Leer — A Companion To Buddhist Philosophy

Blackwell Companions to Philosophy A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy Edited by STEVEN M. EMMANUEL r^WI LEY- BLACKWELL A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy Blackwell Companions to Philosophy This outstanding student reference series offers a comprehensive and authoritative survey of philosophy as a whole. Written by today’s leading philosophers, each volume provides lucid and engaging coverage of the key figures, terms, topics, and problems of the field. Taken together, the volumes provide the ideal basis for course use, representing an unparalleled work of reference for students and specialists alike. Already published in the series: 1 . The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy, Second Edition Edited by Nicholas Burmin and Eric Tsui- James 2. A Companion to Ethics Edited by Peter Singer 3. A Companion to Aesthetics, Second Edition Edited by Stephen Davies, Kathleen Marie Higgins, Robert Hopkins, Robert Stecker, and David E. Cooper 4. A Companion to Epistemology, Second Edition Edited by Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa, and Matthias Steup 5. A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy (two- volume set), Second Edition Edited by Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit 6. A Companion to Philosophy of Mind Edited by Samuel Guttenplan 7. A Companion to Metaphysics, Second Edition Edited by Jaegwon Kim, Ernest Sosa, and Gary S. Rosenkrantz 8. A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, Second Edition Edited by Dennis Patterson 9. A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, Second Edition Edited by Charles Taliaferro, Paul Draper, and Philip L. Quinn 10. A Companion to the Philosophy of Language Edited by Bob Hale and Crispin Wright 11. A Companion to World Philosophies Edited by Eliot Deutsch and Ron Bontekoe 12. A Companion to Continental Philosophy Edited by Simon Critchley and William Schroeder 13. A Companion to Feminist Philosophy Edited by Alison M. Jaggar and Iris Marion Young 14. 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A Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography Edited by Aviezer Tucker 42. A Companion to Aristotle Edited by Georgios Anagnostopoulos 43. A Companion to the Philosophy of Technology Edited by Jan-Kyrre Berg Olsen, Stig Andur Pedersen, and Vincent F. Hendricks 44. A Companion to Latin American Philosophy Edited by Susana Nuccetelli, Ofelia Schutte, and Otdvio Bueno 45. A Companion to the Philosophy of Literature Edited by Garry L. Hagberg and Walter Jost 46. A Companion to the Philosophy of Action Edited by Timothy O'Connor and Constantine Sandis 47. A Companion to Relativism Edited by Steven D. Hales 48. A Companion to Hegel Edited by Stephen Houlgate and Michael Baur 49. A Companion to Schopenhauer Edited by Bart Vandenabeele 50. A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy Edited by Steven M. Emmanuel Forthcoming: A Companion to Rawls, Edited by Jon Mandle and David Reidy A Companion to Foucault, Edited by Chris Falzon, Timothy O’Leary, and Jana Sawicki A Companion to Derrida, Edited by Leonard Lawlor and Zeynep Direk A Companion to Locke, Edited by Matthew Stuart A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy Edited by Steven M. Emmanuel ©WILEY- BLACKWELL A John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., Publication This edition first published 2013 © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Wiley-Blackwell is an imprint of John Wiley & Sons, formed by the merger of Wiley's global Scientific, Technical and Medical business with Blackwell Publishing. Registered Office John Wiley & Sons Ltd, The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, P019 8SQ, UK Editorial Offices 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148-5020, USA 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, 0X4 2DQ, UIC The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, P019 8SQ, UK For details of our global editorial offices, for customer services, and for information about how to apply for permission to reuse the copyright material in this book please see our website at www.wiley.com/ wiley-blackwell. The right of Steven M. Emmanuel to be identified as the author of the editorial material in this work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. 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If professional advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional should be sought. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A companion to Buddhist philosophy / edited by Steven M. Emmanuel, pages cm - (Blackwell companions to philosophy ; 1 39) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-470-65877-2 (hardback) 1. Buddhist philosophy. I. Emmanuel, Steven M., editor of compilation. B162.C66 2013 181'.043-dc23 2012036590 A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Cover image: Statue of Buddha, Sukhothai, Thailand. Photo © Paul Davis. Cover design by Nicki Averill Design and Illustration. Set in 10/12.5 pt Photina by Toppan Best-set Premedia Limited 1 2013 Are not the mountains, waves, and skies, a part Of me and of my soul, as I of them? - Lord Byron Contents Notes on Contributors xi Acknowledgments xviii List of Abbreviations xix Introduction 1 Steven M. Emmanuel Part I Conceptual Foundations 1 1 1 The Philosophical Context of Gotama’s Thought 13 Stephen J. Laumakis 2 Dukkha, Non-Self, and the Teaching on the Four “Noble Truths” 26 Peter Harvey 3 The Conditioned Co-arising of Mental and Bodily Processes within Life and Between Lives 46 Peter Harvey Part II Major Schools of Buddhist Thought 69 4 Theravada 7 1 Andrew Skilton 5 Indian Mahayana Buddhism 8 6 James Blumenthal 6 Tibetan Mahayana and Vajrayana 99 Douglas Duckworth 7 East Asian Buddhism 110 Ronald S. Green vii CONTENTS Part III Themes in Buddhist Philosophy 127 A. Metaphysics 129 8 Metaphysical Issues in Indian Buddhist Thought 129 Jan Westerhoff 9 Emptiness in Mahayana Buddhism: Interpretations and Comparisons 151 David Burton 10 Practical Applications of the Perfection of Wisdom Sutra and Madhyamaka in the Kalacakra Tantric Tradition 1 64 Vesna A. Wallace 1 1 The Huayan Metaphysics of Totality 180 Alan Fox 12 Forms of Emptiness in Zen 190 Bret W. Davis 1 3 Between the Horns of Idealism and Realism: The Middle Way of Madhyamaka 214 Graham Priest B. Epistemology 223 14 A Survey of Early Buddhist Epistemology 223 John J. Holder 1 5 Reason and Experience in Buddhist Epistemology 241 Christian Coseru 1 6 The Three Truths in Tiantai Buddhism 256 Brook Ziporyn 1 7 “Spiritual Exercise” and Buddhist Epistemologists in India and Tibet 270 Matthew T. Kapstein 18 Yogic Perception, Meditation, and Enlightenment: The Epistemological Issues in a Key Debate 290 Tom J. F. Tillemans C. Language and Logic 307 19 Language and Logic in Indian Buddhist Thought 307 Brendan S. Gillon 20 Buddhist Philosophy of Logic 320 Koji Tanaka 2 1 Candraklrti on the Limits of Language and Logic 331 Karen C. Lang viii CONTENTS 22 On the Value of Speaking and Not Speaking: Philosophy of Language in Zen Buddhism Steven Heine 23 The Voice of Another: Speech, Responsiveness, and Buddhist Philosophy Richard F. Nance D. Philosophy of Mind 24 Mind in Theravada Buddhism Maria Heim 2 5 Philosophy of Mind in Buddhism Richard P. Hayes 26 Cognition, Phenomenal Character, and Intentionality in Tibetan Buddhism Jonathan Stoltz 2 7 The Non-Self Theory and Problems in Philosophy of Mind Joerg Tuske E. Ethics and Moral Philosophy 28 Ethical Thought in Indian Buddhism Christopher W. Gowans 29 Character, Disposition, and the Qualities of the Arahats as a Means of Communicating Buddhist Philosophy in the Suttas Sarah Shaw 30 Compassion and the Ethics of Violence Stephen Jenkins 3 1 Buddhist Ethics and Western Moral Philosophy William Edelglass F. Social and Political Philosophy 32 The Enlightened Sovereign: Buddhism and Kingship in India and Tibet Georgios T. Halkias 33 Political Interpretations of the Lotus Sutra James Mark Shields 34 Socially Engaged Buddhism: Emerging Patterns of Theory and Practice Christopher S. Queen 3 5 Comparative Reflections on Buddhist Political Thought: Asoka, Shambhala and the General Will David Cummiskey 349 366 377 377 395 405 419 429 429 452 466 476 491 491 512 524 536 IX CONTENTS Part IV Buddhist Meditation 553 3 6 Buddhist Meditation: Theory and Practice 555 Charles Goodman 3 7 Seeing Mind, Being Body: Contemplative Practice and Buddhist Epistemology 572 Anne Carolyn Klein 38 From the Five Aggregates to Phenomenal Consciousness: Towards a Cross-Cultural Cognitive Science 585 Jake H. Davis and Evan Thompson Part V Contemporary Issues and Applications 599 39 Buddhism and Environmental Ethics 601 Simon P. James 40 Buddhism and Biomedical Issues 613 Damien Keown 41 War and Peace in Buddhist Philosophy 631 Sallie B. King 42 Buddhist Perspectives on Human Rights 651 Karma Lekshe Tsomo 43 Buddhist Perspectives on Gender Issues 663 Rita M. Gross 44 Diversity Matters: Buddhist Reflections on the Meaning of Difference 675 Peter D. Hershock Further Reading 693 Index 696 x Notes on Contributors James Blumenthal is Associate Professor in the Philosophy Department