El arte de la guerra

.'X"

S ^T^ ^

UN Tzu

ON THE

ART OF WA.R

THE OLDEST MILITARY TREATISE IN THE WORLD

TRANSLATED FROM THE CHINESE WITH INTRODUCTION AND CRITICAL NOTES

BY

LIONEL GILES, M. A.

Assistant in the Department of Oriental Printed Books & MSS. in the British Museum.

LONDON

LUZAC & C°. 1910

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CONTENTS

Page

PREFACE vii

INTRODUCTION

Sun Wu and his Book xi

The Text of Sun Tzu xxx

The Commentators xxxiv

Appreciations of Sun Tzu xlii

Apologies for war xliii

Bibliography 1

Chap. I. Laying Plans i

II. Waging War 9

„ III. Attack by Stratagem 17

„ IV. Tactical Dispositions 26

„ V. Energy 33

„ VI._Weak Points and Strong 42

„ VIL Manoeuvring 55

„ VIII. Variation of Tactics 71

IX,-Xhe Army on the March 80

Terrain 100

The Nine Situations 114

The Attack by Fire 150

„" XIII. The Use of Spies . 160

CHINESE CONCORDANCE 176

INDEX 192

PREFACE

The seventh volume of "Memoires concernant 1'histoire, les sciences, les arts, les mceurs, les usages, &c., des Chinois"1 is devoted to the Art of War, and contains, amongst other treatises, "Les Treize Articles de Sun-tse, " translated from the Chinese by a Jesuit Father, Joseph Amiot. Pere Amiot appears to have enjoyed no small reputation as a sinologue in his day, and the field of his labours was certainly extensive. But his so-called trans- lation of Sun Tzu, if placed side by side with the original, is seen at once to be little better than an imposture. It contains a great deal that Sun Tzu did not write, and very little indeed of what he did. Here is a fair speci- men, taken from the opening sentences of chapter 5 : —

De Vhabilete dans le gouvernement des Troupes. Sun-tse dit : Ayez les noms de tous les Officiers tant generaux que subalternes; inscrivez-les dans un catalogue a part, avec la note des talents & de la capacite de chacun d'eux, afin de pouvoir les employer avec avantage lorsque 1'oc- casion en sera venue. Faites en sorte que tous ceux que vous devez commander soient persuades que votre principale attention est de les preserver de tout dommage. Les troupes que vous ferez avancer centre 1'ennemi doivent etre comme des pierres que vous lanceriez centre des oeufs. De vous a 1'ennemi il ne doit y avoir d'autre difference que celle du fort au foible, du vuide au plein. Attaquez a decouvert, mais soyez vainqueur en secret. Voila en peu de mots en quoi consiste 1'habilete & toute la perfection meme du gouvernement des troupes.

Throughout the nineteenth century, which saw a wonder- ful development in the study of Chinese literature, no translator ventured to tackle Sun Tzu, although his work was known to be highly valued in China as by far the

1 Published at Paris in 1782.

vm PREFACE

oldest and best compendium of military science. It wa; not until the year 1905 that the first English translation by Capt. E. F. Calthrop, R.F.A., appeared at Tokyo under the title "Sonshi" (the Japanese form of Sun Tzu). Unfortunately, it was evident that the translator's know ledge of Chinese was far too scanty to fit him to grappl( with the manifold difficulties of Sun Tzu. He himsel plainly acknowledges that without the aid of two Japanes< gentlemen "the accompanying translation would have beer impossible." We can only wonder, then, that with thei help it should have been so excessively bad. It is no merely a question of downright blunders, from which non< can hope to be wholly exempt. Omissions were frequent hard passages were wilfully distorted or slurred over. Sucl offences are less pardonable. They would not be tolerate( in any edition of a Greek or Latin classic, and a simila standard of honesty ought to be insisted upon in trans lations from Chinese.

From blemishes of this nature, at least, I believe tha the present translation is free. It was not undertake! out of any inflated estimate of my own powers; but could not help feeling that Sun Tzu deserved a bette fate than had befallen him, and I knew that, at any rate I could hardly fail to improve on the work of my predeces sors. Towards the end of 1908, a new and revised editioi of Capt. Calthrop's translation was published in London this time, however, without any allusion to his Japanes collaborators. My first three chapters were then alread; in the printer's hands, so that the criticisms of Capl Calthrop therein contained must be understood as refer ring to his earlier edition. In the subsequent chapters have of course transferred my attention to the secon> edition. This is on the whole an improvement on th other, though there still remains much that cannot pas

1 A rather distressing Japanese flavour pervades the work throughout. Thus, Kir Ho Lu masquerades as "Katsuryo," Wu and Yu'eh become "Go" and "Etsu," etc. etc,

PREFACE IX

muster. Some of the grosser blunders have been rectified and lacunae filled up, but on the other hand a certain number of new mistakes appear. The very first sentence of the introduction is startlingly inaccurate; and later on, while mention is made of "an army of Japanese com- mentators" on Sun Tzu (who are these, by the way?), not a word is vouchsafed about the Chinese commentators, who nevertheless, I venture to assert, form a much more numerous and infinitely more important "army."

A few special features of the present volume may now be noticed. In the first place, the text has been cut up into numbered paragraphs, both in order to facilitate cross- reference and for the convenience of students generally. The division follows broadly that of Sun Hsing-yen's edition ; but I have sometimes found it desirable to join two or more of his paragraphs into one. In quoting from other works, Chinese writers seldom give more than the bare title by way of reference, and the task of research is apt to be seriously hampered in consequence. With a view to obviating this difficulty so far as Sun Tzu is concerned, I have also appended a complete concordance of Chinese characters, following in this the admirable example of Legge, though an alphabetical arrangement has been preferred to the distribution under radicals which he adopted. Another feature borrowed from "The Chinese Classics" is the printing of text, translation and notes on the same page ; the notes, however, are inserted, according to the Chinese method, immediately after the passages to which they refer. From the mass of native commentary my aim has been to extract the cream only, adding the Chinese text here and there when it seemed to present points of literary interest. Though constituting in itself an important branch of Chinese literature, very little com- mentary of this kind has hitherto been made directly acces- sible by translation. l

1 A notable exception is to be found in Biot's edition of the Chou Li.

X PREFACE

I may say in conclusion that, owing to the printing off of my sheets as they were completed, the work has not had the benefit of a final revision. On a review of the whole, without modifying the substance of my criticisms, I might have been inclined in a few instances to temper their asperity. Having chosen to wield a bludgeon, how- ever, I shall not cry out if in return I am visited with more than a rap over the knuckles. Indeed, I have been at some pains to put a sword into the hands of future opponents by scrupulously giving either text or reference for every passage translated. A scathing review, even from the pen of the Shanghai critic who despises "mere trans- lations," would not, I must confess, be altogether unwel- come. For, after all, the worst fate I shall have to dread is that which befel the ingenious paradoxes of George in The Vicar of Wakefield.

INTRODUCTION

SUN Wu AND HIS BOOK.

Ssu-ma Ch'ien gives the following biography of Sun Tzu:1- *

Sun Tzu Wu was a native of the Cn'i State. His Art of War brought him to the notice of f|fj IS Ho Lu, 2 King of 1^ Wu. Ho Lu said to him: I have carefully perused your 13 chapters. May I submit your theory of managing soldiers to a slight test? — Sun Tzu replied: You may. — Ho Lu asked: May the test be applied to women? — The answer was again in the affirmative, so arrangements were made to bring 180 ladies out of the Palace. Sun Tzu divided them into two companies, and placed one of the King's favourite concubines at the head of each. He then bade them all take spears in their hands, and addressed them thus: I presume you know the difference between front and back, right hand and left hand? — The girls replied: Yes. - Sun Tzu went on: When I say "Eyes front," you must look straight ahead. When I say "Left turn," you must face towards your left hand. When I say "Right turn," you must face towards your right hand. When I say "About turn," you must face right round towards the back. — Again the girls assented. The words of command having been thus ex-- plained, he set up the halberds and battle-axes in order to begin the drill. Then, to the sound of drums, he gave the order "Right turn." But the girls only burst out laughing. Sun Tzu said : If words of command are not clear and distinct, if orders are not thoroughly understood, then the general is to blame. — So he started drilling them again, and this time gave the order "Left turn," whereupon the girls once more burst into fits of laughter. Sun Tzu said : If words of command are not clear and distinct, if orders are not thoroughly understood, the general is to blame. But if his orders are clear, and the soldiers nevertheless disobey, then it is the fault of their officers. — So saying, he ordered the leaders of the two companies to be beheaded. Now the King of Wu was watching the

1 Shih Chi, ch. 6s.

2 Also written ^ Rf| Ho LU. He reigned from 514 to 496 B.C.

xn INTRODUCTION

scene from the top of a raised pavilion ; and when he saw that his fa- vourite concubines were about to be executed, he was greatly alarmed and hurriedly sent down the following message: We are now quite satis- fied as to our general's ability to handle troops. If We are bereft of these two concubines, our meat and drink will lose their savour. It is our wish that they shall not be beheaded. — Sun Tzu replied: Having once received His Majesty's commission to be general of his forces, there are certain commands of His Majesty which, acting in that capacity, I am unable to accept. — Accordingly, he had the two leaders beheaded, and straightway installed the pair next in order as leaders in their place. When this had been done, the drum was sounded for the drill once more ; and the girls went through all the evolutions, turning to the right or to the left, marching ahead or wheeling back, kneeling or standing, with perfect accuracy and precision, not venturing to utter a sound. Then Sun Tzu sent a messenger to the King saying: Your soldiers, Sire, are now properly drilled and disciplined, and ready for Your Majesty's in- spection. They can be put to any use that their sovereign may desire; bid them go through fire and water, and they will not disobey. — But the King replied: Let our general cease drilling and return to camp. As for us, We have no wish to come down and inspect the troops. — There- upon Sun Tzu said: The King is only fond of words, and cannot trans- late them into deeds. — After that, Ho Lu saw that Sun Tzu was one who knew how to handle an army, and finally appointed him general. In the West, he defeated the G§Ji__State and forced his way into Yin the capital; to the north, he put fear into the States of Ch'i and Chin, and spread his fame abroad amongst the feudal princes. And Sun Tzu shared in the might of the King.

About Sun Tzu himself this is all that Ssu-ma Ch'ien has to tell us in this chapter. But he proceeds to give a biography of his descendant, J$fr Jj|| Sun Pin, born about a hundred years after his famous ancestor's death, and also the outstanding military genius of his time. The historian speaks of him too as Sun Tzu, and in his preface we read: % -f- $f jjjj] ft) jfft _E| j£ "Sun Tzu had his feet cut off and yet continued to discuss the art of war." l It seems likely, then, that "Pin" was a nickname bestowed on him after his mutilation, unless indeed the story was invented in order to account for the name. The crowning incident of his career, the crushing defeat of his treacherous rival P'ang Chuan, will be found briefly related on p. 40.

1 Shih Chi, ch. 130 , f. 6 r°.

INTRODUCTION XIII

To return to the elder Sun Tzu. He is mentioned in two other passages of the Shih Chi: -

In the third year of his reign [512 B.C.] Ho Lu, King of Wu, took the field with -^ ^ Tzu-hsu [i.e. f£ J| Wu Yiian] and f£j g-g Po P'ei, and attacked Ch'u. He captured the town of ^ Shu and slew the two prince's sons who had formerly been generals of Wu. He was then meditating a descent on §±|$ Ying [the capital]; but the general Sun Wu said: "The army is exhausted. ' It is not yet possible. We must wait". . . . 2 [After further successful fighting,] "in the ninth year [506 B.C.], King Ho Lu of Wu addressed Wu Tzu-hsii and Sun Wu, saying: "Formerly, you declared that it was not yet possible for us to enter Ying. Is the time ripe now?" The two men replied: "ChVs general, -^ ^ Tzu-ch'ang, 3 is grasping and covetous, and the princes of HI* T'ang and ^^ Ts'ai both have a grudge against him. If Your Majesty has resolved to make a grand attack, you must win over T'ang and Ts'ai, and then you may succeed." Ho Lu followed this advice, [beat Ch'u in five pitched battles and marched into Ying]. 4

This is the latest date at which anything is recorded of Sun Wu. He does not appear to have survived his patron, who died from the effects of a wound in 496.

In the chapter entitled ffit fj (the earlier portion of which M. Chavannes believes to be a fragment of a treatise on Military Weapons), there occurs this passage : 5

From this time onward, a number of famous soldiers arose, one after the other : ^~ ;||J Kao-fan, 6 who was employed by the Chin State ; Wang-tzu, 7 in the service of Ch'i; and Sun Wu, in the service of Wu. These men developed and threw light upon the principles of war ( m

1 I note that M. Chavannes translates f& *^ "le peuple est e"puise." But in Sun Tzu's own book (see especially VII §§ 24 — 26) the ordinary meaning of ^&

is "army," and this, I think, is more suitable here.

2 These words are given also in Wu Tzu-hsii's biography, ch. 66, fol. 3 r°.

3 The appellation of ^T Nang Wa.

4 Shih Chi^ ch. 31, fol. 6r°.

5 Ibid. ch. 25, fol. i r°.

6 The appellation of ;jfjfj£ ^& Hu Yen, mentioned in ch. 39 under t^' year 637.

7 ^£ -^ jjjjjj ^ Wang-tzii Chceng-fu, ch. 32, year 607.

XIV INTRODUCTION

It is obvious that Ssu-ma Ch'ien at least had no doubt about the reality of Sun Wu as an historical personage ; and with one exception, to be noticed presently, he is by far the most important authority on the period in question. It will not be necessary, therefore, to say much of such a work as the ^ ^ ^ ^ Wu Yiieh Cfcun Cfciu, which is supposed to have been written by Jj| fl|| Chao Yeh of the Ist century A.D. The attribution is somewhat doubt- ful ; but even if it were otherwise, his account would be of little value, based as it is on the Shih Chi and ex- panded with romantic details. The story of Sun Tzu will be found, for what it is worth, in chapter 2. The only new points in it worth noting are: i) Sun Tzu was first recommended to Ho Lu by Wu Tzu-hsli. 2) He is called a native of Wu. x 3) He had previously lived a retired life, and his contemporaries were unaware of his ability. 2

The following passage occurs in ^£ fjf -^ Huai-nan Tzu : "When sovereign and ministers show perversity of mind, it is impossible even for a Sun Tzu to encounter the foe."3 Assuming that this work is genuine (and hitherto no doubt has been cast upon it), we have here the earliest direct reference to Sun Tzu, for Huai-nan Tzu died in 122 B.C., many years before the Shih Chi was given to the world.

UJ [S] Liu Hsiang (B.C. 80-9) in his %fr ff> says: "The reason why Sun Wu at the head of 30,000 men beat

1 The mistake is natural enough. Native critics refer to the ^ ^ft !^ , a work of the Han dynasty, which says (ch. 2, fol. 3 v° of my edition) : /g P^

"Ten li outside the Wu gate [of the city of ^ Wu, now Soochow in Kiangsu] there is a great mound, raised to commemorate the entertainment of Sun Wu of Chci, who excelled in the art of war, by the King of Wu."

M * •? 7 ft ft •

INTRODUCTION XV

Ch'u with 200,000 is that the latter were undisciplined."1 15 ^ tft Teng Ming-shih in his jft R ^ |f || (com- pleted in 1 1 34) informs us that the surname ^ was be- stowed on Sun Wu's grandfather by j|Sr £+ Duke Ching of Ch'i [547-490 B.C.]. Sun Wu's father Sun }J| P'ing, rose to be a Minister of State in Ch'i, and Sun Wu him- self, whose style was J| j)|||J Ch'ang-ch'ing, fled to Wu on account of the rebellion which was being fomented by the kindred of gj jj& Tcien Pao. He had three sons, of whom the second, named B|j Ming, was the father of Sun Pin. According to this account, then, Pin was the grandson of Wu,3 which, considering that Sun Pin's victory over ^ Wei was gained in 341 B.C., may be dismissed as chronologically impossible. Whence these data were ob- tained by Teng Ming-shih I do not know, but of course no reliance whatever can be placed in them.

An interesting document which has survived from the close of the Han period is the short preface written by the great ]f ^ Ts'ao Ts'ao, or H jf£ tffr Wei Wu Ti, for his edition of Sun Tzu. I shall give it in full : —

I have heard that the ancients used bows and arrows to their advan- tage. 3 The Lun Yii says : "There must be a sufficiency of military strength." 4 The Shu Ching mentions "the army" among the "eight objects of government."5 The I Ching says: " ||jjj 'army' indicates firmness and justice; the experienced leader will have good fortune."6

2 The Shih Chi, on the other hand, says :

3fa -fjl . I may remark in passing that the name jj£ for one who was a great warrior is just as suspicious as H^ f°r a man wh° had his feet cut off.

« An allusion to , , II. ,:

jtjjj^ ^ ^ ^|J J[/j[ ^ ^ ~j\ "They attached strings to wood to make bows, and sharpened wood to make arrows. The use of bows and arrows is to keep the Empire in awe."

4 !if Jnf XIL 7' 5 IS t? V' iv* 7>

, 7th diagram ( gjg ).

XVI INTRODUCTION

The Shih Ching says : "The King rose majestic in his wrath, and he marshalled his troops." ' The Yellow Emperor, T'ang the Completer and Wu Wang all used spears and battle-axes in order to succour their generation. The Ssu-ma Fa says : "If one man slay another of set pur- pose, he himself may rightfully be slain." 2 He who relies solely on warlike measures shall be exterminated; he who relies solely on peaceful measures shall perish. Instances of this are Fu Ch'ai 3 on the one hand and Yen Wang on the other. * In military matters, the Sage's rule is normally to keep the peace, and to move his forces only when occasion requires. He will not use armed force unless driven to it by necessity. 5 Many books have I read on the subject of war and fighting; but the work composed by Sun Wu is the profoundest of them all. [Sun Tzu was a native of the Ch'i state, his personal name was Wu. He wrote the Art of War in 13 chapters for Ho Lii, King of Wu. Its principles were tested on women, and he was subsequently made a general. He led an army westwards, crushed the Ch'u State and entered Ying the capital. In the north, he kept Ch'i and Chin in awe. A hundred years and more after his time, Sun Pin lived. He was a descendant of Wu]. 6 In his treatment of deliberation and planning, the importance of rapidity in taking the field, 7 clearness of conception, and depth of design, Sun

ch. I ( ) ad init. The text of the passage in the

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3 The son and successor of Ho Lu. He was finally defeated and overthrown by ^J jg| Kou Chien, King of Yiieh, in 473 B.C. See post.

4 King Yen of |fj£ Hsu, a fabulous being, of whom Sun Hsing-yen says in

his preface: ^ ffjj j£ "His humanity brought him to destruction." See Shih Chi^ ch. 5, f. i z/c, and M. Chavannes' note, Memoires Historiques^ torn. II, p. 8. i TV, Skn, HU. ch. 90: $ ^ J- £ ^ gfc £ £ ^ gj| H

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6 The passage I have put in brackets is omitted in the T'-u Shu, and may be an interpolation. It was known, however, to j*J| ^ |j} Chang Shou-chieh of the T'ang dynasty, and appears in the Tlai P^ing Yu Lan.

7 Ts'ao Kung seems to be thinking of the first part of chap. II, perhaps especially of § 8.

INTRODUCTION XVII

Tzfi stands beyond the reach of carping criticism. My contemporaries, however, have failed to grasp the full meaning of his instructions, and while putting into practice the smaller details in which his work abounds, they have overlooked its essential purport. That is the motive which has led me to outline a rough explanation of the whole. *

One thing to be noticed in the above is the explicit statement that the 1 3 chapters were specially composed for King Ho Lu. This is supported by the internal evidence of I. § 15, in which it seems clear that some ruler is addressed.

In the bibliographical section of the Han Shu, 3 there is an entry which has given rise to much discussion : ^^-f-A + H ^^1^ "The works of Sun Tzu of Wu in 82 p'ien (or chapters), with diagrams in 9 chuan." It is evident that this cannot be merely the 13 chapters known to Ssu-ma Ch'ien, or those we possess to-day. Chang Shou-chieh in his jjj ff g j£ J|| refers to an edition of Sun Tzu's -ft jj- of which the " 1 3 chapters" formed the first chuan, adding that there were two other chuan besides. 3 This has brought forth a theory, that the bulk of these 82 chapters consisted of other writings of Sun Tzii - - we should call them apocryphal — similar to the ^{j ^ Wen Ta, of which a specimen dealing with the Nine Situations 4 is preserved in the :J|| J& T^ung Tien, and another in Ho Shih's commentary. It is suggested

» ft*

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A # # s # am & « A IB

at A * z

3 The -|j^ ~7yT =^ mentions two editions of Sun Tzii in 3 chuan, namely

fc«? -a

* See chap. XL

xvm INTRODUCTION

that before his interview with Ho Lu, Sun Tzu had only written the 13 chapters, but afterwards composed a sort of execresis in the form of question and answer between himself and the King. || $ jfj Pi I-hsiin, author of the ^ jy. £fe ^ Sun Tzu Hsu Lu, backs this up with a quotation from the Wu Yueh Cfcun Cfciu: "The King of Wu summoned Sun Tzu, and asked him questions about the art of war. Each time he set forth a chapter of his work, the King could not find words enough to praise him." l As he points out, if the whole work was ex- pounded on the same scale as in the above-mentioned fragments, the total number of chapters could not fail to be considerable. 3 Then the numerous other treatises at- tributed to Sun Tzu3 might also be included. The fact that the Han Chih mentions no work of Sun Tzu except the 82 p'ien, whereas the Sui and T'ang bibliographies give the titles of others in addition to the "13 chapters," is good proof, Pi I-hsiin thinks, that all of these were contained in the 82 p^ien. Without pinning our faith to the accuracy of details supplied by the Wu Yuek Cfcun Cfciu, or admitting the genuineness of any of the treatises cited by Pi I-hslin, we may see in this theory a probable solution of the mystery. Between Ssu-ma Ch'ien and Pan Ku there was plenty of time for a luxuriant crop of for- geries to have grown up under the magic name of Sun Tzu, and the 82 p'ien may very well represent a collected edition of these lumped together with the original work.

3 Such as the /\ |8j[ |jj , quoted in ^|J ^ Cheng Hsuan's commentary on the Ckon Li, the ffc g| ^ |Eff £ fe and „££ j£ || £ , mentioned in

*e Rt ^fe Sui C'"h-' and the S ~f" ^. ij[ jjj£ , in 'he Han Tang Chih.

INTRODUCTION XIX

It is also possible, though less likely, that some of them existed in the time of the earlier historian and were pur- posely ignored by him. l

Tu Mu, after Ts'ao Kung the most important commen- tator on Sun Tzu, composed the preface to his edition 3 about the middle of the ninth century. After a somewhat lengthy defence of the military art, 3 he comes at last to Sun Tzu himself, and makes one or two very startling assertions : -- "The writings of Sun Wu," he says, "originally comprised several hundred thousand words, but Ts'ao Ts'ao, the Emperor Wu Wei, pruned away all redundancies and wrote out the essence of the whole, so as to form a single book in 1 3 chapters." 4 He goes on to remark that Ts'ao Ts'ao's commentary on Sun Tzu leaves a certain proportion of difficulties unexplained. This, in Tu Mu's opinion, does not necessarily imply that he was unable to furnish a com- plete commentary. 5 According to the Wei Chih, Ts'ao himself wrote a book on war in something over 100,000 words, known as the ^ |J . It appears to have been of such exceptional merit that he suspects Ts'ao to have used for it the surplus material which he had found in Sun Tzu. He concludes, however, by saying: "The Hsin Shu is now lost, so that the truth cannot be known for certain." 6

Tu Mu's conjecture seems to be based on a passage

1 On the other hand, it is noteworthy that -* Wu Tzu, which is now in 6 chapters, has 48 assigned to it in the Han Chih. Likewise, the pt| m£ Chttng Yung is credited with 49 chapters, though now in one only. In the case of such very short works, one is tempted to think that jg|| might simply mean "leaves."

2 See T-u Shu, |g || M, ch. 442, j| ^ 2.

3 An extract will be found on p. xlv.

4 se % m 9 Ji m. -m w

1 r » ff I

XX INTRODUCTION

in the ^ |jf $$ §^ "Wei Wu Ti strung together Sun Wu's Art of War," l which in turn may have resulted from a misunderstanding of the final words of Ts'ao Kung's preface:

#fc ft 1S fl&H 1^ This> as Sun Hsing-yen points out,2 is only a modest way of saying that he made an explana- tory paraphrase, 3 or in other words, wrote a commentary on it. On the whole, the theory has met with very little acceptance. Thus, the (Jtj J|[ ^ |J says:4 "The mention of the 13 chapters in the Shih Chi shows that they were in existence before the Han Chih, and that later accretions are not to be considered part of the original work. Tu Mu's assertion can certainly not be taken as proof." 5

There is every reason to suppose, then, that the 13 chapters existed in the time of Ssu-ma Ch'ien practically as we have them now. That the work was then well known he tells us in so many words: "Sun Tzu's 13 Chapters and Wu Ch'i's Art of WTar are the two books that people commonly refer to on the subject of military matters. Both of then are widely distributed, so I will not discuss them here." 6 But as we go further back, serious difficulties begin to arise. The salient fact which has to be faced is that the Tso Chuan, the great con- temporary record, makes no mention whatever of Sun

frlr Q

4

99,

INTRODUCTION XXI

W u^ either as a general or as a writer. It is natural, in view of this awkward circumstance, that many scholars should not only cast doubt on the story of Sun Wu as given in the Shih Chi, but even show themselves frankly sceptical as to the existence of the man at all. The most powerful presentment of this side of the case is to be found in the following disquisition by IPf ^(C Aj> Yeh Shui-hsin : l -

It is stated in Ssu-ma Ch'ien's history that Siin Wu was a native of the Ch'i State, and employed by Wu; and that in the^eign of Ho Lu he crushed Ch'u, entered Ying, and was a great general. But in Tso's Commentary no Sun Wu appears at all. It is true that Tso's Commen- tary need not contain absolutely everything that other histories contain. But Tso has not omitted to mention vulgar plebeians and hireling ruf- fians such as Ying K'ao-shu, a Ts'ao Kuei, 3 Chu Chih-wu 4 and Chuan She-chu. 5 In the case of Sun Wu, whose fame and achievements were so brilliant, the omission is much more glaring. Again, details are given, in their due order, about his contemporaries Wu Yuan and the Minister P'ei. 6 Is it credible that Sun Wu alone should have been passed over?7

In point of literary style, Sun Tzu's work belongs to the same school as Kuan Tzu,* the Liu T'ao,* and the Yueh Yu, 10 and may have

1 Yeh shih of the Sunsdynasty [1151—1223]. see

ch. 221, ff. 7, 8.

2 See Tso Chuan, [§ /£± , I. 3 ad fin. and XI. 3 ad init. He hardly deserves to be bracketed with assassins.

3 See pp. 66, 128.

* See Tso Chuan, fit ^ , XXX. 5.

5 See p. 128. Chuan Chu is the abbreviated form of his name.

6 7. e. Po Pcei. See ante.

m m z m

8 The nucleus of this work is probably genuine, though large additions have been made by later hands. Kuan Chung died in 645 B. C.

9 See infra, p. 1.

10 I do not know what work this is, unless it be the last chapter of the |||| =|^> . Why that chapter should be singled out, however, is not clear.

XXII INTRODUCTION

been the production of some private scholar living towards the end of the "Spring and Autumn" or the beginning of the "Warring States" period. » The story that his precepts were actually applied by the Wu State, is merely the outcome of big talk on the part of his followers. 2

From the flourishing period of the Chou dynasty 3 down to the time of the a Spring and Autumn," all military commanders were statesmen as well, and the class of professional generals, for conducting external campaigns, did not then exist. It was not until the period of the "Six States" * that this custom changed. Now although Wu was an uncivilised State, is it conceivable that Tso should have left unrecorded the fact that Sun Wu was a great general and yet held no civil office? What we are told, therefore, about Jang-chu 5 and Sun Wu, is not authentic matter, but the reckless fabrication of theorising pundits. The story of Ho Lu's ex- periment on the women, in particular, is utterly preposterous and in- credible. 6

Yeh Shui-hsin represents Ssu-ma Ch'ien as having- said that Sun Wu crushed Ch'u and entered Ying. This is not quite correct. No doubt the impression left on the reader's mind is that he at least shared in these exploits; but the actual subject of the verbs $£ , A > M an^ II is certainly |ff) fjg , as is shown by the next words :

•^ •¥* H- ^ JJ M • 7 The fact may or may not t>e

significant; but it is nowhere explicitly stated in the Shih Chi either that Sun Tzti was general on the occasion of

' About 480 B. C.

'n^m^-^

*B %ilj ft A

That is, I suppose, the age of Wu Wang and Chou Rung.

4 In the 3rd century B. C.

5 Ssu-ma Jang-chu, whose family name was |JJ Tien, lived in the latter half of the 6th century B. C., and is also believed to have written a work on war. See Shih Chi, ch. 64, and infra, p. 1.

.

See the end of the passage quoted from the Shih Chi on

p. xii.

INTRODUCTION XXIII

the taking of Ying, or that he even went there at all. Moreover, as we know that Wu Yuan and Po Pcei both took part in the expedition, and also that its success was largely due to the dash and enterprise of ^ |f| Fu Kai, Ho Lu's younger brother, it is not easy to see how yet another general could have played a very prominent part in the same campaign.

$ft 1H 3& Ch'en Chen-sun of the Sung dynasty has the note : l —

Military writers look upon Sun Wu as the father of their art. But the fact that he does not appear in the Tso Chuan, although he is said to have served under Ho Lii King of Wu, makes it uncertain what period he really belonged to. 2

He also says : — The works of Sun Wu and Wu Ch'i may be of genuine antiquity. 3

It is noticeable that both Yeh Shui-hsin and Ch'en Chen-sun, while rejecting the personality of Sun Wu as he figures in Ssu-ma Ch'ien's history, are inclined to ac- cept the date traditionally assigned to the work which passes under his name. The author of the Hsu Lu fails to appreciate this distinction, and consequently his bitter attack on Ch'en Chen-sun really misses its mark. He makes one or two points, however, which certainly tell in favour of the high antiquity of our "13 chapters." "Sun Tzu," he says, "must have lived in the age of Ching Wang [519—476], because he is frequently plagiarised in subsequent works of the Chou, Ch4n and Han dynasties." 4

1 In the ^jiL ^jJ£ jij# -9|j f a classified catalogue of his family library.

' See Win Hsien T'ung K'ao, eh. 221, 1. 9 r° : \£ £ =j & % jjflj ^

fi yn 4 it A x • li n ffi ? j& M .^- ii. ^''.M il if

Bf A-tfc-

3 See Hsu Lu, f. ,4 ,°

Here is a list of the passages in Sun Tzii from which

XXIV INTRODUCTION

The two most shameless offenders in this respect are Wu Chli and Huai-nan Tzu, both of them important historical personages in their day. The former lived only a century after the alleged date of Sun Tzu, and his death is known to have taken place in 381 B.C. It was to him, according to Liu Hsiang, that *§* ^3 Tseng Shen delivered the Tso Chuan, which had been entrusted to him by its author. l Now the fact that quotations from the Art of War, acknowledged or otherwise, are to be found in so many authors of different epochs, establishes a very strong probability that there was some common source anterior to them all, - - in other words, that Sun Tzu's treatise was already in existence towards the end of the 5th century B. C. Further proof of Sun Tzu's antiquity is furnished by the archaic or wholly obsolete meanings attaching to a number of the words he uses. A list of these, which might perhaps be extended, is given in the Hsu Lu; and though some of the interpretations are doubtful, the main argument is hardly affected thereby. 3 Again, it must not be forgotten that Yeh Shui-hsin, a scholar and critic of the first rank, deliberately pronounces the style of the 13 chapters to

either the substance or the actual words have been appropriated by early authors: VII. 9; IX. 175 I. 24 (l|k |g| jj|). IX. 23; IX. i, 3, 7; V. i; III. 18; XL 58; VII. 31; VII. 24; VII. 26; IX. 15; IX. 4 (bis) (^ -^). III. 8; IV. 7 (Itlf-7*) VII^I95v-I4;in2(g|^^). III. 8; XL 2; I. 19; XI. 58; X. 10 & VI. I (U ^fti ' ^wo °^ t^ie aDOve are given as quotations). V. 13;

IV' 2 - IX- XI> I25 XI' 30; I- 135 VII. 19 & IV. 7; VII. 32;

VII. 25; IV. 20 & V. 23; IX. 43; V. 15; VII. 26; V. 4 & XI. 39; VIII. ii ;

' See Legge's Classics, vol. V, Prolegomena p. 27. Legge thinks that the Tso Chuan must have been written in the 5th century, but .not before 424 B.C.

2 The instances quoted are: — III. 14, 15: ||J is said to be equivalent to || ;

IL I5: M = K; VIL 28: H - ,t ; XL 6o: ^ - 1¥ 5 XL 24; the use

of pj instead of g| (the later form); XI. 64: f^ = >^; IX. 3: ^g = ^; III. u: JJI and |ft^ antithetically opposed in the sense of ffiff ML and XL 6:» =XI

INTRODUCTION XXV

belong to the early part of the fifth century. Seeing that he is actually engaged in an attempt to disprove the existence of Sun Wu himself, we may be sure that he would not have hesitated to assign the work to a later date had he not honestly believed the contrary. And it is precisely on such a point that the judgment of an educated Chinaman will carry most weight. Other internal evidence is not far to seek. Thus, in XIII. § i, there is an unmistakable allusion to the ancient system of land- tenure which had already passed away by the time ol Mencius, who was anxious to see it revived in a modified form. L The only warfare Sun Tzu knows is that carried on between the various feudal princes ( ^ ^ ), in which armoured chariots play a large part. Their use seems to have entirely died out before the end of the Chou dynasty. He speaks as a man of Wu, a state \vhich ceased to exist as early as 473 B. C. On this I shall touch presently. But once refer the work to the 5th century or earlier, and the chances of its being other than a dona fide pro- duction are sensibly diminished. The great age of forgeries did not come until long after. That it should have been forged in the period immediately following 473 is parti- cularly unlikely, for no one, as a rule, hastens to identify himself with a lost cause. As for Yeh Shui-hsin's theory, that the author was a literary recluse, 3 that seems to me quite untenable. If one thing is more apparent than an- other after reading the maxims of Sun Tzu, it is that their essence has been distilled from a large store of personal observation and experience. They reflect the mind not only of a born strategist, gifted with a rare faculty of gene- ralisation, but also of a practical soldier closely acquainted with the military conditions of his time. To say nothing

1 See Mencius III. I. iii. 13 — 20.

2 | 1 j /|>fC |Jjl ~JT need not be pressed to mean an actual dweller in the mountains. I think it simply denotes a person living a retired life and standing aloof from public affairs.

XXVI INTRODUCTION

of the fact that these sayings have been accepted and endorsed by all the greatest captains of Chinese history, they offer a combination of freshness and sincerity, acute- ness and common sense, which quite excludes the idea that they were artificially concocted in the study. If we admit, then, that the 13 chapters were the genuine pro- duction of a military man living towards the end of the "Ch'un Ch4u" period, are we not bound, in spite of the silence of the Tso Chuan, to accept Ssu-ma Ch'ien's ac- count in its entirety? In view of his high repute as a sober historian, must we not hesitate to assume that the records he drew upon for Sun Wu's biography were false and untrustworthy? The answer, I fear, must be in the negative. There is still one grave, if not fatal, objection to the chronology involved in the story as told in the Shih Chi, which, so far as I am aware, nobody has yet pointed out. There are two passages in Sun Tzu in which he alludes to contemporary affairs. The first is in VI. §21: —

Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yiieh exceed our own in number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. I say then that victory can be achieved.

The other is in XI. § 30 : -

Asked if an army can be made to imitate the shuai-jan, I should answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yiieh are enemies; yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a storm, they will come to each other's assistance just as the left hand helps the right.

These two paragraphs are extremely valuable as evidence of the date of composition. They assign the work to the period of the struggle between Wu and Yueh. So much has been observed by Pi I-hsun. But what has hitherto escaped notice is that they also seriously impair the cre- dibility of Ssu-ma Ch'ien's narrative. As we have seen above, the first positive date given in connection with Sun Wu is 5 1 2 B. C. He is then spoken of as a general, acting as confidential adviser to Ho Lu, so that his alleged introduction to that monarch had already taken place,

INTRODUCTION XXVII

and of course the 1 3 chapters must have been written earlier still. But at that time, and for several years after, down to the capture of Ying in 506, ^ Chlu, and not Yiieh, was the great hereditary enemy of Wu. The two states, Ch'u and Wu, had been constantly at war for over half a century, 1 whereas the first war between Wu and Ylieh was waged only in 510, 2 and even then was no more than a short interlude sandwiched in the midst 01 the fierce struggle with Ch'u. Now Ch'u is not mentioned in the 13 chapters at all. The natural inference is that they were written at a time when Ylieh had become the prime antagonist of Wu, that is, after Ch'u had suffered the great humiliation of 506. At this point, a table of dates may be found useful.

B.C.

5H 512

510

tween the two states. 5°9

or 508 506

505

5°4 497 496

Accession of Ho Lu.

