres. Then through the action of the movements of
the spheres and the stars the matters are mixed in different
mixtures from which the minerals, vegetables, and animals
arise. It is not necessary that from each intellect another
intellect should derive endlessly, for these intellects are of a
different kind, and what is valid for the one is not valid for the
other. It follows from this that the intellects after the First
Principle are ten in number and that there are nine spheres,
and the sum of these noble principles after the First Principle
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is therefore nineteen; and that under each of the primary
intellects there are three things, another intellect and a soul
and body of a sphere. Therefore there must be in each
intellect a triple character, and in the first effect a plurality
can only be imagined in this way: (i) it is conscious of its
principle, (ii) it is conscious of itself, (ili) it is in itself possible,
since the necessity of its existence derives from another.
These are three conditions, and the most noble of these
three effects must be related to the most noble of these
conditions. Therefore the intellect proceeds from the first
effect; in so far as the first effect is conscious of its principle;
the soul of the sphere proceeds from the first effect, in so far
as the first effect is conscious of itself; and the body of the
sphere proceeds from the first effect, in so far as by itself the
first effect belongs to possible existence. We must still
explain why this triple character is found in the first effect,
although its principle is only one. We say that from the First
Principle only one thing proceeds, namely, the essence of
this intellect through which it is conscious of itself. The effect,
however, must by itself become conscious of its principle,
and this kind of consciousness cannot derive from its cause.
Also the effect by itself belongs to possible existence, and i
cannot receive this possibility from the First Principle, but
possesses it in its own essence. We do indeed regard it as
possible that one effect should proceed from the one,
although this effect possesses by itself and not through its
principle certain necessary qualities, either relative or
nonrelative. In this way a plurality arises, and so it becomes
the principle of the existence of plurality. Thus the composite
can meet the simple, as their meeting must needs take place
and cannot take place in any other g manner, and this is the
right and reasonable explanation, and it is in this way that
this philosophical theory must be understood.
| say:
All these are inventions fabricated against the philosophers by Avicenna,
Farabi, and others. But the true theory of the ancient philosophers is that
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there are principles which are the celestial bodies, and that the principles
of the celestial bodies, which are immaterial existents, are the movers of
those celestial bodies, and that the celestial bodies move towards them in
obedience to them and out of love for them, to comply with their order to
move and to understand them, and that they are only created with a view
to movement. For when it was found that the principles which move the
celestial bodies are immaterial and incorporeal, there was no way left to
them in which they might move the bodies other than by ordering them to
move. And from this the philosophers concluded that the celestial bodies
are rational animals, conscious of themselves and of their principles,
which move them by command. And since it was established-in the De
Anima-that there is no difference between know/edge and the object of
knowledge, except for the latter's being in matter, of necessity the
substance of immaterial beings-if there are such -had to be knowledge or
intellect or whatever you wish to call it. And the philosophers knew that
these principles must be immaterial, because they confer on the celestial
bodies everlasting movement in which there is no fatigue or weariness,’
and that anything which bestows such an everlasting movement must be
immaterial, and cannot be a material power. And indeed the celestial body
acquires its permanence only through these immaterial principles. And the
philosophers understood that the existence of these immaterial principles
must be connected with a first principle amongst them; if not, there could
be no order in the world. You can find these theories in the books of the
philosophers and, if you want to make sure of the truth in these matters,
you will have to consult them. It also becomes clear from the fact that all
the spheres have the daily circular movement, although besides this
movement they have, as the philosophers had ascertained, their own
special movements, that He who commands this movement must be the
First Principle, i.e. God, and that He commands the other principles to
order the other movements to the other spheres. Through this heaven and
earth are ruled as a state is ruled by the commands of the supreme
monarch, which, however, are transmitted to all classes of the population
by the men he has appointed for this purpose in the different affairs of the
state. As it says in the Qur'an: ‘And He inspired every Heaven with its
bidding. This heavenly injunction and this obedience are the prototypes of
the injunction and obedience imposed on man because he is a rational
animal. What Avicenna says of the derivation of these principles from
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each other is a theory not known amongst the ancients, who merely state
that these principles hold certain positions in relation to the First Principle,
and that their existence is only made real through this relation to the First
Principle. As is said in the Qur'an: ‘There is none amongst us but has his
appointed place. It is the connexion which exists between them which
brings it about that some are the effect of others and that they all depend
on the First Principle. By ‘agent’ and ‘object’, ‘creator’ and ‘creature’, in so
far as it concerns this existence nothing more can be understood than just
this idea of connexion. But what we said of this connexion of every
existent with the One is something different from what is meant by ‘agent’
and ‘object’, ‘maker’ and ‘product’ in this sublunary world. If you imagine a
ruler who has many men under his command who again have others
under their command, and if you imagine that those commanded receive
their existence only through receiving this command and through their
obedience to this command, and those who are under those commanded
can only exist through those commanded, of necessity the first ruler will be
the one who bestows on all existents the characteristic through which they
become existent, and that which exists through its being commanded will
only exist because of the first ruler. And the philosophers understood that
this is what is meant by the divine laws when they speak of creation, of
calling into existence out of nothing, and of command. This is tire best way
to teach people to understand the philosophical doctrine without tile
ignominy attaching to it, which seems to attach when you listen to the
analysis Ghazali gives of it here. Tire philosophers assert that all this is
proved in their books, and the man who, (raving fulfilled the conditions
they impose,’ is able to study their works will find the truth of what they
say---or perhaps its opposite--and will not understand Aristotle’s theory or
Plato’s in any other sense than that here indicated. And their philosophy is
tire highest point human intelligence can reach. It may be that, Nvlrerr it
man discover, these explanations of philosophical theory, lie will find that
they happen not only to be true but to be generally acknowledged, and
teachings which are f;errerally acceptable are pleasing and delightful to
all.
