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ORIENTAL TRANSLATION FUND.
NEW SERIES.
Volume XII.
A BUDDHIST MANUAL
OK
PSYCHOLOGICAL ETHICS
OF THE FOURTH CENTURY B.C.
BEING
Jl translation, non) make for tfje grt^t time, from tl>o
Original ^ali ,
OF THE
FIRST BOOK IN THE ABHIDHAMMA BITAKA
>
ENTITLED
DHAMMA-SANGANI
(COMPENDIUM OF STATES OB PHENOMENA).
Hfflitb Tntrobuctors jessag and notes '
BY
CAROLINE A. F. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A.,
Fellow of University College, London.
PRINTED AND PUBLISHED UNDER THE PATRONAGE OF THE
ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY;
AND SOLD AT
22, ALBEMARLE STREET, LONDON.
1900.
ed by CjOCK^Ic
EDWARD T. STURDY,
BY
WHOSE GENEROUS ASSISTANCE
THE EDITION OF THE COMMENTARY
HAS BEEN RENDERED ACCESSIBLE TO SCHOLARS,
AN1>
A TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT TO READERS GENERALLY.
THIS VOLUME IS DEDICATED
WITH THE CORDIAL REGARD OF HIS FRIEND,
THE TRANSLATOR.
ed by CjOCK^Ic
ERRATA.
P. 5, for ope£(f, read bptliQ.
P. 13, for citt’ ekaggata, read cittass’ ekaggata (bis).
P. 23, for k a y a - p a s s a d d h i, read kayappassaddhi.
P. 44, for p a r i p • p h a r a t i, read parippharati.
P. 57, for Aruppaj hana, read Aruppajjhana (bis).
P. 58, for - v i 1 a s a, read - v i 1 a s a.
P. 68, for v i m o k k h a ip read vimokklio.
P. 132, for s a n t i r a n a, read santirana (bis).
Pp. 149, 150, for ahftatavindriyaip, read ahftatavindriyarp
P. 158, for thftnaip, read than a ip.
P. 165, for arupino, read arupino.
P. 166, for Atthakatha, read Atthakatha.
P. 174, for samudlranaip, read samud Ira n a ip.
P. 175, for attabhavo, read attabhavo.
,, divide indriyesu from guttadvaro.
P. 183, forsumukkhapakamil, read snmukliapakka in a.
,, for ‘ long,* short, read ‘long,’ ‘short.’
P. 185, for sakkhusamphassajo, read sukhasampliassajo.
P. 199, for kaya-pasado, read kayappasado.
P. 201, for sneho, read sin eh o.
P. 241, for patitthanaip, read pa tit th ana ip.
P. 242 note 1 , for Mil 317 read Mil 313.
P. 250, for Atthakatha, read Atthakatha.
P. 252, for t h a n a ip, read t h a n a pi.
pp. 264, 265, from §§ [1015] to [1019] the questions are wrongly numbered.
P. 280, for - 1 a n h a, read • t a n h a.
P. 294, for tatkagato, read tatkagato.
„ for aramnianaip, read arammanaip.
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‘ Yaiji kiftci dhamniaiu abhijaftfta
ajjhattaip athavapi bahiddha.’
SrrrA Nii'ata, 917.
* Api khvaham avuso imasmiiu yeva vyamamatte kalevare saftftiiphi sa-
niauake lokarp pafihapemi . .
Samyctta NikJya, i. 62; = A., ii. 48.
4 Kullupamaiji vo bhikkhave ajiinantehi dhammil pi vo jishatabbii, pag-eva
adhannua.’
Majjhima Nikhaya, i. 185.
4 Der Buddhismus ist die einzige, eigentlich positivistische Religion die
uns die Geachichte zeigt.’
Nietzsche.
4 We shall find that every important philosophical reformation, after a time
of too highly strained metaphysical dogmatism or unsatisfying scepticism,
has been begun by some man who saw the necessity of looking deeper into the
mental roust itution . '
(r. Ckoom Robertson.
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CONTENTS.
PACK
INTRODUCTORY ESSAY xv
I. The Manual and the History of Psychology. II. The Date of the
Manual (p. xviii). III. On the Commentaries and the Importance
of the Atthasalini (p. xx). IY. On the Method and Argument of
the Manual (p. xxvi). V. On the Chief Subject of Inquiry —
Dhamma (p. xxxii). VI. On the Inquiry into Rupain and the
Buddhist Theory of Sense (p. xli.). VII. On the Buddhist Philo-
sophy of Mind and Theory of Intellection (p. lxiii.). VIII. On the
Buddhist Notions of 4 Good, Bad, and Indeterminate ’ (p. lxxxii.).
BOOK I.
THE GENESIS OF THOUGHTS (Cittuppada-kandam).
PART I.
GOOD STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS.
CHAPTER I.
The Eight Main Types of Thought relating to the Sensuous
Universe (Kama vacar a- at tha-m ahacitt ani) ... 1
CHAPTER II.
Good in relation to the Universe of Form (rupavacara-
kusalam) ... ... ... ... ... ... 43
Methods for inducing Jh&na: I. The Eight Artifices. II. The
Stations of Mastery (p. 58). III. The Three First Deliver-
ances (p. 63). IV. The Four Jhanas of the Sublime Abodes
(p. 65). V. The Jhana of Foul Things (p. 69).
CHAPTER III.
Good in relation to the Universe of the Formless (arupSva-
cara-kusala m). The Four Jhanas connected with Form-
less Existence (c a 1 1 a r i arupaj jhanani) ... ... 71
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X
CHAPTER IV.
Degrees of Efficacy in Good relating to the Three Realms
CHAPTER V.
Thought engaged upon the Higher Ideal (lokuttaram
cittam)
I. The First Path. II. The Second Path (p. 95). IIL The
Third Path (p. 96). TV. The Fourth Path (p. 97).
PART II.
BAD STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS.
CHAPTER VI.
The Twelve Bad Thoughts (d v a d a 8 a akusalacitt&ni) ...
PART III.
INDETERMINATE STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS.
CHAPTER I.
On Effect, or Result (v i p a k o)
A. Good Karma. B. Bad Karma (p. 151).
CHAPTER II.
Action-thoughts (k i r i y a)
Introductory
BOOK II.
FORM (r upakandam).
CHAPTER I.
Exposition of Form under Single Concepts (ekaka-niddeso)
CHAPTER II.
Categories of Form under Dual aspects — positive and negative
(duvidhena rupasangaho)
CHAPTER III.
Categories of Form under Triple Aspects. Exposition of the
Triplets
CHAPTER IV.
Categories of Form under Fourfold Aspects . . .
PACK
76
82
98
123
156
165
168
172
220
232
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XI
CHAPTER Y.
PAGE
Category of Form under a Fivefold Aspect ... ... ... 241
CHAPTER VI.
Category of Form under a Sixfold Aspect ... ... ... 244
CHAPTER VII.
Category of Form under a Sevenfold Aspect .. . ... ... 245
CHAPTER VIII.
Category of Form under an Eightfold Aspect ... ... 246
CHAPTER IX.
Category of Form under a Ninefold Aspect ... ... ... 247
CHAPTER X.
Category of Form under a Tenfold Aspect ... ... ... 248
CHAPTER XI.
Category of Form under an Elevenfold Aspect ... ... 249
BOOK III.
THE DIVISION ENTITLED ‘ELIMINATION’ (nikkhepa-
k a n d a m).
PART I.
CHAPTER I.
The Group of Triplets (t i k a m) ... ... ... ... 250
CHAPTER II.
The Group on Cause (hetu-gocchakam) ... ... 274
CHAPTER III.
The Short Intermediate Set of Pairs (c u 1 a n t a r a - d uk am) ... 288
CHAPTER IV.
The Intoxicant Group (a 8 a v a - g o c c h a k a m) ... ... 291
CHAPTER V.
The Group of the Fetters (s a ii ti o j a n a - g o c c h a k a in) ... 297
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Xll
CHAPTER VI.
PAGE
The Group of the Ties (ganth a- goechakam) ... ... 304
CHAPTER VII.
The Group of the Floods (ogha - goechakam) ... ... 308
CHAPTER VIII.
The Group of the Bonds (yoga -goechakam) ... ... 309
CHAPTER IX.
The Group of the Hindrances (nl varan a- goechakam) ... 310
CHAPTER X.
The Group on Contagion (par a mas a- goc ch aka in) ... 316
CHAPTER XI.
The Great Intermediate Set of Pairs (mahantara-dukam) 318
CHAPTER XII.
The Group on Grasping (upadana-gocchakam) ... ... 323
CHAPTER XIII.
The Group on the Corruptions (kilesa-gocchaka ni) . . . 327
CHAPTER XIV.
The Supplementary Set of Pairs (pi^hidukain) ... ... 331
PART II.
The Suttanta Pairs of Terms (s u 1 1 a n t i k a - d u k a m) ... 338
APPENDIX I.
On the Supplementary Digest appended to the Dhamma-Sangani,
and entitled, in the Commentary, the Atthakatha-
kandam or Atthuddh&ro ... ... ... 360
APPENDIX II.
On the term Uncompounded Element (asankhata dhatu) 367
Indexes... ... ... ... ... ... ... 370
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ABBREVIATIONS.
1. BUDDHIST CANONICAL BOOKS
A . — A nguttara-Nikay a.
C. — Cullavagga.
D. — Dlgha-Nikaya.
Dhp. — Dhammapada.
Dh. K. — Dhatu-Katha.
Dh. S. — Dhamma-Sangani.
Jat. — Jataka.
K. — Siamese (Kambodian) edition of the text.
K. V. — Katha Vatthu.
M . — M aj j hima-N ik&y a.
M. P. S. — Maha-Parinibbana Sutta (Childers).
P. P.— Puggala-Pafifiatti.
S. — Samyutta-Nikaya.
S. N. — Sutta* Nipata.
Yin. — Vinaya.
2. OTHER BOOKS.
Abh. S. — Abhidhammattha-Sangaha.
Asl. — AtthasalinT.
I)iv. — Divyavadana.
P. T. S.— Journal of the Pali Text Society.
J. R. A. S.^— Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.
M. B. V. — Maha Bodhi Vansa.
Mah.— Maha Vansa.
Mil. — Milinda Panho.
S. B. E. — Sacred Books of the East.
Sum. — Sumangala-Vilasini.
Vis. M. — Visuddhi Magga.
TBy ‘printed text,’ or simply ‘text,’ is always meant the edition
published in 1885 by the Pali Text Society, unless otherwise stated.]
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INTRODUCTORY ESSAY.
I.
The Manual and the History of Psychology.
If the tombs of Egypt or the ruins of Greece itself were
to give up, among their dead that are now and again being
restored to us, a copy of some manual with which the
young Socrates was put through the mill of current
academic doctrine, the discovery would be hailed, especially
by scholars of historical insight, as a contribution of
peculiar interest. The contents would no doubt yield no
new matter of philosophic tradition. But they would
certainly teach something respecting such points as pre-
Aristotelian logical methods, and the procedure followed
in one or more schools for rendering students conversant
with the concepts in psychology, ethics and metaphysic
accepted or debated by the culture of the age.
Readers whose sympathies are not confined to the shores
of the Mediterranean and iEgean seas will feel a stir of
interest, similar in kind if fainter in degree, on becoming
more closely acquainted with the Buddhist text -book
entitled Dhamma-Sangani. The English edition of the
Pali text, prepared for the Pali Text Society by Professor
Dr. Ed. Muller, and published fifteen years ago, has so
far failed to elicit any critical discussion among Pali
scholars. A cursory inspection may have revealed little
but what seemed dry, prolix and sterile. Such was, at
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XVI
least, the verdict of a younger worker, now, alas ! no more, 1
Closer study of the work will, I believe, prove less un-
grateful, more especially if the conception of it as a
student’s manual be kept well in view. The method of
the book is explicative, deductive ; its object was, not to add
to the Dhamma, but to unfold the orthodox import of
terms in use among the body of the faithful, and, by
organizing and systematizing the aggregate of doctrinal
concepts, to render the learner’s intellect both clear and
efficient.
Even a superficial inspection of the Manual should yield
great promise to anyone interested in the history of
psychology. When upwards of six years ago my attention
was first drawn to it, and the desirability of a translation
pointed out by Professor Rhys Davids, I was at once
attracted by the amount of psychological material embedded
in its pages. Buddhist philosophy is ethical first and last.
This is beyond dispute. But among ethical systems there is
a world of difference in the degree of importance attached to
the psychological prolegomena of ethics. In ethical problems
we are on a basis of psychology, depending for our material
largely upon the psychology of conation or will, 2 with its
co-efficients of feeling and intelligence. And in the
history of human ideas, in so far as it clusters about those
problems, we find this dependence either made prominent
or slurred over. Treated superficially, if suggestively and
picturesquely, in Plato, the nature and functions of that
faculty in man, whereby he is constituted an ethical and
political ‘animal,’ are by Aristotle analyzed at length.
But the Buddhists were, in a way, more advanced in the
1 H. C. Warren, ‘ Buddhism in Translations,’ xviii. Cf.
Kern, ‘ Indian Buddhism,’ p. 3.
2 Cf. G. C. Robertson, ‘Elements of General Philosophy,’
pp. 191, 197 ; ‘ Philosophical Remains,’ p. 3 ; A. Bain,
‘Moral Science’ — ‘The Psychological Data of Ethics.’
‘Every ethical system involves a psychology of conduct,
and depends for its development upon its idea of what
conduct actually is ’ (C. Douglas, ‘ The Philosophy of
J. S. Mill,’ p. 251).
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xvu
psychology of their ethics than Aristotle — in a way, that
is, which would now be called scientific. Rejecting the
assumption of a psyche and of its higher manifestations
or nofis, they were content to resolve the consciousness of
the Ethical Man, as they found it, into a complex continuum
of subjective phenomena. They analyzed this continuum,
as we might, exposing it, as it were, by transverse section.
But their treatment was genetic. The distinguishable
groups of dhamma — of states or mental psychoses —
‘ arise ’ in every case in consciousness, in obedience to certain
laws of causation, physical and moral 1 — that is, ultimately,
as the outcome of antecedent states of consciousness. There
is no exact equivalent in Pali, any more than there is in
Aristotle, for the relatively modem term ‘ consciousness,’
yet is the psychological standpoint of the Buddhist philo-
sophy virtually as thoroughgoing in its perceptual basis
as that of Berkeley. It was not solipsism any more than
Berkeley’s immaterialism was solipsistic. It postulated
other percipients 2 3 * as Berkeley did, together with, not a
Divine cause or source of percepts, but the implicit Monism
of early thought veiled by a deliberate Agnosticism. And just
as Berkeley, approaching philosophical questions through
psychology, ‘ was the first man to begin a perfectly
scientific doctrine of sense-perception as a psychologist,’ 8
so Buddhism, from a quite early stage of its development,
set itself to analyze and classify mental processes witlP
remarkable insight and sagacity. And on the results of,
that psychological analysis it sought to base the whole'
rationale of its practical doctrine and discipline. From
studying the processes of attention, and the nature of
sensation, the range and depth of feeling and the plasticity
of the will in desire and in control, it organized its system
of personal self-culture.
1 Utuandkamma.
2 Cf e.g . below, p. 272 [1045].
3 G. C. Robertson, op. cit., p. 154.
b
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XV1U
Germany has already a history of psychology half com-
pleted on the old lines of the assumed monopoly of ancient
thought by a small area of the inhabited world. England
has not yet got so far. Is it too much to hope that, when
such a work is put forth, the greater labour of a wider and
juster initiative will have been undertaken, and the develop-
ment of early psychological thought in the East have been
assigned its due place in this branch of historical research ?
II.
The Date of the Manual .
We can fortunately fix the date of the Dhamma- San-
gani within a limit that, for an Indian book, may be
considered narrow. Its aim is to systematize or formulate
certain doctrines, or at least to enumerate and define a
number of scattered terms or categories of terms, occurring
in the great books of dialogues and sundry discourse
entitled the Nikayas of the Sutta Pitaka. The whole
point of view, psychological and philosophical, adopted in
them is, in our Manual, taken for granted. The technical
terms used in them are used in it as if its hearers, subse-
quently its readers, would at once recognise them. No one
acquainted with those books, and with the Dhamma-
Sangani, will hesitate in placing the latter, in point of
time, after the Nikayas.
On the other hand, the kind of questions raised in our
Manual are on a different plane altogether from those
raised in the third book in the Abhidhamma Pitaka, viz.,
the Katha Vatthu, which we know to have been composed
by Tissa at Patna, in the middle of the third century b.c. 1
The Dhamma- Sangani does not attempt to deal with any
such advanced opinions and highly-elaborated points of
doctrine as are put forward by those supposed opponents of
the orthodox philosophy who are the interlocutors in the
Katha Yatthu. It remains altogether, or almost alto-
gether, at the old standpoint of the Nikayas as regards
1 AtthasalinI, p. 8 ; Maha Bodhi Vansa, p. 110.
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XIX
doctrine, differing only in method of treatment. The
Katha Vatthu raises new questions belonging to a later
stage in the development of the faith.
The Dhamma-Sangani is therefore younger than the
Nikayas, and older than the Katha Yatthu. If we date
it half-way between the two, that is, during the first third
of the fourth century b.c. (contemporary, therefore, with
the childhood of Aristotle, b. 384), we shall be on the safe
side. But I am disposed to thiijk that the interval between
the completion of the Nikayas and the compilation of the
Dhamma-Sangani is less than that between the latter
work and the Katha Vatthu ; and that our manual should
therefore be dated rather at the middle than at the end of
the fourth century b.c., or even earlier. However that
may be, it is important for the historian of psychology to
remember that the ideas it systematizes are, of course,
older. Practically all of them go back to the time of the
Buddha himself. Some of them are older still.
The history of the text of our Manual belongs to that of
the canonical texts taken collectively. There are, however,
two interesting references to it, apart from the general
narrative, in the Maha Vansa, which show, at least, that
the Dhamma-Sangani was by no means laid on the shelf
among later Buddhists. King Kassapa V. of Ceylon (a.d.
929-939) had a copy of it engraved on gold plates studded
with jewels, and took it in procession with great honour to
a vihara he had built, and there offered flowers to it. 1
Another King of Ceylon, Yijaya Bahu I. (a.d. 1065-1120),
shut himself up every morning for a time against his
people in the beautiful Hall of Exhortation, and there made
a translation of the Dhamma-Sangani, no doubt from Pali
into Sinhalese. 2
I can testify to the seriousness of the task, and feel a
keen sympathy with my royal predecessor, and envy withal
for his proximity in time and place to the seat of orthodox
tradition. Nothing, unfortunately, is now known, so far
1 Mah., ch. 1., vers. 50, 51, 56. 2 Ibid., ch. lxx., ver. 17.
b 2
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XX
as I have been able to ascertain, of this work, in which
the translator was very likely aided by the best scholarship
of the day, and which might have saved me from many a
doubt and difficulty.
in.
On the Commentaries and the Importance of the
A tthasdlim .
It will be seen from Appendix I. that the last part of the
text of our Manual is a supplement added to it by way of
commentary, or rather of interpretation and digest. It is,
perhaps, not surprising that so much of this kind of
material has survived within the four corners of the
Pitakas. We have the Old Commentary embedded in the
Vinaya, and the Parivara added as a sort of supple-
mentary examination paper to it. Then there is the
Niddesa, a whole book of commentary, on texts now
included in the Sutta Nipata, and there are passages
clearly of a commentarial nature scattered through the
Nikayas. Lastly, there is the interesting fragment of
commentary tacked on to the Dhamma-Sangani itself
(below, p. 357). As these older incorporated commentaries
are varied both in form and in method, it is evident that
commentary of different kinds had a very early beginning.
And the probability is very great that the tradition is not
so far wrong, when it tells us that commentaries on all the
principal canonical books were handed down in schools of
the Order abng with the texts themselves.
This is not to maintain that all of the Commentaries
were so handed down in all the schools, nor that each of
them was exactly the same in each of the schools where it
was taught. But wherever Commentaries were so handed
down, tradition tells us that they were compiled, and subse-
quently written, in the dialect of the district where the
school was situated. From two places, one in India and
the other in Ceylon, we have works purporting to give in
Pali the substance of such ancient traditional comment as
had been handed down in the local vernacular. One of
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XXI
these is the Atthasalinl, Buddhaghosa’s reconstruction, in
Pali, of the Commentary on our present work, as handed
down in Sinhalese at the school of the Great Monastery,
the Maha Vihara at Anuradhapura in Ceylon.
The Maha Vansa, indeed, saya (p. 251) that he wrote
this work at Gaya, in North India, before he came to
Anuradhapura. This, however, must be a mistake, if it
refers to the work as we have it. For in that work he
frequently quotes from and refers to another work which
he certainly wrote after his arrival in Ceylon, namely, the
N Visuddhi Magga, and once or twice he refers to the
Samanta Pasadika, which he also wrote in Ceylon.
The Sadhamma Sangaha 1 has two apparently incon-
sistent statements which suggest a solution. The first is
that he wrote, at the Vihara at Gaya, a work called the
‘Uprising of Knowledge’ Cftanodaya), and a Commentary
on the Dhamma-Sangani, called the Atthasalinl, and began
to write one on the Parittas. Then it was that he was urged
to go, and actually did go, to Ceylon to obtain better materials
for his work. The second is that, after he had arrived
there and had written seven other works, he then wrote the
Atthasalinl. When the same author makes two such state-
ments as these, and in close conjunction, he may well mean
to say that a work already written in the one place was
revised or rewritten in the other.
Dhamma Kitti, the author of the Sadhamma Sangaha,
adds the interesting fact that, in revising his Atthasalinl,
Buddhaghosa relied, not on the Maha Atthakatha in
Sinhalese, but on another Commentary in that language
called the Maha Paccari.
We know, namely, that at the time when Buddhaghosa
wrote — that is, in the early part of the fifth century a.d. —
the Commentaries handed down in the schools had been, at
various times and places, already put together into treatises
and written books in the native dialects. And we know
the names of several of those then existing. These are :
1 Journal of the Pali Text Society, 1888, pp. 58, 56.
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XXII
1. The Commentary of the dwellers in the * North
Minster * — the Uttara Vihara — at Anuradhapura. 1
2. The Mula-, or Maha-Atthakatha, or simply ‘ The
Atthakatha,’ of the dwellers in the ‘Great Minster’ — the
Maha Vihara — also at Anuradhapura, 2
3. The Andha-Atthakatha, handed down at Kaneipura
(Congevaram), in South India.
4. The Maha Paccari, or Great Baft, said to be so called
from its having been composed on a raft somewhere in
Ceylon. 3
5. The Kurunda Atthakatha, so called because it was
composed at the Kurundavelu Vihara in Ceylon. 4
6. The Sankhepa Atthakatha or Short Commentary,
which, as being mentioned together with the Andha Com-
mentary, 5 may possibly be also South Indian.
Buddhaghosa himself says in the introductory verses to
the AtthasalinI : 6
‘ I will set forth, ( rejoicing in what I reveal, the explana-
tion of the meaning of that Abhidhamma as it was chanted
forth by Maha Kassapa and the rest (at the first Council),
and re-chanted later (at the second Council) by the Arahats,
and by Mahinda brought to this wondrous isle and turned
into the language of the dwellers therein. Rejecting now
the tongue of the men of Tambapanni 7 and turning it into
that pure tongue which harmonizes with the texts [I will
set it forth] showing the opinion of the dwellers in the
Great Minster, undefiled by and unmixed with the views of
1 J. P. T. S., 1882, pp. 115, 116. English in Tumour’s
Maha Vansa, pp. xxxvii, xxxviii.
2 Sum. 180, 182 ; Sadhamma Sangaha, 55 ; M. B. V.
184-136.
3 Papanca Sudani on M. ii. 13 ; Sadhamma Sangaha, 55.
4 Sadhamma Sangaha, 55.
6 Vijesinha in the J. R. A. S., 1870 (vol. v., New Series),
p. 298.
6 Asl., p. 1, ver. 18 et seq.
7 Taprobane = Ceylon.
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XX111
the sects, and adducing also what ought to be adduced from
the Nikayas and the Commentaries.’ 1
It would be most interesting if the book as we have it
had been written at Gaya in North India, or even if we
could discriminate between the portion there written and
the additions or alterations made in Ceylon. But this we
can no longer hope to do. The numerous stories of Ceylon
Theras occurring in the book are almost certainly due to
the author’s residence in Ceylon. And we cannot be certain
that these and the reference to his own book, written in
Ceylon, are the only additions. We cannot, therefore, take
the opinions expressed in the book as evidence of Buddhist
opinion as held in Gaya. That may, in great part, be so.
But we cannot tell in which part.
In the course of his work Buddhaghosa quotes often
from the Nikayas without mentioning the source of his
quotations ; and also from the Vibhanga 2 and the Maha
Pakarana 3 (that is, the Patthana), giving their names.
Besides these Pitaka texts, he quotes or refers to the follow-
ing authorities :
1. His own Samanta Pasadika, e.g ., pp. 97, 98.
2. His own Yisuddhi Magga, pp. 168, 188, 186, 187
(twice), 190, 198. 4 *
3. The Maha Atthakatha, pp. 80, 86, 107.
4. The Atthakathacariya, pp. 85, 123, 217.
5. The Atthakatha, pp. 108, 113, 188, 267, 318.
6. The Atthakatha’s, pp. 99, 188.
7. The Agamatthakatha’s, p. 86. 6
1 Agamatthakathasu, perhaps ‘from the commen-
taries on the Nikayas.’ See note 5 below.
2 For instance, pp. 165-170, 176, 178.
8 For instance, pp. 7, 9, 87, 212, 409.
4 The apparent references at pp. 195, 196 are not to the
book.
6 The reading in the printed text is agamanatthaka-
thasu. But this is not intelligible. And as we have
agamatthakathasu at p. 2, ver. 17, it is probable we
must so read also here, where the meaning clearly is 4 in
the commentaries on the Nikayas.’
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XXXV
8. Acariyanam samanatthakatha, p. 90.
9. Porana, pp. 84, 111, 291, 299, 818.
^ 10. The Thera (that is Nagasena), pp. 112, 121, 122.
11. Nagasenatthera, p. 114.
12. Ayasma Nagasena, p. 119.
13. Ayasma Nagasenatthera, p. 142.
14. Thera Nagasena, p. 120.
15. Dlgha-bhanaka, pp. 151, 899 (cf. p. 407).
16. Majjhima-bhanaka, p. 420.
17. Vitanda-vadi, pp. 8, 90, 92, 241.
18. Petaka, possibly Petakopadesa, p. 165.
I do not claim to have exhausted the passages in the
Atthasalinl quoted from these authorities, or to be able to
define precisely each work — what, for instance, is the dis-
tinction between 5 and 6, and whether 4 was not identical
with either. Nor is it clear who were the Porana or
Ancients, though it seems likely, from the passages quoted,
""that they were Buddhist thinkers of an earlier age, but of a
later date than that of our Manual, inasmuch as one of the
citations shows that the ‘Door-theory’ of cognition was
already developed (see below, p. lxviii., etc.). From the
distinct references to 3 and to 7, it seems possible that the
so-called ‘ Great Commentary ’ (3) dealt not so much with
any particular book, or group of books, as with the doctrines
of the Pitakas in general.
The foregoing notes may prove useful when the times
are ready for a full inquiry into the history of the Buddhist
Commentaries. 1 With respect to the extent to which the
Atthasalinl itself has been quoted in the following pages, it
may be judged that the scholastic teaching of eight centuries
later is a very fallacious guide in the interpretation of
original doctrines, and that we should but darken counsel
1 I may add that a Tika, or sub-commentary on the
Atthasalinl, written by a Siamese scholar, Kanakitti, of
unknown date, was edited in Sinhalese characters by Koda-
goda Pafinasekhara of Kalutara, in Ceylon, and published
there in 1890.
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XXV
if we sought light on Aristotle from mediaeval exegesis of
the age of Duns Scotus.
Without admitting that the course of Buddhist and that
of Western culture coincide sufficiently to warrant such a
parallel, it may readily be granted that Buddhaghosa must
not be accepted en bloc . The distance between the con-
structive genius of Gotama and his apostles as compared
with the succeeding ages of epigoni needs no depreciatory
criticism on the labours of the exegesists to make itself felt
forcibly enough. Buddhaghosa’s philology is doubtless
crude, and he is apt to leave cruces unexplained, concern-
ing which an Occidental is most in the dark . 1 Nevertheless,
to me his work is not only highly suggestive, but also a mine
of historic interest. To put it aside is to lose the historical
perspective of the course of Buddhist philosophy. It is to
regard the age of Gotama and of his early Church as consti-
tuting a wondrous * freak ’ in the evolution of human ideas,
instead of watching to see how the philosophical tradition
implanted in that Church^itself based on earlier culture)
had in the lapse of centuries been carefully handed down by
the schools of Theras, the while the folklore that did duty
for natural science had more or less fossilized, and the study
of the conscious processes of the mind had been elaborated.
This is, however, a point of view that demands a fuller
examination than can here be given it. I will now only
maintain that it is even more suggestive to have at hand
the best tradition of the Buddhist schools at the fulness of
their maturity for the understanding of a work like the
Dhamma-Sangani than for the study of the Dialogues.
Our manual is itself a book of reference to earlier books,
and presents us with many terms and formulae taken out of
that setting of occasion and of discourse enshrined in which
we meet them in the Nikayas. The great scholar who
comments on them had those Nikayas, both as to letter and
spirit, well pigeon-holed in memory, and cherished both
1 Cf. Dr. Neumann in ‘Die Beden Gotamo Buddhos, .
p. xv et seq.
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XXVI
with the most reverent loyalty. That this is so, as well as
the fact that we are bred on a culture so different in mould
and methods (let alone the circumstances of its develop-
ment) from that inherited by him, must lend his interpreta-
tions an importance and a suggestiveness far greater than
that which the writings of any Christian commentator on
the Greek philosophy can possess for us.
IV.
On the Method and Argument of the Manual .
The title given to my translation is not in any way a
faithful rendering of the canonical name of the Manual.
This is admitted on my title-page. There is nothing very
intelligible for us in the expression * Compendium of States,’
or 4 Compendium of Phenomena.’ Whether the Buddhist
might find it so or not, there is for him at all events a
strong and ancient association of ideas attaching to the
title Dhamma-Sangani which for us is entirely non-
existent. I have therefore let go the letter, in order to
indicate what appears to me the real import of the work.
Namely, that it is, in the first place, a manual or text-book,
and not a treatise or disquisition, elaborated and rendered
attractive and edifying after the manner of most of the
Sutta Pitaka. And then, that its subject is ethics, but
that the inquiry is conducted from a psychological stand-
point, and, indeed, is in great part an analysis of the psycho-
logical and psycho-physical data of ethics.
I do not mean to assert that the work was compiled
solely for academic use. No such specialized function is
assigned it in the Commentary. Buddhaghosa only main-
tains that, together with the rest of the Abhidhamma, 1 it
was the ipsissima verba of the Buddha, not attempting to
upset the mythical tradition that it was the special mode
he adopted in teaching the doctrine to the 4 hosts of devas
come from all parts of the sixteen world-systems, he having
1 But including the Matika only of the later Katha Yatthu.
Cf. 4 Dialogues of the Buddha,’ p. xi ; Asl., p. 1.
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xxvii
placed his mother (re-incarnate as a devl) at their head
because of the glory of her wisdom.’ 1 Whether this myth
had grown up to account for the formal, unpicturesque
style of the Abhidhamma, on the ground that the devas
were above the need of illustration and rhetoric of an \
earthly kind, I do not know. The Commentary fre-
quently refers to the peculiar difference in style from that
employed in the Suttanta as consisting in the Abhidhamma
being nippariyaya-desan a — teaching which is not
accompanied by explanation or disquisition. 2 And the
definition it gives, at the outset, of the term Abhidhamma
shows that this Pitaka, and a fortiori theDhamma-Sangani,
was considered as a subject of study more advanced than
! the other Pitakas, and intended to serve as the complement
and crown of the learner’s earlier courses. 3 Acquaintance
with the doctrine is, as I have said, taken for granted.
The object is not so much to extend knowledge as to ensure
mutual consistency in the intension of ethical notions, and
to systematize and formulate the theories and practical
mechanism of intellectual and moral progress scattered in
profusion throughout the Suttantas. 4
It is interesting to note the methods adopted to carry
out this object. The work was in the first instance incul-
cated by way of oral teaching respecting a quantity of
matter which had been already learnt in the same way.
And the memory, no longer borne along by the interest of
1 Asl., p. 1.
2 E.g., Asl. 403. The meaning of this expression is
illustrated by its use on p. 317 of the Cy. : na nip par i-
yayena dlgham rupayatanam; Le., ‘that which is
long (or short) is only inferentially a visual object.’
3 Asl., p. 2. Translated by Mr. A. C. Taylor, J. E. A. S.,
1894.
4 Professor Edmond Hardy, in his Introduction to the fifth
volume of the Anguttara Nikaya, expresses the belief that
the Dhamma-Sangani is ‘entirely dependent upon the
Anguttara.’ For my part, I have found no reason to limit
^the manual’s dependence on the Suttantas to anyone book.
Buddhaghosa does not specially connect the two works.
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xxvrn
narrative or by the thread of an argument, had to be
assisted by other devices. First of these is the catechetical
method. Questions, according to Buddhist analysis, are
put on five several grounds : l
to throw light on what is not known ;
to compare what one knows with the knowledge of
others ;
to clear up doubts ;
to get the premises in an argument granted ; 2
to give a starting-point from which to set out the
content of a statement.
The last is selected as the special motive of the catechiz-
ing here resorted to. It is literally the wish to discourse
or expound (kathetu kamyata), but the meaning is
more clearly brought out by the familiar formula quoted,
viz. : * Four in number, brethren, are these Advances in
Mindfulness. Now which are the Four?’ Thus it was
held that the questions in the Manual are analytic or
explicative, having the object of unfolding and thereby of
delimitating the implications of a mass of notions which a
study of the Suttantas, if unaided, might leave insufficiently
co-ordinated in the mind.
And the memory, helped by the interrogative stimulus,
was yet further assisted by the symmetrical form of both
question and answer, as well as by the generic uniformity
in the matter of the questions. Throughout Book I., in the
case of each inquiry which opens up a new subject, the
answer is set out on a definite plan called uddesa — ex-
position — and is rounded off invariably by the appana,
or emphatic summing up : * all these (whatever they may
stand for on other occasions or in other systems) on this
occasion =x.' The uddesa is succeeded by the n i d -
desa — de-position — i.c., analytical question and answer
on the details of the expository statement. This is indicated
formally by the initial adverb t a 1 1 h a — what here (in this
1 Asl. 55, 56 ; cf. Sum. 68.
2 A favourite method in the Dialogues. The Cy. quotes
as an instance M. i. 282.
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XXIX
connexion) is a . . b . . c ? Again, the work is in great part
planned with careful regard to logical relation. The
Buddhists had not elaborated the intellectual vehicle of
genus and species, as the Greeks did, hence they had not
the convenience of a logic of Definition. There is scarcely
an answer in any of these Niddesas but may perhaps be
judged to suffer in precision and lucidity from lack of it.
They substitute for definition proper what J. S. Mill might
have called predication of equipollent terms — in other
words, the method of the dictionary. In this way precision
of meaning is not to be expected, since nearly all so-called
synonyms do but mutually overlap in meaning without
coinciding ; and hence the only way to ensure no part of
the connotation being left out is to lump together a number
of approximate equivalents, and gather that the term in
question is defined by such properties as the aggregate
possesses in common. If this is the rationale of the
Buddhist method, the inclusion, in the answer, of the very
term which is to be defined becomes no longer the fallacy
it is in Western logic. Indeed, where there is no pursuit
of exact science, nor of sciences involving ‘ physical division,*
but only a system of research into the intangible products
and processes of mind and character, involving aspects and
phases, Le., logical division, I am not sure that a good case
might not be made out for Buddhist method. It is less
rigid, and lends itself better, perhaps, to a field of thought
where * a difference in aspects is a difference in things.* 1
However that may be, the absence of a development of
the relation of Particular and Universal, of One and All, is
met by a great attention to degree of Plurality. Number
plays a great part in Buddhist classes and categories. 2
Whether this was inherited from a more ancient lore, such
as Pythagoras is said to have drawn from, or whether this
feature was artificially developed for mnemonic purposes, I
do not know. Probably there is truth in both alternatives.
1 Professor J. Ward, Ency. Brit., 9th ed., 1 Psychology.*
2 Cf. especially, not only Book II. of this work, but also
the whole of the Anguttara.
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XXX
But of all numbers none plays so great a part in aiding
methodological coherency and logical consistency as that of
duality. I refer of course especially to its application in
the case of the correlatives, Positive and Negative.
Throughout most of Book II. the learner is greatly aided
by being questioned on positive terms and their opposites,
taken simply and also in combination with other similarly
dichotomized pairs. The opposite is not always a con-
tradictory. Room is then left in the * universe of discourse *
for a third class, which in its turn comes into question.
Thus the whole of Book I. is a development of the triplet
of questions with which Book III. begins (a-kusalam
being really the Contrary of kusalam, though formally
its Contradictory) : What is A ? What is B ? What is
(ab), i.e. f non-^4 and non-B ? In Book III. there is no
obvious ground of logic or method for the serial order or
limits observed in the ‘ Clusters * or Groups, and the inter-
polated sets of * Pairs * of miscellaneous questions. Never-
theless a uniform method of catechizing characterizes the
former.
Finally, there is, in the way of mnemonic and intellectual
aid, the simplifying and unifying effect attained by causing
all the questions (exclusive of sub-inquiries) to refer to the
one category of d h a m m a .
There is, it is true, a whole Book of questions re-
ferring to rupam, but this constitutes a very much
elaborated sub-inquiry on * form * as one sub-species of a
species of dhamma — rupino dhamma, as distin-
guished from all the rest, which are a-rupino
dhamma. This will appear more clearly if the argu-
ment of the work is very concisely stated.
Those who can consult the text will see that the
M a t i k a, or table of subjects of all the questions (which
I have not held it useful to reproduce), refers exclusively
to Book III. Book III. in fact contains the entire work
considered as an inquiry (not necessarily exhaustive) into
the concrete, or, as one might say, the applied ethics of
Buddhism. In it many if not all fundamental concepts
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XXXI
are taken as already defined and granted. Hence Books I.
and II. are introductory and, as it were, of the nature of
inquiry into data. Book II. is psycho-physical; Book I.
is psychological. Together they constitute a very elaborate
development, and again a sub-development, of the first
triplet of questions in Book III., viz.: dhamma which
are good, Lc ., make good karma, those which are bad, and
those which make no karma (the indeterminates). Now, of
these last some are simply and solely results 1 of good or
bad dhamma, and some are not so, but are states of
mind and expressions of mind entailing no moral result
(on the agent ). 2 * Some again, while making no karma, are
of neither of these two species, but are dhamma which
might be called either unmoral (r up am ), 8 or else super -
moral (uncompounded element or Nirvana ). 4 These are
held to constitute a third and fourth species of the third
class of dhamma called indeterminate. But the former of
the two alone receives detailed and systematic treatment.
Hence the whole manual is shown to be, as it professes
to be, a compendium, or, more literally, a co-enumeration
of dhamma.
The method of treatment or procedure termed Abhi-
dhamma (for Abhidhamma is treatment rather than matter)
is, according to the Matika, held to end at the end of
the chapter entitled Pitthi-dukam or Supplementary
Set of Pairs. The last thirty-seven pairs of questions 6 and
answers, on the other hand, are entitled Suttantika-
dukam. They are of a miscellaneous character, and are
in many cases not logically opposed. Buddhaghosa has
nothing to say by way of explaining their inclusion, nor
the principle determining their choice or number. Nor is
it easy to deduce any explanation from the nature or the
treatment of them. The name Suttantika may mean
that they are pairs of terms met with in the Dialogues, or
1 Book I., Part III., ch. i. 2 Ibid., ch. ii.
3 Book II. 4 Appendix II.
6 §§ 1296 - 1866 .
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XXX11
in all the four Nikayas. This is true and verifiable. But
I for one cannot venture to predicate anything further
respecting them.
Y.
On the Chief Subject of Inquiry — D hamma .
If I have called Buddhist ethics psychological, especially
as the subject is treated in this work, it is much in the same
way in which I should call Plato’s psychology ethical.
Neither the founders of Buddhism nor of Platonic Socratism
had elaborated any organic system of psychology or of
ethics respectively. Yet it is hardly overstating the case
for either school of thought to say that whereas the latter
psychologized from an ethical standpoint, the former built
their ethical doctrine on a basis of psychological principles.
For whatever the far-reaching term d h a m in o may in
our manual have precisely signified to the early Buddhists,
it invariably elicits, throughout Book I., a reply in terms
of subjective consciousness. The discussion in the Com-
mentary, which I have reproduced below, p. 2, note 8,
on dhammarammanam, leaves it practically beyond
doubt that dhammo, when thus related to mano, is
as a visual object to visual perception — is, namely, mental
object in general. It thus is shown to be equivalent to
Herbart’s Vorstellung, to Locke’s idea — ‘ whatsoever is the
immediate object of perception, thought or understanding ’
— and to Professor Ward’s * presentation.’ 1
The dhamma in question always prove to be, whatever
their ethical value, factors of c i 1 1 a m used evidently in its
widest sense, i.e., concrete mental process or state. Again,
the analysis of rupam in Book II., as a species of ‘ in-
determinate ’ d h a m m a , is almost wholly a study in the
phenomena of sensation and of the human organism as
sentient. Finally, in Book III. the questions on various
dhamma are for the most part answered in terms of the
four mental skandhas, of the cittani dealt with in
Book I., and of the springs of action as shown in their
1 ‘ Ency. Brit.,’ 9th ed., art. ‘Psychology.’
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XXX1U
effect on will. Thus the whole inquiry in its most
generalized expression comes practically to this: Given
man as a moral being, what do we find to be the content
of his consciousness ?
Now this term dhammo is, as readers are already
aware, susceptible of more than one interpretation. Even
when used for the body of ethical doctrine it was applied
with varying extension, i.e. 9 either to the whole doctrine, or
to the Suttantas as opposed to Vinaya and Abhidhamma,
or to the doctrine of the Four Truths only. But whatever
in this connexion is the denotation, the connotation is easy
to fix. That this is not the case where the term has, so to
speak, a secular or * profane * meaning is seen in the various
renderings and discussions of it. 1 The late H. C. Warren
in particular has described the difficulties, first of deter-
mining what the word, in this or that connexion, was
intended to convey, and then of discovering any word or
words adequate to serve as equivalent to it. One step
towards a solution may be made if we can get at a Buddhist
survey of the meanings of dhammo from the Buddhists’
own philosophical point of view. And this we are now
enabled to do in consequence of the editing of the Attha-
salini. In it we read Buddhaghosa’s analysis of the term,
the various meanings it conveyed to Buddhists of the fifth
century a.d., and his judgment, which would be held as
authoritative, of the special significance it possessed in
the questions of the Dhamma - sangani. ‘ The word
dhammo,’ runs the passage (p. 88), ‘is met with [as
meaning] doctrine (p a r i y a 1 1 i), condition or cause
(hetu), virtue or good quality (guno), absence of essence
or of living soul (nissatta-nijjivat a),’ etc. Illustra-
tive texts are then given of each meaning, those referring
to the last being the beginning of the answer in our Manual
1 Cf. 9 e.g., Oldenberg, ‘Buddha,’ etc., 3rd ed., p. 290;
Warren, ‘Buddhism in Translations,’ pp. 116, 864; Kern,
‘Indian Buddhism,’ p. 51, n. 3; Neumann, ‘Beden des\
Gotamo,’ pp. 13, 28, 91; Gogerly, ‘Ceylon Friend,* 1874,
p. 21.
c*
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xxxiv
numbered [121] : ‘ Now at that time there are states ’ ; and,
further, the passage from the Satipanhanasutta 1 : ‘Con-
cerning dhammas he abides watchful over dhammas.’ And
it is with the fourth and last-named meaning of d h a m m o
that the term is said to be used in the questions of the
Manual. Again, a little later (p. 40), he gives a more
positive expression to this particular meaning by saying
that d h a m m o, so employed, signifies * that which has the
mark of bearing its nature’ (or character or condition —
sabhavadharano). This to us somewhat obscure
characterization may very likely, in view of the context,
mean that dhammo as phenomenon is without sub-
stratum, is not a quality cohering in a substance. ‘Pheno-
menon ’ is certainly our nearest equivalent to the negative
definition of nissatta-nijjlvam, and this is actually
the rendering given to dhammo (when employed in this
sense in the Sutta just quoted) by Dr. Neumann : ‘Da wacht
ein Monch bei den Erscheinungen. . . If I have used
states, or states of consciousness, instead of phenomena,
it is merely because, in the modern tradition of British
psychology, ‘ states of consciousness * is exactly equivalent
to such phenomena as are mental, or at least conscious.