Ho Lu attacks Ch'u, but is dissuaded from entering !g[$ Ying, the

capital. Shih Chi mentions Sun Wu as general. Another attack on Ch'u. Wu makes a successful attack on Yiieh. This is the first war be-

Ch'u invades Wu, but is signally defeated at J& jl^ Yii-chang. Ho Lu attacks Ch'u with the aid of T'ang and Ts'ai. Decisive

battle of yjv^l Jljf; Po-chii, and capture of Ying. Last mention

of Sun Wu in Shih Chi. Yiieh makes a raid on Wu in the absence of its army. Wu is

beaten by Ch'in and evacuates Ying. Ho Lu sends 4 £ Fu Ch'ai to attack Ch'u.

""*

^J {j|| Kou Chien becomes King of Yiieh.

Wu attacks Yiieh, but is defeated by Kou Chien at #|| ^ Tsui-li. Ho Lu is killed.

1 When Wu first appears in the Ch'-un CWiu in 584, it is already at variance with its powerful neighbour. The Cfrun Ch'-iu first mentions Yiieh in 537, the Tso Chuan in 60 1.

This is explicitly stated in the Tso Chuan, ft3 ^. XXXII, 2 : W J& >ffe

XXVIII INTRODUCTION

B.C.

494

and enters the capital of Yueh. 485 '

or

484 482

Fu Ch'ai defeats Kou Chien in the great battle of $ Fu-chiao,

Kou Chien renders homage to Wu. Death of Wu Tztt-hsu. Kou Chien invades Wu in the absence of Fu Ch'ai.

47 Further attacks by Yueh on Wu. 476

475 473

Kou Chien lays siege to the capital of Wu. Final defeat and extinction of Wu.

The sentence quoted above from VI. § 21 hardly strikes me as one that could have been written in the full flush of victory. It seems rather to imply that, for the moment at least, the tide had turned against Wu, and that she was getting the worst of the struggle. Hence we may conclude that our treatise was not in existence in 505, before which date Yueh does not appear to have scored any notable success against Wu. Ho Lu died in 496, so that if the book was written for him, it must have been during the period 505—496, when there was a lull in the hostilities, Wu having presumably been exhausted by its supreme effort against Chcu. On the other hand, if we choose to disregard the tradition connecting Sun Wu's name with Ho Lu, it might equally well have seen the light between 496 and 494, or possibly in the period 482—473, when Yueh was once again becoming a very serious menace. l We may feel fairly certain that the author, whoever he may have been, was not a man of any great eminence in his own day. On this point the negative testimony of the Tso Chuan far outweighs any shred of authority still attaching to the Shih Chi, if once its other facts are discredited. Sun Hsing-yen, however, makes a feeble attempt to explain the omission of his name from

1 There is this to be said for the later period, that the feud would tend to grow more bitter after each encounter, and thus more fully justify the language used in XI. § 30.

INTRODUCTION XXIX

the great commentary. It was Wu Tzu-hsii, he says, who got all the credit of Sun Wu's exploits, because the latter (being an alien) was not rewarded with an office in the State. 1

How then did the Sun Tzu legend originate? It may be that the growing celebrity of the book imparted by degrees a kind of factitious renown to its author. It was felt to be only right and proper that one so _weiL-yersed in thescience o£ja£ar- should have solid achievements to his credit as well. Now the capture of Ying was un- doubtedly the greatest feat of arms in Ho Lu's reign ; it made a deep and lasting impression on all the surrounding states, and raised Wu to the short-lived zenith of her power. Hence, what more natural, as time went on, than that the acknowledged master of strategy, Sun Wu, should be popularly identified with that campaign, at first perhaps only in the sense that his brain conceived and planned it; afterwards, that it was actually carried out by him in conjunction with Wu Yuan, 3 Po P'ei and Fu Kai?

It is obvious that any attempt to reconstruct even the outline of Sun Tzu's life must be based almost wholly on conjecture. With this necessary proviso, I should say that he probably entered the service of Wu about the time of Ho Lu's accession, and gathered experience, though only in the capacity of a subordinate officer, during the intense military activity which marked the first half of that prince's reign. 3 If he rose to be a general at all, he certainly was never on an equal footing with the three

i See his preface to Sun Tzu: »

2 With Wu Yuan himself the case is just the reverse: — a spurious treatise on war has been fathered on him simply because he was a great general. Here we have an obvious inducement to forgery. Sun Wu, on the other hand, cannot have been widely known to fame in the 5th century.

3 See Tso Chuan, fc ^ , 4th year (506), § 14: g $J ^ [t|J $L ^ g*

^ ^fC ^ 6Bf UFrom the date of Kin£ Cnao's accession [515] there was no year in which Ch'u was not attacked by Wu."

XXX INTRODUCTION

above mentioned. He was doubtless present at the in- vestment and occupation of Ying, and witnessed Wu's sudden collapse in the following year. Ylieh's attack at this critical juncture, when her rival was embarrassed on every side, seems to have convinced him that this upstart kingdom was the great enemy against whom every effort would henceforth have to be directed. Sun Wu was thus a well-seasoned warrior when he sat down to write his famous book, which according to my reckoning must have appeared towards the end, rather than the beginning, ot Ho Lu's reign. The story of the women may possibly have grown out of some real incident occurring about the same time. As we hear no more of Sun Wu after this from any source, he is hardly likely to have survived his patron or to have taken part in the death-struggle with Ylieh, which began with the disaster at Tsui-li.

If these inferences are approximately correct, there is a certain irony in the fate which decreed that China's most illustrious man of peace should be contemporary with her greatest writer on war.

THE TEXT OF SUN Tzij.

I have found it difficult to glean much about the history of Sun Tzu's text. The quotations that occur in early authors go to show that the "13 chapters" of which Ssu- ma Ch'ien speaks were essentially the same as those now extant. We have his word for it that they were widely circulated in his day, and can only regret that he refrained from discussing them on that account. 1 Sun Hsing-yen says in his preface: —

During the Ch'in and Han dynasties Sun Tzu's Art of War was in

»*^4.A..- • 7^^ — """^ i"*""" " "^TT7"r~ .. X.

mysterious import, and were unwillineMto ex

1 See supra^ p. xx.

INTRODUCTION XXXI

the benefit of posterity. Thus it came about that Wei Wu was the first to write a commentary on it. '

As we have already seen, there is no reasonable ground to suppose that Ts'ao Kung tampered with the text. But the text itself is often so obscure, and the number of editions which appeared from that time onward so great, especially during the T'ang and Sung dynasties, that it would be surprising if numerous corruptions had not managed to creep in. Towards the middle of the Sung period, by which time all the chief commentaries on Sun Tzu were in existence, a certain ^ ^ ^ Chi Tlien-pao published a work in 15 chuan entitled -f- ^ $j> 3f* ^ ££ "Sun Tzu with the collected commentaries of ten writers." 3 There was another text, with variant readings put forward by Chu Fu of ^ J|L Ta-hsing, 3 which also had supporters among the scholars of that period ; but in the Ming editions, Sun Hsing-yen tells us, these readings were for some reason or other no longer put into circulation. * Thus, until the end of the i8th century, the text in sole pos- session of the field was one derived from Chi T'ien-pao's edition, although no actual copy of that important work was known to have surrived. That, therefore, is the text of Sun Tzu which appears in the War section of the great Imperial encyclopaedia printed in 1726, the ~j!t ^f*" HO 1§* ^H jfc fat Chin T'u Shu Chi Ch'eng. Another copy at my disposal of what is practically the same text, with slight variations, is that contained in the ^ ffs; -j- — • ^ "Eleven philosophers of the Chou and Ch'in dynasties"

a # ffl ^ ir

2S« %&%&•

3 Alluded to on p. xvii, note 3*

XXXII INTRODUCTION

[1758]. And the Chinese printed in Capt. Calthrop's first edition is evidently a similar version which has filtered through Japanese channels. So things remained until •££ M t/T Sun Hsing-yen [1752-1818], a distinguished antiquarian and classical scholar, l who claimed to be an actual descendant of Sun Wu, 2 accidentally discovered a copy of Chi T'ien-pao's long-lost work, when on a visit to the library of the §p $& Hua-yin temple. 3 Appended to it was the ^ jjfc / Skno of J|$ £ ji^ Cheng Yu-hsien, mentioned in the T^ung Chih, and also believed to have perished. 4 This is what Sun Hsing-yen designates as the "j^f ^5C or Jg( ^ "original edition (or text)" — a rather misleading name, for it cannot by any means claim to set before us the text of Sun Tzu in its pristine purity. Chi T'ien-pao was a careless compiler, 6 and appears to have been content to reproduce the somewhat debased version current in his day, without troubling to collate it

1 A good biographical notice, with a list of his works, will be found in the

H $J It A H Sfr> ch- «8> to

• Preface * /,,,

y\^ -Jjjj "My family comes from Lo-an, and we are really descended from Sun Tztt. I am ashamed to say that I only read my ancestor's work from a literary point of view, without comprehending the military technique. So long have we been enjoying the blessings of peace!"

3 Hua-yin is about 14 miles from yjj| ^ T'ung-kuan on the eastern border of Shensi. The temple in question is still visited by those about to make the ascent of the 3p [Jj or Western Sacred Mountain. It is mentioned in the ~fc HH

, ch. 32, f. 22, as the : -

% ^ -Ji jfe ^ J^ If ' 41-111 asituated five

east of the district city of Hua-yin. The temple contains the Hua-shan tablet in scribed by the T'ang Emperor Hsiian Tsuncr [713—755] "

5 Cf. Sua Hsing-yen's remark h frapos of his mistakes in the names and order of the commentators: *

INTRODUCTION XXXIII

with the earliest editions then available. Fortunately, two versions of Sun Tzu, even older than the newly discovered work, were still extant, one buried in the T'ung Tien, Tu Yu's great treatise on the Constitution, the other similarly enshrined in the T^ai P'ing Yii Lan encyclo- paedia. In both the complete text is to be found, though split up into fragments, intermixed with other matter, and scattered piecemeal over a number of different sections. Considering that the Yu^Lan takes us back to the year 983, and the T'ung Tien about 200 years further still, to the irii^J^_of^hje_J.t_aii^_jlyna^^ ', the value of these early transcripts of Sun Tzu can hardly be overestimated. Yet the idea of utilising them does not seem to have oc- curred to anyone until Sun Hsing-yen, acting under Govern- ment instructions, undertook a thorough recension of the text. This is his own account : —

Because of the numerous mistakes in the text of Sun Tzu which his editors had handed down, the Government ordered that the ancient edition [of Chi T'ien-pao] should be used, and that the text should be revised and corrected throughout. It happened that Wu Nien-hu, the Governor Pi Kua, and Hsi, a graduate of the second degree, had all devoted them- selves to this study, probably surpassing me therein. Accordingly, I have had the whole work cut on blocks as a text-book for military men. l

The three individuals here referred to had evidently been occupied on the text of Sun Tzu prior to Sun Hsing- yen's commission, but we are left in doubt as to the work they really accomplished. At any rate, the new edition, when ultimately produced, appeared in the names of Sun Hsing-yen and only one co-editor, J^ J{ tjjj[ Wu Jen-chi. They took the "original text" as their basis, and by careful comparison with the older versions, as well as the extant commentaries and other sources of information such as

C

XXXIV INTRODUCTION

the / Shuo, succeeded in restoring a very large number of doubtful passages, and turned out, on the whole, what must be accepted as the closest approximation we are ever likely to get to Sun Tzu's original work. This is what will hereafter be denominated the "standard text."

The copy which I have used belongs to a re-issue dated 1877. It is in 6 pen, forming part of a well-printed set of 23 early philosophical works in 83 pen. 1 It opens with a preface by Sun Hsing-yen (largely quoted in this intro- duction), vindicating the traditional view of Sun Tzu's life and performances, and summing up in remarkably concise fashion the evidence in its favour. This is followed by Ts'ao Kung's preface to his edition, and the biography of Sun Tzu from the Shih Chi, both translated above. Then come, firstly, Cheng Yu-hsien's I Shuo, 3 with author's preface, and next, a short miscellany of historical and bibliographical information entitled ^ -^ ^ ^ Sun Tzu Hsu Lu, compiled by ||f. J£( £3] Pi I-hsiin. As regards the body of the work, each separate sentence is followed by a note on the text, if required, and then by the various commentaries appertaining to it, arranged in chronological order. These we shall now proceed to discuss briefly, one by one.

THE COMMENTATORS.

•Sun Tzu can boast an exceptionally long and distinguished

roll of commentators, which would do honour to any classic.

Hfc 87 ^ Ou-yang Hsiu remarks on this fact, though he

wrote before the tale was complete, and rather ingeniously

explains it by saying that the artifices of war, being in-

1 See my "Catalogue of Chinese Books" (Luzac & Co., 1908), no. 40.

This is a discussion of 29 difficult passages in Sun Tzti, namely: I. 2; 26; 16; II. 9 & 105 III. 3; HI & VII; III. 17; IV. 4; 6; V. 3; 10 & n; 14; the headings of the 13 chapters, with special reference to chap. VII; VII. 5; 15 & 16; 27; 33, &c.; VIII. 1-6; IX. n; X. 1-20; XI. 23; 31; 19; 43; VII. 12-14 & XI. 52; XI. 56; XIII. 15 & 16; 26; XIII in general.

INTRODUCTION XXXV

exhaustible, must therefore be susceptible of treatment in a great variety of ways. l

1 • W ^ Ts'ao Ts'ao or ~§f ^ Ts'ao Kung, afterwards known as ^ j£ ffi Wei Wu Ti [A.D. 155-220]. There is hardly any room for doubt that the earliest commentary on Sun Tzu actually came from the pen of this extra- ordinary man, whose biography in the San fato Chih 3 reads like a romance. One of the greatest military geniuses- that the world has seen, and Napoleonic in the scale of his operations, he was especially famed for the marvellous rapidity of his marches, which has found expression in the line m 1" & W II «fc PI "^Ik of Ts'ao Ts'ao, and Ts'ao Ts'ao will appear." Ou-yang Hsiu says of him that he was a great captain who "measured his strength against Tung Cho, Lu Pu and the two Yuan, father and son, and vanquished them all ; whereupon he divided the Empire of Han with Wu and Shu, and made himself king. It is recorded that whenever a council of war was held by Wei on the eve of a far-reaching campaign, he had all his calculations ready, those generals who made use of them did not lose one battle in ten ; those who ran counter to them in any particular saw their armies incontinently beaten and put to flight." 3 Ts'ao Kung's notes on Sun Tzu, models of austere brevity, are so thoroughly charac- teristic of the stern commander known to history, that it is hard indeed to conceive of them as the work of a mere litterateur. Sometimes, indeed, owing to extreme com-

Preface to Mei Yao-ch'en's edition: ^

~ tin M^

s See ch.

XXXVI INTRODUCTION

pression, they are scarcely intelligible and stand no less in need of a commentary than the text itself. 1 As we have seen, Ts'ao Rung is the reputed author of the ffi fj, a book on war in 100,000 odd words, now lost, but mentioned in the ||| ^ . 3

2- InL J^t Meng Shih. The commentary which has come down to us under this name is comparatively meagre, and nothing about the author is known. Even his personal name has not been recorded. Chi T'ien-pao's edition places him after Chia Lin, and f§ 4^ 3l£ Ch'ao Kung-wu also assigns him to the T'ang dynasty, 3 but this is obviously a mistake, as his work is mentioned in the |^ |J |g |§ ^ . In Sun Hsing-yen's preface, he appears as Meng Shih of the Liang dynasty [502—557]. Others would identify him with ^ |f£ Meng K'ang of the 3rd century. In the ^ jjj J| he is named last of the 3£ ^ "Five Commentators the others being Wei Wu Ti, Tu Mu, Ch'en Hao and Chia Lin.

3. ^ ^ Li Ch'iian of the 8th century was a well- known writer on military tactics. His -fc E=J (^ $§£ nas been in constant use down to the present day. The JH ^ mentions ^ #[» ^ ^ (lives of famous generals from the Chou to the T'ang dynasty) as written by him. 5 He is also generally supposed to be the real author of the popular Taoist tract, the |^ ^f $g. According to Ch'ao Kung-wu and the T'ien-i-ko catalogue, 6 he followed the ^ £u ^g ^ text of Sun Tzu, which differs considerably from those

, "

Catalogue of the library of the Fan

family at Ningpo, - , fol. I2 ^ : ^ |± ^ (g ^ ^| fig ^ ^

"His commentary is frequently obscure 5 it furnishes a clue, but does not fully develop the meaning." 2 See ^g yjj , ch. 141 ad init.

3 ^F^w Hsien T'-ung K^ao^ ch. 221, f. 9^°. 4 Ch. 207, f. 5 r°.

5 It is interesting to note that M. Pelliot has recently discovered chapters i, 4 and 5 of this lost work in the "Grottos of the Thousand Buddhas." See B. E. F. E. O, t. VIII, nos. 3—4, p. 525. 6 LoCt cit.

INTRODUCTION XXXVII

now extant. His notes are mostly short and to the point, and he frequently illustrates his remarks by anecdotes from Chinese history.

4. ti'fe Tu Yu O^ed 8l2) did n°t publish a separate commentary on Sun Tzu, his notes being taken from the T^ung Tien, the encyclopaedic treatise on the Constitution which was his life-work. They are largely repetitions of Ts'ao Kung and Meng Shih, besides which it is believed that he drew on the ancient commentaries of ^ ^ Wang Ling and others. Owing to the peculiar arrangement of the T^ung Tien, he has to explain each passage on its merits, apart from the context, and sometimes his own explanation does not agree with that of Ts'ao Kung, whom he always quotes first. Though not strictly to be reckoned as one of the "Ten Commentators," he was added to their number by Chi T'ien-pao, being wrongly placed after his grandson Tu Mu.

5- ti$C Tu MU (803-852) is perhaps best known as a poet — a bright star even in the glorious galaxy of the T'ang period. We learn from Ch'ao Kung-wu that although he had no practical experience of war, he was extremely fond of discussing the subject, and was more- over well read in the military history of the Cfcun Ck'iu and Chan Kuo eras. l His notes, therefore, are well worth attention. They are very copious, and replete with historical parallels. The gist of Sun Tzu's work is thus summarised by him: "Practise benevolence and justice, but on the other hand make full use of artifice and measures of ex- pediency." 3 He further declared that all the military

i Wen Hsien T^ung K^ao, ch. 221, f . 9 : {ft f | >$ $fr ffi ^ g |&

2 Preface to his commentary (T<-u Shu, j J& , ch. 442):

XXXVIII INTRODUCTION

triumphs and disasters of the thousand years which had elapsed since Sun Wu's death would, upon examination, be found to uphold and corroborate, in every particular, the maxims contained in his book. : Tu Mu's somewhat spiteful charge against Ts'ao Kung has already been con- sidered elsewhere.

6- $jt (}!| Ch'en Hao appears to have been a contemp- orary of Tu Mu. Ch'ao Kung-wu says that he was im- pelled to write a new commentary on Sun Tzu because Ts'ao Kung's on the one hand was too obscure and subtle, and that of Tu Mu on the other too long-winded and diffuse.2 Ou-yang Hsiu, writing in the middle of the nth century, calls Ts'ao Kung, Tu Mu and Ch'en Hao the three chief commentators on Sun Tzu (5Ei ^£), and observes that Ch'en Hao is continually attacking Tu Mu's short- comings. His commentary, though not lacking in merit, must rank below those of his predecessors.

7- W ffi Chia Lin is known to have lived under the T'ang dynasty, for his commentary on Sun Tzu is men- tioned in the jfijf ^ and was afterwards republished by $£ HJ Chi Hsieh of the same dynasty together with those of Meng Shih and Tu Yu. 3 It is of somewhat scanty texture, and in point of quality, too, perhaps the least valuable of the eleven.

8- $1 Jl E£ Mei Yao-ch'en (1002-1060), commonly known by his "style" as Mei H -$£ Sheng-yu, was, like 1 u Mu, a poet of distinction. His commentary was pub- lished with a laudatory preface by the great Ou-yang Hsiu, from which we may cull the following: -

Later scholars have misread Sun Tzu, distorting his words and trying to make them square with their own one-sided views. Thus, though

1 **' & ft'% # ft ? A4M* $ jft*f |ft

* #l ttc £ •

INTRODUCTION XXXIX

commentators have not been lacking, only a few have proved equal to the task. My friend Sheng-yu has not fallen into this mistake. In at- tempting to provide a critical commentary for Sun Tzu's "work, he does not lose sight of the fact that these sayings were intended for states en- gaged in internecine warfare; that the author is not concerned with the military conditions prevailing under the sovereigns of the three ancient dynasties, ' nor with the nine punitive measures prescribed to the Minister of War. 2 Again, Sun Wu loved brevity of diction, but his meaning is always deep. Whether the subject be marching an army, or handling soldiers, or estimating the enemy, or controlling the forces of victory, it is always systematically treated; the sayings are bound together in strict logical sequence, though this has been obscured by commentators who have probably failed to grasp their meaning. In his own commentary, Mei Sheng-yu has brushed aside all the obstinate prejudices of these critics, and has tried to bring out the true meaning of Sun Tzu himself. In this way, the clouds of confusion have been dispersed and the sayings made clear. I am convinced that the present work deserves to be handed down side by side with the three great commentaries; and for a great deal that they find in the sayings, coming generations will have constant reason to thank my friend Sheng-yu. 3

Making some allowance for the exuberance of friendship, I am inclined to endorse this favourable judgment, and would certainly place him above Ch'en Hao in order of merit.

1 The Hsia, the Shang and the Chou. Although the last-named was nominally existent in Sun Tzii's day, it retained hardly a vestige of power, and the old mili- tary organisation had practically gone by the board. I can suggest no other ex- planation of the passage.

2 See Chou Li, XXIX. 6-10.

• see r« s*., r m, ch. 9o, f. ,„.

XL INTRODUCTION

9- 3E 1=[ Wang Hsi, also of the Sung dynasty, is decidedly original in some of his interpretations, but much less judicious than Mei Yao-ch'en, and on the whole not a very trustworthy guide. He is fond of comparing his own commentary with that of Ts'ao Kung, but the com- parison is not often flattering to him. We learn from Ch'ao Kung-wu that Wang Hsi revised the ancient text of Sun Tzu, filling up lacunae and correcting mistakes. l

10. '(of $& $$9 Ho Yen-hsi of the Sung dynasty. The personal name of this commentator is given as above by JfU jftj. Cheng Ch'iao in the T'ung Chih, written about the middle of the twelfth century, but he appears simply as 'fof J^ Ho Shih in the Yu Hai, and Ma Tuan-lin quotes Ch'ao Kung-wu as saying that his personal name is un- known. There seems to be no reason to doubt Cheng Ch'iao's statement, otherwise I should have been inclined to hazard a guess and identify him with one yfBf -^ ^ Ho Ch'u-fei, the author of a short treatise on war entitled 'Off ffjjjf, who lived in the latter part of the nth century. 2 Ho Shih's commentary, in the words of the T'ien-i-ko catalogue, ^ fff ^L j£ "contains helpful additions" here and there, but is chiefly remarkable for the copious ex- tracts taken, in adapted form, from the dynastic histories and other sources.

1 1 - §11 Bl Chang Yii. The list closes with a com- mentator of no great originality perhaps, but gifted with admirable powers of lucid exposition. His commentary is based on that of Ts'ao Kung, whose terse sentences he contrives to expand and develop in masterly fashion. Without Chang Yu, it is safe to say that much of Tslao Kung's commentary would have remained cloaked in its pristine obscurity and therefore valueless. His work is not mentioned in the Sung history, the T'ung K'ao, or

m

See |HJ Jjjl £ m, ch. 99, f.

INTRODUCTION XLI

the Yu Hai, but it finds a niche in the T'ung Chih, which also names him as the author of the ^j $$• *$$ "Lives of Famous Generals." l

It is rather remarkable that the last-named four should all have flourished within so short a space of time. Ch'ao Kung-wu accounts for it by saying: "During the early years of the Sung dynasty the Empire enjoyed a long spell of peace, and men ceased to practise the art of war. But when [Chao] Yiian-hao's rebellion came [1038-42] and the frontier generals were defeated time after time, the Court made strenuous enquiry for men skilled in war, and military topics became the vogue amongst all the high officials. Hence it is that the commentators of Sun Tzu in our dynasty belong mainly to that period." '

Besides these eleven commentators, there are several others whose work has not come down to us. The Sui Shu mentions four, namely ££ /|| Wang Ling (often quoted by Tu Yu as J -J-); ijg -^ $j$ Chang Tzu-shang; f|f ffj Chia Hsu of Ut Wei-,3 and #£ £ Shen Yu of ^ Wu. The T^ang Shu adds $fc ^ Sun Hao, and the T^ing Chih jjlf •=*• Hsiao Chi, while the T'u Shu mentions a Ming commentator, ^ }|ij 3£ Huang Jun-yii. It is possible that some of these may have been merely collectors and editors of other commentaries, like Chi T;ien-pao and Chi Hsieh, mentioned above. Certainly in the case of the latter, the entry ${* ^ xi J£ ^ m tne T^ung K'ao, without the fol- lowing note, would give one to understand that he had written an independent commentary of his own.

There are two works, described in the Ssu K'u Ch'uan

1 This appears to be still extant. See Wylie's "Notes," p. 91 (new edition). • T**g A-X he. ci,.: fc J|j ^ ^ ^ ^ # T A ^ ^ ^

3 A notable person in his day. His biography is given in the San Kuo Chih^ ch. 10.

XLII INTRODUCTION

Shu l and no doubt extremely rare, which I should much like to have seen. One is entitled $fa ^ j^ |5f , in 5 chuan. It gives selections from four new commentators, probably of the Ming dynasty, as well as from the eleven known to us. The names of the four are $$ jf; Hsieh Yuan ; ^ ||| Chang Ao; 2$5 ^ Li Tslai; and ^ yg \ ^ Huang Chih- cheng. The other work is ^ -^ f|| f|fc in 4 chuan, compiled by J|[$ ^ Cheng Tuan of the present dynasty. It is a com- pendium of information on ancient warfare, with special reference to Sun Tzu's 1 3 chapters.

APPRECIATIONS OF SUN Tzu.

Sun Tzu has exercised a potent fascination over the minds of some of China's greatest men. Among the famous generals who are known to have studied his pages with enthusiasm may be mentioned ^ {=f Han Hsin (d. B.C. I96),2 ay| Feng I (d. A.D. 34), 3 g || Lu Meng (d. 219), 4 and -gj- ^ Yo Fei (i 103-1 141). 5 The opinion of Ts'ao Kung, "wHo~ disputes with Han Hsin the highest place in Chinese military annals, has already been recorded. 6 Still more remarkable, in one way, is the testimony of purely literary men, such as ^ ^J Su Hsiin (the father of Su Tung-p'o), who wrote several essays on military topics, all of which owe their chief inspiration to Sun Tzu. The following short passage by him is preserved in the Yu Hai:1 —

1 Ch. ioo, ff. 2, 3. 2 see p. 144. 3 Hou Han S/iu, ch. 17 ad init.

4 San Kuo Chih^ ch. 54, f. ioz/° (commentary). 6 Sung Shih, ch. 365 ad init.

0 The few Europeans who have yet had an opportunity of acquainting themselves with Sun Tzti are not behindhand in their praise. In this connection, I may per- haps be excused for quoting from a letter from Lord Roberts, to whom the sheets of the present work were submitted previous to publication: "Many of Sun Wu's maxims are perfectly applicable to the present day, and no. 1 1 on page 77 is one that the people of this country would do well to take to heart "

1 Ch. 140, f. 13^°.

INTRODUCTION XLIIT

Sun Wu's saying, that in war one cannot make certain of conquering, * is very different indeed from what other books tell us. 2 Wu Ch'i was a man of the same stamp as Sun Wu: they both wrote books on war, and they are linked together in popular speech as "Sun and Wu." But Wu Ch'i's remarks on war are less weighty, his rules are rougher and more crudely stated, and there is not the same unity of plan as in Sun work, wherej:he style is terse,but themeaning fully brought out»

The ^ ^| fH 3?|, ch. 17, contains the following extract from the 5| pf] ffi ^ "Impartial Judgments in the Garden of Literature" by Jf|$ j|* Cheng Hou : -

Sun Tzu's 13 chapters are not only the staple and base of all military men's training, but also compel the most careful attention of scholars and men of letters. His sayings are terse yet elegant, simple yet profound, perspicuous and eminently practical. Such works as the Lun Yu, the / Ching and the great Commentary, 4 as well as the writings of Mencius, Hsiin K'uang and Yang Chu, all fall below the level of Sun Tzu. 5

Chu Hsi, commenting on this, fully admits the first part of the criticism, although he dislikes the audacious comparison with the venerated classical works. Language of this sort, he says, "encourages a ruler's bent towards unrelenting warfare and reckless militarism." 6

APOLOGIES FOR WAR.

Accustomed as we are to think of China as the greatest peace-loving nation on earth, we are in some danger of

1 See IV. § 3.

2 The allusion may be to Mencius VI. 2. ix. 2 :

4 The Tso Chuan.

m m % ro * in ffi w JB m

XLIV INTRODUCTION

forgetting that her experience of war in all its phases has also been such as no modern State can parallel. Her long military annals stretch back to a point at which they are lost in the mists of time. She had built the Great Wall and was maintaining a huge standing army along her frontier centuries before the first Roman legionary was seen on the Danube. What with the perpetual col- lisions of the ancient feudal States, the grim conflicts with Huns, Turks and other invaders after the centralisation of government, the terrific upheavals which accompanied the overthrow of so many dynasties, besides the countless rebellions and minor disturbances that have flamed up and flickered out again one by one, it is hardly too much to say that the clash of arms has never ceased to resound in one portion or another of the Empire.

No less remarkable is the succession of illustrious cap- tains to whom China can point with pride. As in all countries, the greatest are found emerging at the most fateful crises of her history. Thus, Po Ch'i stands out conspicuous in the period when Ch'in was entering upon her final struggle with the remaining independent states. The stormy years which followed the break-up of the Ch'in dynasty are illumined by the transcendent genius of Han Hsin. When the House of Han in turn is tottering to its fall, the great and baleful figure of Ts'ao Ts'ao do- minates the scene. And in the establishment of the Pang dynasty, one of the mightiest tasks achieved by man, the superhuman energy of Li Shih-min (afterwards the Emperor T'ai Tsung) was seconded by the brilliant strategy of Li Ching. None of these generals need fear comparison with the greatest names in the military history of Europe.

In spite of all this, the great body of Chinese sentiment, from Lao Tzu downwards, and especially as reflected in the standard literature of Confucianism, has been consistently pacific and intensely opposed to militarism in any form. It is such an uncommon thing to find any of the literati

INTRODUCTION XLV

defending warfare on principle, that I have thought it worth while to collect and translate a few passages in which the unorthodox view is upheld. The following, by Ssu-ma Ch'ien, shows that for all his ardent admiration of Confucius, he was yet no advocate of peace at any price : -

Military weapons are the means used by the Sage to punish violence and cruelty, to give peace to troublous times, to remove difficulties and dangers, and to succour those who are in peril. Every animal with blood in its veins and horns on its head will fight when it is attacked. How much more so will man, who carries in his breast the faculties of love and hatred, joy and anger! When he is pleased, a feeling of affection springs up within him; when angry, his poisoned sting is brought into play. That is the natural law which governs his being .... What then shall be said of those scholars of our time, blind to all great issues, and without any appreciation of relative values, who can only bark out their stale formulas about "virtue" and "civilisation," condemning the use of military weapons? They will surely bring our country to impotence and dishonour and the loss of her rightful heritage; or, at the very least, they will bring about invasion and rebellion, sacrifice of territory and general enfeeblement. Yet they obstinately refuse to modify the position they have taken up. The truth is that, just as in the family the teacher must not spare the rod, and punishments cannot be dispensed with in the State, so military chastisement can never be allowed to fall into abeyance in the Empire. All one can say is that this power will be exercised wisely by some, foolishly by others, and that among those who bear arms some will be loyal and others rebellious. *

The next piece is taken from Tu Mu's preface to his commentary on Sun Tzu : -

War may be defined as punishment, which is one of the functions of government. It was the profession of Chung Yu and Jan Ch'iu, both

1 Shih Chi, ch. 25, fol. i:

itt m nfr a fc & % g

£ & z

XLVI INTRODUCTION

disciples of- Confucius. Nowadays, the holding of trials and hearing of litigation, the imprisonment of offenders and their execution by flogging in the market-place, are all done by officials. But the wielding of huge armies, the throwing down of fortified cities, the haling of women and children into captivity, and the beheading of traitors -— this is also work which is done by officials. The objects of the rack * and of military weapons are essentially the same. There is no intrinsic difference be- tween the punishment of flogging and cutting off heads in war. For the lesser infractions of law, which are easily dealt with, only a small amount of force need be employed : hence the institution of torture and flogging. For more serious outbreaks of lawlessness, which are hard to suppress, a greater amount of force is necessary: hence the use of military weapons and wholesale decapitation. In both cases, however, the end in view is to get rid of wicked people, and to give comfort and relief to the good 2 . . . .

Chi-sun a,sked Jan Yu, saying: "Have you. Sir, acquired your military aptitude by study, or is it innate?" Jan Yu replied: "It has been ac- quired by study." 3 "How can that be so," said Chi-sun, "seeing that you are a disciple of Confucius?" "It is a fact," replied Jan Yu; "I was taught by Confucius. It is fitting that the great Sage should exercise both civil and military functions, though to be sure my instruction in the art of fighting has not yet gone very far."

Now, who the author was of this rigid distinction between the "civil" and the "military," and the limitation of each to a separate sphere of action, or in what year of which dynasty it was first introduced, is more than I can say. But, at any rate, it has come about that the members of the governing class are quite afraid of enlarging on military topics, or do so only in a shamefaced manner. If any are bold enough to discuss the subject, they are at once set down as eccentric individuals of coarse and brutal propensities. This is an extraordinary instance of the way in

1 The first instance of ^fc ^^ given in the P'-'ei Wen Yun Fu is from Ssu-ma Ch'ien's letter to 'fjj- 4^ Jen An (see AJT vjg ? cn. 41, f. 9 r°), where M. Chavannes translates it "la cangue et la chaine." But in the present passage it seems rather to indicate some single instrument of torture.

3 Cf. SAIA Chi, ch. 47, f. ii

INTRODUCTION XLVII

which, through sheer lack of reasoning, men unhappily lose sight of fun- damental principles. l

When the Duke of Chou was minister under Ch'eng Wang, he regulated ceremonies and made music, and venerated the arts of scholarship and learning; yet when the barbarians of the River Huai revolted, 2 he sal- lied forth and chastised them. When Confucius held office under the Duke of Lu, and a meeting was convened at Chia-ku, 3 he said : "If pacific negotiations are in progress, warlike preparations should have been made beforehand." He rebuked and shamed the Marquis of Ch'i, who cowered under him and dared not proceed to violence. How can it be said that these two great Sages had no knowledge of military matters? *

We have seen that the great Chu Hsi held Sun Tzu in high esteem. He also appeals to the authority of the Classics : -

Our Master Confucius, answering Duke Ling of Wei, said: "I have never studied matters connected with armies and battalions." 5 Replying to K'ung Wen-tzu, he said: "I have not been instructed about buff-coats and weapons." 6 But if we turn to the meeting at Chia-ku, 7 we find that he used armed force against the men of Lai, 8 so that the marquis of Ch'i was overawed. Again, when the inhabitants of Pi revolted, he ordered his officers to attack them, whereupon they were defeated and fled in confusion. 9 He once uttered the words : "If I fight, I con-

0 * ?i •? li ¥ * ft # 0

tr * * * m £ ift Sf-

2 See Shti Ching^ preface § 55.

3 See Tso Chuan, Jj£ ^ X. 2 ; Shih Chi, ch. 47, f. 4 r°

4 J3 * # JA BE

» Lun KB, XV. i.

6 Tso Chuan^ j ^. , XI. 7. 7 See supra.

8 Tso Chuan, X. 2. 9 Ibid. XII. 5; CA*Vz K«i ch-

XLVIII INTRODUCTION

quer." * And Jan Yu also said : "The Sage exercises both civil and mil- itary functions."2 Can it be a fact that Confucius never studied or received instruction in the art of war? We can only say that he did not specially choose matters connected with armies and fighting to be the subject of his teaching. 3

Sun Hsing-yen, the editor of Sun Tzu, writes in similar strain : —

Confucius said: "I am unversed in military matters." * He also said: "If I fight, I conquer." * Confucius ordered ceremonies and regulated music. Now war constitutes one of the five classes of State ceremonial, 5 and must not be treated as an independent branch of study. Hence, the words "I am unversed in" must be taken to mean that there are things which even an inspired Teacher does not know. Those who have to lead an army and devise stratagems, must learn the art of war. But if one can command the services of a good general like Sun Tzu, who was employed by Wu Tzti-hsu, there is no need to learn it oneself. Hence the remark added by Confucius : "If I fight, I conquer." 6

The men of the present day, however, wilfully interpret these words of Confucius in their narrowest sense, as though he meant that books on the art of war were not worth reading. With blind persistency, they adduce the example of Chao Kua, who pored over his father's books to no purpose, 7 as a proof that all military theory is useless. Again, seeing

1 have failed to trace this utterance. See note 2 on p. xliii.