at Oregon State University and founding faculty member at Maitripa College, Portland. He is the author of numerous articles and books on Buddhism, including The Ornament of the Middle Way: A Study of the Madhyamaka Thought of Sdntaraksita (Snow Lion, 2004), editor of Incompatible Visions: South Asian Religions in History and Culture (University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), and co-author (with Geshe Lhundup Sopa) of Steps on the Path to Enlightenment: A Commentary on Tsongkhapa’s Lamrim Chenmo, Vol. 4: Samatha (Wisdom, 2012). In 2004 he had the honor of translating Nagarjuna's “Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning" for His Holiness the Dalai Lama on the occasion of his public lectures on the text in Pasadena, California. David Burton is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Theology and Religious Studies at Canterbury Christ Church University in the UK. Along with a number of articles, he has published two books: Buddhism, Knowledge and Liberation: A Philosophical Study (Ashgate, 2004) and Emptiness Appraised: A Critical Study of Nagarjuna’s Philosophy (RoutledgeCurzon, 1999). Christian Coseru is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the College of Charleston, South Carolina. He is the author of several articles on Buddhist philosophy and a book, Perceiving Reality: Consciousness, Intentionality, and Cognition in Buddhist Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 2012). David Cummiskey is Professor of Philosophy at Bates College, Lewiston, Maine. He is the author of Kantian Consequentialism (Oxford University Press, 1996), and his recent articles include “Competing Conceptions of the Self in Kantian and Buddhist Moral Theories,” in Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy (Walter de Gruyter, 2010) , “The Law of Peoples," in The Morality and Global Justice Reader (Westview Press, 2011) , and “Dignity, Contractualism, and Consequentialism.” in Utilitas, 20/4 (2008). Bret W. Davis is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University Maryland. Among his books are Heidegger and the Will: On the Way to Gelassenheit (Northwestern University Press, 2007): co-edited with Brian Schroeder and Jason M. Wirth, Japanese and Continental Philosophy: Conversations with the Kyoto School (Indiana University Press, xi NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS 2011); and co-edited with Fujita Masakatsu, Sekai no naka no Nihon no tetsugaku (Japa- nese Philosophy in the World) (Showado, 2005). He has also published numerous articles in English and in Japanese on continental and comparative philosophy, on the Kyoto School, and on Zen. Jake H. Davis is a doctoral student in philosophy and cognitive science at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, visiting faculty at the Barre Center for Bud- dhist Studies, Massachusetts, and a visiting scholar in psychiatry at Brown University. He trained in Buddhist theory and meditative practice under the meditation master Sayadaw U Pandita of Burma and served for a decade as an interpreter between Burmese and English for meditation retreats in Burma and abroad. Douglas Duckworth is Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Humanities at East Tennessee State University. He is the author of Mipam on Buddha- Nature: The Ground of the Nyingma Tradition (SUNY Press, 2008) and Jamgon Mipam: His Life and Teachings (Shambhala, 2011). He also translated Botriil's Distinguishing the Views and Philosophies: Illuminating Emptiness in a Twentieth-Century Tibetan Buddhist Classic (SUNY Press, 2011). William Edelglass is Professor of Philosophy and Environmental Studies at Marlboro College, Vermont. Previously he taught at the Institute of Buddhist Dialectics in Dhar- amsala, India. He has published widely in Indian and Tibetan Buddhist philosophy, environmental philosophy, and contemporary continental philosophy. He is co-editor of the journal Environmental Philosophy and of Facing Nature: Levinas and Environmental Philosophy (Duquesne University Press, 2012), Buddhist Philosophy: Essential Readings (Oxford University Press, 2009), and The Oxford Handbook of World Philosophy (2010). Alan Fox is Professor of Asian and Comparative Philosophy and Religion in the Philosophy Department at the University of Delaware. He has published on Chinese Buddhism and philosophical Daoism. His publications include “Self-Reflection in the Sanlun Tradition: Madhyamika as the Deconstructive Conscience of Buddhism," in the Journal of Chinese Philosophy (March 1992), “Process Ecology and ‘Ideal Dao,’” in the Journal of Chinese Philosophy (March 2005), and “Dushun’s Huayan Fajie Guan Men (Meditative Approaches to the Huayana Dharmadatu ),” in Buddhist Philosophy: Essen- tial Readings (Oxford University Press, 2009). Brendan S. Gillon is Professor of Linguistics at McGill University. He has research interests in the history of logic and metaphysics in India, Sanskrit linguistics, and natural language semantics, and has published extensively in all of these areas. He is editor of Logic in Earliest Classical India (Motilal Banarsidass, 2010) and co-editor of Semantics: A Reader (Oxford University Press, 2004). In collaboration with Richard Hayes, he has translated the first 38 verses and their prose commentary of Dhar- maklrti’s Svarthanumana chapter of the Pramanavarttika. Charles Goodman is Associate Professor in the Philosophy Department and the Department of Asian and Asian-American Studies at Binghamton University. He is the author of several published articles on Buddhist philosophy and of the book Consequences of Compassion: An Interpretation and Defense of Buddhist Ethics (Oxford University Press, 2009). xii NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS Christopher W. Gowans is Professor of Philosophy at Fordham University. He is the editor of Moral Disagreements (Routledge, 2000) and Moral Dilemmas (Oxford University Press, 1989) and the author of Philosophy of the Buddha (Routledge, 2003). Ronald S. Green is Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Reli- gious Studies at Coastal Carolina University, South Carolina. He is an editor of a book series on religions and social engagement which includes Buddhist Roles in Peacemaking: How Buddhism can Contribute to Sustainable Peace (Blue Pine Books, 2009). His research focuses on East Asian developments of Yogacara and tantric Buddhist philosophy. Rita M. Gross, before her retirement, was for twenty-five years Professor of Compara- tive Studies in Religion at the University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire. She is a well-known Dharma teacher and the author of many books and articles. Her best-known books are Buddhism after Patriarchy (SUNY Press, 1993), Feminism and Religion: An Introduction (Beacon Press, 1996), and A Garland of Feminist Reflections: Forty Years of Religious Exploration (University of California Press, 2009). She was co-editor of Buddhist— Chris- tian Studies for ten years and has been active in inter-religious discussion. Georgios T. Halkias is Research Fellow and Coordinator of Religions of Central Asia at the Centre of Religious Studies at the Ruhr University in Bochum and a Fellow at the Oxford Centre of Buddhist Studies. Among his publications are Luminous Bliss: A Reli- gious History of Pure Land Literature in Tibet (University of Hawaii Press) and a number of articles on Tibetan and Central Asian Buddhism and history and interdisciplinary studies in religion. Peter Harvey is Emeritus Professor of Buddhist Studies at the University of Sunderland in the UK. His research focuses on early Buddhist thought and practices and Buddhist ethics. He is the editor of Buddhist Studies Review and the author of An Introduction to Buddhism: Teachings, History and Practices (Cambridge University Press, 1990, 2nd edn 2012), The Selfless Mind: Personality, Consciousness and Nirvana in Early Buddhism (Curzon Press, 1995), and An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics: Foundations, Values and Practices (Cambridge University Press, 2000). He is currently working on Spiritual Nobility in Early Buddhism: Noble Path, Noble Persons, and the Four True Realities that They See. Richard P. Hayes is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of New Mexico. He earned his doctorate in Sanskrit and Indian studies at the University of Toronto. He has taught in the departments of Philosophy and Religious Studies at the University of Toronto and McGill University and as Numata guest professor of Buddhism at Leiden University. Maria Heim is Associate Professor of Buddhist Studies at Amherst College, Massa- chusetts. She holds a BA from Reed College and a PhD in Sanskrit and Indian studies from Harvard University. She works on South Asian Buddhism, particularly on Theravada, and is currently focusing on the thought of Buddhaghosa. She is interested in moral psychology and is completing a book on Theravada understandings of agency and intention in the different canonical and commentarial genres of the Pali literature. xiii NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS Steven Heine is Professor of Religious Studies and History as well as Associate Director