And, further, because this use of 4 states * has been taken up
into that psychological tradition on the very same grounds
as prompted this Buddhist interpretation of d h a m m a —
the ground of non-committal, not to say negation, with
respect to any psychical substance or entity.
That we have, in this country pre-eminently, gone to
work after the manner of electrical science with respect to
its subject-matter, and psychologized without a psyche, is,
of course due to the influence of Hume. In selecting a
term so characteristic of the British tradition as ‘ states *
of mind or consciousness, I am not concerned to justify its
use in the face of a tendency to substitute terms more
expressive of a dynamic conception of mental operations, 0
or of otherwise altered standpoints. The Buddhists seem
1 D. (suttanta 22) ; M. i. 61.
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XXXV
to have held, as our psychology has held, that for purposes
of analysis it was justifiable to break up the mental con-
tinuum of the moral individuality into this or that congeries
of states or mental phenomena. In and through these
they sought to trace the working of moral causation. To
look beneath or behind them for a * thing in itself ’ they
held to be a dangerous superstition. With Goethe they
said : * Suche nichts hinter den Phanomenen ; sie selbst
sind die Lehre !’ And in view of this coincidence of impli-
cation and emphasis, * states of mind ’ or * of conscious-
ness ’ seemed best to fit dhamma when the reply was
made in terms of mental phenomena.
In the book on Form, the standpoint is no doubt shifted
to a relatively more objective consideration of the moral
being and his contact with a world considered as external.
But then the word dhamma (and my rendering of it) is
also superseded by r u p a m .
It is only when we come to the more synthetic matter of
Book III. that dhamma strains the scope of the term I
have selected if ‘ states ’ be taken as strictly states of mind
or of consciousness. It is true that the Buddhist view of
things so far resembles the Berkeleian that all phenomena,
or things or sequences or elements, or however else we may
render dhamma, may be regarded as in the last resort
* states of mind.’ This in its turn may seem a straining
of the significance which the term possessed for early Bud-
dhists in a more general inquiry such as that of Book III.
Yet consider the definitions of dhamma, worthy of
Berkeley himself, on p. 272 [1044-45].
The difficulty lay in the choice of another term, and none
being satisfactory, I retained, for want of a better, the
same rendering, which is, after all, indefinite enough to
admit of its connoting other congeries of things or aspects
beside consciousness.
The fundamental importance in Buddhist philosophy of
this Phenomenalism or Non-substantialism as a protest
against the prevailing Animism, which, beginning with pro-
jecting the self into objects, elaborated that projected self
c 2
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XXXVI
into noumenal substance, has by this time been more or "
less admitted. The testimony of the canonical books leaves
no doubt on the matter, from Gotama’s first sermon to his
first converts, 1 and his first Dialogue in the * Long Collec-
tion,* to the first book of the Katha Vatthu. 2 There are
other episodes in the books where the belief in a permanent
spiritual essence is, together with a number of other specu-
lations, waived aside as subjects calculated to waste time
and energy. But in the portions referred to the doctrine
of repudiation is more positive, and may be summed up in
one of the refrains of the Majjhima Nikaya : S u h n a m
idam attena va attaniyena v a t i — Void is this of
soul or of aught of the nature of soul ! 3 The force of the
often repeated * This is not mine, this is not I, this is not
my Self,* is not intended to make directly for goodness but
for truth and insight. * And since neither self nor aught
belonging to self, brethren, can really and truly be accepted,
is not the heretical position which holds : — This is the
world and this is the self, and I shall continue to be in the
future, permanent, immutable, eternal, of a nature that
knows no change, yea, I shall abide to eternity ! — is not
this simply and entirely a doctrine of fools ?’ 4
And now that the later or scholastic doctrine, as shown
in the writings of the greatest of the Buddhist scholastics,
becomes accessible, it is seen how carefully and conscien-
tiously this anti-substantialist position had been cherished 1
and upheld. Half-way to the age of the Commentators,
the Milinda-panho places the question of soul- theory
at the head of the problems discussed. Then turning to
Buddhaghosa we find the emphatic negation of the Suman-
gala YilasinI (p. 194) : — 1 Of aught within called self which
looks forward or looks around, &c., there is none !’ matched
1 S. ii. 66-8 ; also in Maha Vagga, i. 6, 38-47.
2 Cf. Rhys Davids* ‘ American Lectures,* pp. 39, 40.
3 Or ‘self* (attena). M. i. 297 ; ii. 263 (lege sunfiam);
cf. S. iv. 54; and K. V. 67, 579. Cf. the ‘Emptiness-con—
cept,’ below, p. 33. 4 M. i. 138.
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in the Atthasalinl, not only by the above-given definition
of dhamina’s, but also by the equally or even more
emphatic affirmation respecting them, given in my note 1
to p. 83 : — * There is no permanent entity or self which
acquires the states . . . these are to be understood pheno-
menally (sabhavatthena). There is no other essence
or existence or personality or individual whatever.’ Again,
attention is drawn in the notes to his often-reiterated com-
ment that when a disposition or emotion is referred to
cittam, e.g.y nandlrago cittassa, 1 the repudiation
of an ego is thereby implied. Once more, the thoughts
and acts which are tainted with ‘ Asavas ’ or with corrup-
tions are said to be so in virtue of their being centred in
the soul or self, 2 and those which have attained that * ideal
Better,’ and have no ‘beyond’ (an-uttara) are inter-
preted as having transcended or rejected the soul or self. 3
To appreciate the relative consistency with which the
Buddhists tried to govern their philosophy, both in subject
and in treatment, in accordance with this fundamental
principle, we must open a book of Western psychology,
more or less contemporary, such as the ‘ De Anima,’ and
note the sharply contrasted position taken up at the outset.
‘The object of our inquiry,’ Aristotle says in his opening
sentences, ‘ is to study and ascertain the nature and essence
of the Psyche, as well as its accidents. ... It may be well
to distinguish . . . the genus to which the Psyche belongs,
and determine what it is . . . whether it is a some-
thing and an essence, or quantity, or quality . . . whether
it is among entities in potentiality, or whether rather it is
a reality. . . . Now, the knowledge of anything in itself
seems to be useful towards a right conception of the causes
of the accidents in substances. . . . But the knowledge
of the accidents contributes largely in its turn towards
knowing what the thing essentially is. . . . Thus the
1 P. 277, n. 2 ; also pp. 129, note 1 ; 298, note 8, &c. ;
and cf. p. 175, p. 1. See also on d h a t u, p. lxxvii.
2 P. 294, n. 7 ; 827, n. 1. 8 P. 886, n. 2.
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essence is the proper beginning for every demonstra-
tion. . . .*
The whole standpoint which the Buddhists brought into
question, and decided to be untenable as a basis of sound
doctrine, is here accepted and taken as granted. A
phenomenon, or series of phenomena, is, on being held up
for investigation, immediately and unhesitatingly looked
upon under one of two aspects : either it must be a sub-
stance, essence, reality, or it belongs to one of those nine
other ‘Categories’ — quantity, quality, etc. — which con-
stitute the phenomenon an attribute or group of attributes v
cohering in a substance.
It is true that Aristotle was too progressive and original
a thinker to stop here. In his theory of mind as eZSo<? or
* form,’ in itself mere potentiality, but becoming actuality
as implicate in, and as energizing body, he endeavoured to
transform the animism of current standpoints into a more \
rational conception. And in applying his theory he goes
far virtually to resolve mind into phenomenal process ( De
An ., III., chaps, vii., viii.). But he did not, or would not,
wrench himself radically out of the primitive soil and plant
his thought on a fresh basis, as the Buddhist dared to
do. Hence Greek thought abode, for all his rationalizing,
saturated with substantialist methods, till it was found
acceptable by and was brought up into an ecclesiastical
philosophy which, from its Patristic stage, had inherited a
tradition steeped in animistic standpoints.
Modem science, however, has been gradually training
the popular mind to a phenomenalistic point of view, and
joining hands in psychology with the anti- substantialist
tradition of Hume. So that the way is being paved for a
more general appreciation of the earnest effort made by
Buddhism — an effort stupendous and astonishing if we con-
sider its date and the forces against it — to sever the growth
of philosophic and religious thought from its ancestral
stem and rear it in a purely rational soil.
But the philosophic elaboration of soul-theory into Sub-
stantialism is complicated and streqgthened by a deeply
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important factor, on which I have already touched. This
factor is the exploitation by philosophy, not of a primitive
Weltanschauung , but of a fundamental fact in intellectual
procedure and intellectual economy. I refer to the process
of assimilating an indefinite number of particular impres-
sions, on the ground of a common resemblance, into a
‘ generic idea * or general notion, and of referring to each
assimilated product by means of a common name. Every
act of cognition, of coming-to-know anything, is reducible
to this compound function of discerning the particular and
of assimilating it into something relatively general. And
this process, in its most abstract terms, is cognizing Unity
in Diversity, the One through and beneath the Many.
Now no one, even slightly conversant with the history of
philosophy, can have failed to note the connexion there has
ever been set up between the concept of substratum and
phenomena on the one hand, and that of the One and the
Many on the other. They have become blended together,
though they spring from distinct roots. And so essential,
in every advance made by the intellect to extend knowledge
and to reorganize its acquisitions, is the co-ordinating and
economizing efficacy of this faculty of generalizing, that
its alliance with any other deep-rooted traditional product
of mind must prove a mighty stay. A fact in the growth
of religious and of philosophic thought which so springs out
of the very working and growth of thought in general as
this tendency to unify, must seem to rest on unshakeable
foundations.
And when this implicit logic of intellectual procedure,
this subsuming the particular under the general, has been
rendered explicit in a formal system of definition and pre-
dication and syllogism, such as was worked out by the
Greeks, the breach of alliance becomes much harder. For
the progress in positive knowledge, as organized by the
logical methods, is brought into harmony with progress in
religious and philosophic thought.
This advance in the West is still in force, except in
so far as psychological advance, and scientific progress
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generally, tell on the traditional logic and philosophy.
Psychological analysis, for instance, shows that we mky
confuse the effective registration of our knowledge with the
actual disposition of the originals. That is to say, this
perceiving and judging, by way of generalizing and unifying,^
is the only way by which we are able to master the infinite
diversities and approximate uniformities of phenomena.
Through such procedure great results are attained. Con-
ceptions are widened and deepened. Laws are discovered
and then taken up under more general laws. Knowledge
groups all phenomena under a few aspects of all but
supreme generality. Unification of knowledge is every- "
where considered as the ideal aim of intellect.
But, after all, this is only the ideal method and economy
of intellect. The stenographers ideal is to compress re-
corded matter into the fewest symbols by which he can
reproduce faithfully. The ideal of the phonograph is to
reproduce without the intermediacy of an economical pro-
cess. Limitations of time and faculty constrain us to be-
come mental stenographers. Whatever be our vifew as to
the reality fdl an external wdrld outside our perception of it,
psychology teaches us to distinguish our fetches of abstrac-
tion and generalization for what they are psychologically —
i.e ., for effective mental shorthand — whatever they may
represent besides. The logical form of Universal in term
and in proposition is as much a token of our weakness in
realizing the Particular as of our strength in constructing
what is at best an abstract and hypothetical whole. * The
philosophical concept of the One is pregnant with powerful
associations. To what extent is it simply as a mathematical
symbol in a hypothetical cosmos of carefully selected data,
whence the infinite concrete is eliminated lest it ‘should
flow in over us n and overwhelm us ?
Now, the Buddhistic phenomenalism had also both the
one and the other member of this great alliance of
1 Infra , p. 851: ‘Yam . . . papaka akusala dhamma
anvassaveyy um. *
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Noumenon and Unity to contend with. But the alliance
had, so far at least as we know or can infer, not yet been
welded together by a logical organon, or by any develop-
ment in inductive science. Gotama and his apostles were
conversant with the best culture of their age, yet when
they shape their discourse according to anything we should
call logic, they fall into it rather than wield it after the
conscious fashion of Plato or Aristotle. Nor is there, in
the books, any clear method practised of definition according
to genus and species, or of mutual exclusion among con-
cepts. Thus freer in harness, the Buddhist revolutionary
philosophy may be said to have attempted a relatively less
impracticable task. The development of a science and art
of logic in India, as we know it, was later in time ; and
though Buddhist thinkers helped in that development, it
coincided precisely with the decline of Buddhistic non-
8ubstantialism, with the renascence of Pantheistic thought.
VI, _
On the Inquiry int of Rup a m (Farm) J and the Buddhist
Theory of Sense.
Taking dhamma, then, to mean phenomena considered
as knowledge — in other words, as actually or potentially
states of consciousness — we may next look more closely
into, that which the catechism brings out respecting
rupam (Book II., and § 583) considered as a species of
dhamma. By this procedure we shall best place our-
selves at the threshold, so to speak, of the Buddhist
position, both as to its psychology and its view of things
in general, and be thus better led up to the ethical import
of the questions in the first part.
The entire universe of dhamma is classed with respect
to rupam in questions 1091, 1092 (Book III.). They are
there shown to be either rupino, having form, or
a-rupino, not having form. The positive category
comprises ‘ the four great phenomena (four elements) and
all their derivatives.’ The negative term refers to what
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we should call modes or phases of consciousness, or sub-
jective experience — that is, to ‘the skandhas of feeling,
perception, syntheses and intellect* — as well as to ‘un-
compounded element.* (The skandhas are also ‘elements’
— that is, irreducible but phenomenal factors (see p. 129,
n. 1) — but they are compounds. 1 ) Bupam would thus
appear at first sight to be a name for the external world
or for the Extended universe, as contrasted with the
unextended, mental, psychical or subjective universe.
Personally I do not find, so far, that the Eastern and
Western concepts can be so easily made to coincide. It
will be better before, and indeed without as yet, arriving
at any such conclusive judgment, to inquire into the
application made of the term in the Manual generally.
We find rupam used in three, at least, of the various
meanings assigned to it in the lexicons. It occurs first,
and very frequently, as the general name for the objects
of the sense of sight. It may then stand as simply
rupam (§ 617, ‘this which is visual form,* as opposed
to § 621, etc., ‘ this which is “ sound,” “ odour,” ’ etc.).
More usually it is spoken of as ruparammanam,
object of sight (p. 1), or as rupayatanam, sphere
(province, Gehiet) of sights or of visual form (pp. 172, 183
et seq.). It includes both sensations of colour and lustre and
the complex sensations of form. Used in this connexion,
its specialization is, of course, only due to the psychological
fact that sight is the spokesman and interpreter of all the
senses, so that ‘I see * often stands for ‘ I perceive or dis-
cern through two or more modes of sensation.*
On this point it is worth while pointing out an interesting
flash of psychological discrimination in the Commentary.
It will be noticed, in the various kinds of rupayatanam
enumerated in § 617 (p. 188, n. 9), that, after pure visual
sensations have been instanced, different magnitudes and
forms are added, such as ‘ long, short,* etc. On these
1 C/., e.g ., Dhp. A., p. 413 : ... ‘ all the compounds,
with their divisions of skandhas, elements and spheres.*
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Buddhaghosa remarks: ‘Here, inasmuch as we are able
to tell “long,” “short,” etc., by touch, while we cannot
bo discern “blue,” etc., therefore “long,” “short” and
the rest are not visual forms except inferentially (literally,
not visual forms without explanation). A , B , placed in
such a relation to C, D, is only by customary usage spoken
of as something seen * (Asl. 816). 1 This may not bring
ns up to Berkeley, but it is a farther step in that direction
than Aristotle’s mere hint — * There is a movement which is
perceptible both by Touch and Sight ’ — when he is alluding
to magnitudes, etc., being ‘common sensibles,’ i.e., per-
ceptible by more than one sense. 2
To resume : Rupam, in its wider sense (as ‘ all form ’),
may be due to the popular generalization and representa-
tive function of the sense of sight, expressed in Tennyson’s
line:
‘ For knowledge is of things we see . . .’
And thus, even as a philosophical concept, it may, loosely
speaking, have stood for ‘ things seen,’ as contrasted with
the unseen world of dhamma arupino. But this is
by no means an adequate rendering of the term in its more
careful and technical use in the second Book of our Manual.
For, as may there be seen, much of the content of ‘ form ’
is explicitly declared to be invisible. 3
Rupam occurs next, and, with almost equal frequency,
together with its opposite, arupam, to signify those two
other worlds, realms or planes 4 of temporal existence,
1 The symbols are my own adaptation, not a literal
rendering. In the account of the ‘ external senses ’ or
Indriyas given in the (later) Siinkhya text-books, Professor
Garbe points out that the objects of sight are limited to
colour (rupa), exclusive of form (Garbe, ‘Die Sankhya
Philosophic,’ p. 258).
2 ‘ De Anima,’ II. vi.
3 Cf. §§ 597 et seq ., 657, 658, 751, 752, etc.
4 To the employment of ‘universe’ for avacaram
exception may be taken, since the latter term means only
a part of the Oriental cosmos. I admit it calls for apology.
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xliv
which Buddhism accepted along with other current
mythology, and which, taken together with the lowest, or
sensuous plane of existence, exhaust the possible modes
of re-birth. These avacaras, or loci of form and
non-form, are described in terms of vague localization
(§§ 1280-85), but it is not easy to realize how far existence
of either sort was conceived with anything like precision.
Including the * upper ’ grades of the world of sensuous
existence, they were more popularly known as heaven or
sagga (svarga), i.e ., the Bright. Their inhabitants
were devas, distinguished into hosts variously named.
Like the heaven of the West or the Near East, they were
located ‘ above.’ Unlike that heaven, life in them was
temporal, not eternal.
But the Dhamma-sangani throws no new light on the
kind of states they were supposed to be. Nor does
Buddhaghosa here figure as an Eastern Dante, essaying
to body out more fully, either dogmatically or as in a
dream, such ineffable oracles as were hinted at by a Paul
‘ caught up to the third heaven . . . whether in the body
or out of the body I cannot tell — God knoweth,’ or the
ecstatic visions of a John in lonely exile. The AtthasalinI
is not free from divagations on matters of equally secondary
importance to the earnest Buddhist. 1 Yet it has nothing
If I have used it throughout Book I., it was because there
the term avacaram seemed more suggestive of the
logician’s term 4 universe of discourse,’ or ‘of thought/
than of any physically conceived actuality. It seemed to
fit De Morgan’s definition of ‘ the universe of a proposi-
tion ’ — ‘ a collection of all objects which are contemplated
as objects about which assertion or denial may take place/
the universe of form, for instance, either as a vague, vast
concept ‘ in ’ time and effort, or as a state of mind, a rapt
abstraction — in either case a ‘ universe of thought ’ for the
time being.
1 Of., e.g ., on a similar subject, Sum. 110. He tells us,
it is true (see below, p. 196, n. 4), that the food of the
gods who inhabited the highest sphere of the sensuous
world was of the maximum degree of refinement, leading
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to tell of a mode of being endowed with rupa, yet with- \
out the kama, or sensuous impulses held to be bound
up with rupa, when the term is used in its wider sense. 1
Nor does it enlighten us on the more impalpable denizens
of a plane of being where rupa itself is not, and for
which no terms seem held appropriate save such as express
high fetches of abstract thought. 2 We must go back, after
all, to the Nikayas for such brief hints as we can find.
We do hear, at least, in the Dlgha Nikaya, of beings in one
of the middle circles of the Form heavens termed Eadiant
(Abhassara), as ‘ made of mind, feeding on joy, radiating
light, traversing the firmament, continuing in beauty.* 8
Were it not that we miss here the unending melody
sounding through each circle of the Western poet’s
Paradise, 4 we might well apply this description to Dante’s
‘ anime liete,’ who, like incandescent spheres :
‘ Fiammando forte, a guisa di comete,
E come cerchi in tempra d’ oriuoli
Si giran.’ ...
Liker to those brilliant visions the heavens of Form seem
to have been than to the ‘ quiet air ’ and ‘ the meadow of
fresh verdure ’ on that slope of Limbo where
‘ Genti v’ eran con occhi tardi e gravi,’
who
perhaps to the inference that in the two superior planes it
was not required.
1 See pp. 168-170: ‘All form is that which is . . .
related, or which belongs to the universe of sense, not to
that of form, or to that of the formless.’
2 See the four Aruppas, pp. 71-75.
3 D. i. 17. Again we read (D. i. 195), that of the three
possible ‘ personalities ’ of current tradition, one was made
of mind, having form, and a complete organism, and one
was without form and made of consciousness, or perception
(arupl safiilamayo).
4 There is no lack of music in some of the lower Indian
heavens. Cf., e.g., M. i. 252, on Sakka the god enjoying the
music in his sensuous paradise. And see Vimana Vatthu,
passim.
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‘ Parlavan rado, con voci soavi.’
Yet the rare, sweet utterances of these devas of Europe,
discoursing with ‘the Master of those who know,’ may
better have accorded with the Buddhist conception of
‘ beings made of mind ’ than the choric dances of the
spheres above.
Among these shadowy beings, however, we are far from
the fully bodied out idea of the ‘ all form ’ and the ‘ skandha
of form ’ of the second and third Books of the Manual.
It may be that the worlds of r u p a and arupa were so
called in popular tradition because in the former, visible,
and in the latter, invisible, beings resided. But whereas
attributes concerning either are ‘sadly to seek,’ there is no
lack of information concerning the attributes of form in the
‘ sensuous universe ’ or kamavacaram. If the list
given of these in the first chapter of Book II. be consulted,
it will be seen that I have not followed the reading of the
P. T. S. edition when it states that all form is kama-
vacaram eva, rupavacaram eva, that is, is both
related to the universe of sense and also to that of form.
The Siamese edition reads kamavacaram eva, na
rupavacaram eva. It may seem at first sight illogical
to say that form is not related to the universe of form.
But the better logic is really on the side of the Siamese.
On page 834 of my translation, 1 it is seen that the
avacaras were mutually exclusive as to their contents*
To belong to the universe of form involved exclusion from
that of sense. But in the inquiry into ‘ all form ’ we are
clearly occupied with facts about this present world >and
about women and men as we know them — in a word, with
the world of sense. Hence the ‘ all form * of Book II. is
clearly not the form of the rupavacaram. It is not
used with the same implications.
Further than this, further than the vague avacara-
geography gathered already from other sources, the Manual
does not bring us, nor the Commentary either.
1 §§ 1281-1284 of the P. T. S.’s edition.
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We come then to r tip am in the sensuous plane of
being, or at least to such portion of that plane as is con-
cerned with human beings : to sabbam rupam and to
its distribution in each human economy, termed rupak-
khandho. Whether taken generally, or under the
more specialized aspect, there seems to be unanimity of
teaching concerning the various manifestations of it. 1
Under it are comprised four ultimate primary, or underiv-
able constituents and twenty-three secondary, dependent or
derived modes. Thus :
No upada
= (a) The Tangible
(i.e., earthy or
solid,
lambent
or fiery,
gaseous
or aerial
elements,
or great
phenomena),
(b) The Fluid
(or moist)
Element.
Ru pam
Upada
= (a) The Five Senses,
(b) The Four Objects of Sense
(excluding Tangibles),
(c) The Three Organic
Faculties.
(i d ) The Two Modes of Intima-
tion,
(e) The Element of Space,
(/) Three Qualities of Form,
( g ) Three Phases in the
Evolution of Form,
(A) Impermanence of Form,
(i) Bodily nutriment.
To enter with any fulness of discussion into this classifi-
cation, so rich in interesting suggestions, would occupy
itself a volume. In an introduction of mere notes I will
offer only a few general considerations.
We are probably first impressed by the psychological
aspect taken of a subject that might seem to lend itself to
purely objective consideration. The main constituents of
1 Cf-, e.g., S. iii. 59, with Dh. S., § 584, and Vis. Mag.
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the material world, classified in the East as we know them
to have been classified, contemporaneously, in the West,
are set down in terms of subjective or conscious experience.
The apo-dhatu is not called explicitly the Intangible ;
virtually, however, it and the other three * Great Pheno-
mena,’ or literally ‘ Great things that have Become,’ 1 are
regarded from the point of view of how they affect us by
way of sense. We might add, how they affect us most
fundamentally by way of sense. In the selection of Touch
among the senses the Indian tradition joins hands with
Demokritus. But of this no more at present.
Again, in the second table, or secondary forms, the same
standpoint is predominant. We have the action and
re-action of sense-object and sense, the distinctive expres-
sions of sex and of personality generally, and the pheno-
mena of organic life, as ‘ sensed ’ or inferred, compre-
hended under the most general terms. Two modes of form
alone are treated objectively: space and food. And of
these, too, the aspect taken has close reference to the
conscious personality. Aka so is really ok a so, room,
or opportunity, for life and movement. Food, though
described as to its varieties in objective terms, is referred
to rather in the abstract sense of nutrition and nutriment
than as nutritive matter . (Cf. p. 203, n. 3.)
1 Better in Greek ra yiyvofieva, or in German die vier
grossen Geicordcnen . How the Buddhist logic exactly
reconciled the anomaly of apodhatu as underived and
yet as inaccessible to that sense which comes into contact
with the underived is not, in the Manual, clearly made out.
In hot water, as the Cy. says, there is -heat, gas, and solid ,
and hence we feel it. Yet by the definition there must be
in fluid a something underived from these three elements.
The Buddhist Sensationalism was opposed to the view
taken in the Upanishad, where the senses are derived from
p r a j fi a (rendered by Prof. Deussen ‘ consciousness ’), an<Ks
again from the World Soul. In the Garbha Up., however,
sight is spoken of as fire. The Buddhist view was subse-
quently again opposed by the Sankhya philosophy, but not
by the Nyaya.
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xlix
Or we may be more especially struck by the curious
selection and classification exercised in regard to the items
of the catalogue of form.
Now, the compilers of this or of any of the canonical
books were not interested in rupam on psychological
grounds as such. Their object was not what we should
term scientific. They were not inquiring into forms, either
as objective existences, or as mental constructions, with
any curiosity respecting the macrocosm, its parts, or its
order. They were not concerned with problems of pri-
mordial v\tj 9 of first causes, or of organic evolution, in the
spirit which has been operative in Western thought from
Thales (claimed by Europe) to Darwin. For them, as for
the leaders of that other rival movement in our own culture,
, the tradition of Socrates and Plato, man was, first and last,
! the subject supremely worth thinking about. And man
^was worth thinking about as a moral being. The physical
universe was the background and accessory, the support and
the ‘fuel* (upadanam), of the evolution of the moral
life. It was necessary to man as ethical (at least during
his sojourn on the physical plane), but it was only in so far
as it affected his ethical life that he could profitably study
it. The Buddhist, like the Socratic view, was that of
primitive man — * What is the good of it ?’ — transformed and
sublimated by the evolution of the moral ideal. The early
questioning : Is such and such good for life-preservation,
for race-preservation, for fun? or is it bad? or is it in-
determinate ? becomes, in evolved ethics : Does it make for
my perfection, for others* perfection, for noblest enjoyment ?
does it make for the contrary ? does it make for neither ?
And the advance in moral evolution which was attempted
by Buddhist philosophy, coming as it did in an age of
metaphysical dogmatism and withal of scepticism, brought
with it the felt need of looking deeper into those data of
mental procedure on which dogmatic speculation and
ethical convictions were alike founded. 1
1 G. Croom Robertson, ‘ Philosophical Remains,’ p. 8.
d
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1
Viewed in this light, the category of rupam or of
rupakkhandho becomes fairly intelligible, both as to
the selection and classification of subject matter and as to
the standpoint from which it is regarded. As a learner of
ethical doctrine, pursuing either the lower or the higher
ideal, the Buddhist was concerned with the external world
just as far as it directly and inevitably affected his moral
welfare and that of other moral beings, that is to say, of
all conscious animate beings. To this extent did he receive
.instruction concerning it.
In the first place, the great ultimate phenomena of his
physical world were one and the same as the basis of his
own physical being. That had form ; so had this. That
was built up of the four elements; so was this. That
came into being, persisted, then dissolved ; this was his
destiny, too, as a temporary collocation or body, * subject
to erasion, abrasion, dissolution and disintegration.’ 1 And
all that side of life which we call mind or consciousness,
similarly conceived as collocations or aggregates, was bound
up therein and on that did it depend.
Here, then, was a vital kinship, a common basis of
physical being which it behoved the student of man to
recognise and take into account, so as to hold an intelligent
and consistent attitude towards it. The bhikkhu sekho 2 3
* who has not attained, who is aspiring after the unsurpass^
able goal,’ has to know, inter alia , earth, water, flame, air,
each for what it is, both as external and as part of himself s
— must know 4 unity ’ (e k a 1 1 a m) for what it is ; must
indulge in no conceits of fancy (m a m a n ii i) about it or
them, and must so regard them that of him it may one
day be said by the masters : Parinnatam tassa ! —
4 He knows it thoroughly.’
To this point we shall return. That the elements are
considered under the aspect of their tangibility involves
1 D. i. 76, c.g.
2 The brother in orders undergoing training. M. i. 4.
3 M. i., pp. 185, et 8eq.; pp. 421, et seq.
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for the Buddhist the further inquiry into the sensitive
agency by which they affect him as tangibles, and so into
the problem of sensation and sense-perception in general.
On this subject the Dhamma-sangani yields a positive and
valuable contribution to our knowledge of the history of
psychology in India in the fourth century b.c. It may
contain no matter additional to that which is reproduced
in Hardy's ‘ Manual of Buddhism ’ (pp. 899-404, 419-428).
But Hardy drew directly from relatively modern sources,
and though it is interesting to see how far and how faith-
fully the original tradition has been kept intact in these
exegetical works, we turn gladly to the stronger attractions
of the first academic formulation of a theory of sense which
ancient India has hitherto preserved for us. There is no
such analysis of sensation — full, sober, positive, so far as
it goes — put forward in any Indian book of an equally
early date. The pre-Buddhistic Upanishads (and those,
too, of later date) yield only poetic adumbrations, sporadic
aphorisms on the work of the senses. The Nyaya doctrine
of pratyaksha or perception, the Jaina Sutras, the
elaboration of the Vedanta and Sankhya doctrines are, of
course, of far later date. It may not, therefore, be uncalled
for if I digress at some length on the Buddhist position in
this matter, and look for parallel theories in the West rather
than in India itself.
The theory of action and reaction between the five
special 1 senses and their several objects is given in
pages 172-190 and 197-200 of my translation. It may be
summarized as follows :
A. The Senses*-
First, a general statement relating each sense in turn
(a) to Nature (the four elements), ( b ) to the individual
. 1 They are called ‘ special ’ in modern psychology to dis-
tinguish them from organic, general or systemic sense,
which works without specially adapted peripheral organs.
d 2
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lii
organism, and affirming its invisibility and its power of
impact.
Secondly, an analysis of the sensory process, in each
case, into
(a) A personal agency or apparatus capable of reacting
to an impact not itself ;
(b) An impingeing * form,’ or form producing an impact
of one specific kind ;
(c) Impact between (a) and ( b ) ;
(< d ) Eesultant modification of the mental continuum,
viz. : in the first place, contact (of a specific sort) ; then,
hedonistic result, or intellectual result, or, presumably,
both. The modification is twice stated in each case,
emphasis being laid on the mutual impact, first as causing
the modification, then as constituting the object of attention
in the modified consciousness of the person affected.
B. The Sense-objects.
First, a general statement, relating each kind of sense-
object in turn to Nature, describing some of the typical
varieties, and affirming its invisibility, except in the case
of visual objects, 1 and its power of producing impact. 2
Secondly, an analysis of the sensory process in each
case as under A, but, as it were, from the side of the
sense-object, thus :
(a) A mode of form or sense-object, capable of producing
impact on a special apparatus of the individual organism ;
1 This insistence on the invisibility of all the senses, as
well as on that of all sense-objects except sights or visual
forms, is to me only explicable on the ground that rupain
recurring in each question and each answer, and signifying,
whatever else it meant, in popular idiom, things seen , it
was necessary, in philosophic usage, to indicate that the
term, though referring to sense, did not , with one exception,
connote things seen. Thus, even solid and fiery objects
were, qua tangibles, not visible. They were not visible to
the kayo, or skin-sensibility. They spelt visible only to
the eye.
2 See p. 183, n. 1.
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(6) The impact of that apparatus ;
(c) The reaction or complementary impact of the sense-
object ;
(d) Resultant modification of the mental continuum,
viz. : in the first place, contact (of a specific sort) ; then
hedonistic result, or intellectual result, or, presumably,
both. The modification is twice stated, in each case
emphasis being laid on the mutual impact, first as causing
the modification, then as constituting the object of attention
in the modified consciousness thus affected.
If we, for purposes of comparison, consult Greek views
on sense-perception before Aristotle — say, down to b.c. 850
— we shall find nothing to equal this for sobriety, con-
sistency and thoroughness. The surviving fragments of
Empedoklean writings on the subject read beside it like
airy fancies ; nor do the intact utterances of Plato bring us
anything more scientific. Very possibly in Demokritus we
might have found its match, had we more of him than a
few quotations. And there is reason to surmise as much,
or even more, in the case of Alkmaeon.
Let me not, however, be understood to be reading into
the Buddhist theory more than is actually there. In its
sober, analytical prose, it is no less archaic, naive, and
inadequate as explanation than any pre-Aristotelian theory
of the Greeks. The comment of Dr. Siebeck on Empedokles
applies equally to it : 1 ‘It sufficed him to have indicated
the possibility of the external world penetrating the sense-
organs, as though this were tantamount to an explanation
of sensation. The whole working out of his theory is an
attempt to translate in terms of a detailed and consecutive
physiological process the primitive, naive view of cognition.’
Theory of this calibre was, in Greece, divided between
impact (Alkmaeon, Empedokles, with respect to sight , Demo-
kritus, Plato, who, to impact, adds a commingling of sense
and object) and access (efflux and pore theory of Empe-
dokles) as the essential part of the process. The Buddhist
1 * Geschichte der Psychologic, ’ i. 107.
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liv
explanation confines itself to impact. 1 But neither East
nor West, with the possible exception of Alkmaeon, had yet
gripped the notion of a conducting medium. In Aristotle
all is changed. ‘Eidola* which collide, and ‘aporrhoae’
which penetrate, have been thrown aside for an examination
into ‘metaxu.’ And we find the point of view similarly
shifted in Buddhaghosa’s time, though how long before
him this advance had been made we do not know. Nor
was there, in the earlier thought of East or West, any
clear dualistic distinction drawn between mind and matter,
between physical (and physiological) motion or stimulus
on the one hand, and consequent or concomitant mental
modification on the other, in an act of sense-perception.
The Greek explanations are what would now be called
materialistic. The Buddhist description may be inter-
preted either way. It is true that in the Milinda-paiiho,
written some three or four centuries later than our Manual,
the action and reaction of sense and sense-object are com-
pared in realistic metaphor to the clash of two cymbals
and the butting of two goats. 2 3 * But, being metaphorical,
this account brings us really no further. The West, while
it retained the phraseology characterizing the earlier theory
of sense, ceased to imply any direct physical impact or
contact when speaking of being ‘ struck ’ by sights, sounds,
or ideas. How far, and how early, was this also the case
in the East ?
The very fact that the Buddhist theory, with all its
analytical and symmetrical fulness of exposition, yields so
very abstract and schematic a result leaves the way open to
surmise that, even in the time of our Manual, the process
of sense impression was not materialistically conceived. 8
1 Access comes later into prominence with the develop-
ment of the ‘ Door- theory.’ See following section.
2 * Milindapanho,’ p. 60. S.B.E., vol. xxxv., pp. 92, 98.
Cf. below, p. 5, n. 2.
3 Note 2, p. 175, below, suggests the eye, in the case of
sight. If so, in what shape did the object get there ?
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lv
We are not told, for instance, where the mutual impact
takes place, nor with what a distant object impinges. And
if dbamma are conceived, as in the Manual, as actual
or potential states of consciousness, and rupam is con-
ceived as a species of dhamma, it follows that both the
r up am, which is ‘ external * and comes into contact with
the rupam which is ‘of the self/ and also this latter
rupam are regarded in the light of the two mental factors
necessary to constitute an act of sensory consciousness,
actual or potential.
Such may have been the psychological aspect adumbrated,
groped after — not to go further — in the Dhamma-sangani
itself. That the traditional interpretation of this impact-
theory grew psychological with the progress of culture in
the schools of Buddhism seems to be indicated by such a
comment in the AtthasalinI as : ‘ strikes (impinges) on form
is a term for the eye ( i.e ., the visual sense) being receptive
of the object of consciousness.' 1 This seems to be a clear
attempt to resolve the old metaphor, or, it may be, the
old physical concept, into terms of subjective experience.
Again, when alluding to the simile of the cymbals and the
rams, we are told by Buddhaghosa to interpret ‘ eye * by
‘ visual cognition,’ and to take the * concussion ’ in the sense
of function . 2 Once more, he tells us that when feeling
arises through contact, the real causal antecedent is mental,
though apparently external. 3
Without pursuing this problem further, we cannot leave
the subject of sense and sensation without a word of com-
ment and comparison on the prominence given in the
Buddhist theory to the notion of ‘ contact ’ and the sense
of touch. As with us, both terms are from the same stem.
But p h a s s o (contact), on the one hand, is generalized to
include all receptive experience, sensory as well as idea-
1 Asl. 309. Cakkhum arammanam sampaticcha-
yamanam eva rupamhi patihanhati nama.
2 Ibid . 108: ‘kiccatthen’ eva.
3 See below, p. 5, n. 2.
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lvi
tional, 1 and to represent the essential antecedent and con-
dition of all feeling (or sensation = vedana). On the
other hand, phusati, photthabbam (to touch, the
tangible) are specialized to express the activity of one of
the senses. Now, the functioning of the tactile sense
(termed body-sensibility or simply body, kayo, pp. 181,
182) is described in precisely the same terms as each of the
other four senses. Nevertheless, it is plain, from the sig-
nificant application of the term tangible, or object of touch,
alluded to already — let alone the use of * contact ’ in a wider
sense — that the Buddhists regarded Touch as giving us
knowledge of things * without ’ in a more fundamental way
than the other senses could. By the table of the contents
of rupam given above, we have seen that it is only
through Touch that a knowledge of the underived elements
of the world of sense could be obtained, the fluid or moist
element alone excepted. This interesting point in the
psychology of early Buddhism may possibly be formulated
somewhere in the Abhidhamma Pitaka. I should feel
more hopeful in this respect had the compilers been, in the
first instance, not ethical thinkers, but impelled by the
scientific curiosity of a Demokritus. The latter, as is well
known, regarded all sensation as either bare touch or
developments of touch — a view borne out to a great extent
by modern biological research. This was, perhaps a corol-
lary of his atomistic philosophy. Yet that Demokritus
was no mere deductive system-spinner, but an inductive
observer, is shown in the surviving quotation of his
dictum, that we should proceed, in our inferences, ‘ from
phenomena to that which is not manifest.’ Now, as the
Buddhist view of rupam calls three of the four elements
* underived ’ and ‘ the tangible,’ while it calls the senses
and all other sense-objects * derived from that tangible ’
and from fluid, one might almost claim that their position
with respect to Touch was in effect parallel to that of
Demokritus. The Commentary does not assist us to any
1 See below, p. 4, n. 2.
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lvii
clear conclusion on this matter. But, in addition to the
remark quoted above, in which visual magnitudes are pro-
nounced to be really tactile sensations, it has one interest-
ing illustration of our proverb, ‘ Seeing is believing, but
Touch is the real thing.* It likens the four senses, exclud-
ing touch, to four balls of cotton-wool, intervening between
hammer and four anvils ( i.e ., Upadarupam, or derived
form, without and within) and deadening the impact. But
in Touch, hammer smites through wool, getting at the bare
anvil. 1
Further considerations on the Buddhist theory of
sense, taking us beyond bare sensation to the working
up of such material into concrete acts of perception, I
propose to consider briefly in the following section. The
remaining heads of the rupa-skandha are very concisely
treated in the niddesa answers (pp. 190-197), and, save
in the significance of their selection, call for no special
treatment.
It is not quite clear why senses and sense-objects should
be followed by three indriyas — by three only and just
these three. The senses themselves are often termed
indriyas, and not only in Buddhism. In the indriyas of
sex, however, and the phenomena of nutrition, the rupa -
skandha, in both the self and other selves, is certainly
catalogued under two aspects as general and as impressive
as that of sense. In fact, the whole organism as modi-
fiable by the ‘ s a b b a in rupam* without, may be said
to be summed up under these three aspects. They fit
fairly well into our division of the receptive side of the
organism, considered, psychophysically, as general and
special sensibility. From his ethical standpoint the learner
did well to take the life in which he shared into account
under its impressive aspects of sense, sex and nutrition.
And this not only in so far as he was receptive. The very
term indriyam, which is best paralleled by the Greek
hivaiu?, or faculty — i.e., ‘powers in us, and in all other
1 Asl. 268; below, p. 127, n. 1.
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lviii
things, by which we do as we do 91 — and which is inter-
preted to this effect by Buddhaghosa , 1 2 * * * * * points to the active,
self-expressive side of existence. Both as recipient, then,
and as agent, the learner of the Dharma had to acquire
and maintain a certain attitude with respect to these aspects
of the rupa-skandha.
The same considerations apply to the next two kinds of
r u p a m , with which we may bracket the next after them.
The two modes of * intimation * or self-expression exhaust
the active side of life as such, constituting, as one might
say, a world of sub-derivative or tertiary form, and calling
quite especially for modification by theory and practice
(dassanena ca bhavanaya ca). And the element
of space, strange as it looks, at first sight, to find it listed just
here, was of account for the Buddhist only as a necessary
datum or postulate for his sentient and active life. The
vacua of the body, as well as its plena , had to be reckoned
in with the rupa-skandha ; likewise the space without by
which bodies were delimitated, and which, yielding room
for movement, afforded us the three dimensions . 8
The grounds for excluding space from the four elements
and for calling it derived remain in obscurity. In the
Maha Rahulovada-Sutta (cited below) it is ranked imme-
diately after, and apparently as co-ordinate with, the
other four. And it was so ranked, oftener than not, by
Indian thought generally. Yet in another Sutta of the
same Nikaya — the Maha Hatthipadopama- Sutta — Sariputta
1 Republic, v. 477. 2 Asl., p. 119 and passim.
8 See below, p. 194, n. 1 ; also M. i. 423. In the former
passage space is described as if external to the organism ;
in the latter Gotama admonishes his son respecting the
internal aka so.
On the interesting point put forward by Professor von
Schroeder of a connexion between aka 9 a and the Pytha-
gorean o\/ca?, see Professor Garbe in the Vienna Oriental
Journal , xiii., Nro. 4 (1899). The former scholar refers to
the ranking of space as a fifth element, as a schwankend
uberlieferte Bezeichnung . It was so for Buddhism.
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lix
describes four elements, leaving out aka so. Eliminated
for some reason from the Underived, when the Dhamma-
sangani was compiled, it was logically necessary to include
it under Derived Bupam. That it was so included because
it was held to be a mental construction, or a ‘ pure form of
intuition,’ is scarcely tenable.
And yet the next seven items of derived form are
apparently to be accepted rather as concepts or aspects of
form than as objective properties or ‘primary qualities'
of it. Be that as it may, all the seven are so many
common facts about rupam, both as ‘sabbam’ and
as skandha. The Three Qualities 1 indicated the ideal
efficiency for moral ends to which the rupa-skandha, or
any form serving such an end, should be brought. The
Three Phases in the organic evolution of form and the great
fact of Impermanence applied everywhere and always to
all form. And as such all had to be borne in mind, all
had to co-operate in shaping theory and practice.