2 See supra.

- IN « & m m A ffi m & ti ft A z

ft M 6 ff ± £ ft £ HB ftA ft 1? B.3U M &

* See supra.

5 Vh., Epf jjjg , the other four being "=jy , |X| , !jj| and J|£ "worship, mourning, entertainment of guests and festive rites." See Shu Ching, II. I. iii. 8, and Chou Li, IX. fol. 49.

« Preface to Sun Tzu: ^^.g^^^^^^^^^

E m & m s. m z - ^ M

See p. 166.

INTRODUCTION XLIX

that books on war have to do with such things as opportunism in design- ing plans, and the conversion of spies, they hold that the art is immoral and unworthy of a sage. These people ignore the fact that the studies of our scholars and the civil administration of our officials also require steady application and practice before efficiency is reached. The ancients were particularly chary of allowing mere novices to botch their work. l Weapons are baneful 2 and fighting perilous: and unless a general is in constant practice, he ought not to hazard other men's lives in battle. 3 Hence it is essential that Sun Tzu's 13 chapters should be studied. *

Hsiang Liang used to instruct his nephew Chi 5 in the art of war. Chi got a rough idea of the art in its general bearings, but would not pursue his studies to their proper outcome, the consequence being that he was finally defeated and overthrown. He did not realise that the tricks and artifices of war are beyond verbal computation. Duke Hsiang of Sung G and King Yen of Hsu 7 were brought to destruction by their misplaced humanity. The treacherous and underhand nature of war necessitates the use of guile and stratagem suited to the occasion. There is a case on record of Confucius himself having violated an extorted oath, 8 and also of his having left the Sung State in disguise. 9 Can we then recklessly arraign Sun Tzu for disregarding truth and honesty?10

1 This is a rather obscure allusion to Tso Chuan, ^tQ fl<* , XXXI. 4, where

>^c -*-^

Tzu-ch^an says: ^ ^ E^ ^ ^ |jg ^ ^ JJL || "If you have a piece of beautiful brocade, you will not employ a mere learner to make it up." * Cf. Too Te Ching, ch. 31: & % ^ f£ £ $$ .

3 Sun Hsing-yen might have quoted Confucius again. See Lun Yu, XIII. 29, 30.

A

5 Better known as Hsiang ^j Yii [B.C. 233-202].

6 The third among the ^ 4t\ (or tfH) enumerated on p. 141. For the in-

• • * I r-l -^Jyv

cident referred to, see Tso Chuan, 4&L /fe , XXII. 4.

7 See supra, p. xvi, note 4. 8 Shih Chi, ch. 47, f. 7 r°.

9 Ibid., ch. 38, f. 8z>°.

10 ig ^ ^5, m ft fch 43

L INTRODUCTION

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

The following are the oldest Chinese treatises on war, after Sun Tzu. The notes on each have been drawn principally from the 0 jj £ ^ fgj ^ g ^ Stf #« ch'uan shu chien ming mu lu, ch. 9, fol. 22 sqq.

1 . -^ -^ Wu Tzu, in i chuan or 6 ^ chapters. By ^ ^g Wu Ch'i (df. B.C. 381). A genuine work. See Shih Chi, ch. 65.

2. Hj ,lf ^ Ssu-ma Fa, in i chuan or 5 chapters. Wrongly attributed to fjf) J| fj| |£ Ssu-ma Jang-chu of the 6th century B.C. Its date, however, must be early, as the customs of the three ancient dynasties are con- stantly to be met with in its pages. * See Shih Chi, ch. 64.

The Ssu K^u Ch'uan Shu (ch. 99, f. i) remarks that the oldest three treatises on war, Sun Tzu, Wu Tzu and the Ssu-ma Fa, are, generally speaking, only concerned with things strictly military - - the art of producing, col- lecting, training and drilling troops, and the correct theory with regard to measures of expediency, laying plans, trans- port of goods and the handling of soldiers 2 - - in strong contrast to later works, in which the science of war is usually blended with metaphysics, divination and magical arts in general.

3- ^ §@ Liu T'ao, in 6 chuan or 60 chapters. At- tributed to g H Lii Wang (or Lii ^ Shang, also

known as ^ /^ T'ai Kung) of the 1 2th century B.C. 3 But

3 See p. 174. Further details on T'ai Kung will be found in the Shih Chi, ch. 32 ad init. Besides the tradition which makes him a former minister of Chou Hsin, two other accounts of him are there given, according to which he would appear to have been first raised from a humble private station by Wen Wang.

INTRODUCTION LI

its style does not belong to the era of the Three Dynasties. 1 1^ M W Lu Timing (550-625 A.D.) mentions the work,

and enumerates the headings of the six sections, ^, jj£, J5% ' ^K) » HI anc* ^t ' so t^iat t^ie forgery cannot have been

later than the Sui dynasty.

4- It IS "7" Wei Liao Tzu» in 5 chuan. Attributed to Wei Liao (4th cent. B.C.), who studied under the famous JJjL & ^r Kuei-ku Tzu. The g| ^, under ^ ^, men- tions a book of Wei Liao in 31 chapters, whereas the text we possess contains only 24. Its matter is sound enough in the main, though the strategical devices differ considerably from those of the Warring States period. 3 It has been furnished with a commentary by the well- known Sung philosopher ij|f jjfc Chang Tsai.

5- H 0& San Liieh, in 3 chuan. Attributed to J| ^ ^ Huang-shih Kung, a legendary personage who is said to have bestowed it on Chang Liang (d. B.C. 187) in an interview on a bridge. 8 But here again, the style is not that of works dating from the Ch'in or Han period. The Han Emperor Kuang Wu [A.D. 25—57] apparently quotes from it in one of his proclamations; but the passage in question may have been inserted later on, in order to prove the genuineness of the work. We shall not be far out if we refer it to the Northern Sung period [420-478 A.D., or somewhat earlier. 4

3 See Han Shu, Jg j^ ^ , ch. 40. The work is there called^ ^ .& ££ .

Hence it has been confused with the Liu T~ao. The T~u Shu attributes both the Liu T-ao and the San Liieh to Tlai Kung.

* && 7'tt#it M *ff'£ ft ••$.! 2

4k -^j?> l/j[ ImF •%&. ~jfc H}| pf ?^ . Another work said to have been written by Huang-shih Kung, and also included in the military section of the Imperial Catalogue, is the -|pr ips Su Shu in i chuan. A short ethical treatise of Taoist

Lil INTRODUCTION

6. ^ f§ <& ftjj ij Li Wei Rung Wen Tui, in 3 sections. Written in the form of a dialogue between T'ai Tsung and his great general ^ jf| Li Ching, it is usually ascribed to the latter. Competent authorities consider it a forgery, though the author was evidently well versed in the art of war. l

7. ^ ip| & $; Li Ching Ping Fa (not to be confounded with the foregoing) is a short treatise in 8 chapters, preserved in the Tung Tien, but not published separately. This fact explains its omission from the Ssu K'u Ch'uan Shu.

8- S ^ $S Wu Ch<i ching> 3 m i ^-««». Attributed to the legendary minister Jjj^ Jg Feng Hou, with exegetical notes by $$ $fc ^ Kung-sun Hung of the Han dynasty (d. B.C. 121), and said to have been eulogised by the celebrated general Jf pj| Ma Lung (d. A.D. 300). Yet the earliest mention of it is in the ^ ^. Although a forgery, the work is well put together. 3

Considering the high popular estimation in which ^ ^ ^ Chu-ko Liang has always been held, it is not sur- prising to find more than one work on war ascribed to his pen. Such are (i) the -f- ^ ^ Shih Liu Ts'e ( i chuan\ preserved in the ^< ^ ^C ft Yung Lo Ta Tien ;

(2) ?ff $L Chiang Yuan (i ^.)- and (3) Aj) § Hsin Shu

(i ch.\ which steals wholesale from Sun Tzu. None of these has the slightest claim to be considered genuine.

savour, having no reference whatever to war, it is pronounced a forgery from the hand of ^^ |^ _ml Chang Shang-ying (d. 1121), who edited it with commentary.

Correct Wylie's "Notes," new edition, p. 90, and Courant's "Catalogue des Livres Chinois," no. 5056.

We are told in the ^ ^ J? that the above six works, together with Sun Tzii, were those prescribed for military training in the j^ J|i. period (1078-85). See Yu Hai, ch. 140, f. 4 r°. 2 Also written g ^ j and | J Wu Chi Ching.

INTRODUCTION LIII

Most of the large Chinese encyclopaedias contain ex- tensive sections devoted to the literature of war. The following" references may be found useful : —

Tung Tien (circa 800 A.D.), ch. 148-162.

T<ai P'in§ Yii Lan (983), ch. 270-359. 3$C fit M ^ W^n Hsien T'ung K'ao (13* cent.), ch. 221. 35 '/S Yii Hai (13th cent.), ch. 140, 141. H yf HII H" San Ts'ai T'u Hui (16* cent.), \ ^ ch. 7, 8. If IS $3 ^ Kuang Po Wu Chih (1607), ch. 31, 32. }f ^|||J;ChHen Ch'io Lei Shu (1632), ch. 75. ?K3 SS iS ® Yiian Chien Lei Han (1710), ch. 206-229. "ifr -4* H S ^1 J?!c Ku Chin T<u Shu Chi Ch'eng (1726),

section XXX, ^jr/. ch. 81-90.

g| ^jgc^Ji^ Hsu Wen Hsien T4ung K'ao (1784),

ch. 121-134.

M 18 ^ tft ^t H Huang Ch'ao Ching Shih Wen Pien

(1826), ch. 76, 77.

The bibliographical sections of certain historical works also deserve mention : —

•^ g| ^ Ch'ien Han Shu, ch. 30. |5jf ^ Sui Shu, ch. 32-35. 3j| jg m Chiu T'ang Shu, ch. 46, 47. ^ff )§ ^ Hsin T'ang Shu, ch. 57-60.

Sung Shih, ch. 202-209.

T'ung Chih («>^ 1150), ch. 68.

To these of course must be added the great Catalogue of the Imperial Library: -

K'u Ch'iian Shu Tsung Mu T'i Yao (1790), ch. 99, 100.

I. LAYING PLANS.

This is the only possible meaning of g-|-, which M. Amiot and Capt. Calthrop wrongly translate "Fondements de 1'art militaire" and "First principles" respectively. Ts'ao Kung says it refers to the deliberations in the temple selected by the general for his temporary use, or as we should say, in his tent. See §26.

i . Sun Tzii said : The art of war is of vital importance to the State.

2. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.

3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be taken into account in one's deliberations, when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field.

The old text of the Tung Tien has $r $g £ J# ft jfc £ || ,

etc. Later editors have inserted l|j after j£ , and J^ before ^-|* . The former correction is perhaps superfluous, but the latter seems neces- sary in order to make sense, and is supported by the accepted reading in § 12, where the same words recur. I am inclined to think, however, that the whole sentence from jdfc to 'H|| is an interpolation and has no business here at all. If it be retained, Wang Hsi must be right in saying that g-(- denotes the "seven considerations" in § 13. 'fjfj are the circumstances or conditions likely to bring about victory or defeat. The antecedent of the first is J ; of the second, J^ • >

4. -

contains the idea of "comparison with the enemy," which cannot well be brought out here, but will appear in § 12. Altogether, difficult though it is, the passage is not so hopelessly corrupt as to justify Capt. Calthrop in burking it entirely.

4. These are : (i) The Moral Law ; (2) Heaven ; (3) Earth ; (4) The Commander; (5) Method and discipline.

It appears from what follows that Sun Tzti means by j|f^ a Principle of harmony, not unlike the Tao of Lao Tzu in its moral aspect. One might be tempted to render it by "morale," were it not considered as an attribute of the ruler in § 13.

5, 6. The Moral Law causes the people to be in complete accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger.

The original text omits ^ ^jjj, inserts an J£J after each ~flj*, and omits JjjJ after ffjj . Capt. Calthrop translates : "If the ruling authority be upright, the people are united" • — a very pretty sentiment, but wholly out of place in what purports to be a translation of Sun Tzu.

7. Heaven signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons.

The commentators, I think, make an unnecessary mystery of (^ ||J|? . Thus Meng Shih defines the words as Mil & Tjft &S "the hard and

Inl'J s\^ JHL /MO

the soft, waxing and waning," which does not help us much. Wang Hsi, however, may be right in saying that what is meant is jUj ^ ^ "the general economy of Heaven," including the five elements, the four sea- sons, wind and clouds, and other phenomena.

8. Earth comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; open ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and death.

^E ^fe (omitted by Capt. Calthrop) may have been included here because the safety of an army depends largely on its quickness to turn these geographical features to account.

10. & ^ ft id g- g ± ffl

9. 7^£ Commander stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerity, benevolence, courage and strictness.

The five cardinal virtues of the Chinese are (i) f"! humanity or benevolence; (2) l|| uprightness of mind; (3) jj|J| self-respect, self-control, or "proper feeling;" (4) ^ wisdom; (5) -jpj sincerity or good faith. Here >JU and >j=| are put before ^^ , and the two military virtues of "courage" and "strictness" substituted for l|h and ifi® .

10. By Method and discipline are to be understood the marshalling of the army in its proper subdivisions, the gradations of rank among the officers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the control of military expenditure.

The Chinese of this sentence is so concise as to be practically unintel- ligible without commentary. I have followed the interpretation of Ts'ao Kung, who joins |Qj ^j|J and again ^ J^ . Others take each of the six predicates separately. f[j| has the somewhat uncommon sense of "cohort" or division of an army. Capt. Calthrop translates: "Partition and ordering of troops," which only covers ^ ^j|J .

1 1 . These five heads should be familiar to every general : he who knows them will be victorious; he who knows them not will fail.

12. Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine the military conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison, in this wise : -

The Yu Lan has an interpolated ^ before g-J* . It is obvious, how- ever, that the ^L ^jf Just enumerated cannot be described as g-f. Capt. Calthrop, forced to give some rendering of the words which he had omitted in § 3, shows himself decidedly hazy: "Further, with regard to these and the following seven matters, the condition of the enemy must be compared with our own." He does not appear to see that the seven queries or considerations which follow arise directly out of the Five heads, instead of being supplementary to them.

& & ft m ±

i& V II ft** it 4

13. (i) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral law?

I. e., "is in harmony with his subjects." Cf. § 5.

(2) Which of the two generals has most ability?

(3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth?

See §§ 7, 8.

(4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced?

Tu Mu alludes to the remarkable story of Ts'ao Ts'ao (A. D. 155 — 220), who was such a strict disciplinarian that once, in accordance with his own severe regulations against injury to standing crops, he condemned himself to death for having allowed his horse to shy into a field of corn ! However, in lieu of losing his head, he was persuaded to satisfy his sense of justice by cutting off his hair. Ts'ao Ts'ao's own comment on the present passage is characteristically curt: |§* fft ^ ^ ^ ffjj jjfc |^ f{when you lay down a law, see that it is not disobeyed; if it is disobeyed, the offender must be put to death."

(5) Which army is the stronger?

Morally as well as physically. As Mei Yao-ch'en puts it, ptj Jfft £[» |^ ,

which might be freely rendered "esprit de corps and 'big battalions.'"

(6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained ?

Tu Yu quotes 3E -^ as saying: "Without constant practice, the of- ficers will be nervous and undecided when mustering for battle; without constant practice, the general will be wavering and irresolute when the crisis is at hand."

(7) In which army is there the greater constancy both in reward and punishment?

IJJ , literally "clear;" that is, on which side is there the most absolute certainty that merit will be properly rewarded and misdeeds summarily punished ?

14. By means of these seven considerations I can fore- cast victory or defeat.

I?- I^ 0 ftf ffS i&J fllfe

15. The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will conquer: — let such a one be retained in command! The general that hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat: — let such a one be dismissed !

The form of this paragraph reminds us that Sun Tzu's treatise was composed expressly for the benefit of his patron ||f] ^ Ho Lii, king of the Wti State. It is not necessary, however, to understand ^j before @ ^ (as some commentators do), or to take *|^ as "generals under my command."

1 6. While heeding the profit of my counsel, avail your- self also of any helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules.

Capt. Calthrop blunders amazingly over this sentence: "Wherefore, with regard to the foregoing, considering that with us lies the advantage, and the generals agreeing, we create a situation which promises victory." Mere logic should have kept him from penning such frothy balderdash.

17. According as circumstances are favourable, one should modify one's plans.

Sun Tzu, as a practical soldier, will have none of the "bookish theoric." He cautions us here not to pin our faith to' abstract principles; "for," as Chang Yii puts it, "while the main laws of strategy can be stated clearly enough for the benefit of all and sundry, you must be guided by the actions of the enemy in attempting to secure a favourable position in actual warfare." On the eve of the battle of Waterloo, Lord Uxbridge, commanding the cavalry, went to the Duke of Wellington in order to learn what his plans and calculations were for the morrow, because, as he explained, he might suddenly find himself Commander-in-chief and would be unable to frame new plans in a critical moment. The Duke listened quietly and then said: "Who will attack the first to-morrow — I or Bonaparte?" "Bonaparte," replied Lord Uxbridge. "Well," continued the Duke, "Bonaparte has not given me any idea of his projects; and as my plans will depend upon his, how can you expect me to tell you what mine are ?" *

* "Words on Wellington," by Sir W. Fraser.

18- ^ % H M.

ft 4t& ff :$ 2 7 1^ K ^ £ 78 ft W4M:

Sfcifii^za

20. ^ij fffi if ;£ ii ffn $t £

21. » rffl ffi 2 ffi BB & 2

22. & ffi) £ 2. J& ffi If 2

1 8. All warfare is based on deception.

The truth of this pithy and profound saying will be admitted by every soldier. Col. Henderson tells us that Wellington, great in so many mili- tary qualities, was especially distinguished by "the extraordinary skill with which he concealed his movements and deceived both friend and foe."

/i 9. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.

20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign dis- order, and crush him.

JJ5(, as often in Sun Tzu, is used in the sense of *j|c. It is rather remarkable that all the commentators, with the exception of Chang Yii, refer ja^ to the enemy: "when he is in disorder, crush him." It is more natural to suppose that Sun Tzu is still illustrating the uses of deception in war.

21. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior strength, evade him.

The meaning of jjj is made clear from chap. VI, where it is opposed to ||[ "weak or vulnerable spots." jjtji » according to Tu Yu and other commentators, has reference to the keenness of the men as well as to numerical superiority. Capt. Calthrop evolves an extraordinarily far-fetched translation: "If there are defects, give an appearance of perfection, and awe the enemy. Pretend to be strong, and so cause the enemy to avoid you" !

22. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to ir- ritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant.

I follow Chang Yu in my interpretation of :&% . j|l is expanded by Mei Yao-ch'en into ^ J^ j|r jg . Wang Tzu, quoted by Tu Yu,

23.

fcUZfe £ *Ht ffl

25- ift^lt^

20.

says that the good tactician plays with his adversary as a cat plays with a mouse, first feigning weakness and immobility, and then suddenly pouncing upon him.

23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest.

This is probably the meaning, though Mei Yao-ch'en has the note:

K% •$& ^ i^C $f $$. ^ ^ "while we are taking our ease, wait for

the enemy to tire himself out." The Yu Lan has jtj| ffjj ^ ^

"Lure him on and tire him out." This would seem also to have been

Ts'ao Kung's text, judging by his comment J,/j[ 7Ji|J »j& ^ .

If his forces are united, separate them.

Less plausible is the interpretation favoured by most of the commen- tators: "If sovereign and subject are in accord, put division between them."

24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected.

25. These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged beforehand.

This seems to be the way in which Ts'ao Kung understood the passage, and is perhaps the best sense to be got out of the text as it stands. Most of the commentators give the following explanation : "It is impossible to lay down rules for warfare before you come into touch with the enemy." This would be very plausible if it did not ignore [J^ , which unmistakably refers to the maxims which Sun Tzu has been laying down. It is possible, of course, that jj£ may be a later interpolation, in which case the sentence would practically mean: "Suc- cess in warfare cannot be taught." As an alternative, however, I would venture to suggest that a second ^ may have fallen out after "jjj*, so that we get : "These maxims for succeeding in war are the first that ought to be imparted."

26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought.

8

Chang Yii tells us that in ancient times it was customary for a temple to be set apart for the use of a general who was about to take the field, in order that he might there elaborate his plan of campaign. Capt. Calthrop misunderstands it as "the shrine of the ancestors," and gives a loose and inaccurate rendering of the whole passage.

The general who loses a battle makes but few cal- culations beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.

II. WAGING WAR.

Ts'ao Kung has the note: ^^^ "He who

wishes to fight must first count the cost," which prepares us for the dis- covery that the subject of the chapter is not what we might expect from the title, but is primarily a consideration of ways and means.

i. Sun Tzu said: In the operations of war, where there are in the field a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand mail-clad soldiers,

were lightly built and, according to Chang Yii, used for the attack ; the "ffi ifi were heavier, and designed for purposes of defence. Li Ch'iian, it is true, says that the latter were light, but this seems hardly probable. Capt. Calthrop translates "chariots" and "supply wagons" respectively, but is not supported by any commentator. It is interesting to note the analogies between early Chinese warfare and that of the Homeric Greeks. In each case, the war-chariot was the important factor, forming as it did the nucleus round which was grouped a certain number of foot-soldiers. With regard to the numbers given here, we are informed that each swift chariot was accompanied by 75 footmen, and each heavy chariot by 25 footmen, so that the whole army would be divided up into a thousand battalions, each consisting of two chariots and a hundred men.

with provisions enough to carry them a thousand li,

2.78 modern li go to a mile. The length may have varied slightly since Sun Tzu's time.

the expenditure at home and at the front, including enter- tainment of guests, small items such as glue and paint,

10

2.

3. A $ en; IN H M ^ &

and sums spent on chariots and armour, will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day.

ty , which follows ?||! in the textus receptus, is important as indicating the apodosis. In the text adopted by Capt. Calthrop it is omitted, so that he is led to give this meaningless translation of the opening sentence : "Now the requirements of War are such that we need 1,000 chariots," etc. The second JJP, which is redundant, is omitted in the Yu Lan.

-5~^

-3^ ^ , like -^J- Jji above, is meant to suggest a large but indefinite number. As the Chinese have never possessed gold coins, it is incorrect to translate it "1000 pieces of gold."

Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men.

Capt. Calthrop adds: "You have the instruments of victory," which he seems to get from the first five characters of the next sentence.

2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, the men's weapons will grow dull and their ardour will be damped.

The Yu Lan omits ^ ; but though ^ ^ is certainly a bold phrase, it is more likely to be right than not. Both in this place and in § 4, the Tlung Tien and Yu Lan read jji|j (in the sense of "to injure") in- stead of $|,.

If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength. As synonyms to Jjjl are given jjj^ , $p , |p| and ^ .

3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will not be equal to the strain.

9\. ^ Sift means literally, "If there is long exposure of the army." Of -^ in this sense K'ang Hsi cites an instance from the biography of

W fS Tou Jun§ in tne Hou Han Shui wnere tne commentary defines it by H . Cf. also the following from the |r^ g ^ : ^ j|f ^

^ US ^ %k "General, you have long been exposed to all weathers."

1 1

4.

4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardour damped, your strength exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue.

Following Tu Yu, I understand ^ in the sense of "to make good," i. e. to mend. But Tu Mu and Ho Shih explain it as "to make good plans" — for the future.

5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays.

This concise and difficult sentence is not well explained by any of the commentators. Ts'ao Kung, Li Ch'iian, Meng Shih, Tu Yu, Tu Mu and Mei Yao-ch'en have notes to the effect that a general, though naturally stupid, may nevertheless conquer through sheer force of rapidity. Ho Shih says: "Haste may be stupid, but at any rate it saves expenditure of energy and treasure; protracted operations may be very clever, but they bring calamity in their train." Wang Hsi evades the difficulty by remarking : "Lengthy operations mean an army growing old, wealth being expended, an empty exchequer and distress among the people; true cleverness in- sures against the occurrence of such calamities." Chang Yii says: "So long as victory can be attained, stupid haste is preferable to clever dila- toriness." Now Sun Tzu says nothing whatever, except possibly by im- plication, about ill-considered haste being better than ingenious but lengthy operations. What he does say is something much more guarded, namely that, while speed may sometimes be injudicious, tardiness can never be anything but foolish — if only because it means impoverishment to the nation. Capt. Calthrop indulges his imagination with the following: "Therefore it is acknowledged that war cannot be too short in duration. But though conducted with the utmost art, if long continuing, misfortunes do always appear." It is hardly worth while to note the total disappearance of ;j*(J jj|j| in this precious concoction. In considering the point raised here by Sun Tzti, the classic example of Fabius Cunctator will inevitably occur to the mind. That general deliberately measured the endurance of Rome against that of Hannibal's isolated army, because it seemed to him that the latter was more likely to suffer from -a long campaign in a strange country. But it is quite a moot question whether his tactics would have proved successful in the long run. Their reversal, it is true, led to Can- nae; but this only establishes a negative presumption in their favour.

12

6. There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare.

The Yu Lan has [gj instead of g| — evidently the mistake of a scribe.

7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on.

That is, with rapidity. Only one who knows the disastrous effects of a long war can realise the supreme importance of rapidity in bringing it to a close. Only two commentators seem to favour this interpretation, but it fits well into the logic of the context, whereas the rendering, "He who does not know the evils of war cannot appreciate its benefits," is distinctly pointless.

8. The skilful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither are his supply-waggons loaded more than twice.

Once war is declared, he will not waste precious time in waiting for reinforcements, nor will he turn his army back for fresh supplies, but crosses the enemy's frontier without delay. This may seem an audacious policy to recommend, but with all great strategists, from Julius Caesar to Napoleon Buonaparte, the value of time — that is, being a little ahead of your opponent — has counted for more than either numerical superiority or the nicest calculations with regard to commissariat. |sj| is used in the sense of ^ . The T'ung Tien and Yu Lan have the inferior reading ^. The commentators explain ^f\ ~ JJ& by saying that the wag- gons are loaded once before passing the frontier, and that the army is met by a further consignment of supplies on the homeward march. The Yu Lan, however, reads ^. here as well.

9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus the army will have food enough for its needs.

|H , "things to be used," in the widest sense. It includes all the im- pedimenta of an army, apart from provisions.

13

3 ft ft tt € &tt & * M ft &

m * * g * 1 m w ** it *8

10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by contributions from a distance. Con- tributing to maintain an army at a distance causes the people to be impoverished.

The beginning of this sentence does not balance properly with the next, though obviously intended to do so. The arrangement, moreover, is so awkward that I cannot help suspecting some corruption in the text. It never seems to occur to Chinese commentators that an emendation may be necessary for the sense, and we get no help from them here. Sun Tzu says that the cause of the people's impoverishment is Jg| jjffjjj ; it is clear, therefore, that the words have reference to some system by which the husbandmen sent their contributions of corn to the army direct. But why should it fall on them to maintain an army in this way, except because the State or Government is too poor to do so? Assuming then that ^^ ought to stand first in the sentence in order to balance j|£ (the fact that the two words rhyme is significant), and thus getting rid of |S| ^ > we are still left with J^ [Jjjj , which latter word seems to me an obvious mistake for ^ . "Poverty in the army" is an unlikely ex- pression, especially as the general has just been warned not to encumber his army with a large quantity of supplies. If we suppose that (jj|} somehow got written here instead of [H (a very simple supposition, as we have jj£ j^ (jjjj in the next sentence), and that later on somebody, scenting a mistake, prefixed the gloss H ^ to ^^ , without however erasing J^ (Jj|j , the whole muddle may be explained. My emended text then would be " etc<

1 1 . On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up ; and high prices cause the people's sub- stance to be drained away.

jj£, that is, as Wang Hsi says, before the army has left its own ter- ritory. Ts'ao Kung understands it of an army that has already crossed the frontier. Capt. Calthrop drops the J^ , reading j^£ £j|j ^ , but even so it is impossible to justify his translation "Repeated wars cause high prices."

12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be afflicted by heavy exactions.

H

A ' JJ JB »^4Ui W II I -b

14. «

Cf. Mencius VII. 2. xiv. 2, where j£ g* has the same meaning as

JEt ^ • -£ was an ancient measure of land- The ful1 table> as §iven

by f^ ^ ^, may not be out of place here: 6/^ = 1^; 100 ^ =

i ^; ico^^1 ^; 3 ^t = i M; 3 M = i #; 4^=1 eL;

4S=iJ^; 4 j£ = i 'fij • According to the Chou Li, there were nine husbandmen to a iJJ:, which would assign to each man the goodly al- lowance of 100 jjjj^ (of which 6.6 now go to an acre). What the values of these measures were in Sun Tzti's time is not known with any certainty. The lineal f^, however, is supposed to have been about 20 cm. ^ may include levies of men, as well as other exactions.

V/I3, 14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their incomes will be dissipated;

The Yu Lan omits gj Jjp . I would propose the emended reading

'/I SB HlI Eft > etc- In yiew of tne fact tnat we nave St jifi in tne S'* /M~I y^-^ i •^j '^

two preceding paragraphs, it seems probable that ^J is a scribe's mistake for j||J , Jp having been added afterwards to make sense. p£| jjjj| ^

^ J^ ^Cj literally: "Within the middle plains there is emptiness in the homes." For F£ Jgr cf. Shih Ching II. 3. vi. 3 and II. 5. n. 3. With

regard to -f> £ 3£ ^ , Tu Mu says: ^ || -f ^ ^ ^ {fj ,

and Wang Hsi : ^ .^ -^ 4±. ^ ; that is, the people are mulcted not of y3^, but of T7¥, of their income. But this is hardly to be extracted from our text. Ho Shih has a characteristic tag: ||0 Jxj[ fji '1^ 2J!C

Sm^^^JgA±*fi^fi'lt "The *»& being regarded as the essential part of the State, and food as the people's heaven, is it not right that those in authority should value and be careful of both?"

while Government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out .horses, breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, protective mantlets, draught-oxen and heavy waggons, will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue.

15

31 1 ^ - +

The K# Lan has several various readings here, the more important of which are «Jjj? for the less common ^ (read /'z'2), "~J"' for j^, and

Ji 2fc. for j£ ^«, which latter, if right, must mean "oxen from the country districts" (cf. supra, § 12). For the meaning of >H| , see note on III, § 4. Capt. Calthrop omits to translate fr. ^ ^ jjl .

15. Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One cartload of the enemy's provisions is equivalent to twenty of one's own, and likewise a single picul of his provender is equivalent to twenty from one's own store.

Because twenty cartloads will be consumed in the process of transporting one cartload to the front. According to Ts'ao Kung, a ||f = 6 ffi 4 gij. ,

or 64 g>J, but according to Meng Shih, 10 ffl make a |jf. The ^

picul consisted of 70 ^j* catties (Tu Mu and others say 120). lg ^f, literally, "beanstalks and straw."

1 6. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger ; that there may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards.

These are two difficult sentences, which I have translated in accordance with Mei Yao-ch'en's paraphrase. We may incontinently reject Capt. Calthrop's extraordinary translation of the first: "Wantonly to kill and destroy the enemy must be forbidden." Ts'ao Kung quotes a jingle cur- rent in his day: ^ ft % ± ^ ^^ ffl| <£ ± ^ Q. Tu Mu says: "Rewards are necessary in order to make the soldiers see the advantage of beating the enemy ; thus, when you capture spoils from the enemy, they must be used as rewards, so that all your men may have a keen desire to fight, each on his own account. Chang Yu takes ^c|J as the direct object of J^( , which is not so good.

17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been taken, those should be rewarded who took the first.

i6

is.

Capt. Calthrop's rendering is : "They who are the first to lay their hands on more than ten of the enemy's chariots, should be encouraged." We should have expected the gallant captain to see that such Samson-like prowess deserved something more substantial than mere encouragement. T. omits |jj£ , and has Jjj/J _£, in place of the more archaic g^ _^ .

Our own flags should be substituted for those of the enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with ours. The captured soldiers should be kindly treated

A 1

and kept.

i8./ This is called, using the conquered foe to augment /onown strength. ^ ^ f . ^ ^f^ff^^,

. In war,* then, let your great object be victory, not engthy campaigns. r*&2sC,£

As Ho Shih remarks: ^^pf^C^^'Srif ^w*r is not a / thing to be trifled with." Sun Tzu here reiterates the main lesson which this chapter is intended to enforce.

20. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the people's fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril.

In the original text, there is a /jh before the J$J .

« jk ft

III. ATTACK BY STRATAGEM.

1. Sun Tzu said: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better to capture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them.

A jj[ "army corps," according to Ssu-ma Fa, consisted nominally of 12500 men; according to Ts'ao Kung, a j^j contained 500 men, a 7jj£ any number between 100 and 500, and a '(JL any number between 5 and 100. For the last two, however, Chang Yii gives the exact figures of TOO and 5 respectively.

2. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.

Here again, no modern strategist but will approve the words of the old Chinese general. Moltke's greatest triumph, the capitulation of the huge French army at Sedan, was won practically without bloodshed.

3. Thus the highest form of generalship is to baul the enemy's plans ;

2

4 .

I.e., as Li Ch'iian says (<f& 3( jft $ &)> "> their very inception. Perhaps the word "baulk" falls short of expressing the full force of ^ , which implies not an attitude of defence, whereby one might be content to foil the enemy's stratagems one after another, but an active policy of counter-attack. Ho Shih puts this very clearly in his note: "When the enemy has made a plan of attack against us, we must anticipate him by delivering our own attack first."

the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces ;

Isolating him from his allies. We must not forget that Sun Tzti, in speaking of hostilities, always has in mind the numerous states or princi- palities into which the China of his day was split up.

the next in order is to attack the enemy's army in the field ;

When he is already in full strength, and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.

The use of the word J5£ is somewhat unusual, which may account for the reading of the modern text : S ~J\ JJ£ JjjjJJ .

4. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be avoided.

Another sound piece of military theory. Had the Boers acted upon it in 1899, and refrained from dissipating their strength before Kimberley, Mafeking, or even Ladysmith, it is more than probable that they would have been masters of the situation before the British were ready seriously to oppose them.

The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various implements of war, will take up three whole months;

It is not quite clear what |J| were. Ts'ao Kung simply defines them as ^ ;jtjg "large shields," but we get a better idea of them from Li Ch'iian, who says they were to protect the heads of those who were assaulting the city walls at close quarters. This seems to suggest a sort of Roman testudo, ready made. Tu Mu says they were "what are now termed j|2 ffi" (wheeled vehicles used in repelling attacks, according to K'ang Hsi), but this is denied by Ch'en Hao. See supra, II. 14. The name is also applied to turrets on city walls. Of |j|f 4H (fen yuri) we get

19

5 . %. -* 0 g & m m m z w ± H » z -

a fairly clear description from several commentators. They were wooden missile-proof structures on four wheels, propelled from within, cove- red over with raw hides, and used in sieges to convey parties of men to and from the walls, for the purpose of filling up the encircling moat with earth. Tu Mu adds that they are now called ~fc j||| "wooden donkeys." Capt. Calthrop wrongly translates the term, "battering-rams." I follow Ts'ao Kung in taking J=T as a verb, co-ordinate and synonymous with /jj|£ . Those commentators who regard jj|£ as an adjective equiva- lent to -^ "long," make JL presumably into a noun.

and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three months more.

The J£|J |||| (or Jjjj , in the modern text) were great mounds or ram- parts of earth heaped up to the level of the enemy's walls in order to discover the weak points in the defence, and also to destroy the jjfe ^ fortified turrets mentioned in the preceding note. Tu Yu quotes the Tso

5. The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants,

Capt. Calthrop unaccountably omits this vivid simile, which, as Ts'ao Kung says, is taken from the spectacle of an army of ants climbing a wall. The meaning is that the general, losing patience at the long delay, may make a premature attempt to storm the place before his engines of war are ready.

with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege.

We are reminded of the terrible losses of the Japanese before Port Arthur, in the most recent siege which history has to record. The T'-ung Tien reads ^ J$ ^ £ jg; . . . ||J ^ ± $L . . . # $ £ <£ .

For "|H^ J the Yu Lan has fQ ^K . Capt. Calthrop does not translate and mistranslates

6. Therefore the skilful leader subdues the enemy's troops without any fighting; he captures their cities with-

\

2O

7.

out laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field.

Chia Lin notes that he only overthrows the [j|| , that is, the Govern- ment, but does no harm to individuals. The classical instance is Wu Wang, who after having put an end to the Yin dynasty was acclaimed "Father and mother of the people."

7. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete.

Owing to the double meanings of & , ^ [= ^ ] and ^ |J , the latter part of the sentence is susceptible of quite a different meaning: "And thus, the weapon not being blunted by use, its keenness remains perfect." Chang Yii says that ^pjj is "the advantage of a prosperous kingdom and a strong army." x This is the method of attacking by stratagem.

8. It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy's one, to surround him ; if five to one, to attack him ;

Straightaway, without waiting for any further advantage. if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two.