of the School of International and Public Affairs and Director of Asian Studies at Florida International University. His research specialty is the origins and development of Zen Buddhism, especially the life and teachings of Dogen, founder of the S5to sect. He has published two dozen books, including The Zen Poetry of Dogen (Tuttle, 1997) and, with Oxford University Press, Opening a Mountain (2002), Did Dogen Go to China? (2006), Zen Masters (2010), and Dogen: Textual and Historical Studies (2012). Peter D. Hershock is Director of the Asian Studies Development Program at the East-West Center in Honolulu, Hawaii. His research has focused mainly on using Buddhist conceptual resources to address contemporary issues. Among his books are Liberating Intimacy: Enlightenment and Social Virtuosity in Ch’an Buddhism (SUNY Press, 1996), Reinventing the Wheel: A Buddhist Response to the Information Age (SUNY Press, 1999), Chan Buddhism (University of Hawaii Press, 2005), Buddhism in the Public Sphere: Reorienting Global Interdependence (Routledge, 2006), and Valuing Diver- sity: Buddhist Reflection on Realizing a More Equitable Global Future (SUNY Press, 2012). John J. Holder is Associate Professor of Philosophy at St. Norbert College, Wisconsin. He is the author of Early Buddhist Discourses (Hackett, 2006), a volume containing English translations of Pali discourses that are essential for the study of early Buddhist philosophy. He has also published articles on early Buddhist epistemology, ethics, and social theory. His research focus is on comparative philosophy, specifically comparing early Buddhism and classical American pragmatism with the aim of developing a natu- ralistic theory of aesthetics and religious meaning. Simon P. James is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at Durham University in the UK. He is the author of Zen Buddhism and Environmental Ethics (Ashgate, 2004), The Presence of Nature: A Study in Phenomenology and Environmental Philosophy (Palgrave, 2009), and (with David E. Cooper) Buddhism, Virtue and Environment (Ashgate, 2005). Stephen Jenkins is Professor of Religious Studies at Humboldt State University. His research is focused on Buddhist concepts of compassion, their philosophical grounding, and their ethical implications. His current work explores these themes in justifications of warfare, penal codes, compassionate killing, tantric sadhanas for killing, and the Asokan edicts. Matthew T. Ivapstein is currently Director of Tibetan Studies at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes in Paris and Numata Visiting Professor of Buddhist Studies in the Divinity School of the University of Chicago. His publications include The Tibetan Assim- ilation of Buddhism: Conversion, Contestation, and Memory (Oxford University Press, 2000) , Reason’s Traces: Identity and Interpretation in Indian and Tibetan Buddhist Thought (Wisdom, 2001), The Tibetans (Blackwell, 2006), and, in the Clay Sanskrit Series, The Rise of Wisdom Moon (New York University Press, 2009). Damien Keown is Emeritus Professor of Buddhist Ethics at Goldsmiths College, Uni- versity of London. His main research interests are theoretical and applied aspects of Buddhist ethics, with particular reference to contemporary issues. He is the author of many books and articles, among them The Nature of Buddhist Ethics (Palgrave, 2001) , Buddhism and Bioethics (Palgrave, 2001), Buddhism: A Very Short Introduction xiv NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS (Oxford University Press, 2000), Buddhist Ethics: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2006), and the Oxford Dictionary of Buddhism (2003). In 1994 he founded the Journal of Buddhist Ethics with Charles S. Prebish, with whom he also co- founded the Routledge Critical Studies in Buddhism Series, and co-edited the Routledge Encyclopedia of Buddhism. Sallie B. King is Professor of Philosophy and Religion at James Madison University, Virginia. She is the author of Buddha Nature (SUNY Press, 1991), Journey in Search of the Way: The Spiritual Autobiography of Satomi Myodo (SUNY Press, 1993), Being Benevo- lence: The Social Ethics of Engaged Buddhism (University of Hawaii Press, 2005), and Socially Engaged Buddhism (University of Hawaii Press, 2009). She is co-editor (with Christopher S. Queen) of Engaged Buddhism: Buddhist Liberation Movements in Asia (SUNY Press, 1996) and (with Paul O. Ingram) of The Sound of Liberating Truth: Bud- dhist— Christian Dialogues in Honor of Frederick J. Streng (Curzon Press, 1999). Anne Carolyn Klein is Professor of Religious Studies at Rice University and a founding director and resident teacher of the Dawn Mountain Center, Houston. Her work centers on the Tibetan Buddhist tradition and its Indian roots, with a special interest in the interplay between intellectual understanding and contemplative practice. She is the author or translator of six books, notably Heart Essence of the Vast Expanse: A Story of Transmission (Snow Lion, 2010) and the recently republished Meeting the Great Bliss Queen (Snow Lion, 2008). Karen C. Lang is Professor of Indian Religions in the Department of Religious Studies and two-time Director of the Center for South Asian Studies at the University of Virginia. Her publications include Four Illusions: Candrakirti’s Advice for Travelers on the Bodhisattva Path (Oxford University Press, 2003) and Aryadeva’s Catuhsataka: On the Bodhisattva’s Cultivation of Merit and Knowledge (Akademisk Forlag, 1986), as well as numerous articles on Buddhist philosophy and literature. She has been a member of the team that produced the first English translation of Tsongkhapa’s The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment. Her primary research and transla- tion interests focus on the work of the seventh-century Indian Buddhist philosopher Candrakirti. Stephen J. Laumakis is Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Aquinas Scholars Honors Program at the University of St. Thomas in St. Paul, Minnesota. Among his publications are articles in East-West Connections: Review of Asian Studies, the Modern Schoolman. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, and a book, An Introduction to Bud- dhist Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 2008). Richard F. Nance is Assistant Professor of South Asian Buddhism in the Department of Religious Studies at Indiana University. He has published work in the Journal of Indian Philosophy, Religion Compass, and the Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, and is the author of Speaking for Buddhas: Scriptural Commentary in Indian Bud- dhism (Columbia University Press, 2012). Graham Priest is Boyce Gibson Professor of Philosophy at the University of Mel- bourne, Distinguished Professor at the Graduate Center, City University of New York, and Arche Professorial Fellow at the University of St. Andrews. His books include xv NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS In Contradiction (Nijhoff, 1987), Beyond the Limits of Thought (Clarendon Press, 2002), Towards Non-Being (Clarendon Press, 2005), Doubt Truth to be a Liar (Clarendon Press, 2006), and Introduction to Non-Classical Logic (Cambridge University Press, 2008). Christopher S. Queen is Lecturer on Buddhism and World Religions at Harvard Uni- versity. Among his publications are Engaged Buddhism: Buddhist Liberation Movements in Asia (with Sallie King; SUNY Press, 1996); American Buddhism: Methods and Findings in Recent Scholarship (with Duncan Williams; Curzon Press, 1999); Engaged Buddhism in the West (Wisdom 2000); and Action Dharma: New Studies in Engaged Buddhism (with Charles Prebish and Damien Keown; RoutledgeCurzon, 2003). Sarah Shaw has membership of the Faculty of Oriental Studies and Wolfson College, Oxford University, and is an honorary fellow of the Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies. She is the author of a number of books on Buddhist meditation and narrative, including Buddhist Meditation: An Anthology of Texts from the Pali Canon (Routledge, 2006) and Introduction to Buddhist Meditation (Routledge, 2008). She is also co-editor (with Linda Covill and Ulrike Roesler) of Lives Lived, Lives Imagined: Biographies of Awakening (Wisdom, 2010). James Mark Shields is Assistant Professor of Comparative Humanities and Asian Thought at Bucknell University, Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, and Research Associate at the Reischauer Institute for Japanese Studies, Harvard University. He is the author of Critical Buddhism: Engaging with Modern Japanese Buddhist Thought (Ashgate, 2011) and co-editor (with Victor SSgen Hori and Richard P. Hayes) of Teaching Buddhism in the West: From the Wheel to the Web (Routledge, 2003). He is currently working on a book manuscript entitled Warp and Woof: Modernism and Progressivism in Japanese Buddhism, 1886-1936. Andrew Skilton is a Senior Research Fellow in the Department of Theology and Reli- gious Studies at King’s College London and Spalding Fellow at Clare Hall, Cambridge. His research focuses on textual sources from Indian and South-East Asian Buddhism in Sanskrit and Pali. Jonathan Stoltz is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of St. Thomas in St. Paul, Minnesota. He has authored papers on Buddhist epistemology in numerous journals, including Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophy East and West, and the Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies. He is currently writing a book on phi- losophy of mind in twelfth-century Tibetan Buddhism. Koji Tanaka is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Auckland, New Zealand. A specialist in logic and Buddhist philosophy, he contributed ‘A Dharmakirtian Critique of Nagarjunians" to Pointing at the Moon (Oxford University Press, 2009) and is a co-author of Moonshadows: Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philoso- phy (Oxford University Press, 2011). Evan Thompson is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toronto. He is the author of Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind (Harvard Uni- versity Press, 2007), co-author of The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human xvi NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS Experience (MIT Press, 1991), and co-editor of Self, No Self? Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions (Oxford University Press, 2010). Tom J. F. Tillemans is Emeritus Professor of Buddhist Studies at the University of Lausanne, Switzerland. He is the author of many books and articles on Buddhism and currently serves as editor in chief of the “84000” (see http://84000.co), a long-term project to translate Buddhist canonical literature. Joerg Tuske is Associate Professor in the Philosophy Department at Salisbury Univer- sity in Maryland. His main interest lies in Sanskrit philosophy, especially in the debate about the dtman. His publications include “Teaching by Example: An Interpretation of the Role of Upamana in Early Nyaya Philosophy,” in Asian Philosophy (2008), and “Dignaga and the Raven Paradox,” in the Journal of Indian Philosophy (1998). Karma Lekshe Tsomo is Associate Professor in the Department of Theology and Religious Studies at the University of San Diego, where she teaches courses on Bud- dhism. world religions, comparative religious ethics, and death and afterlife. She studied Buddhism in Dharamsala, India, for 1 5 years and received a doctorate in comparative philosophy from the University of Hawai'i at Manoa, with research on death and iden- tity in China and Tibet. Her publications include Sisters in Solitude: Two Traditions of Buddhist Monastic Ethics for Women (SUNY Press, 1996), Into the Jaws of Yama, Lord of Death: Buddhism, Bioethics, and Death (SUNY Press, 2006), and a number of edited volumes on women in Buddhism. Vesna A. Wallace is Professor of Buddhist Studies in the Department of Religious Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Her areas of research are Indian Buddhism and Mongolian Buddhism. She has published three books related to the Kalacakratantra and a series of articles on the Kalacakra tantric tradition and Mongo- lian Buddhism. Jan Westerhoff is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Durham and Research Associate in the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. He is the author of numerous articles and books on Buddhism, including The Dispeller of Dis- putes: Nagdrjuna’s Vigrahavydvartanl (Oxford University Press, 2010) and Ndgdrjuna's Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Investigation (Oxford University Press, 2009). Brook Ziporyn is Professor of Chinese Philosophy, Religion, and Comparative Thought at the Divinity School of the University of Chicago and Visiting Professor at the National University of Singapore. His published books include Evil and/or/as the Good: Omni- centrism, Intersubjectivity, and Value Paradox in Tiantai Buddhist Thought (Harvard University Press, 2000), The Penumbra Unbound: The Neo-Taoist Philosophy of Guo Xiang (SUNY Press, 2003), Being and Ambiguity: Philosophical Experiments with Tiantai Bud- dhism (Open Court, 2004) and Zhuangzi: The Essential Writings with Selections from Traditional Commentaries (Hackett, 2009). xvn Acknowledgments A volume such as this is only possible because of the efforts of many talented people. I would therefore like to express my sincere gratitude to the contributors, with whom it has been both an honor and a great pleasure to collaborate on this project. I would also like to thank Caroline Richmond for her careful editorial work in preparing the final manuscript for publication, and Sue Leigh for her patient diligence in seeing the volume through the final stages of production. xviii List of Abbreviations Bibliographical AKB Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakosa-bhasyam. Trans. L. M. Pruden from Louis de La Vallee Poussin’s French translation of Abhidharmakosabhdsyam. 4 vols. Berke- ley, CA: Asian Humanities Press, 1991. AN Ahguttara Nikdya: The Book of the Gradual Sayings. Trans. F. L. Woodward and E. M. Hare. 5 vols. London: PTS, 1932-6; The Numerical Discourses of the Buddha. Trans. Bhikkhu Bodhi. Boston: Wisdom, 2012. BW Bhikkhu Bodhi, The Buddha’s Words: An Anthology of Discourses from the Pali Canon. Boston: Wisdom, 2005. CS Aryadeva’s Catuhsataka: On the Bodhisattva’s Cultivation of Merit and Knowledge. Trans. Karen Lang. Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1986. Dhp. Dhammapada : The Word of the Doctrine. Trans. K. R. Norman. London: PTS, 1997: The Dhammapada. Trans. V. Roebuck. London: Penguin, 2010. Dhs. Dhammasangani: A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics. Trans. C. A. F. Rhys Davids. Third edn. London and Boston: PTS, 1974. Dhs-a Atthasalini: : Commentary on the Dhammasangani. The Expositor. Trans. Pe MaungTin. 2 vols. London: PTS, 1920-1. DN Digha Nikdya: Dialogues of the Buddha. Trans. T. W. Rhys Davids and C. A. F. Rhys Davids. 3 vols. London: PTS, 1899-1921: Long Discourses of theBuddha. Trans. M. Walshe. Second rev. edn. Boston: Wisdom, 1996. DN-a Digha Nikdya Atthakathd (Sumahgalavildsini) . Commentary on DN. It. The ltivuttaka. Trans. P. Masefield. London: PTS, 2000. J The Jataka, or, Stories of the Buddha's Former Births. Ed. E. B. Cowell. 7 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1895-1907; London PTS, 1972 [ fdtakas cited by number], MA Introduction to the Middle Way: Candrakirti’s Madhyamakdvatdra. Trans. Pad- makara Translation Group. Boston and London: Shambhala, 2004. Miln. Milindapahha: Milinda’s Questions. Trans. I. B. Horner. 2 vols. London: PTS, 1963-4. xix LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS MMK The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way. Trans, and Commentary Jay L. Garfield. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. MN Majjhima Nikdya: The Collection of the Middle Length Sayings. Trans. I. B. Horner. 3 vols. London: PTS, 1954-9; The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha. Trans. Bhikkhu Nanamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi. Boston: Wisdom, 1995. MN-a Majjhima Nikdya Atthakathd (Papahcasudam) . Commentary on MN. Patis. Patisambliidd-magga: The Path of Discrimination. Trans. Bhikkhu Nanamoli. London: PTS, 1982. PP Mulamadhyamakakdrikds de Ndgdrjuna avec la Prasannapada Commentaire de Candrakirti. Trans. Louis de La Vallee Poussin. Osnabriick: Biblio Verlag, 1970 [reprint], SB Rupert Gethin, Sayings of the Buddha: A Selection of Suttasfrom the Pali Nikdyas. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. SN Samyutta Nikdya: The Book of the Kindred Sayings. Trans. C. A. F. Rhys Davids and F. L. Woodward. London: PTS, 1917-30; The Connected Discourses of the Buddha. Trans. Bhikkhu Bodhi. Boston: Wisdom. 2005. Sn Sutta-nipdta: The Group of Discourses. Trans. K. R. Norman. Second edn. London: PTS, 2001. T Taisho shinshu daizokyo: The Taisho Tripitaka. Ed. Takakusu Juniro et al. Tokyo: Taisho issaikyd kanko-kai, 1914-32. [Taisho is a definitive version of the Chinese Buddhist canon standardized in Japan during the Taishd period.] Online edn: Chinese Buddhist Electronic Text Association (CBETA), www. cbeta.org/. Thag. Thera-gdthd: Elders’ Verses. Trans. K. R. Norman. Vol. 1. London: PTS, 1969. TS The Tattva-samgraha of Santaraksita with the Commentary (Panjikd ) of Kamalasila. Trans. Ganganatha Jha. Vols. 1-2. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1986. Ud. The Uddna. Trans. P. Masefield. London: PTS, 1994. Vibh. Vibhanga: The Book of Analysis. Trans. U. Thittila. London: PTS, 1969. Vibh-a Commentary on Vibhanga: Dispeller of Delusion. Trans. Bhikkhu Nanamoli. 2 vols. London: PTS, 1996. Vin. Vinaya Pitaka: The Book of the Discipline. Trans. I. B. Horner. 