Concerning, lastly, the aharo, or support, of the rupa-
skandha, the hygiene and ethics of diet are held worthy of
rational discussion in the Sutta Pitaka. 2
We have now gone with more or less details into the
divisions of rupam in the ‘sensuous universe,’ with a
view of seeing how far it coincided with any general
philosophical concept in use among ourselves. For me it
does not fit well with any, and the vague term ‘form,’
implicated as it is, like rupam, with ‘things we see,* is
perhaps the most serviceable. Its inclusion of faculties
and abstract notions as integral factors prevent its
coinciding with ‘ matter,’ or ‘ the Extended,’ or ‘ the
External World.’ If we turn to the list of attributes given
in Chapter I. of Book II., rupam appears as pre-
eminently the unmoral (as to both cause and effect) and
the non-mental. It was ‘ favourable ’ to immoral states, as
the chief constituent of a world that had to be mastered
1 Lightness, plasticity, wieldiness, pp. 194, 195.
2 C/., e.g., M. i., Suttas 54, 55, 65, 66, 70.
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lx
and transcended by moral culture, but the immoral
states exploiting it were of the other four skandhas. It
included the phenomena of sense, but rather on their
physical pre-mental side than as full-fledged facts of con-
sciousness. And it was sharply distinguished, as a con-
stituent ‘collocation’ or ‘aggregate’ (skandha, rasi), in
the total aggregate of the individual organism from the
three collocations called cetasika (feelings, perceptions,
syntheses), and from that called citta (intellect, thought,
cognition). The attabhavo, or personality, minus all
mental and moral characteristics, is rupam.
As such it is one with all rupam not of its own com-
position. It is ‘ in touch ’ with the general impersonal
rupam, as well as with the mental and moral con-
stituents of other personalities by way of their r u p a m . i
That this intercommunication was held to be possibly on
the basis, and in virtue oij this common structure was
probably as implicit in the Buddhist doctrine as it was
explicit in many of the early Greek philosophers. It is
not impossible that some open allusions to ‘like being
known by like* may be discovered in the Pitakas as a
consciously held and deliberately stated principle or ground
of the impressibility of the sentient organism. No such
statement occurs in our Manual. But the phrase, recurring
in the case of each of the special senses, ‘derived from
the four Great Phenomena,* may not have been inserted
without this implication. Without further evidence, how~
ever, I should not be inclined to attach philosophical signi-
ficance in this direction to it. But on the one hand w©
have an interesting hint in the Commentary that such a
principle was held by early Buddhists. ‘ Where there is
difference of kind (or creature), we read, 1 there is no
sensory stimulus. According to the Ancients, “Sensory
stimulus is of similar kinds, not of different kinds.” ’
1 Asl. 313. Bhuta visese hi sati pasiido va na uppajjati.
‘ Samananam bhutanam hi pasado, na visamananan ti’
Porana.
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lxi
And again : * The solid, both within and without, becomes
the condition of the sense of touch in the laying hold of the
object of perception — in discerning the tangible.’ 1 It is
true that Buddhaghosa is discoursing, not on this question,
but on what would now be called the specific energy, or
specialized functioning, of nerve. Nevertheless, it seems
inferable from the quotations that the principle was estab-
lished. And we know also how widely accepted (and also
contested) 2 this same principle — 'H y vaxrts tov ofioLov rq 5
ofioi a) — was in Greece, from Empedokles to Plato and to
Plotinus, 3 thinkers, all of them, who were affected, through
Pythagorism or elsewise, by the East. The vivid description
by Buddhaghosa (cf. below, pp. 178-174) of the presence in
the seat of vision of the four elements is very suggestive of
Plato’s account of sight in the 4 * Timaeus,’ where the prin-
ciple is admitted.
Whether as a principle, or merely as an empirical fact,
the oneness of man’s rupaskandha with the sabbam rupam
without was thoroughly admitted, and carefully taught as
orthodox doctrine. And with regard to this kinship, I
repeat, a certain philosophical attitude, both theoretical
and practical, was inculcated as generally binding. That
attitude is, in one of the Majjhima discourses, 4 led up to
and defined as follows : All good states (dhamma) what-
ever are included in the Four Noble Truths concerning 111. 6
Now the First Noble Truth unfolds the nature of 111 : that
it lies in using the five skandhas for Grasping. 6 And the
1 Ibid., 815. Ajjhattika-bahira pathavl etassa kaya-
pasadassa arammanagahane . . . photthabbajanane pac-
cayo hoti.
2 Cf. Aristotle's discussion, De An., i. 2, 5.
3 Cf. the passage, Enn. i. 6, 9, reproduced by Gothe :
ov yap hv 7rd)7roT€ elSev 6<f>0a\fi6 s fjXiou rjXiociSrjs prj
yeyevrj fievo<;.
4 M. i. 184, et 8eq. 6 See below, p. 276.
6 Ibid., p. 328. I have retained the meaning of 4 Grasp-
ing ’ as dictated by Buddhaghosa for the group of the Four
Kinds of Grasping. Dr. Neumann renders upadanak-
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lxii
first of the five is that of rupam. Now rupam com-
prises the four Great Phenomena and all their derivatives.
And the first of the four is Earth (the solid element). Then
the solid within y or ‘ belonging to the self,’ is catalogued,
with the injunction that it is to be regarded as it really is
with right wisdom (yathabhutam sammapannaya
datthabba m). And this means that— while recognizing
his kinship with the element to the full — the good student
should not identify himself with it so as to see in it a
permanent unchanging substance as which he should
persist amid transient phenomena. He was to reflect,
‘This is not mine, it is not I, it is not the soul of me!’
‘ It is void of a Self.’ 1 And so for the other three elements.
In their mightiest manifestations — in the earthquake as in
the flood, in conflagration as in tempest — they are but
temporal, phenomenal; subject to change and decay.
Much more is this true of them when collocated in the
human organism. So far from losing himself in his
meditation in the All, in Nature, in ‘ cosmic emotion ’ of
any kind, he had to realize that the rupam in which he
participated was but one of the five factors of that life
which, in so far as it engulfed and mastered him and bore
him drifting along, was the great 111, the source of pain
and delusion. From each of those five factors he had to
detach himself in thought, and attain that position of
mastery and emancipation whereby alone the true, the
Ideal Self could emerge — temporary as a phenomenal
khandho by element of the impulse to live (Lebenstrieb ;
an expression doubtlessly prompted by Schopenhauer’s
philosophy). It would be very desirable to learn from the
Papafica - Sudani (Buddhaghosa’s ‘ Commentary on the
Majjhima Nikaya), whether the Commentator interprets
the t^rm to the same effect in both passages. Dhamma-
dinna, the woman-apostle, explains upadanam, used with
a similar context, as meaning ‘ passionate desire in the five
skandhas-of-grasping.’ (M. i. 300.)
1 See above, p. xxxvi, where the context leaves no doubt
as to what the reflection is meant to emphasize.
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lxiii
collocation, eternal by its ethical aspiration/ And the
practical result of cultivating i this earth-like culture 1 and
the rest, as Gotama called it in teaching his son, was that
€ the mind was no longer entranced by the consideration of
things as affecting him pleasantly or disagreeably,’ 1 but
‘ the disinterestedness which is based on that which is good
was established.’ 2 4 And he thereat is glad ’ — and rightly
bo — 4 for thus far he has wrought a great work !’
These seem to me some of the more essential features in
the Buddhist Dharma concerning Rupam.
VII.
On the Buddhist Philosophy of Mind and Theory oj
Intellection.
It would have been the greatest possible gain to our
knowledge of the extent to which Buddhism had developed
any clear psychological data for its ethics, had it occurred
to the compilers of the Dhamma-Sangani to introduce an
analysis of the other four skandhas parallel to that of the
skandha of form. It is true that the whole work, except the
book on r u p a m, is an inquiry into arupino dhamma,
conceived for the most part as mental phenomena, but
there is no separate treatment of them divided up as such.
Some glimpses we obtain incidentally, most of which have
been pointed out in the footnotes to the translation. And
it may prove useful to summarize briefly such contribution
as may lie therein to the psychology of Buddhism.
And, first, it is very difficult to say to what extent, if at
all, such psychological matter as we find is distinctively
and originally Buddhist, or how much was merely adopted
from contemporary culture and incorporated with the
Dharma. Into this problem I do not here propose to
inquire farther. If there be any originality, any new
departure in the psychology scattered about the Nikayas, it
is more likely to be in aspect and treatment than in new
2 M. i. 186.
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Google
1 M. i. 428, 424.
lxiv
matter. Buddhism preached a doctrine of regenerate
personality, to be sought after and developed by and out
of the personal resources of the individual through a system
of intellectual self-culture. Thrown back upon himself, he
developed introspection, the study of consciousness. But,
again, his doctrine imposed on him the study of psychical
states without the psyche. Nature without and nature
within met, acted and reacted, and the result told on the
organism in a natural, orderly, necessary way. 1 But there
was no one adjusting the machinery. 2 The Buddhist
might have approved of Leibniz’s amendment of Locke’s
* Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu * in
the additional phrase ‘ nisi ipse intellectus.’ But he would
not thereby have exalted vififtanam, cittam, or mano
to any hypostatic permanence as prior or as immanent.
He would only admit the priority of intellect to particular
sensations as a natural order, obtaining among the pheno-
menal factors of any given act of cognition.
Psychological earnestness, then, and psychological in-
quiry into mental phenomena, coexisting apart from, and
in opposition to, the usual assumption of a psychical
entity: such are the only distinctively Buddhist features
which may, in the absence of more positive evidence than
we yet possess, be claimed in such analysis of mind as
appears in Buddhist ethics.
Of the results of this earnest spirit of inquiry into mental
phenomena, in so far as they may be detached from ethical
doctrine, and assigned their due place in the history of
human ideas, it will be impossible, for several years, to
prepare any adequate treatment. Much of the Abhi-
dhamma Pitaka, and even some of the Sutta Pitaka, still
remains unedited.
Of the former collection nothing has been translated with
the exception of the attempt in this volume. And, since
Buddhist psychology has an evolution to show covering
nearly a thousand years, we have to await fresh materials
1 Cf. Mil. 57-61. 2 Sum. 194.
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lxv
from the yet unedited works of Buddhaghosa, the Buddhist
Sanskrit texts, and such works as the Netti-pakarana,
Professor Hardy’s edition of which is now in the press.
Meanwhile there is an increasing store of accessible
material which might be sifted by the historical in-
vestigator.
There are, for instance, in the Dhamma-Sangani several
passages suggesting that Buddhist scholars, in con-
templating the consciousness or personality as affected by
phenomena considered as external, were keenly alive to the
distinction between the happening of the expected and the
happening of the unexpected, between instinctive reaction
of the mind and the organism generally, on occasion of
sense, and the deliberate confronting of external phenomena
with a carefully adjusted intelligence. Modern psychology
has largely occupied itself with this distinction, and with
the problems of consciousness and subconsciousness, of
volition and of memory, involved in it. The subject of
attention, involuntary and voluntary, figures prominently
in the psychological literature of the last two decades.
But it is not till the centuries of post- Aristotelian and of
neo-Platonic thought that we see the distinction emerging
in Western psychology contemporaneously with the develop-
ment of the notion of consciousness. 1
In the history of Buddhist thought, too, the distinction
does not appear to have become explicitly and consciously
made till the age of, or previous to, the writing of the great
Commentaries (fifth century). A corresponding explicitness
in the notion of consciousness and self-consciousness, or at
least in the use of some equivalent terms, has yet to be
traced. 2 * Buddhism is so emphatically a philosophy, both
in theory and practice, of the conscious will, with all that
this involves of attention and concentration, that we hardly
1 Cf. Siebeck, op. cit., ii., pp. 200, 858, 888.
2 In the Maha Nidana Sutta Gotama discourses on sibi
consdre by way of nama-rupa. See in Grimblot’s 4 Sept
Suttas,* p. 255.
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look to find terms discriminating such notions from among
other mental characteristics. We are reminded instead of
Matthew Arnold's well-known remark that as, at Soli, no
one spoke of solecisms, so in England we had to import the
term Philistine.
But, whereas it is the Atthasalini, written from the
standpoint of a later elaboration of thought, that makes
explicit what it holds to be the intention of the classic
manual, the latter work lends itself without straining to
such interpretation. I pass over Buddhaghosa’s comments
on the limitations and the movements of attention repro-
duced below, pp. 198, n. 2, 200, n. 1, as derived very possibly
from thought nearer to his own times. Again, with re-
spect to the residual unspecified factors in good and bad
thoughts — the * or-whatever-other-states n — among which
the Commentator names, as a constant, qianasikara, or
attention — this specifying may be considered as later
elaboration. But when the Commentary refers the curious
alternative emphasis in the description of the sensory act 1 2
to just this distinction between a percipient who is pre-
/ pared or unprepared for the stimulus, it seems possible
that he is indeed giving us the original interpretation.
1 See below p. 5, n. 1 ; also Asl., pp. 168, 250, etc. The
definition given of manasikara in the ‘ ye-va-panaka ’
passage of the Commentary (p. 188) is difficult to grasp
fully, partly because, here and there, the reading seems
doubtful in accuracy, partly because of the terms of the
later Buddhist psychology employed, which it would first
be necessary to discuss. But I gather that manasikara
may be set going in the first, middle, or last stage of an
act of cognition — i.e., on the arammanam or initial
presentation, the vlthi (or avajjanam), and the
j a van am; that in this connexion it is concerned with
the first of the three ; that it involves memory, association
of the presentation with [mental] ‘ associates,’ and con-
fronting the presentation. And that it is a constructive
and directing activity of mind, being compared to a
charioteer.
2 Below, p. 176, nn. 1, 2.
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Again, the remarkable distinction drawn, in the case of
every type of good or of bad thoughts, ‘relating to the
sensuous universe/ i.e., to the average moral consciousness,
between thoughts which are prompted by a conscious
motive, 1 and such as are not, seems to me to indicate a
groping after the distinction between instinctive or spon-
taneous intellection, on the one hand, and deliberate,
purposive, or motivated thought on the other.
Taken in isolation, there is insufficient material here to
establish this alternative state of mind as a dominant
feature in Buddhist psychology. Taken in conjunction
with the general mental attitude and intellectual culture
involved in Buddhist ethical doctrine and continually in-
culcated in the canonical books, and emphasized as it is
by later writings, the position gains in significance. The
doctrine of karma, inherited and adopted from earlier and
contemporary thought, never made the Buddhist fatalistic.
He recognised the tremendous vis a tergo expressed in our
doggerel :
‘ For ’tis their nature to.’
But he had unlimited faith in the saving power of nurture.
He faced the grim realities of life with candour, and
tolerated no mask. This honesty, to which we usually add
a mistaken view of the course of thought and action he
prescribed in consequence of the honesty, gains him the
name of Pessimist. But the hope that was in him of
what might be done to better nature through nurture,
even in this present life, by human effort and goodwill,
reveals him as a strong Optimist with an unshaken ideal of
the joy springing from things made perfect. He even tried
to ‘ pitchfork nature ’ in one or two respects, though
opposed to asceticism generally — simply to make the Joy
1 Cf. below, p. 84, n. 1. The thoughts which are not
called sasankharena are by the Cy. ruled as being
a - sankharena, though not explicitly said to be so
(Asl. 71).
* 2
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lxviii
more easily attainable by those who dared to * come out. 9
And this regenerating nurture resolves itself, theoretically,
into a power of discrimination ; practically, into an exercise
of selection. The individual learner, pervious by way of
his * fivefold door * to an inflooding tide of impressions
penetrating to the sixth door of the co-ordinating ‘ mind, 9
was to regulate the natural alertness of reception and per-
ception by the special kind of attention termed yon iso
manasikara, or thorough attention, and by the clear-
eyed insight referred to already as yathabhutam
sammappafifiaya datthabbam, or the higher
wisdom of regarding ‘ things as in themselves they really
are 9 — to adopt Matthew Arnold’s term. The stream of
phenomena, whether of social life, of nature, or of his
own social and organic growth, was not so much to be
ignored by him as to be marked, measured and classed
according to the criteria of one who has chosen * to follow
his own uttermost,’ 1 and has recognised the power of that
^ stream to imperil his enterprise, and its lack of power to
give an equivalent satisfaction. 2 * The often-recurring sub-
ject of sati-sampajaniiam, or that ‘mindful and
aware’ attitude, which evokes satire in robust, if super-
ficial, criticism, is the expansion and ethical application of
this psychological state of prepared and pre-ad justed sens©
or voluntary attention. 8 The student was not to be taken
by surprise — ‘evil states of covetousness and repining
flowing in over him dwelling unprepared 9 — until he had
‘ . . . The nobler mastery learned
Where inward vision over impulse reigns.’ 4
1 Settham upanamam udeti . . . attano uttarim bhajetha
(A. i. 126).
2 Cj\ M. i. 85-90 on kamanam assadan ca adinavafi ca
nissaranam ca . . . yathabhutam pajanitva.
8 See below on guarding the door of the senses,
pp. 850-858. Also note on D. i. 70 in * Dialogues of th©
Buddha,’ p. 81.
4 George Eliot, ‘Brother and Sister. 9
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Then indeed he might dwell at ease, strong in his
emancipation.
Step by step with his progress in the cultivation of
attention, he was also practising himself in that faculty of
selection which it were perhaps more accurate not to
distinguish from attention. Alertness is never long, and,
indeed, never strictly, attending to anything and every-
thing at once. We are reminded of Condillac’s definition
of attention as only an ‘exclusive sensation.’ From the
multitude of excitations flowing in upon us, one is, more
or less frequently, selected, 1 the rest being, for a time,
either wholly excluded or perceived subconsciously. And
this selective instinct, varying in strength, appears, not only
in connexion with sense-impressions, but also in our more
persisting tendencies and interests, as well as in a general
disposition to concentration or to distraction.
Buddhism, in its earnest and hopeful system of self-
culture, set itself strenuously against a distrait habit of
mind, calling it tatra-tatrabhinandinl 2 — ‘the
there-and-there-dalliance,’ as it were of the butterfly. And
it adopted and adapted that discipline in concentration
(samadhi), both physical and psychical, both perceptual
and conceptual, for which India is unsurpassed. But it
appreciated the special practice of rapt absorbed concen-
trated thought called Dhyana or Jhana, not as an end in
itself, but as a symbol and vehicle of that habit of selec-
tion and Bmgle-minded effort which governed ‘ life accord-
ing to the Higher Ideal.’ It did not hold with the robust
creed, which gropes, it may be, after a yet stronger ideal :
‘ Greift nur hinein ins voile Menschenleben,
Und wo Ihr’s packt, da ist es interessant ?’
‘Full life’ of the actual sort, viewed from the Buddhist
standpoint, was too much compact of Vanity Fair, shambles
1 Cf. Hoffding’s criticism of Condillac in ‘Outlines of
Psychology’ (London, 1891), p. 120.
2 M. i. 299.
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lxx
and cemetery, to be worth the plunge. It had, on the
other hand, great faith in experimenting on nature by a
judicious pruning of everything it judged might wreck or
hinder the evolution of a life of finer, higher quality . If
we, admitting this intention, look on the frequent injunc-
tions respecting what ‘was to be put away’ (paha-
tabbam) 1 from the life of each disciple, whether by
insight or by culture, whether by gentle or by forcible
restraint, 2 * * * not as so much mere self-mortification and
crippling of energy, but as expressions of selective culture
for the better ‘forcing* of somewhat tender growths, we
may, if we still would criticise, appraise more sym-
pathetically.
If I have dwelt at some length on a side of Buddhist
psychological ethics which is not thrown into obvious relief
in our Manual, it was because I wished to connect that
side with the specially characteristic feature in Buddhist
psychology where it approximates to the trend of our
own modern tradition. There, on the one hand, we
have a philosophy manifestly looking deeper into the
mental constitution than any other in the East, and giving
especial heed to just those mental activities — attention
and feeling, conation and choice — which seem most to
imply a subject, or subjective unity who attends, feels,
wills and chooses. And yet this same philosophy is
emphatically one that attempts to ‘ extrude the Ego.’ If,
on the other hand, we leap over upwards of 2,000 years
and consider one of the most notable contributions to our
national psychology, we find that its two most salient
features are a revival of the admission of an Ego or
Subject of mental states, which had been practically
extruded, and a theory of the ultimate nature of mental pro-
cedure set out entirely in terms of attention and feeling. 8
1 See, e.g., below, p. 256 et seq.
2 Cf. the Sabbasava Sutta and passim, M. i., especially
the Vitakkasanthana Sutta.
8 I refer to Professor Ward’s ‘Psychology/ Ency. Brit.,
9th ed.
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And yet the divergence between the two conclusions,
widely removed though they are by time and space, is not
so sharp as at first appears. The modern thinker, while
he finds it more honest not to suppress the fact that all
psychologists, not excepting Hume, do, implicitly or ex-
plicitly, assume the conception of ‘ a mind * or conscious ^
subject, is careful to ‘ extrude ’ metaphysical dogma. That
everything mental is referred to a Self or Subject is, for
him, a psychological conception which may be kept as free
from the metaphysical conception of a soul, mind-atom,
or mind-stuff as is that of the individual organism in
biology. In much the same way the Buddhists were content
to adopt the term attabhavo (self-hood or personality
— for which Buddhaghosa half apologizes 1 ) — ajjhat-
tikam (belonging to the self, subjective 2 * * ) and the like,
as well as to speak of citt am, mano and viiifianam
where we might say * mind.’ It is true that by the two
former terms they meant the totality of the five skandhas,
that is to say, both mind and body, but this is not the case
with the three last named. And if there was one thing
which moved the Master to quit his wonted serenity and
wield the lash of scorn and upbraiding, and his followers
to use emphatic repudiation, it was just the reading into
this convenient generalization of mind or personality that
‘ metaphysical conception of a soul, mind-atom, or mind-
stuff,’ which is put aside by the modern psychologist.
And I believe that the jealous way in which the
Buddhists guarded their doctrine in this matter arose, not
from the wish to assimilate mind to matter, or the whole
personality to a machine, but from the too great danger
that lay in the unchecked use of atta, 8 ahankara,
attabhavo, even as a mere psychological datum, in that
it afforded a foothold to the prevailing animism. They
1 See below, p. 175, n. 1. 2 Ibid., p. 207, n. 1.
8 Svayam (this one) is nearly always substituted for
atta as a nominative, the latter term usually appearing
in oblique cases.
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were as Protestants in regard to the crucifix. They re-
membered with Ste. Beuve : * La sauvagerie est toujours
la a deux pas, et, d&s qu’on lache pied, elle recommence.’
What, then, was their view of mind, as merely pheno-
menal, in relation to the rupa-skandha or non-mental part
of the human individual? We have considered their
doctrine of external phenomena impingeing on and modi-
fying the internal or personal rupam by way of sense.
Have we any clue to their theory of the propagation of
the modifications, alleged in their statement 1 to take place
in relation to those factors of personality which were
arupino, and not derived from material elements — the
elements (d h a t u’s), namely, or skandhas of feeling, per-
ception, syntheses and intellect? How did they regard
that process of co-ordination by which, taking sensuous ex-
perience as the more obvious starting-point in mental experi-
ence, sensations are classed and made to cohere into groups
or percepts, and are revived as memories, and are further
co-ordinated into concepts or abstract ideas ? And finally,
and at back of all this, who feels, or attends, or wills ?
Now the Dhamma-Sangani does not place questions of
this kind in the mouth of the catechist. In so far as it is
psychological (not psycho-physical or ethical), it is so
^ strictly phenomenological , that its treatment is restricted to
the analysis of certain broadly defined states of mind, felt
or inferred to have arisen in consequence of certain other
mental states as conditions. There is no reference any-
where to a ‘ subjective factor ’ or agent ivlio has the
( cittam or thought, with all its associated factors of
attention, feeling, conception and volition. Even in the
case of Jhana, where it is dealing with more active modes
of regulated attention, involving a maximum of constructive
thought with a minimum of receptive sense, the agent, as
conscious subject , is kept in the background. The inflexion
of the verb 2 alone implies a given personal agent, and the
1 See answers in §§ 600, 604, etc.
2 Bhaveti, viharati (cultivates, abides); p. 43 et seq.
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Commentary even feels it incumbent to point him out. It
is this psychologizing without a psyche that impressed me ^
from the first, and seemed to bring the work, for all its
remoteness in other respects, nearer to our own Experiential
school of and since Locke, than anything we find in Greek
traditions.
It is true that each of the four formless skandhas is
defined or described, and this is done in connexion with
the very first question of the book. But the answers are
given, not in terms of respective function or of mutual
relation, but of either synonyms, or of modes or constituent
parts. For instance, feeling (vedana) is resolved into
three modes, 1 perception ( san n a ) is taken as practically
self-evident and not really described at all, 2 the syntheses
(sankhara) are resolved into modes or factors, intellect
(vinnanam) is described by synonyms.
Again, whereas the skandhas are enumerated in the
order in which, I believe, they are unvaryingly met with,
there is nothing, in text or Commentary, from which we
can infer that this order corresponds to any theory of
genetic procedure in an act of cognition. In other words,
we are not shown that feeling calls up perception, or that
the sankharas are a necessary link in the evolution of
perception into conception or reasoning. 3 If we can infer
1 See pp. 3-9, 27-29.
2 It is on the other hand described with some fulness in
the Cy. See my note s.v.
3 <?/. the argument by Dr. Neumann, ‘ Buddhistische
Anthologie,’ xxiii, xxiv. If I have rendered sankhara by
‘ syntheses,’ it is not because I see any coincidence between
the Buddhist notion and the Kantian Synthesis der Wahrneh -
mungen. Still less am I persuaded that Unterscheidungen
is a virtually equivalent term. Like the ‘ confections ’ of
Professor Rhys Davids and the ‘ Gestaltungen ’ of Professor
Oldenberg, I use syntheses simply as, more or less, an
etymological equivalent, and wait for more light. I may
here add that I have used intellection and cognition inter-
changeably as comprehending the whole process of knowing,
or coming to know.
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anything in the nature of causal succession at all, it is such
that the order of the skandhas as enumerated is upset.
Thus, taking the first answer (and that is typical for the
whole of Book I. when new ground is broken into) : a
certain sense -impression evokes, through * contact,’ a
complex state of mind or psychosis called a thought or
c i 1 1 a m . Bom of this contact and the ‘ appropriate *
c i 1 1 a m , now (t.e., in answer 3) called, in terms of its
synonym, representative intellection (manovinnana-
dhatu), feeling, we are told, is engendered. Perception
is called up likewise and, apparently, simultaneously. So
is ‘ thinking * (cetana ) — of the sankhara-skandha. And
‘ associated with ’ the c i 1 1 a m come all the rest of the
constituent dhammas, both sankharas, as well as specific
modes 1 or different aspects 2 3 of the feeling and the thought
already specified. In a word, we get contact evoking the
fifth skandha, and, as the common co-ordinate resultant,
the genesis or excitement of the other three. This is
entirely in keeping with the many passages in the Nikayas,
where the concussion of sense and object are said to result
in vinnanam =cittam = the fifth skandha. ‘Eye,’ for
instance, and ‘ form,’ in mutual ‘ contact,’ result in ‘ visual
cognition.*
In the causal chain of that ancient formula, the
Paticca-samuppada, 8 on the other hand, we find
quite another order of genesis, sankharas inducing cogni-
tion or thought, and contact alone inducing feeling. This
mysterious old rune must not further complicate our
problem. I merely allude to it as not in the least support-
^ ing the view that the order of statement, in the skandhas,
^ implies order of happening. What we may more surely
gather from the canon is that, as our own psychological
thought has now conceived it, 4 the, let us say, given
1 E.g. f ease.
2 E.g., the ‘ faculties * of mind (ideation) and of pleasure.
3 Given below on p. 348 [1336].
4 Professor Ward, op. cit .
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individual ‘ attends to or cognizes ( v i j a n a t i ) changes
in the sensory continuum, and is, in consequence, either
pleased or pained* (or has neutral feeling). And, further,
in any and every degree of conscious’ or subconscious mood
or disposition, he may be shown to be experiencing a
number of 'associated states,’ as enumerated. All this
is in our Manual called a cittuppada — a genesis of
thought.
Of thought or of thinking. There seems to be a breadth
and looseness of implication about c i 1 1 a m fairly parallel
to the popular vagueness of the English term. It is true
that the Commentary does not sanction the interpretation
of contact and all the rest (I refer to the type given in the
first answer) as so many attributes of the thought which
‘has arisen.’ The sun rising, it says, is not different from
its fiery glory, etc., arising. But the cittam arising is a
mere expression to fix the occasion for the induction of the
whole concrete psychosis, and connotes no more and no
less than it does as a particular constituent of that
complex. 1
This is a useful hint. On the other hand, when we
consider the synonymous terms for cittam, given in
answer 6, and compare the various characteristics of these
terms scattered through the Commentary, we find a con-
siderable wealth of content and an inclusion of process and
product similar to that of our ‘ thought.’ For example,
‘cittam means mental object or presentation (aram-
manam); that is to say, he thinks ; that is to say, he
attends to a thought.’ 2 Hence my translation might well
1 Asl. 118. I gather, however, that the adjective ceta-
sikam had a wider and a narrower denotation. In the
former it meant ‘ not bodily,’ as on p. 6. In the latter it
served to distinguish three of the incorporeal skandhas
from the fourth, t.e., cittam, as on pp. 265, 818 — citta-
cetasika dhamma. Or are we to take the Commentator’s
use of kayikam here to refer to those three skandhas, as
is often the case (p. 48, n. 8) ? Hardly, since this makes
the two meanings of cetasikam self-contradictory.
2 Ibid . 68.
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lxxvi
have run : When a good thought . . . has arisen ... as
the object of this or that sense, etc. Again, cittam is
defined as a process of connecting (sandhanam) the
last (things) as they keep arising in consciousness with
that which preceded them. 1 Further, it is a co-ordinating,
relating, or synthesizing (sandahanam); 2 and, again,
it has the property of initiative action (pure carikam).
For, when the sense-impression gets to the ‘ door ’ of the
senses, cittam confronts it before the rest of the mental
congeries. 3 The sensations are, by cittam, wrought up
into that concrete stream of consciousness which they
evoke.
Here we have cittam covering both thinking and
thought or idea. When we turn to its synonym or quasi-
synonym m a n o we find, so far as I can discover, that only
activity, or else spring, source or nidus of activity, is the
aspect taken. The faculty of ideation (manindriya m),
for instance, 4 while expressly declared to be an equivalent
(vevacanam) of cittam, and, like it, to be that which
attends or cognizes (vijanati),is also called a measuring
the mental object — declared above to be c i 1 1 a m. 5 In a
later passage (ibid., 129), it is assigned the function of accept-
ing, receiving, analogous, perhaps, to our technical expres-
sion ‘assimilating* (s ampaticchanam). In thus
appraising or approving, it has all sensory objects for its
field, as well as its more especial province of dhammas. 6
These, when thus distinguished, I take to mean ideas,
including images and general notions. And it is probably
1 Asl., pp. 112, 118.
2 Cf. the characteristic — samvidahanam — of cetana
in my note, p. 8.
8 The figure of the city-guardian, given in Mil. 62, is
quoted by the Cy.
4 See below, p. 18, and Asl. 128.
5 It is at the same time said to result in (establishing)
fact or conformity (tathabhavo), and to succeed sense-
perception as such.
6 See p. 2, n. 8.
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only in order to distinguish between mind in this abstract
functioning and mind as cognition in its most comprehensive
sense that we see the two terms held apart in the sentence :
‘Cittam cognizes the dhammas which are the objects of
mano, just as it cognizes the visual forms, etc., which are
the objects of the senses.’ 1
When cittam is thus occupied with the abstract func-
tioning of mano 2 — when, that is, we are reflecting on past
experience, in memory or ratiocination — then the more
specific term is, I gather, not cittam, but manovin-
fianam (corresponding to cakkhuvifiiianam, etc.).
This, in the Commentarial psychology, certainly stands
for a further stage, a higher * power ’ of intellection, for
* representative cognition,’ its specific activity being distin-
guished as judging or deciding (santiranam), and as
fixing or determining (votthappanam).
The affix dhatu, whether appended to mano or to
manovinnanam, probably stands for a slight distinc-
tion in aspect of the intellectual process. It may be intended
to indicate either of these two stages as an irreducible
element, a psychological ultimate, an activity regarded as its
own spring or source or basis. Adopted from without by
Buddhism, it seems to have been jealously guarded from
noumenal implications by the orthodox. Buddhaghosa,
indeed, seems to substitute the warning against its abuse
for the reason why it had come to be used. According to
him, the various lists of dhammas (e.g., in the first answer),
when considered under the aspect of phenomena, of ‘ empti-
ness,’ of non-essence, may be grouped as together forming
two classes of dhatu. 3 Moreover, each special sense can
be so considered (cakkhu-dhatu, etc. ; see pp. 214, 215),
1 Asl., p 112.
2 Cf. the expression suddha-manodvaro in my note,
p. 8. And on what follows, cf. pp. 129, 182, nn.
3 Viz., manovififiana-dhatu and dham ma-dhat u
see Asl. 153, and below, p. 26, n. 2. The term ‘ element ’
is similarly used in our own psychology.
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lxxviii
and so may each kind of sense-object. For, with respect
to sense, or the apprehension of form, they are so many
phenomenal ultimates — the two terms, so to speak, in each
sensory relation.
How far d h a t u corresponds to v a 1 1 h u — how far the
one is a psychological, the other a physical conception 1
of source or base — is not easily determined. But it is
interesting to note that the Commentator only alludes to a v
basis of thought (cittassa vatthu), that is, to the
heart (hadaya- vatthu), when the catechizing is in
terms of mano-dhatu. 2 * His only comment on * heart/
when it is included in the description of cittam (answer
[6]), is to say that, whereas it stands for cittam, it
simply represents the inwardness (intimity) of thought.*
But in the subsequent comment he has a remark of great
interest, namely, that the ‘ heart-basis ’ is the place whither
all the * door-objects ’ come, and where they are assimilated,
or received into unity. In this matter the Buddhist
philosophy carries on the old Upanishad lore about the
heart, just as Aristotle elaborated the dictum of Empedokles,
that perception and reasoning were carried on in ‘ the
blood round the heart.’
1 Cf. below, pp. 214, 215, with 209-211.
2 Asl. 264 ; below, p. 129, fn.
8 Asl. 140: * Heart = thought (Hadayan ti cittam).
In the passage — “ I will either tear out your mind or break
your heart ” — the heart in the breast is spoken of. In the
passage (M. i. 32) — “ Methinks he planes with a heart that
knows heart” (like an expert)! — the mind is meant. In
the passage — “The vakkam is the heart” — the basis of
heart is meant. But here cittam is spoken of as heart in
the sense of inwardness (abbhantaram).’ It is interest-
ing to note that, in enumerating the rupaskandha in the
Visuddhi Magga, Buddhaghosa’s sole departure from con-
formity with the Dhamma-Sangani is the inclusion of
hadaya-vatthu after ‘ vitality .’
The other term, 4 that which is clear’ (pan da ram), is
an ethical metaphor. The mind is said to be naturally
pure, but defiled by incoming corruptions. ( Cf. A. i.,
p. 10.)
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lxxix
It is possible that this ancient and widely-received
tradition of the heart (rather than the brain, for instance)
as the seat of the soul or the mind is latent in the question
put by Mahakotthito, a member of the Order, to Sariputta,
the leading apostle : l ‘ Inasmuch as these five indriyas
(senses) are, in province and in gratification, mutually
independent, what process of reference is there, 2 and who is
it that is gratified by them in common V So apparently
thinks Dr. Neumann, who renders Sariputta’s answer —
4 The mind (mano )* — by Her z. This association must,
however, not be pressed. For in another version of this
dialogue more recently edited, Gotama himself being the
person consulted, his interlocutor goes on to ask : What is
the pa tisaranam of mano — of recollection (sati) —
of emancipation — of Nirvana? 8 So that the meaning of
the first question may simply be that as emancipation looks
to , or makes for Nirvana, and recollection or mindfulness
for emancipation, and ideation or thinking refers or looks
1 M. i. 295.
2 Kim patisaranam. The word is a crux, and may
bear more than one meaning. Cf Yinaya Texts (S. B. E.
xvii.), ii., p. 864, n. ; ‘ Dialogues of the Buddha,* i.,
p. 122, n. Dr. Neumann renders it by Hort f following
Childers.
It is worthy of note that, in connexion with the heresy of
identifying the self with the physical organism generally ^
(below, p. 259), the Cy. makes no allusion to heart, or
other part of the rupam, in connexion with views (2)
or (4). These apparently resembled Augustine’s belief:
the soul is wholly present both in the entire body and in
each part of it. With regard to view (3), is it possible
that Plotinus heard it at Alexandria, or on his Eastern
trip? For he, too, held that the body was ‘in the soul,’^ x
permeated by it as air is by fire (Enn. iv.). Buddhaghosa’s
illustrative metaphor is ‘as a flower being “ in” its own
perfume.’ I regret that space fails me to reproduce his
analysis of these twenty soul-hypotheses.
8 S. v., p. 218. In the replies mano is referred to
Sati, sati to vimutti, and this to Nirvana.
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to memory, 1 so sensation depends on thinking, on mental
construction (to become effective as knowledge).
It is, indeed, far more likely that Buddhist teaching
made little of and passed lightly over this question of a
physical basis of thought or mind. It was too closely
involved with the animistic point of view — how closely we
may see, for instance, in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad.
When King Milinda puts a similar question respecting the
subject of sensations, 2 3 he does so from so obviously
animistic a standpoint that the sage, instead of discussing
mano, or heart, with him, argues against any one central
subjective factor whatever, and resolves the process of
cognition into a number of 4 connate * activities. The
method itself of ranking mental activity as though it were
a sixth kind of sense seems to point in the same direction,
and reminds us of Hume’s contention, that when he tried
to 4 catch himself ’ he always 4 tumbled on some particular
perception.’ Indeed it was, in words attributed to Gotama
himself, the lesser blunder in the average man to call
4 this four-elementish body ’ his soul than to identify the
self with 4 what is called c i 1 1 a m , that is, mano, that
is, vifinanam.* For whereas the body was a colloca-
tion that might hold together for many years, 4 mind, by
day and by night is ever arising as one thing, ceasing as
another !* 8
Impermanence of conscious phenomena was one of the
two grounds of the Buddhist attack. So far it was on all
fours with Hume. The other ground was the presence of
law, or necessary sequence in mental procedure. The Soul
was conceived as an entity, not only above change , an
absolute constant, but also as an entirely free agent . Both
1 Cf. the interesting inquiry into the various modes of
association in remembering , given in Mil., pp. 78, 79, and
77, 78.
2 Mil. 54. He calls it vedagu (knower), and, when
cross-examined, abbhantare jivo (the living principle
within).
3 S. ii., pp. 94-96.
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grounds, be it noted, are laid down on psychological
evidence — on the testimony of consciousness. And both
grounds were put forward by Gotama in his very first
sermon. 1 The standard formula for the latter only is
reproduced in our Manual. 2 * And it is interesting to see
the same argument clothed in fresh dress in the dialogue
with Milinda referred to above. The point made is this :
that if any one of the skandhas could be identified with a
self or soul, it would, as not subject to the conditions of
phenomena, act through any other faculty it chose. It
would be a principle, not only of the nature of what we
should call will, but also of genuine free will. 8 Soul and
Free Will, for the Buddhist, stand or fall together. But,
he said, what we actually find is no such free agency. We
only find certain organs (doors), with definite functions,
natural sequence, the line of least resistance and associa-
tion. 4 Hence we conclude there is no transcendent
‘ knower ’ about us.
Here I must leave the Buddhist philosophy of mind and
theory of intellection. We are only at the threshold of its
problems, and it is hence not strange if we find them as
baffling as, let us say, our own confused usage of many
psychological terms — feeling, will, mind — about which we
ourselves greatly differ, would prove to an inquiring
Buddhist. If I have not attempted to go into the crux of
the sankhara-skandha, it is because neither the Manual
nor its Commentary brings us any nearer to a satisfactory
hypothesis. For future discussion, however, the frequent
enumerations of that skandha’s content, varying with
every changing mood, should prove pertinent. In every
direction there is very much to be done. And each addition
to the texts edited brings new light. Nor can philosophic
interest fail in the long-run to accumulate about a system
1 Vin. i. 14; = M. i. 188, 800; S. iii. 66; cf iv. 84.
2 P. 257 et seq .
8 Cf the writer’s article on the Vedalla Suttas, J. B. A. S.,
April, 1894. 4 Mil., loc. cit .
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of thought which at that early time of day took up a task
requiring such vigour and audacity — the task, namely, of
opposing the prevailing metaphysic, not because problems
of mind did not appeal to the founders of that system, but
because further analysis of mind seemed to reveal a realm ^
of law-governed phenomenal sequence for which the ready
hypothesis of an unconditioned permanent Self super gram -
maticam was too cheap a solution,
VIII.
On the Buddhist Notions of ‘ Good , Bad , and Indeterminate
By way of dhamma, rupam and cittam, by
way of Buddhist phenomenology and psychology, we come
at last to the ethical purport of the questions in the
Manual. Given a human being known to us by way of
these phenomenal states, what is implied when we say that
some of them are good, some bad, others neither ?
The Dhamma-Sangani does not, to our loss be it said,
define any one of these concepts. All it does is to show
us the content of a number of * thoughts ’ known as one
or the other of these three species of dhamma. In a sub-
sequent passage (pp. 345-348) it uses the substantival form
of ‘ good * (kusalata; another form is k o s a 1 1 a m) in
the sense of skill or proficiency as applied to various kinds
of insight, theoretical or practical.
Now if we turn to the later expression of old tradition in the
Commentaries, we find, on the one hand, an analysis of the
meaning of ‘good’; on the other, the rejection of precisely
that sense of skill, and of that alone out of four possible
meanings, with respect to * good ’ as used in Book I.
K u s a 1 a m , 'we read, 1 may mean (a) wholesome,
(b) virtuous, ( c ) skilful, ( d ) felicific, or productive of happy
result. The illustrations make these clear statements
clearer. E.g. of (a), from the Dasaratha Jataka: ‘ Is it good
for you, sir, is it wholesome ?’ 2 Of ( b ) ‘ What, sir, is good
1 Asl. 38.
2 The two adjectives are kusalam, anamayam.
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behaviour in act? Sire, it is conduct that is blameless
(a n a v a j j o).’ Of (c) ‘ You are good at knowing all about
the make of a chariot.’ 1 Again: ‘The four girl-pupils
are good at singing and dancipg.’ Of (d) ‘Good states,
brethren, are acquired through good karma having been
wrought and stored up.’
Of these four, (c) is alone ruled out as not applicable to
the eight types of good thoughts constituting dhamma
k u s a 1 a . In so far, then, as we suffer the Buddhist
culture of the fifth century to interpret the canon for us,
‘good,’ in the earlier ethics, meant that which insures
soundness, physical and moral, as well as that which is
felicific.
The further question immediately suggests itself, whether
Buddhism held that these two attributes were at bottom
identical. Are certain ‘ states ’ intrinsically good, i.e.,
virtuous and right, independently of their results ? Or is
‘ good,’ in the long-run at least, felicitous result, and only
on that account so called? Are Buddhists, in a word,
Intuitionists, or are they Utilitarians? Or is not a
decidedly eclectic standpoint revealed in the comprehensive
interpretation given of kusalam?
These are, however, somewhat modern — I am tempted to
say, somewhat British — distinctions to seek in an ancient
theory of morals. They do not appear to have troubled
Buddhism, early or late. The Buddhist might possibly
have replied that he could not conceive of any thought,
word, or deed as being intrinsically good and yet bad in its
results, and that the distinction drawn by the Commentator
was simply one of aspects.
If pressed, however, we can almost imagine the Buddhist
well content with the relative or dependent good of Utili-
tarianism, so closely is his ethics bound up with cause
and effect. Good, for him, is good with respect to karma
— that is, to pleasurable effect or eudcemonia.
With respect to the supremely good effect, to arahatship
1 Cf. M. ii. 94.
/ 2
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or Nirvana, he might, it is true, have admitted a difference,
namely, that this state was absolutely good, and not good
because of its results. It was the supreme Result or Fruit,
and there was 4 no beyond.’ But then he did not rank
Nirvana exactly in the category of good, and precisely for
this reason, that in it moral causation culminated and
ceased. He spoke of it as Indeterminate, as without
result — as a Freedom, rather than as a Good.