Note that ^ does not refer to the enemy, as in the two ^preceding clauses. This sudden change of object is quite common in Chinese. Tu Mu takes exception to the saying; and at first sight, indeed, it appears to violate a fundamental principle of war. Ts'ao Kung, however, gives a clue to Sun Tzti's meaning: ty ^ j|£ — ||J — $ij ^ ]£ — t$;f ^ij pj "Being two to the enemy's one, we may use one parlf; of our army in the regular way, and the other for some special diversion." [For explanation of j£ and ^ , see V. 3, note.] Chang Yu thus further elucidates the point : "If our force is twice as numerous as that of the enemy, it should be split up into two divisions, one to meet the enemy in front, and one to fall upon his rear; if he replies to the frontal attack, he may be crushed from behind; if to the rearward attack, he may be crushed in front. This is what is meant by saying that "one part may be used in the regular way, and the other for some special diversion." Tu Mu does not understand that dividing one's army is simply an irre- gular, just as concentrating it is the regular, strategical method, and he is too hasty in calling this a mistake."

21

»• 1& HI it ifc £ & n sfe JS Z * ^ M'J B^ 3! £

9. If equally matched, we can offer battle;

Li Ch'iian, followed by Ho Shih, gives the following paraphrase: =fc 2£ ^t $f£ Wfe *& 3£ ® "If attackers and attacked are equally

_H ^Pl XV IKl*. |R- |=t Pi ~T*\

matched in strength, only the able general will fight." He thus takes j||2 as though it were j||| ^jf , which is awkward.

if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy ; The Tu Shu has ^f* instead of i^fc , which is hardly distinguishable in sense

-J A^— •

from :jjn| in the next clause. The meaning, "we can watch the enemy," is certainly a great improvement on the above; but unfortunately there ap- pears to be no very good authority for the variant. Chang Yu reminds us that the saying only applies if the other factors are equal; a small difference in numbers is often more than counterbalanced by superior energy and discipline.

if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him.

10. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end it must be captured by the larger force.

In other words: "C'est magnifique; mais ce n'est pas la guerre."

11. Now the general is the bulwark of the State: if the bulwark is complete at all points, the State will be strong ; if the bulwark is defective, the State will be weak.

K!i cannot be restricted to anything so particular as in Capt. Calthrop's translation, "divided in his allegiance." It is simply keeping up the metaphor suggested by ^ . As Li Ch'uan tersely puts it: (Sjjji j|f£ -{j^

ft&$W*Jfc:&M "C/l'*> gap' indicates deficiency; if the general's ability is not perfect (i. e. if he is not thoroughly versed in his profession), his army will lack strength."

12. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his army: —

22

1 «. '"""""""'

13. (i) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army.

Ts'ao Kung weakly defines ^ as :jjjp "control," "direct." Cf. § 17 ad Jin. But in reality it is one of those graphic metaphors which from time to time illuminate Sun Tzu's work, and is rightly explained by Li Ch'uanas=:^. He adds the comment: #fl ^ ]g| JgL $$ tijfa || ^ . "It is like tying together the legs of a thoroughbred, so that it is unable to gallop." One would naturally think of "the ruler" in this passage as being at home, and trying to direct the movements of his army from a distance. But the commentators understand just the reverse, and quote the saying of T'ai Kung: g^pTJ^^t^^S^PTja^t pfa ^jin "A kingdom should not be governed from without, an army should not be directed from within." Of course it is true that, during an engagement, 'or when in close touch with the enemy, the general should not be in the thick of his own troops, but a little distance apart. Otherwise, he will be liable to misjudge the position as a whole, and give wrong orders.

14. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army. This causes restless- ness in the soldier's minds.

Ts'ao Kung's note is: 5 ^ ^ A B B ^ ^ A 5 /H ^

"Pf Ji^l j?p ^ ill > which may be freely translated : "The military sphere and the civil sphere are wholly distinct; you can't handle an army in kid gloves." And Chang Yu says: "Humanity and justice (fc f^ ) are the principles on which to govern a state, but not an army; opportunism and flexibility ( |H $jjk ), on the other hand, are military rather than

civic virtues." |ij ^ jj| ^ jg£ , "to assimilate the governing of an army" - to that of a State, understood. The Tung Tien has ^ inserted before JiJ , here and in § 15.

23

B5 n =

T5- (3) By employing the officers of his army without discrimination,

That is, he is not careful to use the right man in the right place. through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.

I follow Mei Yao-ch'en here. The other commentators make ~jf\ ^JJ etc. refer, not to the ruler, as in §§ 13, 14, but to the officers he employs.

Thus Tu Yu says: ^ ^ ^ ^ ff f| ^ 1^ ft $ 1£ & "If

a general is ignorant of the principle of adaptability, he must not be en- trusted with a position of authority." Tu Mu quotes •p? ~fc ^ : "The skilful employer of men will employ the wise man, the brave man, the covetous man, and the stupid man. For the wise man delights in establishing his merit, the brave man likes to show his courage in action, the covetous man is quick at seizing advantages, and the stupid man has no fear of death." The Tung Tien reads j|f U ^ , which Tu Yu explains as |j j|j£ "is utterly defeated." Capt. Calthrop gives a very inaccurate rendering : "Ignorant of the situation of the army, to interfere in its dispositions."

1 6. But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to come from the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging vic- tory away.

Most of the commentators take HI in the sense of ^E, which it

seems to bear also in the Li Chi, ^ jjl£ . I. 18. [^|7 is there given as its equivalent, but Legge tries notwithstanding to retain the more usual sense, translating "draw . . . back," which is hardly defensible.] Tu Mu and Wang Hsi, however, think jj| Jj|f means "leading up to the enemy's victory."

17. Thus we may know that there are five essentials

24

for victory: (i) He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight.

Chang Yii says: "If he can fight, he advances and takes the offensive; if he cannot fight, he retreats and remains on the defensive. He will invariably conquer who knows whether it is right to take the offensive or the defensive."

(2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces.

This is not merely the general's ability to estimate numbers correctly, as Li Ch'iian and others make out. Chang Yii expounds the saying more satisfactorily: "By applying the art of war, it is possible with a lesser force to defeat a greater, and vice versa. The secret lies in an eye for locality, and in not letting the right moment slip. Thus Wu Tzii says: 'With a superior force, make for easy ground; with an inferior one, make for difficult ground.'"

(3) He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks.

Ts'ao Kung refers j^ ~"f\ less well to sovereign and subjects.

(4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared.

(5) He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign.

Tu Yu quotes £ ^ as saying: =|fg#;g-&ifc#,M

"It is the sovereign's function to give broad instructions, but to decide on battle is the function of the general." It is needless to dilate on the military disasters which have been caused by undue interference with operations in the field on the part of the home government. Napoleon undoubtedly owed much of his extraordinary success to the fact that he was not hampered by any central authority, — that he was, in fact, H&

J -Tfi • /*"

and jg in one.

Victory lies in the knowledge of these five points. Literally, "These five things are knowledge of the principle of victory." 1 8. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred

25

battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. ^

Ch'iian cites the case of p g| Fu Chien, prince of Ch'in,

who in 383 A.D. marched with a vast army against the ^- Chin Emperor. When warned not to despise an enemy who could command the services of such men as ||J- ^^ Hsieh An and ^g ^ Huan Ch'ung, he boast- fully replied : "I have the population of eight provinces at my back, in- fantry and horsemen to the number of one million; why, they could dam up the Yangtsze River itself by merely throwing their whips into the stream. What danger have I to fear?" Nevertheless, his forces were soon after disastrously routed at the y|j|2 Fei River, and he was obliged to beat a hasty retreat.

If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle, x^

The modern text, represented by the ^ *jj£ ^ ^ and Tu 6/^,has jjfc J|£ , which I should be inclined to adopt in preference to ^ here, though the Tung Tien and Yu Lan both have the latter. Chang Yu oifers the best commentary on ^fl fj£ ffl S • He says that these words "have reference to attack and defence: knowing the enemy enables you to take the offensive, knowing yourself enables you to stand on the defensive." He adds: ^^^^t^^S?fe^^ "Attack is the secret of defence; defence is the planning of an attack." It would be hard to find a better epitome of the root-principle of war.

2.

IV. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS.

^U is a very comprehensive and somewhat vague term. Literally, "form," "body," it comes to mean "appearance," "attitude" or "disposition ;" and here it is best taken as something between, or perhaps combining, "tactics" and "disposition of troops." Ts'ao Kung explains it as jp[ ^

^ifc^il^ii^il^ffi^'l^-tfc "marching and counter-

marching on the part of the two armies with a view to discovering each other's condition." Tu Mu says: "It is through the ^ dispositions of an army that its condition may be discovered. Conceal your dispositions (3&| JfJ)> and your condition will remain secret, which leads to victory; show your dispositions, and your condition will become patent, which leads to defeat." Wang Hsi remarks that the good general can &|& Jfa it ^ 13 Hfc J£t ^3j ^ "secure success by modifying his tactics to meet those of the enemy." In the modern text, the title of the chapter appears as j|f ^ , which Capt. Calthrop incorrectly translates "the order of battle."

1. Sun Tzu said: The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy.

2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.

That is, of course, by a mistake on his part. Capt. Calthrop has: "The causes of defeat come from within; victory is born in the enemy's camp," which, though certainly an improvement on his previous attempt, is still incorrect.

27

3- I

4-

3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat,

"By concealing the disposition of his troops, covering up his tracks, and taking unremitting precautions" (Chang Yii).

but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.

The original text reads ^ j|j£ ^ ~pj* Jj^ , which the modern text has further modified into £ ^ jj£\ ~p* J . Capt. Calthrop makes out the

impossible meaning, "and further render the enemy incapable of victory."

4. Hence the saying: One may know how to conquer without being able to do it.

Capt. Calthrop translates: "The conditions necessary for victory may be present, but they cannot always be obtained," which is more or less unintelligible.

5 . Security against defeat implies defensive tactics ; ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive.

For ^p ~p[* Jj|p I retain the sense which it undoubtedly bears in §§ i — 3, in spite of the fact that the commentators are all against me. The meaning they give, "He who cannot conquer takes the defensive," is plausible enough, but it is highly improbable that ^ should suddenly become active in this way. An incorrect variant in the Yii Lan is

6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength • attacking, a superabundance of strength.

7. The general who is skilled in defence hides in the most secret recesses of the earth;

Literally, "hides under the ninth earth," which is a metaphor indicating the utmost secrecy and concealment, so that the enemy may not know

28

his whereabouts. The ^ Jjjj of this passage have of course no connection with the - jj "Nine situations" of chap. XI.

he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven.

Another metaphor, implying that he falls on his adversary like a thun- derbolt, against which there is no time to prepare. This is the opinion* of most of the commentators, though Ts'ao Kung, followed by Tu Yu, explains fyjfc as the hills, rivers, and other natural features which will afford shelter or protection to the attacked, and ^ as the phases of weather which may be turned to account by the attacking party. Capt. Calthrop's "The skilful in attack push to the topmost heaven" conveys no meaning at all.

Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect our- selves; on the other, a victory that is complete.

Capt. Calthrop draws on a fertile imagination for the following: "If these precepts be observed, victory is certain."

8. To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is not the acme of excellence.

As Ts'ao Kung remarks, ^ ^ "the thing is to see the plant

before it has germinated," to foresee the event before the action has begun. Li Ch'iian alludes to the story of Han Hsin who, when about to attack the vastly superior army of Jj| Chao, which was strongly entrenched in the city of jfc ^ Ch'eng-an, said to his officers: "Gentlemen, we are going to annihilate the enemy, and shall meet again at dinner." The officers hardly took his words seriously, and gave a very dubious assent. But Han Hsin had already worked out in his mind the details of a clever stratagem, whereby, as he foresaw, he was able to capture the city and inflict a crushing defeat on his adversary. For the full story, see ^ JS ff > chap. 34, ^ >jg ^ . Capt. Calthrop again blunders badly with : "A victory, even if popularly proclaimed as such by the common folk, may not be a true success."

9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the whole Empire says, "Well done!"

True excellence being, as Tu Mu says : (^ |j| j|| ^| ^ jty ffi H $5f 'fifc Z, H 1^ ^ jfJL -j/J "To Plar> secretly, to move sur-

29

tit ft * tt * if ft £ # JK * » 11*11 It

reptitiously, to foil the enemy's intentions and baulk his schemes, so that at last the day may be won without shedding a drop of blood." Sun Tzti reserves his approbation for things that

"the world's coarse thumb And finger fail to plumb."

10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength;

^ ft is explained as the fur of a hare, which is finest in autumn, when it begins to grow afresh. The phrase is a very common one in Chinese writers. Cf. Mencius, I. i. vii. 10, and Chuang Tzti, ffi ;[[> *Jj£, et al.

to see sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear.

Ho Shih gives as real instances of strength, sharp sight and quick hearing: Jf^ ||| Wu Huo, who could lift a tripod weighing 250 stone; JS§ ^fc. Li Chu, who at a distance of a hundred paces could see objects no bigger than a mustard seed ; and [Jjjj lj|lf Shih K'uang, a blind musician who could hear the footsteps of a mosquito.

1 1 . What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease.

The original text, followed by the Tu ^«,has But this is an alteration evidently intended to smooth the awkwardness of H^ W^ §3 ^ ^ ifc ' wkicn means literally : "one who, conquering, excels in easy conquering." Mei Yao-ch'en says: "He who only sees the obvious, wins his battles with difficulty; he who looks below the surface of things, wins with ease."

12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage.

Tu Mu explains this very well: "Inasmuch as his victories are gained over circumstances that have not come to light, the world at large knows nothing of them, and he wins no reputation for wisdom; inasmuch as the hostile state submits before there has been any bloodshed, he receives no credit for courage."

13.

13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes.

Ch'en Hao says: "He plans no superfluous marches, he devises no futile attacks." The connection of ideas is thus explained by Chang Yu : "One who seeks to conquer by sheer strength, clever though he may be at winning pitched battles, is also liable on occasion to be vanquished; whereas he who can look into the future and discern conditions that are not yet manifest, will never make a blunder and therefore invariably win." Li Ch'iian thinks that the character ~fifc should be J^ "to have doubts." But it is better not to tamper with the text, especially . when no improve- ment in sense is the result.

Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated.

The T'-u Shu omits jj£\ . ^^ is here = jW . Chia Lin says it is put for ^jp

in the sense of ^jjfc ; but this is far-fetched. Capt. Calthrop altogether ignores the important word ^ .

14. Hence the skilful fighter puts himself into a position which makes defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy.

A ^ • ti "coimsel of perfection," as Tu Mu truly observes.

Jj|j need not be confined strictly to the actual ground occupied by the troops. It includes all the arrangements and preparations which a wise general will make to increase the safety of his army.

15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory.

Ho Shih thus expounds the paradox: "In warfare, first lay plans which will^ ensure victory, and then lead your army to battle: if you will not begin with stratagem but rely on brute strength alone, victory will no longer be assured."

fcflf ***<**«<*

1 6. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly adheres to method and discipline;

For ^ and ££, see supra, I. 4 sqq. I think that Chang Yu is wrong in altering their signification here, and taking them as ^ and $|J £ ^ ££ respectively.

thus it is in his power to control success.

17. In respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement; secondly, Estimation of quantity; thirdly, Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory.

1 8. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity to Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity ; Balancing of chances to Calculation ; and Victory to Balancing of chances.

It is not easy to distinguish the four terms j|£ -j|j* f|£ 7pp| very clearly. The first seems to be surveying and measurement of the ground, which enable us to jjj form an estimate of the enemy's strength, and 'to Jjr make calculations based on the data thus obtained; we are thus led to ;|p| a general weighing-up, or comparison of the enemy's chances with our own; if the latter turn the scale, then Jj|p victory ensues. The chief difficulty lies in j£ , which some commentators take as a calculation of numbers^ thereby making it nearly synonymous with ~JT? . Perhaps -M] is rather a consideration of the enemy's general position or con- dition ('|*j{| or ^^ ^ip1)? while (^ is the estimate of his numerical strength. On the other hand, Tu Mu defines f|!£ as ^ j£ , and adds : jjSji jjjy

B ^ M H fl ffl t^ H Wi & "the question of relative strength having been settled, we can bring the varied resources of cunning into play." Ho Shih seconds this interpretation, which is weakened, however, by the fact that ;|p| is given as logically consequent on jjjf ; this cer- tainly points to the latter being a calculation of numbers. Of Capt. Calthrop's version the less said the better.

32

19. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound's weight placed in the scale against a single grain.

Literally, "a victorious army is like an J^ i (20 oz.) weighed against a <|i j^« (^ oz.); a routed army as a j^w weighed against an i" The point is simply the enormous advantage which a disciplined force, flushed with victory, has over one demoralised by defeat. Legge, in his note on Mencius, I. 2. ix. 2, makes the Jj^ to be 24 Chinese ounces, and cor- rects Chu Hsi's statement that it equalled 20 oz. only. But Li Ch'iian of the T'ang dynasty here gives the same figure as Chu Hsi.

20. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep. So much for tactical dispositions.

The construction here is slightly awkward and elliptical, but the general sense is plain. The Tu Shu omits jj*-^. A|j7/=8^or Chinese feet.

V.

2.

V. ENERGY.

^jj; here is said to be an older form of 3jk; Sun Tzu, however, would seem to have used the former in the sense of "power," and the latter only in the sense of "circumstances." The fuller title -^ ^i is found in the T*u Shu and the modern text. Wang Hsi expands it into /jif!| 33)* ^ ^JJP "tne application, in various ways, of accumulated power;" and Chang Yu says: # #$ ft & && # & #1$ "When the soldiers' energy has reached its height, it may be used to secure victory."

i. Sun Tzu said: The control of a large force is the same in principle as the control of a few men : it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers.

That is, cutting up the army into regiments, companies, etc., with subordinate officers in command of each. Tu Mu reminds us of Han Hsin's famous reply to the first Han Emperor, who once said to him: "How large an army do you think I could lead?" "Not more than 100,000 men, your Majesty." "And you?" asked the Emperor. "Oh!" he an- swered, "the more the better" ( ^ ^ ^ yjft If). Chang Yu gives the following curious table of the subdivisions of an army: — 5 men make a ^|J; 2 ^|J make a fc; 5 fc make a |^; 2 [^ make a *£? ;

2 make a ; 2 make a - ; 2 - make a ;6 ; 2 >fe make a

^.; 2 |fl|!. make a W . A j|? or army corps thus works out at 3200 men. But cf. III. § i, note. For ^ , seel. § 10. It is possible that ^ in that paragraph may also be used in the above technical sense.

2. Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from fighting with a small one : it is merely a question of instituting signs and signals.

3

34

One must be careful to avoid translating pj ^ "fighting large number," no reference to the enemy being intended. ^, is ex- plained by Ts'ao Kung as denoting flags and banners, by means of which every soldier may recognise his own particular regiment or company, and thus confusion may be prevented. ^ he explains as drums and gongs, which from the earliest times were used to sound the advance and the retreat respectively. Tu Mu defines ^ as |5jj[ ^ "marshalling the troops in order," and takes ^g as the flags and banners. Wang Hsi also dissents from Ts'ao Kung, referring ^ to the ordering of the troops by means of banners, drums and gongs, and -^ to the various names by which the regiments might be distinguished. There is much to be said for this view.

3. To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy's attack and remain unshaken — this is effected by manoeuvres direct and indirect.

For jj£\ , there is another reading Ijj , "all together," adopted by Wang Hsi and Chang Yu. We now come to one of the most interesting parts of Sun Tzu's treatise, the discussion of the j£ and the ^ . As it is by no means easy to grasp the full significance of these two terms, or to render them at all consistently by good English equivalents, it may be as well to tabulate some of the commentators' remarks on the subject before proceeding further. Li Ch'iian: ^j^^jE^Hj^ii^ "Facing the enemy is cheng, making lateral diversions is chli" Chia Lin: H tfc #1 IE g| $t ffi Jl/j[ ^ & "In presence of the enemy, your troops should be arrayed in normal fashion, but in order to secure victory abnormal manoeuvres must be employed." Mei Yao-ch'en : J|ff ^|J -fjj*

$ $ jE^MftZWjMi&Z uc»* is active> '""s is

passive; passivity means waiting for an opportunity, activity brings the victory itself." Ho Shih:

E "We must

cause the enemy to regard our straightforward attack as one that is secretly designed, and vice versa; thus cheng may also be chlit and ch'i may also be cheng" He instances the famous exploit of Han Hsin, who when marching ostensibly against [{£» ^ Lin-chin (now j|JJ ^ Chao-i in Shensi), sud- denly threw a large force across the Yellow River in wooden tubs, utterly disconcerting his opponent. [Ch'ien Han Shu, ch. 34.] Here, we are told, the march on Lin-chin was ~|P , and the surprise manoeuvre was ^ . Chang Yu gives the following summary of opinions on the words : "Military writers

*£*>t^ # #*A*^

-fa&^JbUrt cJU^t^fj

35 ^^fc^C^ly . t»*ife

5. j

do not all agree with regard to the meaning of chli and cheng. Jj^J* j|j=? -^

Wei Liao Tzu [4* cent. B.C.] says: ZE^^^D^^M'^ 'Direct warfare favours frontal attacks, indirect warfare attacks from the rear.' Ts'ao Kung says: 'Going straight out to join battle is a direct operation; appearing on the enemy's rear is an indirect manoeuvre.' ^fc Jjjjjji ^ Li Wei-kung [6th and 7th cent. A.D.] says: 'In war, to march straight ahead is nieng; turning movements, on the other hand, are ch'i* These writers simply regard cheng as cheng, and ch'i as ch'i; they do nqt note that the two are mutually interchangeable and run into each other like the two sides of a circle [see infra, § n]. A comment of the T'ang Emperor T'ai Tsung goes to the root of the matter : 'A chli manoeuvre may be cheng, if we make the enemy look upon it as cheng; then our real attack will be chli, and vice versa. The whole secret lies in confusing the enemy, so that he cannot fathom our real intent.'" To put it per- haps a little more clearly : any attack or other operation is Jp , on which the enemy has had his attention fixed; whereas that is ^-, which takes him by surprise or comes from an unexpected quarter. If the enemy perceives a movement which is meant to be ^- , it immediately becomes Jp .

at the impact of your army may be like a grind- stone dashed against an egg — this is effected by the science of weak points and strong.

^ jj t literally "the hollow and the solid," is the title of chap. VI. 5^ tuan is the T:u Shu reading, Cf^ hsia that of the standard text. It ap- pears from K'ang Hsi that there has been much confusion between the two characters, and indeed, it is probable that one of them has really crept into the language as a mistake for the other.

5. In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory.

Chang Yu says: &^W^$1»g^$Wg^

"Steadily develop indirect tactics, either by pounding the enemy's flanks or falling on his rear." A brilliant example of "indirect tactics" which decided the fortunes of a campaign was Lord Roberts' night march round the Peiwar Kotal in the second Afghan war. *

* "Forty-one Years in India," chap. 46.

36

7.

8-

9-

6. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible as Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams;

is the universally accepted emendation for -^ , the reading of the

like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew; like the four seasons, they pass away but to return once more.

Tu Yu and Chang Yii understand this of the permutations of -^ and 7F. • But at present Sun Tzu is not speaking of "jP at all> unless, in- deed, we suppose with JUJ ^ Jjp Cheng Yu-hsien that a clause relating to it has fallen out of the text. Of course, as has already been pointed out, the two are so inextricably interwoven in all military operations, that they cannot really be considered apart. Here we simply have an expression, in figurative language, of the almost infinite resource of a great leader.

7. There are not more than five musical notes,

yet the combinations of these five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard.

8. There are not more than five primary colours,

j J blue, yellow, red, white and black.

yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever be seen.

9. There are not more than five cardinal tastes, St $ B$C ~tf* 1? sour' acrid> salt> sweet, bitter.

yet combinations of them yield more flavours than can ever be tasted.

37

IE

io. In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack — the direct and the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless series of manoeuvres.

/ 1 1 . The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is like moving in a circle — you never come to an end. Who can exhaust the possibilities of their combination ?

The Tu Shu adds ^ . The final j£ may refer either to the circle

or, more probably, to the -^ Jp ^ ^|& understood. Capt. Calthrop is wrong with: "They are a mystery that none can penetrate."

12. The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even roll stones along in its course.

13. The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike and destroy its victim.

For Jjjj£ the Yu Lan reads Ijpjf , which is also supported by a quotation

in the g J^ fjj; ^ [3rd cent. B.C.]. j[jj in this context is a word which really defies the best efforts of the translator. Tu Mu says that it is equivalent to |[jj jjj; ||| j^£ "the measurement or estimation of distance." But this meaning does not quite fit the illustrative simile in §15. As applied to the falcon, it seems to me to denote that instinct of self-restraint which keeps the bird from swooping on its quarry until the right moment, together with the power of judging when the right moment has arrived. The analogous quality in soldiers is the highly im- portant one of being able to reserve their fire until the very instant at which it will be most effective. When the "Victory" went into action at Trafalgar at hardly more than drifting pace, she was for several minutes exposed to a storm of shot and shell before replying with a single gun. Nelson coolly waited until he was within close range, when the broadside he brought to bear worked fearful havoc on the enemy's nearest ships. That was a case of iSJ .

38

15.

14. Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and prompt in his decision.

Tu Yu defines |[j} here by the word ||||f , which is very like "decision" in English, ^g is certainly used in a very unusual sense, even if, as the commentators say, it = jj£ . This would have reference to the measurement of distance mentioned above, letting the enemy get near before striking. But I cannot help thinking that Sun Tzu meant to use the word in a figurative sense comparable to our own idiom "short and sharp." Cf. Wang Hsi's note, which after describing the falcon's mode of attack, proceeds :

^£^WbHii1ttl&^f "This is Just how the 'psychological moment' should be seized in war." I do not care for Capt. Calthrop's rendering : "The spirit of the good fighter is terrifying, his occasions sudden."

15. Energy may be likened to the bending of a cross- bow; decision, to the releasing of the trigger.

"Energy" seems to be the best equivalent here for ijjfa , because the comparison implies that the force is potential, being stored up in the bent cross-bow until released by the finger on the trigger. None of the com- mentators seem to grasp the real point of the simile.

1 6. Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and chaos, your array may be without head or tail, yet it wlfln5e~probf ''againSF defeat.

J& |f|j, literally "formation circular", is explained by Li Ch'iian as

IS |H) Hf ifc "without back or front." Mei Yao-ch'en says: "The sub- divisions of the army having been previously fixed, and the various signals agreed upon, the separating and joining, the dispersing and collecting which will take place in the course of a battle, may give the appearance of disorder when no real disorder is possible. Your formation may be without head or tail, your dispositions all topsy-turvy, and yet a rout of your forces quite out of the question." It is a little difficult to decide whether pj g[ and ^ [gj should not be taken as imperatives: "fight in disorder (for the purpose of deceiving the enemy), and you will be secure against real disorder." Cf. I. § 20: pjj Jj( .

39

disorder postulates perfect discipline; simulated fear postulates courage; simulated weakness postulates strength.

In order to make the translation intelligible, it is necessary to tone down the sharply paradoxical form of the original. Ts'ao Kung throws out a hint of the meaning in his brief note : -^ ^ ^ [j^ *Jj|j -jj^ "These things all serve to destroy formation and conceal one's condition." But Tu Mu is the first to put it quite plainly : "If you wish to feign con- fusion in order to lure the enemy on, you must first have perfect discipline; if you wish to display timidity in order to entrap the enemy, you must have extreme courage ; if you wish to parade your weakness in order to make the enemy over-confident, you must have exceeding strength."

1 8. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question of subdivision ;

See supra, § i.

concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy; — "ffififc ^k^£

It is passing strange that the commentators should unaemana as "circumstances" — a totally different sense from that which it has previously borne in this chapter. Thus Tu Mu says: Jjjl^ y£f ^|J ^

i*ffi)^S&i$:A#^:a»'l*& "seei"g that we .are

favourably circumstanced and yet make no move, the enemy will believe that we are really afraid."

masking strength with weakness is to be effected by tactical dispositions. ' - - ^^U^^i^l^ ^L^^^^C^f.

Chang Yii relates the following anecdote of Kao Tsu/the first Han Emperor: "Wishing to crush the Hsiung-nu, he sent out spies to report on their condition. But the Hsiung-nu, forewarned, carefully concealed all their able-bodied men and well-fed horses, and only allowed infirm soldiers and emaciated cattle to be seen. The result was that the spies one and all recommended the Emperor to deliver his attack, ijj: j^ Lou Ching alone opposed them, saying: "When two countries go to war, they are naturally inclined to make an ostentatious display of their strength. Yet our spies have seen nothing but old age and infirmity. This is surely some ruse on the part of the enemy, and it would be unwise for us to attack." The Emperor, however, disregarding this advice, fell into the trap and found himself surrounded at Po-teng."

4o

20.

19. Thus one who is skilful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy will act.

Ts'ao Kung's note is ^ J|| ^ fy "Make a display of weakness and want," but Tu Mu rightly points out that ^ does not refer only to weakness : "If our force happens to be superior to the enemy's, weakness may be simulated in order to lure him on; but if inferior, he must be led to believe that we are strong, in order that he may keep off. In fact, all the enemy's movements should be determined by the signs that we choose to give him." The following anecdote of Jjj^ J]J| Sun Pin, a

descendant of Sun Wu, is related at length in the £ ffg, chap. 65: In 341 B.C., the gC Ch'i State being at war with |j| Wei, sent gj ^ Tien Chi and Sun Pin against the general ^ y^| P'ang Chiian, who happened to be a deadly personal enemy of the latter. Sun Pin said : "The Ch'i State has a reputation for cowardice, and therefore our adversary despises us. Let us turn this circumstance to account." Accordingly, when the army had crossed the border into Wei territory, he gave orders to show 100,000 fires on the first night, 50,000 on the next, and the night after only 20,000. P'ang Chiian pursued them hotly, saying to himself1: "I knew these men of Ch'i were cowards : their numbers have already fallen away by more than half." In his retreat, Sun Pin came to a narrow defile, which he calculated that his pursuers would reach after dark. Here he had a tree stripped of its bark, and inscribed upon it the words : "Under this tree shall P'ang Chuan die." Then, as night began to fall, he placed a strong body of archers in ambush near by, with orders to shoot directly they saw a light. Later on, P'ang Chuan arrived at the spot, and noticing the tree, struck a light in order to read what was written on it. His body was immediately riddled by a volley of arrows, and his whole army thrown into confusion. [The above is Tu Mu's version of the story; the Shih Chi, less dramatically but probably with more historical truth, makes P'ang Chuan cut his own throat with an exclamation of despair, after the rout of his army.]

He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it.

20. By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then with a body of picked men he lies in wait for him. This would appear to be the meaning if we retain 3X, which Mei Yao-ch'en explains as TSC "men of spirit." The Tu Shu reads

-filfe

22.

39 ^ JW Si 3f RiJ ih

an emendation suggested by 3§ Jg| Li Ching. The meaning then would be, "He lies in wait with the main body of his troops.".

2 1 . The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined energy, and does not require too much from individuals.

Tu Mu says : "He first of all considers the power of his army in the bulk; afterwards he takes individual talent into account, and uses each man according to his capabilities. He does not demand perfection from the untalented."

Hence his ability to pick out the right men and to utilise combined energy.

Another reading has ^ instead of 3jjjfc. It would be interesting if Capt. Calthrop could tell us where the following occurs in the Chinese: "yet, when an opening or advantage shows, he pushes it to its limits."

22. When he utilises combined energy, his fighting men become as it were like unto rolling logs or stones. For it is the nature of a log or stone to remain motionless on level ground, and to move when on a slope; if four- cornered, to come to a standstill, but if round-shaped, to go rolling down.

Ts'ao Kung calls this fj£ Q 4& ffj8< "the use of natural or inherent power." Capt. Calthrop ignores the last part of the sentence entirely. In its stead he has: "So await the opportunity, and so act when the opportunity arrives" • — another absolutely gratuitous interpolation. The Tlung Tien omits ^£ .

23. Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in height. So much on the subject of energy.

The T'ung Tien omits || . The chief lesson of this chapter, in Tu Mu's opinion, is the paramount importance in war of rapid evolutions and sudden rushes. "Great results," he adds, "can thus be achieved with small forces."

VI

0rt ./fa. |4.* )L 7C ^

VI. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG.

Chang Yu attempts to explain the sequence of chapters as follows: "Chapter IV, on Tactical Dispositions, treated of the offensive and the defensive; chapter V, on Energy, dealt with direct and indirect methods. The good general acquaints himself first with the theory of attack and defence, and then turns his attention to direct and indirect methods. He studies the art of varying and combining these two methods before pro- ceeding to the subject of weak and strong points. For the use of direct or indirect methods arises out of attack and defence, and the perception of weak and strong points depends again on the above methods. Hence the present chapter comes immediately after the chapter on Energy."

1 . Sun Tzu said : Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to battle, will arrive exhausted.

Instead of l|| , the Yu Lan has in both clauses the stronger word JjH .

'7^—. l£9>

For the antithesis between ^ and 2fi , cf. I. §23, where however %ft is used as a verb.

2. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on him.

The next paragraph makes it clear that |*jj[ does not merely mean, as Tu Mu says, ^ j|£ Jfc |^ ^ «to make the enemy approach me," but rather to make him go in any direction I please. It is thus practically synonymous with fljjj . Cf. Tu Mu's own note on V. § 19. One mark of a great soldier is that he fights on his own terms or fights not at all. * * See Col. Henderson's biography of Stonewall Jackson, 1902 ed., vol. II, p. 490-

43

5.

3. By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can make it, impossible .for the e;iemy to draw near.

In the first case^-he will entice him with a bait; in the second, he will strike at some important point which the enemy will have to defend.

4. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him ;

This passage may be cited as evidence against Mei Yao-Ch'en's inter- pretation of I. § 23.

if well supplied with food, he can starve him out;

/||H is probably an older form than -^| , the reading of the original text. Both are given in the gj£ ^£.

if quietly encamped, he can force him to move.

The subject to ofe is still sS jg& ^& ; but these clauses would read

J Nii 1=1 \ >\ H '

better as direct admonitions, and in the next sentence we find Sun Tzu dropping insensibly into the imperative.

5. Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march swiftly to places where you are not expected.

The original text, adopted by the Tlu Shu, has |jj lit $f ~jf> jfH ;

it has been altered to suit the context and the commentaries of Ts'ao Kung and Ho Shih, who evidently read jj£\ ^ . The other reading would mean: "Appear at points to which the enemy cannot hasten;" but in this case there is something awkward in the use of ^^ . Capt. Calthrop is wrong of course with "appearing where the enemy is not."

6. An army may march great distances without distress, if it marches through country where the enemy is not.

We must beware of understanding ^ ^ £ jjjjj as "uninhabited country." Sun Tzu habitually uses A in the sense of ||£, e.g. supra, §2.

44

Ts'ao Kung sums up very well : Jfj ^ lj£ |J[ $j| JL Jyf ->J- |jg S

^ J£ "Emerge from the void [q. d. like "a bolt from the blue"], strike at vulnerable points, shun places that are defended, attack in unexpected quarters." The difference of meaning between ^ and ^ is worth noting.

7. You can be sure of succeding in your attacks if you only attack places which are undefended.

j££ ^ TJP is of course hyperbolical; Wang Hsi rightly explains it as "weak points; that is to say, where the general is lacking in capacity, or the soldiers in spirit; where the walls are not strong enough, or the pre- cautions not strict enough; where relief comes too late, or provisions are too scanty, or the defenders are variance amongst themselves."

You can ensure the safety of your defence if you only hold positions that cannot be attacked.

I. e., where there are none of the weak points mentioned above. There is rather a nice point involved in the interpretation of this latter clause. Tu Mu, Ch'en Hao, and Mei Yao-ch'en assume the meaning to be: "In order to make your defence quite safe, you must defend even those places that are not likely to be attacked;" and Tu Mu adds: "How much more, then, those that will be attacked." Taken thus, however, the clause balances less well with the preceding — always a consideration in the highly anti- thetical style which is natural to the Chinese. Chang Yii, therefore, seems to come nearer the mark in saying: "He who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven [see IV. § 7], making it impos- sible for the enemy to guard against him. This being so, the places that I shall attack are precisely those that the enemy cannot defend . . . He who is skilled in defence hides in the most secret recesses of the earth, making it impossible for the enemy to estimate his whereabouts. This being so, the places that I shall hold are precisely those that the enemy cannot attack."

8. Hence that general is skilful in attack whose opponent does not know what to defend ; and he is skilful in defence whose opponent does not know what to attack.

An aphorism which puts the whole art of war into a nutshell.

45

91 $ II

10.

9. O divine art of sublety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be invisible, through you inaudible;

Literally, "without form or sound," but it is said of course with reference to the enemy. Chang Yii, whom I follow, draws no sharp distinction between ^ and BJft , but Tu Mu and others think that ^ indicates the

i/o* n"r IW*

secrecy to be observed on the defensive, and j[j|jj the rapidity to be dis- played in attack. The Yu Lan text differs considerably from ours, reading :

' IK * ft ¥ tic. m m ** » ^ I* ¥ it ¥

and hence we can hold the enemy's fate in our hands.