One of the premisses from which this explanation is deduced is that
when one observes this sublunary world, one finds that what is called
‘living’ and ‘knowing’ moves on its own account in welldefined movements
towards well-defined ends and well-defined acts from which new well-
167
defined acts arise. For this reason the theologians say that any act can
only proceed from a living, knowing being. When one has found this first
premiss, that what moves in welldefined movements from which arise
well-defined and ordered actions is living and knowing, and one joins to
this a second premiss which can be verified by the senses, that the
heavens move on their own account in well-defined movements from
which there follow in the existents under them well-defined acts, order,
and rank through which these existents under them receive their
subsistence, one deduces from this, no doubt, a third principle, namely,
that the heavenly bodies are living beings endowed with perception. That
from their movements there follow well-defined acts from which this
sublunary world, its animals, vegetables, and minerals receive their
subsistence and conservation , is evident from observation, for, were it not
that the sun in its ecliptic approaches the sublunary world and recedes
from it, there would not be the four seasons, and without tile four seasons
there would be no plants and no animals, and the orderly origination of
elements out of each other necessary for the conservation of their
existence would not take place. For instance, when the sun recedes
towards tile south the air in the north becomes cold and rains occur and
tire production of the watery element increases, whereas in tile south tile
production of the airy element becomes greater; whereas in summer,
when the sun approaches our zenith, the opposite takes place. Those
actions which the sun exercises everlastingly through its varying distance
from the different existents which always occupy one and the same place
are also found in the moon and all the stars which have oblique spheres,
and they produce tile four seasons through their circular movements, and
the most important of all these movements, in its necessity for tire
existence and conservation of the creation, is tire highest circular
movement which produces day and night. The Venerable Book refers in
several verses to the providential care for man which arises out of God’s
subjection of all tile heavens to His bidding, as, for instance, in tile
Quranic verse ‘And the sun and the moon and the stars are subjected to
His bidding’, and wircn man observes these acts and this guidance which
proceed necessarily and permanently from tire movcnrcnts of tile stars,
and sees how these stars move in fixed movements, and drat they have
well-defined shapes and move in well-defined directions towards well-
defined actions in opposite motions, he understands that these well-
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defined acts can only arise from beings perceptive, living, capable of
choice and of willing.
And he becomes still more convinced of this when he sees that many
beings in this world which have small, despicable, miserable, and
insignificant bodies are not wholly devoid of life, notwithstanding the
smallness of their size, the feebleness of their powers, the shortness of
their lives, the insignificance of their bodies; and that divine munificence
has bestowed on them life and perception, through which they direct
themselves and conserve their existence. And he knows with absolute
certainty that the heavenly bodies are better fitted to possess life and
perception than the bodies of this sublunary world, because of the size of
their bodies, the magnificence of their existence, and the multitude of their
lights,’ as it says in the Divine Words: ‘Surely the creation of the heavens
and the earth is greater than the creation of man, but most men know it
not. But especially when he notices how they direct the living beings of
this sublunary world, does he understand with absolute certainty that they
are alive, for the living can only be guided by a being leading a more
perfect life. And when man observes these noble, living, rational bodies,
capable of choice, which surround us, and recognizes a third principle,
namely, that they do not need for their own existence the providence with
which they guide the sublunary world, he becomes aware that they are
commanded to perform these movements and to control the animals,
vegetables, and minerals of this sublunary world, and that He who
commands them is not one of them and that He is necessarily incorporeal
(for, if not, He would be one of them) and that all these heavenly bodies
control the existents which are under them, but serve Him, who for His
existence is in no need of them. And were it not for this Commander, they
would not give their care everlastingly and continuously to this sublunary
world which they guide willingly, without any advantage to themselves,
especially in this act. They move thus by way of command and obligation
the heavens which repair to them, only in order to conserve this sublunary
world and to uphold its existence. And the Commander is God (glory be to
Him), and all this is the meaning of the Divine Words ‘We come willingly’.