He would not then have fallen in with Aristotle’s
definition of Good in terms of aim , viz., as 4 that at which
everything aims.' Good was rather the means lyy and icith
which we aim. But that at which we aim is, in all lower
quests, Sukham, in the one high quest, Vimutti
(emancipation), or Nirvana.
Nor must the substitution of these two last terms for
that well-being, that well-ness, 4 to ev %qv,' which is the
etymological equivalent pf sukham, 1 be taken as in-
dicating the limit of the consistent Hedonism or Eudae-
monism of the Buddhist. For he did not scruple to speak
of these two also (Emancipation and Nirvana) in terms
of pleasurable feeling. Gotama attaining his supreme
enlightenment beneath the Bo-tree is said to have
4 experienced Emancipation-bliss ’ (vimutti-sukha-
patisamvedi). 2 And to King Milinda the Sage
emphatically declares Nirvana to be ‘absolute (or entire)
happiness’ (ekanta- sukham). 8 And we know, too,
that Buddhism defined all right conduct and the sufficient
motive for it in terms of escape from ill (dukkham, the
antithesis of sukham) or suffering. Here then again
their psychological proclivity is manifested. They analyzed
feeling, or subjective experience, into three modes :
sukham, dukkham, adukkham-asukham. And
in Good and Bad they saw, not ends or positions of attain-
ment, but the vehicles or agencies, or, to speak less in
abstractions, the characteristic mark of those kinds of
1 Cf. p. 12, n. 8. 2 Yin. i. 2, 3, quoted Jat. i. 77.
8 Mil. 818.
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conduct, by which well-being or ill- being might re-
spectively be entailed.
The Buddhist, then, was a Hedonist, and hence, whether
he himself would have admitted it or not, his morality was
dependent, or, in the phrase of British ethics, utilitarian,
and not intuitionist. Hedonist, let us say, rather than
eudaemonistic, because of the more subjective (psycho-
logical) import of the former term. And he found the
word sukham good enough to cover the whole ground of
desirability, from satisfaction in connexion with sense —
compare Buddhaghosa’s traveller refreshed obtaining both
joy and ease 1 — up to the ineffable * Content * of Nirvana. 2
He did not find in it the inadequacy that some moral
philosophers have found in our ‘ Pleasure.’ His ethical
system was so emphatically a study of consequences — of
karma and vipaka (effect of karma)— of Beeing in every
phenomenon a reaping of some previous sowing — that the
notion of good became for him inevitably bound up with
result. As my late master used to say {ex cathedrd) :
If you bring forward consequences — how acts by way of
result affect self and others — you must come to feeling.
Thence pleasure becomes prominent. And did not folk
suffer loose, lower associations to affect their judgment,
there would be no objection to Hedonism. For pleasures
are of all ranks, up to that of a good conscience.*
A reflection may here suggest itself to readers in this
country who have, at the feet of Spencer, Bain, and Leslie
Stephen, learnt to Bee, behind Nature’s device of Pleasur-
able Feeling, the conservation of the species — ‘ quantity
of life, measured in breadth as well as in length ’ — as the
more fundamental determinant of that which, in the long-
run, becomes the end of conduct. Namely, that there
seems a strange contradiction in a philosophic position
which is content to find, in the avoidance of pairr and
the quest of pleasurable feeling, its fundamental spring of
1 Below, p. 12, n. 8.
2 Santutthi. See p. 858, n. 2.
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moral action while, at the same time, it says of life — apart
from which it admits no feeling to be possible — that the
attainment of its last phase is the one supremely happy
event. 1 Pleasurable feeling, from the evolutionists stand-
point, means, and is in order to, the increase, ‘intensive
and extensive,* of life. Yet to the Hedonistic Buddhist,
the dissolution of the conditions of renewed existence is a
happy event, t.e., an event that causes pleasurable feeling
in the thoughtful spectator.
I believe that the modem ethics of evolution would have
profoundly interested the early Buddhists, who after their
sort and their age were themselves evolutionists. And I
believe, too, that they would have arisen from a discussion
with our thinkers on this subject as stanch Buddhists and
as stanch Hedonists as they had sat down. I admit that
with respect to the desirableness of life taken quantitatively,
and in two dimensions, they were frankly pessimistic. As
I have already suggested, 2 * and have put forward elsewhere. 8
to prize mere quantity of living stood by Gotama con-
demned as ignoble, as stupid, as a mortal bondage, as one
of the four Asavas or Intoxicants. 4 The weary, heart-
rending tragedies immanent in the life of the world he
recognised and accepted as honestly and fully as the
deepest pessimist. The complexities, the distractions, the
burdens, the dogging sorrow, the haunting fear of its
approaching tread, inevitable for life lived in participation
of all that the human organism naturally calls for, and
human society puts forward as desirable — all this he judged
too heavy to be borne, not, indeed, by lay followers, but by
those who should devote themselves to the higher life. To
these he looked to exemplify and propagate and transmit
1 Cf. 9 e.g. 9 M. P. S. 62 ; Maha Sudassana-sutta, S. B. E.
xi. 240, 289.
2 See above, pp. lxix, lxx.
8 In an article ‘On the Will in Buddhism/ J. B. A. S.,
January, 1898.
4 Cf. below, p. 290 et seq.
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his doctrine. Theirs it was to lift the world to higher
standpoints and nobler issues. Life in its fulness they at
least could not afford to cultivate.
But if we take life of a certain quality where selective
economy, making for a certain object, cuts off some lines
of growth but forces others on — then Buddhism, so far
from 4 negating the will to live * that kind of life, pro-
nounced it fair and lovely beyond all non-being, beyond all
after-being. If final death, as it believed, followed inevit-
ably on the fullest fruition of it, it was not this that made
such life desirable. Final dissolution was accepted as
welcome, not for its own sake, but as a corollary, so to
speak, of the solved problem of emancipation. It merely
signified that unhealthy moral conditions had wholly passed
away.
Keeping in view, then, the notion of Good in thought,
word and deed, as a means entailing various kinds of
felicific result, we may see in Book I. of our Manual, first,
the kind of conscious experience arising apart from syste-
matic effort to obtain any such specific result, but which
was bound, none the less, to lead to hedonistic consequences,
pleasant or unpleasant (pp. 1-42). Next, we see a certain
felicific result deliberately aimed at through self-cultivation
in modes of consciousness called Good (pp. 48-97). And,
incidentally, we learn something of the procedure adopted
in that systematic culture.
The Commentary leaves us no room to doubt whether or
not the phase rupupapattiya maggam bhaveti
(‘ that he may attain to the heavens of Form he cultivates
the way thereto ’) refers to a flight of imaginative power
merely. 4 Form = the r u p a-b h a v o,’ or mode of existence
so called. 4 Attainment =nibbatti, jati, safijati’ —
all being terms for birth and re-birth. 1 So for the attaining
to the Formless heavens. Through the mighty engine of
4 good states,’ induced and sustained, directed and developed
1 Asl. 162. See below, pp. 48 et seq.> 71 et aeq.
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by intelligence and self-control, it was held that the student
might modify his own destiny beyond this life, and insure,
or at least promote, his chances of a happy future. The
special culture or exercise required in either case was that
called Jhana, or rapt contemplation, the psychology of
which, when adequately investigated, will one day evoke
considerable interest. There was first intense attention by
way of ‘,an exclusive sensation,’ 1 to be entered upon only
when all other activity was relaxed to the utmost, short of
checking in any way the higher mental functions. After a
time the sensation practically ceases. The wearied sense
gives out. Change, indispensable to consciousness, has
been eliminated ; and we have realized, at all events since
Hobbes wrote, how idem semper sentire et non sentire ad
idem recidunt. Then comes the play of the ‘ after-image,’
and then the emergence of the mental image, of purely
ideational or representative construction. This will be, not
of the sense-object first considered, but some attenuated
abstraction of one of its qualities. And this serves as a
background and a barrier against all further invasion of
sense-impressions for the time being. To him thus purged
and prepared there comes, through subconscious persist-
ence, a reinstatement of some concept, associated with feeling
and conation (i.e., with desire or aspiration), which he had
selected for preliminary meditation. And this conception
he now proceeds by a sort of psychical involution to raise
to a higher power, realizing it more fully, deepening its
import, expanding its application.
Such seems to have been the Kasina method according
to the description in the Yisuddhi Magga, chap, iv., 2 but
there were several methods, some of which, the method,
e.g., of respiration, are not given in our Manual. Of the
thoughts for meditation, only a few occur in the Dhamma-
1 See above, p. lxix.
2 Translated in Warren’s ‘Buddhism in Translations,’
p. 298 et seq. Cf. below, Book I., Part I., chap. ii. Cf. also
Rhys Davids’ ‘ Yogavacara’s Manual,* Introduction.
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Sangani, such as the ‘ Sublime Abodes ’ of thought — love,
pity, etc. But in the former work we find numerous lists
for exercise in the contemplative life, with or without the
rapt musing called Jhana. 1
In the exercises calculated to bring out re-birth in the
world of Form, it was chiefly necessary to ponder on things
of this life in such a way as to get rid of all appetite and
impulse in connexion with them, and to cultivate an attitude
of the purest disinterestedness towards all worldly attrac-
tions. If the Formless sphere were the object of aspiration,
it was then necessary, by the severest fetches of abstraction,
to eliminate not only all sense-impression, but also all
sensory images whatever, and to endeavour to realize con-
ditions and relations other than those obtaining in actual
experience. 2 Thus, in either method a foretaste of the
mode of re-becoming aspired after was attempted.
But besides and beyond the sort of moral consciousness
characterizing these exercises which were calculated to
promote a virtuous and happy existence in any one of the
three worlds, there were the special conditions of intellect
and emotion termed lok’uttaram cittam. 3 Those
exercises were open to the lay pupil and the bhikkhu
alike. There was nothing especially 4 * * * 8 holy,’ nothing
esoteric, about the practice of Jhana. The diligent upa-
saka or upasika, pursuing a temporary course of such
religious and philosophic discipline as the rising schools of
1 J. P. T. S., 1891-1898. Synopsis of the Vis. Mag.,
Parts H and III.
2 In translating the formula of the Third Aruppa or
meditation on Nothingness, I might have drawn attention
to Kant’s development of the concept of None or Nothing,
in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (end of Div. i. of Transc.
Logic). Some great adepts were credited with the power of
actually partaking in other existences while yet in this,
notably Maha Moggallana (e.g., M. i).
Gotama tells of another in the Kevaddha Sutta (D. i.
215), but tells it as a myth.
8 P. 82 et seq. Cf. n. 2 on p. 81.
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Buddhism afforded, might be expected to avail himself or
herself of it more or less. But those ‘ good ’ dhammas
alluded to were those which characterized the Four Paths,
or Four Stages of the way, to the full ‘ emancipation 9 of
Nirvana. If I have rendered lokuttaram cittam by
‘ thought engaged upon the higher ideal ’ instead of select-
ing a term more literally accurate, it is because there is,
in a way, less of the ‘ supramundane ’ or 4 transcendent,'
as we usually understand these expressions, about this
cittam than about the aspiring moods described above*
For this sort of consciousness was that of the man or
woman who regarded not heaven nor re-birth, but one
thing only, as 4 needful ' : the full and perfect efflorescence
of mind and character to be brought about, if it might be,
here and now.
The Dhamma-Sangani never quits its severely dry and
formal style to descant on the characteristics and methods
of that progress to the Ideal, every step in which is else-
where said to be loftier and sweeter than the last, with
a wealth of eulogy besides that might be quoted. Edifying
discourse it left to the Suttanta Books. But no rhetoric
could more effectively describe the separateness and un-
compromising other-ness of that higher quest than the one
word A-pariyapanna m — Unincluded — by which refer-
ence is made to it in Book III.
Yet for all this world of difference in the quo vadis of
aspiration, there is a great deal of common ground covered
by the moral consciousness in each case, as the respective
expositions show. That of the Arahat in %pe differs only in
two sets of additional features conferring greater richness
of content, and in the loftier quality of other features not
in themselves additional.
This quality is due to the mental awakening or enlighten-
ment of sambodhi. And the added factors are three
constituents of the Noble Eightfold Path of conduct (which
are, more obviously, modes of overt activity than of con-
sciousness) and the progressive stages in the attainment of
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the sublime knowledge or insight termed afifia. 1 2 Our
Western languages are scarcely rich enough to ring the
changes on the words signifying 4 to know ’ as those of
India did on j n a and v i d, d r s and pas. Our religious
ideals have tended to be emotional in excess of our intel-
lectual enthusiasm. ‘ Absence of dulness ’ has not ranked
with us as a cardinal virtue or fundamental cause of good.
Hence it is difficult to reproduce the Pali so as to give im-
pressiveness to a term like a fi fi a as compared with the mere
nana m, 2 usually implying less advanced insight, with which
the 4 first type of good thought ’ is said to be associated.
But I must pass on. As a compilation dealing with
positive culture, undertaken for a positive end, it is only
consistent that the Manual should deal briefly with the
subject of bad states of consciousness. It is true that
akusalam, as a means leading to unhappy result, was
not conceived as negatively as its logical form might lead
as to suppose. Bad karma was a 4 piling up,’ no less than
its opposite. Nevertheless, to a great extent, the difference
between bad types of thought and good is described in
terms of the contradictories, of the factors in the one kind
and in the other. Nor are the negatives always on the
side of evil. The three cardinal sources of misery are
positive in form. And the five * Path-factors ’ go to
constitute what might have been called the Base Eightfold
Path.
We come, finally, to the third ethical category of
a-vyakatam, the Inexplicit or Indeterminate. The
subject is difficult if interesting, bringing us as it does
within closer range of the Buddhist view of moral causa-
tion. The hall-mark of Indeterminate thought is said to
be ‘absence of result’ 3 — that is, of pleasant or painful
result. And there are said to be four species of such
1 Viz, : Anafifiat’annassamltindriyam, annin-
driyam, afifiatavindriyam. Pp. 86, 96, 97, 150. Cf.
Dh. K. 58.
2 Contra , cf. M. i., 184. 8 Asl. 89.
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thought: (1) Vipako, or thought which is a result;
(2) K i r i y a , or consciousness leading to no result ;
(8) form, as outside moral causation ; (4) uncompounded
element (or, in later records, Nirvana), as above or beyond
the further efficacy of moral causation.
Of these four, the third has been dealt with already ; the
fourth I cannot discuss here and now. 1 It is conceivable
that the earlier Buddhists considered their summun bonurn
a subject too ineffably sublime and mysterious for logical
and analytical discussion. Two instances, at least, occur
to me in the Nikayas, 2 where the talk was cut short, in the
one case by Gotama himself, in the other by the woman-
apostle Dhammadinna, when the interlocutor brought up
Nirvana for discussion of this sort. This is possibly the
reason why, in a work like our Manual, the concept is pre-
sented — in all but the commentarial appendixes — under
the quasi-metaphysical term ‘ uncompounded element.’ It
is classed here as a species of Indeterminate, because,
although it was the outcome of the utmost carrying power
of good karma, it could, as a state of mind and character,
itself work no good effect for that individual mind and
character. These represented pure effect. The Arahat
could afford to live wholly on withdrawn capital and to use
it up. His conduct, speech and thought are, of course,
necessarily ‘ good,’ but good with no ‘ heaping - up ’
potency.
Of the other two Indeterminates, it is not easy to say
whether they represent aspects only of states considered
with respect to moral efficacy, or whether they represent
divisions in a more rigid and artificial view of moral causa-
tion than we should, at the present day, be prepared to
maintain. To explain: every thought, word and deed
(morally considered) is for us at once the effect of certain
antecedents, and the cause, or part of the cause, of sub-
sequent manifestations of character. It is a link, both
held and holding. But in vipako we have dhammas
1 See Appendix II. 2 S. v. 218 ; M. i. 804.
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considered, with respect to cause, merely as effects; in
kiriya 1 we have dhammas considered, with respect to
effect, as having none . And the fact that both are divided
off from Good and Bad — that is to say, from conduct or
consciousness considered as causally effective — and are
called Indeterminate, seems to point, not to aspects only,
but to that artificial view alluded to. Yet in this matter I
confess to the greater wisdom of imitating the angels,
rather than rushing in with the fools. Life presented
itself to the Buddhist much as the Surrey heath appeared
to the watchful eyes of a Darwin — as a teeming soil,
a khettam, 2 where swarmed the seeds of previous
karmas waiting for 4 room,’ for opportunity to come to
effect. And in considering the seed as potential effect, they
were not, to that extent, concerned with that seed as
capable of producing, not only its own flower and fruit, but
other seed in its turn.
However that may have been, one thing is clear, and
for us suggestive. Moral experience as result pure and
simple was not in itself uninteresting to the Buddhists.
In dealing with good and bad dhammas, they show us a
field of the struggle for moral life, the sowing of potential
well-being or of ill. But in the Avyakatas we are either
outside the struggle and concerned with the unmoral
Rupam, or we walk among the sheaves of harvest.
From the Western standpoint the struggle covers the
whole field of temporal life. Good and bad * war in the
members * even of its Arahats. The ideal of the Buddhist,
held as realizable under temporal conditions, was to walk
1 I am indebted to the Rev. Suriyagoda Sumangala, of
Ratmalane, Ceylon, for information very kindly given con-
cerning the term kiriya or kriya. He defines it as
‘action ineffective as to result,’ and kiriya-cittam as
‘mind in relation to action ineffective as to result.’ He
adds a full analysis of the various modes of kiriya
taught by Buddhists at the present day.
2 4 Origin of Species,’ p. 56. A. i. 228, 224. Cf. Asl. 860.
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XC1V
among his sheaves 'beyond the Good and the Bad / 1 The
Good consisted in giving hostages to the future. His ideal
was to be releasing them, and, in a span of final, but
glorious existence, to be tasting of the finest fruit of living
— the peace of insight, the joy of emancipation. This was
life supremely worth living, for
' leben heisst
In Freiheit leben und mit freiem Geist !’ 2
The Good, to take his own metaphor, was as a raft bearing
him across the stream of danger. After that he was to
leave it and go on. 'And ye, brethren, learn by the
parable of the raft that ye must put away good conditions,
let alone bad / 3
It is not easy for us, who have learnt from Plato to call
our Absolute the Good and our Ideal a mmmuW bonum, to
sympathize really with this moral standpoint. Critics see
in it an aspiration towards moral stultification and self-
complacent egoism.
Yes, there is little fear but that in the long-run fuller
knowledge will bring deeper insight into what in Buddhism
is really worthy of admiration for all time. If it is now
accused of weakening the concept of individuality by reject-
ing soul, and, at the same time, of fostering egoistic morality,
it is just possible that criticism is here at fault. On the
ruins of the animistic view, Buddhism had to reconstruct a
new personality, wholly phenomenal, impermanent, law-
determined, yet none the less able, and alone able, by
indomitable faith and will, to work out a personal salva-
tion, a personal perfection. Bearing this in mind and
surveying the history of its altruistic missionary labours,
we cannot rashly cast egoistic morality at it to much effect.
Nor has it much to fear from charges of stultification,
quietism, pessimism and the like. We are misled to a
1 Nietzsche on Buddhism in 'Der Antichrist/
2 A. Pfungst, ' An Giordano Bruno/
3 See the third quotation, p. vii.
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xcv
certain extent herein by the very thoroughness of its
methods of getting at the moral life by way of psychical
training. We see, as in our Manual, and other canonical
records, elaborate systems for analyzing and cultivating the
intellectual faculties, the will and feeling, and we take
these as substitutes for overt moral activity, as ends when
they are but means. And if the Dhamma-Sangani seems
to some calculated to foster introspective thought to a
morbid extent, it must not be forgotten that it is not
Buddhist philosophy alone which teaches that, for all the
natural tendency to spend and be spent in efforts to cope,
by thought and achievement, with the world without, ‘ it is
in this little fathom-long mortal frame with its thinkings
and its notions that the world * 1 itself and the whole problem
of its misery and of the victory over it lies hid.
If I have succeeded to any extent in connecting the
contents of this Manual with the rest of the Buddhist
Pitakas, it is because I had at my disposal the mass of
material accumulated in my husband’s MS. Pali dictionary.
Besides this, the selection of material for Sections II. and
III. of my Introduction is his work. Besides this I owe
him a debt of gratitude indefinitely great for advice and
criticism generally.
1 See second quotation, p. vii.
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[BOOK I.
THE GENESIS OF THOUGHTS
(Cittuppada-kandam).
PART I.—GOOD STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS.
Chapter I.
The Eight Main Types of Thought relating to the
Sensuous Universe (Kamavacara-attha-mahacit-
tani).] 1
I.
[1] Which are the states that are good ? 2
When a good thought concerning the sensuous uni-
verse 3 has arisen, which is accompanied by happiness and
associated with knowledge, 4 and has as its object a
1 The brackets enclosing this and all other headings
indicate that the latter have been transposed from the
position they occupy in the text. There each heading
stands at the end of its section.
2 See Introduction. 3 Ibid.
4 Kana-sampayuttam. According to the Cy., a good
thought deserves to be thus distinguished on three grounds :
from the karma it produces, from the maturity of the
faculties it involves, and from the remoteness of mental
and moral infirmity which it implies (Asl. 76). Sam-
payuttam — lit., con -yoked — is, in the Kathavatthu,
quoted by the Cy. (p. 42), described as including the
following relations (between one * state * and another) :
concomitant (sahagata), connate (sahajata), contiguous
1
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2
sight, 1 a sound, a smell, a taste, a touch, 2 a [mental] state, 3
or what not, 4 then there is
(i) contact (§ 2),
(ii) feeling (§ 8),
(samsattha), having a common origin (ekuppada), a
common cessation (ekanirodha), a common basis or
embodiment (ekavatthuka),a common object of attention
(ekarammana). In the present work the term is sub-
sequently rendered by ‘connected/ c.</., in § 1007, etc. The
preceding adjectival phrase, somanassa-sahagatam,
which I have rendered ‘accompanied by happiness/ is
virtually declared by the Cy. to be here equivalent to
somanassa-sampayuttam, inasmuch as it is to be
interpreted in its fullest intension. Of its five distinguish-
able shades of meaning, the one here selected is that of
‘conjoined’ (samsattham). And of the four distinguish-
able connotations of ‘conjoined,* the one here selected is
that of ‘connate.’ Hence ‘accompanied by’ means here
‘connate.’ And further, inasmuch as the concomitance is
not between two corporeal phenomena, or between a
corporeal and an incorporeal phenomenon, it is of that
persistent and thoroughgoing kind — persisting beyond the
common origin — which is described under the word
‘ associated.’
Thus far the intricate Buddhaghosa. But I have yet to
discover any attempt to analyze the laws governing the
process of association between mental states, such as we
first find in Aristotle.
On ‘ happiness/ see §§ 10, 18.
1 Ruparammanam, saddarammanam, etc., i.e .,
either as a present sensation or as a representative image
relating to the past or future ; in the language of Hume,
as an impression or as an idea ; in the more comprehensive
German term, as Vorstellung (Asl. 71). See Introduc-
tion.
2 Literally, an object that is tangible — the standard
Pali term.
3 Dhammurammanam — the ‘object/ that is, of re-
presentative imagination or ideation (mano, cittam,
Asl., 71), just as a thing seen is the object of sight,
Buddhaghosa rejects the opinion that a dhammaram-
manamis something outside the range of the senses, and
cites M. i. 295, where Sariputta declares that, whereas
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3
(iii) perception (§ 4),
(iv) thinking (§ 5),
(v) thought (§ 6),
(vi) conception (§ 7),
(vii) discursive thought (§8),
(viii) joy (§ 9),
(ix) ease (§ 10),
(x) self-collectedness (§ 11),
(xi) the faculty of faith (§ 12),
(xii) the faculty of energy (§ 18),
(xiii) the faculty of mindfulness (§ 14),
(xiv) the faculty of concentration (§ 15),
(xv) the faculty of wisdom (§ 16),
each sense has its specific field, the mano has all these
five fields as its scope. At the moment when an object
enters * the door of the eye * or other sense, it enters also
( the door of the ideating faculty causing the consciousness,
or one’s being, to vibrate (bhavangacalanassa paccayo
hoti), just as the alighting bird, at the same moment,
strikes the bough and casts a shadow (ibid. 72). — As we
might say, presentative cognition is invariably accompanied
by representative cognition. — Then, in the course of the
l mental undulations arising through this disturbance by !
1 way of sense impact, one of these eight psychoses termed
Mahacittani may emerge. ‘But in pure representative
cognition (suddha-manodvare) there is no process of
sensory stimulation/ as when we recall past sense-experi-
ence. — The process of representation is illustrated in detail,
and completes an interesting essay in ancient psychology.
In the case of seeing, hearing, and smell, past pleasant
sensations are described as being simply revived during a
subsequent state of repose. In the case of taste and touch,
it is present disagreeable sensations which suggest certain
contrasted experience in the past. But the commentator
is not here interested in ‘ association by contrast ’ as such.
4 Lit., ‘ or whatever [object the thought] is about/ The
gist of the somewhat obscure comment is that, while no
new class of objects is here to be understood over and
above those of present or past sensations, there is no serial
or numerical order in which these become material for
thought.
1—2
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4
(xvi) the faculty of ideation (§ 17),
(xvii) the faculty of happiness (§ 18),
(xviii) the faculty of vitality (§ 19) ;
(xix) right views (§ 20),
(xx) right intention (§ 21),
(xxi) right endeavour (§ 22),
(xxii) right mindfulness (§ 28),
(xxiii) right concentration (§ 24) ;
(xxiv) the power of faith (§ 25),
(xxv) the power of energy (§ 26),
(xxvi) the power of mindfulness (§ 27),
(xxvii) the power of concentration (§ 28),
(xxviii) the power of wisdom (§ 29),
(xxix) the power of conscientiousness (§ 80),
(xxx) the power of the fear of blame (§ 81) ;
(xxxi) absence of lust (§ 82),
(xxxii) absence of hate (§ 83),
(xxxiii) absence of dulness (§ 34) ;
(xxxiv) absence of covetousness (§ 85),
(xxxv) absence of malice (§ 36),
(xxxvi) right views 1 * * (§ 87);
(xxxvii) conscientiousness (§ 88),
(xxxviii) fear of blame (§ 89) ;
(xxxix, xl) serenity in sense and thought (§§ 40, 41),
(xli, xlii) lightness in sense and thought (§§ 42, 43),
(xliii, xliv) plasticity in sense and thought (§§ 44, 45),
(xlv, xlvi) facility in sense and thought (§§ 46, 47),
(xlvii, xlviii) fitness in sense and thought (§§ 48, 49),
(xlix, 1) directness in sense and thought (§§ 50, 51) ;
(li) mindfulness (§ 52),
(lii) intelligence (§ 53)
(liii) quiet (§54)
1 According to Buddhaghosa the 4 states ’ numbered
xxxiv-vi are considered as equivalents of those numbered
xxxi-iii respectively, but as taken under another aspect.
In the prior enumeration the threefold 4 root of good ’ is
set out ; in the latter, reference to the 4 path of karma ’ is
understood (Asl. 129).
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(liv) insight (§ 55),
(lv) grasp (§ 56),
(lvi) balance (§ 57).
Now these — or whatever other incorporeal, causally in-
duced states 1 there are on that occasion — these are states
that are good.
[2] What on that occasion is contact (p h a s s o) ? 2
1 Nine other states, according to the Cy., are here im-
plied as factors in this psychosis, viz., desire (or conation,
or volition, chando), resolve (adhimokkho), attention
(manasikaro), equanimity (tatramaj jhattata), pity
(karuna), sympathy (mudita), abstinence from evil con-
duct in act, speech, and mode of livelihood. And the
opening words of this and similar supplementary clauses
in the text are coined into a technical term — ye-va-
panaka, ‘the or- whatever * [states], — to signify such
groups.
The Cy. then ‘ defines * the nine : desire, qualified as
orthodox desire (dhammacha ndo), to distinguish it from
ethically undesirable desire (cf. § 1097, etc.), is the wish to
act, the stretching forth the hand of the mind (cf. ope £«?)
to grasp the object in idea. Resolve is steadfastness,
decision, the being unshaken as a pillar. Attention is
movement, direction of the mind, confronting the object.
Equanimity — lit., the mean (medium) state— is the being
borne along evenly, without defect or excess, without
partiality. Pity and sympathy are described in § 258 et
seq. The last three give those three factors of the Eight-
fold Path unrepresented in the analysis of the thought
(Asl. 182, 188).
It is not without interest to note that in this supple-
mentary category all the purely psychological states are
wholly, or at least mainly, volitional or emotional.
2 Touch or contact must be understood in a very general
sense, as the outcome of three conditions : an impingeing
sentient organ, an impingeing agency conceived as external
to the sentient organ, and impact or collision. The similes
in Mil. 60 of the rams and the cymbals are quoted in the
Cy. The eye and its object are the usual illustration, but
the representative imagination (mano or cittam) and its
object are included as proceeding by way of contact, only
without impact (sanghattanam). The real causal con-
nexion in every case — so I understand the, to me, obscurely
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6
The contact which on that occasion is touching, the
being brought into contact, the state of having been
brought into touch with — this is the contact that there
then is.
[8] What on that occasion is feeling (vedana) 9 1
The mental pleasure, the mental ease, which, on that
occasion, is born of contact with the appropriate element of
representative intellection ; 2 the pleasurable, easeful sensa-
worded comment to say (Asl. 109) — is mental, even though
we speak of an external agency, just as when lac melts
with heat we speak of hot coals as the cause, though the
heat is in the lac’s own tissue.
‘ Contact ’ is given priority of place, as standing for the
inception of the thought, and as being the sine qud non of
all the allied states, conditioning them much as the roof-
tree of a storied house supports all the other combinations
of material (ibid. 107).
1 Vedana is a term of very general import, meaning
sentience or reaction, bodily or mental, on contact or im-
pression. Sensation is scarcely so loyal a rendering as
feeling, for though vedana is often qualified as ‘born of the
contact * in sense-activity, it is always defined generally as
consisting of the three species — pleasure (happiness), pain
(ill), and neutral feeling — a hedonistic aspect to which the
term ‘feeling’ is alone adequate. Moreover, it covers
representative feeling.
This general psychical aspect of vedana, as distinct from
sensations localized bodily — e.g ., toothache — is probably
emphasized by the term ‘mental’ (cetasikam) in the
answer. The Cy. points out that by this expression
( = cittanissitattam) ‘bodily pleasure is eliminated’
(Asl. 189). It also illustrates the general scope of
vedana by the simile of a cook who, after preparing a
number of dishes for his lord, tastes each critically to test
them, the lord partaking of whichever he pleases. The
cook represents all the associated states in the thought-
complex, each functioning in one specific way. Vedana,
the master, ‘ enjoys the essence (taste) of the object ’ as a
whole.
2 Taj ja-manovinnanadhatu. Tajj a is paraphrased
by anucchavika, sarupa. Cf. A. i. 207; S. iv. 215;
M. i. 190, 191 ; Mil. 58. On the remainder of the corn-
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7
tion which is bom of contact with thought; 1 the pleasurable,
easeful feeling which is bom of contact with thought — this
is the feeling that there then is.
[4] What on that occasion is perception (sanna)? 2
The perception, the perceiving, the state of having per- ,
ceived which on that occasion is bom of contact with the
pound term, see § 6. And on the hedonistic expressions in
the answer, see § 10.
1 Ceto- samphassajam . . . vedayitam. The latter
term (experience) is, more literally, that which is felt, das
Empfundene. Ceto, c it tarn are used interchangeably
in the Cy. on these terms (see § 6). The ‘contact ’ is that
between idea or object and thought, or the ideating agency,
conceived as analogous to the impact between sense-organ
and sense-object. In consequence of this contact or pre-
sentation, emotional affection arises in consciousness.
2 The apparently capricious way in which the intension
of the term sanna is varied in the Pitakas makes it difficult
to assign any one adequate English rendering. In the
Mahavedalla Sutta (M. i. 298) and elsewhere (cf Mil. 61)
it is explained as the relatively simple form of intellection
or cognition which consists in the discernment, recognition,
assimilation of sensations — e.g., of colours, as ‘ blue,’ etc. —
the process termed in modern English psychology sense-
perception, except that it is not quite clear that, in Buddhist
psychology, as in English, the perception is made only on
occasion of sense-stimulation. The answer, indeed, in our
§ 4 alludes to representative activity only. In the Maha-
parinibbana Sutta, however (cf. A. v. 105), safina stands
for the intellectual realization of a number of highly
complex concepts, such as impermanence, non-substan-
tiality, etc. In the Potthapada Sutta (D. i. 180-187), again,
the s a ft ft a discussed is clearly what we should call con-
sciousness, whether as opposed to the unconsciousness of
trance, or as the raw material of ft an am, or as conceivably
distinct from the soul or Ego. Lastly, in a more popular
sense the term is used (notably in the Jatakas and in
commentators’ similes) for sign, mark, or token.
Here, if we follow the Cy. (Asl. 110), sanna means simply
that sense-perception which discerns, recognises and gives
class-reference to (upatthita-visaya), the impressions
of sense. Its procedure is likened to the carpenter’s recog-
nition of certain woods by the mark he had made on each ;
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8
appropriate element of representative intellection — this
is the perception that there then is.
[5] What on that occasion is thinking (cetana)? 1
The thinking, the cogitating, the reflection, which is bom
of contact with the appropriate element of representative
intellection — this is the thinking that there then is.
[6] What on that occasion is thought (cittam) ?
to the treasurer’s specifying certain articles of jewelry by
the ticket on each ; to the wild animal’s discernment in the
scarecrow of the work of man. The essence of sanha is
said to be recognition by way of a mark. In this notion of
mark and marking lies such continuity of thought as may
be claimed for the various uses of the term. The bare fact
of consciousness means ability to discriminate — that is, to
mark. To mark is to perceive. And the ideas or concepts
of ‘ impermanence,’ ‘ impurity,’ and the like, were so many
acts of marking, though of a highly ‘ re-representative *
character. Safina, no less than cittam (see Intro-
duction), and ‘thought,’ stands for both faculty and any
act or product of that faculty. And it is even objectified
so far as to signify further the result of any such act —
that is, in its connotation of mark or sign.
It is, I believe, when connoting the more specific sense
of faculty, or of skandha, that it may safely be rendered by
‘ perception ’ or ‘ marking,’ and may be taken to mean the
relatively ‘ superficial,’ ‘transient’ (Asl. 110, 111) play of
cognition when concerned with objects of sense. In ch. xiv.
of the Yisuddhi Magga — in a passage the late Henry C.
Warren was good enough to transcribe for me — sanha is
in this way, and this way only, distinguished from vinna-
nam and pah ha. The latter terms stand for cognition at
(as we might say) a relatively higher and a still higher
power, in virtue of the greater depth and complexity of tho
concepts they were exercised about (see §§ 6, 16).
1 There is no more difficult problem in interpreting the
Dhamma Sangani than to get at the grounds on which its
compilers, and subsequently its commentator, saw fit to set
out mutually independent descriptions of terms etymologi-
cally so identical as cetana and cittam. The only
parallel that suggests itself to me is the distinction drawn,
during a long period in British philosophy, between ‘ reason-
ing ’ and ‘ reason ’ — that is, between deductive inference and
the nous, or noetic function. Both pairs of terms are quite
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9
The thought which on that occasion is ideation, mind,
heart, that which is clear, ideation as the sphere of mind,
the faculty of mind, intellection, the skandhaof intellec-
tion, the appropriate element of representative intellection
— this is the thought that there then is.
popular in form. Compare, e.g ., in the Nidana-katha
(Jat. i. 74), Buddha’s reply to Mara : ‘ I have here no con-
scious (or intelligent) witness. . . . Let this . . . earth, un-
conscious though it be, be witness. . . . Sacetano koci
sakkhl, etc. . . . ayam acetanapi . . . pathavl sak-
khlti.* Again, in A. i., p. 224, the import seems simple
and quite untechnical: ‘Their thoughts (cetana) and
hopes (lit., thinking and hoping) are fixed on lower things.’
Hence I have kept to terms popular in form. This does
not justify the use of terms so undifferentiated as ‘thinking’
and ‘ thought * ; yet I have returned to them, after essaying
half a dozen substitutes, for various reasons. They show
the close connection between the Buddhist pair of terms,
instead of obscuring it ; they are equally popular and vague
in form and extension ; the import of cetana has much in
common with a psychological account of thinking ; no term
misfits cittam less than ‘thought,’ unless it be ‘heart,’
on which see Introduction. It is unfortunate that Buddha-
ghosa does not give a comparative analysis of the two, as he
does in the case of vitakka-vicara and piti-sukham.
Under cetana he expatiates in forcible similes, describing it
as a process of activity and toil, and as a co-ordinating, order-
ing function. He likens it to an energetic farmer, bustling
about his fifty-five labourers (the fifty-five co-constituents
in the thought-complex) to get in the harvest ; to a senior
apprentice at the carpenter’s, working himself and supervis-
ing the tasks of the others ; to the leader of a warrior band,
fighting and inciting. To these notions the definition of
Nagasena (Mil. 61) only adds that of preparing (abhisan-
kharanam), the other qualifying term being merely a
denominative form (as if we should say ‘ thinkifying ’).
In so far, then, as ‘ thinking ’ connotes representative,
co-ordinative intellection, it coincides with cetana. In its
narrower, technical sense of intellection by way of general
notions, it does not (see Introduction). Any way, to call it
‘ thinking ’ is sufficiently indefinite, and does not preclude
the rendering of it elsewhere by such terms as ‘ reflecting,’
‘ cogitating,’ ‘ considering,* etc. But the problem has still
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10
[7] What on that occasion is conception (vitakko) 7 1
The ratiocination, the conception, which on that occasion
is the disposition, 2 the fixation, the focussing, 3 the applica-
to be solved of how it is related to such terms as safina,
cittam, and vinnanam. With regard to skandha, it is
classed, not with cittam, but under the sankhara-
skandha, § 62.
Cittam, together with the terms in which it is de-
scribed, is discussed in my Introduction.
1 Vitakko and vicaro is another pair of terms which it
is hard to fit with any one pair of English words. It is very
possible that academic teaching came to attach a more preg-
nant and specialized import to them than was conveyed in
popular and purely ethical usage. Cf. M. i., Suttas xix.
and xx., where vitakka would be adequately rendered by
ideas, notions, or thoughts. In Asl. 114, 115, on the other
hand ( cf Mil. 62, 68), the relation of the two to cittam
and to each other is set out with much metaphor, if with
too little psychological grasp. Yitakko is distinctively
mental procedure at the inception of a train of thought, the
deliberate movement of voluntary attention. As a king
ascends to his palace leaning on the arm of favourite or
relative, so thought ascends to its object depending upon the
conceptive act (vitakko; Asl. 114). Other metaphorical
attributes are its impingeing upon, circum-impingeing upon
(paryahanam), the object, and, again, bringing it near.
Hence in selecting ‘ conception * in preference to ‘reasoning/
by which vitakko has often been translated, I wished to
bring out this grasping, constructive, reaching-out act of the
mind, this incipient fetch of the imagination, elaborated in
the Buddhist scholastic analysis of the term ; but I had no
wish to read our own logical or psychological import of con-
ception as intellection by way of general notions, or the like,
into the Eastern tradition. Yet just as conception may be
so used as to include ‘reasoning* or ‘ratiocination,* so
vitakko is, in the reply, described by takko, the term used
for ratiocinative procedure, argument, or logic {cf. I>. i.
12, 21). ‘What,’ asks the Cy., ‘does one reason about
(takkesi) ? About a pot, a cart, the distance of anything.
Well, vitakko is a stronger reasoning.*
2 On ‘ disposition,* ‘ right intention,’ see § 21.
3 Appana vyappanii, the latter an intensive form of
the former (Asl. 142, 148). In the ‘ Yogavacara’s Manual *
(p. xi and passim) appana denotes the dawn of the desired
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11
tion of the mind, 1 right intention — this is the conception
that there then is.
[8] What on that occasion is discursive thought
(viearo) ? 2
The process, the sustained procedure (viearo), the
progress and access [of the mind] which on that occasion
is the [continuous] adjusting and focussing of thought 8 —
this is the discursive thought that there then is.
[9] What on that occasion is joy (plti)
concept during the practice of regulated meditation. Bud-
dhaghosa defines it thus: — ekaggam cittam arammane
appenti.
1 Cetaso abhiniropana == arammane cittam . . .
patitthapeti (ibid.)
2 Vicar o, as compared with vitakko, was used to express
the movement and maintenance of the voluntary thought-
continuum, as distinguished from the initiative grappling
with the subject of reflection. Examining in detail, as com-
pared with grasping the whole, is also read into it by com-
mentators (Asl. 114). It is a pounding up (anumajja-
nam), as well as a linking together. Metaphors are
multiplied, to show its relation to vitakko. It is as the
reverberation of the beaten drum or bell is to the beating;
as the planing movement of the bird’s wings after the
initial upsoaring; as the buzzing of the bee when it has
alighted on the lotus; as the scouring of the dirty bowl
when clutched; as the manipulating hand of the potter,
vitakko being represented by the hand which holds the
clay to the wheel, and so on. ‘ Investigation ’ would well
represent the sustained activity ; ‘ analysis,’ the cogitation in
details ; ‘ discursive thought ’ gives some of the import of
both, without introducing modern and Western implications.
3 Like the adjusting of bow and arrow. ‘Focussing’ is
anupekkhamano.
4 Plti, as distinguished from sukham, is explicitly ex-
cluded from the skandha of feeling, considered as the
irreducible hedonic constituent, and referred to the
composite psychoses of the sankhara skandha. It con-
notes emotion, as distinct from bare feeling ; that is to say,
plti is a complex psychical phenomenon, implying a
‘ central psycho-physical origin ’ and a widely diffused
* somatic resonance \(cf. Sully, ‘ The Human Mind,’ ii. 56).
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12
The joy which on that occasion is gladness, rejoicing at,
rejoicing over, mirth and merriment, felicity, 1 exultation,
transport of mind 2 — this is the joy that there then is.
[10] What on that occasion is ease (sukham) ? 8
It arises out of a present idea, and suffuses the whole
being. By Buddhaghosa’s day it was divided into five
species : the thrill of joy, just causing ‘ the flesh to creep ’ ;
the flash of joy, like lightning ; the flood of joy, like the
breakers on a sea-shore; ecstasy or transport, in which
the subject could float in the air ; and overwhelming
suffusing joy (Asl. 115, 116). Instances are related of the
fourth species (ubbega-piti), the inspiring idea being
‘Buddha rammanam , (see also Yisuddhi Magga, ch. iv.;
‘ Yogavacara’s Manual,’ vii.). The same word (ubbego) is
used to describe the anguish or trembling over guilt
discovered. See below, § 81 n.
1 Yitti, meaning literally, as the Cy. points out,
prosperity, wealth, and used here by analogy as a state
conditioned by a source of pleasure. ‘ Happiness arises to
him who is joyful through his joy, as it arises to the
wealthy through his rice-possessions.’ (Asl. 148.)
2 Attamanata cittassa. Buddhaghosa, who did not
know the true etymology of this term, is ready as ever with
a guess : attano man at a, or mentality of one’s self, not
of another, subjective experience. If I am pained or
pleased, that is peculiarly my affair (ibid.). Psychologically
it is interesting to note that he is prepared to find this
intimate, subjective reference in a state of intense feeling.
‘ Feeling is subjective experience par excellence . . . our
feelings . . . are all our own.* (Sully, ‘ The Human
Mind,’ ii. 2 ; G. C. Robertson, ‘ Elements of Psychology,*
185-188.)
3 To contrast plti with sukham, Buddhaghosa draws
a charming picture of the traveller who, fordone with
journeying through a desert, hears with joy of a pool in a
grove, and with joy comes upon it, and who, on drinking,
bathing, and resting in the shade is filled with ease.
Sukham, it is true, is not bare quiescence ; it is positive,
pleasurable feeling, and may have active concomitants; its
‘ essence ’ is expansion or increase (upabruhanam). But
just as dukkham means, not so much pain as ill-being or
misery, so does sukham mean well-being or sane and
sound caenaesthesis. And as ‘ joy ’ is the satisfaction of
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The mental pleasure, the mental ease which on that
occasion is the pleasant, easeful experience born of contact
with thought, the pleasant, easeful feeling born of contact
with thought — this is the ease that there then is.