The Tung Tien has jj£ j|| ^J )|& >f|> fjj ^ . Capt. Calthrop's version of this paragraph is so remarkable that I cannot refrain from quoting it in full : "Now the secrets of the art of offence are not to be easily apprehended, as a certain shape or noise can be understood, of the senses; but when these secrets are once learnt, the enemy is mastered."

10. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the enemy's weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more rapid than those of the enemy.

The second member of the sentence is weak, because ^ TJJ" ~fe is nearly tautologous with 'jfi ~pj* ^ . The Yu Lan reads ||| for JJ .

11. If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch. All we need do is to attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve.

Tu Mu says : "If the enemy is the invading party, we can cut his line of communications and occupy the roads by which he will have to return ; if we are the invaders, we may direct our attack against the sovereign himself." It is clear that Sun Tzu, unlike certain generals in the late Boer war, was no believer in frontal attacks.

46

is. & ^ A

12. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging us even though the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground. All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable in his way.

In order to preserve the parallelism with § n, I should prefer to follow the Tu Shu text, which inserts g| before jjj- Jjjjj . This extremely con- cise expression is intelligibly paraphrased by Chia Lin : §5j| ^ ^ ^ ||| yjffi "even though we have constructed neither wall nor ditch." The real crux of the passage lies in 3Jfe S j^f ^ -|j^ . ^ of course = jg .

Ts'ao Kung defines 3Jg by the word j^, which is perhaps a case of obscurum per obscurius. Li Ch'iian, however, says : g^J -jjjj* j? fjjj ^^ ^ "we puzzle him by strange and unusual dispositions;" and Tu Mu finally clinches the meaning by three illustrative anecdotes — one of §§ ^ <^ Chu-ko Liang, who when occupying ftjl? 2p» Yang-p'ing and about to be attacked by ffj Jj^ ^^ Ssu-ma I, suddenly struck his colours, stopped the beating of the drums, and flung open the city gates, showing only a few men engaged in sweeping and sprinkling the ground. This unex- pected proceeding had the intended effect; for Ssu-ma I, suspecting an ambush, actually drew off his army and retreated. What Sun Tzti is advocating here, therefore, is nothing more nor less than the timely use of "bluff." Capt. Calthrop translates: "and prevent the enemy from attacking by keeping him in suspense," which shows that he has not fully grasped the meaning of 3JJ? .

13. By discovering the enemy's dispositions and remaining invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated, while the enemy's must be divided. ^ /^^^£/*vtty.

The conclusion is perhaps not very obvious, but Chang Yii (after Mei Yao-ch'en) rightly explains it thus : "If the enemy's dispositions are visible, we can make for him in one body; whereas, our own dispositions being kept secret, the enemy will be obliged to divide his forces in order to guard against attack from every quarter." ^ is here used as an active verb: "to make to appear." See IV, note on heading. Capt. Calthrop's "making feints" is quite wrong.

47

14. We cap form a single united body, while the enemy must split up into fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate parts of a whole,

The original text has ]fy ||£ ;p£f lit — • -{f^ , which in accordance with the T^ung Tien and Yu Lan has been altered as above. I adopt the more plausible reading of the Tu Shu: -jj^ j£j[ -J- ;pJ£ jit — • fy , in spite of having to refer -j-» to ourselves and not to the enemy. Thus Tu Yu and Mei Yao-ch'en both regard -J-1 as the undivided force, con- sisting of so many parts, and — • as each of the isolated fractions of the enemy. The alteration of ;gJ£ into ztt can hardly be right, though the true text might conceivably have been ^^ \fy -[- it JpJ£ ~ffi — • -jfj^ .

which means that we shall be many to the enemy's few.

15. And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire straits.

For Jjg , the Tung Tien and Yu Lan have j|£ . Tu Yu, followed by

the other commentators, arbitrarily defines J^J as /j^ fjjj ^ )j|p "few and easy to conquer," but only succeeds thereby in making the sentence absolutely pointless. As for Capt. Calthrop's translation: "In superiority of numbers there is economy of strength," its meaning is probably known to himself alone. In justification of my own rendering of jj^J , I would refer to Lun Yu IV. 2 and VII. 25 (3).

1 6. The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then the enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several different points;

Sheridan once explained the reason of General Grant's victories by saying that "while his opponents were kept fully employed wondering what he was going to do, he was thinking most of what he was going to do himself."

and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers we shall have to face at any given point will be proportionately few.

48

19. & *R ifc £ *fe *u ifc £ 0 f«

17. For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear; should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his right, he will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements everywhere, he will everywhere be weak.

In Frederick the Great's Instructions to his Generals we read: "A defensive war is apt to betray us into too frequent detachment. Those generals who have had but little experience attempt to protect every point, while those who are better acquainted with their profession, having only the capital object in view, guard against a decisive blow, and acquiesce in smaller misfortunes to avoid greater."

1 8. Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible attacks; numerical strength, from compelling our adversary to make these preparations against us.

The highest generalship, in Col. Henderson's words, is "to compel the enemy to disperse his army, and then to concentrate superior force against each fraction in turn."

19. Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we may concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight.

There is nothing about "defeating" anybody in this sentence, as Capt. Calthrop translates. What Sun Tzu evidently has in mind is that nice calculation of distances and that masterly employment of strategy which enable a general to divide his army for the purpose of a long and rapid march, and afterwards to effect a junction at precisely the right spot and the right hour in order to confront the enemy in overwhelming strength. Among many such successful junctions which military history records, one of the most dramatic and decisive was the appearance of Bliicher just at the critical moment on the field of Waterloo.

49

B

21.

20. But if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be impotent to succour the right, the right equally impotent to succour the left, the van unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the van. How much more so if the furthest portions of the army are anything under a hundred li apart, and even the nearest are separated by several li\

The Chinese of this last sentence is a little lacking in precision, but the mental picture we are required to draw is probably that of an army advancing towards a given rendez-vous in separate columns, each of which has orders to be there on a fixed date. If the general allows the various detachments to proceed at haphazard, without precise instructions as to the time and place of meeting, the enemy will be able to annihilate the army in detail. Chang Yii's note may be worth quoting here : "If we do not know the place where our opponents mean to concentrate or the day on which they will join battle, our unity will be forfeited through our preparations for defence, and the positions we hold will be insecure. Suddenly happening upon a powerful foe, we shall be brought to battle in a flurried condition, and no mutual support will be possible between wings, vanguard or rear, especially if there is any great distance between the foremost and hindmost divisions of the army."

2 1 . Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yiieh exceed our own in number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory.

Capt. Calthrop omits J^j[ 3S, teF ^ , and his translation of the remainder is flabby and inaccurate. As Sun Tzu was in the service of the Jj£ Wu State, it has been proposed to read J& instead of ^* — a wholly un- necessary tampering with the text. Yiieh coincided roughly with the present province of Chehkiang. Li Ch'iian very strangely takes ^ not as the proper name, but in the sense of jj^ "to surpass." No other commentator follows him. JJ|f j|£ belongs to the class of expressions like ^ jj£

"distance," - /J> "magnitude," etc., to which the Chinese have to resort

50

22. n. HI

23. ft £ ffij

in order to express abstract ideas of degree. The T'u Shu, however,

omits J|j£ .

I say then that victory can be achieved.

Alas for these brave words ! The long feud between the two states ended in 473 B. C. with the total defeat of Wu by ^J {^ Kou Chien and its incorporation in Yiieh. This was doubtless long after Sun Tzu's death. With his present assertion compare IV. § 4 : ^ fjf ffl jffl ^ "pf jj^ (which is the obviously mistaken reading of the Yu Lan here). Chang Yu is the only one to point out the seeming discrepancy, which he thus goes on to explain: "In the chapter on Tactical Dispositions it is said, 'One may know how to conquer without being able to do it,' whereas here we have the statement that 'victory can be achieved.' The explanation is, that in the former chapter, where the offensive and defensire are under discussion, it is said that if the enemy is fully prepared, one cannot make certain of beating him. But the present passage refers particularly to the soldiers of Yiieh who, according to Sun Tzu's calculations, will be kept in ignorance of the time and place of the impending struggle. That is why he says here that victory can be achieved."

22. Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from fighting.

Capt. Calthrop quite unwarrantably translates : "If the enemy be many in number, prevent him," etc.

Scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of their success.

This is the first of four similarly constructed sentences, all of which present decided difficulties. Chang Yii explains 2$ fl| ^ ^ If as J$ fi ffj- ;£ ^ -^C • This is perhaps the best way of taking the words, though Chia Lin, referring g-j- to ourselves and not the enemy,

offers the alternative of^^^^^ff^^^-tfc "Know beforehand all plans conducive to our success and to the enemy's failure."

y 23. Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity.

Instead of ft , the T'ung Tien, Yii Lan, and also Li Ch'uan's text have ^ , which the latter explains as "the observation of omens," and Chia Lin simply as "watching and waiting." ft is defined by Tu Mu

24.

as Wi t ' and Chang Yu teUs us ^at by noting the joy or anger shown by the enemy on being thus disturbed, we shall be able to conclude whether his policy is to lie low or the reverse. He instances the action of Chu-ko Liang, who sent the scornful present of a woman's head-dress to Ssu-ma I, in order to goad him out of his Fabian tactics.

Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable spots.

Two commentators, Li Ch'uan and Chang Yii, take ^^ ^ in the sense of ^ ~£ "put on specious appearances." The former says: "You may either deceive the enemy by a show of weakness — striking your colours and silencing your drums; or by a show of strength — making a hollow display of camp-fires and regimental banners." And the latter quotes V. 19, where ^ ^ certainly seems to bear this sense. On the other hand, I would point to § 13 of this chapter, where J|J must with equal certainty be active. It is hard to choose between the two inter- pretations, but the context here agrees better, I think, with the one that I have adopted. Another difficulty arises over Tfa ££: ^ Wj> which

most of the commentators, thinking no doubt of the ^ J|Jj in XI. § i, refer to the actual ground on which the enemy is encamped. The notes of Chia Lin and Mei Yao-ch'en, however, seem to favour my view. The same phrase has a somewhat different meaning in I. § 2.

24. Carefully compare the opposing army with your own,

Tu Yu is right, I think, in attributing this force to ^j| : Ts'ao Kung defines it simply as ip" . Capt. Calthrop surpasses himself with the stag- gering translation "Flap the wings" ! Can the Latin cornu (in its figurative sense) have been at the back of his mind?

so that you may know where strength is superabundant and where it is deficient. Cf. IV. § 6.

25. In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain is to conceal them ;

The piquancy of the paradox evaporates in translation. ifljE J^ is perhaps not so much actual invisibility (see supra, § 9) as "showing no sign" of what you mean to do, of the plans that are formed in your brain.

52

so. 5

81 H £ l^W * » £ If

28.

conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the prying of the subtlest spies, from the machinations of the wisest brains.

ft Hj is expanded by Tu Mu into g| ^ |gj fg- '$ ^ |£ Jfc. [For P|] ,see XIII, note on heading.] He explains J# ^jf in like fashion :

^^^it£±^^iti£<flt& "thou§h the enemy may

have clever and capable officers, they will not be able to lay any plans against us."

26. How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy's own tactics - - that is what the multitude cannot comprehend.

All the commentators except Li Ch'iian make ^ refer to the enemy. So Ts'ao Kung: @ $£ ^ ffij lfc Jjf . ^ is defined as jf . The T*u Shu has iS, with the same meaning. ^§ee IV. §13. The Yu Lan reads ^ , evidently a gloss. v3nxi§L

27. All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved. ^/>C^^fy

I. e.t everybody can see superficially how a battle is won; what they cannot see is the long series of plans and combinations which has preceded the battle. It seems justifiable, then, to render the first J^ by "tactics" and the second by "strategy."

28. Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your methods be regulate_dr^y the infinite variet of circumstances. ,

As Wang Hsi sagely remarks: "There is underlying victory, but the tactics (Jf£) which lead up to it are infinite in number." With this compare Col. Henderson; "The rules of strategy are few and simple. They may be learned in a week. They may be taught by familiar illustrations or a dozen diagrams. But such knowledge will no more teach a man to lead an army like Napoleon than a knowledge of grammar will teach him to write like Gibbon."

53

* X 2JBJI ff IH S 1

31. ^ m *& m m m & m n. m

32. i&

33. is

29. Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards.

ff is ^j| jj: ^ Liu Chou-tzu's reading for ^ in the original text.

30. So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is weak.

Like water, taking the line of least resistance.

31. Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which it flows;

The Tung Tien and Yu Lan read ^j|J J& , — the latter also fljlj Jft . The present text is derived from Cheng Yu-hsien.

the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing.

32. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions.

33. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby succeed in winning, rqay be called a heaven-born captain. JT

34. The five elements Water, fire, wood, metal, earth. are not always equally predominant;

That is, as Wang Hsi says: ffi; ;j"|J "^f -jj^ "they predominate alternately."

54

the four seasons make ^ay for each other in turn. Literally, "have no invariabl, seat>>>

There are short days a^ long; the moon has its periods of waning and waxing.

Cf. V. § 6. The purport of the passage js simpiy to illustrate the want of fixity in war by the chang«s constantiy taking place in Nature. The comparison is not very happ.^ however, because the regularity of the phenomena which Sun Tzu mntions is by no means paralleled in war.

VII.

VII. MANOEUVRING.

The commentators, as well as the subsequent text, make it clear that this is the real meaning of j|f ^jj . Thus, Li Ch'iian says that ^ means ^ ^] "marching rapidly to seize an advantage"; Wang Hsisays:

^ ^^M^f M 9A W* "'Striving' means striving for an advan- tage; this being obtained, victory will follow;" and Chang Yii : ppjj jj?

ffi ^j" f75 ^p1 ^J ifc "The two armies face to face, and each striving to obtain a tactical advantage over the other." According to the latter commentator, then, the situation is analogous to that of two wrestlers manoeuvring for a "hold," before coming to actual grips. In any case, we must beware of translating 4JJ1 by the word "fighting" or "battle," as if it were equivalent to |g^ . Capt. Calthrop falls into this mistake.

1 . Sun Tzu said : In war, the general receives his com- mands from the sovereign.

For jB: there is another reading ^ , which Li Ch'uan explains as :&£ Jfj ^ -gjj "being the reverent instrument of Heaven's chastisement."

2. Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend and harmonise the different elements thereof before pitching his camp.

Ts'ao Kung takes ^p as referring to the ;pp p^ or main gate of the

military camp. This, Tu Mu tells us, was formed with a couple of flags

hung across. [Cf. Chou Li, ch. xxvii. fol. 3 r of the Imperial edition :

lit JS^ P^ •] ^fc ffi would then mean "setting up his Jfft ^ opposite

that of the enemy." But Chia Lin's explanation, which has been adopted

56

Jt * 4^ 1^

m

above, is on the whole simpler and better. Chang Yii, while following Ts'ao Kung, adds that the words may also be taken to mean "the establishment of harmony and confidence between the higher and lower ranks before venturing into the field;" and he quotes a saying of Wu Tzu (chap, i ad init.}: "Without harmony in the State, no military ex- pedition can be undertaken; without harmony in the army, no battle array can be formed." In the historical romance j|J J^|j ^|J ||j| , chap.

75, Sun Tzti himself is represented as saying to -^ 8 Wu Yiian: -fc

Jl ff & Z & ± fa ft E '& & It W ft ffi "As a

general rule, those who are waging war should get rid of all domestic troubles before proceeding to attack the external foe." ^ is defined as jj^ . It here conveys the notion of encamping after having taken the field.

3. After that, comes tactical manoeuvring-, than which there is nothing more difficult.

I have departed slightly from the traditional interpretation of Ts'ao Kung, who says: ^^§^^^^^5^11^ "From the time of receiving the sovereign's instructions until our encampment over against the enemy, the tactics to be pursued are most difficult." It seems to me that the jp[ ^- tactics or manoeuvres can hardly be said to begin until the army has sallied forth and encamped, and Ch'en Hao's note gives colour to this view: "For levying, concentrating, harmonising and intrenching an army, there are plenty of old rules which will serve. The real difficulty comes when we engage in tactical operations." Tu Yu also observes that "the great difficulty is to be beforehand with the enemy in seizing favourable positions."

The difficulty of tactical manoeuvring consists in turning the devious into the direct, and misfortune into gain.

jyi x£ 'jjfa ]jf[ is one of those highly condensed and somewhat enig- matical expressions of which Sun Tzu is so fond. This is how it is ex- plained by Ts'ao Kung: ^jaU^S^M^itSifc

"Make it appear that you are a long way off, then cover the distance rapidly and arrive on the scene before your opponent." Tu Mu says: "Hoodwink the enemy, so that he may be remiss and leisurely while you are dashing along with the utmost speed." Ho Shih gives a slightly different turn to the sentence: "Although you may have difficult ground to traverse and natural obstacles to encounter, this is a drawback which

57

can be turned into actual advantage by celerity of movement." Signal examples of this saying are afforded by the two famous passages across the Alps — that of Hannibal, which laid Italy at his mercy, and that of Napoleon two thousand years later, which resulted in the great victory of Marengo.

4. Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after enticing the enemy out of the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach the goal before him, shows knowledge of the artifice of deviation.

Chia Lin understands ^ as the enemy's line of march, thus : "If our adversary's course is really a short one, and we can manage to divert him from it ( ^J ^ ) either by simulating weakness or by holding out some small advantage, we shall be able to beat him in the race for good positions." This is quite a defensible view, though not adopted by any other commentator. ^ of course = jjj|£ , and ^ and ^Q are to be

taken as verbs. Tu Mu cites the famous march of j|& -^ Chao She in 270 B.C. to relieve the town of j|f| Ijjl O-yii, which was closely in- vested by a ^ps; Ch'in army. [It should be noted that the above is the correct pronunciation of ^ ]M , as given in the commentary on the Cfrien Han Shu, ch. 34. Giles' dictionary gives "Yii-yii," and Chavannes, I know not on what authority, prefers to write "Yen-yii." The name is omitted altogether from Playfair's "Cities and Towns."] The King of Chao first consulted j|| ^ Lien P'o on the advisability of attempting a relief, but the latter thought the distance too great, and the intervening country too rugged and difficult. His Majesty then turned to Chao She, who fully admitted the hazardous nature of the march, but finally said : "We shall be like two rats fighting in a hole — and the pluckier one will win !" So he left the capital with his army, but had only gone a distance of 30 // when he stopped and began throwing up intrenchments. For 28 days he continued strengthening his fortifications, and took care that spies should carry 'the intelligence to the enemy. The Ch'in general was overjoyed, and attributed his adversary's tardiness to the fact that the beleaguered city was in the Han State, and thus not actually part of Chao territory. But the spies had no sooner departed than Chao She began a forced march lasting for two days and one night, and arrived on the scene of action with such astonishing rapidity that he was able to occupy a commanding position on the ^ [Jj "North hill" before the enemy

58

5. ffiJC 5. ff 3iS ^

c. § 5 rfii ^ ^

had got wind of his movements. A crushing defeat followed for the Ch'in forces, who were obliged to raise the siege of O-yii in all haste and retreat across the border. [See jjj |g, chap. 81.]

5. Manoeuvring with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined multitude, most dangerous.

I here adopt the reading of the Tung Tien, Cheng Yu-hsien and the T'u Shu, where ^ appears to supply the exact nuance required in order to make sense. The standard text, on the other hand, in which j|F is repeated, seems somewhat pointless. The commentators take it to mean that manoeuvres may be profitable, or they may be dangerous: it all depends on the ability of the general. Capt. Calthrop translates ^ ^ "the wrangles of a multitude" !

6. If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an advantage, the chances are that you will be too late.

The original text has ^jfc instead of J^; but a verb is needed to balance 23§.

On the other hand, to detach a flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage and stores.

^ j|? is evidently unintelligible to the Chinese commentators, who paraphrase the sentence as though it began with pj| ijijg . Absolute tautology in the apodosis can then only be avoided by drawing an im- possibly fine distinction between iSb and ^ . I submit my own rendering without much enthusiasm, being convinced that there is some deep-seated corruption in the text. On the whole, it is clear that Sun Tzu does not approve of a lengthy march being undertaken without supplies. Cf. in- fra, § ii.

7. Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff-coats,

^g; Ep does not mean "to discard one's armour," as Capt. Calthrop translates, but implies on the contrary that it is to be carried with you. Chang Yii says: Jg ^g ^ ^ "This means, in full panoply."

59

9. 3L + ffi m & m M m ± m s

10. = + m ffij ^ ft) iw = » z — M

and make forced marches without halting day or night, covering double the usual distance at a stretch,

The ordinary day's march, according to Tu Mu, was 30 li\ but on one occasion, when pursuing ^|J ^ Liu Pei, Ts'ao Ts'ao is said to have covered the incredible distance of 300 li within twenty-four hours.

doing a hundred li in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of all your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy.

8. The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind, and on this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its destination.

For j|j£ , see II. § 14. The moral is, as Ts'ao Kung and others point out: Don't march a hundred li to gain a tactical advantage, either with or without impedimenta. Manoeuvres of this description should be con- fined to short distances. Stonewall Jackson said: "The hardships of forced marches are often more painful than the dangers of battle." He did not often call upon his troops for extraordinary exertions. It was only when he intended a surprise, or when a rapid retreat was impera- tive, that he sacrificed everything to speed.*

9. If you march fifty li in order to outmanoeuvre the enemy, you will lose the leader of your first division, and only half your force will reach the goal.

jjjjfc is explained as similar in meaning to ^: literally, "the leader of the first division will be torn away." Cf. Tso Chuan, 3| i9th year: >fe IH j^ lit 2J£ "This is a case of [the falling tree] tearing up its roots."

10. If you march thirty li with the same object, two- thirds of your army will arrive.

In the Tung Tien is added: j $ | "From this

we may know the difficulty of manoeuvring."

* See Col. Henderson, op. cit. vol. I. p. 426.

i.i. We may take it then that an army without its baggage-train is lost; without provisions it is lost; without bases of supply it is lost.

5^ j^jji is explained by Tu Yu as ^^ ffi ^ Jj| "fodder and the like;" by Tu Mu and Chang Yii as ^ ^ "goods in general;" and by Wang Hsi as ^ |j|jj j|g j^f %, JB "fuel> salt> foodstuffs, etc." But I think what Sun Tzu meant was "stores accumulated in depots," as distinguished from ifem Jff and S & , the various impedimenta accompanying an army on its march. Cf. Chou Li, ch. xvi. fol. 10: 2J£ A . . . ?£(/ l£r

•

1 2. We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of our neighbours.

j& — -^Q. Li Ch'iian understands it as 'JJH "guard against," which is hardly so good. An original interpretation of ^j? is given by Tu Mu, who says it stands for ^ Ji or ^ fjjrj^ "join in battle."

13. We are not fit to lead an army on the march un- \ less we are familiar with the face of the country — its

^mountains and forests, its pitfalls

Ujjjr, defined as J^j] ^ (Ts'ao Kung) or J^ ^ (Chang Yu). and precipices,

[$H , defined as — • "^ — » ~T^ . its marshes

ja, defined as and swamps. g|, defined as

14. We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we make use of local guides. §§ 12—14 are repeated in chap. XI. § 52.

6i

± M m m

15. In war, practise dissimulation, and you will succeed.

According to Tu Mu, jfc stands for jfc )0. Cf. I. § 18. In the tactics of Turenne, deception of the enemy, especially as to the numerical strength of his troops, took a very prominent position. *

Move only if there is a real advantage to be gained.

This is the interpretation of all the commentators except Wang Hsi, ^ who has the brief note g^ ^ -fy "Entice out the enemy" (by offering him some apparent advantage). /

1 6. Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops,^ must be decided by circumstances.

17. Let your rapidity be that of the wind,

The simile is doubly appropriate, because the wind is not only swift «* but, as Mei Yao-*ch'en points out, 3jt j^ $fc "invisible and leaves no tracks."

your compactness that of the forest.

It is hardly possible to take |jj£ here in its ordinary sense of "sedate," as Tu Yu tries to do. Meng Shih comes nearer the mark in his note ^§ "tr ^H ^f 'fT ?'J "Wnen slowly marching, order and ranks must be preserved" - so as to guard against surprise attacks. But natural forests do not grow in rows, whereas they do generally possess the quality of density or compactness. I think then that Mei Yao-ch'en uses the right adjective in saying #p ^ ^ ^ ^ .

1 8. In raiding and plundering be like fire,

Cf. Shih Ching, IV. 3. iv. 6: fa ^ ^ %\ g|J ^ ft # ^

"Fierce as a blazing fire which no man can check."

in immovability like a mountain.

That is, when holding a position from which the enemy is trying to dislodge you, or perhaps, as Tu Yu says, when he is trying to entice you into a trap.

* For a number of maxims on this head, see "Marshal Turenne" (Longmans, 1907), p. 29.

62

19.

19. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.

The original text has j|| instead of U . Cf. IV. § 7. Tu Yu quotes a saying of T'ai Kung which has passed into a proverb : ^ ^ ^f\ ~fc ^ If ^ 1|) ^f» 2£ IjlC @ "You cannot shut your ears to the thunder or your eyes to the lightning — so rapid are they." Likewise, an attack should be made so quickly that it cannot be parried.

20. When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be divided amongst your men;

The reading of Tu Yu, Chia Lin, and apparently Ts'ao Kung, is ^ |S) ft $$, > wmcn is explained as referring to the subdivision of the army, mentioned in V. §§ i, 2, by means of banners and flags, serving to point out ( ^[ ) to each man the way he should go ( |fj] ). But this is very forced, and the ellipsis is too great, even for Sun Tzu. Luckily, the T'ung Tien and Yu Lan have the variant |j|j , which not only sug- gests the true reading ^pjj, but affords some clue to the way in which the corruption arose. Some early commentator having inserted [6] as the sound of ^|J , the two may afterwards have been read as one character; and this being interchangeable with |pjj, ^p|5 must finally have disap- peared altogether. Meanwhile, ;jjt would have been altered to ^ in order to make sense. As regards ^ ^J , I believe that Ho Shih alone has grasped the real meaning, the other commentators understanding it as "dividing the men into parties'' to search for plunder. Sun Tzu wishes to lessen the abuses of indiscriminate plundering by insisting that all booty shall be thrown into a common stock, which may afterwards be fairly divided amongst all.

when you capture new territory, cut it up into allotments for the benefit of the soldiery.

That this is the meaning, may be gathered from Tu Mu's note : ^i ±*5 *I KIJ # flj ja^f ^ 5£. The H §& gives the same advice: U jfa 3gi £ • )fj5 means "to enlarge" or "extend" — at the expense of the enemy, understood. Cf. Shih Ching, III. i. vii. i: »|^

"hating all the great States." Ch'en Hao also says lg & "quarter your soldiers on the land, and let them sow and plant

63

23. mm

it." It is by acting on this principle, and harvesting the lands they in- vaded, that the Chinese have succeeded in carrying out some of their

most memorable and triumphant expeditions, such as that of Jff ^3 Pan Ch'ao who penetrated to the Caspian, and in more recent years, those of jjig J|£ jfc Fu-k'ang-an and ^ ^ ^ Tso Tsung-t'ang.

2 1 . Ponder and deliberate

Note that both these words, like the Chinese ^ /pH , are really meta- phors derived from the use of scales.

before you make a move.

Chang Yu quotes Jpsf j|§ -^r as saying that we must not break camp until we have gauged the resisting power of the enemy and the clever- ness of the opposing general. Cf. the "seven comparisons" in I. § 13. Capt. Calthrop omits this sentence.

22. He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation.

See supra, §§ 3, 4. Such is the art of manoeuvring.

With these words, the chapter would naturally come to an end. But there now follows a long appendix in the shape of an extract from an earlier book on War, now lost, but apparently extant at the time when Sun Tzu wrote. The style of this fragment is not noticeably different from that of Sun Tzu himself, but no commentator raises a doubt as to its genuineness.

23. The Book of Army Management says:

It is perhaps significant that none of the earlier commentators give us any information about this work. Mei Yao-Ch'en calls it jj? ^ ^ JpL "an ancient military classic," and Wang Hsi, ~^£ jff U "an old book on war." Considering the enormous amount of fighting that had gone on for centuries before Sun Tzu's time between the various kingdoms and principalities of China, it is not in itself improbable that a collection of military maxims should have been made and written downraf some e^r- lier period. V

64

26.

On the field of battle, Implied, though not actually in the Chinese.

the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of gongs and drums.

I have retained the words <£*• gfc of the original text, which recur in the next paragraph, in preference to the other reading j|{? ^f K drums and bells," which is found in the T^ung Tien, Pel Tlang Shu Cfcao and Yu Lan. ^p is a bell with a clapper. See Lun Yu III. 24, Chou Li XXIX. 15, 29. £>• of course would include both gongs and bells of every kind. The T'-u Shu inserts a ^ after each ^jjj .

Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution of banners and flags.

24. Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby the ears and eyes of the host

The original text, followed by the T'-u Shu, has ^ for ||J here and in the next two paragraphs. But, as we have seen, A is generally used in Sun Tzti for the enemy.

may be focussed on one particular point.

Note the use of — • as a verb. Chang Yu says : jjj^ jg J^j 7Jj£ |J|J

§$WH£^£it£i,#B-^^ "If siSht and hearing converge simultaneously on the same object, the evolutions of as many as a million soldiers will be like those of a single man" !

25. The host thus forming a single united body, it is impossible either for the brave to advance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat alone.

Chang Yu quotes a saying: J j & 4

| "Equally guilty are those who advance against orders and those who retreat against orders." Tu Mu tells a story in this con- nection of J^. ^g Wu Ch'i, when he was righting against the Ch'in State. Before the battle had begun, one of his soldiers, a man of matchless daring, sallied forth by himself, captured two heads from the enemy, and

65

27. j&HS PT^^&mi^'tt

returned to camp. Wu Ch'i had the man instantly executed, whereupon an officer ventured to remonstrate, saying : "This man was a good soldier, and ought not to have been beheaded." Wu Ch'i replied: "I fully be- lieve he was a good soldier, but I had him beheaded because he acted without orders."

This is the art of handling large masses of men.

26. In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal- fires and drums, and in fighting by day, of flags and banners, as a means of influencing the ears and eyes of your army.

The Tung Tien has the bad variant ||j for $jj& . With regard to the latter word, I believe I have hit off the right meaning, the whole phrase being slightly elliptical for "influencing the movements of the army through their senses of sight and hearing." Li Ch'iian, Tu Mu and Chia Lin certainly seem to understand it thus. The other commentators, however, take |jj (or J^ ) as the enemy, and ^j& as equivalent to ^|& ~^ or %jj&

Hk "to perplex" or "confound." This does not agree so well with what has gone before, though on the other hand it renders the transition to § 27 less abrupt. The whole question, I think, hinges on the alternative readings ^ and J\^. The latter would almost certainly denote the enemy. Ch'en Hao alludes to ^ -^ JS? L* Kuang-pi's night ride to

W HI? Ho-yang at the head of 500 mounted men; they made such an imposing display with torches, that though the rebel leader ifl JB^ M Shih Ssu-ming had a large army, he did not dare to dispute their pas- sage. [Ch'en Hao gives the date as ^ =j^ ^j^ A.D. 756; but according

to the ffi )!* ||£ New T'ang History, ^|J ^j| 61, it must have been later than this, probably 760.]

27. A whole army may be robbed of its spirit;

"In war," says Chang Yu, "if a spirit of anger can be made to pervade all ranks of an army at one and the same time, its onset will be irresistible. Now the spirit of the enemy's soldiers will be keenest when they have newly arrived on the scene, and it is therefore our cue not to fight at once, but to wait until their ardour and enthusiasm have worn off, and then strike. It is in this way that they may be robbed of their keen spirit." Li Ch'uan and others tell an anecdote (to be found in the Tso Chuan,

5

66

28. 29.

year 10, § i) of Ifj J||j Ts'ao Kuei, & protege of Duke Chuang of Lu. The latter State was attacked by Ch'i, and the Duke was about to join battle at -M J\\ Ch'ang-cho, after the first roll of the enemy's drums, when Ts'ao said: "Not just yet." Only after their drums had beaten for the third time, did he give the word for attack. Then they fought, and the men of Ch'i were utterly defeated. Questioned after- wards by the Duke as to the meaning of his delay, Ts'ao Kuei replied: "In battle, a courageous spirit is everything. Now the first roll of the drum tends to create this spirit, but with the second it is already on the wane, and after the third it is gone altogether. I attacked when their spirit was gone and ours was at its height. Hence our victory." J^. -^ (chap. 4) puts "spirit" first among the "four important influences" in war, and continues: =

— ' .A. x£ §11 HH t^Sl "The value of a whole army — a mighty host of a million men — is dependent on one man alone: such is the influence of spirit!"

a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind. Capt. Calthrop goes woefully astray with "defeat his general's ambition." Chang Yu says: tf $• ft £ ft ± -& -£ ^ £ * '!* % ± J^ Ao* "Presence of mind is the general's most important asset. It is the quality which enables him to discipline disorder and to inspire cour- age into the panic-stricken." The great general d^5 ij{| Li Ching (A.D.

571-649) has a saying: ^^^^lt^S^$S|$ff3

B *)k ^ ?& S ^ £ $3 Oil "Attacking does not merely consist in assaulting walled cities or striking at an army in battle array; it must in- clude the art of assailing the enemy's mental equilibrium." [ ^jjj ^f , pt. 3.]

28. Now a soldier's spirit is keenest in the morning;

Always provided, I suppose, that he has had breakfast. At the battle of the Trebia, the Romans were foolishly allowed to fight fasting, whereas Hannibal's men had breakfasted at their leisure. See Livy, XXI, liv. 8, Iv. i and 8.

by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is bent only on returning to camp.

29. A clever general, therefore,

67

30.

82. M g IE IE z m to * £ ^ 2 it ft 7c? n ^ *

The jjgjjf , which certainly seems to be wanted here, is omitted in the Tu Shu.

avoids an army when its spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to return. This is the art of studying moods.

The Tlung Tien, for reasons of ^ gj|[ "avoidance of personal names

of the reigning dynasty," reads jfjt for £p in this and the two next paragraphs.

30. Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy: - - this is the art of retaining self-possession.

31. To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait at ease

The Tlung Tien has ^ for /^ . The two characters are practically synonymous, but according to the commentary, the latter is the form always used in Sun Tzu.

while the enemy is toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while the enemy is famished: - - this is the art of hus- banding one's strength.

32. To refrain from intercepting

*|£ is the reading of the original text. But the J£ 1jj> |g |j£

quotes the passage with 4§£ yao1 (also meaning "to intercept"), and this is supported by the Pei T'ang Shu Cfrao, the Yu Lan, and Wang Hsi's text.

an enemy whose banners are in perfect order, to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident array:

For this translation of ^ 'jg* , I can appeal to the authority of Tu Mu, who defines the phrase as 3&E ||^ . The other commentators mostly follow Ts'ao Kung, who says -^ , probably meaning "grand and

imposing". Li Ch'iian, however, has ^ Jfr "in subdivisions," which is somewhat strange.

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33. 34.

— this is the art of studying circumstances.

I have not attempted a uniform rendering of the four phrases yj^ ^ , '/p Aj) i */p J] and yjpf ^ » though y|^ really bears the same meaning in each case. It is to be taken, I think, not in the sense of "to govern" or "control," but rather, as K'ang Hsi defines it, = fj|j ^ "to examine and practise," hence "look after," "keep a watchful eye upon." We may find an example of this use in the Chou Li, XVIII. fol. 46 : yj=f fi -fc fljH . Sun Tzti has not told us to control or restrain the quality which he calls ^pj?, but only to observe the time at which it is strongest. As for j(^», it is important to remember that in the present context it can only mean "presence of mind." To speak of "controlling presence of mind" is ab- surd, and Capt. Calthrop's "to have the heart under control" is hardly less so. The whole process recommended here is that of VI. § 2 :

33. It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes downhill.

" " The Yii Lan reads ^fe for -£T .

lr"» 14

34. Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers whose temper is keen.

35. Do not swallow a bait offered by the enemy.

Li Ch'iian and Tu Mu, with extraordinary inability to see a metaphor, take these words quite literally of food and drink that have been poisoned by the enemy. Ch'en Hao and Chang Yii carefully point out that the saying has a wider application. The T'ung Tien reads ^ "to covet" instead of ^ . The similarity of the two characters sufficiently accounts for the mistake.

Do not interfere with an army that is returning home.

The commentators explain this rather singular piece of advice by saying that a man whose heart is set on returning home will fight to the death against any attempt to bar his way, and is therefore too dangerous an opponent to be tackled. Chang Yii quotes the words of Han Hsin:

3& 'S» 3|C §li ^& i 'fcf )9f ^P >nL "Invincikle is the soldier who hath his desire and returneth homewards." A marvellous tale is told of

69

Ts'ao Ts'ao's courage and resource in ch. i of the San Kuo Chih, j|f* *$* $E : *n *9^ A.D., he was besieging EM ||| Chang Hsiu in ;js|| Jang, when :§||J =^j? Liu Piao sent reinforcements with a view to cutting off Ts'ao's retreat. The latter was obliged to draw off his troops, only to find himself hemmed in between two enemies, who were guarding each outlet of a narrow pass in which he had engaged himself. In this des- perate plight Ts'ao waited until nightfall, when he bored a tunnel into the mountain side and laid an ambush in it. Then he marched on with his baggage-train, and when it grew light, Chang Hsiu, finding that the bird had flown, pressed after him in hot pursuit. As soon as the whole army had passed by, the hidden troops fell on its rear, while Ts'ao him- self turned and met his pursuers in front, so that they were thrown into confusion and annihilated. Ts'ao Ts'ao said afterwards: Jjjj- j^ 3f- ^

to check my army in its retreat and brought me to battle in a desperate position: hence I knew how to overcome them."

36. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free.

This does not mean that the enemy is to be allowed to escape. The object, as Tu Mu puts it, is ^ J^j[ J^ ffifr -A> ifllE jj£\ ^ ^ j(^ "to

make him believe that there is a road to safety, and thus prevent his fighting with the courage of despair." Tu Mu adds pleasantly : |Jj fjjj ||< ^ "After that, you may crush him."

Do not press a desperate foe too hard.

For *Q, the T'u Shu reads j[|| "pursue." Ch'en Hao quotes the

saying: ^ |p| j||J ^jj( 1& |p| |J|J [^g "Birds and beasts when brought to bay will use their claws and teeth." Chang Yii says: ||£ ^jjf ^£ ^£j-

^ "if? T^t — ' Hfe fW >F* "Pf *§ IS ?$> "^ y°ur adversary has burned his boats and destroyed his cooking-pots, and is ready to stake all on the issue of a battle, he must not be pushed to extremities." The phrase jj| ^g doubtless originated with Sun Tzti. The /*« Wen Yun Fu gives four examples of its use, the earliest being from the Ch'ien Han Shu^ and I have found another in chap. 34 of the same work. Ho Shih il- lustrates the meaning by a story taken from the life of ^J j|* ^|J Fu Yen-ch'ing in ch. 251 of the -^ jjj . That general, together with his colleague ^jrj^ |J Jg£ Tu Chung-wei, was surrounded by a vastly superior army of Khitans in the year 945 A.D. The country was bare and desert- like, and the little Chinese force was soon in dire straits for want of

;o

37. ft flj :H 2 ft fc

water. The wells they bored ran dry, and the men were reduced to squeezing lumps of mud and sucking out the moisture. Their ranks thinned rapidly, until at last Fu Yen-ch'ing exclained : "We are desperate men. Far better to die for our country than to go with fettered hands into captivity!" A strong gale happened to be blowing from the north- east and darkening the air with dense clouds of sandy dust. Tu Chung- wei was for waiting until this had abated before deciding on a final at- tack; but luckily another officer, ^* ^J* jl Li Shou-cheng by name, was quicker to see an opportunity, and said: "They are many and we are few, but in the midst of this sandstorm our numbers will not be discernible; victory will go to the strenuous fighter, and the wind will be our best ally." Accordingly, Fu Yen-ch'ing made a sudden and wholly unexpected onslaught with his cavalry, routed the barbarians and succeeded in breaking through to safety. [Certain details in the above account have been added from the g ^ 4 , ch. 78.]

37. Such is the art of warfare.

Cheng Yu-hsien in his jjj^ g^ inserts jfp after ^, I take it that these words conclude the extract from the S jffr which began at § 23.

VIII. VARIATION OF TACTICS.

The heading means literally "The Nine Variations," but as Sun Tzu does not appear to enumerate these, and as, indeed, he has already told us (V. §§ 6 — n) that such deflections from the ordinary course are prac- tically innumerable, we have little option but to follow Wang Hsi, who says that "Nine" stands for an indefinitely large number. "All it means is that in warfare ^ jjjfe it $jj& we ought to vary our tactics to the utmost degree ... I do not know what Ts'ao Kung makes these Nine Variations out to be [the latter's note is^^Jg^fij^j1^^ -Jjj^ ], but it has been suggested that they are connected with the Nine Situations" — of chap. XI. This is the view adopted by Chang Yii: see note on ^ ijjj, § 2. The only other alternative is to suppose that something has been lost — a supposition to which the unusual shortness of the chapter lends some weight.

1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his com- mands from the sovereign, collects his army and concentrates his forces.

Repeated from VII. § i, where it is certainly more in place. It may have been interpolated here merely in order to supply a beginning to the chapter.

2. When in difficult country, do not encamp. For explanation of J^J ]fy , see XI. § 8.

In country where high roads intersect, join hands with your allies.

See XI, §§ 6, 12. Capt. Calthrop omits

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Do not linger in dangerously isolated positions.

£& Jjjj is not one of the Nine Situations as given in the beginning of chap. XI, but occurs later on (ibid. § 43, q. v.). We may compare it with jg $fa (XI. § 7). Chang Yii calls it a ^ $g £ ijjj, situated across the frontier, in hostile territory. Li Ch'iian says it is "country in which there are no springs or wells, flocks or herds, vegetables or firewood;" Chia Lin, "one of gorges, chasms and precipices, without a road by which to advance." In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem.

See XI. §§ 9, 14. Capt. Calthrop has "mountainous and wooded country," which is a quite inadequate translation of [j] .

In a desperate position, you must fight.

See XI. §§ 10, 14. Chang Ytt has an important note here, which must be given in full. "From Jg, ijjj fiffi ^ ," he says, "down to this point, the Nine Variations are presented to us. The reason why only five are given is that the subject is treated en precis ( Jjjf; Jt -fc $fa fy ). So in chap. XI, where he discusses the variations of tactics corresponding to the Nine Grounds, Sun Tzu mentions only six variations; there again we have an abridgment. [I cannot understand what Chang Yii means by this statement. He can only be referring to §§ 11—14 or §§ 46 — 50 of chap. XI; but in both places all the nine grounds are discussed. Per- haps he is confusing these with the Six ^Jj J^ of chap. X.] All kinds of ground have corresponding military positions, and also a variation of tactics suitable to each ( j^ jfy ^ <jj£ 7^ $j& ). In chap. XI, what we find enumerated first [§§ 2 — 10] are the situations; afterwards [§§ 1 1 — 14] the corresponding tactics. Now, how can we tell that the "^ J||j& "Nine Variations" are simply the ^ jfy ^ %jj& "variations of tactics corres- ponding to the Nine Grounds"? It is said further on [§ 5] that 'the general who does not understand the nine variations of tactics may be well acquainted with the features of the country, yet he will not be able to turn his knowledge to practical account.' Again, in chap. XI [§ 41] we read : 'The different measures adapted to the nine varieties of ground ( ^L Mfe £ 'HI ) an(^ ^e exPediency of aggressive or defensive tactics must be carefully examined.' From a consideration of these passages the meaning is made clear. When later on the nine grounds are enumerated, Sun Tzu recurs to these nine variations. He wishes here to speak of the Five Advantages [see infra, § 6], so he begins by setting forth the Nine Variations. These are inseparably connected in practice, and therefore they are dealt with together." The weak point of this argument is the suggestion that 3£ IJJ "five things" can stand as a - , that is, an

73

abstract or abridgment, of nine, when those that are omitted are not less important than those that appear, and when one of the latter is not in- cluded amongst the nine at all.

3. There are roads which must not be followed,

"Especially those leading through narrow defiles," says Li Ch'iian, "where an ambush is to be feared."

armies which must not be attacked,

More correctly, perhaps, "there are times when an army must not be attacked." Ch'en Hao says: "When you see your way to obtain a trivial advantage, but are powerless to inflict a real defeat, refrain from attacking, for fear of overtaxing your men's strength."

towns

Capt. Calthrop says "castles" — an unfortunate attempt to introduce local colour.

which must not be besieged,

Cf. III. § 4. Ts'ao Kung gives an interesting illustration from his own experience. When invading the territory of ^ yft Hsu-chou, he ignored the city of jSE Jjjj? Hua-pi, which lay directly in his path, and pressed on into the heart of the country. This excellent strategy was rewarded by the subsequent capture of no fewer than fourteen important district cities. Chang Yu says: "No town should be attacked which, if taken, cannot be held, or if left alone, will not cause any trouble " ^j jj£ Hsiin Ying, when urged to attack >fg Kjl? Pi-yang, replied: "The city is small and well-fortified; even if I succeed in taking it, 't will be no great feat of arms ; whereas if I fail, I shall make myself a laughing-stock." In the seventeenth century, sieges still formed a large proportion of war. It was Turenne who directed attention to the importance of marches, countermarches and manoeuvres. He said: "It is a great mistake to waste men in taking a town when the same expenditure of soldiers will gain a province." *

positions which must not be contested, commands of the sovereign which must not be obeyed.

This is a hard saying for the Chinese, with their reverence for au- thority, and Wei Liao Tzu (quoted by Tu Mu) is moved to exclaim:

* "Marshal Turenne," p. 50.

74

5. # ^ m t$ % -I £ m % m & MU ye ^ mn ZM^

6- '/£ ^ ^ 531 #,•£& £ * SI 2fl 3E. fU ^ .H ft A

. "Weapons

are baleful instruments, strife is antagonistic to virtue, a military com- mander is the negation of civil order !" The unpalatable fact remains, however, that even Imperial wishes must be subordinated to military necessity. Cf. III. § 17. (5), X. § 23. The Tung Tien has $f ^£ 1|[ before ^& ^ , etc. This is a gloss on the, words by Chu-ko Liang, which being repeated by Tu Yu became incorporated with the text. Chang Yii thinks that these five precepts are the 3JL ?PJ referred to in §6. Another theory is that the mysterious ~j\^ %jj& are here enumerated, starting with

and endin§ at *tb W j^r ^ ^ ' while the final clause

embraces and as it were sums up all the nine. Thus Ho Shih says : "Even if it be your sovereign's command to encamp in diffi- cult country, linger in isolated positions, etc., you must not do so." The theory is perhaps a little too ingenious to be accepted with confidence.

4. The general Ivho thoroughly understands the advan- tages that accompany variation of tactics knows how to handle his troops.

Before 7J;|J in the original text there is a ^|j which is obviously not required.

5. The general who does not understand these, may be well acquainted with the configuration of the country, yet he will not be able to turn his knowledge to practical account.

Literally, "get the advantage of the ground," which means not only securing good positions, but availing oneself of natural advantages in every possible way. Chang Yii says : "Every kind of ground is characterised by certain natural features, and also gives scope for a certain variability of plan. How is it possible to turn these natural features to account unless topographical knowledge is supplemented by versatility of mind?"

6. So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of varying his plans, even though he be acquainted with the Five Advantages, will fail to make the best use of his men.

75

M J-ftflfr

Ts<ao Kung says that the 3£ ^|J are ~^C 3£ |Jj ^ "the five things that follow;" but this cannot be right. We must rather look back to the five "variations" contained in § 3. Chia Lin (who reads jfc ^|j& here to balance the 5t %\\ ) te^s us tnat these imply five obvious and generally advantageous lines of action, namely : "if a certain road is short, it must be followed; if an army is isolated, it must be attacked; if a town is in a parlous condition, it must be besieged; if a position can be stormed, it must be attempted ; and if consistent with military operations, the ruler's commands must be obeyed." But there are circumstances which some- times forbid a general to use these advantages. For instance, "a certain road may be the shortest way for him, but if he knows that it abounds in natural obstacles, or that the enemy has laid an ambush on it, he will not follow that road. A hostile force may be open to attack, but if he knows that it is hard-pressed and likely to fight with desperation, he will refrain from striking," and so on. Here the *|& comes in to modify the ^|J , and hence we see the uselessness of knowing the one without the other — of having an eye for weaknesses in the enemy's armour without being clever enough to recast one's plans on the spur of the mo- ment. Capt. Calthrop offers this slovenly translation : "In the manage- ment of armies, if the art of the Nine Changes be understood [stf\, a knowledge of the Five Advantages is of no avail."

7. Hence in the wise leader's plans, considerations of advantage and of disadvantage will be blended together.

"Whether in an advantageous position or a disadvantageous one," says Ts'ao Kung, "the opposite state should be always present to your mind."

8. If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, we may succeed in accomplishing the essential part of our schemes.

>j=| , according to Tu Mu, is equivalent to ^ , and %jfc Tfj" ^ -j^

is paraphrased by Chang Yii as "jjj* J£j[ ^jp £ ^£ lf£ • Tu Mu Soes on to say: "If we wish to wrest an advantage from the enemy, we must not fix our minds on that alone, but allow for the possibility of the enemy also doing some harm to us, and let this enter as a factor into our cal- culations."

9. If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we

76

are always ready to seize an advantage, we may extricate ourselves from misfortune.

A translator cannot emulate the conciseness of J^ "to blend [thoughts of advantage] with disadvantage," but the meaning is as given. Tu Mu says : "If I wish to extricate myself from a dangerous position, I must consider not only the enemy's ability to injure me, but also my own ability to gain an advantage over the enemy. If in my counsels these two considerations are properly blended, I shall succeed in liberating myself. . . For instance, if I am surrounded by the enemy and only think of effecting an escape, the nervelessness of my policy will incite my ad- versary to pursue and crush me; it would be far better to encourage my men to deliver a bold counter-attack, and use the advantage thus gained to free myself from the enemy's toils." See the story of Ts'ao Ts'ao, VII. § 35, note. In his first edition, Capt. Calthrop translated §§ 7 — 9 as follows: "The wise man perceives clearly wherein lies advantage and disadvantage. While recognising an opportunity, he does not overlook the risks, and saves future anxiety." This has now been altered into: "The wise man considers well both advantage and disadvantage. He sees a way out of adversity, and on the day of victory to danger is not blind" Owing to a needless inversion of the Chinese, the words which I have italicised are evidently intended to represent § 8 !

10. Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them;

Chia Lin enumerates several ways of inflicting this injury, some of which would only occur to the Oriental mind: — "Entice away the enemy's best and wisest men, so that he may be left without counsellors. Introduce traitors into his country, that the government policy may be rendered futile. Foment intrigue and deceit, and thus sow dissension between the ruler and his ministers. By means of every artful contri- vance, cause deterioration amongst his men and waste of his treasure. Corrupt his morals by insidious gifts leading him into excess. Disturb and unsettle his mind by presenting him with lovely women." Chang Yu (after Wang Hsi) considers the ^ to be military chastisement: "Get the enemy," he says, "into a position where he must suffer injury, and he will submit of his own accord." Capt. Calthrop twists Sun Tzu's words into an absurdly barbarous precept: "In reducing an enemy to submis- sion, inflict all possible damage upon him."

make trouble for them,

UH is defined by Ts'ao Kung as it}. , and his definition is generally

77

adopted by the commentators. Tu Mu, however, seems to take it in the sense of "possessions," or, as we might say, "assets," which he considers

to be ^ JK H W A 3® ^ ff "a larSe army' a rich exchequer, harmony amongst the soldiers, punctual fulfilment of commands." These give us a whip-hand over the enemy.

and keep them constantly engaged;

^, literally, "make servants of them." Tu Yu says ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ "prevent them from having any rest."

hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to any given point.

Meng Shih's note contains an excellent example of the idiomatic use of *|& : "^ T^J %jj& pjj JJ g|? "cause them to forget pien (the reasons for acting otherwise than on their first impulse), and hasten in our direction."

1 1 . The art of war teaches us to rely not on the like- lihood of the enemy's not coming, but on our own readi- ness to receive him;

The Tung Tien and Yu Lan read ^ || 0 ^ ^ ifc » but the

conciser form is more likely to be right.

not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable.

The Tung Tien and Yu Lan insert 3£ -^ after the first ]^£ , and omit # Jft ,

1 2 . There are five dangerous faults which may affect a general: (i) Recklessness, which leads to destruction;

_p| fjfjj ffiE j|T% "Bravery without forethought," as Ts'ao Kung analyses it, which causes a man to fight blindly and desperately like a mad bull. Such an opponent, says Chang Yii, "must not be encountered with brute force, but may be lured into an ambush and slain." Cf. Wu Tzti, chap. IV

<^ Mt, ji A

78

"In estimating the character of a general, men are wont to pay exclusive attention to his courage, forgetting that courage is only one out of many qualities which a general should possess. The merely brave man is prone to fight recklessly; and he who fights recklessly, without any perception of what is expedient, must be condemned." Ssu-ma Fa, too, makes the incisive remark _t ^ >5 ^ "Simply going to one's death does not bring about victory."

(2) cowardice, which leads to capture-

' Jj£> 0^ is explained by Ts'ao Kung of the man "whom timidity pre- vents from advancing to seize an advantage," and Wang Hsi adds, "who is quick to flee at the sight of danger." Meng Shih gives the closer paraphrase ^ jjfc £|r ^ "he who is bent on returning alive," that is, the man who will never take a risk. But, as Sun Tzti knew, nothing is to be achieved in war unless you are willing to take risks. T'ai Kung said: -fc %\] ^ fl^f ^ §g S $& "He who lets an advantage slip will subsequently bring upon himself real disaster." In 404 A.D., Jjjj\ ^t Liu Yii pursued the rebel ^g "& Huan Hsiian up the Yangtsze and fought a naval battle with him at |Jj|J. |]||| ty\\ the island of Ch'eng- hung. The loyal troops numbered only a few thousands, while their op- ponents were in great force. But Huan Hsuan, fearing the fate which was in store for him should he be overcome, had a light boat made fast to the side of his war-junk, so that he might escape, if necessary, at a moment's notice. The natural result was that the fighting spirit of his soldiers was utterly quenched, and when the loyalists made an attack from windward with fireships, all striving with the utmost ardour to be first in the fray, Huan Hsuan's forces were routed, had to burn all their baggage and fled for two days and nights without stopping. [See ^|p jfe

chap. 99, fol. 13.] Chang Yii tells a somewhat similar story of ^ ffl 7Jjf> Chao Ying-ch'i, a general of the Chin State who during a battle with the army of Ch'u in 597 B.C. had a boat kept in readiness for him on the river, wishing in case of defeat to be the first to get across.

(3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults ;

I fail to see the meaning of Capt. Calthrop's "which brings insult." Tu Mu tells us that $|c j| Yao Hsiang, when opposed in 357 A.D. by ^ Jg Huang Mei, ^ =fe Teng Ch'iang and others, shut himself up behind his walls and refused to fight. Teng Ch'iang said: "Our adver- sary is of a choleric temper and easily provoked; let us make constant sallies and break down his walls, then he will grow angry and come out.

79

Once we can bring his force to battle, it is doomed to be our prey." This plan was acted upon, Yao Hsiang came out to fight, was lured on as far as ^ j§* San-yuan by the enemy's pretended flight, and finally attacked and slain.

(4) a delicacy of honour which is sensitive to shame ;

This need not be taken to mean that a sense of honour is really a defect in a general. What Sun Tzti condemns is rather an exaggerated sensitiveness to slanderous reports, the thin-skinned man who is stung by opprobrium, however undeserved. Mei Yao-ch'en truly observes, though somewhat paradoxically: ^j|J ^^ ~jf\ |p| "The seeker after glory should be careless of public opinion."

(5) over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to Worry and trouble.

Here again, Sun Tzu does not mean that the general is to be careless of the welfare of his troops. All he wishes to emphasise is the danger of sacrificing any important military advantage to the immediate comfort of his men. This is a shortsighted policy, because in the long run the troops will suffer more from the defeat, or, at best, the prolongation of the war, which will be the consequence. A mistaken feeling of pity will often induce a general to relieve a beleaguered city, or to reinforce a hard-pressed detachment, contrary to his military instincts. It is now generally admitted that our repeated efforts to relieve Ladysmith in the South African War were so many strategical blunders which defeated their own purpose. And in the end, relief came through 'the very man who started out with the distinct resolve no longer to subordinate the interests of the whole to sentiment in favour of a part. An old soldier of one of our generals who failed most conspicuously in this war, tried once, I remember, to defend him to me on the ground that he was always "so good to his men." By this plea, had he but known it, he was only condemning him out of Sun Tzti's mouth.

13. These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous to the conduct of war.

14. When an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the cause will surely be found among these five dangerous faults. Let them be a subject of meditation.

IX. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH.

The contents of this interesting chapter are better indicated in § i than by this heading.

i . Sun Tzu said : We come now to the question of encamping the army, and observing signs of the enemy.

The discussion of j|| jl? , as Chang Yii points out, extends from here down to ^ ^ £ #f IK & ifc <SS i-'7), and ^| $j£ from that point down to jj£\ ^jjjjl &j£ ^ (§§ 18 — 39). The rest of the chapter consists of a few desultory remarks, chiefly on the subject of discipline.

Pass quickly over mountains,

For this use of jjfa, cf. infra, § 3. See also ^fjj* -^ , ch. i. fol. 2 (standard edition of 1876): $jjfc fa JjjJ*; Shih Chi, ch. 27 ad init.:

and keep in the neighbourhood of valleys.

Tu Mu says that ^ here = jj£. The idea is, not to linger among barren uplands, but to keep close to supplies of water and grass. Capt. Calthrop translates "camp in valleys," heedless of the very next sentence. Cf. Wu Tzu, ch. 3 : ^ |£ ^ |g "Abide not in natural ovens," /. e. ^ ^ ^ IH "the openings of large valleys." Chang Yii tells the fol- lowing anecdote : " j£ |j|$ ^g Wu-tu Ch'iang was a robber captain in the time of the Later Han, and Jj| ^ Ma Yuan was sent to exterminate his gang. Ch'iang having found a refuge in the hills, Ma Yuan made no attempt to force a battle, but seized all the favourable positions com- manding supplies of water and forage. Ch'iang was soon in such a desperate plight for want of provisions that he was forced to make a total surrender. He did not know the advantage of keeping in the neighbour- hood of valleys." •

8i

2

2. Camp in high places,

Not on high hills, but on knolls or hillocks elevated above the sur- rounding country.

facing the sun.

jjjj^ £[::=: |fj [j|^ . Tu Mu takes this to mean "facing south," and Ch'en Hao "facing east." Cf. infra, §§ n, 13.

Do not climb heights in order to fight.

^jg is here simply equivalent to "jf|f . The T'ung Tien and Yu Lan read |J£ . So much for mountain warfare.

After [Jj , the Tung Tien and Yu Lan insert ^ .

3. After crossing a river, you should get far away from it.

"In order to tempt the enemy to cross after you," according to Ts'ao Kung, and also, says Chang Yu, "in order not to be impeded in your evolutions." The Tung Tien reads j|£ ^ %jb -fa "lf the enemy crosses a river," etc. But in view of the next sentence, this is almost certainly an interpolation.

4. When an invading force crosses a river in its on- ward march, do not advance to meet it in mid-stream. It will be best to let half the army get across, and then deliver your attack.

The T'ung Tien and Yu Lan read Jg for ^ , without change of meaning. Wu Tzu plagiarises this passage twice over: — ch. II ad fin.,

• Li

Ch'iian alludes to the great victory won by Han Hsin over ^|[ fl Lung Chu at the yjj^ Wei River. Turning to the Ch'ien Han Shu, ch. 34, fol. 6 verso, we find the battle described as follows: "The two armies were drawn up on opposite sides of the river. In the night, Han Hsin ordered his men to take some ten thousand sacks filled with sand and construct a dam a little higher up. Then, leading half his army across, he at-

6

82

. ft fcJMR ftJl it M ft ft

tacked Lung CM; but after a time,, pretending to have failed in his attempt, he hastily withdrew to the other bank. Lung Chu was much elated by this unlooked-for success, and exclaiming : "I felt sure that Han Hsin was really a coward!" he pursued him and began crossing the river in his turn. Han Hsin now sent a party to cut open the sandbags, thus releasing a great volume of water, which swept down and prevented the greater portion of Lung Chii's army from getting across. He then turned upon the force which had been cut off, and annihilated it, Lung Chu himself being amongst the slain. The rest of the army, on the further bank, also scattered and fled in all directions."

5. If you are anxious to fight, you should not go to meet the invader near a river which he has to cross.

For fear of preventing his crossing. Capt. Calthrop makes the injunction ridiculous by omitting

6. Moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing the sun.

See supra, § 2. The repetition of these words in connection with water is very awkward. Chang Yii has the note : al/ S ;J| "1SJ (fifi p£ -^C

* ^^ /i xyy_ X*"ft tsSj\. *^?^4 /+

-t i0 f} if ^1 M i| fffi Jt ft "Said either of tro°Ps marshalled on the river-bank, or of boats anchored in the stream itself; in either case it is essential to be higher than the enemy and facing the sun." The other commentators are not at all explicit. One is much tempted to reject their explanation of jjjj^ /Jl altogether, and understand it simply

as "seeking safety.'' [Cf. Jjfc B£ in VIII. § 12, and infra, §9.] It is true

that this involves taking jjjj^ in an unusual, though not, I think, an im- possible sense. Of course the earlier passage would then have to be translated in like manner.

Do not move up-stream to meet the enemy.

Tu Mu says: "As water flows downwards, we must not pitch our camp on the lower reaches of a river, for fear the enemy should open the sluices and sweep us away in a flood. This is implied above in the words J|jj^ ^ ||J jfyj . Chu-ko Wu-hou has remarked that 'in river warfare we must not advance against the stream,' which is as much as to say that our fleet must not be anchored below that of the enemy, for then they would be able to take advantage of the current and make short work of us." There is also the danger, noted by other commentators,

83

that the enemy may throw poison on the water to be carried down to us. Capt. Calthrop's first version was: "Do not cross rivers in the face of the stream" — a sapient piece of advice, which made one curious to know what the correct way of crossing rivers might be. He has now improved this into: "Do not fight when the enemy is between the army and the source of the river."

So much for river warfare.

7. In crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern should be to get over them quickly, without any delay.

Because of the lack of fresh water, the poor quality of the herbage, and last but not least, because they are low, flat, and exposed to attack.

8. If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should have water and grass near you, and get your back to a clump of trees.

Li Ch'uan remarks that the ground is less likely to be treacherous where there are trees, while Tu Yu says that they will serve to protect the rear. Capt. Calthrop, with a perfect genius for going wrong, says "in the neighbourhood of a marsh." For ^k the Tlung Tien and Ytt Lan wrongly read ^|J , and the latter also has ^g instead of ^* .

So much for operations in salt-marshes. .1

9. In dry, level country, take up an easily accessible position

This is doubtless the force of Jjj^j , its opposite being |^ . Thus, Tu

Mu explains it as -JJ3 ^ ^f i$8 ^ |fl "ground that is smooth and firm," and therefore adapted for cavalry; Chang Ytt as ;JfJ ^ fit J^£ Rl ^ ilk "level ground, free from depressions and hollows." He adds later on that although Sun Tzu is discussing flat country, there will never- theless be slight elevations and hillocks.

with rising ground to your right and on your rear,

84

io. Jl ift P9 W £ 5

11. ii it sx9 •3E4Ht 9 • it

12. # £ ffi £ » m n w ^ *n # 0

The Yii Lan again reads ^ for ^ . Tu Mu quotes T'ai Kung as saying : "An army should have a stream or a marsh on its left, and a hill or tumulus on its right."

so that the danger may be in front, and safety lie behind. Wang Hsi thinks that ^ ^ contradicts the saying jjj^ £j: in § 2, and therefore suspects a mistake in the text.

So much for campaigning in flat country.

10. These are the four useful branches of military knowledge

Those, namely, concerned with (i) mountains, (2) rivers, (3) marshes, and (4) plains. Compare Napoleon's "Military Maxims," no. i.

which enabled the Yellow Emperor to vanquish four several sovereigns.

Mei Yao-ch'en asks, with some plausibility, whether »jjj» is not a mistake for jpT "armies," as nothing is known of Huang Ti having conquered four other Emperors. The Shih Chi (ch. I ad init.) speaks only of his victories over jj£ *jjj* Yen Ti and j^ -fa Ch'ih Yu. In the ^ |?g it is mentioned that he "fought seventy battles and pacified the Empire." Ts'ao Kung's explanation is, that the Yellow Emperor was the first to institute the feudal system of vassal princes, each of whom (to the number of four) originally bore the title of Emperor. Li Chfcian tells us that the art of war originated under Huang Ti, who received it from his Minister M, J5f Feng Hou.

1 1 . All armies prefer high ground to low,

"High ground," says Mei Yao-ch'en, "is not only more agreeable and salubrious, but more convenient from a military point of view; low ground is not only damp and unhealthy, but also disadvantageous for fighting." The original text and the Tlu Shu have ^jp instead of Jal .

and sunny places to dark.

12. If you are careful of your men,

Ts'ao Kung says: [fi] fc ^ ~pf $ >$ ^ ^ "Make for fresh water and pasture, where you can turn out your animals to graze." And

85

the other commentators follow him, apparently taking ^^ as = ffi . Cf. Mencius, V. i. ix. i, where ^jji ffi ^- means a cattle-keeper. But here ^ £jr surely has reference to the health of the troops. It is the title of Chuang Tzii's third chapter, where it denotes moral rather than physical well-being.

and camp on hard ground,

jj must mean dry and solid, as opposed to damp and marshy, ground. This is to be found as a rule in high places, so the commentators explain jj as practically equivalent to "Jj|j .

the army will be free from disease of every kind,

Chang Yii says: "The dryness of the climate will prevent the outbreak of illness."

and this will spell victory.

13. When you come to a hill or a bank, occupy the sunny side, with the slope on your right rear. Thus you will at once act for the benefit of your soldiers and utilise the natural advantages of the ground.

14. When, in consequence of heavy rains up-country, a river which you wish to ford is swollen and flecked with foam, you must wait until it subsides.

The T'ung Tien and Ya Lan have a superfluous ~~J\ before fc .

15. Country in which there are precipitous cliffs with torrents running between,

% ffi , explained by Mei Yao-ch'en as^^l^l^^C^^^I. deep natural hollows,

^ # , explained as |3J @J ^ ^ ffl l£ #f Hf V^ces enclosed on every side by steep banks, with pools of water at the bottom."

confined places,

86

^ 5}5 "natural pens or prisons," explained as ^£ jgj J|| ^g ^

^A HE HJ "Places surrounded by precipices on three sides — easy to get into, but hard to get out of." tangled thickets,

^ |f, explained as ^ ^ ^ ^ |f |g ^ |g "places covered with such dense undergrowth that spears cannot be used."

quagmires

^ jig, explained as ^ "pfflffig $. ^ ^ M "low-lying places, so heavy with mud as to be impassible for chariots and horsemen."

and crevasses,

^ |$$ is explained by MeiYao-ch^n as ^ tH ffi [6) ^ ^ jfc ^

"a narrow difficult way between beetling cliffs," but Ts'ao Kung says

UJ $1 it *H[ ilb ^ ft E K ^ ii: 3t ^. which seems to

denote something on a much smaller scale. Tu Mu's note is j^ ^ j(S ^HL ^t R§ ^k 5 "Sroun(^ covered with trees and rocks, and inter- sected by numerous ravines and pitfalls." This is very vague, but Chia Lin explains it clearly enough as a defile or narrow pass : ppjj ^ [J^ ^ ~f& $5 "M ff5 St S' anc^ Chang Yii takes much the same view. On the whole, the weight of the commentators certainly inclines to the rendering "defile". But the ordinary meaning of [J§ (a crack or fissure) and the fact that <^U Jfljj above must be something in the nature of a defile, make me think that Sun Tzu is here speaking of crevasses. The Tung Tien and Yil Lan read J|$ for |Jj^, with the same meaning; the latter also has -^ ^ after ^ J|J — a palpable gloss. should be left with all possible speed and not approached 1 6. While we keep away from such places, we should get the enemy to approach them; while we face them, we should let the enemy have them on his rear.

17. If in ,the neighbourhood of your camp

The original text has jg Jfj , but ^ has been generally adopted as yielding much better sense.

87

is. at a B5 » # it s wrto

there should be any hilly country,

|J& Iffi is £|$ -^ 2, *&» according to Chang Yu, ponds surrounded by aquatic grass, hollow basins filled with reeds,

The original text omits 3JJL and £fc, so that ^ and ^ join to make a pair: "ponds and basins." This is plausible enough at first sight, but there are several objections to the reading: (r) 3JL is unlikely to have got into the text as a gloss on ^; (2) it is easy to suppose, on the other

hand, that 3j£. and afterwards tk (to restore the balance of the sentence)

" VM* i I

were omitted by a copyist who jumped to the conclusion that gi| and ^p must go together; (3) the sense, when one comes to consider it, actually requires ^J, for it is absurd to talk of pools and ponds as in themselres suitable places for an ambush; (4) Li Ching (571 — 649 A. D.) in his -E j£ "Art of War" has the words: |f $| !g % glj # ^ g -ft . This is evidently a rerniniscence of Sun Tzti, so there can be little doubt that ^j§ stood in the text at this early date. It may be added that the T'-ung Tien and Yu Lan both have $&, and the latter also reads :yj± for #..

or woods with thick undergrowth,

I read /\\ ^ with tne Yii Lan in preference to [Jj ^JC, given in the original text, which is accepted by the commentators without question. The text of the T(u Shu up to this point runs as follows: fr

they must be carefully routed out and searched; for these are places where men in ambush or insidious spies are likely to be lurking.

The original text omits |j^, which has been restorecj from the T~ung Tien and Yii Lan. The T'u Shu omits ||£ as well, making " a sub-

stantive. On Chang Yu has the note:

on our guard against traitors who may lie in close covert, secretly spying out our weaknesses and overhearing our instructions. Fu and chien are to be taken separately."

1 8. When the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet, he is relying on the natural strength of his position.

88

19. a us & a * # A 2 at tfe

». £ ft £ * 4 * ft

Here begin Sun Tzu's remarks on the reading of signs, much of which is so good that it could almost be included in a modern manual like Gen. Baden-Powell's "Aids to Scouting."

19. When he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle, he is anxious for the other side to advance.

Probably because we are in a strong position from which he wishes to dislodge us. "If he came close up to us," says Tu Mu, "and tried to force a battle, he would seem to despise us, and there would be less probability of our responding to the challenge."

20. If his place of encampment is easy of access, he is tendering a bait.

Sj is here the opposite of |Jj|r in § 18. The reading of the T^ung Tien and Yil Lan, 3t ffi $j. % fg $ %\] ifc , is pretty obviously corrupt. The original text, which transposes ^ and 5§", niay very pos- sibly be right. Tu Mu tells us that there is yet another reading :

2 1 . Movement amongst the trees of a forest shows that the enemy is advancing.

Ts'ao Kung explains this as "felling trees to clear a passage," and Chang Yii says: "Every army sends out scouts to climb high places and observe the enemy. If a scout sees that the trees of a forest are moving and shaking, he may know that they are being cut down to clear a pas- sage for the enemy's march."

The appearance of a number of screens in the midst of thick grass means that the enemy wants to make us suspicious.

Whenever the meaning of a passage happens to be somewhat elusive, Capt. Calthrop seems to consider himself justified in giving free rein to the imagination. Thus, though his text is here identical with ours, he renders the above : "Broken branches and trodden grass, as of the passing of a large host, must be regarded with suspicion." Tu Yu's explanation, borrowed from Ts'ao Kung, is as follows : "The presence of a number of screens or sheds in the midst of thick vegetation is a sure sign that the enemy has fled and, fearing pursuit, has constructed these hiding-places

89

22-

23.

in order to make u's suspect an ambush." It appears that these "screens" were hastily knotted together out of any long grass which the retreating enemy happened to come across.

22. The rising of birds in their flight is the sign of an ambuscade.

Chang Yii's explanation is doubtless right: "When birds that are flying along in a straight line suddenly shoot upwards, it means that soldiers are in ambush at the spot beneath."

Startled beasts indicate that a sudden attack is coming.

An example of JJ fou* in the meaning of "ambuscade" may be found in the Tso Chuan, |g 9th year: 3jg* ^ =£ g[ J£j[ ffi ^ . In the

present passage, however, it is to be distinguished from -^ just above, in that it implies onward motion on the part of the attacking force. Thus, Li Ch'iian defines it as ^ jj; ffp jg , and Tu Mu as ^ t|j ^ ^ .

23. When there is dust rising in a high column, it is the sign of chariots advancing; when the dust is low, but spread over a wide area, it betokens the approach of infantry.

ft f?5 IPt "high and sharp," or rising to a peak, is of course some- what exaggerated as applied to dust. The commentators explain the phenomenon by saying that horses and chariots, being heavier than men, raise more dust, and also follow one another in the same wheel-track, whereas foot-soldiers would be marching in ranks, many abreast. According to Chang Yii, "every army on the march must have scouts ( $fc ^ffc ^ ^ ) some way in advance, who on sighting dust raised by the enemy, will gallop back and report it to the commander-in-chief." Cf. Gen. Baden- Powell: "As you move along, say, in a hostile country, your eyes should be looking afar for the enemy or any signs of him : figures, dust rising, birds getting up, glitter of arms, etc." *

When it branches out in different directions, it shows that parties have been sent to collect firewood.

There is some doubt about the reading jffij. J^jJ . The T'ung Tien and Yil Lan have , and Li Ch'iian proposes

* "Aids to Scouting," p. 26.

go

A few clouds of dust moving to and fro signify that the army is encamping.