6 vols. London: PTS, 1938-66. Vism. Buddhaghosa, Visuddhimagga: The Path of Purification: Vuisuddhimagga. Trans. Bhikkhu Nanamoli. Onalaska, WA: BPS Pariyatti, 1999. General Ch. Chinese Gk Greek Jp. Japanese K. Korean P. Pali PTS Pali Text Society Skt Sanskrit Tb. Tibetan xx Introduction STEVEN M. EMMANUEL The task of producing a comprehensive, single-volume treatment of Buddhist philoso- phy presents certain editorial challenges, not the least of which is the problem of how to do justice to the sheer breadth and diversity of a tradition that spans some two and a half millennia. The following introductory remarks are intended to shed some light on the considerations that shaped the structure and content of this volume. The Buddha and Buddhist Philosophy Buddhism is a living tradition that traces its origins to the life and teachings of Siddhat- tha Gotarna (Skt Siddhartha Gautama), the historical Buddha. However, not much is known with any certainty about the life of the founder. While his dates are convention- ally given as 566-486 BCE, many scholars now believe it is more likely that the Buddha died sometime between 368 and 404 bce. 1 The earliest accounts of the Buddha's life are fragmentary and, though more com- plete biographical narratives begin to appear around the first century CE, these versions of the story are highly embellished and in some cases offer conflicting accounts of events. While these texts are of enormous importance to Buddhist tradition, they present challenges for the historian who is interested in separating myth from fact. That said, the picture we have of the historical Buddha is a composite based on what scholars have inferred from a combination of early Buddhist sources, archeological evidence, and general historical information about the culture and traditions of Indian society of the period. 2 Another salient fact for us is that the Buddha did not commit any of his teachings to writing. According to tradition. 500 arahats (awakened disciples) assembled at Rajagaha several months after the Buddha’s death to recite the teachings as they had been heard. These were divided into two collections: the first containing rules for A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy, First Edition. Edited by Steven M. Emmanuel. ©2013 John Wiley & Sons. Inc. Published 201 3 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1 STEVEN M. EMMANUEL monastic conduct ( vinaya-pitaka ); the second containing discourses delivered by the Buddha and his close disciples ( sutta-pitaka ). Over time a third collection of “higher teachings” developed ( abhidhamma-pitaka ). These contained detailed lists and exposi- tions of concepts found in the discourses and were aimed at giving a more precise philosophical formulation of the Buddha’s teachings. As Buddhism gradually spread across the Indian subcontinent, versions of these teachings were orally preserved in various schools. Only much later were they written down in collections of scriptural texts. The history of the formation of the Buddhist scriptural canon remains largely obscure to modern scholarship. The “Pali canon" of the Theravada school was one of the earliest to be written down. According to Theravada tradition, this occurred in Sri Lanka in the latter half of the first century BCE. Other early schools produced canons in various Middle Indian dialects (Gethin 1998, 41-2). Important elements of these canons have been preserved in Sanskrit and in Chinese translation. However, the Pali canon is the only one to have survived intact in its original Indian language. These texts, commonly referred to as the Tipitaka, form the scriptural basis of the southern tradition of Buddhism. As Buddhist thought spread to China (beginning in the first century ce) and then to Tibet (beginning in the seventh century ce) it continued to be translated and interpreted through other cultural lenses and, to greater and lesser degrees, shaped by its encoun- ters with other systems of thought. These encounters produced many new expressions of Buddhism, which differed from one another on philosophical points as well as matters of practice. Textual sources for the eastern and northern traditions of Bud- dhism are contained in Chinese and Tibetan canons respectively. While both of these collections contain translations of materials that have counterparts in the Pali canon, they also contain a unique body of literature known as the Mahayana scriptures, which reflect important shifts in thinking that had begun already within the early Indian Buddhist community. As the name Mahayana (“greater vehicle”) implies, these scriptures purport to describe a superior path, according to which the ultimate aim of spiritual practice is not the fulfillment of one’s own nirvanic aspirations, which Mahayanists associated with the enlightenment realized by the arahat, but the complete and perfect awakening attained by the Buddha himself. This path is illustrated in Mahayana writings by the bodhisattva, who vows to work for the liberation of all beings. Some of these writings, known as the Prajndpdramitd Sutras (“Perfection of Wisdom Sutras”), point to a more profound wisdom that can be attained through deep contemplation on the “emptiness” of all things. In addition to the Mahayana scriptures, the Tibetan canon includes a distinctive body of tantric writings of Indian origin. 3 These esoteric teachings set out practical methods for realizing the supreme goal described in the Mahayana scriptures - for example, yogic practices, rituals, meditations using sacred mantras, and visualizations. As such, Tantric Buddhism is commonly understood to represent a third path of prac- tice referred to as Vajrayana. Western scholarship has traditionally regarded the earliest portions of the Pali canon as the most authoritative and reliable source for understanding early Buddhism. 4 The justification for this relies greatly on the Theravadin account of its provenance, 2 INTRODUCTION which traces the canon back to a recension of the scriptures brought to Sri Lanka around 250 BCE, thereby securing its claim to being a faithful representation of the word of the Buddha. However, the supposed primacy of the Theravada canon has been the object of much critical scrutiny in recent years. Scholars have challenged what they regard as unwarranted assumptions about the monolithic character of Theravada tra- dition, as well as the presumed reliability of the canon as a source for understanding what Buddhists in earlier times actually believed and practiced (see Blackburn 2001 and Schopen 1997). There is considerable doubt surrounding the supposition that the Pali texts, as we now have them, are a verbatim transcription of an oral version dating to the middle of the third century BCE. The content of surviving fragments from other early canons, though quite similar to the Pali texts, is sufficiently different to suggest an ongoing process of composition and redaction. Many scholars would concur with the general assessment of Luis 0. Gomez: Transmitted and edited through the oral tradition, the words of the Buddha and his imme- diate disciples had suffered many transformations before they came to be compiled, to say nothing of their state when they were eventually written down. We have no way of deter- mining which, if any, of the words contained in the Buddhist scriptures are the words of the founder. . . . Evidently, the Pali canon, like other Buddhist scriptures, is the creation, or at least the compilation and composition, of another age and a different linguistic milieu. As they are preserved today, the Buddhist scriptures must be a collective creation, the fruit of the effort of several generations of memorizers, redactors, and compilers. (Gomez 2002, 55) Along the same lines, Steven Collins has persuasively argued that the Pali canon, understood as a “closed list of scriptures with a special and specific authority as the avowed historical record of the Buddha’s teaching," did not pre-exist the Theravada school, but was rather a product of it (Collins 1990, 72). Indeed, the creation of that canon continued at least through the fifth century CE, and “like most other religious Canons was produced in the context of dispute, here sectarian monastic rivalries" (ibid. , 76-7). We might also note in this connection that a large portion of the Mahayana scriptures were already in circulation by the fifth century CE. All this points to a far more complicated (less linear) picture of the development of Buddhism than one might infer from the traditional Theravada account. Given the complex history of these texts, we should be wary of attempts to recover a more authentic or original form of Buddhism from canonical sources. This attitude has greatly influenced the presentation of Buddhism in contemporary scholarship, where it is now customary to stress the plurality of Buddhist thought and practice. In response to concerns about the perceived over-reliance on canonical writings, and in particular the narrowing effect of this textual-critical approach on research and teach- ing, scholars have increasingly begun to look to other sources, including “oral and vernacular traditions, epigraphy, ritual, patterns of social and institutional evolution, gender, lay and folk traditions, art, archeology and architecture” (Cabezon 1995, 262-3), which they believe offer a more accurate account of the actual practice of Buddhism. Still, the gravitational pull of the canonical texts remains strong, especially in pres- entations of Buddhist philosophy. Every general survey pays close attention to the 3 STEVEN M. EMMANUEL discourses of the sutta-pitaka (the so-called Pali Nikayas) or to their counterparts in the Chinese canon (where they are called “Agamas”). It is generally accepted that these texts are an important source for understanding how Buddhist thinkers in the early centuries of the Common Era framed their own philosophical inquiries. As Rupert Gethin observes: The failure to appreciate this results in a distorted view of ancient Buddhism, and its sub- sequent development and history both within and outside India. From their frequent refer- ences to and quotations from the Nikayas/Agamas, it is apparent that all subsequent Indian Buddhist thinkers and writers of whatever school or persuasion, including the Mahayana - and most certainly those thinkers such as Nagarjuna, Asanga, and Vasub- andhu, who became the great Indian fathers of east Asian and Tibetan Buddhism - were completely familiar with this material and treated it as the authoritative word of the Buddha. (Gethin 1998. 