[11] What on that occasion is self-collectedness (cittass’
e k a g g a t a)
The stability, solidity, absorbed steadfastness of thought 2
which on that occasion is the absence of distraction.
gaining (potentially or actually) what we desire, so is ‘ease’
the enjoyment of the flavour (French, savour er) of what
we have gained (Asl. 117). See further § 60. 1 Mental
ease* (cetasikam sukham) is perhaps more correctly
somanassam, rendered (§ 1, etc.) by 4 happiness,’
sukham being sometimes distinguished as bodily (kayikam)
only. See S. v. 209.
1 4 Citt’ ekag gat a, the one-peaked condition of mind,
is a name for concentration (samadhi),’ says the Cy.
(p. 118). And accordingly, whereas under § 15 it gives
no further description of samadhi, it here applies to
citt’ ekaggata the metaphors used in Mil. 88 to illustrate
samadhi, viz., the centre part of a tent-shaped hut, and a
chieftain leading his army. It then adds that 4 this
samadhi, which is called self-collectedness, has, as its
characteristic mark, the absence of wandering, of distrac-
tion ; as its essence, the binding together of the states of
mind that arise with it, as water binds the lather of soap ;
and as its concomitants, calmness, or wisdom — for it is
said, 44 he who is at peace he understands, he sees things as
they really are ” — and ease. The steadfastness of thought
is likened to the steadiness of a lamp-flame in a windless
place.* See 4 Yogavacara’s Manual,’ p. xxvi.
2 These three cognate terms are in the text cittassa
thiti santhiti avatthiti. According to the Cy. (p. 148),
the standing unshaken in or on the object (arammane)
connoted by thiti is modified by the prefix sam to imply
kneading together (sampindetva) the associated states in
the object, and by the prefix ava to imply the being im-
mersed in the object. The last metaphor is in Buddhist
doctrine held applicable to four good and three bad states —
faith, mindfulness, concentration ( = self-collectedness) and
wisdom; craving, speculation and ignorance, but most of
all to self-collectedness.
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balance, 1 imperturbed mental procedure, quiet, 2 the faculty
and the power of concentration, right concentration — this
is the self-collectedness that there then is.
[12] What on that occasion is the faculty of faith
(saddhindriyam)? 8
1 The faith which on that occasion is a trusting in, the
! professing confidence in, 4 the sense of assurance, faith, 6
1 Avisaharo, avikkhepo (v. § 57). Distraction and
loss of equilibrium are attributed to the presence of ‘ excite-
ment and perplexity ’ (§§ 425, 429 ; Asl. 144).
2 Samatho. Distinguished as of three species : mental
calm (so used here) ; legal pacification, or settlement ;
calm in all the sanskaras, by which, according to the Cy.
(144), is meant the peace of Nirvana.
3 On ‘ faculty,’ see Introduction.
Faith is characterized and illustrated in the same terms
and approximately the same similes as are used in Mil.,
pp. 84-60. That is to say, it is shown to be a state of
mind where the absence of perplexity sets free aspiration
and energy. It is described as trust in the Buddha and
his system. There is, however, no dwelling just here on
any terminus ad quern , as St. Paul did in speaking of
‘ the prize for the mark of the high calling,’ etc., towards
which he pressed in ardent faith. There is, rather, an
insistence on that self-confidence born of conviction of the
soundness of one’s methods and efforts which is, as it were,
an aspect of faith as a vis a tergo. In the simile of the
stream, the Cy. differs from Trenckner’s version of the
Milinda to the extent of making the folk afraid to cross
because of alligators and other monsters, till the hero takes
his sword and plunges in. See the note on ‘ faith * in the
translation of Mil. i. 56.
4 I.e., in the Buddha, the Doctrine and the Order.
Buddhaghosa is only interested in making the etymology
bear on ethics, and compares the ‘downward plunge’ of
confidence (o-kappana) in the attitude of faith to the
‘ sinking ’ in ‘ mindfulness,’ the ‘ grounded stand ’ in ‘ con-
centration,’ and the ‘ sounding ’ penetration of ‘ wisdom ’
Asl. 144, 145).
6 The Cy. puts forward an alternative explanation of the
repetition in the description of this and following com-
pounds of the first term of the compound, viz., ‘ faith.*
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faith as a faculty and as a power — this is the faith that
there then is.
[18] What on that occasion is the faculty of energy
(viriyindriyam)? 1
The mental inception 2 of energy which there is on that
occasion, the striving and the onward effort, the exertion
According to the former, it is the method of Abhidamma
to set out in isolation the adjectival part of a compound on
which the substantival part depends: faith-faculty = faith
(faculty of). According to the latter, the identity between
the two abstractions, faith and faith-faculty, is brought
out. The case of woman and attribute of femininity, it
remarks, is different. (This may be a groping after the
distinction between concrete and abstract.)
1 Viriyam is by Euddhaghosa connected with (a) vlra,
the dynamic effectiveness which is the essence of the genus
‘hero* (vlro), ( b ) iriya, vibrating movement. He charac-
terizes it by the two notions, ‘ supporting ’ and ‘ grasping
at, 1 or ‘stretching forward* (paggaho), and, again, by
‘exerting* (ussahanam). Cf. Mil. 86; Sum. Vil. 68.
And he cites the same similes as nppear in the Milinda.
He seems to have wished, as modern psychologists have
done, to account for the two modes of conscious effort :
Resistance and Free Energy. But he also emphasizes the
fact that the energy in question is mental, not bodily
(pp. 120 et 8eq. 9 145).
2 Arambho (cf. arammanam), overt action as distin-
guished from inaction, hence action at its inception, is dis-
tinguished by the Cy. as having six different implications,
according as there is reference to karma, to a fault com-
mitted, to slaying or injury, or to action as such (k iriya),
or energy as such.
I do not pretend that the four following pairs of words
fit those in the text exactly. They are mere approximations.
‘Endeavour* is vayamo, the term representing ‘energy’
in the Noble Eightfold Path. ‘Unfaltering’ effort
(asithila-parakkamata) is the attitude of one who has
made the characteristic Buddhist vow: Verily may skin
and nerve and bone dry up and wither, or ever I stay my
energy, so long as I have not attained whatsoever by
human vigour, energy, and effort is attainable ! (M. i. 480).
The desire sustained — lit., not cast down — is that felt on
an occasion for making good karma.
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and endeavour, the zeal and ardour, the vigour and forti-
tude, the state of unfaltering effort, the state of sustained
desire, the state of unflinching endurance, the solid grip of
the burden, energy, energy as faculty and as power, right
endeavour — this is the energy that there then is.
[14] What on that occasion is the faculty of mindfulness
(satindriyam) 2 1
The mindfulness which on that occasion is recollecting,
calling back to mind ; the mindfulness 2 which is remember-
ing, bearing in mind, the opposite of superficiality 8 and
of obliviousness ; mindfulness as faculty ^mindfulness as \
power, right mindfulness— this is the faculty of mindfulness
that there then is.
1 Buddhaghosa’s comment on sati, in which he closely
follows and enlarges on the account in Mil. 87, 88, shows
that the traditional conception of that aspect of conscious-
ness had much in common with the Western modern theory
v of conscience or moral sense. Sati appears under the
metaphor of an inward mentor, discriminating between
good and bad and prompting choice. Hardy went so far
as to render it by ‘ conscience,’ but this slurs over the in-
teresting divergencies between Eastern and Western
thought. The former is quite unmystical on the subject of
sati. It takes the psychological process of representative
functioning (without bringing out the distinction between
bare memory and judgment), and presents the same under
an ethical aspect. See also under hiri, §80; and the
notion as described in ‘ Questions of Milinda,’ 88, n. 2.
2 The three fold mention of sati in the reply {cf § 12)
agrees with K., but not with Puggala Pannatti (p. 25). It
is not noticed by the Cy.
3 Apilapanata. The Atthasiilinl solves the problem pre-
sented by this term (see Milinda (S.B.E.), vol. i., p. 58, n: 2)
by deriving it from pilavati, to float, and interprets: —
* not floating on the surface like pumpkins and pots on the
water,’ sati entering into and plunging down into the
object of thought. Cf. § 11, n. 2 ; § 12, n. 2, in which
connection the term is again used. The positive form occurs
infra, § 1849. P. P. has (a) vilapanata (21, 25). (Asl. 147;
cf 405.) I should have rendered the word by ‘ profundity,’
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[15] What on that occasion is the faculty of concentra-
tion (samadhindriyam)? 1
Answer as for 1 self-collectedness,’ § 11.
[16] What on that occasion is the faculty of wisdom
(panfiindriyam)? 2
had I not preferred to bring out the negative form of the
original.
1 Buddhaghosa’s etymology — ‘ arammane cittam
samma adhiy^ti, thapeti ti* — is no doubt incorrect,
sam-a-dha being the sounder analysis; nevertheless,
he brings out that voluntary and deliberate adjustment of
the attention with a view to sustained mental effort which
is connoted bysamadhi (Asl. 122).
2 To fit the term pafina with its approximate European
equivalent is one of the cruces of Buddhist philosophy. I
have tried in turn reason, intellect, insight, science, under-
standing, and knowledge. All of these have been, and are,
used in the literature of philosophy with varying shades
of connotation, according as the sense to be conveyed is
popular and vague, psychological and precise, or transcen-
dental and — passez-moi le mot — having precise vague-
ness. And each of them might, with one implication or
another, represent panna. The main difficulty in choice
lay in determining whether, to the Buddhist, panna stood
for mental function, or for the aggregate product of certain
mental functioning, or for both. When all the allusions to
pafina in the Sutta Pitaka have been collated, a final trans-
lation may become possible. Here it must suffice to quote
two. In M. i. 292, he who has panna (pannava) is
declared in virtue thereof to understand (pajanati) the
nature of the phenomenon of pain or ill (the Four Noble
Truths). In D. i. 124 Gotama asks : What is this panna ?
and himself sets out its content as consisting in certain
intellectual attainments, viz., the Jhanas, insight into the
nature of impermanence, the mental image of one’s self, the
power of Iddhi, the cosmic Ear, insight into other minds, into
one’s own past lives, the cosmic Eye, and the elimination of
all vitiating tendencies. Buddhaghosa also (Vis. M., ch. xiv.)
distinguishes panna from safina and vifinana. He
describes it as adequate to discern not only what these ean,
viz., sense-objects and the Three Marks (impermanence,
pain, and non-substantiality) respectively, but also the
2
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18
The wisdom which there is on that occasion is under-
standing, search, research, searching the Truth, 1 discern-
ment, discrimination, differentiation, erudition, proficiency,
subtlety, criticism, reflection, analysis, breadth, 2 sagacity, 3
leading, 1 insight, intelligence, incitement ; 6 wisdom as
faculty, wisdom as power, wisdom as a sword, 6 wisdom as
a height, 7 wisdom as light, 8 wisdom as glory, 9 wisdom as
splendour, 10 wisdom as a precious stone ; the absence of
dulness, searching the Truth, 11 right views — this is the
wisdom that there then is.
[17] What on that occasion is the faculty of ideation
(representative imagination, manindriyam)?
Answer as for ‘ thought ’ (c i 1 1 a m), § 6.
Path. For him, then, it might be called intellect ‘ at a
higher power.’ And in Gotama’s reply, all those attain-
ments are described in terms of intellectual process.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the term did not stand for
bare mental process of a certain degree of complexity ,
but that it also implied mental process as cultivated in
accordance with a certain system of concepts objectively
valid for all Buddhist adepts. Hence, I think it best to
reject such terms as reason, intellect, and understanding,
and to choose wisdom, or science, or knowledge, or philo-
sophy. Only they must be understood in this connexion
as implying the body of learning as assimilated and applied
by the intellect of a given individual. See further under
nanam (Introduction) and vij ja (§ 1296).
1 7.e., the doctrines of the ‘ Four Truths ’ (Asl. 147). Cf.
Mil. 83.
2 Wisdom compared to the breadth and amplitude of the
earth (Asl. 147, 148).
8 Hedha. The Cy. explains the specific wisdom of this
term to lie in ‘ slaying ’ vice, or else in ‘ grasping and
bearing’ (148).
4 Parinayika. 6 Literally, a goad.
6 ‘ For the slaying of vices ’ (Asl. 148 ; cf Jat. iv. 174).
7 ‘ In the sense of something lofty ’ (ibid. ; cf. Dhp. v.
28 = Mil. 387).
8 Ang. ii. 139. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid.
11 Repeated by way of antithesis to ‘ dulness ’ (Asl. 148).
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[18] What on that occasion is the faculty of pleasure
(somanassindriyam)?
Answer as for ‘ ease ’ (sukha m), § 10.
[19] What on that occasion is the faculty of vitality
(j I vitindr iy am)?
The persistence of these incorporeal states, their sub-
sistence, going on, their being kept going on, their progress,
continuance, preservation, life, life as faculty 1 — this is the
faculty of vitality that there then is. 2
[20] What on that occasion are right views (samma-
d i 1 1 h i ) ? 3
Answer as for the ‘ faculty of wisdom/ § 16.
[21] What on that occasion is right intention (samma-
sankappo)? 4
Answer as for 1 conception,’ § 7.
[22] What on that occasion is right endeavour (samma-
v a y a m o) ?
Answer as for the ‘ faculty of energy/ § 18.
[23] What on that occasion is right -mindfulness
(sammasati)?
Answer as for the ‘ faculty of mindfulness/ § 14.
[24] What on that occasion is right concentration
(sammasamadhi) ?
Answer as for * self-collectedness/ §11.
1 In the text, hoti before i dam is probably an error.
2 This answer is exceptional in the omission of tasmim
samaye (‘ on that occasion ’) at the beginning of the sen-
tence. Cf. §§ 82, 295, 441. The reason of its omission is
probably that in the presence of life, by which the com-
plex of dhammas is sustained as lotuses by water, or as an
infant by its nurse (Asl. 124), there is nothing contingent
on the ethical quality (good, bad, or indeterminate) of the
given complex.
3 For a discussion of the term ditthi, see § 1003. On
these five factors of the Path see Introduction.
4 Sankappo is by the Cy. especially identified with the
expression cetaso abhiniropana, application of the
mind, the disposition or adjustment of attention, that on
which the heart is set, hence aspiration, intention, purpose,
design.
2—2
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[25] What on that occasion is the power of faith
(saddhabalam)?
Answer as for the ‘ faculty of faith/ § 12.
[26] What on that occasion is the power of energy
(vi riyabalam)?
Answer as for the ‘ faculty of energy/ § 18.
[27] What on that occasion is the power of mindfulness
(satibalam)?
Answer as for the ‘ faculty of mindfulness/ § 14.
[28] What on that occasion is the power of concentra-
tion (samadhibalam)?
Answer as for ‘self-collectedness/ § 11.
[29] What on that occasion is the power of wisdom
(paiifiabalam)?
Answer as for the ‘ faculty of wisdom/ § 16.
[80] What on that occasion is the power of conscientious-
ness (h i r i b a 1 a m) ? l
1 Hiri and ottappam, as analyzed by Buddhaghosa, pre-
sent points of considerable ethical interest. Taken together
they give us the emotional and conative aspect of the modern
notion of conscience, just as sati represents it on its in-
tellectual side. The former term ‘ is equivalent to shame
(lajja)/ the latter to ‘anguish (ubbego) over evil-doing.’
Hiri has its source within; ottappam springs from with-
out. Hiri is autonomous (attadhipati) ; ottappam,
heteronomous, influenced by society (lokadhipati). The
former is established on shame ; the latter on dread. The
former is marked by consistency ; the latter by discernment
of the danger and fearsomeness of error. The subjective
source of hiri is fourfold, viz., the idea of what is due to
one’s birth, age, worth and education. Thus, one having
hiri will think, ‘Only mean folk (fishers, etc.), children,
poor wretches, the blind and ignorant, would do such an
act/ and he refrains. The external source of ottappam
is the idea that ‘ the body of the faithful will blame you/
and hence one refrains. If a man have hiri, he is, as
said the Buddha, his own best master. To one who is
sensitive by way of ottappam, the masters of the faith
are the best guides (Asl. 126).
In a supplementary paragraph (p. 127) the ‘ marks ’
(consistency, etc.) are thus explained : In hiri one reflects
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The feeling of conscientious scruple 1 which there is on
that occasion when scruples ought to be felt, conscientious
scruple at attaining to bad and evil states — this is the power
of conscientiousness that there then is.
[81] What on that occasion is the power of the fear of
blame (ottappabalam)?
The sense of guilt, 2 which there is on that occasion,
where a sense of guilt ought to be felt, a sense of guilt at
attaining to bad and evil states — this is the fear of blame
that there then is.
[82] What on that occasion is the absence of lust
(alobho)?
The absence of lust, of lusting, of lustfulness, which
there is on that occasion, the absence of infatuation, the
feeling and being infatuated, the absence of covetousness,
that absence of lust which is the root of good 3 — this is
the absence of lust that there then is.
[83] What on that occasion is the absence of hate
(a d o s o) ?
on the worth of one’s birth, one’s teacher, one’s estate, and
one’s fellow-students. In ottappam one feels dread at
self-reproach, the blame of others, chastisement, and re-
tribution in another life.
1 Hiriyati, paraphrased by jigucchati (Asl. 149 ;
D. i. 174 ; M. i. 78).
2 Ottappati, paraphrased by ubbego (Asl. 124).
3 I.e.j the fundamental condition, the cause of goodness.
On ‘covetousness’ and ‘infatuation,’ see §§ 85, 1059.
Alobho and its two co-ordinate virtues, the threefold
‘ root ’ of goodness, lose all their force in English negatives,
but to a Buddhist convey doubtless as much impressive-
ness, as much of positive import, as the negative ‘ immor-
tality’ does to the Christian. Alobho, e.g., involves
active altruism; a do so, active sympathy; am oho, a life
of culture (see § 34, n.). I do not know any positive terms
meet to represent them.
The * mark ’ of the first is absence of greed, or of adhe-
sion, as a drop of water runs off a lotus leaf. Its essence
is independence, like that of the emancipated bhikshu
(Asl. 127).
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The absence of hate, of hating, 1 of hatred, which there
is on that occasion, the absence of malice, of spleen, 2 the
absence of hate which is the root of good — this is the
absence of hate that there then is.
[34] What on that occasion is the absence of dulness
(a m o h o) ?
Answer as for the ‘ faculty of wisdom/ § 16. 8
[35] What on that occasion is the absence of covetous-
ness (a n a b h i j j h a) ?
Answer as for the ‘ absence of lust,’ § 32. 4
[36] What on that occasion is the absence of malice
(avy apado) ? 6
Answer as for the ‘ absence of hate/ § 33.
[37] What on that occasion are right views (sam-
m ad it t hi)? 6
Answer as for the ‘faculty of wisdom/ § 16.
1 K. reads adusana, adusitattam. The ‘mark* of
a do so is said to be absence of churlishness and crossness
(see § 1060); its essence the suppression of annoyance
and fever ; its immediate result is loveliness — like the full
moon (Asl. 127).
2 ‘ The opposite of the pain felt when one is angry *
(Asl. 150).
8 Buddhaghosa expatiates at some length on the excel-
lencies of the fundamental trinity of Buddhist virtue. To
take a few only: alobho (1) involves health, ado so (2)
youth (hate ages quickly), am oho (3) long life (through
prudence). (1) tends to material good through generosity
(cf ‘he that soweth plenteously/ etc.) ; (2) to the acquisition
of friends, won and held by love ; (3) to self-development.
(1) leads to life in the devaloka, (2) to life in the Brahma-
loka, (3) to Arahatship. (1) gives insight into imperma-
nence, and, conversely, (2) and (3) into the other two marks
(‘ pain ' and ‘ non- substantiality/ respectively).
4 Abhijjha and lobho are synonymous. See §§ 1059
and 1136, where abhijjha stands for lobho.
5 Described (Asl. 129) as the being void of any wish to
destroy welfare of others, bodily or mental, their advantages
in this or other worlds, or their good reputation.
6 Cf. § 1 (xxxvi), footnote.
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[38] What on that occasion is conscientiousness (h i r i) ?
Answer as for the ‘ power of conscientiousness,* § 80.
[39] What on that occasion is the fear of blame
(ottappam) ?
Answer as for the ‘ power of the fear of blame,’ § 81.
[40] What on that occasion is repose of sense (k a y a -
passaddhi)? 1
The serenity, 2 3 the composure which there is on that
occasion, the calming, the tranquillizing, the tranquillity of
the skandhas of feeling, perception and syntheses — this
is the serenity of sense that there then is.
[41] What on that occasion is serenity of thought
(cittapassaddhi)?
The serenity, the composure which there is on that
occasion, the calming, the tranquillizing, the tranquillity
of the skandha of intellect — this is the serenity of thought
that there then is.
[42] What on that occasion is buoyancy 8 of sense
(kayalahuta)?
The buoyancy which there is on that occasion, the alert-
ness in varying, 4 5 the absence of sluggishness 6 and inertia,
in the skandhas of feeling, perception and syntheses — this
is the buoyancy of sense that there then is.
[43] What on that occasion is buoyancy of thought
(cittalahuta)?
1 On the meaning of kayo see Introduction.
2 Passaddhi is described as a state free from pain —
where pain is allayed and suppressed ; where tremor or
unquiet is replaced by ‘ coolness * — the opposite to the
states called kilesas, especially excitement (§ 1229).
Cf. D. i. 73 ; M. i. 37.
3 Literally, lightness, described as the opposite of heavi-
ness, sluggishness and the rigidity of stolidity and stupor
(§ H85).
4 ‘The capacity of changing quickly* (Asl. 150). Cf
Childers’ Dictionary, s.v. parivatti.
5 Bead adandhanata. K. reads adandhata, but
adandhanata in § 43 and § 639.
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The buoyancy, etc. (as in § 42), in the skandha of in-
tellect — this is the buoyancy of thought that there then is.
[44] What on that occasion is plasticity of sense (kaya-
muduta)? 1
The plasticity which there is on that occasion, the
suavity, smoothness, absence of rigidity, in the skandhas
of feeling, perception and syntheses — this is the plasticity
of sense that there then is.
[45] What on that occasion is plasticity of thought
(cittamuduta)?
The plasticity which, etc. (as in § 44), in the skandha
of intellect — this is the plasticity of thought that there
then is.
[46] What on that occasion is wieldiness 2 of sense
(k a y a k a m m a n h a t a) ?
The wieldiness which there is on that occasion, the
tractableness, the pliancy, of the skandhas of feeling, per-
ception and syntheses— this is the wieldiness of sense that
then is.
[47] What on that occasion is wieldiness of though
(cittakammaiinata)?
The wieldiness, etc. (as in § 46), of the skandha of
intellect — this is the wieldiness of thought that there
then is.
[48] What on that occasion is fitness 3 of sense (kaya-
paguiinata)?
The fitness which there is on that occasion, the com-
petence, the efficient state of the skandhas of feeling,
perception and syntheses — this is the fitness of sense that
there then is.
1 The suppression of stiffness and resistance, or oppug-
nancy ; the attitude antithetical to that belonging to the
kilesas of opinionativeness and conceit.
2 Kammaiiiiata, literally workableness, or serviceable-
ness — for good action (Asl. 151), by which one ‘ succeeds in
constructing objects of thought’ (ibid. 180).
3 The antithesis to illness and diffidence (ibid. 131).
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[49] What on that occasion is fitness of thought (citta-
pagunnata)?
The fitness, etc. {as in § 48), of the skandha of in-
tellect — this is the fitness of thought that there then is.
[50] What on that occasion is rectitude 1 of sense
(kayujjukata)?
The straightness which there is on that occasion, the
rectitude, without deflection, twist or crookedness, of the
skandhas of feeling, perception and syntheses — this is the
directness of sense that there then is.
[51] What on that occasion is rectitude of thought
(c i 1 1 u j ju k a t a) ?
The straightness, etc. (as in § 50), of the skandha of
intellect — this is the rectitude of thought that there
then is.
[52] What on that occasion is mindfulness (s a t i) ?
Answer as for the ‘ faculty of mindfulness,’ § 14.
[53] What on that occasion is intelligence (sam-
pa j anfiam) ? 2
Answer as for ‘ wisdom,’ § 16.
[54] What on that occasion is quiet (s a m a t h o) ?
Answer as for ‘self-collectedness,’ § 11.
[55] What on that occasion is insight (vipassana)?
Answer as for ‘ wisdom,’ § 16.
[56] What on that occasion is grasp (p a g g a h o) ?
Answer as for the ‘faculty of energy,’ § 18.
[57] What on that occasion is balance (avikkhepo)? 3
1 Defined as the antithesis of crookedness, deception
(may a) and craftiness (Asl. 131).
2 Or comprehension ; to know anything according to its
usefulness, its expediency, its scope, and to know it clearly.
Named as approximately equivalent to ‘ wisdom,’ the Cy.
assigns to it as well the characteristics of mindfulness
{ibid.). Cf. the frequent twin qualification of sati-sam-
pajano — e.g., M. i. 274.
3 ‘The opposite of excitement or fluster’ (Asl. ibid.).
Literally, ‘the absence of wavering’ (or vacillation or
unsteadiness).
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Answer as for € self-collectedness, * § 11.
These, or whatever other 1 2 incorporeal, causally induced
states there are on that occasion — these are states that
are good.
Here ends the delimitation of terms (Pada-bhajani-
yam).
End of the First Portion for Recitation.
[Summary of the constituents of the First Type of
Thought (sangahavaram or kotthasavara m).] *
[58] Now, on that occasion
the skandhas are four,
the spheres (a y a t a n a n i) are two,
the elements (dhatuyo) are two,
the nutriments (a h a r a) are three,
the faculties (indriyani) are eight,
the Jhana is fivefold,
the Path is fivefold,
the powers (b a 1 a n i) are seven,
the causes (h e t \\) are three ;
1 See above, p. o.
2 The constituent dhammas of the first of the eight
schemata of ‘good thoughts’ (cittangani) are now
rehearsed with reference to class and number. The motive
probably was to aid the student either to a conspectus of
the psychosis in question, or mnemonically. Thus, if the
constituent factors of the thought be regarded under the
aspect of classified aggregates (rasatthena, or khandhat-
thena), they all fall under four heads. All that do not
belong to the skajj^bag^°f feeling, perception, or intellect,
come under the sansfcara-skandha. Regarded under the
aspect of collocation or conjuncture (ay a tan am), they all
fall under two heads, corresponding to the fourth, and to
the first, second, and third, of those four skandhas re-
spectively. Regarded under the aspect of phenomena, of
non-noihnena (sabhavatthena, suniiatatthena, nis-
sattatthena), they all fall under two heads, corre-
sponding to the two preceding. We then come to partial
aspects.
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27
contact,
feeling,
perception, * are each single [factors] ;
thinking,
thought,
the skandhas of
feeling,
perception, are eac ij g j j e [f ac t or s] ;
syntheses,
intellect,
the sphere of ideation (man a-'
yatanam),
the faculty of ideation,
the element of representative in-
tellection (m a n o v i h ii a n a - are each single
dhatu), [factors],
the sphere of a (representative)
state,
the element of a (representative)
state,
These, or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced
states there are on that occasion — these are states that are
good.
[59] What on that occasion are the four skandhas ?
The skandhas of feeling, perception, syntheses and in-
tellection.
[60] (L) What on that occasion is the skandha of feeling?
The mental pleasure, the mental ease, which there is
on that occasion, 1 the pleasurable, easeful sensation which
is born of contact with thought, the pleasant, easeful
1 The omission in both this and the next answer of the
phrase, used in §§ 8 and 4 — ‘ born of contact with the
appropriate element of representative intellection * — is not
noticed in the Cy. K. draws attention to it in a footnote,
not at this passage, but at §§ 108-110. The omission is
probably accidental.
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28
feeling born of contact with thought — this is the skandha
of feeling that there then is (§§ 8, 10, 18).
[61] (ii.) What on that occasion is the skandha of per-
ception ?
The perception, the perceiving, the state of having per-
ceived, which there is on that occasion — this is the skandha
of perception that there then is (§ 4).
[62] (iii.) What on that occasion is the skandha of
syntheses
(i) Contact,
(ii) thinking,
(iii) conception,
(iv) discursive thought,
(v) joy,
(vi) self-collectedness,
(vii) the faculty of faith,
(viii) the faculty of energy,
(ix) the faculty of mindfulness,
(x) the faculty of concentration,
(xi) the faculty of wisdom,
(xii) the faculty of vitality,
(xiii) right views,
(xiv) right intention,
(xv) right endeavour,
(xvi) right mindfulness,
(xvii) right concentration,
(xviii) the power of faith,
(xix) the power of energy,
(xx) the power of mindfulness,
(xxi) the power of concentration,
(xxii) the power of wisdom,
(xxiii) the power of conscientiousness,
(xxiv) the power of the fear of blame,
(xxv) absence of lust,
(xxvi) absence of hate,
(xxvii) absence of dulness,
1 See Introduction.
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(xxviii) absence of covetousness,
(xxix) absence of malice,
(xxx) right views,
(xxxi) conscientiousness,
(xxxii) the fear of blame,
(xxxiii) serenity of sense,
(xxxiv) serenity of thought,
(xxxv) buoyancy of sense,
(xxxvi) buoyancy of thought,
(xxxvii) plasticity of sense,
(xxxviii) plasticity of thought,
(xxxix) wieldiness of sense,
(xl) wieldiness of thought,
(xli) fitness of sense,
(xlii) fitness of thought,
(xliii) rectitude of sense,
(xliv) rectitude of thought,
(xlv) mindfulness,
(xlvi) intelligence,
(xlvii) quiet,
(xlviii) insight,
(xlix) grasp,
(1) balance.
These, or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced
states there are on that occasion, exclusive of the skandhas
of feeling, perception and intellection — these are the
skandha of syntheses.
[68] (iv.) What on that occasion is the skandha of in-
tellect ?
The thought which on that occasion is ideation, mind,
the heart, that which is clear, ideation as the sphere of
mind, as the faculty of mind, the skandha of intellect, the
appropriate element of representative intellection — this is
the skandha of intellect that there then is (§ 6).
These on that occasion are the four skandhas.
[64] What on that occasion are the two spheres *?
The sphere of ideation, the sphere of (mental) states.
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[65] What on that occasion is the sphere of ideation
(manayatanam)?
Answer as for ‘ thought/ § 6, and for the * skandha of
intellection/ § 63.
[66] What on that occasion is the sphere of (mental)
states (dhammayatanam)?
The skandhas of feeling, perception, syntheses — this is
on that occasion the sphere of (mental) states.
These are on that occasion the two spheres.
[67] What on that occasion are the two elements ?
The element of representative intellection, the element
of (mental) states.
[68] What on that occasion is the element of repre-
sentative intellection (m a n o v i n ii a n a d h a t u) ?
Answer as for ‘ thought/ § 6 ; cf §§ 63, 65.
[69] What on that occasion is the element of (mental)
states (dhammadhatu)?
The skandhas of feeling, of perception, of syntheses—
these are on that occasion the element of (mental) states.
These are on that occasion the two elements.
[70] What on that occasion are the three nutriments? 1
The nutriment of contact, the nutriment of representa-
tive cogitation, the nutriment of intellection.
[71] What on that occasion is the nutriment of contact
(phassaharo)?
1 These three incorporeal nutriments or foods, together
with the fourth or corporeal food, are given in the Sutta
Pitaka: M. i. 261 ; S. ii. 11. In the A. they are not
classified under the Gatukka Nipata ; but in the Dasaka
Nipata (A. v. 136) ten species of aharo are named, which
have no reference to the four. E.g., ‘ appropriate action is
the aharo of health.’ Buddhaghosa, dwelling on the ety-
mology, calls them not so much conditions as supplementary
casual * adducts’ (a-har). Given, e.g., a living individual,
adduce contact, and you get feeling ; adduce cogitation, and
you get the three ‘ becomings ’ (in the universe of sense,
etc.) ; adduce intellect, and you get conception and name-
and-form (Asl. 153).
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8]
Answer as for ‘ contact/ § 2.
[72] What on that occasion is the nutriment of repre-
sentative cogitation (manosahcetanaharo)?
The thinking, the cogitating, the reflection which there
is on that occasion — this is the representative cogitation
that there then is.
[78] What on that occasion is the nutriment of intellec-
tion (vinnanaharo)?
Ansiver as for the ‘skandha of intellection/ § 63.
These on that occasion are the three nutriments.
[74] What on that occasion are the eight faculties ?
The faculties of faith, energy, mindfulness, concentra-
tion, wisdom, ideation, happiness, vitality.
[75-82] What on that occasion is the faculty of faith . . .
vitality ?
Ansiver8 as in §§ 12-19 respectively .
These on that occasion are the eight faculties.
[88] What on that occasion is the fivefold Jhana
(pancangikam jhana m)?
Conception, discursive thought, joy, ease, self-collected-
ness.
[84-88] What on that occasion is conception . . . self-
collectedness ?
Answers as in §§ 7-11 respectively .
This on that occasion is the fivefold Jhana.
[89] What on that occasion is the fivefold Path (p a ii -
cangiko maggo)?
Right views, right intention, right endeavour, right
mindfulness, right concentration.
[90-94] What on that occasion are right views ... is
. . . right concentration ?
Answers as in §§ 20-24 respectively .
This on that occasion is the fivefold Path.
[95] What on that occasion are the seven powers ?
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The power of faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration,
wisdom, conscientiousness, the fear of blame.
[96-102] What on that occasion is the power of faith
. . . the fear of blame ?
Answers as in §§ 25-81 respectively .
These on that occasion are the seven powers.
[108] What on that occasion are the three causes (t a y o
h e t u) ?
The absence of lust, of hate, and of dulness.
[104-106] What on that occasion is the absence of lust
. . . dulness?
Answers as in §§ 82-84 respectively .
These are on that occasion the three causes.
[107] What on that occasion is contact . . .
[108] feeling . . .
[109] perception . . .
[110] thinking . . .
[111] thought . . .
[112] the skandha of feeling . . .
[118] the skandha of perception . . .
[114] the skandha of syntheses . . .
[115] the skandha of intellection . . .
[116] the sphere of ideation . . .
[117] the faculty of ideation . . .
[118] the element of ideational intellection . . .
[119] the sphere of (mental) states . . .
[120] the element of (mental) states,
regarded as a single factor ?
Answers as in 2-6, 60-68, 65, 65, 65, 66, 66, respec-
tively .
These, or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced
states there are on that occasion — these are states that
are good.
[Here ends] the Summary [of the constituents of the
First Main Type of Good Thoughts].
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88
[The ‘Emptiness’ Section (sunnatavaro)]. 1 * 3
{121] Now, at that time there are
states (distinguishable constituents of the
‘ thought ’),
skandhas, powers,
spheres, causes,
elements, contact,
nutriments, feeling,
faculties, perception,
Jhana, thinking,
the Path, thought,
the skandha of feeling,
the skandha of perception,
the skandha of syntheses,
the skandha of intellect,
the sphere of ideation,
the faculty of ideation,
the element of representative intellection,
the sphere of [mental] states,
the element of [mental] states.
These, or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced
states there are on that occasion — these are states that are
good.
1 On the significance of the term ‘ emptiness,* see
Introduction ; cf. § 844. The significance of this section
in the student’s course of study seems to have consisted
simply in this : That the interest being withdrawn from the
nature and numbers of the particular constituents in each
of the species of mental activity to which the thought-
complex is reducible, emphasis is laid on the principle that
\ this same thought-complex is an aggregate or combination
\of such phenomenal factors, and nothing more . ‘There
are states of consciousness* (dhamma honti); that is
(Asl. 155), ‘there is no permanent entity or self which \
acquires the states.’ ‘The states are to be understood
phenomenally. There is no other being or existence or
person or individual whatever.’
3
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34
[122] What on that occasion are states ?
The skandhas of feeling, of perception, of syntheses, of
intellection.
[123] What on that occasion are skandhas?
Answer as in § 59.
[124-145] Similar questions are then put respecting
* spheres,’ ‘ elements,* and so on through the list of con -
stituent species . The answers are identical with those given
to similar questions in the previous ‘ Summary,* viz., in
§§ 64, 67, 70, 74, 83, 89, 95, 103, and 107-120.
[Here ends] the ‘ Emptiness * Section.
[Here ends] the First Main Type of Good Thoughts.
H.
[146] Which are the states that are good ?
When a good thought concerning the sensuous universe
has arisen by the prompting of a conscious motive, 1 a
1 Sasankharena. Buddhaghosa’s explanation of the
term is ^terse and explicit. Sa = co-, sankharo = com-
pound, is here used in the sense of concomitant with spring,
motive, means, or cause (ussaho, payogo, upayo,
paccayo-gahanam). For instance, a bhikshu dwelling
in the neighbourhood of a vihara is inclined, when duty
calls him to sweep the terrace round the sthupa, wait on
the elders, or listen to the Dhamma, to find the way too far,
and shirk attendance. Second thoughts, as to the impro-
priety of not going, induce him to go. These are prompted
either by his own conscience (attano va payogena),
or by the exhortation of another who, showing the dis-
advantage in shirking, and the profit in attending, says,
‘ Come, do it !’ And the ‘ good thought,’ i.e. t of course, the
resolve to go, is said ‘to have arisen by way of a concomitant
motive, by way of the taking hold of a cause.* Asl. 156.
This explanation is not discrepant with that of sasank-
hariko, given to Childers by Yijesinha Mudliar. He
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85
thought which is accompanied by pleasure, associated with
knowledge, and having, as its object, a sight, a sound, a
smell, a taste, a touch, a [mental] state, or what not, then
there is contact, feeling, etc. 1 [here follows the list of ‘ states 9
dealt with in §§ 1-145 and constituting the First Thought ] —
these, or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced
states there are on that occasion — these are states that are
good. . • •
[Here ends] the Second Thought. 2
III.
[147] Which are the states that are good?
When a good thought concerning the sensuous universe
has arisen accompanied by pleasure, disconnected with
knowledge, and having as its object, a sight, a sound, a
was not, I take it, so bad a Buddhist as to mean that an
asankharikam cittam was a thought in and for
itself spontaneous, i.e. 9 uncaused. He would mean only
that the subject of the thought experienced it without
being conscious of its mental antecedent as such , without
paccaya-gahanam. In a cittam sasankharena, on
the other hand, the thought presents itself in consciousness
together with its mental conditions. In the Abhidham-
mattha-Sangaha the terms used in a similar connexion are
asankharikam and sasankharikam. J. P. T. S., 1884,
p. 1 et seq . Cf. Warren, ‘ Buddhism in Translations,* 490.
1 In the text (§ 146), at the omitted repetitions indicated
by * . . . p e . . .* reference is made to § 147. More cor-
rectly reference should be made to § 1. The second type-
thought is in all respects (including Summary and ‘Empti-
ness * Section) identical with the first (Asl. 156), with the
sole exception of the additional implication * by the prompt-
ing of a conscious motive.* With the same exception the
fourth, sixth, and eighth type- thoughts are identical with
the third, fifth, and seventh respectively. Hence the
reference in § 159 of the text should have been to § 157.
2 K. reads Dutiyam Cittam, and so on for the
eight.
8—2
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86
smell, a taste, a touch, a [mental] state, or what not, then
there is
contact,
feeling,
perception,
thinking,
thought,
the faculty of
faith,
energy,
mindfulness,
conception,
discursive thought,
joy>
ease,
self-collectedness ;
concentration,
ideation,
happiness,
vitality ;
right intention, 1 right mindfulness,
right endeavour, right concentration ;
the power of
faith, concentration,
energy, conscientiousness,
mindfulness, the fear of blame ;
absence of lust,
absence of hate,
absence of covetousness,
absence of malice ;
conscientiousness,
fear of blame ;
serenity, wieldiness,
buoyancy, fitness,
plasticity, rectitude,
both of sense and thought ;
mindfulness, grasp,
quiet, balance.
1 Sammaditthi should have been here omitted in the
text, just as it is rightly omitted at the place of ifcs second
mention between avyapado and hiri. Its absence from
the third type of thought is involved in the qualifying
phrase ‘disconnected with knowledge/ just as ‘wisdom,’
* insight/ etc., are. Cf K. In 147a the Path is said to be
fourfold only.
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37
These, or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced
states there are on that occasion — these are states that are
good.
[Summary, cf. § 58 et seq.]
[147a] Now, on that occasion
the skandhas are four,
the spheres are two,
the elements are two,
the nutriments are three,
the faculties are seven, 1
the Jhana is fivefold,
the Path is fourfold,
the powers are six, 2
the causes are two, 3
contact, etc.
[Continue as in § 58.]
* * * * * *
[148] What on that occasion is the skandha of syntheses ?
The content of the sanskdr a- skandha is the same as in the
First Type of Thowjht , § 62, 4 with the following omissions :
4 The faculty of wisdom/
4 right views/
4 the power of wisdom/
4 the absence of dulness/
4 intelligence/
4 insight.’
1 That of 4 wisdom ’ being omitted.
2 See preceding note.
3 4 Absence of dulness ’ being omitted.
4 In the text the reader is referred to § 62 without
reservation, and is thereby landed in inconsistencies.
K. enumerates the content of the skandha in full, omitting
all those factors which are incompatible with a thought
divorced from knowledge. I have thought it sufficient to
name only these excluded factors.
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88
These are omitted as incompatible ivith the quality * discon-
nected with knowledge.*
******
These, or whatever other incorporeal, etc.
******
[Here ends] the Third Type of Thought. 1
IV.
[149] Which are the states that are good ?
When a good thought concerning the sensuous universe
has arisen by the prompting of a conscious motive, a
thought which is accompanied by happiness, disconnected
with knowledge, and having as its object a sight, a sound,
a smell, a taste, a touch, a [mental] state, or what not, then
there is contact, etc. [continue as in § 147] — these, or what-
ever other incorporeal, causally induced states there are on
that occasion — these are states that are good. . . . 2
******
[Here ends] the Fourth Thought.
1 Placed erroneously in the text after § 147.
2 So K. The text, by omitting not only the repetitions,
but also the essentially distinctive factor sasankharena,
renders the insertion of the ‘ Fourth Thought * quite un-
intelligible.
Buddhaghosa gives a different illustration of this type of
thought in harmony with its resemblance to and difference
from the former cittam sasankharena, viz.: in its
involving a pleasurable state of mind, but not any great
understanding or discernment. Such is the thought of
little boys, who, when their parents duck their heads to
make them worship at a cetiya, willingly comply, though
doing so without intelligent conviction. Asl. 156.
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39
V.
[150] Which are the states that are good ?
When a good thought concerning the sensuous universe
has arisen, accompanied by disinterestedness, 1 associated
with knowledge, and having as its object a sight, a sound,
a smell, a taste, a touch, a [mental] state, or what not,
then there is contact, etc. [continue as in § 1, but for 1 joy *
and 1 happiness * substitute ‘ equanimity ’ (upekkha), and
for ‘ the faculty of happiness * substitute ‘ the faculty of
disinterestedness ’]. 2
[151] What on that occasion is contact ?
Answer as in % 2.
[152] What on that occasion is feeling ?
The mental [condition] neither pleasant nor unpleasant,
which, on that occasion, is bom of contact with the appro-
priate element of representative intellection ; the sensation,
bom of contact with thought, which is neither easeful nor
painful ; the feeling, bom of contact with thought, which is
neither easeful nor painful — this is the feeling that there
then is.
******
[Continue as in §§ 4-8.]
[158] What on that occasion is disinterestedness ? 3
Answer as in preceding reply, omitting the phrase * bom
1 Upekkha. ‘This is impartiality (lit., middleness) in
connexion with the object of thought, and implies a dis-
criminative knowledge’ (Asl. 157). Cf its significance in
the cultivation of Jhana, § 165. In the Jhana that may
arise in connexion with the first type of thought, which is
concomitant with ‘ joy ’ and ‘ ease,’ it is replaced by ‘ self-
collectedne88.’ See § 83.
2 Here, again, the excision, in the text, of practically the
whole answer, and the reference to § 156, where the sixth
thought is differentiated from this, the fifth thought, by
the quality sasankharena, quite obscures the classifica-
tion adopted in the original.
3 Substituted for ‘joy * and ‘ ease, ’ §§ 9, 10.
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40
of contact with the appropriate element of representative
intellection.’
[ Continue as in §§ 11-17.]
[154] What on that occasion is the faculty of dis-
interestedness ?