Chang Yii says: "In apportioning the defences for a cantonment, light horse will be sent out to survey the position and ascertain the weak and strong points all along its circumference. Hence the small quantity of dust and its motion*"

24. Humble words and increased preparations are signs that the enemy is about to advance.

"As though they stood in great fear of us," says Tu Mu. "Their ob- ject is- to make us contemptuous and careless, after which they will attack us." Chang Yu alludes to the story of gj j|[ T'ien Tan of the Ch'i State, who in 279 B.C. was hard-pressed in his defence of [|p ||§ Chi- mo against the Yen forces, led by jjjj^ 5J^f Ch'i Chieh. In ch. 82 of the Shih Chi we read: "T'ien Tan openly said: 'My only fear is that the Yen army may cut off the noses of their Ch'i prisoners and place them in the "front rank to fight against us; that would be the undoing of our city.' The other side being informed of this speech, at once acted on the suggestion; but those within the city were enraged at seeing their fellow-countrymen thus mutilated, and fearing only lest they should fall into the enemy's hands, were nerved to defend themselves more obstinately than ever. Once again T'ien Tan sent back converted spies who reported. these words to the enemy: 'What I dread most is that the men of Yen may dig up the ancestral tombs outside the town, and by inflicting this indignity on our forefathers cause us to become faint-hearted.' Forthwith the besiegers dug up all the graves and burned the corpses lying in them. And the inhabitants of Chi-mo, witnessing the outrage from the city-walls, wept passionately and were all impatient to go out and fight, their fury being increased tenfold. T'ien Tan knew then that his soldiers were ready for any enterprise. But instead of a sword, he himself took a mat- tock in his hands, and ordered others to be distributed amongst his best warriors, while the ranks were filled up with their wives and concubines. He then served out all the remaining rations and bade his men eat their fill. The regular soldiers were told to keep out of sight, and the walls were manned with the old and weaker men and with women. This done, envoys were despatched to the enemy's camp to arrange terms of surrender, whereupon the Yen army began shouting for joy. T'ien Tan also collected 20,000 ounces of silver from the people, and got the wealthy citizens of Chi-mo to send it to the Yen general with the prayer that, when the town capitulated, he would not allow their homes to be plundered or their women to be maltreated. Ch'i Chieh, in high good humour, granted their prayer; but his army now became increasingly slack and

9'

26. Jfi5

careless. Meanwhile, T'ien Tan got together a thousand oxen, decked them with pieces of red silk, painted their bodies, dragon-like, with coloured stripes, and fastened sharp blades on their horns and well-greased rushes on their tails. When night came on, he lighted the ends of the rushes, and drove the oxen through a number of holes which he had pierced in the walls, backing them up with a force of 5000 picked warriors. The animals, maddened with pain, dashed furiously into the enemy's camp where they caused the utmost confusion and dismay; for their tails acted as torches, showing up the hideous pattern on their bodies, and the weapons on their horns killed or wounded any with whom they came into contact. In the meantime, the band of 5000 had crept up with gags in their mouths, and now threw themselves on the enemy. At the same moment a frightful din arose in the city itself, all those that remained behind making as much noise as possible by banging drums and hammering on bronze vessels, until heaven and earth were convulsed by the uproar. Terror-stricken, the Yen army fled in disorder, hotly pursued by the men of Ch'i, who succeeded in slaying their general Ch'i Chieh . . . The result of the battle was the ultimate recovery of some seventy cities which had belonged to the Ch'i State."

Violent language and driving forward as if to the attack are signs that he will retreat.

I follow the original text here, also adopted by the Tu Shu. The standard text reads ||£ =jfa ffjj ij|j J|t lg| ^g- ^ fy on the strength

of Ts'ao Kung's commentary Hfjjf g^ -j^ , which shows that his text in- cluded the word |^. Strong as this ground is, I do not think it can counterbalance the obvious superiority of the other reading in point of sense, g^ not only provides no antithesis to j|f , but makes the whole passage absurd; for if the language of the enemy is calculated to deceive, it cannot be known as deceitful at the time, and can therefore afford no "sign." Moreover, the extra word in itjj j[£ |g (an awkward locu-

tion, by the way) spoils the parallelism with

25. When the light chariots

The same, according to Tu Yu, as the B^ £ of II. $ I. come out first and take up a position on the wings, it is a sign that the enemy is forming for battle.

The Tung Tien omits |fj .

26. Peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant indicate a plot.

92

27.

28.

29.

30. » fffi ft tfc

Tu Yu defines jjft as Jg $J , and Li Ch'uan as J| jg[ ;> $J ";

treaty confirmed by oaths and hostages." Wang Hsi and Chang Yii, 01 the other hand, simply say fit jjg£ "without reason," "on a frivolou pretext," as though ^J bore the rather unusual sense of "important.' Capt. Calthrop has "without consultation," which is too loose.

27. When there is much running about

Every man hastening to his proper place under his own regimental banner and the soldiers fall into rank,

I follow the Tl u Shu in omitting jjj after Jiri . Tu Mu quotes th< Chou Li, ch. xxix. fol. 31: ^ Qg ^ 38 # ^ TJr jfc . it means that the critical moment has come.

What Chia Lin calls >g. J|J ^ flft , as opposed to ||

28. When some are seen advancing and some retreating it is a lure.

Capt. Calthrop is hardly right in translating: "An advance, followed b) sudden retirement." It is rather a case of feigned confusion. As Tu Mi

29. WThen the soldiers stand leaning on their spears they are faint from want of food.

^ is here probably not a synonym for ^ , but = & "a weapon.' The original text has ^ fflj JJL ^* » which has been corrected fron the Tlung Tien and Yu Lan.

30. If those who are sent to draw water begin b) drinking themselves, the army is suffering from thirst.

As Tu Mu remarks: |JJ — '^^^^r^ifa "One may knov the condition of a whole army from the behaviour of a single man." Th< •^ may mean either that they drink before drawing water for the army or before they return to camp. Chang Yu takes the latter view. Th< Tung Tien has the faulty reading ^ - = , and the Yu Lan

worse still,

93

32- & $k % £ & # P* * & til

33.

34. *

31. If the enemy sees an advantage to be gained

Not necessarily "booty," as Capt. Calthrop translates it. The Tlung Tien and Yu Lan read fS] ^ Jjj, % |J , etc.

and makes no effort to secure it, the soldiers are exhausted.

32. If birds gather on any spot, it is unoccupied.

A useful fact to bear in mind when, for instance, as Ch'en Hao says, the enemy has secretly abandoned his camp.

Clamour by night betokens nervousness.

Owing to false alarms; or, as Tu Mu explains it: Jgf |H >P ^ jjjfc ^L ^ J^l S ifi ifc "Fear makes men restless; so they fall to shouting at night in order to keep up their courage." The T'ung Tien inserts Pj[ before |T^ .

33. If there is disturbance in the camp, the general's authority is weak. If the banners and flags are shifted about, sedition is afoot.

The Tung Tien and Yu Lan omit J^ . If the officers are angry, it means that the men are weary.

And therefore, as Capt. Calthrop says, slow to obey. Tu Yu under- stands the sentence differently : "If all the officers of an army are angry with their general, it means that they are broken with fatigue" [owing to the exertions which he has demanded from them].

34. When an army feeds its horses with grain and kills its cattle for food,

!§L ,fj| |^j] ^ is expanded by Mei Yao-ch'en (following Tu Mu) into

|pilJaf*^.i^^^Ss^±' which is the sense J

have given above. In the ordinary course of things, the men would be fed on grain and the horses chiefly on grass.

i and when the men do not hang their cooking-pots

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35. || ff H ^ f& w A A

The 7^£- TzV;* reads ^ , which is much the same as feft , and th Yu Lan jjj , which is manifestly wrong.

over the camp-fires, showing that they will not return t< their tents,

For }g , the Tung Tien and Yil Lan both read ^ .

you may know that they are determined to fight to the death For 1jj| ^ , see VII. § 36. I may quote here the illustrative passag from the Hou Han Shu, ch. 71, given in abbreviated form by the /"< Wen Yun Fu: "The rebel ^ jg] Wang Kuo of i|£ Liang was besiegin the town of |Jjj[ ^ Ch'en-ts'ang, and j|| "jjj ^f Huang-fu Sung, who wa in supreme command, and U j|t Tung Cho were sent out against hin The latter pressed for hasty measures, but Sung turned a deaf ear to h counsel. At last the rebels were utterly worn out, and began to thro1 down their weapons of their own accord. Sung was now for advancin to. ,the attack, but Cho said : 'It is a principle of war not to pursue dei perate-men and not to press a retreating host.' Sung answered: 'The does not apply here. What I am about to attack is a jaded army, not retreating host; with disciplined troops I am falling on a disorganise multitude, not a band of desperate men.' Thereupon he advanced t the attack unsupported by his colleague, and routed the enemy, Wan Kuo being slain." The inferior reading of the T'u Shu for § 34 is z

follows: it' Jf :fl|- A «-9:|Kii-'{k V flg'^'JIf X' V4I 1PI 7§ "tfc • ^e ^rst c^ause strikes me as rather shallow for Sun Tzi and it is hard to make anything of jjjjj: ^ in the second without th negative. Capt. Calthrop, nothing daunted, set down in his first edition "When they cast away their cooking-pots." He now has: "When th cooking-pots are hung up on the wall."

35. The sight of men whispering together

fi|[ |f|L is well explained by Tu Mu as ^ vg ^ ^jjl "speaking wit bated breath." in small knots

The Shuo Wen rather strangely defines ^ by the word ^E, but th £rh Ya says -A. «to join" or "contract," which is undoubtedly its pr mary meaning. Chang Yu is right, then, in explaining it here by th word Jpf . The other commentators are very much at sea: Ts'ao Kun

l, Tu Yu ^ j^ , Tu Mu ®li®\^^$l, Chia Li Mei Yao-ch<en Bjf ^ ^ , Wang Hsi Eg ift J^ .

95 36. M

37. ;fc|

33. #

or speaking in subdued tones

~/{ ^ is said to be the same as points to disaffection amongst the rank and file.

-^ ^ is equivalent to -^ J[t ^ j(£, the subject of course being "the general," understood. In the original text, which seems to be fol- lowed by several commentators, the whole passage stands thus: =j& |f|[

^^f^HAW^^c^ifc- Here h would be the seneral

who is talking to his men, not the men amongst themselves. For ^^ , which is the chief stumbling-block in the way of this reading, the T'u S/iu gives the very plausible emendation g^ (also read /isi, and defined by K'ang Hsi as ^ S "to speak fast"). But this is unnecessary if we keep to the standard text.

36. Too frequent rewards signify that the enemy is at the end of his resources;

Because, when an army is hard pressed, as Tu Mu says, theie is al- ways a fear of mutiny, and lavish rewards are given to keep the men in good temper.

too many punishments betray a condition of dire distress.

Because in such case discipline becomes relaxed, and unwonted severity is necessary to keep the men to their duty.

37. To begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright at the enemy's numbers, shows a supreme lack of in- telligence.

I follow the interpretation of Ts'ao Kung: ^Q jgjt $j£ ^ ^ ^ ^ Ml] ^ HJ* £ fy ' also ad°Pted by Li Ch'iian, Tu Mu and Cha*ng Yii. Another possible meaning, set forth by Tu Yu, Chia Lin, Mei Yao-ch'en and Wang Hsi, is: "The general who is first tyrannical towards his men, and then in terror lest they should mutiny, etc." This would connect the sentence with what went before about rewards and punishments. The T'ung Tien and Yu Lan read '|*j§ "affection" instead of ;^| .

38. When envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths, it is a sign that the enemy wishes for a truce.

96

40. ^ it * * * «Ji « * IH t * A

Tu Mu says: #f 0 £ R # * ft * » Q »

ifc ^ $fc ^ A tit "If tlie enemv °Pen friendly relations by sending hostages, it is a sign that they are anxious for an armistice, either because their strength is exhausted or for some other reason." But it hardly needs a Sun Tzu to draw such an obvious inference; and although Tu Mu is supported by Mei Yao-ch'en and Chang Yii, I cannot think that hostages are indicated by the word ^ .

39. If the enemy's troops march up angrily and remain facing ours for a long time without either joining battle or taking themselves off again, the situation is one that demands great vigilance and circumspection.

Capt. Calthrop falls into a trap which often lurks in the word ^ . He translates: "When both sides, eager for a fight, face each other for a considerable time, neither advancing nor retiring," etc. Had he reflected a little, he would have seen that this is meaningless as addressed to a commander who has control over the movements of his own troops. ;j|J |jj , then, does not mean that the two armies go to meet each other, but simply that the other side comes up to us. Likewise with ;jig ^» . If this were not perfectly clear of itself, Mei Yao-ch'en 's paraphrase would make it so : ^g jfjj ^Jj ^ ^ , etc. As Ts'ao Kung points out, a manoeuvre of this sort may be only a ruse to gain time for an unexpected flank attack or the laying of an ambush.

40. If our troops are no more in number than the enemy, that is amply sufficient;

Wang Hsi's paraphrase, partly borrowed from Ts'ao Kung, is jg| ~f\

k 1_* •—» ^ • t*^ S J

Jg JjL ^ . Another reading, adopted by Chia Lin and the T*u S/iu,

is Ji ^ji j||- ^jHj? ^ , which Capt. Calthrop renders, much too loosely : "Numbers are no certain mark of strength."

it only means that no direct attack can be made.

Literally, "no martial advance." That is to say, j£ "chtng" tactics and frontal attacks must be eschewed, and stratagem resorted to instead. What we can do is simply to concentrate all our available strength, keep a close watch on the enemy, and obtain reinforcements.

97

# H ^ A 42. $ 3t % pt iffi 18 2 MiJ 7 JR ^ «

B Ifllt A fi 7 f? 'M 7 W M A

This is an obscure sentence, and none of the commentators succeed in squeezing very good sense out of it. The difficulty lies chiefly in the words Jffi Jl , which have been taken in every possible way. I follow Li Ch'iian, who appears to offer the simplest explanation: ^ ^ ^

^t" %& ifc "Only the side that gets more men will win." Ts'ao Kung's note, concise as usual to the verge of incomprehensibility, is |^ :j|

jFjL 4-ft . Fortunately we have Chang Yii to expound its meaning to us in language which is lucidity itself:

1IV&&& B "When the numbers

are even, and no favourable opening presents itself, although we may not be strong enough to deliver a sustained attack, we can find additional recruits amongst our sutlers and camp-followers, and then, concentrating our forces and keeping a close watch on the enemy, contrive to snatch the victory. But we must avoid borrowing foreign soldiers to help us." He then quotes from Wei Liao Tzti, ch. 3: g^^^g^|J-]-^S Jf -7* i® S& j-jj ^Ef "The nominal strength of mercenary troops may be 100,000, but their real value will be not more than half that figure." According to this interpretation, Jjj( J^ means "to get recruits," not from outside, but from the tag-rag and bobtail which follows in the wake of a large army. This does not sound a very soldierly suggestion, and I feel convinced that it is not what Sun Tzu meant. Chia Lin, on the other hand, takes the words in a different sense altogether, namely "to conquer the enemy" [cf. I. § 20]. But in that case they could hardly be followed by jj]j Qi • Better than this would be the rendering "to make isolated captures," as opposed to ;g£ $£ "a general attack."

41. He who exercises no forethought but makes light of his opponents is sure to be captured by them.

The force of -^ is not easy to appreciate. Ch'en Hao says ^t

' thus

continues, quoting from the Tso Chuan: jj^ Jj /^ ^ ^jj ^ HU ^

fW /l^ II& ^(P -7 "W ^^ "^ bees and scorpi°ns carry poison, how much more will a hostile state I [ f|t ^ , XXII. 3.] Even a puny opponent, then, should not be treated with contempt."

42. If soldiers are punished before they have grown

7

98

*e & ii # w

R * 4 * * ff

* JR

attached to you, they will not prove submissive; and, unless submissive, they will be practically useless. If, when the soldiers have become attached to you, punishments are not enforced, they will still be useless.

This is wrongly translated by Capt. Calthrop: elf the troops know the general, but are not affected by his punishments, they are useless."

43. Therefore soldiers must be treated in the first in- stance with humanity, but kept under control by means of iron discipline.

jj^ and jj£ , according to Ts'ao Kung, are here equivalent to £^ and fg" respectively. Compare our two uses of the word "civil." ^P* — ]p Yen Tzu [f B. C. 493] said of ^| || f J| ^ Ssu-ma Jang-chii : ^ gg IW ^ fl(J H! M j|)C ifc "His civil virtues endeared him to the people; his martial prowess kept his enemies in awe." Cf. Wu Tzu, ch. 4 init.\

^m^^^mzm^MmmM^^m^

"The ideal commander unites culture with a warlike temper; the profes- sion of arms requires a combination of hardness and tenderness." Again I must find fault with Capt. Calthrop's translation : "By humane treatment we obtain obedience; authority brings uniformity."

This is a certain road to victory.

44. If in training soldiers commands are habitually en- forced, the army will be well-disciplined; if not, its discipline will be bad.

The Tung Tien and Yii Lan read: ^^^Tji^^^A^

m ^ * ff w A « 4 * 7 n.ty A x »^

45- If a general shows confidence in his men but always insists on his orders being obeyed,

The original text has ^ ^ ft ^ . ^ ^ is certainly awkward without fa, but on the other hand it is clear that Tu Mu accepted the Tung Tien text, which is identical with ours. He says : "A general ought

99

in time of peace to show kindly confidence in his men and also make his authority respected, so that when they come to face the enemy, orders may be executed and discipline maintained, because they all trust and look up to him." What Sun Tzu has said in § 44, however, would lead one rather to expect something like this : "If a general is always confident that his orders will be carried out," etc. Hence I am tempted to think that he may have written ^ ^ j=| Jf=f =£ . But this is perhaps too conjectural.

the gain will be mutual.

Chang Yu says: ± 0 B $ 15 & K* 1g J$ ± ft ± T

;j»g ^ -jj^ "The general has confidence in the men under his command, and the men are docile, having confidence in him. Thus the gain is mutual." He quotes a pregnant sentence from Wei Liao Tzu, ch. 4:

4 Z Z & * M $& ~$i >Mi; M 4« "The art of givi"g

orders is not to try to rectify minor blunders and not to be swayed by petty doubts." Vacillation and fussiness are the surest means of sapping the confidence of an army. Capt. Calthrop winds up the chapter with a final mistranslation of a more than usually heinous description: "Orders are always obeyed, if general and soldiers are in sympathy." Besides inventing the latter half of the sentence, he has managed to invert pro- tasis and apodosis.

X.

X. TERRAIN.

Only about a third of the chapter, comprising §§ i — 13, deals with ^ J|5 , the subject being more fully treated in ch. XI. The "six cala- mities" are discussed in §§ 14 — 20, and the rest of the chapter is again a mere string of desultory remarks, though not less interesting, perhaps, on that account.

i. Sun Tzu said: We may distinguish six kinds of ter- rain, to wit: (i) Accessible ground;

Mei Yao-ch'en says: ^H* $fa ^ U "plentifully provided with roads and means of communication."

(2) entangling ground;

The same commentator says: $pj |g ^ ^ Q jfa jjfr $$ "Net-like country, venturing into which you become entangled."

(3) temporising ground;

Tu Yu explains ^JT as -^ . This meaning is still retained in modern phrases such as j|r ^, ^ ^ "stave off," "delay." I do not know

why Capt. Calthrop calls ^JT Jjjj "suspended ground," unless he is con- fusing it with ^ ^ .

(4) narrow passes; ($} precipitous heights; The root idea in |$g£ is narrowness; in |Jjpt, steepness.

(6) positions at a great distance from the enemy.

It is hardly necessary to point out the faultiness of this classification. A strange lack of logical perception is shown in the Chinaman's unques- tioning acceptance of glaring cross-divisions such as the above.

101

3. m y

2. Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is called accessible.

Generally speaking, 2p ||j| "level country" is meant. Cf. IX. § 9:

3. With regard to ground of this nature,

The Tung Tien reads Jg *j± J^ . be before the enemy in occupying the raised and sunny spots,

See IX. § 2. The Tung Tien reads and carefully guard your line of supplies.

A curious use of 7Jc|J as a verb, if our text is right. The general meaning is doubtless, as Tu Yu says, fit >ffi& H£ jjjjb ^ ^H ^tf' "not to allow the enemy to cut your communications." Tu Mu, who was not a soldier and can hardly have had any practical experience of fighting, goes more into detail and speaks of protecting the line of communications by a wall ( trjg| ), or enclosing it by embankments on each side ( jfc ^ §§))! In view of Napoleon's dictum, "the secret of war lies in the com- munications," * we could wish that Sun Tzti had done more than skirt the edge of this important subject here and in I. § 10, VII. § u. Col. Hen- derson says : "The line of supply may be said to be as vital to the existence of an army as the heart to the life of a human being. Just as the duel- list who finds his adversary's point menacing him with certain death, and his own guard astray, is compelled to conform to his adversary's move- ments, and to content himself with warding off his thrusts, so the com- mander whose communications are suddenly threatened finds himself in a false position, and he will be fortunate if he has not to change all his plans, to split up his force into more or less isolated detachments, and to fight with inferior numbers on ground which he has not had time to prepare, and where defeat will not be an ordinary failure, but will entail the ruin or the surrender of his whole army." **

Then you will be able to fight with advantage.

Omitted by Capt. Calthrop.

* See KPens<§es de Napoleon !«," no. 47. ** "The Science of War," chap. 2.

102

B5

ttj ffn

4. Ground which can be abandoned but is hard to re-occupy is called entangling.

Capt. Calthrop is wrong in translating :j|< "retreat from it."

5. From a position of this sort, if the enemy is unprepared, you may sally forth and defeat him. But if the enemy is prepared for your coming, and you fail to defeat him, then, return being impossible, disaster will ensue.

^f\ 7J?|J (an example of litotes) is paraphrased by Mei Yao-ch'en as jj£\ ^ ^j|J "you will receive a check."

6. When the position is such that neither side will gain by making the first move, it is called temporising ground.

'S^ -^ IP! ^l ffi 'Hf "tit "Each side finds it inconvenient to move, and the situation remains at a deadlock" (Tu Yu).

7. In a position of this sort, even though the enemy should offer us an attractive bait,

Tu Yu says ^=j£ ^T* ^^ -^ "turning their backs on us and pretending to flee." But this is only one of the lures which might induce us to quit our position. Here again ^pl] is used as a verb, but this time in a different sense: "to hold out an advantage to."

it will be advisable not to stir forth, but rather to retreat, thus enticing the enemy in his turn; then, when part of his army has come out, we may deliver our attack with advantage.

Mei Yao-ch'en paraphrases the passage in a curious jingle, the scheme of rhymes being aMdd: %. % ffi $fe ^ ft ft fa % ^ f |J fflj

io3

8. With regard to narrow passes, if you can occupy them first,

Capt. Calthrop says: "Defiles, make haste to occupy." But this is a conditional clause, answering to ^^ j^ -^Q ^ ~£ in the next paragraph.

let them be strongly garrisoned and await the advent of the enemy.

Because then, as Tu Yu observes, f ft\\

$HJ iilfc "^ie initiative Wl^ ^e with lls> and by making sudden and unex- pected attacks we shall have the enemy at our mercy." The commen- tators make a great pother about the precise meaning of ^9£, which to the foreign reader seems to present no difficulty whatever.

9. Should the enemy forestall you in occupying a pass, do not go after him if the pass is fully garrisoned, but only if it is weakly garrisoned.

10. With regard to precipitous heights, if you are be- forehand with your adversary, you should occupy the raised and sunny spots, and there wait for him to come up.

Ts'ao Kung says: ^J ^ |^ H ^ ^ Pf ^ ^ A "The Par~ ticular advantage of securing heights and defiles is that your actions can- not then be dictated by the enemy." [For the enunciation of the grand principle alluded to, see VI. § 2]. Chang Yu tells the following anec- dote of ^ ^j |jtt]r P'ei Hsing-chien (A.D. 619 — 682), who was sent on a punitive expedition against the Turkic tribes. "At nightfall he pitched his camp as usual, and it had already been completely fortified by wall and ditch, when suddenly he gave orders that the army should shift its quarters to a hill near by. This was highly displeasing to his officers, who protested loudly against the extra fatigue which it would entail on the men. P'ei Hsing-chien, however, paid no heed to their remonstrances and had the camp moved as quickly as possible. The same night, a terrific storm came on, which flooded their former place of encampment to the depth of over twelve feet. The recalcitrant officers were amazed at the sight, and owned that they had been in the wrong. 'How did you know what was going to happen?' they asked. P'ei Hsing-chien replied: 'From this time forward be content to obey orders without asking

104

13. jiiftA

unnecessary questions.' [See Cte T^aw^ S>4«, ch. 84, fol. 12 r°., and -fltt« :T'0/*£- 67^ ch. 1 08, fol. 5 v°.} From this it may be seen," Chang Yii continues, "that high and sunny places are advantageous not only for fighting, but also because they are immune from disastrous floods."

11. If the enemy has occupied them before you, do not follow him, but retreat and try to entice him away.

The turning-point of ^* |f£ ££ Li Shih-min's campaign in 621 A.D. against the two rebels, Ijjf ||| |j|i Tou Chien-te, King of W Hsia, and lE Ht ^j Wang Shih-ch'ung, Prince of J||J Cheng, was his seizure o the heights of jj£ 3p Wu-lao, in spite of which Tou Chien-te persisted in his attempt to relieve his ally in Lo-yang, was defeated and taken prisoner. [See Chiu Tang Shu, ch. 2, fol. 5 z>°., and also ch. 54.]

12. If you are situated at a great distance from the enemy, and the strength of the two armies is equal,

The Tung Tien reads it is not easy to provoke a battle,

Ts'ao Kung says that ^ Ifffe means $[£ jj|£ "challenging the enemy." But the enemy being far away, that plainly involves, as Tu Yu says,

$$, Hfc "&°ing to meet him." The point of course is, that we must not think of undertaking a long and wearisome march, at the end of which

xfe $5 fci I§£ IPt "we should. be exhausted and our adversary fresh and keen."

and righting will be to your disadvantage.

13. These six are the principles connected with Earth. Or perhaps, "the principles relating to ground." See, however, I. § 8.

The general who has attained a responsible post must be careful to study them.

Capt. Calthrop omits Eg <g£ . Out of the foregoing six ^|j} ^ , it will be noticed that nos. 3 and 6 have really no reference to the config- uration of the country, and that only 4 and 5 can be said to convey any definite geographical idea.

105

15. ^c^J^JlJJl— I* + 0

14. Now an army is exposed to six several calamities, not arising from natural causes,

The T*u Shu reads

but from faults for which the general is responsible. These are: (i) Flight; (2) insubordination; (3) collapse; (4) ruin; (5) disorganisation; (6) rout.

I take exception to Capt. Calthrop's rendering of |Sjg and jjfo as

"distress" and "disorganisation," respectively.

15. Other conditions being equal, if one force is hurled against another ten times its size, the result will be the flight of the former.

Cf. III. § 10. The general's fault here is that of ^ ^ J] "not calculating the enemy's strength." It is obvious that life cannot have the same force as in § 12, where it was equivalent to Ji ^J . I should

not be inclined, however, to limit it, with Chang Yu, to t|^ ^ ^ Jj| -& ~£ ^|J 3p£ "the wisdom and valour of the general and the sharpness of the weapons." As Li Ch'iian very justly remarks, -^ ^ ^ >gj

2. *tfe ffl ^ ft Z It R'J "ST ^ "Given a decided advantage in position, or the help of some stratagem such as a flank attack or an am- buscade, it would be quite possible [to fight in the ratio of one to ten]."

1 6. When the common soldiers are too strong and their officers too weak, the result is insubordination.

iffll "laxity" — the metaphor being taken from an unstrung bow. Capt. Calthrop's "relaxation" is not good, on account of its ambiguity. Tu Mu cites the unhappy case of J|J ^ffj T'ien Pu \Hsin T'ang Shu, ch. 148], who was sent to ^| Wei in 821 A.D. with orders to lead an army against I /Ji ip; Wang T'ing-ts'ou. But the whole time he was in command, his soldiers treated him with the utmost contempt, and openly flouted his authority by riding about the camp on donkeys, several thousands at a time. T'ien Pu was powerless to put a stop to this conduct, and when,

io6

n. H5

after some months had passed, he made an attempt to engage the enemy, his troops turned tail and dispersed in every direction. After that, the unfortunate man committed suicide by cutting his throat.

When the officers are too strong and the common soldiers too weak, the result is collapse.

Ts'ao Kung says: g* f}% ^ *g T£ || $Bl Pi "The officers are energetic and want to press on, the common soldiers are feeble and sud- denly collapse." Note that j$j is to be taken literalb of physical weak- ness, whereas in the former clause it is figurative. Li Ch'iian makes [^ equivalent to j£ , and Tu Mu explains it as |lg ^ ^ Tft ^jj "stumb- ling into a death-trap."

17. When the higher officers

~fc |tl ' according to Ts'ao Kung, are the >J> jj^ "generals of in- ferior rank." But Li Ch'iian, Ch'en Hao and Wang Hsi take the term as simply convertible with j|^ or -^ 4^.

are angry and insubordinate, and on meeting the enemy give battle on their own account from a feeling of resent- ment, before the commander-in-chief can tell whether or no he is in a position • to fight, the result is ruin.

Ts'ao Kung makes -fc i^, understood, the subject of ^R , which seems rather far-fetched. Wang Hsi's note is:

"This means, the general is angry without just cause, and at the same time does not appreciate the ability of his subordinate officers; thus he arouses fierce resentment and brings an avalanche of ruin upon his head." He takes |^ , therefore, in the sense of ^ • but I think that Ch'en Hao

is right in his paraphrase ^ jjjj| j||;! ^ "they don't care if it be pos- sible or no." My interpretation of the whole passage is that of Mei Yao- ch'en and Chang Yu. Tu Mu gives a long extract from the Tso Chuan, Hf <$£, XII. 3, showing how the great battle of j{£\|$ Pi [597 B.C.] was lost for the ^ Chin State through the contumacy of -^Q |^ Hsien Hu and the resentful spite of |J| |^- Wei I and ^g ^ Chao Chan. Chang

Yu also alludes to the mutinous conduct of |f| B Luan Yen [ibid.

1 8. When the general is weak and without authority; when his orders are not clear and distinct;

Wei Liao Tzu (ch. 4) says: ±^^4,|lJ^^Zl|i, jfjf fiffi H ^ ^ H(J ^ Jfi 31 ^ "If the commander gives his orders with decision, the soldiers will not wait to hear them twice ; if his moves are made without vacillation, the soldiers will not be in two minds about doing their duty." General Baden-Powell says, italicising the words: "The secret of getting successful work out of your trained men lies in one nutshell — in the clearness of the instructions they receive." * As- suming that clear instructions beget confidence, this is very much what Wei Liao Tztt (loc. cit.) goes on to say: ^ ^ ^ >g 3t J$ jjft g|

#*;&*&• Cf. alsoWuTzuch.3: ffl J« £ W » * H ~k — ® ^ <£ fii ty M ® "the most fatal defect in a mili-

••"i^ _/ > — — r— ^^*f sf > — 1_ V ~\ «w»» /y*»

tary leader is diffidence; the worst calamities that befall an army arise from hesitation."

when there are no fixed duties assigned to officers and men,

|J* ^X ^ ^ ~ffij ^ ^ "Neither officers nor men have any regular routine" [Tu Mu].

and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner, the result is utter disorganisation.

19. When a general, unable to estimate the enemy's strength, allows an inferior force to engage a larger one, or hurls a weak detachment against a powerful one, and neglects to place picked soldiers in the front rank, the result must be a rout.

Chang Yii paraphrases the latter part of the sentence ^ j|3| ||j| Jj|

£ ± H! H» 3t & & & & * til > and c°ntinu<*: Jl Sfc $ ffl » » ft to H ^ - RIJ }|t ^- ^ - RIJ « ^ ^ -&

"Whenever there is fighting to be done, the keenest spirits should be * "Aids to Scouting," p. xii.

io8

20.

appointed to serve in the front ranks, both in order to strengthen the resolution of our own men and to demoralise the enemy." Cf. the primi ordines of Caesar ("De Bello Gallico," V. 28, 44 et a/.). There seems little to distinguish ^ from j^jr in § 15, except that ^ is a more forcible word.

20. These are six ways of courting defeat,

Ch'en Hao makes them out to be: (i) 'jfc -fa jjf J&J "neglect to

» / I -T^. >5^- >T>

estimate the enemy's strength;" (2) 2J£ ^ JflJ ^ "want of authority;" (3) £ J* gfl| |& "defective training;" (4) # 3g jft & "unjustifiable anger;" (5) £|i ^v ^ ^ "non-observance of discipline ;" (6) ^ ^ HH J|| "failure to use picked men."

which must be carefully noted by the general who has attained a responsible post. See supra, § 13.

21. The natural formation of the country is the soldier's best ally;

Chia Lin's text has the reading ^ for JJjff . Ch'en Hao says: ^ ^ >P $fj i^ ^c|J "The advantages of weather and season are not equal to those connected with ground."

but a power of estimating the adversary,

The insertion of a "but" is necessary to show the connection of thought here. A general should always utilise, but never rely wholly on natural advantages of terrain.

of controlling the forces of victory,

wl )$af ^s one °f those condensed expressions which mean so much in Chinese, and so little in an English translation. What it seems to imply is complete mastery of the situation from the beginning.

and of shrewdly calculating difficulties, dangers and distances, The Tung Tien and Yu Lan read ff @ fa £ %\] <g ^ fe .

I am decidedly puzzled by Capt. Calthrop's translation : "an eye for steep- ness, command and distances." Where did he find the word which I have put in italics?

109

22. #» it m ffl a ^ $ 0 * #« lit

23.

constitutes the test of a great general.

A somewhat free translation of ^ . As Chang Yu remarks, these are ^ £ $ "the essentials of soldiering," ground being only a helpful accessory.

22. He who knows these things, and in fighting puts his knowledge into practice, will win his battles. He who knows them not, nor practises them, will surely be defeated.

23. If fighting is sure to result in victory, then you must fight, even though the ruler forbid it; if fighting will not result in victory, then you must not fight even at the ruler's bidding.

Cf. VIII. § 3 fin. Huang Shih-kung of the Ch'in dynasty, who is said to have been the patron of EM ^ Chang Liang and to have written the ^ |5§, has these words attributed to him: |jj jj? ^j gj|

JJUJ "The responsibility of setting an army in motion must devolve on the general alone ; if advance and retreat are controlled from the Palace, brilliant results will hardly be achieved. Hence the god-like ruler and the enlightened monarch are content to play a humble part in furthering their country's cause [///., kneel down to push the chariot wheel]." This

means that |gj #\* £ ^ $£ j|F gjj ^ "in matters lying outside the zenana, the decision of the military commander must be absolute." Chang Yu also quotes the saying: ^^^P^^'T'^sS "Decrees of the Son of Heaven do not penetrate the walls of a camp." Napoleon, who has been accused of allowing his generals too little independence of action, speaks in the same sense: "Un general en chef n'est pas a convert de ses fautes a la guerre par un ordre de son souverain ou du ministre, quand celui qui le donne est eloigne du champ d'operation, et qu'il connait mal, ou ne connait pas du tout le dernier etat des choses." *

* "Maximes de Guerre," no. 72.

I 10

24. J

24. The general who advances without coveting fame and retreats without fearing disgrace,

It was Wellington, I think, who said that the hardest thing of all for a soldier is to retreat.

whose only thought is to protect his country and do good service for his sovereign,

^, which is omitted by the Tu Shu, is said by Ch'en Hao to be equivalent to ^ . If it had to be separately translated, it would be something like our word "accrue."

is the jewel of the kingdom.

A noble presentment, in few words, of the Chinese "happy warrior." Such a man, says Ho Shih, fj= ~fc S -Iff ^ »$| ^ "even if he had to suffer punishment, would not regret his conduct."

25. Regard your soldiers as your children, and they will follow you into the deepest valleys; look on them as your own beloved sons, and they will stand by you even unto death.

Cf. I. § 6. In this connection, Tu Mu draws for us an engaging pic- ture of the famous general Wu Ch'i, from whose treatise on war I have frequently had occasion to quote: "He wore the same clothes and ate the same food as the meanest of his soldiers, refused to have either a horse to ride or a mat to sleep on, carried his own surplus rations wrapped in a parcel, and shared every hardship with his men. One of his soldiers was suffering from an abscess, and Wu Ch'i himself sucked out the virus. The soldier's mother, hearing this, began wailing and lamenting. Somebody asked her, saying: 'Why do you cry? Your son is only a com- mon soldier, and yet the commander-in-chief himself has sucked the poison from his sore.' The woman replied : 'Many years ago, Lord Wu performed a similar service for my husband, who never left him afterwards, and finally met his death at the hands of the enemy. And now that he has done the same for my son, he too will fall fighting I know not where'." Li Ch'iian mentions ^ -^ the Viscount of Ch'u, who invaded the small state of ||| Hsiao during the winter. ^ ^ The Duke of Shen said to him : "Many of

1 1 1

1 . j? BO ^ HI $ s ffi 7 si 4 ii ro

27.

the soldiers are suffering severely from the cold." So he made a round of the whole army, comforting and encouraging the men; and straight- way they felt as if they were clothed in garments lined with floss silk. \Tso CJntan, j|£ ^. , XII. 5]. Chang Yii alludes to the same passage,

26. If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make your authority felt; kind-hearted, but unable to enforce your commands ; and incapable, moreover, of quelling disorder :

Capt. Calthrop has got these three clauses quite wrong. The last he translates: "overindulgence may produce disorder."

then your soldiers must be likened to spoilt children; they are useless for any practical purpose.