44) Gethin goes on to note that, while interpretive disagreements inevitably arose, the authority of the texts was never in question. To recognize the teachings presented in the Nikaya/Agama material as in some sense "foundational" to the history of Buddhist philosophy does not, of course, commit us to parochial assumptions concerning the primacy of one textual tradition relative to others, or to claims about how accurately those texts reflect the actual words of the historical teacher. Still less does it commit us to the view that Buddhist philosophy is reducible to the views presented in those texts. Introductions to Buddhist philosophy vary a good deal in the scope and depth of the coverage they offer. Some are limited to an exposition of the discourses contained in the early canonical writings, which are commonly presented as the “basic” or “essen- tial” teachings of the Buddha (e.g., Gowans 2003), while others begin with the basic teachings, then proceed to show how these ideas were developed in later schools (e.g., Siderits 2007). There are differences too in the way the authors approach the question of attribu- tion. In his well-known study entitled What the Buddha Taught (1959), Walpola Rahula aims to give “a faithful and accurate account of the actual words used by the Buddha as they are to be found in the original Pali texts of the Tipitaka” (xi). However, the approach taken by Christopher W. Gowans in Philosophy of the Buddha (2003, 14) is more circumspect: The distance from the Buddha’s mouth to the texts we now possess is considerable . . . and there is much room for modification and misunderstanding. To a limited extent, modern scholarship may inform us when texts are more or less likely to accurately repre- sent what the Buddha really thought. But there is little prospect that we will ever know in detail how closely extant texts correspond to his actual teaching. The question of attribution continues to be a contentious one in the secondary lit- erature. According to Richard Gombrich, the core teachings of Buddhism exhibit a coherence that compels us to see them as the work of a single mind. “One remarkable brain,” he claims, “must have been responsible for the basic ideology. The owner of that 4 INTRODUCTION brain happens to be known, appropriately, as the Buddha, the Awakened’” (Gombrich 2009, 1 7). 5 This view parallels that of Etienne Lamotte, who, half a century earlier, remarked that "Buddhism could not be explained unless we accept that it has its origin in the strong personality of its founder” (Lamotte 1988, 639). Both statements are reactions to what the authors see as a facile dismissal of the textual evidence. Gombrich explains: It should go without saying that we are not bound to take what a Pali text - or any other text in the world - says at face value. But our initial working hypothesis has to be that the text is telling the truth, and in each case where we do not believe it, or doubt it, we must produce our reasons for doing so. There will be innumerable such cases and all kinds of reasons. But if we just dismiss what the text tells us a priori, there is no subject. If there is no subject, no one should be employed to teach it - and good riddance. (Gombrich 2009, 96) 6 Surely the canonical texts must be accorded some evidential weight regarding claims about the origin of their content, even if the history of their formation makes it impos- sible to distinguish precisely between what the founder actually taught and what the texts report. To suppose that the redactors and compilers of the textual tradition merely invented most or all of those ideas and put them in the mouth of a charismatic teacher is as uncharitable as it is implausible. In any event, the texts are what we have, and they have been received by the tradition as embodying the wisdom of the historical Buddha. More important, perhaps, than the question of attribution is the originating concern from which the teachings arose. The Buddha portrayed in the canonical texts was pre- occupied with one central problem: how to overcome dukkha, the suffering or deep unsatisfactoriness that pervades human experience. This problem is the central focus of the Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta (“Setting in Motion of the Wheel of Dhamma”), which establishes the soteriological aim at the heart of all Buddhist thought and prac- tice. Presented as the Buddha’s first public teaching following his awakening at Bodh Gaya, this sutta lays out a conceptual framework for understanding the true causes of suffering and the path of practice that leads to the cessation of suffering. Although this teaching is said to express the profound insight into the nature of reality attained by Gotama Buddha upon his awakening - and indeed can be fully grasped only by those who have themselves attained awakening - it is elaborated in various discourses by means of key concepts such as impermanence, non-self, and conditioned co-arising. These concepts, and the contemplative path that leads to the direct awareness of the realities described by them, would become the focus of rigorous philosophical examina- tion and debate. It is useful to bear in mind here that the Buddha of the canonical texts embraced a thoroughly pragmatic attitude regarding the value of teachings. He warned against the inherent danger of becoming attached to any teaching for its own sake. The value of the Dhamma must be understood in the context of its practical purpose: to facilitate liberation, the realization of nibbdna (Skt nirvana). In this respect, the Buddha likened his Dhamma to a raft: the usefulness of the teaching lies in helping us to reach the other shore. But once there, we must let it go (MN.1. 134-5).' 5 STEVEN M. EMMANUEL In the same spirit of pragmatism, the Buddha urged others not to believe anything merely on the basis of established tradition, the presumed authority of scripture, or reason alone, but to accept only what can be confirmed by experience (see the Kalama Sutta, AN.1. 1 8 8-9 3 ) . He did not invite mere intellectual assent, but encouraged instead a deeper moral, spiritual, and intellectual engagement with the existential problem of suffering. This process, if earnestly undertaken, inevitably opens the door to new ques- tions and new ways of conceptualizing both the path of Buddhist practice and its goal. Indeed, it is the history of this engagement that produced the immensely rich and diverse tradition of thought we call Buddhist philosophy. As we noted at the outset, Buddhism is a living tradition. To take this idea seriously is to recognize that, while it has its origins in the seminal teachings attributed to the historical Buddha, those teachings have always been the subject of interpretation and analysis. Even the codified version of the teachings preserved in the textual canon is to some extent the product of a history of interpretation that had been underway for centuries before being written down. That we cannot come any closer to the mind of the historical Buddha than through this tradition of interpretation and critical engage- ment should be of little concern to those who wish to study Buddhist philosophy. Buddhist Philosophy in Focus The central insight attained by the Buddha can be stated briefly as follows: all phenom- ena are conditioned, transitory, and devoid of any essence or “self” that remains unchanged over time. All phenomena arise within a complex network of mutually conditioning causes and effects. As the Buddha succinctly put the point: “When this exists, that comes to be; with the arising of this, that arises. When this does not exist, that does not come to be; with the cessation of this, that ceases'” (MN.III.64; Nanamoli and Bodhi 199 5, 927). According to this view, nothing in the world of our experience can be said to exist as an independent, unconditioned reality Applying this insight to human nature, we observe that a person is merely a collec- tion of psycho-physical elements or “aggregates” ( khandhas ) - body, feelings, percep- tions, volitions, consciousness - that give rise to a causal pattern we identify as a particular individual. It does not follow from the relative stability of this pattern, however, that there must be an underlying essence. When we look more closely, we see that both the mental and the physical phenomena that make up a person are constantly changing. Physical change is, of course, apparent in the natural process of aging. But careful observation of the mind, where