Answer as in preceding reply . Continue as in §§ 19-57.
[Summary.]
[154a] Now, on that occasion
the skandhas are four,
the spheres are two,
the elements are two,
the nutriments are three,
the faculties are eight,
the Jhana is fourfold, 1
the Path is fivefold,
the powers are seven,
the causes are three,
contact,
etc., etc. [cf. § 58],
the sphere of mental states is a single factor,
the element of mental states is a single factor.
These, or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced
states there are on that occasion — these are states that are
good. ...
[Continue as in §§ 59-61.]
[155] What on that occasion is the skandha of syn-
theses ?
1 Consisting presumably in ‘ conception,’ ‘ discursive
thought,’ ‘disinterestedness* (superseding ‘joy* and ‘ease*),
and ‘ self-collectedness.’ Cf. § 83. The last-named atti-
tude of mind does not usually figure in the Pitakas as the
culminating (or other) stage of Jhana (cf. § 160 et seq.). In
the Abhidhammattha-Sangaha, however, it does occur as
such, and side by side also with ‘ disinterestedness.’
J. P. T. S., 1884, p. 3.
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41
Answer as in § 62, omitting ‘joy.’ 1
******
[Continue as in the Summary and 1 Emptiness * Section
of the First Type of Thought .]
[Here ends] the Fifth Type of Thought.]
VI.
[156] Which are the states that are good ?
When a good thought concerning the sensuous universe
has arisen, accompanied by disinterestedness, associated
with knowledge, prompted by a conscious motive, and
having, as its object, a sight, a sound, a smell, a taste,
a touch, a [mental] state, or what not, then there is
contact, etc.
* ❖ * * * *
[ Continue as in the Fifth Type of Thought.]
❖ * # ❖ * *
[Here ends] the Sixth Type of Thought.
YH.
[157] Which are the states that are good?
When a good thought concerning the sensuous universe
has arisen, accompanied by disinterestedness, disconnected
with knowledge, and having, as its object, a sight, a sound,
a smell, a taste, a touch, a [mental] state, or what not,
then there is contact, etc. . . .
******
[Continue as in the Third Type of Thought , substituting
4 disinterestedness * for * joy * and ‘ ease/ the ‘ faculty of dis-
interestedness * for that of * happiness/ and ‘ fourfold * for
‘fivefold Jhana.’ 2 ]
* * * * * *
1 K. gives the skandha in full, omitting ‘joy/ joy and
upekkha being mutually exclusive.
2 Sanindriyam in the text should be manindriyam.
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42
[Summary.]
[157a] Now, on tfiat occasion
the skandhas are four,
etc., etc.
[ Continue as in the Third Type of Thought , substituting
‘ fourfold ’ for ‘ fivefold Jhana.’]
******
[158] What on that occasion is the skandha of syn-
theses ?
The content of this skandha is the same as in the Third
Type of Thought (see § 148), with the further omission of
‘joy.’
* * * * * *
[Continue as in the First Type of Thought .]
* * * * * *
[Here ends] the Seventh Type of Thought.
VIII.
[159] Which are the states that are good?
When a good thought concerning the sensuous universe
has arisen, accompanied by disinterestedness, disconnected
with knowledge, prompted by a conscious motive, and
having, as its object, a sight, a sound, a smell, a taste,
a touch, a [mental] state, or what not, then there is
contact, etc.
* * * * * *
[Continue as in the Seventh Type of Thought.]
£ sjs i|: ❖
[Here ends] the Eighth Type of Thought.
[End of Chapter I. on] the Eight Main Types of Thought
concerning the Sensuous Universe.
(Here ends the Second Portion for Recitation.)
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48
Chapter II.
[Good in relation to the Universe of Form (rupa-
vacara-kusala m).
Methods for inducing Jhdna.
I.
The Eight Artifices (atthakasina m).
1. The Earth Artifice (pathavikasinam).
(a) The Fourfold System of Jhdna (catukkanayo).]
[160] Which are the states that are good ?
When, that he may attain to the heavens of Form, 1 he 2
cultivates the way thereto, aloof from sensuous appetites,
aloof from evil ideas, 3 and so, by earth-gazing, enters 4 into
1 See Introduction.
* The subject of these states of consciousness.
3 Vivicc’ eva kamehi, vivicca akusalehi dham-
mehi. Lit., ‘having separated one’s self, having become
without, having departed from’ (Asl. 164). That is to say
— again according to the Cy. (ibid .) — from the objects of
sensual desires, and from the desires themselves, respec-
tively (vatthukama, kilesakama. Childers’ Dictionary,
8. r. kamo). The former phrase (vivicc’ eva kamehi)
includes the whole psychological realm of sense-presentation
(kayo, or the three skandhas of feeling, perception and
sanskaras) ; the latter, dhammehi, referring to the realm
of ideation (cittam) only.
The Cy. repudiates the idea that the emphatic enclitic
eva, occurring only in the former of the two phrases,
renders the latter less important, and quotes, in support,
the opening words of the Cula-sihanada Discourse (M. i. 68).
4 Pathavikasinam. The first of the Karmasthana
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44
and abides in 1 the First Jhana (the first rapt meditation) ,
wherein conception works and thought discursive, 2 which is
born of solitude, 3 and full of joy 4 and ease — then the
contact, the feeling . . . the grasp, the balance, which
arise in him, or whatever other 6 incorporeal, causally
induced states that there are on that occasion — these are
states that are good.
******
methods, or quasi-hypnotic devices for attaining to temporary
rapt oblivion of the outer world. The percept of the circle
of mould induces the vivid image (nimittam), and there-
upon Jhana supervenes.
1 I.e. % sustains the mood indefinitely. The Cy. quotes
the Vibhanga as paraphrasing the term by the same
expressions, ‘going on,* etc., as are used to describe above
(§ 19) the * faculty of vitality.*
2 Savitakkam savicaram. Leaving the negative
essential conditions of Jhana, we pass to the positive
features (Asl. 166). The meditation progresses by means
of these two in particular, as a tree does by its flowers and
fruit. According to the Vibhanga, they reveal the deter-
mined resolves of the individual student (puggaladhit-
thana). (Ibid.)
3 According to the Cy., the solitude is rather moral than
physical, and means ‘born in the seclusion which the
student creates by thrusting from his heart the five
hindrances (ibid. ; infra , § 1152). According as it is said in
the Petaka (? Petakopadesa), concentration opposes sensual
desire; joy opposes malice; conception, or the onset of
intellect, opposes stolidity and torpor ; ease opposes excite-
ment and worry ; discursive thought opposes perplexity or
doubt (Asl. 165). See D. i. 78, where the hindrances are
explicitly mentioned in connection with Jhana; also the
notes in Rhys Davids* * Dialogues of the Buddha,* I., p. 84.
4 I.e., joy of the fifth species, pharana-plti (Asl. 166),
§ 9 ; also compare the passage just referred to, D. i. 78,
See above, so imam eva kayam . . . abhisandeti . . .
parip -pharati.
6 These are said to be the four first — desire, etc. — of the
nine named above, p. 5, n. 1 (Asl. 168).
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45
Continue as in the First Type of Thought relating to the
sensuous universe , including the Summary and ‘ Emptiness ’
divisions. 1
[161] Which are the states that are good ?
When, that he may attain to the heavens of Form, he
cultivates the way thereto, suppressing the working of
conception and of thought discursive, and so, by earth-
gazing, enters into and abides in the Second Jhana (the
second rapt meditation), which is self-evolved, 2 born of con-
centration, full of joy and ease, in that, set free from the
working of conception and of thought discursive, the mind
1 So the Cy. (ibid.). In the text, therefore, the reader
should have been referred, not to (147), but to (1). K
indicates the elision simply by a ... pe ... at the
point corresponding to the comma before ‘ or whatever . . .’
in my translation, followed by ‘ime dhamma kusala.’
1 am inclined, however, to think that the detailed
catechism as to the nature of the various dhammas, such
as occurs at §§ 2-57, is not to be understood as included in
the passage elided, either here or in the remaining Jhanas.
K. does not repeat the . . . pe . . . cited above at the
corresponding point in the three remaining Jhanas, where
the Summary is not elided, but given. Nor does it give
the . . . pe . . . which stands in the text, in §§ 168,
165, before Tasmim kho pana samaye. Similarly it
omits the . . . pe . . . given in the text at the corre-
sponding points in the formulae for the ‘five-fold Jhana,’
§ 168 et seq.
2 Ajjhattam, i.e. 9 according to the Cy. (169), attano
jatam, attasantane nibbattam; according to the
Vibhanga, paccattam. It is not quite clear to me what
is the special force of the term in just this Jhana, unless it
be that the ‘earth-gazing* is not now continued — the
individual becoming more rapt from external determinants
of consciousness, more susceptible to purely subjective
conditions.
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46
grows calm and sure, 1 dwelling on high 2 — then the contact,
the feeling, the perception, the thinking, the thought, the
joy, the ease, the self-collectedness, the faculties of faith,
energy, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom, ideation, happi-
ness, and vitality, the right views, 3 right endeavour, . . . 4
the grasp, the balance that arises — these, or whatever other
incorporeal, causally induced states that there are on that
occasion — these are states that are good.
1 Sampasadanam, tranquillizing, paraphrased in the
Cy. (ibid.) by saddha, assurance or faith (above, § 12).
It is a term for Jhana itself, blent as it is with the whole
contemplative discipline, ‘just as cloth steeped in purple
is “purple” * — to adapt the commentator’s simile to our
idiom. The following word cetaso, ‘of the mind,’ may be
taken either with this term, or with that next after it,
ekodibhavam (ibid.).
2 In the text read ekodibhavam. Buddhaghosa’s
comments on this expression contain the original of the
Thera Subhuti’s quotation given in Childers. The substance
of them is that the ceto (intellect, mind, heart), no longer
overwhelmed or encumbered by vitakko and vicaro, rises
up slowly pre-eminent (eko = settho or asahayo) in its
meditative concentration, or samadhi, this term being
synonymous with ekodibhavam (Samadhiss’ etam
adhivacanam). The discursive intellection of the First
Jhana, troubling the ceto, as waves rendering water turgid,
has in the Second Jhana sunk to rest. And this uplifting
is said (the commentator emphasizes) of ceto, and not of
an individual entity, nor of a living soul (na sattassa
na jivassa). See Morris’s note, J. P. T. S., 1885, p. 32.
3 Sammasankappo is here, its usual order of place,
omitted. It involves vitakko; see § 7.
4 The reference in the text to § 157 cannot be right.
The subject has not yet banished pleasurable emotion, and
attained to the calm of disinterestedness ; nor is his state
of mind ‘disconnected with knowledge.’ The type of
thought, as to its remaining components, is still the first,
i.e., that of § 1.
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47
[Summary.]
[161a] Now, on that occasion
the skandhas are four,
the spheres are two,
the elements are two,
the nutriments are three,
the faculties are eight,
the Jhana is threefpld, 1
the Path is fourfold, 2
the powers are seven,
the causes are three,
contact counts as a single factor,
etc., etc.
[Continue as in § 58 et seq .]
******
[162] What on that occasion is the skandha of syntheses?
Contact, joy,
thinking, self-collectedness ;
the faculties of
faith, concentration,
energy, wisdom,
mindfulness, vitality ;
right views,
right endeavour,
etc., etc.
[Continue as in § 62 et seq. 3 ]
1 Cf. § 83. ‘ Conception ’ and ‘ discursive thought * are
now suppressed.
2 Cf. § 89. ‘ Eight intention,’ as involving ‘ conception,’
is now suppressed. The mind is no longer occupied with
overt activities concerned with this life. See p. 46, n. 8.
3 Including, presumably, the 4 Emptiness ’ Section, as in
the case of the First Jhana.
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48
[168] Which are the states that are good ?
When, that he may attain to the heavens of Form, he
cultivates the way thereto, and further, through the waning
of all passion for joy, 1 holds himself unbiassed, 2 the while,
mindful and self-possessed, 8 he experiences in his sense-con-
sciousness 4 that ease whereof the Noble Ones 6 declare : ‘ He
that is unbiassed and watchful dwelleth at ease ’ — and so,
by earth-gazing, enters into and abides in the Third Jhana
— then the contact, the feeling, the perception, the thinking,
the thought, the ease, the self-collectedness, the faculties of
faith, energy, mindfulness, 6 concentration, wisdom, ideation,
happiness and vitality, the right views, right endea-
vour, 7 etc. . . . the grasp, the balance that arises 8 — these,
or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced states
that there are on that occasion — these are states that are
good.
1 Pltiya ca viraga, ‘meaning either distaste for joy
or the transcending of it.* The ca indicates the progressive
continuity from the preceding to the present Jhana (Asl. 171).
2 Upekkhako, or disinterested. He looks on from the
standpoint of one who has arrived, says the Cy. (172). As
we might say :
‘ E terra magnum alterius spectare laborem/
Buddhaghosa expatiates here on the ten kinds of upek-
kha enumerated in Hardy, ‘Man. Buddhism/ 505.
3 Sampajano. Intelligently aware of his own pro-
cedure.
4 Kayo, see Introduction ; supra , p. 48, n. 8.
5 See infra , § 1003, n. 6.
6 Omitted in the text, but not so in K. The context
requires its insertion.
7 Sammasati, inserted in the text, but not in the right
order, is of course required by the context, but is, here and
in K., assumed in the ‘ etc/
8 § 157, to which the reader is referred in the text, is
obviously wrong. § 1 would be nearer the mark.
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[Summary.]
[163a] Now, on that occasion
the skandhas are four,
the spheres are two,
the elements are two,
the nutriments are three,
the faculties are eight,
the Jhana is twofold, 1
the Path is fourfold, 2
the powers are seven,
the causes are three,
contact counts as a single factor,
etc., etc.
[Continue as in % 58.]
******
[164] What on that occasion is the skandha of syn-
theses?
Contact,
thinking,
self-collectedness ;
the faculties of
faith, concentration,
energy, wisdom,
mindfulness, vitality ;
right views, right endeavour,
etc., etc.
[Continue as in § 62.]
******
1 ‘ Ease ’ remains and ‘ self-collectedness.’
2 Cf. § 161 ft n. 2.
4
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[165] Which are the states that are good ?
When, that he may attain to the heavens of Form, he
cultivates the way thereto, and, by the putting away of
ease and by the putting away of ill, by the passing away
~^of the happiness and of the misery 1 he was wont to feel, he
thus, by earth-gazing, enters into and abides in the Fourth
Jhana (the fourth rapt meditation) of that utter purity
of mindfulness which comes of disinterestedness, 2 where
no ease is felt nor any ill — then the contact, the feeling,
the perception, the thinking, the thought, the disinterested-
ness, the self-collectedness, the faculties of faith, energy,
mindfulness, concentration, wisdom, ideation, disinterested-
1 ‘Ease’ and ‘ill/ according to the Cy., are kayikam,
or relating to the three skandhas of feeling, etc. — relating
to sense-consciousness. ‘ Happiness ’ and * misery ’(soman-
assam, domanassam) relate to the intellect, or ideational
consciousness. ‘ Happiness * is the last of these to be trans-
cended ; the others have been expelled in the course of the
previous stages of Jhana (Asl. 175, 176). But all four are
here enumerated, as if all were only in this Fourth Jhana
transcended, in order to show more clearly, by the method
of exhaustive elimination, what is the subtle and elusive
nature of that third species of feeling termed ‘neutral’
(adukkham-asukha), or ‘disinterested’ (upekkha) —
the zero point, or line, as we should say, of hedonic
quantity. The Cy. then gives the simile of selecting heads
of cattle by elimination of the rest of the herd, which
Hardy cites (ibid., 177 ; East. Monachism, 270).
2 Upekkha-satiparisuddhim. According to the
Vibhanga, the mindfulness that is made pure stands for
all the other elements present in consciousness, which have
also been brought into clear relief, as it were, by the calm
medium of equanimity. The simile is then adduced, given
also in Hardy (op. cit. % 271), of the moon by day and by
night. Upekkha is latent in consciousness in the other
stages of Jhana, but rendered colourless by the radiance
of intellectual and emotional exercise, as the crescent moon
during the day, though present in the sky, is dimmed by
the sun’s splendour (Asl. 178).
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51
ness and vitality, the right views, the right endeavour,
etc. . . .
[Continue as in § 168.]
******
[Summary.]
[165a] Now, on that occasion
the skandhas are four,
the spheres are two,
the elements are two,
the nutriments are three,
the faculties are eight,
the Jhana is twofold, 1
the Path is fourfold,
the powers are seven,
the causes are three,
contact counts as a single factor,
etc., etc.
[Continue as in § 58, etc.]
******
[166] What on that occasion is the skandha of syn-
theses ?
Answer as in § 164. 2
******
[Here ends] the Fourfold System of Jhana.
1 Namely, ‘ disinterestedness ’ and * self-collectedness *
(Ad. 179). Else one would have looked to find ekangi-
kam Jhanam.
2 The printed text omits satindriyam, though it is
explicitly required by the context. K. gives it.
4—2
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52
(b) The Fivefold System of Jhana (p a n c ak a n a y o).] 1
[167] The First Jhdna. Question and answer as in the
fourfold course , § 160.
[168] Which are the states that are good ?
WTien, that he may attain to the heavens of Form, he
cultivates the way thereto, and so, by earth-gazing, enters
into and abides in the Second Jhana (the second rapt medi-
tation) wherein is no working of conception, but only of
thought discursive — which is born of concentration, and is
full of joy and ease — then the contact, the feeling, the per-
ception, the thinking, the thought, the discursive inquiry,
the joy, the ease, the self-collectedness, etc. . . .
[Continue as for the Second Jhdna in § 161.]
[Summary.]
[168a] Now, on that occasion
the skandhas are four,
the spheres are two,
the elements are two,
the nutriments are three,
the faculties are eight,
1 Jhana is usually alluded to in the Pitakas in the four-
fold order. The fivefold division is obtained by the suc-
cessive, instead of simultaneous, elimination of vitakko
and vicaro. According to the Cy., it was optional to the
teacher, after the example of the Buddha, to use either at
his discretion, adapting himself to the particular mental
state of his pupils, or having a view to the effectve flow
of his discourse. A passage is quoted from the Pitakas —
probably S. iv. 863 or i. 299, n. 2 (cf K. V. 413 ; Mil 837)
— where s am ad hi is distinguished as (1) having vitakko
and vicaro, (2) having only the latter, (8) having neither.
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58
the Jhana is fourfold,
the Path is fourfold,
etc., etc.
[Continue as in § 58.]
******
[169] What on that occasion is the skandha of syn-
theses ?
Contact, thinking, discursive thought, joy, etc. ...
[Continue as in § 162.]
******
[170-175] The Third, Fourth and Fifth Jhanas.
[These are identical in formulation with the Second , Third
and Fourth Jhanas of the Fourfold System . Questions and
ansioers as in §§ 161-166.]
[Here ends] the Fivefold System of Jhana.
[(c) The Four Modes of Progress (catasso pati-
pad a).] 1
1 It has been seen that, before the several stages of
Jhana could be attained to, the student had to purge and
discipline himself in specific ways— elimination of all
attention to mundane matters, elimination of discursive
cogitation, and so on. The special stage of Jhana super-
vened after each act of self-control and intensified ab-
straction. In these processes there was an earlier and a
subsequent stage called — at least in the later books —
u pa car a and appana respectively. The effective cogni-
tion linking these two was an exercise of panna which,
in the text, is known as abhiiina (‘ intuition ’), probably
the intuitive or subconscious fetch of the mind to compass
the desired appana, or conception. Now, whether the
preparatory abstraction was easy or difficult, and whether
the constructive generalizing effort was sluggish or vigorous,
depended on the moral temperament and the mental ability
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54
[176] Which are the states that are good ?
When, that he may attain to the heavens of Form, he
cultivates the way thereto, aloof from sensuous appetites,
aloof from evil ideas, and so, by earth-gazing, enters into
and abides in the First Jhana . . . progress being painful
and intuition sluggish — then the contact 1 . . . the balance
that arises — these . . . are states that are good.
[177] 2 . . . [«r] when ... he ... so enters into and
abides in the First Jhana . . . progress being painful, but
intuition quick . . .
[178] . . . [or] when ... he ... so enters into and
abides in the First Jhana . . . progress being easy, but
intuition sluggish . . .
[179] . . . [or] when ... he ... so enters into and
abides in the First Jhana . . . progress being easy and
intuition quick — then the contact, etc. . . . the balance
that arises — these . . . are states that are good.
respectively of the individual student (Asl. 182-184). See
the double explanation in A. ii. 149-152, where the swift-
ness or sluggishness of intuition in both accounts depends
on the acuteness or flabbiness of the five faculties of faith,
energy, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom. The ease or
difficulty in self-abstraction depends, in the first explana-
tion, on whether the student is by nature passionate,
malignant, dull, or the reverse of these three. In the
second account progress is painful if he have filled his
consciousness with the disciplinary concepts of the Foul
Things (vide below, § 263), Disgust with the World, Im-
permanence and Death ; easy if he simply work out the
Four Jhtinas.
On the varying import of abhinna (which occurs in
no other connexion in the present work), see * Dialogues
of the Buddha/ i. 62. On upacara and appana, see
‘ Yogavacara’s Manual,’ p. xi. We shall probably learn more
about the whole procedure when the Yisuddhi Magga and
the Vibhanga are edited.
1 Cf.il.
2 The same question is to be understood as repeated in
each section.
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55
[180] These four combinations are repeated in the case of
the 2nd to the 4tli Jhdnas on the Fourfold System , and of the
2nd to the 5th on the Fivefold System .
[Here end] the Four Modes of Progress.
[(d) The Four Objects of Thought (cattari aram-
manani).] 1
[181] Which are the states that are good?
"When, that he may attain to the heavens of Form, he
cultivates the way thereto, and so, aloof from sensuous
appetites, aloof from evil ideas, by earth-gazing, enters into
and abides in the First Jhana (the first rapt meditation),
wherein conception works and thought discursive, which
is born of solitude, and is full of joy and ease, but which
is limited, and has a limited object of thought — then the
contact 2 . . . the balance that arises — these . . . are states
that are good.
[182] . . . [or] when . . . the First Jhana 3 ... is
limited, but has an object of thought capable of infinite
extension . . .
[188] . . . [or] when . . . the First Jhana ... is
capable of infinite extension, but has a limited object of
thought . . .
[184] . . . [or] when . . . the First Jhana ... is
capable of infinite extension, and has an object of thought
capable of infinite extension — then the contact, etc. . . .
the balance that arises, these . . . are states that are good.
1 That is to say, the percepts or concepts on which the
student, in seeking to induce Jhana, fixes his attention are
here classified as having the potentiality to induce a weak
or a lofty mood of rapt contemplation. Buddhaghosa
describes the former kind of object as having the shallow-
ness of a mere basket or dish (Asl. 184). See also below,
1019-1024.
2 Cf. § 1.
3 In the following condensed passages the question and
answer in the text respectively coincides with and com-
mences like the precedent given in § 181.
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56
[185] These four combinations are repeated in the case of
the 2nd to the 4 th Jhdnas on the Fourfold System , and of the
1st to the 5th 1 Jhdnas on the Fivefold System .
[Here end] the Four Objects of Thought.
[(e) ( = c and d) The Sixteenfold Combination (solasak-
khattukam).]
[186] Which are the states that are good?
When, that he may attain to the heavens of Form, he
cultivates the way thereto, aloof from sensuous appetites,
aloof from evil ideas, and so
and abides in the first Jhana
where progress is pain-
ful and intuition sluggish,
, by earth-gazing, enters into
which is limited, and has a
limited object of thought . . .
[187] . . . [or] which is
limited, but has an object
of thought capable of in-
finite extension . . .
[188] . . . [or] which is
capable of infinite extension,
but has a limited object of
thought . . .
[189] . . . [or] which is
capable of infinite extension,
and has an object of thought
capable of infinite extension
[190] . . . [or] where pro-
gress is painful, but intuition
is quick,
' which is limited, and has a
limited object of thought . . .
[191] . . [or] . . . etc.
[Continue for §§ 191-198
, as in §§ 187-189.]
1 In the text, § 185, after pathamam jhanam read
. . . pe . . . paiicamam jhanam. So K. Cf § 180.
Again, after avikkhepo hoti supply . . . pe . . .
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57
[194] . . . [or] where pro- which is limited, 1 and has
gress is easy, but intuition a limited object of thought
sluggish, • • •
[195] . . . [or] . . . etc.
[Continue for §§ 195-197
> as above.]
[198] . . . [or] where pro- which is limited, and has a
gress is easy and intuition limited object of thought . . .
quick,
i [199] [( Continue for §§ 199-
l 201 as above.]
[202] [These sixteen combinations are repeated in the case
of the 2nd to the 4th Jhdnas on the Fourfold System , and of
the 1st to the 5th Jhdnas on the Fivefold System.]
[Here ends] the Sixteenfold Combination.
[2. The Remaining Seven Artifices which may also be
developed in sixteenfold combination (atthakasinam
solasakkhattukam).] 2
1 In the text supply parittam before parittaram-
manam.
2 The first artifice for the induction of Jhana having
been that of earth-gazing (see above, passim). In the
Sutta Pitaka — viz., in the Maha Sakuludayi-Sutta (M. ii.,
p. 14), and in the Jhana Yagga (A. i. 41) — ten kasinas are
enumerated, those omitted in the Dhammasangani being
the kasinas of intellection (v in flan a) and space (akasa).
The fact of the omission and the nature of the two omitted
kasinas are commented on by Buddhaghosa (Asl. 186).
He explains the omission of the former by its being
identical with the second of the four Aruppajhanani
given in §§ 265-268, and that of the latter through its
ambiguity. For either it amounts to the ‘ yellow ’ kasina
(sun-lit space), or it amounts to the first Aruppa jhana
(§ 265). The Ceylon tradition has ten kasinas also, but
admits aloka (light) instead of vifinana. And it includes
yet another quasi-kasina in the shape of a bhuta-kasina,
or the four elements taken collectively, after each has been
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58
[208] Which are the states that are good ?
When, that he may attain to the heavens of Form, he
cultivates the way thereto, aloof from sensuous appetites,
aloof from evil ideas, and so, by the artifice of
water . . .
fire . . .
air . . .
blue-black . . .
yellow . . .
red . . .
white . . .
enters into and abides in the First Jhana . . . then the
contact, etc., that arises — these . . . are states that are
good.
[Here ends] the Sixteenfold Combination in the case of
the seven remaining artifices for induction.
pi.
The Stations of Mastery 1 (a b h i b h a y a t a n a n i) .
1. ‘ Forms as Limited ’ (rupani p a r i 1 1 a n i) .
(a and b) Fourfold and Fivefold Jhana.]
[204] Which are the states that are good ?
When, that he may attain to the heavens of Form, he
separately dwelt upon. See ‘ Yogavacara’s Manual, 1896/
pp. 48-52.
1 Eight ‘ stations * or ‘ positions of mastery ’ are given
in the Maha-parinibbana-Sutta (pp. 28, 29 ; see S. B. E.
xi. 49, 50, and in A. iv. 305), but the formulae of the first
four differ slightly from those in our text. The Cy. draws
attention to this discrepancy (Asl. 189). In the Suttanta
the aesthetic aspect of the objects perceived is taken into
account in all four stations, the specific difference replacing
it in two of them being the conscious dwelling on some
part of one’s own bodily frame orrupaskandha. In the
Dhammasangani this consciousness is excluded from all the
stations. To teach by way of its inclusion and exclusion
is called ‘ merely a jeu d' esprit in the Master’s discourse *
(desana-vilasa-mattam eva). See following note.
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59
cultivates the way thereto, and, unconscious of any part
of his corporeal self, 1 but seeing external objects to be
limited, gets the mastery over them with the thought *1
know, I see!* 2 and so, aloof from sensuous appetites, aloof
from evil ideas, enters into and abides in the First Jhana,
etc. . . . then the contact, etc., that arises — these . . . are
states that are good.
[205] [Repeat in the case of the 2nd to the \th Jhdna on
the Fourfold System , and of the 2nd to the 5th Jhdna on the
Fivefold System .]
[(c) The Four Modes of Progress.]
[206-210] Repeat the four combinations of progress as
painful or easy, and of intuition as sluggish or quick set
out in §§ 176-180, substituting for 6 earth - gazing ’ the
Mastery -formula just stated .
1 Ajjhattam arupasanili (=na rupasanni). This
rendering is in accordance with Buddhaghosa’s comments
(Asl. 188, 189, 191). The student, either because he has
tried and failed, or because he did not wish to try, has not
induced Jhana by way of fixing attention on his own hair
or the rest. Cf. the Maha Bahulovada-Sutta (M. i. 62),
where the individual’s rupa-skandha is fully set forth with
reference to the four elements, ajjhattika pathavld-
hatu, etc., beginning with ‘ hair ’ and the rest. Cj. § 248 n.
2 The external objects in question are contemplated on
the kasina system (Asl. 188). And just as a man of
vigorous digestion bolts a spoonful of rice, so the aspirant
after sublime truth swiftly and easily transcends the initial
act of external perception when the object is insignificant,
and brings forth the desiderated concept (appana). The
judgments by which he registers the consciousness of in-
tellectual mastery have reference, according to Buddhaghosa,
to past experience of enlightenment, and indicate simply
a recognition, or, in terms of syllogism, a minor premise
identified. But he states that, in the Sinhalese commentary
on the Nikayas, they are interpreted as implying a present
access of new light, a fresh moral attainment, gained after
the thinker transcends perceptual consciousness {ibid.).
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[(d) The Two Objects of Thought.]
[211-218] Repeat , substituting for ‘ earth - gazing * the
Mastery foi-mula, § 181, where the Jhdna ‘is limited, and
has a limited object of thought/ and § 188, where the Jhdna
‘ is capable of infinite extension, but has a limited object of
thought/ 1
[(e = t* and d) The Eightfold Combination (atthak-
khattuka m.] 2
[214-221] Repeat , with the same substitution , §§ 186, 188,
190, 192, 194, 196, 198, and 200 of the Sixteenfold Com-
bination .
[222] Repeat these 9 eight combinations in the case of each
of the remaining Jhdnas.
[2. ‘Forms as limited and as beautiful or ugly* s
(rupiini parittani suvanna-dubbannani).
1 The ‘ objects of thought’ are here the kasinas, essentially
discerned to be ‘ limited ’ or insignificant. Hence two, not
four varieties ; and hence eight, not sixteen combinations.
The term appamanam connoting merely a relative , not
an absolute infinitude, there is only a difference of degree
in the depth, purifying efficacy, or what not, of the Jhana
attained to. The same illustrative figure is accordingly
used, varied in degree. The gourmand , discontented with
a small dish of rice, demands more and more. So the
aspirant (now nanuttaro, not ilanuttariko), aiming
at perfect self-concentration, refuses to call that infinite
which seems so (ibid.).
2 So K.
8 The general aesthetic designations of suvannam and
dubbanam are in the Cy. paraphrased by parisuddham
and its negative. Just as the limited nature of visible
things was held to be an efficacious consideration for con-
ceptual efforts, and the notion of ‘infinite* helpful for
dulness, so the beautiful and the ugly were prescribed for
inimical conduct and for indulgence in passion respectively.
The appropriateness of it all is said to be discussed in the
Cariya-niddesa of the Yisuddhi Magga (Asl. 189).
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(a) and ( b )]
[228] Which are the states that are good ?
When, that he may attain to the heavens of Form, he
cultivates the way thereto, and, unconscious of any part
of his corporeal self, but seeing external objects to be
limited, and to be beautiful or ugly, gets the mastery over
them with the thought, ‘I know, I see!’ and so, aloof
from sensuous appetites, aloof from evil ideas, enters into
and abides in the First Jhana, etc. . . . then the contact,
etc., that arises — these . . . are states that are good.
[224] Repeat in the case of each of the remaining Jhdnas.
Develop in eightfold combination.
[8. ‘ Forms as infinite '(rupani appamanan i). 1
(a) and (6)]
[225] Which are the states that are good ?
When, that he may attain to the heavens of Form, he
cultivates the way thereto, and, unconscious of any part
of his corporeal self, but seeing external objects to be
infinite, gets the mastery over them with the thought,
‘I know, I see!’ and so, aloof from sensuous appetites,
etc.
[Continue as in § 204.]
[226] Repeat in the case of each of the remaining Jhdnas.
[(c) The Four Modes of Progress.]
[227-281] Repeat §§ 206-210, substituting ‘infinite* for
‘ limited.*
1 See note on §§ 211-218. Taken in order, Buddha-
ghosa’s comment there reproduced applies to that part of
the text. According to the context, it might better apply
here, where the external forms or kasina-objects are now
contemplated as ‘ infinite.* The reflection, however, applies
to either passage.
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[(d) The Two Objects of Thought.]
[282-284] Repeat , with the same sud>stitution as in ( c) r
§§ 211-218.
[(e = c and d) The Eightfold Combination.]
[285-242] Develop , with the same substitution as in ( c ) and
( d ), after the manner of §§ 187, 189, and so on to § 201.
[248] Repeat these eight combinations in the case of each oft
the remaining Jhanas .
[4. * Forms as infinite and as beautiful or ugly ’ (r u p a n i
appamanani suvann a-d ubbannani).
(a) and ( b )]
[244] Repeat § 228, substituting ‘infinite* for ‘limited.’
[245] Repeat in the case of each of the remaining Jhdnas.
Develop in eightfold combination.
[5. ‘ Forms as blue-black,* etc. (rupani nllan i). 1
1 It is well known that it is as difficult to determine
the range of colour indicated by nil am as to decide the
colour-value of the word yXav/cos. Like the latter term,
nllam may originally have referred more to lustre than
to tinge, meaning darkly lustrous, jetty, or nigrescent.
Any way, it is not plausible to render the term by ‘ blue ’
when one is referred to human hair or bile (pit tarn) as
instances of it in the human body. See note 2 to § 248.
In Jat. iii. 188 hair-dye or hair-wash is called nlliyam —
much, perhaps, as we speak of ‘ blacking * or ‘ russet polish *
for shoes. This implies that the colour called nllam
was, if not the usual, at least the desiderated colour of
human hair.
If it were what we understand by a typical blue, the
term would be applied to sky and sea, or the violet band
of the rainbow, which is, I believe, never the case. Pos-
sibly our own colour- parallels in these respects are a
modern development. Cft Havelock Ellis in Contemporary
Review 9 vol. lxix., p. 727. Modem Hindu colour-terms are,
I am told, largely of Persian origin.
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63
(«)]
. [246] Which are the states that are good ?
When, that he may attain to the heavens of Form, he
cultivates the way thereto, and, unconscious of any part
of his corporeal self, but seeing external objects which
are blue-black, blue-black in colour, blue-black in visible
expanse, 1 blue-black in luminousness, gets the mastery over
them with the thought, ‘ I know, I see !’ and so, aloof from
sensuous appetites, etc.
[Continue as in § 204.]
******
[6-8. ‘ Forms as yellow,’ etc. (r n p a n i p 1 1 a n i).
[247] Repeat § 246, substituting for * blue-black, blue-black
in colour,’ etc., ‘ yellow,’ ‘ red,’ and 1 white ’ 2 3 * * * * successively .
Develop these Stations of Mastery in the Sixteenfold
Combination.
[in.
The Three First Deliverances (tlni vimokkhan i. 8 ]
1 .
[248] When, that he may attain to the heavens of Form,
he cultivates the way thereto, and, conscious of his bodily
1 Nilanidassanam, indicating, according to the Cy.
(190), a uniform sheet of blue without break. The colours
in this and following sections may reside in a flower, a
piece of cloth, or some other basis.
2 The remaining three English colour-names may match
the Pali terms as loosely as in the previous case. Cf.
S. B. E. xi., loc. cit. In the Sutta there translated in-
stances of the colours are given, and, curiously enough,
‘ white ’ is illustrated, not by milk, or the distant Himalaya
snows, but by the morning star.
3 Followed by four more of the Eight Deliverances in
the next chapter, §§ 265-268. The eighth alone is not
given in the present work. See Maha Parinibbana Sutta,
p. 30; A. iv. 806. According to the Cy. (190), the term
‘deliverance’ (vimokkham, or adhimuccanam) is used
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64
form, 1 sees bodily forms, and so, aloof from sensuous
appetites, aloof from evil ideas, enters into and abides in
the First Jhana, etc. . . . then the contact, etc., which
arises, these . . . are states that are good.
2 .
[249] When, that he may attain to the heavens of Form,
he cultivates the way thereto, and, unconscious of his cor-
poreal self, sees external bodily forms, and so, aloof from
sensuous appetites, etc.
[Continue as in preceding section.]
8 .
[250] When, that he may attain to the heavens of Form,
he cultivates the way thereto, and, with the thought,
* How fair it is !’ 2 aloof from sensuous appetites, etc.
to denote the being set free from ‘ adverse conditions ’ and
their seductive fascinations, so that the attention is sus-
tained with all the detachment and confidence that the
child feels who is borne on his father’s hip, his little limbs
dangling, their clutch unneeded.
1 Rupi. Judging by the Cy. (190), this is equivalent
to aj jhattam rupasaiifil— that is, to the opposite of the
term ‘unconscious of any part of his corporeal self,’ the
attitude prescribed in the Stations of Mastery, supra ,
§ 204 et seq. The parikammam selected is ‘one’s own
hair and the rest.’ If a nlla-parikammam is sought,
attention is fixed on the hair or bile (pit t am) or the pupil
of the eye. If the induction is to be by way of yellow, fat
or skin may be taken ; if red, flesh, blood, or the tongue,
or the palms of the hands or feet, etc. ; if white, the teeth,
nails, or white of the eye. At the same time ‘he sees
external bodily forms in the nlla or other kasina with the
Jhdna-vision ’ (jhiinacakkhuna passati).
How this dual effort of intense attention was effected I
do not pretend to understand, but Buddhaghosa more than
once refers us for a more detailed account to the Yisuddhi
Magga.
2 That is to say, says the Cy. (191), not the conscious
acquirement of the concept (appana), but the consciousness
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[Continue as in the first Deliverance .]
These three Deliverances may also be developed in
Sixteenfold Combination.
[IV.
The Four Jhanas of the Sublime Abodes (cattari
brahmaviharajhanan i). 1
1. Love (metta).
(a) Fourfold Jhana.]
[251] Which are the states that are good?
When, that he may attain to the heavens of Form, he
of the perfection or purity of colour or lustre in the par-
ticular kasina is here meant. (The reading should, of
course, be subhan ti.) And this aesthetic consciousness
is declared by Buddhaghosa to quicken the sense of emanci-
pation from morally adverse conditions analogously to that
perception of moral beauty which may be felt in the Sublime
Abodes of the following sections. According to the Pati-
sambhida-magga, here quoted, when, on pervading the
whole world with heart of love, pity, etc., all feeling of
aversion from living beings is rooted out, the student is
struck with the glory of the idea, and works his deliver-
ance.
1 On these four great exercises, see Bhys Davids, S. B. E.
xi. 201, n. ; and on their emancipating efficacy, M. i. 38.
Buddhaghosa again refers the reader to his Visuddhi Magga
for a more detailed commentary (vide chap, ix., and cf.
Hardy, ‘Eastern Monachism,’ p. 248 et seq.). The four
are set out here only under the * Suddhika ’ formulae — that
is, under heads (a) and ( b ). But (c), or the Modes of
Progress, as well as (d) and (e), are understood to follow
in each case (Asl. 192). The object of thought (a ram-
man am) in this connexion will be ‘limited’ if the student
dwells in love, etc., on but a restricted number of beings ;
‘ infinite * if his heart embrace vast numbers.
The commentator has not a little to say in the present
work, however, on the nature and mutual relations of the
‘ Abodes * (pp. 193-195). First, the characteristics of each
5
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66
cultivates the way thereto, and so, aloof from sensuous
appetites, aloof from evil ideas, enters into and abides in the
First Jhana (the first rapt meditation), wherein conception
are fully set forth, together with their false manifestation
(vipatti). Clinging (sinehasambhavo) is the vipatti
of love, the essential mark of which is the carrying on of
beneficent conduct, etc. Tears and the like are less truly
characteristic of pity than is the bearing and relieving the
woes of others. Laughter and the like are less genuine
expressions of sympathy (mudita, which is strictly
<T\r/x ai P 0<T v V7 l> Mitfreude) than is appreciation of what
others have achieved. And there is a condition of dis-
interestedness (upekkha) which is prompted by ignorance,
and not by that insight into the karma of mankind which
can avail to calm the passions.
He next designates the four antisocial attitudes which
are to be extirpated by these ethical disciplines, taken in
order — ill-will (vyapado), cruelty (vihesa), aversion
(arati), and passion (rago) — and shows how each virtue
has also a second vice opposed to it. This he terms its near
enemy, as being less directly assailed by it than its ethical
opposite, the latter resembling an enemy who has to lurk
afar in the jungle and the hills. Love and vengeful conduct
cannot coexist. To prevail in this respect, let love be de-
veloped fearlessly. But where love and its object have too
much in common, love is threatened by lust. On this side
let love be guarded well. Again, the near enemy to pity,
more insidious than cruelty, is the self-pity pining for what
one has not got or has lost— a low, profane melancholy.
And the corresponding worldly happiness in what one has,
or in consequence of obliviousness as to what one has lost,
lies in wait to stifle appreciation of the good fortune of
others. Lastly, there is the unintelligent indifference of
the worldling who has not triumphed over limitations
nor mastered cause and effect, being unable to transcend
external things.
The remainder of his remarks are occupied w r ith the
necessary ethical sequence in the four Abodes, and the
importance of observing method in their cultivation, and
finally with their other technical appellation of Appa-
m anii a, or Infinitudes. In this connexion he repeats the
touching illustration given in Hardy (op. cit., 249) of the
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67
worts and thought discursive, which is born of solitude,
is full of joy and ease, and is accompanied by Love — then
the contact, etc. . . . [? continue as in § 1] . . . the balance
that arises — these . . . are states that are good.
[252] Which are the states that are good ?
When, that he may attain to the heavens of Form, he
cultivates the way thereto, suppressing the working of
conception and of thought discursive, and so, by earth-
gazing, enters into and abides in the Second Jhana (the
second rapt meditation), which is self-evolved, born of con-
centration, is full of joy and ease, in that, set free . . . the
mind grows calm and sure, dwelling on high — and which is
accompanied by Love— then the contact, etc.
[Continue as in the foregoing .]
[253] Which are the states that are good ?
When, that he may attain to the heavens of Form, he
cultivates the way thereto, and further, through the waning
of all passion for joy, holds himself unbiassed, the while,
mindful and self-possessed, he experiences in his sense-con-
sciousness that ease whereof the Noble Ones declare : ‘ He
mother and her four children. Her desire for the growth
of the infant is as Metta; for the recovery of the sick
child as Karuna; for the maintenance of the gifts dis-
played by the youth as Mudita; while her care not to
hinder the career of her grown-up son is as Upekkha.
It may be remarked, by the way, that when Hardy, with
a foreigner’s want of mudita, calumniates the Buddhist
mendicant (p. 250) as one who thinks about the virtues
of solidarity without practising them, he quite forgets that
these exercises are but preparations of the will for that
ministering to the intellectual needs of others to which the
recluse’s life was largely devoted, and the importance of
which the Western, in his zeal for material forms of
charity, does not even now appreciate at its real value.
And Buddhism did not believe in giving the rein to good
impulses unregulated by intellectual control.
5—2
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that is unbiassed and watchful dwelleth at ease * — and so,
by earth-gazing, enters into and abides in the Third Jhana,
which is accompanied by Love 1 — then, etc.
[Continue as in the foregoing .]
(b) Fivefold Jhana.
[254-257] Repeat question and answers in §§ 167, 168,
170, 172, adding in each answer , as in the foregoing section ,
4 and which is accompanied by Love.’ 2
2. Pity (karuna).
[258, 259] Repeat question and answers in the preceding
sections (a) and (6), but substituting in each case ‘ and which
is accompanied by Pity 1 for the clause on Love.
3. Sympathy (mudita).
[260, 261] Repeat question and answers in the preceding
two sections , but substituting in each case ‘and which is
accompanied by Sympathy * for the clause on Pity.