Cf. IX. § 42. We read in the \&- ffi $g , pt. 2 : =j| ^ =f ^

"Injury comes out of kindness." Li Ching once said that if you could make your soldiers afraid of you, they would not be afraid of the enemy. Tu Mu recalls an instance of stern military discipline which occurred in 219 A.D., when Q ^^ Lii Meng was occupying the town of yT [|fe Chiang-ling. He had given stringent orders to his army not to molest the inhabitants nor take anything from them by force. Nevertheless, a certain officer serving under his banner, who happened to be a fellow- townsman, ventured to appropriate a bamboo hat ( ^ ) belonging to one of the people, in order to wear it over his regulation helmet as a pro- tection against the rain. Lii Meng considered that the fact of his being also a native of VrT tvj Tu-nan should not be allowed to palliate a clear

Y?* rrJ J

breach of discipline, and accordingly he ordered his summary execution, the tears rolling down his face, however, as he did so. This act of severity filled the army with wholesome awe, and from that time forth even articles dropped in the highway were not picked up. \SanKuo Chih, ch. 54, f. i3r°.&*°.].

27. If we know that our own men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the enemy is not open to attack, we have gone only halfway towards victory.

That is, as Ts'ao Kung says, "the issue in this case is uncertain."

I 12

29.

2 * ^ ifc 0 £ ^ -tit

so.

28. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, but are unaware that our own men are not in a condition to attack, we have gone only halfway towards victory.

Cf. III. § 13 (i).

29. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, and also know that our men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the nature of the ground makes fighting impracticable, we have still gone only halfway towards victory.

I may take this opportunity of pointing out the rather nice distinction in meaning between jpj? and Jpjr. The latter is simply "to attack" without any further implication, whereas tjpc is a stronger word which in nine cases out of ten means "to attack with expectation of victory," "to fall upon," as we should say, or even "to crush." On the other hand, jpc is not quite synonymous with >0£, which is mostly used of operations on a larger scale, as of one State making war on another, often with the added idea of invasion. ^j£ , finally, has special reference to the subjugation of rebels. See Mencius, VII. 2. ii. 2.

30. Hence the experienced soldier, once in motion, is never bewildered; once he has broken camp, he is never at a loss.

The reason being, according to Tu Mu, that he has taken his measures so thoroughly as to ensure victory beforehand. "He does not move recklessly," says Chang Yu, "so that when he does move, he makes no mistakes." Another reading substitutes [g for $$£ and jp| for ^| . The latter variant only is adopted by the T'ung Tien and Yu Lan. Note that jjj| here means "at the end of his mental resources."

3 1 . Hence the saying : If you know the enemy and know yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt;

Capt. Calthrop makes the saying end here, which cannot be justified, if you know Heaven and know Earth,

^ and jfy are transposed for the sake of the jingle between ^

and ^ . The original text, however, has ^W ^C ^»W ijfe > and tne cor- rection has been made from the T'ung Tien.

you may make your victory complete.

As opposed to |j^ £ ^"> above. The original text has B^L 7JT

^f\ |p| , the corruption being perhaps due to the occurrence of jf\ *JK* in the preceding sentence. Here, however ~jf\ j|S| would not be synonymous

with jf\ ^ , but equivalent to ^f\ ^ ]Q *jjj* "inexhaustible," "beyond computation." Cf. V. § n. The T'ung Tien has again supplied the true reading. Li Ch'uan sums up as follows: ^ ^ ^ ^jp jfy ^}J ^

^ 1^ 9$ K'J W ifc W ^ "Given a knowledge of three things - the affairs of man, the seasons of heaven and the natural advantages of earth — , victory will invariably crown your battles."

* 0

XI. THE NINE SITUATIONS.

Li Ch'iian is not quite right in calling these ^ j|^ ^ %• As we shall see, some of them are highly disadvantageous from the military point of view. Wang Hsi more correctly says : ^ J£ ~£ jfy ^|J ^ ^ ^L ifc "There are nine military situations, good and bad." One would like to distinguish the -j\^ ij|j from the six ^ ^ of chap. X by saying that the latter refer to the natural formation or geographical features of the country, while the ^ Jjjj have more to do with the condition of the army, being jfy ^i "situations" as opposed to "grounds." But it is soon found impossible to carry out the distinction. Both are cross-divisions, for among the J{|j -^ we have "temporising ground" side by side with "narrow passes," while in the present chapter there is even greater confusion.

i . Sun Tzii said : The art of war recognises nine varieties of ground: (i) Dispersive ground; (2) facile ground; (3) contentious ground; (4) open ground; (5) ground of inter- secting highways; (6) serious ground; (7) difficult ground; (8) hemmed-in ground; (9) desperate ground.

2. When a chieftain is righting in his own territory, it is dispersive ground.

So called because the soldiers, being near to their homes and anxious to see their wives and children, are likely to seize the opportunity afforded by a battle and scatter in every direction. "In their advance," observes Tu Mu, "they will lack the valour of desperation, and when they retreat, they will find harbours of refuge." The ^ , which appears in the T'u Shu, seems to have been accidentally omitted in my edition of the standard text.

3.

to

3. When he has penetrated into hostile territory, but no great distance, it is facile ground.

Li Ch'iian and Ho Shih say |g J£ ^ ^ "because of the facility for retreating," and the other commentators give similar explanations.

Tu Mu remarks: §115^^^^^^-^^^^^®

^ )Q "When your army has crossed the border, you should burn your boats and bridges, in order to make it clear to everybody that you have no hankering after home." I do not think that "disturbing ground," Capt. Calthrop's rendering of j|(fr ijjj, has anything to justify it. If an idiomatic translation is out of the question, one should at least attempt to be literal.

4. Ground the possession of which imports great ad- vantage to either side, is contentious ground.

I must apologise for using this word in a sense not known to the dic- tionary, i.e. "to be contended for" — Tu Mu's Jj£\ tjf- £ Jjjjj . Ts'ao Kung says : "Pfj^l^^^^^^S "grouncl on which the few and the weak can defeat the many and the strong," such as [^ Pj^ "the neck of a pass," instanced by Li Ch'iian. Thus, Thermopylae was a ^j£ jfy , because the- possession of it, even for a few days only, meant holding the entire invading army in check and thus gaining invaluable time. Cf. Wu -Tztt, ch. V. ad init.i $ — !jc -f^ J| || ;j$ $& "For those who have to fight in the ratio of one to ten, there is nothing better than a narrow pass." When {zj -^ Lii Kuang was returning from his triumphant expedition to Turkestan in 385 A.D., and had got as far as *SJf -^ I-ho, laden with spoils, J|^ WEt Liang Hsi, administrator of VJrf >UJ Liang-chou, taking advantage of the death of Fu Chien, King of Ch'in, plotted against him and was for barring his way into the province. ^1 j^ Yang Han, governor of ^|j M Kao-ch'ang, counselled him, saying: "Lii Kuang is fresh from his victories in the west, and his soldiers are vigorous and mettlesome. If we oppose him in the shifting sands of the desert, we shall be no match for him, and we must therefore try a different plan. Let us hasten to occupy the defile at the mouth of the "JEJJJ Oj^ Kao-wu pass, thus cutting him off from supplies of water, and when his troops are prostrated with thirst, we can dictate our own terms without moving. Or if you think that the pass I mention is too far off, we could make a stand against him at the ^ I-wu pass, which is

n6

nearer. The cunning and resource of -^ j^ Tzu-fang himself [i.e. jj| would be expended in vain against the enormous strength of these two positions." Liang Hsi, refusing to act on this advice, was overwhelmed and swept away by the invader. [See ^jj- |J , ch. 122, fol. 3 r°, and > ch-43, fol. 26.]

5. Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is open ground.

This is only a makeshift translation of ^|F , which according to Ts ao Kung stands for ^ &j& "ground covered with a network of roads," like a chess-board. Another interpretation, suggested by Ho Shih,'is ^ a§| "ground on which intercommunication is easy." In either case, it must evidently be ^p J|f "flat country," and therefore ^» "Sf ^4 ^6 "can~ not be blocked." Cf. £j| ^ , X. § 2.

6. Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states,

rrfnfi&IHi "Our

the enemy's and a third country conterminous with both." [Ts'ao Kung.] Meng Shih instances the small principality of J||$ Cheng, which was bounded on the north-east by ^ Ch'i, on the west by ^ Chin, and on the south by ^ Ch'u.

so that he who occupies it first has most of the Empire at his command,

^ ~J\ of course stands for the loose confederacy of states into which China was divided under the Chou dynasty. The belligerent who holds this dominating position can constrain most of them to become his allies. See infra, § 48. ^ appears at first sight to be "the masses" or "population" of the Empire, but it is more probably, as Tu Yu says, ^| & £ *& .

is ground of intersecting highways.

Capt. Calthrop's "path-ridden ground" might stand well enough for 2£ ijjj above, but it does not bring out the force of ^ J|jj , which clearly denotes the central position where important highways meet.

7. A A

B tft ttttrtt&VJt

9-

10. iW!

7. When an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile country, leaving a number of fortified cities in its rear,

After ^ , the Tlung Tien intercalates the gloss J|j| J^ jg . it is serious ground.

Wang Hsi explains the name by saying that -fi rJj? jf£ ^ l|j. ^

2 ifc "when an army has reached such a point, its situation is serious." Li Ch'iian instances (i) the victorious march of |$| ^^ Yo I into the capital of Ch'i in 284 B.C., and (2) the attack on Ch'u, six years later, by the Ch'in general Q jfg Po Ch'i.

8. Mountain forests,

Or simply, "forests." I follow the Tlu Shu in omitting the Jfj before ||[ ^ , given in the standard text, which is not only otiose but spoils the rhythm of the sentence.

rugged steeps, marshes and fens - all country that is hard to traverse : this is difficult ground.

J^ p*i 3 (to be distinguished from J|J i 4) is defined by K'ang Hsi (after the Shuo Wtri] as ^f "to destroy." Hence Chia Lin explains

tE Mb as ground $2 ^K )9f Wi "that has been ruined by water Pas~

sing over it," and Tu Yu simply as ^ yJ0 ^ Jj^ "swampy ground." But Ch'en Hao says that the word is specially applied to deep hollows — what Chu-ko Liang, he tells us, used to designate by the expressive term ^tb ^ "earth-hells." Compare the ^ ^ of IX. § 15.

9. Ground which is reached through narrow gorges, and from which we can only retire by tortuous paths, so that a small number of the enemy would suffice to crush a large body of our men : this is hemmed-in ground.

10. Ground on which we can only be saved from destruc- tion by fighting without delay, is desperate ground.

11. ft & ic *fe IW « « a H *4 H'J ft It f Ufa IN ft

.

The situation, as pictured by Ts'ao Kung, is very similar to the H|| ijjj , except that here escape is no longer possible: ^jjj ^ 1^1 Uj ^ ^ff ^ 7K it RlJ ^ ^ Ji. HlJ ^ $E "A lofty mountain in front, a large river behind, advance impossible, retreat blocked." Ch'en Haosays: A^^E^^^'it^^'JiM "to be on 'desperate ground' is like sitting in a leaking boat or crouching in a burning house." Tu Mu quotes from Li Ching a vivid description of the plight of an army thus entrapped: "Suppose an army invading hostile territory without the aid of local guides: — it falls into a fatal snare and is at the enemy's mercy. A ravine on the left, a mountain on the right, a pathway so perilous that the horses have to be roped together and the chariots car- ried in slings, no passage open in front, retreat cut off behind, no choice but to proceed in single file (fjj* ^J J3| jf' £ J^). Then, before there is time to range our soldiers in order of battle, the enemy in over- whelming strength suddenly appears on the scene. Advancing, we can nowhere take a breathing-space; retreating, we have no haven of refuge. We seek a pitched battle, but in vain; yet standing on the defen- sive, none of us has a moment's respite. If we simply maintain our ground, whole days and months will crawl by; the moment we make a move, we have to sustain the enemy's attacks on front and rear. The country is wild, destitute of water and plants; the army is lacking in the necessaries of life, the horses are jaded and the men worn-out, all the resources of strength and skill unavailing, the pass so narrow that a single man defending it can check the onset of ten thousand; all means of offence in the hands of the enemy, all points of vantage already forfeited by ourselves: — in this terrible plight, even though we had the most valiant soldiers and the keenest of weapons, how could they be employed with the slightest effect?" Students of Greek history may be reminded of the awful close to the Sicilian expedition, and the agony of the Athenians under Nicias and Demosthenes. [See Thucydides, VII. 78 sqq.].

ii. On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. On facile ground, halt not. On contentious ground, attack not.

But rather let all your energies be bent on occupying the advantageous position first. So Ts'ao Kung. Li Ch'iian and others, however, suppose the meaning to be that the enemy has already forestalled us, so that it would be sheer madness to attack. In the ^ -^ ^ ^, when the King of Wu inquires what should be done in this case, Sun Tzu replies : "The rule with regard to contentious ground is that those in possession have the advantage over the other side. If a position of this kind is

119

secured first by the enemy, beware of attacking him. Lure him away by pretending to flee - - show your banners and sound your drums — make a dash for other places that he cannot afford to lose — trail brush- wood and raise a dust — confound his ears and eyes — detach a body of your best troops, and place it secretly in ambuscade. Then your op- ponent will sally forth to the rescue."

1 2. On open ground, do not try to block the enemy's way.

Because the attempt would be futile, and would expose the blocking force itself to serious risks. There are two interpretations of ^SE ^ . 1 follow that of Chang Yii ( jfi gj" \% J£ |Sj[ $& lit JjJg ). The other

is indicated in Ts'ao Kung's brief note : ^g ^ J||| -jj^ "Draw closer together" — i.e., see that a portion of your own army is not cut off. Wang Hsi points out that ^g ijjj is only another name for the 5^ jfy "accessible ground" of X. § 2, and says that the advice here given is simply a variation of 5flJ ^H :jjj[ "keep a sharp eye on the line of sup- plies," be careful that your communications are not cut. The T'ung Tien

On ground of intersecting highways, join hands with your allies.

Or perhaps, "form alliances with neighbouring states." Thus Ts'ao Kung has : ^ ^ ^ ifc • Capt. Calthrop's "cultivate intercourse" is much too timid and vague. The original text reads ^ -^ .

13. On serious ground, gather in plunder. On this, Li Ch'iian has the following delicious note : '^j

^ S 11 ft A >tf & ft ^

an army penetrates far into the enemy's country, care must be taken not to alienate the people by unjust treatment. Follow the example of the Han Emperor Kao Tsu, whose march into Ch'in territory was marked by no violation of women or looting of valuables. \Nota bene: this was in 207 B.C., and may well cause us to blush for the Christian armies that entered Peking in 1900 A.D.] Thus he won the hearts of all. In the present passage, then, I think that the true reading must be, not ;jjt 'plunder,' but ^&E ^ 'do not plunder'." Alas, I fear that in this instance the worthy commentator's feelings outran his judgment. Tu Mu,

120

*ij m m % Mb w a

at least, has no such illusions. He says: "When encamped on 'serious ground,' there being no inducement as yet to advance further, and no possibility of retreat, one ought to take measures for a protracted resis- tance by bringing in provisions from all sides, and keep a close watch on the enemy." Cf. also II. §9: |g| || $$ fjfc .

In difficult ground, keep steadily on the march. Or, in the words of VIII. § 2, fi| ^ "do not encamp."

14. On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem.

Ts'ao Kung says: ^jjjf :jjfr |]j| "Try the effect of some unusual artifice;" and Tu Yu amplifies this by saying: Jg jj£ g|J || |g g| §£ |g ^f

J£j[ ^ H|| "In such a position, some scheme must be devised which will suit the circumstances, and if we can succeed in deluding the enemy, the peril may be escaped." This is exactly what happened on the famous occasion when Hannibal was hemmed in among the mountains on. the road to Casilinum, and to all appearances entrapped by the Dictator Fabius. The stratagem which Hannibal devised to baffle his foes was remarkably like that which T'ien Tan had also employed with success exactly 62 years before. [See IX. § 24, note.] When night came on, bundles of twigs were fastened to the horns of some 2000 oxen and set on fire, the terrified animals being then quickly driven along the mountain side towards the passes which were beset by the enemy. The strange spectacle of these rapidly moving lights so alarmed and discomfited the Romans that they withdrew from their position, and Hannibal's army passed safely through the defile. [See Polybius, III. 93, 94; Livy, XXII.

16, 17.]

On desperate ground, fight.

For, as Chia Lin remarks: Jj egfe |jj£ /H ^4* |M |||| ^ "if you

fight with all your might, there is a chance of life ; whereas death is cer- tain if you cling to your corner."

15. Those who were called skilful leaders of old j^j- f H is omitted in the T'u Shu text.

knew how to drive a wedge between the enemy's front and rear;

More literally, "cause the front and rear to lose touch with each other."

121

to prevent co-operation between his large and small divi- sions; to hinder the good troops from rescuing the bad,

I doubt if ^ ^ can mean "officers and men," as Capt. Calthrop translates. This is wanted for J^ ~|\ .

the officers from rallying their men.

The reading ^^, derived from the Yu Lan, must be considered very doubtful. The original text has >^, and the T'u Shu )|£.

1 6. When the enemy's men were scattered, they prevented them from concentrating;

Capt. Calthrop translates ffi fjffi> "they scattered the enemy," which cannot be right.

even when their forces were united, they managed to keep them in disorder.

Mei Yao-ch'en's note makes the sense plain : nt/ R Sft rSi ^f\ gte

^^ i— t rvFc HM * rtt-i

& 1$. S^ ^ fln 7 H^ 5? • ^^ these clauses, of course, down to ^f\ ij|js are dependent on 'fi|l in § 15.

17. When it was to their advantage, they made a for- ward move; when otherwise, they stopped still.

Mei Yao-ch'en connects this with the foregoing: ^ j||| -jj|j ^jj£ ^g1

tt W fl WM M IIIIE 5« RIJ Ih "Having succeeded in thus dislocating the enemy, they would push forward in order to secure any advantage to be gained; if there was no advantage to be gained, they would remain where they were."

1 8. If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in orderly array and on the point of marching to the attack,

j|£ ffl is like fjg PJj , introducing a supposed question.

I should say: "Begin by seizing something which your op- ponent holds dear; then he will be amenable to your will."

122

Opinions differ as to what Sun Tzti had in mind. Ts'ao Kung thinks it is jt Jt)r *Hp ^ 5f?lJ "some strategical advantage on which the enemy is depending." Tu Mu says: fl |$ f|j % 4 H B3 Sf f 'J £

i.lt#3-#ikA-^/Bir»!fft^»*.l "Thethree

things which an enemy is anxious to do, and on the accomplishment of which his success depends, are: (i) to capture our favourable positions; (2) to ravage our cultivated land; (3) to guard his own communications." Our object then must be to thwart his plans in these three directions and thus render him helpless. [Cf. III. § 3.] But this exegesis unduly strains the meaning of iS* and ffife , and 1 agree with Ch'en Hao, who says that ffi ^ does not refer only to strategical advantages, but is any person or thing that may happen to be of importance to the enemy. By boldly seizing the initiative in this way, you at once throw the other side on the defensive.

19. Rapidity is the essence of war:

means "the conditions of war," not, as Capt. Calthrop says, "the spirit of the troops." According to Tu Mu, [[£ j^ ^ -f£ •£ tpf ftJc "this is a summary of leading principles in warfare," and

he adds: ft **'££' til 1ft ft £ IS. $ $ "These are the profoundest truths of military science, and the chief business of the general." The following anecdotes, told by Ho Shih, show the importance attached to speed by two of China's greatest generals. In 227 A.D., ^ j|| Meng Ta, governor of ^jft tyfa Hsin-ch'eng under the Wei Emperor Wen Ti, was meditating defection to the House of Shu, and had entered into correspondence with Chu-ko Liang, Prime Minister of that State. The Wei general Ssti-ma I was then military governor of ^ Wan, and get- ting wind of Meng Ta's treachery, he at once set off with an army to anticipate his revolt, having previously cajoled him by a specious message of friendly import. Ssu-ma's officers came to him and said: "If Meng Ta has leagued himself with Wu and Shu, the matter should be thor- oughly investigated before we make a move." Ssti-ma I replied: "Meng Ta is an unprincipled man, and we ought to go and punish him at once, while he is still wavering and before he has thrown off the mask." Then, by a series of forced marches, he brought his army under the walls of Hsin- ch'eng within the space of eight days. Now Meng Ta had previously said in a letter to Chu-ko Liang: "Wan is 1200 li from here. When the news of my revolt reaches Ssti-ma I, he will at once inform his Imperial Master, but it will be a whole month before any steps can be taken, and by that

I23

so. Jl £ I? 2 £* A JW ¥ ± A

time my city will be well fortified. Besides, Ssu-ma I is sure not to come himself, and the generals that will be sent against us are not worth troubling about." The next letter, however, was filled with con- sternation : "Though only eight days have passed since I threw off my allegiance, an army is already at the city-gates. What miraculous rapidity is this!" A fortnight later, Hsin-ch'eng had fallen and Meng Ta had lost his -head. [See Chin Shu, ch. i, f. 3.] In 621 A.D., Li Ching was sent from j®. »M4 K'uei-chou in Ssti-ch'uan to reduce the successful

rebel jljlj1 $fa Hsiao Hsien, who had set up as Emperor at the modern

ffil ^N Ching-chou FU in Hupeh. It was autumn, and the Yangtsze being then in flood, Hsiao Hsien never dreamt that his adversary would venture to come down through the gorges, and consequently made no preparations. But Li Ching embarked his army without loss of time, and was just about to start when the other generals implored him to postpone his departure until the river was in a less dangerous state for navigation. Li Ching replied: "To the soldier, overwhelming speed is of paramount importance, and he must never miss opportunities. Now is the time to strike, before Hsiao Hsien even knows that we have got an army together. If we seize the present moment when the river is in flood, we shall ap- pear before his capital with startling suddenness, like the thunder which is heard before you have time to stop your ears against it. [See VII, § 19, note.] This is the great principle in war. Even if he gets to know of our approach, he will have to levy his soldiers in such a hurry that they will not be fit to oppose us. Thus the full fruits of victory will be ours." All came about as he predicted, and Hsiao Hsien was obliged to surrender, nobly stipulating that his people should be spared and he alone suffer the penalty of death. [See Hsin T^ang Shu, ch. 93, f. i v°.~\

take advantage of the enemy's unreadiness, make your way by unexpected routes, and attack unguarded spots.

20. The following are the principles to be observed by an invading force : The further you penetrate into a country, the greater will be the solidarity of your troops, and thus the defenders will not prevail against you.

21. Make forays in fertile country in order to supply your army with food.

Cf. supra, § 13. Li Ch'iian does not venture on a note here.

22. Carefully study the well-being of your men,

124

HI ^, according to Wang Hsi, means: ft ^ ffc j£ J^ fl £

"Pet them, humour them, give them plenty of food and drink, and look after them generally."

and do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy and hoard your strength.

Tu Mu explains these words in a rhyming couplet: ||| -j^ ^J ^ — ' §1 flX Jffi> and Ch^n recalls the line of action adopted in 2 24 B.C. by the famous general ^£ l|jj Wang Chien, whose military genius largely contributed to the success of the First Emperor. He had invaded the Ch'u State, where a universal levy was made to oppose him. But, being doubtful of the temper of his troops, he declined all invitations to fight and remained strictly on the defensive. In vain did the Ch'u general try to force a battle: day after day Wang Chien kept inside his walls and would not come out, but devoted his whole time and energy to winning the affection and confidence of his men. He took care that they should be well fed, sharing his own meals with them, provided facilities for bathing, and employed every method of judicious indulgence to weld them into a loyal and homogeneous body. After some time had elapsed, he told off certain persons to find out how the men were amusing them- selves. The answer was, that they were contending with one another in putting the weight and long-jumping (^ ^ jjg Jiff?). When Wang Chien heard that they were engaged in these athletic pursuits, he knew that their spirits had been strung up to the required pitch and that they were now ready for fighting. By this time the Ch'u army, after repeating their challenge again and again, had marched away eastwards in disgust. The Ch'in general immediately broke up his camp and followed them, and in the battle that ensued they were routed with great slaughter. Shortly afterwards, the whole of Ch'u was conquered by Ch'in, and the king j| ^ Fu-ch'u led into captivity. [See Shih Chi, ch. 73, f. 5 r°. It should be noted that, ^ being a taboo character under the Ch'in dynasty, the name figures as ^jj|j throughout.]

Keep your army continually on the move,

In order that the enemy may never know exactly where you are. It has struck me, however, that the true reading might be, not yjj[ & , but

5J| _j£ "link your army together" [cf. supra § 46, |f g$. $J £ JQ ], which would be more in keeping with ffi sjfr |j| Jj . Capt. Calthrop cuts the Gordian knot by omitting the words altogether.

and devise unfathomable plans.

Ch'ang YQ's paraphrase is:

125

23. « Z m ffi a 5B Jl # * 5E 1 ^ ft ± A H

24. j* ± & fig jin ifimm jjfr tt jw m * A M>J w

23. Throw your soldiers into positions whence there is A no escape, and they will prefer death to flight. $

Cf. Nicias' speech to the Athenians: To rs J-VPTTUV yvurs, 5 av^pes") H (TTpUTturM, u,vu,yxa,\QV re ov (//wTv avSfxeiv cLyuAoic, yiyvccrbcci, a$ py ovro$ %up!ov syyvs OTTCI &v (tahstxtffbsvTSS (rubetre, etc. [Thuc. VII. 77. vii.] /u.

If they will face death, there is nothing they may not achieve. ^

^£ by itself constitutes the protasis, and ^ is the interrogative = 7J^ . Capt. Calthrop makes the protasis end with ^ : "If there be no alter- native but death." But I do not see how this is to be got out of the Chinese. Chang Yii gives a clear paraphrase : J^ Zj£ 5E

, and quotes his favourite Wei Liao Tzu (ch. 3): — •

m H H A g

-{^ "If one man were to run amok with a sword in the market-place, and everybody else tried to get out of his way, I should not allow that this man alone had courage and that all the rest were contemptible cowards. The truth is, that a desperado and a man who sets some value on his life do not meet on even terms."

Officers and men alike will put forth their uttermost strength. J^ A appears to stand for the more usual -f- 7X . Chang Yii says :

i^^mitb^r^^^^S^ "lf they are in an awkward

place together, they will surely exert their united strength to get out of it."

24. Soldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense nf fear. If there is no place of refuge, they will stand firm If they are in the heart of a hostile country, they will show a stubborn front.

Capt. Calthrop weakly says: "there is unity," as though the text were ^|J S, as in § 20. But ^pj introduces quite a new idea — that of tenacity -- which Ts'ao Kung tries to explain by the word ^JJJ "to bind fast."

If there is no help for it, they will fight hard.

126

25. Thus, without waiting to be marshalled, the soldiers will be constantly on the qui vive;

Tu Mu says: ^ ^ \$ ^ jfjj § #J f|| • Capt. Calthrop wrongly translates ^ ^ "without warnings."

without waiting to be asked, they will do your will;

Literally, "without asking, you will get." Chang Yii's paraphrase is:

without restrictions, they will be faithful ;

Chang Ytt says: ^ jjft ^ ffij without giving orders, they can be trusted.

This last clause is very similar in sense to the one preceding, except that jjp^ indicates the soldiers' attachment to their leader, and 'fpf the leader's attitude towards them. I rather doubt if ^ can mean "they will have confidence in their leader," as the commentary seems to indi- cate. That way, the sense is not nearly so good. On the other hand, it is just possible that here, as in VIII. § 8 and infra, § 55, >fp| may = ^ : "without orders, they will carry out [their leader's plans]." The whole of this paragraph, of course, has reference to "desperate ground."

26. Prohibit the taking of omens, and do away with superstitious doubts.

jjfp is amplified by Ts'ao Kung into Iffi jffi ~£ =^ , and ^p^into I! 1^ £ ft' Cf< the Ss"-ma Fa, ch- 3: Then, until death itself comes, no calamity need be feared.

The superstitious, "bound in to saucy doubts and fears," degenerate into cowards and "die many times before their deaths." Tu Mu quotes Huang Shih-kung: tt /[A jjjj? ^

1^1 ?S 91 5 i ^2 ^ "'Spells and incantations should be strictly forbidden, and no officer allowed to inquire by divination into the fortunes of an army, for fear the soldier's minds should be seriously perturbed.' The meaning is," he continues, "that if all doubts and scruples are dis-

127

irffft ft* « ft ft ***#£**

28.

carded, your men will never falter in their resolution until they die." The reading of the standard text is fi| Jfjff- ^ "there will be no refuge," which does not fit in well here. I therefore prefer to adopt the variant 5^ , which evidently stood in Li Ch'iian's text.

27. If our soldiers are not overburdened with money, it is not because they have a distaste for riches; if their lives are not unduly long, it is not because they are dis- inclined to longevity.

Chang Yu has the best note on this passage : jj

ti ill "Wealth and long life are things for which all men have a natural inclination. Hence, if they burn or fling away valuables, and sacrifice their own lives, it is not that they dislike them, but simply that they have no choice." Sun Tzu is slyly insinuating that, as soldiers are but human, it is for the general to see that temptations to shirk fighting and grow rich are not thrown in their way. Capt. Calthrop, mistaking jj& for the adjective, has: "not because money is a bad thing ... not because long life is evil."

28. On the day they are ordered out to battle, your soldiers may weep,

The word in the Chinese is ^ "snivel." This is taken to indicate more genuine grief than tears alone.

those sitting up bedewing their garments, and those lying down letting the tears run down their cheeks.

Not because they are afraid, but because, as Ts'ao Kung says, Jjj£ ^p jjfi\ ffi £tj[\ "all have embraced the firm resolution to do or die." We may remember that the heroes of the Iliad were equally childlike in showing their emotion. Chang Yu alludes to the mournful parting at the ^ I River between ^jj ijjpj" Ching K'o and his friends, when the former was sent to attempt the life of the King of Ch'in (afterwards First Emperor) in 227 B.C. The tears of all flowed down like rain as he bade them

farewell and uttered the following lines: Jjj^ jHf JJJJJ tfj> ^ ^ 2J£ ^ %

128

^ttsS "The shrill blast is blowing, Chilly the burn; Your champion is going — Not to return."* But let them once be brought to bay, and they will display the courage of a Chu or a Kuei.

H& was the personal name of Jll ^ Chuan Chu, a native of the Wu State and contemporary with Sun Tzu himself, who was employed by ^ jy. -^ Kung-tzu Kuang, better known as Ho Lii Wang, to assas- sinate his sovereign ^ ^j? Wang Liao with a dagger which he secreted in the belly of a fish served up at a banquet. He succeeded in his at- tempt, but was immediately hacked to pieces by the king's bodyguard. This was in 515 B.C. The other hero referred to, ||f J|r|J Ts'ao Kuei (or Ts'ao ^k Mo), performed the exploit which has made his name famous 166 years earlier, in 681 B.C. Lu had been thrice defeated by Ch'i, and was just about to conclude a treaty surrendering a large slice of territory, when Ts'ao Kuei suddenly seized ^Q ^ Huan Kung, the Duke of Ch'i, as he stood on the altar steps and held a dagger against his chest. None of the Duke's retainers dared to move a muscle, and Ts'ao Kuei proceeded to demand full restitution, declaring that Lu was being unjustly treated because she was a smaller and weaker state. Huan Kung, in peril of his life, was obliged to consent, whereupon Ts'ao Kuei flung away his dagger and quietly resumed his place amid the terrified assemblage without having so much as changed colour. As was to be expected, the Duke wanted afterwards to lepudiate the bargain, but his wise old counsellor ^ -ffjl Kuan Chung pointed out to him the impolicy of breaking his word, and the upshot was that this bold stroke regained for Lu the whole of what she had lost in three pitched battles. [For another anecdote of Ts'ao Kuei see VII. § 27, note; and for the biogra- phies of these three bravos, Ts'ao, Chuan and Ching, see Shih Chi, ch. 86.]

29. The skilful tactician may be likened to the shuai-jan. Now the shiiai-jan is a snake that is found in the Ch'ang mountains. ufeSA?/7

2p jffi means "suddenly" or "rapidly," and the snake in question was doubtless so called owing to the rapidity of its movements. Through this passage, the term has now come to be used in the sense of "military manoeuvres." The ^ jj[| have apparently not been identified.

* Giles' Biographical Dictionary, no. 399.

129

Strike at its head, and you will be attacked by its tail; strike at its tail, and you will be attacked by its head; strike at its middle,

Another reading in the Yu Lan for pb is Hff "belly." and you will be attacked by head and tail both.

30. Asked if an army can be made to imitate the shuai-jan,

That is, as Mei Yao-ch'en says, ^^^^J^^^^^ ]jffl — • HH -3p> "Is it possible to make the front and rear of an army each swiftly responsive to attack on the other, just as though they were parts of a single living body ?"

I should answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Ylieh are enemies;

Cf. VI. § 21.

yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a storm, they will come to each other's assistance just as the left hand helps the right.

The meaning is : If two enemies will help each other in a time of com- mon peril, how much more should two parts of the same army, bound together as they are by every tie of interest and fellow-feeling. Yet it is notorious that many a campaign has been ruined through lack of co- operation, especially in the case of allied armies.

31. Hence it is not enough to put one's trust in the tethering of horses,

~^J is said here to be equivalent to ^| . and the burying of chariot wheels in the ground.

These quaint devices to prevent one's army from running away recall the Athenian hero Sophanes, who carried an anchor with him at the battle of Plataea, by means of which he fastened himself firmly to one spot. [See Herodotus, IX. 74.] It is not enough, says Sun Tzu, to render flight impossible by such mechanical means. You will not succeed unless

9

1 3o

32.

33.

84.

your men have tenacity and unity of purpose, and, above all, a spirit of sympathetic co-operation. This is the lesson which can be learned from the shnai-jan.

32. The principle on which to manage an army is to set up one standard of courage which all must reach.

Literally, "level the courage [of all] as though [it were that of] one." If the ideal army is to form a single organic whole, then it follows that the resolution and spirit of its component parts must be of the same quality, or at any rate must not fall below a certain standard. Wellington's seemingly ungrateful description of his army at Waterloo as "the worst he had ever commanded" meant no more than that it was deficient in this important particular -- unity of spirit and courage. Had he not foreseen the Belgian defections and carefully kept those troops in the background, he would almost certainly have lost the day.

33. How to make the best of both strong and weak - that is a question involving the proper use of ground.

This is rather a hard sentence on the first reading, but the key to it will be found, firstly, in the pause after ^;, and next, in the meaning of ^ itself. The best equivalent for this that I can think of is the German "zur Geltung kommen." Mei Yao-ch'en's paraphrase is: J£ fi£

$($}%inJft%&ffi*&Z1&& "The way to elimin""e

the differences of strong and weak and to make both serviceable is to utilise accidental features of the ground." Less reliable troops, if posted in strong positions, will hold out as long as better troops on more exposed terrain. The advantage of position neutralises the inferiority in stamina and courage. Col. Henderson says: "With all respect to the text books, and to ordinary tactical teaching, I am inclined to think that the study of ground is often overlooked, and that by no means sufficient importance is attached to the selection of positions . . . and to the immense advantages that are to be derived, whether you are defending or attacking, from the proper utilisation of natural features." *

34. Thus the skilful general conducts his army just as though he were leading a single man, willy-nilly, by the hand.

p. 333.

35.

Tu Mu says : $jfa ^ "The simile has reference to the ease with

which he does it." jf\ ^ Q means that he makes it impossible for his troops to do otherwise than obey. Chang Yii quotes a jingle, to be found in Wu Tzti, ch. 4: ^f Z ffi # , ^

35. It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus ensure secrecy; upright and just, and thus maintain order.

pjp seems to combine the meanings "noiseless" and "imperturbable," both of which attributes would of course conduce to secrecy. Tu Mu explains |^| as |^| $jg || ffjlj "deep and inscrutable," and J£ as ^

"|F IJHE y(j|j "fair and unbiassed." Mei Yao-ch'en alone among the com- mentators takes */Snr in the sense of 1=3 i& "self-controlled." |£|£| and

I •—• I— I T9—9 K-^-l

{^ are causally connected with j|j|J and "|p respectively. This is not brought out at all in Capt. Calthrop's rendering: "The general should be calm, inscrutable, just and prudent." The last adjective, moreover, can in no sense be said to represent jjj^j .

36. He must be able to mystify his officers and men by false reports and appearances,

Literally, "to deceive their eyes and ears" — j^ being here used as a verb in the sense of j|JJ£.

and thus keep them in total ignorance.

Ts'ao Kung gives us one of his excellent apophthegms: ^^ ~jjj* ffi

^ J& ^ W ^ JS> #& "The tro°ps must not be allowed to share

your schemes in the beginning; they may only rejoice with you over their happy outcome." "To mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy," is one of the first principles in war, as has been frequently pointed out. But how about the other process — the mystification of one's own men? Those who may think that Sun Tzti is over-emphatic on this point would do well to read Col. Henderson's remarks on Stonewall Jackson's Valley campaign: "The infinite pains," he says, "with which Jackson sought to conceal, even from his most trusted staff officers, his movements, his in- tentions, and his