we might hope to encounter the unifying core of personal identity, reveals nothing more than a perpetual succession of thoughts, ideas, and emotions. This analysis is similar in some respects to the position advanced by David Hume, who reasoned that the thing we call a “self” is nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. Our eyes cannot turn in their sockets without varying our perceptions. Our thought is still more variable than our sight; and all our other senses and faculties contribute to this change; nor is there any 6 INTRODUCTION single power of the soul, which remains unalterably the same, perhaps for one moment. The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appear- ance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no simplicity in it at one time, nor identity in different; whatever natural propension we may have to imagine that simplicity and identity. (Hume 1978, 252-3) 8 While Hume was concerned primarily to make a theoretical point, the Buddha’s analy- sis has a therapeutic and soteriological purpose. The doctrine of non-self ( anatta ) is key to understanding the causes of dukkha and its cessation. A principal cause of the suffering or unsatisfactoriness denoted by dukkha is "thirst” (tanha), the endless craving or desire that shapes our self-centered pursuit of happiness in the world. “Thirst” accounts for a wide range of physical, emotional, and psychologi- cal ills. According to the Buddha, these ills are the inevitable result of the desire to cling to things that are, by their very nature, impermanent and changing. We experience dukkha most immediately in the form of aging, sickness, and death. But everything in the world of human experience - including our thoughts and feel- ings, the people and things we cherish, the myriad situations and events that occur in the course of our lives - is conditioned in this way: it arises interdependently, undergoes a process of change, and passes away. By clinging to these things we only renew the conditions of our own suffering, thereby perpetuating the samsaric cycle of birth, death, and rebirth. To escape suffering, one must abandon the “identity view” (MN.I.434). The path that leads to the cessation of dukkha is a threefold practice involving the cultivation of wisdom, moral training, and concentration (meditation). This practice prepares the way for direct insight into the causes of suffering: Whatever exists therein of feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness, he sees those states as impermanent, as suffering, as a disease, ... as not self. He turns his mind away from those states and directs it towards the deathless element thus: "This is the peace- ful, this is the sublime, this is the stilling of all formations, the relinquishing of all attach- ments, the destruction of craving, dispassion, cessation, Nibbana.” (MN.I.437; Nanamoli and Bodhi 1995, 541) Though this insight clearly reflects a deeper metaphysical understanding of the mental and physical processes that condition sentient experience, the Buddha does not explicitly draw any ontological conclusions regarding the ultimate nature of those phenomena. In fact, as he is portrayed in the discourses, the Buddha is notably reluc- tant to engage in purely theoretical inquiries, as he seems to regard these as a diversion from useful discussion and analysis, and possibly even a hindrance to the pursuit of liberation. 9 That the Buddha does not venture into questions of an ontological nature indicates how closely his interest in metaphysical and epistemological issues is tied to soteriologi- cal ends. In this regard, his approach to philosophy is similar to that of the ancient Hellenistic philosophers, for whom there was no point to philosophical discourse if it did not “expel the suffering of the soul.” 10 The similarities between Buddhist and Hellenistic thought have been well noted by contemporary writers. 11 7 STEVEN M. EMMANUEL Nevertheless, as we noted earlier, critical engagement with the ideas presented in the discourses produced a vigorous tradition of philosophical inquiry, which, though motivated by the same soteriological goal, is broader in its scope and analytical methods . 12 This began with the Abhidhamma movement and was developed further by way of critical reactions to the Abhidhamma in diverging schools of Buddhist thought. In this vast and varied body of writings we find rigorous conceptual analyses of reality, truth, and knowledge; detailed investigations of the nature of mind and consciousness; reflections on ethics and moral psychology; and ideas about the state and the conditions for flourishing in society. Aim and Structure of the Volume An exhaustive account of our subject would fill perhaps several volumes of a compa- rable size. However, in keeping with the general aim of the Companion series we have endeavored to present a broad survey of the most important ideas, problems, and debates in the history of Buddhist philosophy. The volume is arranged in five parts. Part I features three introductory chapters on the conceptual foundations of Buddhist philosophy, beginning with a discussion of the intellectual context of Gotama's thought. This sets up a presentation both of the Bud- dha’s foundational teachings on dukkha and the path that leads to liberation and of the closely related doctrine of conditioned co-arising. We depart here from the customary practice of beginning with an account of Buddha’s life, partly because our focus is philosophical and partly because these accounts are readily available in electronic and printed sources . 13 Part II presents a general survey of the three living traditions of Buddhist thought: Theravada, Mahayana, and Vajrayana. Focusing mainly on bringing out key philo- sophical differences, these discussions provide a useful overview of the major figures and texts associated with the various schools. The chapters comprising Part III are organized by section under topical headings familiar to students of Western philosophy. It should be noted, however, that Buddhist philosophy is not as neatly delineated as this taxonomy would suggest. For example, Buddhist thinkers do not in practice distinguish between epistemology and logic, since they treat inference as one of two sources of knowledge (the other being percep- tion). We have introduced a soft division between these sections for the purpose of isolating more specific questions about both the role that meaning plays in inference and how Buddhist logicians might have conceived of a philosophy of logic. Other chap- ters in the “Language and Logic” section explore Buddhist reflections on the limits of language. Our purpose in presenting the material this way is not to divest Buddhist thought of its native idioms, but rather to help readers understand the characteristic ways in which Buddhist thinkers have addressed issues of perennial concern to Western philosophers. There is a conscious attempt throughout the volume to create a mainstream bridge between the Buddhist and Western traditions. To this end, many chapters in the volume are written from a comparative perspective. It is hoped that this approach wifi not only INTRODUCTION encourage a better understanding and appreciation of Buddhist philosophy but also suggest natural ways to incorporate it in the Western syllabus. Part IV contains a set of chapters on the theory and practice of Buddhist meditation. Although other chapters in the volume include some discussion of the role of contem- plative practice in various traditions of Buddhism, the focus here is on explaining the meditation process and its special value as a mode of inquiry. The concluding chapter offers a cross-cultural look at the relevance of Buddhist meditation to contemporary neuroscience and theories of consciousness. Finally, in Part V we turn to an examination of contemporary developments in Bud- dhist philosophy. These chapters extend the discussion of Buddhist social, political, and ethical thought as it applies to environmental and biomedical issues, war and peace, human rights, gender, and diversity. Notes 1 See Prebish (2008). 2 For a helpful discussion of this issue, see Gethin (1998, 7-27). 3 Esoteric teachings are also represented in the Chinese Zhenyan tradition. 4 Among contemporary scholars, this view is perhaps best represented in the work of Richard Gombrich (1988, 1996, and esp. 2009, ch. 7). 5 Peter Harvey agrees: “There is an overall harmony to the Canon, suggesting ‘authorship’ of its system of thought by one mind’’ (Harvey 2012, 3). 6 This is similar to the “Principle of Testimony” articulated by Richard Swinburne: “The special considerations that lead us to doubt a subject’s reports of his experiences are evi- dence that generally or in matters of a particular kind he misremembers or exaggerates or lies. But, in the absence of such positive evidence, we have good grounds to believe what others tell us about their experiences” (Swinburne 2004, 322). 7 It was understood, of course, that in order to test the teachings one would need to proceed on the basis of some provisional trust or confidence ( saddlm ) in their salvific efficacy. 8 Compare Derek Parfit’s updated version of Hume’s argument in Parfit (1984). 