4. Disinterestedness (upekkha).
[262] When, that he may attain to the heavens of Form,
he cultivates the way thereto, and, by the putting away of
ease and by the putting away of ill, by the passing away
of the happiness and of the misery he was wont to feel, he
thus, by earth-gazing, enters into and abides in the Fourth
Jhana (the fourth rapt meditation) of that utter purity
of mindfulness which comes of disinterestedness, where no
ease is felt nor any ill, and which is accompanied by Dis-
interestedness — then the contact, etc.
[Continue as in § 165.]
1 Love necessarily involves happiness (somanassam
= cetasikam sukham, § 10, n.), hence it cannot be
cultivated by way of the Fourth — or, under (b), Fifth —
Jhana.
2 Omitting the Fifth Jhana. See preceding note.
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69
The Four Jhanas of the Sublime Abodes may be de-
veloped in Sixteen Combinations.
[V.
The Jhana of Foul Things (a s u b h a-j h a n a m.)]
[263] Which are the states that are good ?
When, that he may attain to the heavens of Form, he
cultivates the way thereto, and so, aloof from sensuous
appetites, aloof from evil ideas, enters into and abides in
the First Jhana, wherein, etc. . . . and which is accom-
panied by the idea of a bloated corpse 1 . . .
[or] [264] of a discoloured corpse . . .
[or] of a festering corpse . . .
[or] of a corpse with cracked skin . . .
[or] of a corpse gnawn and mangled . . .
[or] of a corpse cut to pieces . . .
[or] of a corpse mutilated and cut in pieces . . .
[or] of a bloody corpse . . .
[or] of a corpse infested with worms . . .
[or] of a skeleton . . .
then the contact . . . the balance which arises — these . . .
are states that are good. 2
1 The formula of the First Jhana is understood to be
repeated in the case of each of the ten Asubhas, but of the
First only. For, in the words of the Cy. (p. 199), ‘just
as on a swiftly-flowing river a boat can only be steadied
by the power of the rudder, so from the weakness (dubba-
latta) of the idea (in this case) the mind can only be
steadied in its abstraction by the power of conceptual
activity (vitakko).’ And this activity is dispensed with
after the First Jhana.
2 For a more detailed account of this peculiar form of
moral discipline, the reader is again referred to the Visuddhi
Magga (chap. vi.). Hardy (‘ East. Mon.’), who quotes largely
from the Sinhalese commentary on the Visuddhi Magga,
may also be consulted (p. 247 et seq.). In the Satipat-
thana Sutta (D. 22. Cf. Warren, ‘ Buddhism in Translat-
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70
The Jhana of Foul Things may be developed in Sixteen
Combinations.
[Here ends the Chapter on] Good in relation to the
Universe of Form.
tion/ p. 358 et seq . ; and M.I. 58) a system of nine Asubha-
meditations is set out in terms somewhat different. In
S. v. (pp. 129-131) five of the Asubhas, beginning with ‘ the
skeleton * meditation, are prescribed in connexion with the
sambhojjhangas of mindfulness and disinterestedness.
And the same five are given in the Jhana Vagga of A. i. 42
(cf. A. iii. 328). The ten here given are said in the Cy.
(pp. 197-199) to be prescribed for such as were proved to be
passionately affected by the beauty of the body — of the figure,
skin, odour, firmness or continuity, plumpness, limbs and
extremities, symmetry, adornment, identifying self with the
body, or complacency in the possession of it (?kaye
mamattam ; cf. S. N. 951), and teeth respectively. A dead
body is not essential to this kind of mind-culture, the Cy.
citing the cases of those Theras who obtained the requisite
Jhana by the glimpse of a person’s teeth, or by the sight of
a rajah on his elephant. The essential procedure lay in
getting a clear and courageous grasp of the transience of
any living organism.
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[Chapter III.
Good in relation to the Universe of the Formless
(arupavacara-kusala m).
The Four Jhanas connected with Formless Existence
(c attar iarii pa j j hanan i). 1
1. The Sphere of Unbounded Space (akasananca-
y a tan am).]
[265] Which are the states that are good ?
1 These often appear in the Nikayas as the fourth to the
seventh of the Eight Vimokhas or Deliverances (cf. §§ 248-
250 ; Maha Par. Sutta, p. 80 ; A. iv. 806). Though treated
of in the Yisuddhi Magga (chap. iii. ), Buddhaghosa only
makes comparison with the account of them given in the
Vibhanga. In S. iii. 287, and frequently in the Majjhima,
they occur in immediate sequence to the four Jhanas
without any collective title, and not as concomitants of the
Fourth Jhana. There, too, the formulae also have this slight
variation from those in the present work, that the conscious
attainment of each stage of abstraction is expressed by a
brief proposition of identification, e.g., ananto akaso ti
. . . n’atthi kificl ti (It is boundless space! . . . There
is nothing whatever !). The Cy. explains this by a curious
quibble which is incidentally of interest (p. 204). It was
the wish of the Buddha to carry out, as in previous pro-
cedure so in this, the study of the Four Objects of Thought
[arammanani; see above, passim, under (d)]. And the
first of these is that one’s object is ‘ limited.’ But if the
student, in attaining to an undifferentiated consciousness
of unbounded space, realize its nature by the, so to speak,
exclamatory thought, ‘ It is boundless !’ he cannot logically
proceed to consider it as limited. If I interpret Buddha-
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72
When, that he may attain to the Formless heavens,
he cultivates the way thereto, and so, by passing wholly
beyond all consciousness of form, by the dying out of the
consciousness of sensory reaction, 1 by turning the attention
from any consciousness of the manifold, 2 he enters into
and abides in that rapt meditation which is accompanied
by the consciousness of a sphere of unbounded space —
ghosa aright, an interesting significance is hereby added to
these parenthetical exclamations, which are not unfrequent
in Buddhist philosophy. They seem to imply an act of
conscious recognition.
1 The student is to withdraw all interest in and attention
to the world of nip a, to cease so entirely to differentiate
the plenum of external phenomena (including his own form)
which impinge on his senses, that sensations cease, or
resolve themselves into a homogeneous sense of extended
vacuum. Patigho, rendered by sensory reaction, is ex- -
plained to be sight-perception, sound-perception, smell, taste,
and touch-perception. ‘ Thought is (here) not sustained
by way of the five doors ’ (Asl. 201, 202). Hardest of all
was it to abstract all attention from sounds. Alara Kalama,
one of Gotama’s teachers, and proficient in these rapt states,
at least so far as the sixth Vimokha (M. i. 164), was credited
with the power of becoming so absorbed that he failed to
see or hear hundreds of carts passing near him (Asl. 202).
On the psycho-physiological use of patigho, see the theory
of sense in the book on form, infra , § 597 et seq.
2 Nanattasannanam amanasikara. On the latter
term, see above, p. 5, n. 1. Nanattam is of rare occur-
rence in the Nikayas; but see M. i. 8, where, in a series
of concepts, it follows ‘ unity ’ and precedes * the whole ’
(Neumann renders by Vielheit ); also S. iv. 113, 114,
where it is explained to refer to the various kinds of sensa-
tion, the corresponding v in nan a, and the resulting feeling.
In the Yibhanga, quoted by Buddhaghosa (p. 202), it is
explained to mean cognition of the mutual diversity or
dissimilarity (annamaniiam a sadis a) of nature in the
eight kinds of good thoughts, the twelve bad thoughts
(below, § 365), as well as in those ideas of good and bad
results which are taken next to these. For cittani,
however, sauna is substituted, possibly limiting the appli-
cation of the discernment of diversity to the sensuous basis
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73
even the Fourth Jhana, to gain which 1 all sense of ease
must have been put away, and all sense of ill must have
been put away, and there must have been a dying out of
the happiness and misery he was wont to feel — (the rapt
meditation) which is imbued with disinterestedness, and
where no ease is felt nor any ill, but only the perfect
/ purity that comes of mindfulness and disinterestedness —
then the contact, etc. ...[</.§ 165] the balance that
arises, these . . . are states that are good.
[2. The Sphere of Infinite Intellection (vinnananca-
y a t a n a m). 2 ]
[266] Which are the states that are good ?
When, that he may attain to the Formless heavens, he
cultivates the way thereto, and, having passed 3 wholly
beyond the sphere of boundless space, enters into and
abides in that rapt meditation which is accompanied by the
of all those ‘ thoughts.’ The context, nevertheless, seems
to point to a certain general, abstract, ‘ re-representative ’
import in sanna as here applied. It is said to be the
consciousness of one who is occupied with manodhatu or
with manovinnanadhatu — with, let us say, representa-
tive or with re-representative cognition — with ideas or with
cognition of those ideas. The ideation in this case is about
sensuous phenomena as manifold, and the abstract nature
of it lies, of course, in considering their diversity as such.
1 In the text the formula of the Fourth Jhana remains
unaltered (cf. § 165). But it is sandwiched between the
cumbrous adjectival compounds referring to space and to
disinterestedness. Hence some modification was necessary
to avoid uncouthness of diction.
2 Strictly vinnananancayatanam. The usually elided
syllable (rulhi-saddo) is noticed in the Cy. (205).
8 K., here and in the two following replies, has the gerund
samatikkamma, following the usage in the Nikayas (see,
e.g. 9 D., M. P. S., 30; M. i. 174, 209; S. iii. 237, 238;
A. iv. 306). Buddhaghosa apparently reads samatik-
kama (205), as is the unvarying case in the first only of
these four arupajjhanas.
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consciousness of a sphere of infinite intellection 1 — even the
Fourth Jhana, to gain which all sense of ease must have
been put away, etc.
[Continue as in previous section.]
[8. The Sphere of Nothingness (akificannayata-
n a m).]
[267] Which are the states that are good?
When, that he may attain to the Formless heavens,
he cultivates the way thereto, and, having passed wholly
beyond the sphere of infinite intellection, enters into and
abides in that rapt meditation which is accompanied by the
consciousness of a sphere of nothingness — even the Fourth
Jhana, to gain which all sense of ease must have been put
away, etc.
[Continue as in § 265.]
[4. The Sphere where there is neither Perception nor
Non-perception (neva-sanna-nasanfiayatanam).]
[268] Which are the states that are good ?
When, that he may attain to the Formless heavens,
he cultivates the way thereto, and, having passed wholly
beyond the sphere of nothingness, enters into and abides
in that rapt meditation which is accompanied by the con-
sciousness of a sphere where there is neither perception
nor non-perception 2 — even the Fourth Jhana, to gain which
all sense of ease must have been put away, etc.
[Continue as in § 265.]
1 The only explanation given of a term on which one
would gladly have heard Buddhaghosa expatiate is, ‘ There
is no end for him in respect to that which has to be cogi-
tated’ (lit., minded; manasikatabba-vasena) (Asl. 205).
On the next stage, too (§ 267), no light at all is thrown
(p. 206).
2 Buddhaghosa explains this mental state as the cultiva-
tion of the functioning of the subtle residuum of conscious
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The Four Jhanas connected with Formless Existence
may be developed in sixteen combinations.
syntheses (sankharavasesa-sukhuma-bhavam). In
so far as perception (presumably understood as being wholly
introspective) has become incapable of effective functioning
(patu-safina-kiccam), the state is non-perceptual. In so
far as those faint, fine conscious reactions are maintained,
the state is ‘not non-perceptual/ This oscillation about
a zero-point in consciousness is illustrated by the similes
quoted (not from this Cy.) by Hardy (op. cit., 264), namely,
of the bowl containing just so much oil as suffices for
cleansing purposes, but no* to be poured out ; also, of the
little pool, sufficient to wet the feet, but too shallow for a
bathe. Both oil and water exist, or do not exist, according
to what action can be taken with respect to them. The
Cy. adds that this liminal point obtains not only in sanna,
but also in feeling, thought, and contact (208). The study
of the ‘ threshold ’ of consciousness, and of the supra- and
sub-liminal grades clustering about it, is familiar enough
to the investigator in psychophysics. What is unfamiliar
to us is the exploitation of the borderland of consciousness
in the interests of ethical growth. Leibnitz might have
found in the neva-sanna-nasannayatanam, had he
had opportunity, the inspiration for his theory of petites
perceptions .
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[Chapter IV.
Degrees of Efficacy in Good relating to the Three
Realms.
1. Good in relation to the Universe of Sense (kama-
vacarakusalam).]
[269] Which are the states that are good ?
When a good thought concerning the sensuous universe
has arisen, which is (I.) accompanied by happiness and
associated with knowledge — a thought which is
of inferior, or
of medium, or
of superlative efficacy, 1
or the dominant influence in which is
desire, or
energy, or
1 The effective power or karma of all the foregoing
thoughts and exercises to modify the individual^ existence
in one universe or another for good seems to have been,
for practical purposes, distinguished under three grades of
efficacy. So I gather, at least, from the comment on this
curious section (pp. 211, 212) : ‘ “ inferior ” (hlnam) must
be understood to mean paltry in respect of heaping up.’
‘ Heaping up * is in later books almost always associated
with karma. Meaning to toil, more specifically to dig up,
pile up, it is used to express the metaphorical notion of
ever accumulating merit or demerit constituting the indi-
vidual’s potentiality in the way of rebirth. Cf. Mil. 109 ;
also below, § 1059, n. 9, on ‘ she who toils.* The Patthana
may throw more light on the subject (Asl., ibid.).
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77
[another] thought, or
investigation ; x
or the dominant influence in which is
desire of inferior,
of medium, or
of superlative efficacy ;
or the dominant influence in which is
energy of inferior,
of medium, or
of superlative efficacy ;
or the dominant influence in which is
[another] thought of inferior,
of medium, or
of superlative efficacy ;
1 An explanation is also needed, it seems to me, for this
association of the Four Iddhipadas (M. i. 108 ; A. iii. 82 ;
S. v. 264-266) with this special aspect of karma ; for they
lead to Arahatship rather than to rebirth in some other
plane. The Cy. only states that when anyone, in the act
of accumulating, relinquishes desire or the rest, 4 that * is
called inferior [in efficacy]; that when these four states
are moderately or superlatively efficacious they are called
accordingly ; and that 4 when anyone has accumulated,
having made desire (chan do), i.e., the wishing- to-do, his
sovereign, chief and leader,’ then the procedure is said to
be under the dominant influence of desire. So for the
other three.
It is to be regretted that the Cy. does not discuss the
term vlmamsa (investigation), or the propriety of its
position in this series of four. It would be interesting to
have learnt its psychological import in relation tovitakko
and vicaro. There is a suggestion of dual symmetry
about the series: as chando is to viriyam (conation
passing into action), so is cittam (the idea) to the dis-
cursive re-representative intellection of vlmamsa. I have
rendered cittadhipateyyam by the influence of another
thought in accordance with the Cy. (218), where it is said
to be an associated thought, or states associated with the
original 4 good thought.’
There is another brief comment on the adhipateyyas
below, § 1084, n. 2.
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or the dominant influence in which is
investigation of inferior,
of medium, or
of superlative efficacy, 1
then the contact . . . the balance that arises — these . . .
are states that are good.
[270] Which are the states that are good ?
When a good thought concerning the sensuous universe
has arisen which is (II.) accompanied by happiness,
associated with knowledge, and prompted by a conscious
motive . . .
or (III.) accompanied by happiness, and disconnected with
knowledge . . .
or (IV.) accompanied by happiness, disconnected with
knowledge, and prompted by a conscious motive . . .
or (V.) accompanied by disinterestedness, and associated
with knowledge . . .
or (VI.) accompanied by disinterestedness, associated with
knowledge, and prompted by a conscious motive . . .
or (VII.) accompanied by disinterestedness, and discon-
nected with knowledge . . .
or (VIII.) accompanied by disinterestedness, disconnected
with knowledge, and prompted by a conscious motive— a
thought which is of inferior . . .
or of medium . . .
or of superlative efficacy . . .
1 The tabulated form adopted in this and following
replies is intended not only to facilitate a conspectus of
the system, but also to indicate the elision in the Pah
(expressed by . . . pe . . . ) of the repetition of the
unvarying framework of the reply before and after each
tabulated term. The Roman numerals in this and the
next reply refer to the original statement of the 'Eight
Main Types of Thought’ in Chapter I. Apparently the
sensuous basis of the arammanamof each thought is not
intended to be here rehearsed.
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or the dominant influence in which is
desire, or
energy, or
another thought ;
or the dominant influence in which is
desire of inferior,
of medium, or
of superlative efficacy ;
or the dominant influence in which is
energy of inferior,
of medium, or
of superlative efficacy ;
or the dominant influence in which is
[another] thought of inferior,
of medium, or
of superlative efficacy ;
then the contact . . . the balance that arises — these . . .
are states that are good. 1
2. Good in relation to the Universe of Form.
[271] Which are the states that are good ?
When, that he may attain to the heavens of Form, he
cultivates the way thereto, and, aloof from sensuous appe-
tites, aloof from evil ideas, by earth-gazing enters into and
abides in the First Jhana (the first rapt meditation) . . .
which is
of inferior,
or of medium,
or of superlative efficacy ;
1 In accordance with the usual procedure in the Dhamma
Sangani, when combining several subjects in one sentence,
the final details apply only to the last subject in the
series. Hence ‘investigation* is omitted in connexion
with Thought VIII., because, presumably, the latter is
‘disconnected with knowledge.* And it would likewise have
been omitted in connexion with Thoughts III., IV. and VII.,
but not in connexion with the others.
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or the dominant influence in which is
desire, or
energy, or
a thought, or
investigation ;
or the dominant influence in which is
desire . . . energy ... a thought . . . investigation
of inferior,
of medium,
or of superlative efficacy —
then the contact . . . the balance that arises — these . . .
are states that are good.
[272] Repeat in the case of the other Jhdnas , both of
(a) and (b).
8. Good in relation to the Formless Universe.
[278] Which are the states that are good ?
When, that he may attain to the Formless heavens, he
cultivates the way thereto, and so, by passing wholly beyond
all consciousness of form, by the dying out of the conscious-
ness of sensory reaction, by turning the attention from any
consciousness of the manifold, he enters into and abides
in that rapt meditation which is accompanied by the con-
sciousness of a sphere of unbounded space — even into the
Fourth Jhana, to gain which all sense of ease must have
been put away, etc.— (the rapt meditation) where there is
neither ill nor ease, but only the perfect purity that comes
of mindfulness and disinterestedness, and which is of
inferior . . .
medium . . .
or superlative efficacy ...
or the dominant influence in which is
desire . . .
or energy . . .
or a thought . . .
or investigation . . .
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or the dominant influence in which is
desire . . . energy ... a thought . . . investigation
of inferior . . .
medium . . .
superlative efficacy —
then the contact . . . the balance that arises — these . . .
are states that are good.
[274-276] Here follow the three remaining * Jhanas con-
nected with Formless Existence/ each modified by the
characterised enumerated in the foregoing answer . Cf
§§ 266-268. 1
1 In § 275 the text inadvertently omits majjhimam
. . . pe . . . panltam . . . pe . . . before vimam-
sadhipateyyam.
<)
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[Chapter V.
Thought engaged upon the Higher Ideal (lokuttaram
c i 1 1 a m).
I. The First Path (pathamo magg o .) 1
The Twenty Great Methods (visati mahanaya).
1. Rapt Meditation (jhanam).
(i.) The Four Modes of Progress in Purification (sud-
d h i k a-p a t i p a d a).]
[277] Which are the states that are good ?
When he cultivates the Jhana of the Higher Ideal (the
rapt meditation), whereby there is a going forth and onward,
making for the undoing of rebirth 2 — and when, that he
1 That is to say, the first stage of the way or course
of life leading to Arahatship or Nirvana. In the answers,
bhumi (Stage) is substituted for Path. And the ‘First
Bhumi * is declared in the Cy. (pp. 214, 215) to be equiva-
lent to the first-fruits (or fruition) of recluseship (cf. D. i.,
second sutta); in other words, to the fruit of sotapatti,
or of ‘ conversion,’ as it has been termed.
2 The special kind of Jhana which he who has turned
his back on the three lower ideals of life in the worlds of
sense, form, or the formless, and has set his face steadfastly
toward Arahatship, must ‘ practise, bring forth and develop,’
is described by Buddhaghosa as being ekacittakkhani-
kam appana-jhan'am — rapt meditation on a concept
induced by the momentary flash of a thought (cf. K. V.,
pp. 620, 458) — and by the text itself as niyyanikam
apacayagamim. The former of these two last terms
is thus commented upon : ‘ It is a going forth (down from)
the world, from the cycle of rebirth. Or, there is a going
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may attain to the First Stage, he has put away views and
opinions, 1 and so, aloof from sensuous appetites, aloof
from evil ideas, enters into and abides in the First Jhana,
wherein conception works and thought discursive, which is
bom of solitude, is full of joy and ease, progress thereto
being difficult and intuition sluggish — then there is contact,
feeling, perception, thinking, thought, conception, discursive
thought, joy, ease, self-collectedness, the faculties of faith,
energy, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom, ideation, hap-
piness, vitality, and the faculty of believing , 4 I shall come
to know the unknotvn,* 2 right views, right intention, right
speech , right action , right livelihood , s right endeavour, right
forth by means of it. The man who is filled with it, com-
prehending 111, goes forth, putting away the uprising (of
111) goes forth, realizing the cessation (of 111) goes forth,
cultivating the path (leading to that cessation) goes forth.’
And the latter term : This is not like that heaping together
and multiplying of rebirth effected by the good which
belongs to the three worlds of being. This is even as a
man who, having heaped up a stockade eighteen cubits
high, should afterwards take a great hammer and set to
work to pull down and demolish his work. For so it, too,
sets about pulling down and demolishing that potency for
rebirth heaped up by the three-world-good, by bringing
about a deficiency in the causes thereof
1 Ditthigatani, lit. resorting to views. All traditions
or speculations adhered to either without evidence or on in-
sufficient evidence, such as are implied in the states called
‘theory of individuality, perplexity, and the contagion of
mere rule and ritual’ (Asl. 214; infra , §§ 1002-1005).
2 The italics show those constituents of consciousness
wherein this Jhana differs from that mentioned in § 160,
the constituents of which are identical with those of the
First Type of Good Thought, § 1.
3 These three factors of the 4 Eightfold Path,’ which were
not explicitly included in the Eight Types of Good Thoughts,
were, according to the Cy., included implicitly in the 4 or-
whatever-states.’ See above, p. 5, n. 1. Here the Cy. only
remarks that, whereas these three are now 4 included in the
Pali ’ because the Eightfold Path has Nirvana for its goal,
6—2
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mindfulness, right concentration; the powers of faith,
energy, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom, conscientious-
ness, the fear of blame ; the absence of lust, hate, dulness,
covetousness and malice, right views, conscientiousness, the
fear of blame, serenity, lightness, plasticity, facility, fitness
and directness in both sense and thought, mindfulness,
intelligence, quiet, insight, grasp and balance.
Now these — or whatever other incorporeal, causally
induced states there are on that occasion — these are states
that are good.
[278-282] 1 Contact/ ‘feeling/ ‘perception/ ‘thinking/
and ‘ thought * are described as in §§ 2-6.
[283] What on that occasion is conception ?
The ratiocination, the conception, which on that occasion
is the disposition, the fixation, the focussing, the application
of the mind, right intention, ‘ Path-component/ ‘ contained
in the Path * 1 — ■ this is the conception that there then is.
[284] ‘ Discursive thought ’ is described as in § 8.
[285] What on that occasion is joy?
The joy which on that occasion is gladness, rejoicing
at, rejoicing over, mirth, merriment, felicity, exultation,
transport of heart, the joy which is a factor in the Great
Awakening 2 — this is the joy that there then is.
‘ pity ’ and ‘ sympathy ’ are not included because they have
living beings for their object, and not Nirvana.
1 The Path being the ‘ Eightfold Path/ ‘ conception ’
(vitakko) is reckoned as included in it, in virtue of its
being approximately equivalent to ‘ intention * (sankappo).
2 Pit i-samboj jhango. The seven Sambojjhangas are
enumerated in A. iv. 23 ; S. v. 110, 111 ; and also in
Mil. 840, where they are termed ‘ the jewel of the seven-
fold wisdom of the Arahats.’ On the state called sam-
bodhi, see Rhys Davids, ‘Dialogues of the Buddha/ i.,
pp. 190-192. It is in the Cy. (217) described as the harmony
of its seven constituent states, and as forming the opposite
to the detrimental compound consisting of the accumula-
tions of adhesion (llnam) and excitement, indulgence in
the pleasures and satiety of sensuality, and addiction to the
speculations of Nihilism and Etemalism (below, § 1003).
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85
[286] ‘ Ease * is described as in § 10.
[287] What on that occasion is self-collectedness ?
The stability, solidity, absorbed steadfastness of thought
which on that occasion is the absence of distraction,
balance, unperturbed mental procedure, quiet, the faculty
and the power of concentration, right concentration, the
concentration which is a factor in the Great Awakening,
a ‘Path-component/ ‘contained in the Path' — this is the
conception that there then is.
[288] ‘ Faith * is described as in § 12.
[289] What on that occasion is the faculty of energy ?
The mental inception of energy which there is on that
occasion, the striving and the onward effort, the exertion
and endeavour, the zeal and ardour, the vigour and forti-
tude, the state of unfaltering effort, the state of sustained
desire, the state of unflinching endurance, the solid grip of
the burden, energy, energy as faculty and as power, right
energy, the energy which is a factor in the Great Awaken-
ing, a Path-component, contained in the Path — this is the
energy that there then is.
[290] What on that occasion is the faculty of mindful-
ness?
The mindfulness which on that occasion is recollecting,
calling back to mind the mindfulness 1 which is remember-
ing, bearing in mind, the opposite of superficiality and of
obliviousness ; mindfulness, mindfulness as faculty and as
power, right mindfulness, the mindfulness which is a factor
in the Great Awakening, a Path-component, contained in
the Path — this is the mindfulness that there then is.
[291] ‘ Concentration ’ is described in the same tains as
‘ self-collectedness, ’ § 287.
The verb bujjhati is thus paraphrased: He arises from
the slumber of vice, or discerns the four Noble Truths, or
realizes Nirvana.
1 Sati, repeated as in § 14, has dropped out of the
printed text. K. repeats it.
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86
[292] What on that occasion is the faculty of wisdom ?
The wisdom which there is on that occasion is under-
standing, search, research, searching the Truth, discern-
ment, discrimination, differentiation, erudition, proficiency,
subtlety, criticism, reflection, analysis, breadth, sagacity,
leading, insight, intelligence, incitement, wisdom as faculty
and as power, wisdom as a sword, as a height, as light, as
glory, as splendour, as a precious stone; the absence of
dulness, searching the Truth, right views, that searching
the Truth which is a factor in the Great Awakening, 1 a
Path-component, contained in the Path — this is the wisdom
that there then is.
[298-295] The faculties of ‘ideation/ ‘happiness/ and
‘ vitality * are described as in §§ 17-19.
[296] What on that occasion is the faculty of be-
lieving, * I shall come to know the unknown * (a n a n n a-
tanfiassamltindriyam)? 2
The wisdom that makes for the realization of those
Truths 3 that are unrealized, uncomprehended, unattained
1 Under the name of Dhammavicayo, searching the
truth, or doctrine, or religion.
2 According to Buddhaghosa (216), the inspiring sense
of assurance that dawns upon the earnest, uncompromising
student that he will come to know the doctrine of the great
truths — that Ambrosial Way unknown in the cycle of
worldly pursuits and consequences where the goal is not
ambrosial — is to him as the upspringing of a new faculty
or moral principle.
3 Tesam dhammanam . . . sacchikiriyaya pafifia,
etc., which may more literally be rendered the wisdom (or
understanding, etc.) of, for, or from, the realization of,
etc. ‘ Bringing right opposite the eyes * is the paraphrase
(Asl. 218). The student while ‘ in the First Path ’ learns
the full import of those concise formulae known as the
Four Noble Truths, which the Buddha set forth in his first
authoritative utterance. Previously he will have had mere
second-hand knowledge of them ; and as one coming to a
dwelling out of his usual beat, and receiving fresh garland
and raiment and food, realizes that he is encountering new
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87
to, undiscemed, unknown — the wisdom that is understand-
ing, search, research, searching the Truth, etc.
[Continue as in § 292.]
[297] What on that occasion are right views ?
Answer as for 4 wisdom/ § 292.
[298] 4 Right intention * is described in the same terms as
4 conception/ § 288.
[299] What on that occasion is right speech (samma-
v a c a) ?
To renounce on that occasion, abstain and refrain from,
and feel averse to, the four errors of speech, 1 to leave them
uncommitted and undone, to incur no guilt, nor to trespass
nor transgress with respect to them, to destroy the causeway
leading to them 2 — right speech, a Path-component, contained
in the Path — this is the right speech that there then is.
[800] What on that occasion is right action (samma-
kammanto)?
To renounce on that occasion, abstain and refrain from,
and feel averse to, the three errors of conduct, 3 to leave them
uncommitted and undone, to incur no guilt, nor to trespass
nor transgress with respect to them, to destroy the causeway
leading to them — right conduct, a Path-component, contained
in the Path — this is the right conduct that there then is.
[801] What on that occasion is right livelihood (samma-
a j I v o) ?
To renounce on that occasion, abstain and refrain from,
and feel averse to, wrong modes of livelihood, to leave them
experiences, so are these truths, not known hitherto by
him, spoken of as 4 unknown ’ (Asl. 218).
1 That is, lying, slander, rude speech and frivolous talk.
See the Cula Slla, e.g., in D. i. 4.
2 Set ugh at o, i.e., the cause or condition of evil speak-
ing — namely, lust, hate and dulness (Asl. 219). The
metaphor occurs in A. i. 220, 221, 261 ; ii. 145, 146.
3 That is, murder (of any living thing), theft and un-
chastity. D. i. 4.
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88
unpractised and undone, to incur no guilt, nor to trespass
nor transgress with respect to them, to destroy the cause-
way leading to them — right livelihood, a Path-component,
contained in the Path — this is the right livelihood that
there then is.
[802-304] 4 Right endeavour/ ‘ right mindfulness,’ ‘ right
concentration/ 1 are described as in §§ 289-291.
[305-311] The ‘powers’ of ‘faith/ ‘energy/ ‘mindful-
ness,’ ‘ concentration ’ and 4 wisdom ’ are described as in
§§ 288-292; those of ‘conscientiousness’ and ‘the fear of
blame ’ as in §§ 30, 31.
[312-319] ‘ The absence of lust ’ and 4 the absence of
hate ’ are described as in §§ 32, 88 ; ‘ the absence of dulness ’
as in § 309 (‘ wisdom *) ; ‘ the absence of covetousness ’ and
‘the absence of malice’ are described as in §§ 35, 36;
‘conscientiousness’ and ‘the fear of blame 'as in §§ 38,
89 ; ‘ right views ’ as in § 292 or 309 (‘ wisdom ’).
[320] What on that occasion is serenity of sense ?
The serenity, the composure which there is on that
occasion, the calming, the tranquillizing, the tranquillity
of the skandhas of feeling, perception and syntheses, the
serenity which is a factor in the Great Awakening — this
is the serenity of sense that there then is.
[321] What on that occasion is serenity of thought ?
The serenity, the composure which there is on that
occasion, the calming, the tranquillizing, the tranquillity
of the skandha of intellect, the serenity which is a factor
in the Great Awakening — this is the serenity of thought
that there then is.
[322-331] The remaining five attributes characterizing both
sense and thotight ( on that occasion’: — ‘buoyancy/ ‘plas-
ticity,’ etc. — are described as in §§ 42-51.
[332-337] * Mindfulness,’ 1 intelligence,’ ‘ quiet,’ ‘ insight,’
‘grasp’ and ‘balance’ are described as in §§ 290, 292
(‘ wisdom ’), 291, 292, 289 (‘ energy ’) and 291 respectively .
1 Samadhi, before samboj jhango, has dropped out
of the printed text.
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89
These, or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced
states there are on that occasion — these are states that are
good.
[Summary.]
[887a] Now at that time
the skandhas are four,
the spheres are two,
the elements are two,
the nutriments are three,
the faculties are nine,
the Jhana is fivefold,
the Path is eightfold,
the powers are seven,
the causes are three,
contact, \
feeling,
perception, 'r are each single [factors] ;
thinking,
thought,
the skandhas of
feeling,
perception,
syntheses,
intellect,
the sphere of ideation,
the faculty of ideation,
the element of representative in-
tellection, are each single
the sphere of a [representative] [factors],
state,
the element of a [representative]
state,
These, or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced
states there are on that occasion — these are states that are
good.
******
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90
[Here the questions and answers concerning the first two
of the four skandhas enumerated are to he understood to
follow as in §§ 59-61.]
[888] What on that occasion is the skandha of syn-
theses ?
Contact,
thinking, 1
conception,
discursive thought,
joy,
self-collectedness,
the faculties of
faith, concentration,
energy, wisdom,
mindfulness, vitality,
believing 1 1 shall come to know the unknown
right views, right livelihood,
right intention, right endeavour,
right speech, right mindfulness,
right action, right concentration ;
the seven powers ; 2
the absence of
lust, hate and dulness ;
the absence of
covetousness and malice,
right views ;
conscientiousness, the fear of blame ;
serenity, wieldiness,
buoyancy, fitness,
plasticity, directness
of sense and thought ;
mindfulness and intelligence ;
quiet and insight ;
grasp and balance.
1 The printed text has vedana instead of cetana, which
is obviously wrong.
2 These are set out in the original as in § 277.
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91
These, or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced
states there are on that occasion, exclusive of the skandhas
of feeling, perception and intellect — these are the skandha
of syntheses.
******
[Questions on the remaining items in the ‘ Summary * are
understood to follow.]
[840] 1 Which are the states that are good ?
When he cultivates the Jhana of the Higher Ideal (the
rapt meditation), whereby there is a going forth and onward,
making for the undoing of rebirth — and when, that he
may attain to the First Stage, he has put away views and
opinions, and so, aloof from sensuous appetites, aloof from
evil ideas, enters into and abides in the First Jhana . . .
progress thereto being difficult, but intuition quick . . .
[or] [841] . . . progress thereto being easy, but intuition
sluggish . . .
[or] [842] . . . progress thereto being easy and intuition
quick — then the contact . . . the balance that arises —
these . . . are states that are good.
[843] Repeat the Four Modes in the case of the 2nd to the
4th Jhana on the Fourfold System , and of the 1st to the 5th
Jhana on the Fivefold System.
[Here end] the Modes of Progress in Purification.
[(ii.) The Section on Emptiness (sunnata m). 2 ]
(a and h.)
[344] Which are the states that are good ?
When he cultivates the Jhana of the Higher Ideal (the
1 The answer marked [339] in the text is merely a repeti-
tion of lokuttara-jhanam as dukkhapatipadam dan-
dhabhinnam, i.e., of the first ‘ Mode of Progress ’ given in
[277]. I have therefore omitted it. No repetition is noticed
in this connexion by the Cy. K. has no such repetition.
2 Called in the Cy. (221) suniiata-varo, with the sub-
sections suddhika-sunnatri, or ‘Emptiness applied to
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rapt meditation), whereby there is a going forth and onward,
making for the undoing of rebirth — and when, that be
may attain to the First Stage, he has put away views and
opinions, and so, aloof from sensuous appetites, aloof from
evil ideas, enters into and abides in the First Jhana,
wherein conception works and thought discursive, which
is born of solitude, is full of joy and ease, and which is
Empty — then the contact . . . the balance that arises —
these . . . are states that are good.
[845] Repeat the 2nd to the 4 th Jhanas on the Fourfold
System , and the 1st to the 5th on the Fivefold System , tcith
the addition in each case of the phrase ‘ and which is Empty/
[Here ends] the ‘ Emptiness * Section.
the purification-formula,’ i.e., the group marked (a and 5),
and suniiata-patipada, or ‘the Modes of Progress taken
in connexion with Emptiness,’ i.c., the group marked (c).
On the technical term ‘ emptiness,* see above, § 121, and
Rhys Davids, ‘ Yogavacara’s Manual,’ pp. xxvii, xxviii. Of
the three ‘ riddles ’ there discussed — ‘ the empty, the aimless
and the signless’ — only the first two are here prescribed
for cultivation. Buddhaghosa argues on the subject at
some length (Asl. 221-225). He explains that the three
terms are so many names for the way to the Ideal
(lokuttara-maggo), each throwing a special aspect of
it into greater relief than the other two, while yet no
advance can be made without all three concepts. The
advent of the Path as a conscious ideal is especially char-
acterized by insight into the fact that the sanskaras are
void of a permanent soul, and of all that conduces to happi-
ness. The virtue or quality of the Path, again, is wholly
empty of lust, hate and dulness. So also is its object,
namely, Nirvana. But the chief import of ‘ empty * is said
to relate to the fact first named — the nonentity of any
substratum or soul in anything. The ‘aimless’ applies
chiefly to the insight into dukkham, or the nature of pain
or ill. All aspiration or hankering after sanskaras withers
up under the penetration of such insight. By it, too, the
path of the Ideal becomes revealed. The third ‘riddle,’
the ‘signless’ — i.e., the path conceived as free from the
three signs or false tenets of Permanence, Sorrow and Soul
— comes up for meditation later (§§ 506, 511, etc.).
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[(c) The Modes of Progress, with * Emptiness * as the
Basis (sunnat a-m u 1 a k a-p a t i p a d a).]
[846] Which are the states that are good ?
When he cultivates the Jhana of the Higher Ideal . . .
and when, that he may attain to the First Stage, he . . .
enters into and abides in the First Jhana . . . progress
thereto being difficult and intuition sluggish, the method
being the concept of Emptiness — then the contact . . .
the balance that arises — these . . . are states that are
good.
[847-849] Repeat the same formula , substituting in suc-
cession the three remaining Modes of Progress (§§ 176-179),
with the addition in each case of the phrase ‘the method
being the concept of Emptiness.’
[350] Repeat the same formula , substituting in succession
the remaining Jhdnas on the Fourfold System and those on
the Fivefold System , and applying in each case the Four
Modes of Progress , with the additional phrase on ‘ Empti-
ness.’
[(ii.) The Aimless (appanihitam).
(a and b)]. 1
[351] WTiich are the states that are good ?
When he cultivates the Jhana of the Higher Ideal . . .
and when, that he may attain to the First Stage, he . . .
enters into and abides in the First Jhana . . . which is
born of solitude, is full of joy and ease, and which is
Aimless — then the contact . . . the balance that arises —
these . . . are states that are good.
[352] Repeat the same formula , substituting the remaining
three , and the five Jhdnas in succession , with the addition in
each case of the phrase ‘ and which is Aimless.’
1 As in the foregoing, the Cy. (ibid.) co-ordinates this,
and the following section, with the two on ‘emptiness,’
calling (a and b) suddhika-appanihita, and the next
group appanihita-patipada.
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[(c) The Modes of Progress, with Aimlessness as the
Basis (appanihit a-m u 1 a k a-p a t i p a d a).]
[353] When he cultivates the Jhana of the Higher Ideal
. . . and when, that he may attain to the First Stage of
it, he . . . enters into and abides in the First Jhana . . .
progress whereto is difficult and intuition sluggish, the
method being the concept of Aimlessness — then the contact
. . . the balance that arises — these . . . are states that
are good.
[854-356] Repeat the same formula , substituting in suc-
cession the three remaining Modes of Progress , with the
addition in each case of the phrase * the method being the
concept of Aimlessness.*
[357] Repeat the same formula 9 substituting in succession
the remaining three , and the Jive Jhdnas , and applying in
each case the Four Modes of Progress , with the additional
phrase on ‘ Aimlessness.*
[2-20. The Remaining Nineteen Great Methods.]
[858] Which are the states that are good ?
Here follow nineteen concepts , each of which can be sul>-
stituted for 1 the Jhana of the Higher Ideal * in the preceding
81 answers [§§ 277-857], as a vehicle in training the mind
for Arahatship . They are as follows :
2. The Path of the Higher Ideal.
8. The Advance in Mindfulness 1 toward the Higher
Ideal.
4. The System of Right Efforts 2 toward the Higher
Ideal.
5. The Series of Mystic Potencies 3 applied to the Higher
Ideal.
6. The Faculty relating to the Higher Ideal.
7. The Power relating to the Higher Ideal.
1 Satipatthana. M. i. 56.
2 Sammappadhana. See below, § 1867.
8 Iddhipada. See above, § 278 et seq.
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8. The Great Awakening to the Higher Ideal.
9. The Truth of the Higher Ideal.
10. The Peace 1 of the Higher Ideal.
11. The Doctrine of the Higher Ideal.
12. The Skandha related to the Higher Ideal.
13. The Sphere of the Higher Ideal.
14. The Element of the Higher Ideal.
15. The Nutriment of the Higher Ideal.
16. Contact with the Higher Ideal.
17. Feeling relating to the Higher Ideal.
18. Perception relating to the Higher Ideal.
19. Thinking relating to the Higher Ideal.
20. Thought relating to the Higher Ideal.
[The Dominant Influences in the Modes of Progress
(adhipati).]
[359] Which are the states that are good ?
When he cultivates the Jhana of the Higher Ideal
. . . and when, that he may attain to the First Stage,
he . . . enters into and abides in the First Jhana . . .
progress whereto is painful and intuition sluggish, and the
dominant influence in which is desire, energy, a thought,
or investigation, then the contact . . . the balance that
arises — these are states that are good.
[360] Repeat this formula, in the case of the remaining
three and five Jhdnas.
[361] Repeat the foregoing [§§ 359, 360] in the case of
each of the nineteen remaining ‘ Great Methods.’
[Here ends] the First Path.
II. The Second Path.
[362] Which are the states that are good ?
When he cultivates the Jhana of the Higher Ideal (the
rapt meditation), whereby there is a going forth and onward,
making for the undoing of rebirth — and when, that he may
1 Samatho. See above, § 54.
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attain to the Second Stage, he has diminished the strength
of sensual passions and of malice, 1 and so, aloof from
sensuous appetites, aloof from evil ideas, enters into and
abides in the First Jhana . . . progress whereto is difficult
and intuition sluggish — then the contact . . . the faculty
of knowledge made perfect 2 . . . the balance that arises —
these . . . are states that are good.
******
[Here ends] the Second Path.
III. The Third Path.
[868] Which are the states that are good ?
When he cultivates the Jhana of the Higher Ideal (the
rapt meditation), whereby there is a going forth and onward,
making for the undoing of rebirth — and when, that he
may attain to the Third Stage, he has put away the
entire residuum of sensual passions and of malice, 3 and so.
1 Cf. D. i. 156 and M. P. S. 16, 17. It is striking that
here and in the following answer no diminution of moho
(dulness) is included. df., however, below, § 1184. Ignor-
ance ( = dulness) is only really conquered in the Fourth Path.
The diminution is described (Asl. 288) as coming to pass
in two ways : vicious dispositions arise occasionally and no
longer habitually, and when they do arise it is with an
attenuated intensity. They are like the sparse blades of
grass in a newly-mown field, and like a flimsy membrane
or a fly’s wing.
2 Cf. § 296. The faith and hope of the Sotapatti, or
student of the First Path, while struggling with the limita-
tions of his stage of knowledge (fiatamariyadam, the
Cy. calls them, p. 289), are now rewarded by his attain-
ment, as a SakadagamI, of that deepening philosophic
insight into the full implication of the ‘Four Truths’
termed a fin a, or knowledge par excellence , and applied,
in Buddhist writings, only to evolving or evolved Arahat-
ship. Cf. below, § 555.
3 These, which the Cy., in connexion with the Second
Path, termed collectively kilesa, are now referred to as
safifiojanani. See § 1229 et seq. and § 1118 ct seq.
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aloof from sensuous appetites, aloof from evil ideas, enters
into and abides in the First Jhana . . . progress whereto
is difficult and intuition sluggish — then the contact . . .
the faculty of knowledge made perfect . . . the balance
that arises — these . . . states that are good.
[Here ends] the Third Path.
IV. The Fourth Path.
[864] Which are the states that are good ?
When he cultivates the Jhana of the Higher Ideal (the
rapt meditation), whereby there is a going forth and onward,
making for the undoing of rebirth, and when, that he may
attain the Fourth Stage, he has put away absolutely and
entirely all passion for Form, all passion for the Formless,
all conceit, excitement and ignorance, and so, aloof from
sensuous appetites, aloof from evil ideas, enters into and
abides in the First Jhana . . . progress whereto is difficult
and intuition sluggish — then the contact . . . the faculty of
knowledge made perfect . . . the balance that arises — these
. . . are states that are good.