And another proof of all this is that, if a man sees a great many people,
distinguished and meritorious, applying themselves to definite acts without
a moment's interruption, although these acts are not necessary for their
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own existence and they do not need them, it is absolutely evident to him
that these acts have been prescribed and ordered to them and that they
have a leader who has obliged them in his everlasting service to act
continually for the good of others. This leader is the highest among them
in power and rank and they are, as it were, his submissive slaves. And this
is the meaning to which the Venerable Book refers in the words: ‘Thus did
we show Abraham the kingdom of heaven. and the earth that he should
be of those who are safe. ‘ And when man observes still another thing,
namely, that all the seven planets in their own special movements are
subservient to their universal daily motion and that their own bodies as
parts of the whole are submissive to the universal body, as if they were all
one in fulfilling this service, he knows again with absolute certainty that
each planet has its own commanding principle, supervising it as a deputy
of the first Commander. Just as, in the organization of armies, | where
each body of troops has one commander, called a centurion, each
centurion is subordinate to the one Commander-in-chief of the army, so
also in regard to the movements of the heavenly bodies which the
ancients observed. They number somewhat more than forty, of which
seven or eight’-for the ancients disagreed about this -dominate the others
and themselves depend on the first Commander, praise be to Him! Man
acquires this knowledge in this way, whether or not lie knows how the
principle of the creation of these heavenly bodies acts, or what the
connexion is between the existence of these commanders and the first
Commander. In any case lie does not doubt that, if these heavenly bodies
existed by themselves, that is, if they were eternal and had no cause, they
might refuse to serve their own commanders or might not obey them, and
the commanders might refuse to obey the first Commander. But, since it is
not possible for them to behave in this way, the relation between them and
the first Commander is determined by absolute obedience, and this means
nothing more than that they possess this obedience in the essence of their
being, not accidentally, as is the case in the relation between master and
servant. Servitude, therefore, is not something additional to their essence,
but these essences subsist through servitude and this is the meaning of
the Divine Words: ‘There is none in the heavens or the earth but comes to
the Merciful as a servant. And their possession is the kingdom of the
heavens and the earth which God showed to Abraham, as it is expressed
in the Devine Words: ‘Thus did we show Abraham the kingdom of heaven
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and earth that he should be of those who are safe. Therefore you will
understand that the creation of these bodies and the principle of their
becoming cannot be like the coming to be of the bodies of this sublunary
world, and that the human intellect is too weak to understand how this act
works, although it knows that this act exists. He who tries to compare
heavenly with earthly existence, and believes that the Agent of the divine
world acts in the way in which an agent in this sublunary world works, is
utterly thoughtless, profoundly mistaken, and in complete error.
This is the extreme limit we can reach in our understanding of the
theories of the ancients about the heavenly bodies, of their proof for the
existence of a Creator for these bodies who is immaterial, and of their
statements concerning the immaterial existents under Him, one of which is
the soul. But to believe in His existence as if He were the cause through
which these bodies had been produced in time, in the way we see the
production of the bodies of this sublunary world, as the theologians
desired-this, indeed, is very difficult, and the premisses they use for its
proof do not lead them where they desire. We shall show this later, when
we discuss the different proofs for the existence of God.
And since this has been firmly established, we shall now go back to
relate and refute in detail what Ghazali tells of the philosophers, and to
show the degree of truth reached by his assertions, for this is the primary
intention of this book.
Ghazali says, refuting the philosophers:
What you affirm are only suppositions and in fact you do
nothing but add obscurities to obscurities. If a man were to
say that he had seen such things in a dream, it would be a
proof of his bad constitution, or if one should advance such
arguments in juridical controversies, in which everything
under discussion is conjectural, one would say these were
stupidities which could not command any assent.
| say:
This is very much the way the ignorant treat the learned and the vulgar
the eminent, and in this way, too, the common people behave towards the
products of craftsmanship. For, when the artisans show the common
7a
people the products of their craftsmanship which possess many qualities
from which they draw wonderful actions, the masses scoff at them and
regard them as insane, whereas in reality they themselves are insane and
ignorant in comparison with the wise. With such utterances as these the
learned and the thoughtful need not occupy themselves. What Ghazali
ought to have done, since he relates these theories, is to show the
motives which led to them, so that the reader might compare them with
the arguments through which he wants to refute them.
Ghazali says:
The ways of refuting such theories are countless, but we
shall bring here a certain number. The first is that we say:
You claim that one of the meanings of plurality in the first
effect is that it is possible in it
Tahafut al-Tahafut — La Incoherencia de la Incoherencia
Averroes (Ibn Rushd)