[864a] What on that occasion is the faculty of knowledge
made perfect (annindr iy am)?
The wisdom that makes for the realization of those
truths that have been realized, comprehended, attained
to, discerned and known — the wisdom that is understand-
ing, search, research, searching the Truth, etc.
[Continue as in § 292.]
******
These, or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced
states there are on that occasion, these are states that are
good.
[Here ends] the Fourth Path.
[Here ends] Thought engaged upon the Higher Ideal.
7
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[PART II. — BAD STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS.
Chapter VI.
The Twelve Bad Thoughts (dvadasa akusalacit-
t ani).]
I.
[865] Which are the states that are bad ? L
When a bad thought has arisen, which is accompanied
by happiness, and associated with views and opinions, 1 2 3 * and
has as its object a sight, a sound, a smell, a taste, 8 a touch,
a [mental] state, or what not, then there is
contact,
feeling,
perception,
thinking,
thought,
conception,
discursive thought,
joy,
1 In this connexion those constituents of the twelve
thoughts which in themselves are ethically neutral are to
be understood as unchanged in the connotation assigned
them in connexion with good thoughts. There being for
bad thoughts no other sphere of existence save the sensuous
universe, this is to be understood throughout (Asl. 247).
2 Ditthigata-sampayuttam. Cf. p. 88, n. 1, with
§§ 881, i008.
3 Rasarammanam va is inadvertently omitted in the
printed text.
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99
ease,
self-collectedness ; l
the faculties of
energy,
concentration, 2 3 * * * *
ideation,
happiness,
vitality ;
wrong views,
wrong intention,
wrong endeavour,
wrong concentration ;
the powers of
energy,
concentration,
unconscientiousness,
disregard of blame ;
lust, covetousness,
dulness, 8 wrong views,
unconscientiousness,
disregard of blame,
1 See following note.
2 Concentration of mind is essential to the higher life
of Buddhism ; nevertheless, so far is it from constituting
excellence, that it is also an essential to effective evil-doing.
If the mind be undistracted, says Buddhaghosa, the
murderer’s knife does not miss, the theft does not mis-
carry, and by a mind of single intent (lit., of one taste)
evil conduct is carried out (Asl. 248). Cf. the Hebrew
idiom rendered by ‘the heart being set* — to do good or
evil (Eccles. viii. 11 ; Ps. lxxviii. 8).
3 Hate (doso) and malice (vyapado) do not find a place
among the factors of Bad Thoughts (corresponding to the
place occupied by their opposites in the Good Thoughts,
§ 1) till we come to the last four types of bad thoughts.
Whereas these are accompanied by melancholy (doma-
nassam), the subject of the first and the following three
types of thought is a cheerful sinner. Joy, ease, happiness,
were held to be incompatible with hate.
7—2
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quiet,
grasp, 1
balance.
Now, these — or whatever other incorporeal, causally
induced states that there are on that occasion — these are
states that are bad. 2
[866-870] What on that occasion is contact . . . feeling
. . . perception . . . thinking . . . thought?
Answers as in §§ 2-6 respectively .
[871] What on that occasion is conception ?
Answer as in § 7, substituting 4 wrong intention ’ (m i c-
chasankappo) for* right intention.*
[872-874] What on that occasion is discursive thought
. . . joy . . . ease?
Answers as in §§ 8-10 respectively .
[875] What on that occasion is self-collectedness ?
Answer as in § 11, substituting ‘ wrong concentration ’ jor
4 right concentration.’
[876] What on that occasion is the faculty of energy ?
Answer as in § 18, substituting 4 wrong endeavour ’ for
4 right endeavour.*
[877] What on that occasion is the faculty of concentra-
tion?
Answer as in § 375.
1 Vipassana (insight) has been erroneously included
in the text. Moral insight was as incompatible with im-
moral thoughts to the Buddhist as it was to Socrates and
Plato. Hence also ‘wisdom’ and ‘mindfulness’ are ex-
cluded, as well as ‘ faith.’ The Cy. rules that the followers
of heretical dogmas and mere opinion can have but a
spurious faith in their teachers, can only be mindful of
bad thoughts, and can only cultivate deceit and delusion.
Nor can there possibly be that sixfold efficiency of sense
and thought which is concomitant with good thoughts (§§40-
51). Asl. 249.
2 Kusala in the text is, of course, a slip. There are
in all these Bad Thoughts ten ‘ whatever-other ’ states :
desire, resolve, attention, conceit, envy (issa, or read
iccha, longing), meanness, stolidity, torpor, excitement,
worry (Asl. 250). See above, p. 5, n. 1.
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[378-380] What on that occasion is the faculty of idea-
tion . . . happiness . . . vitality?
Answers as in §§ 17-19 respectively .
[381] What on that occasion are wrong views (miccha-
d i 1. 1 h i) ? l
The views which on that occasion are a walking in
opinion, the jungle of opinion, 2 the wilderness of opinion,*
the puppet-show of opinion, 4 the scuffling of opinion, 6 the
Fetter of opinion, 6 the grip 7 and tenacity 8 of it, the inclina-
tion towards it, 9 the being infected by it, a by-path, a wrong
road, wrongness, the ‘fording place,’ 10 shiftiness of grasp
— these are the wrong views that there then are.
1 Micchaditthi is defined in the Cy. (p. 248) as aya-
thavadassanam, seeing things as they are not. (On
ditthi, see § 1003, n.) Sixty-two kinds of this perverted
vision, or ill-grounded speculation are distinguished in the
Brahmajala Sutta (D. i.), all of them being theories of
existence, and are alluded to by the commentator (p. 252).
Cf. Rhys Davids, ‘ American Lectures,’ p. 27 et seq.
2 Because of the difficulty of getting out of it, as out of
a grass, forest, or mountain jungle (Asl., ibid.).
3 Because of the danger and fearsomeness of indulging
in such opinions, as of a desert beset with robbers and
snakes, barren of water or food (ibid.).
4 Buddhaghosa does not derive this term from visukam,
but from visu-kayikam = antithetically constituted — i.e. 9
to sammaditthi.
6 The disorder and struggle through some being Annihila-
tionists, some Eternalists, etc. (Asl. 253).
6 See § 1113.
7 The obsession by some object of thought, like the grip
of a crocodile (Asl. 253).
8 The text of the Cy. reads patitthaho for patiggaho.
K., however, reads patiggaho.
9 I.e. 9 towards the fallacious opinion of Permanence, etc.
(Asl. 253).
10 Titthayatanam. It is impossible to get an English
equivalent for this metaphor, which literally means only
a standing-place, but which is usually, in its first intention,
associated with a shallow river-strand or seashore, and, in
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[882-884] What on that occasion is wrong intention . .
wrong endeavour . . . wrong concentration ?
Answers as in §§ 871, 876, 875 respectively .
[885, 886] What on that occasion is the power of energy
. . . the power of concentration ?
Answers as in §§ 888, 884 respectively .
[887] What on that occasion is the power of uncon-
scientiousness (ahirikabalam)?
The absence which there is on that occasion of any
feeling of conscientious scruple when scruples ought to be
felt, the absence of conscientious scruple at attaining to
bad and evil states — this is the power of unconscientious-
ness that there then is.
[888] What on that occasion is the power of disregard
of blame (anottappabalam)?
The absence which there is on that occasion of any sense
of guilt where a sense of guilt ought to be felt, the absence 1
of a sense of guilt at attaining to bad and evil states — this
is the power of disregard of blame that there then is.
[889] What on that occasion is lust ?
The lust, lusting, lustfulness which there is on that
occasion, the infatuation, the feeling and being infatuated,
the covetousness, the lust that is the root of badness — this
is the lust that there then is.
[890] What on that occasion is dulness ?
The lack of knowledge, of vision, which there is on that
occasion ; the lack of co-ordination, of judgment, of wake-
fulness, 2 of penetration; the inability to comprehend, to
grasp thoroughly; the inability to compare, to consider.
its second, with sectarian speculative beliefs and the teach-
ing of them. Buddhaghosa himself gives an alternative
connotation : (a) ‘ where the foolish, in the course of their
gyrations (? i.e., samsara) cross over’; (b) the region or
home of sectarians (titthiya). Cf. the use of the term
in M. i. 488.
1 N a has here dropped out of the printed text.
2 Sambodho. Cf § 285.
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to demonstrate; the folly, the childishness, the lack of
intelligence; the dulness that is vagueness, obfuscation,
ignorance, the Flood 1 of ignorance, the Bond of ignorance,
the bias of ignorance, the obsession of ignorance, the
barrier of ignorance ; the dulness that is the root of bad-
ness — this the dulness that there then is.
[891-897] What on that occasion is covetousness . . .
are wrong views ... is unconscientiousness . . . dis-
regard of blame . . . quiet . . . grasp . . . balance ?
Answers as in §§ 889, 881, 887, 888, 875, 876, and, again,
375 respectively .
Or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced states
there are on that occasion — these are states that are bad.
[Summary.]
[397a] Now, on that occasion
the skandhas are four,
the spheres are two,
the elements are two,
the nutriments are three,
the faculties are five,
the Jhana is fivefold,
the Path is fourfold,
the powers are four,
the causes are two, 2
contact, ) are each single [factors] ;
etc. ) etc.
[ Continue as in § 58.]
$ * ❖ # * *
1 On ignorance as a Flood and as a Bond, see below,
§§ 1151, 1151a.
Whereas the mark (lakkhanam) of lust is the seizing
on an object in idea, it is the essence (raso) of dulness to
cover up the real nature of that object, with the result that
the attention devoted to it is of a superficial nature (ayo-
ni8o). Asl. 249.
2 Namely, ‘ lust 1 and ‘ dulness.’
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[B98] What on that occasion is the skandha of syn-
theses ?
Contact,
thinking,
conception,
discursive thought,
joy.
self-collectedness ;
the faculties of
energy,
concentration,
vitality ;
wrong views,
wrong intention,
wrong endeavour,
wrong concentration ;
the powers of
energy,
concentration,
unconscientiousness,
disregard of blame ;
lust, covetousness,
dulness ; wrong views ;
unconscientiousness,
disregard of blame ;
quiet,
grasp,
balance.
These, or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced
states there are on that occasion, exclusive of the skandhas
of feeling, perception and intellect — these are the skandha
of syntheses.
[Continue as in § 58.]
X' * v v <|!
n.
[899] Which are the states that are bad ?
When a bad thought has arisen which is accompanied
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by pleasure, associated with views and opinions, and
prompted by a conscious motive, 1 and which has as its
object a sight ... or what not, then there is contact . . .
balance . . .
[Continue as in the First Thought , § 865.]
III.
[400] Which are the states that are bad ?
When a bad thought has arisen which is accompanied
by happiness and disconnected with views and opinions,
and which has as its object a sight, a sound, a smell, a
taste, a touch, or what not, then there is contact, etc.
[Continue as in the first Bad Thought , but omitting the
single, tioice enumerated item ‘ wrong views.*] 2
[Summary.]
[400al Now, at that time
the skandhas are four,
the spheres are two,
1 The Cy. instances the case of a young man who, being
refused the hand of the daughter of some false doctrinaire
on the ground of his being of a different communion, is
prompted by his affections to frequent the church of the
girl’s people and to adopt their views, thus gaining his
reward (Asl. 255).
2 Somanassindriyam, bracketed in the text, must,
of course, be included. The Cy. instances the frame of
mind of those who are indulging in ‘worldly pleasures,’
such as public sports and dances, and at village festivals
(natasamaj jadini). Cfi ‘Dialogues of the . Buddha,’
I., p. 7, n. 4.
It is difficult to interpret the concisely and obscurely
worded double illustration given in the Cy. (p. 257) of this
type of thought. The same circumstances are supposed
as in the Third Thought, with the added low-class delights
of horse-play and vulgar curiosity.
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the elements are two,
the nutriments are three,
the faculties are five,
the Jhana is fivefold,
the Path is threefold,
etc., etc.
[Continue as in § 58.]
* * * * * ❖
[401] What on that occasion is the skandha of syn-
theses ?
Anstver as in % 398, omitting ‘wrong views.’
IY.
[402] Which are the states that are bad ?
When a bad thought has arisen which is accompanied
by pleasure, disconnected with views and opinions, and
prompted by a conscious motive, and which has as its
object a sight ... or what not, then there is contact . . .
balance . . .
[Continue as in the Third Thought , § 400.]
[403] Which are the states that are bad ?
When a bad thought has arisen which is accompanied
by disinterestedness, and associated with views and opinions,
and has as its object a sight, a sound, a smell, a taste, a
touch, a [mental] state, or what not, then there is
contact, thought,
feeling, conception,
perception, discursive thought,
thinking, disinterestedness,
self-collectedness ;
the faculties of
energy,
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concentration,
ideation ;
disinterestedness,
vitality ;
wrong views,
wrong intention,
wrong endeavour,
wrong concentration ;
the powers of
energy,
concentration,
unconscientiousness,
disregard of blame ;
lust, covetousness,
dulness ; wrong views ;
unconscientiousness,
disregard of blame,
composure,
grasp,
balance.
These, or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced
states there are on that occasion — these are states that are
bad.
[404-407] Questions and answers on ‘contact,’ ‘feeling/
‘ disinterestedness/ and * the faculty of disinterestedness *
identical with those in §§ 151-154.
[Summary.]
[407a] Now, at that time
the skandhas are four,
etc.,
the faculties are five,
the Jhana is fourfold, 1
1 Cf. § 154a.
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the Path is fourfold,
etc.
[Continue as in § 58.]
* $ * *r *
[408] What on that occasion is the skandha of syn-
theses ?
Contact,
thinking,
conception,
discursive thought,
self-collectedness,
etc.
[Continue as in § 898, ‘joy* having been omitted as
incompatible with ‘ disinterestedness.’]
* * # * * $
VI.
[409] Which are the states that are bad ?
When a bad thought has arisen which is accompanied
by disinterestedness, associated with views and opinions,
and prompted by a conscious motive, and which has as its
object a sight ... or what not, then there is contact, etc.
[ Continue as in Thought F.]
VII.
[410] Which are the states that are bad ?
When a bad thought has arisen which is accompanied
by disinterestedness, and disconnected with views and
opinions, and which has as its object a sight ... or what
not, then there is contact, etc.
[Continue as in Thought F., omitting ‘ wrong views.’]
******
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[Summary.]
[410a] Now at that time
the skandhas are tour,
etc.,
the faculties are five,
the Jhana is fourfold,
the Path is threefold,
etc.
[Continue as in § 897a.]
******
[411] What on that occasion is the skandha of syn-
theses ?
Answer as in § 898, omitting both ‘joy* and ‘wrong
views.’
# •;« A' * *
vm.
[412] Which are the states that are bad ?
Answer as in Thought VII., with the additional j actor,
inserted as in Thoughts II., IV., VI., of * prompted by a
conscious motive.’ 1
IX.
[418] Which are the states that are bad ?
When a bad thought has arisen which is accompanied
by melancholy and associated with repugnance, 2 and which
has as its object a sight, a sound, a smell, a taste, a touch,
a mental state, or what not, then there is
contact,
feeling,
perception,
1 The Cy. gives no illustrations of this or the three pre-
ceding types of thought.
2 Pa tig ho, used (§ 1060) to describe do so, and again
(§ 597 et seq.) in connexion with sense-stimulation, as
‘ reaction.’
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110
thinking,
thought,
conception,
discursive thought,
distress,
self-collectedness ;
the faculties of
energy,
concentration,
ideation,
melancholy,
vitality ;
wrong intention,
wrong endeavour,
wrong concentration ;
the powers of
energy,
concentration,
unconscientiousness,
disregard of blame ;
hate,
dulness ;
malice ;
unconscientiousness,
disregard of blame,
quiet,
grasp,
balance.
These, or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced
states there are on that occasion — these are states that are
bad.
[414] The question and answer on ‘ contact,’ § 2.
[415] What on that occasion is feeling ?
The mental pain, the mental distress (dukkham),
which, on that occasion, is born of contact with the appro-
priate element of representative intellection; the painful,
distressful sensation which is born of contact with thought ;
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the painful, distressful feeling which is bom of contact with
thought — this is the distress that there then is.
[416, 417] What on that occasion is distress (d u k k h a m)
. . . the faculty of melancholy (domanassindriyam)?
Answers as for ‘feeling’ in § 415, omitting ‘with the
appropriate element of representative intellection.’
* ❖ * # * *
[418] What on that occasion is hate ?
The hate, hating, hatred which on that occasion is a
disordered temper, the getting upset, 1 opposition, hostility,
churlishness, 2 abruptness, 8 disgust of heart — this is the
hate that there then is.
[419] What on that occasion is malice ?
Answer as for * hate.’
Or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced states
there are on that occasion — these are states that are bad.
1 Vyapatti, vyapajjana. Cf. § 1060, n. 5. Here
the comment is pakatibhava-vijahanatthena = throw-
ing off a normal state (Asl. 258). ‘Like gruel that has
gone bad ’ (Sum., 1. 211).
2 Candikkam. See J. P. T. S., 1891, p. 17 ; P. P. ii. 1
( = ii. 11). Smp. 297. Morris thinks candifctam is the
right spelling. I incline to hold that the lectio difficilior
is more likely to be correct. The Gy. in four passages
spells with kk. K., by an oversight, has candittam in
the present passage, but kk in §§ 1060, 1814.
8 Asuropo. Refers, according to the Cy. (258), to the
broken utterance of a man in a rage.
It is not a little curious that such constituents as ‘ self-
collectedness,* ‘quiet’ and ‘balance’ should not be found
incompatible with hate as described above. ‘Concentra-
tion ’ is less incompatible, and it must be remembered that
all three states are described in the same terms. Hence,
if one stands, the others cannot fall. But see under
Thoughts X. and XII.
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[Summary.]
[419a] Now, on that occasion
the skandhas are four,
etc.,
the faculties are five,
the Jhana is fourfold,
the Path is threefold,
the powers are four,
the causes are two, 1
etc.
[Continue as in §§ 58-61.]
[420] What on that occasion is the skandha of syn-
theses ?
Contact,
thinking,
conception,
discursive thought,
self-collectedness ;
, the faculties of
energy,
concentration,
vitality ;
wrong intention,
wrong endeavour,
wrong concentration ;
the powers of
energy,
concentration,
unconscientiousness,
disregard of blame ;
hate,
dulness ;
1 Namely, doso and moho.
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malice ;
unconscientiousness,
disregard of blame,
quiet,
grasp,
balance.
These, or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced
states there are on that occasion, exclusive of the skandhas
of feeling, perception and intellect — these are the skandha
of syntheses.
* * + * * *
X.
[421] Which are the states that are bad ?
When a bad thought has arisen which is accompanied
by melancholy, associated with repugnance, and prompted
by a conscious motive, and which has as its object a sight
. . . or what not, then there is contact, etc.
[Continue as in Thought IX.]
* * * * * *
XI.
[422] Which are the states that are bad ?
When a bad thought has arisen which is accompanied
by disinterestedness and associated with perplexity, and
which has as its object a sight, a sound, a smell, a taste,
a touch, a mental state, or what not, then there is
contact,
feeling,
perception,
thinking,
thought,
conception,
8
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114
discursive thought,
disinterestedness,
self-collectedness ;
the faculties of
energy, disinterestedness,
ideation, vitality ;
wrong intention,
wrong endeavour ;
the powers of
energy,
unconscientiousness,
disregard of blame ;
perplexity ;
dulness ;
unconscientiousness,
disregard of blame,
grasp.
These, or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced
states there are on that occasion — these are states that are
bad.
[428] What on that occasion is contact ?
The usual formula.
[424] What on that occasion is self-collectedness ?
The sustaining of thought which there is on that occa-
sion 1 — this is the self-collectedness that there then is.
******
1 Buddhaghosa says on this passage (Asl. 259): ‘Inas-
much as this weak form of thought has only the capacity
of keeping going, or persisting (pavatti' thitimatta-
kam’), none of the other features of ‘ self-collectedness *
are here applied to it. It is clear, therefore, that the
‘. . . pe . . .’ after thiti in the text is a mistake.
And cf K. ‘ Concentration/ it will be noticed, as well as
‘ quiet* and ‘ balance/ are entirely omitted.
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[425] What on that occasion is perplexity (vici-
kiccha)? 1
The doubt, the hesitating, the dubiety, which on that
1 It is tempting to render vicikiccha by ‘doubt.* It
would not be incorrect to do so. The dual state of mind
which is the etymological basis of d&u-bt is shown in two
of the terms selected to describe the word. Again, the
objects of vicikiccha, as given in § 1004, are those to
which the term ‘doubt,’ in its ethico-religious sense, might
well be applied. But there are features in which the
Buddhist attitude of vicikiccha does not coincide with
doubt as usually understood in the West. Doubt is
the contrary of belief, confidence, or faith. Now, the
approximate equivalents of the latter — saddha and
pas ado — are not alluded to in the answer, as they might
be, for the purpose of contrast. Again, though this by
itself is also no adequate ground for not matching the
two terms in question, the etymology of the words is very
different. There is nothing of the dual, divided state of
mind in the structure of vicikiccha as there is in that
of ‘doubt.’ Cikit is the desiderative or frequentative of
cit, to think; vi, the prefix, indicating either intensive or
distracted thinking. Thus, the etymology of the Indian
word lays stress on the dynamic rather than the static,
on the stress of intellection rather than the suspense of
inconclusiveness. When the term recurs (§ 1004), Buddha-
ghosa refers it to kiccho — to ‘ the fatigue incurred through
inability to come to a decision ’ — a position nearer, psycho-
logically, to ‘ perplexity ’ than to ‘ doubt.’ It is quite true
that, on etymological ground, neither is kankha a match
for our term ‘doubt.’ Kanks is to desire. The word
would seem to give the emotional and volitional comple-
ment of the intellectual state implied in vicikiccha, the
longing to escape into certainty and decision attendant on
the anxious thinking. Kankha, however, is not one of
any important category of ethical terms, as is vicikiccha;
besides, its secondary meaning — namely, of a matter sub
judice, or of the state of mind connected therewith (see Jat.
i. 165 ; M. i. 147) — seems to have superseded the primary
meaning, which is retained in akankhati (cf. Akan-
kheyya Sutta, M. i. 83). Hence, it can be fairly well
rendered by ‘ doubt.* I do not, then, pretend that ‘ per-
8—2
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occasion is puzzlement, 1 perplexity; distraction, standing
at cross-roads; 2 collapse, 3 uncertainty of grasp; evasion,
hesitation; 4 incapacity of grasping thoroughly, 6 stiffness
of mind, 6 mental scarifying 7 — this is the perplexity that
there then is.
******
plexity’ is etymologically the equivalent of vicikiccha,
but I use it (1) to guard against a too facile assimilation
of the latter to the implications of * doubt ’ as used by us,
and (2) to throw emphasis on the * mortal coil ’ and tangle
of thought in one who, on whatever grounds, is sceptically
disposed.
1 Yimati, almost an exact parallel to vicikiccha, con-
noting as it does either intense or distraught mind-action.
2 Dvelhakam, dvedhapatho. Here we get to the
etymological idea in our own ‘doubt.* The Cy. has, for
the one, ‘ to be swayed or shaken to and fro ’ ; for the
other, ‘ as a path branching in two, this being an obstacle
to attainment * (259).
3 Samsayo, the etymological equivalent of ‘collapse.*
To succumb to one*s inability to be persistently carrying
on such problems as, Is this permanent or impermanent ?
etc., says the Cy. (ibid.).
4 Asappana, parisappana. According to the Cy.,
these mean, respectively, ‘ to relinquish * (or slip down
from — osakkati; cf. Trenckner’s ‘Miscellany/ p. 60)
‘an object of thought through inability to come to a
decision,’ and ‘to slip* (or run — sappati [vide sarp])
‘ about on all sides from inability to plunge in.* Asl. 260.
6 Apariyogahana, employed to describe moho. See
§ 390.
6 I should not have hesitated to adopt, for thambhi-
tattam, chambhitattam (vacillation), the alternate
reading in the Cy. (Asl. 260), were it not that the latter
paraphrases the term by saying ‘the meaning is a con-
dition of denseness (or rigidity, thaddho). For when per-
plexity arises, one makes one’s mind stiff (stubborn, dense,
thaddham).’ K. also reads thambhitattam. Both
terms, however, though opposed in connotation, are derived
from the root stambh, to prop; and both are used to
7 See note on p. 117.
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117
[Summary.]
[425a] Now, at that time
the skandhas are lour,
etc.,
the faculties are four,
the Jhana is fourfold,
the Path is twofold,
the powers are three,
the cause is one, 1
etc.
[Continue as in § 58.]
******
[426] What on that occasion is the skandha of syn-
theses ?
Contact,
thinking,
conception,
discursive thought,
self-collectedness ;
the faculties of
energy,
vitality ;
describe the gaseous element, which, though it is vacil-
lating, holds solids apart. See below, § 965. There is the
further comment (Asl., ibid.) that, * in respect of certainty,
inability to cann/ on the idea in the mind is meant.’ Vici-
kiccha, then, though it implies active racking of the
brain, impedes progress in effective thinking, and results
in a mental condition akin to the denseness and apariyo-
gahana of moho.
7 Manovilekho. ‘When perplexity arises, seizing the
object of thought, it scratches the mind, as it were ’ (ibid.).
When the term is used to describe kukkuccam, or worry
(§ 1160), it is illustrated in the Cy. by the scaling of a
copper pot with an awl (araggam). Asl. 884.
1 Namely, moho.
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wrong intention,
wrong endeavour ;
the powers of
energy,
unconscientiousness,
disregard of blame ;
perplexity,
dulness ;
unconscientiousness,
disregard of blame,
grasp. 1
Or whatever other, etc.
[Continue as in § 420.]
XII.
[427] Which are the states that are bad?
When a bad thought has arisen which is accompanied
by disinterestedness and associated with excitement, and
which has as its object a sight, a sound, a smell, a taste,
a touch, a mental state, or what not, then there is
contact,
feeling,
perception,
thinking,
thought,
conception,
discursive thought,
disinterestedness,
self-collectedness,
the faculties of
energy,
concentration,
ideation,
1 On the omission of * balance,’ cf. below, § 429, n.
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119
disinterestedness,
vitality ;
wrong intention,
wrong endeavour,
wrong concentration ;
the powers of
energy,
concentration,
unconscientiousness,
disregard of blame ;
excitement ;
dulness ;
unconscientiousness,
disregard of blame,
quiet,
grasp,
balance.
These, or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced
states there are on that occasion — these are states that are
bad.
[428] Usual question and answer on ‘ contact.’
******
[429] What on that occasion is excitement (uddhac-
cam)?
The excitement of mind which on that occasion is dis-
quietude, agitation of heart, turmoil of mind — this is the
excitement that there then is. 1
******
1 Yam cittassa uddhaccam avupasamo, cetaso
vikkhepo, bhantattam cittassa — idam vuccati
uddhaccam. It seems clear that, whether or no ud-
dhaccam can elsewhere be rendered by terms indicative
of a puffed-up state of mind (see Rhys Davids, ‘ Buddhism,’
p. 109; Warren, ‘Buddhism in Translations,’ p. 865 ; Neu-
mann, ‘ Die Reden,’ etc., I passim), the specific meaning in
this connexion (Tattha katamam uddhaccam) is the
antithesis of vupasamo, and the equivalent of vikkhepo,
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[429a] Now, at that time
the skandhas are four,
etc.,
the faculties are five,
both of which are expressions about the meaning of which
there is little or no uncertainty. In Sanskrit auddhatya
is only found twice in later works, one of them Buddhist
(v. Bothl. and Both., s.v.), and there means wrestling,
a word used by ourselves for certain agitated, perfervid
mental states. That the term should be yoked with kuk-
kuccam (worry) in the Nlvaranas (see §§ 1158-1160; and
cf. the cognate meaning in another allied pair, thina-
middham, §§ 1155-1157) goes far to rob it of implica-
tions of vanity or self-righteousness. (In ‘Dialogues of
the Buddha,’ i. 82, the former pair are rendered ‘ flurry
and worry.’) Buddhaghosa gives little help; but he dis-
tinguishes uddhaccam, as a struggling over one object of
thought (ekarammane vipphandati), from perplexity
as a struggling over dwer^objects of thought. The Bud-
dhists were apparently seeking for terms to describe a state
of mind antithetical to that conveyed by the designation
thlnamiddham — stolidity and torpor. In the latter
there is excessive stability — the immobility not of a finely-
adjusted balance of faculties and values, but of an inert
mass. In the former (uddhacca-kukkuccam) there is
a want of equilibrium and adjustment. From some cause
or another the individual is stirred up, agitated, fussed ;
in American idiom, ‘rattled.’
What I have rendered ‘turmoil’ (bhantattam; more
literally, wavering, rolling, staggering) Buddhaghosa calls
vibhanti-bhavo ( sic lege), bhantayana-bhantagon-
adlnam viya (Asl. 260).
Whatever the exact meaning of uddhaccam may be,
there is enough to show that it is in great part antithetical
to some of the other constituents enumerated under the
Bad Thought in question — at least, when these are taken
in their full intention. I refer to the approximately
synonymous group : ‘ self-collectedness,’ ‘ concentration/
‘quiet* and ‘balance.’ The last, indeed (avikkhepo),
is a contradiction in terms to the phrase which describes
uddhaccam as cetaso vikkhepo! The text actually
omits it, but this is through mere inadvertence (cf. § 430).
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the Jhana is fourfold,
the Path is threefold,
the powers are four,
the cause is one,
etc.
[Continue as in § 58.]
******
It is given in K., and the Cy. explicitly states (p. 260) that
there are twenty-eight constituents enumerated, fourteen
of them being described in terms of one or other of the
other fourteen. (If the reader will compare § 427 with
the corresponding descriptions given in §§ 2-57, he will
prove this to be correct.) Nor is there a word to comment
on, or explain away any apparent incongruity in the in-
clusion. There is only a short discussion, alluded to
already, on the relation of uddhaccam and vicikiccha.
Thoughts XI. and XII., as departing from the symmetrical
procedure of I. to IX., are said to be miscellaneous items,
and to be concerned with persistent attending to the idea
(arammane pavattanaka-cittani). And just as, if a
round gem and a tetragonal gem be sent rolling down an
inclined plane, the former’s motion is uniform, while that
of the latter is from one position of rest to another, so
vicikiccha connotes a continual working of thought,
while uddhaccam works on one given basis at a time.
There being, then, as it would appear, this fairly close
analogy between ‘ perplexity * and ‘ excitement/ it is fair
to assume that ‘ self-collectedness * and its synonyms are
to be understood in Thought XII., as present in the feeble
degree to which they, or at least the first of them, is
present in Thought XL (see § 424, n.). The compilers
were thus between two fires as to their logic. Either
avikkhepo must go to admit of the use of vikkhepo —
in which case the synonyms of avikkhepo (samadhi,
etc.) must go too — or it and its synonyms must be re-
tained with a highly attenuated import. Possibly the
subject was conceived as agitated on some one point only,
but calm as to things in general.
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122
[480] What on that occasion is the skandha of syn-
theses ?
Contact,
thinking,
conception,
discursive thought,
self-collectedness ;
the faculties of
energy,
concentration,
vitality ;
wrong intention,
wrong endeavour,
wrong concentration ;
the powers of
energy,
concentration,
unconscientiousness,
disregard of blame ;
excitement ;
dulness ;
unconscientiousness,
disregard of blame,
quiet,
grasp,
balance.
Or whatever other, etc.
[ Continue as in § 62.]
******
[Here end] the Twelve Bad Thoughts.
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[PART III.— INDETERMINATE STATES OF CONSCIOUS -
NESS}
Chapter I.
On Effect, or Result (vipako).
A. Good Karma.
1. In the sensuous universe.
(a) The Five Modes of Cognition considered as effects of
good (kusalavipakani panca-vinfianani).]
(i.) [431] Which are the states that are indeterminate ?
When, as the result of good karma 1 2 having been wrought,
having been stored up in connexion with the sensuous
universe, visual cognition has arisen, accompanied by dis-
interestedness, 3 and having as its object something seen,
then there is
contact, thinking,
feeling, thought,
perception, disinterestedness,
self-collectedness ;
1 Dhamma avyakata. The term and its treatment
are discussed in my Introduction. Cf. Vis. Magga, ch. xiv.
2 Kammam; literally, action, work, deed.
3 In this and the two following sections (2 and 3)
upekkha is apparently used as a psychological term only,
without ethical implication, and signifies simply neutral
feeling.
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the faculties of
ideation,
disinterestedness,
vitality.
These, or whatever other 1 incorporeal, causally induced
states there are on that occasion — these are states that are
indeterminate.
[432] Question and answer on ‘ contact * as above , passim .
[433] What on that occasion is feeling ?
The mental [condition], neither pleasant nor unpleasant,
which on that occasion is bom of contact with the appro-
priate element of visual cognition ; the sensation, bom of
contact with thought, which is neither easeful nor painful ;
the feeling, born of contact with thought, which is neither
easeful nor painful — this is the feeling that there then is.
[434] What on that occasion is perception ?
The perception, the perceiving, the state of having per-
ceived, which on that occasion is born of contact with the
appropriate element of visual cognition — this is the per-
ception that there then is.
[435] What on that occasion is thinking ?
The thinking, the cogitating, the reflection which on
that occasion is born of contact with the appropriate
element of visual cognition — this is the thinking that there
then is.
[436] What on that occasion is thought ?
The thought which on that occasion is ideation, mind,
heart, that which is clear, ideation as the sphere of mind,
the faculty of ideation, intellect, the skandha of intellect,
the appropriate element of visual cognition — this is the
thought that there then is.
[437] What on that occasion is disinterestedness ?
Answer as for ‘ feeling,’ § 436, omitting the phrase ‘ which
is bom of contact with the appropriate element of visual
cognition.’
1 There will be but one of these, viz., attention (Asl. 262).
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[488] What on that occasion is self-collectedness ?
The persistence of thought 1 which there is on that
occasion — this is the self-collectedness that there then is.
[439] What on that occasion is the faculty of ideation ?
Answer as for ‘ thought/ § 436.
[440] What on that occasion is the faculty of dis-
interestedness ?
Answer as in § 487.
[441] What on that occasion is the faculty of vitality ?
Answer as in % 19.
Or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced states
there are on that occasion — these are the states that are
indeterminate.
[Summary.]
[441a] Now, on that occasion
the skandhas are four,
the spheres are two,
the elements are two,
the nutriments are three,
the faculties are three, 2
contact counts as a single factor,
etc.
[ Continue as in § 58],
1 In the text omit . . . pe . . . after thiti, as in § 424,
and for the same reason (Asl. 262).
2 Jhana and the Path, says the Cy. (262), are not in-
cluded in the summary ; and why ? Jhana at its extremity
has conception (vitakko), and the Path at it 9 extremity
has cause (hetu). Hence, it is not consistent to include
Jhana in a thought that has no conceptual activity, or the
Path, when the thought is not causally effective.
This remark throws a little light on to the problem of
indeterminate states. In vitakko the mind is working
towards an end good or bad ; in the Path the first factor
(right views) is synonymous with ‘absence of dulness,
which is the cause or root of good (§ 1054). Neither
vitakko nor amoho is, therefore, a possible constituent
in a cognition which is inefficacious to produce good or bad
karma.
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the faculty of ideation counts as a single factor,
the element of visual cognition counts as a single factor,
the sphere of [mental] states counts as a single factor,
etc.
[Continue as in § 58.]
******
[442] What on that occasion is the skandha of syn-
theses ?
Contact,
thinking,
self-collectedness,
the faculty of vitality,
or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced states there
are on that occasion, exclusive of the skandhas of feeling,
perception and intellect — these are the skandha of syn-
theses.
******
(ii.-v.) [443] Which are the states that are indeter-
minate?
When, as the result of good karma having been wrought,
having been stored up in connexion with the sensuous
universe,
auditory cognition,
olfactory cognition, or
gustatory cognition
has arisen, accompanied by disinterestedness, and having
as its object
a sound,
a smell, or
a taste
respectively ... or
cognition of body
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127
has arisen, accompanied by ease, and having as its object
something tangible, 1
then there is
contact, thinking,
feeling, 2 thought,
perception, ease,
self-collectedness ;
the faculties of
ideation,
ease,
vitality.
Now, these, or whatever other incorporeal, causally
induced states there are on that occasion — these are states
that are indeterminate.
[444] Question and answer on ‘ contact * as above , passim .
[445] What on that occasion is feeling?
The bodily pleasure, the bodily ease, which on that
occasion is bom of the appropriate element of the cog-
nition of body; the pleasurable, easeful sensation which
1 Or ‘ a touch * (i?. p. 2, n. 2). The view that the cogni-
tion of something tangible has a positive hedonic concomit-
ant — pleasant or, if the karma be bad (§ 556), unpleasant —
as compared with the neutral feeling attending other kinds
of sense-cognition (under the given circumstances), is of
psychological interest. And the comment it evokes is not
less so. Touch, or body-sensibility, is, the Cy. explains
(268), the one sense through which the four elements with-
out and within the individual come into direct contact. Other
cognition is secondary, inasmuch as the other senses are
derived (up ad a). They are as balls of cotton- wool on four
anvils, deadening the impact of the hammer. In touch the
wool is beaten through, and the reaction is stronger. Cf.
this with the theory of sense below, §§ 596-682. Neverthe-
less, the ease or the distress is so faintly marked, that the
cognition remains ‘ indeterminate.’
The constituent states, contact, etc., refer only to the
last-named species of cognition. In the case of the other
four ‘disinterestedness’ would have to be substituted for
‘ ease.’
2 Ye dan a has dropped out of the printed text.
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128
is bom of contact with the body ; the pleasurable, easeful
feeling which is born of contact with the body — this is the
feeling that there then is.
[446] What on that occasion is perception ?
The perception, the perceiving, the state of having
perceived, which on that occasion is bom of contact with
appropriate element of the cognition of body — this is the
perception that there then is.
[447] What on that occasion is thinking ?
The thinking, the cogitating, the reflection, which on that
occasion is born of contact with the appropriate element
of the cognition of body — this is the thinking that there
then is.
[448] What on that occasion is thought ?
The thought which on that occasion is ideation, mind,
heart, that which is clear ; ideation as the sphere of mind,
the faculty of ideation, intellect, the skandha of intellect,
the appropriate element of the cognition of body — this is
the thought that there then is.
[449] What on that occasion is ease ?
The bodily pleasure, the bodily ease which on that occa-
sion is the pleasant, easeful sensation bom of contact with
the body ; the pleasant, easeful feeling born of contact with
the body — this is the ease that there then is.
[450-458] What on that occasion is self-collectedness 1
. . . the faculty of ideation 2 . . . of ease . . . of vitality?
Answers as in §§ 438, 448, 449 and 441 respectively .
Or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced states
there are on that occasion — these are states that are in-
determinate.
1 In § 450 omit ... pe ... in the text after thiti.
2 In § 451 supply kaya- before vinnanadhatu. The
state manindriyam is, it is true, one of representative
cognition only, but it is occupied, under the given circum-
stances, with a kaya-vifinanam. The ‘door of mano*
has as its object any or all of the objects of the five Benses.
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129
[Summary.]
[453a] Now, on that occasion
the skandhas are four,
etc.
[ Continue as in § 441a, substituting ‘ the element of the
cognition of body 'for * the element of visual cognition.’]
******
[454] What on that occasion is the skandha of syn-
theses ?
A nswer as in % 442.
******
[(b) Good (karma) taking effect in ideation (kusalavi-
paka manodhatu).]
[455] Which are the states that are indeterminate ?
When, as the result of good karma having been wrought,
having been stored up in connexion with the sensuous
universe, an element of ideation 1 * * * * * * * 9 has arisen, accompanied
by disinterestedness, and having as its object a sight, a
sound, a smell, a taste, something tangible, or what not,
then there is
contact, thought,
feeling, conception ,
1 Once more the Cy. points out (263) the significance
of the affix -dhatu (element), as meaning the absence of
entity (nissatta), the ‘emptiness’ or phenomenal char-
acter of the ideational faculty. Cf. above, p. 33, n. The
characteristics of mano are here set out. See Introduc-
tion (Theory of Intellection). The theory of a sensorium
commune here alluded to is practically identical with that
adopted by Aristotle in the ‘De Sensu.’ ‘The basis (or
site, vatthu) of this kind of thought is a constant, namely,
the heart ; the objects of the “ doors ” (or of the idea-door)
are not constants. Whereas they come in one after
another, this is the locus (thanam), which has the function
of receiving them into unity’ (ekasampaticchana-
kiccam).
The process of cognition is completed by manovinnti-
nadhatu (see below).
9
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180
perception, discursive thought,
thinking, disinterestedness,
self-collectedness ;
the faculties of
ideation,
disinterestedness,
vitality.
These, or whatever other 1 incorporeal, causally induced
states there are on that occasion — these are states that are
indeterminate.
[456] Question and answer on ‘ contact ’ as above , passim .
[457] What on that occasion is feeling?
The mental [condition], neither pleasant nor unpleasant,
which on that occasion is born of contact with the appro-
priate element of ideation ; the sensation, born of contact
with thought, which is neither easeful nor painful; the
feeling, born of contact with thought, which is neither
easeful nor painful — this is the feeling that there then is.
[458-460] What on that occasion is perception . , .
thinking . . . thought?
Answers as in §§ 446-448, substituting ‘element of idea-
tion 'for ‘element of the cognition of body.’
[461] What on that occasion is conception ?
The ratiocination, the conceiving which on that occasion
is the disposition, the fixation, the focussing, the application
of the mind 2 — this is the conception that there then is.
[462] What on that occasion is discursive thought ?
The process, the sustained procedure, the progress and
access [of the mind] which on that occasion is the con-
tinuous adjusting and directing of thought — this is the
discursive thought that there then is.
1 These (Asl. 264) include two others, resolve and atten-
tion. Cf above, p. 5, n. 1.
2 Inasmuch, says the Cy. (264), as this thought is neither
good nor bad (in its effect), intention (sankappo) 9 either right
or wrong, is not included in the connotation of its component
vitakko. Cf §§ 7 and 371, also p. 125, n. 2.
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131
[463-467] What on that occasion is disinterestedness
. . . self-collectedness . • . the faculty of ideation . . .
of disinterestedness ... of vitality?
Answers as in §§ 437, 438, 460, 440, 1 441 respectively .
[Summary.]
[467a] Now, on that occasion
the skandhas are four,
the spheres are two,
the elements are two,
the nutriments are three,
the faculties are three,
contact counts as a single factor,
etc.
[Continue as in § 58.]
the faculty of ideation counts as a single factor,
the element of ideation counts as a single factor,
etc.
******
[468] What on that occasion is the skandha of syn-
theses ?
Contact, discursive thought,
thinking, self-collectedness,
conception, the faculty of vitality.
Or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced states
there are on that occasion, exclusive of the skandhas of
feeling, perception and intellect — these are the skandha of
syntheses.
* ❖ * * * *
1 The references given in the text will prove, on examina-
tion, to be for the most part misleading.
9—2
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132
(c) Good (karma) taking effect in representative intellec-
tion (kusala-vipaka mano vifiiian adhatu).
(i.) When accompanied by happiness .
[469] Which are the states that are indeterminate ?
When, as the result of good karma having been wrought,
having been stored up in connexion with the sensuous
universe, an element of representative cognition 1 has
arisen, accompanied by happiness and having as its object
1 The function of the manovihnanadhatu is dis-
cussed in the Introduction (Theory of Intellection). As a
resultant state, it is here said (Asl. 264), when ‘accom-
panied by happiness/ to eventuate in two sets of circum-
stances : ‘ Standing in the doors of the five senses, it
accomplishes the task (or function, kiccam) of deciding
(santlrana) as to that idea (or percept) which the element
of ideation, just expired, received on the expiry of that
sense-cognition which constituted the result of good karma.’
Again: ‘When the action of the six doors (senses and
ideation) results in a more impressive idea, this becomes
what is called the idea’ (tad-arammanam), i.e., ‘the
object of the impulse ’ (j a van am), and the element of
representative cognition is drawn away to fix itself on that
object. So a vessel crossing a strong current avails to
turn the latter aside for a moment, though its natural
course is a flowing downward. The normal flow of the
intellect is, so to speak, down th
Dhammasangani
C. A. F. Rhys Davids