9 This issue is explored in Ruegg (1995, 149-53). 10 Epicurus, as quoted in Porphyry, To Marcella 3 1 . Translated in Long and Sedley (1987, 155). 1 1 See, for example, Gowans (2003, 42-6), as well as his essay “Medical Analogies in Buddhist and Hellenistic Thought: Tranquillity and Anger,” in Ganeri and Carlisle (2010, 11-34). 12 This included questions of an ontological nature. See Ronkin (2005) for a detailed discus- sion of the development of Buddhist metaphysics in the Abhidhamma. 1 3 Two concise biographies of the Buddha’s life are Carrithers (1983) and Strong (2001). For a presentation of the Buddha's life based on Pali canonical texts, the reader may consult Nanamoli (1992). References Blackburn, Anne M. (2001). Buddhist Learning and Textual Practice in Eighteenth-Century Lankan Monastic Culture. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Cabezon, Jose Ignacio (1995). Buddhist Studies as a Discipline and the Role of Theory. In Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 18, 231-68. 9 STEVEN M. EMMANUEL Carrithers, Michael (1983). The Buddha: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Collins, Steven (1990). On the Very Idea of the Pali Canon. In Journal of the Pali Text Society 15, 89-126. Ganeri, Jonardon, and Carlisle, Clare (eds) (2010). Philosophy as Therapeia. Royal Institute of Philosophy, Supplement no. 66. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gethin, Rupert (1998). The Foundations of Buddhism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gombrich, Richard (1988). Theravdda Buddhism: A Social History from Ancient Benares to Modern Colombo. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Gombrich, Richard (1996). How Buddhism Began: The Conditioned Genesis of the Early Teachings. London: Athlone Press. Gombrich, Richard (2009). What the Buddha Thought. London: Equinox. Gomez, Luis 0. (2002). Buddhism in India. In The Religious Traditions of Asia: Religion, History and Culture. Ed. J. M. Kitagawa. London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 41-96. Gowans, Christopher W. (2003). Philosophy of the Buddha. London: Routledge. Harvey, Peter (2012). Introduction to Buddhism: Teachings, History and Practices. Second edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hume, David (1978). A Treatise of Human Nature. Second edn. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Lamotte, Etienne (1988). History of Indian Buddhism. Trans. Sara Webb-Boin. Louvain: Institut Orientaliste. Long, A. A., and Sedley, D.N. (1987). The Hellenistic Philosophers. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nanamoli, Bhikkhu (1992). The Life of the Buddha. Kandy, Sri Lanka: Buddhist Publication Society. Nanamoli, Bhikkhu, and Bodhi, Bhikkhu (trans.) (1995). The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha. Boston: Wisdom. Parfit, Derek (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Prebish, Charles (2008). Cooking the Buddhist Books: The Implications of the New Dating of the Buddha for the History of Early Indian Buddhism. In Journal of Buddhist Ethics 15, 1-21. Rahula, Walpola (1974). What the Buddha Taught. Rev. edn. New York: Grove Press. Ronkin, Noa (2005). Early Buddhist Metaphysics: The Making of a Philosophical Tradition. London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon. Ruegg, D. Seyfort (1995). Some Reflections on the Place of Philosophy in the Study of Buddhism. In Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 18, 145-81. Schopen, Gregory (1997). Bones, Stones, and Buddhist Monks: Collected Papers on the Archaeology, Epigraphy, and Texts of Monastic Buddhism in India. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Siderits, Mark (2007). Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction. Indianapolis: Hackett. Strong, John S. (2001). The Buddha: A Short Biography. Oxford: Oneworld. Swinburne, Richard (2004). The Existence of God. Second edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 10 Part I Conceptual Foundations 1 The Philosophical Context of Gotama’s Thought STEPHEN J. LAUMAICIS Some Fundamental Problems Although it is de rigueur to begin any account of Buddhism with the “received” biog- raphy of its founder, Siddhattha Gotama, or, as he is more commonly known, the Buddha or the Awakened One, there are at least a half dozen fundamental problems with this practice. First, like Jesus and Socrates, the Buddha never wrote anything - about either himself or his teachings. Second, his supposed teachings were compiled anywhere from a hundred to a few hundred years after his death. Third, the canonical teachings t hat ultimately informed the “received” view of his life contain numerous conflicting and, in fact, contradictory accounts of his life. Fourth, there is no scholarly doubt that the supposed teachings of the Buddha underwent various changes, editions, and developments as they passed from an oral tradition to a written record. Fifth, there are ongoing scholarly debates over exactly what - if anything at all - can be said with any degree of certainty with respect to what the man who became the Buddha actually thought or taught given the previous issue. And, sixth, the “received” view of his life fails to consider the historical and intellectual contexts in and from which his supposed teachings emerged. If the foregoing problems were not enough to make one stop and think about what we really know about the Buddha and his teachings, there is the additional question about whether what the Buddha thought and taught is philosophy, religion, both, or neither. Nevertheless, despite these problems, recent scholarship has begun to shed some light on the social, cultural, historical, and intellectual contexts in and from which the Buddha and Buddhism arose, fn order to take advantage of this work and sidestep the thorny issues associated with the supposed biography of the Buddha and the debate over whether Buddhism is a philosophy, a religion, both, or neither, this essay will A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy, First Edition. Edited by Steven M. Emmanuel. ©2013 John Wiley & Sons. Inc. Published 201 3 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 13 STEPHEN J. LAUMAKIS instead provide an account of his intellectual biography by analyzing the philosophical context in and from which his thought and teachings emerged. Indian “Views” of Reality As I have argued elsewhere (Laumakis 2008), perhaps one of the easiest ways of under- standing the basic elements of classical Indian thought - and Siddhattha Gotama’s reaction to it - is to think of them as a collection of intellectual insights in a series of transitions in what we might call the “Indian Way” of seeing and understanding reality (Roller 2006). Conceived of in this way, it is helpful to think of the ancient Indians as offering us at least three distinct conceptual frameworks or “views" of reality. The first “view," what we might call the understanding of the Dasyus, or the pre- Aryan or “pre-Vedic view" of things, seems to have countenanced belief in many gods, nature worship, fertility rituals, concerns about purification, and some basic ideas about both an afterlife and the possibilities of reincarnation. According to some schol- ars, the last two points, in particular, appear to be anchored in simple observations about the cycle of birth-life-death in nature, the phases of the moon, the seasons of the year, and obvious family resemblances. Recent archeological evidence also sup- ports the claim that the Dasyus appear to have been vegetarians who engaged in ascetic practices and yogic meditation. The second Indian “view," the understanding of the Aryans and the Vedas, builds upon this early view of things and seems to have formalized it with ritual sacrifices and celebrations, the production of sacred texts (supposedly not composed by humans) - concerned with the “wisdom” of poet-seers and hearers to whom it was revealed, and liturgical formulae and chants about what had been seen and heard. This second view also contains the “philosophical” (or merely human) reflections and speculations of the Upanishads. The third and final “view," what we might call the post-Vedic understanding of reality, is actually a more sustained, careful, and detailed working out of the individual elements of the pre-Vedic and Vedic views of things. This rather complex understand- ing of reality includes a clarification and specification of the roles of the gods (or a denial of their existence) and their relation to the ultimate, single source of all things (i.e., Brahman), a delineation of the details of the varna / color and caste systems, an account of the stages of life (i.e., studying under a teacher or being a student; returning home to marry and raise a family as a householder; relinquishing daily affairs to one’s son by retiring and beginning meditative practices; and, finally, leaving home to live and die in the forest as an ascetic) and the various aims of life (i.e., dharma/v irtue or moral righteousness, art/ia/wealth and success, fafma/pleasure and fulfilling material desires, and mofcsa/liberation or achieving salvation). It also contains more serious reflection on the cyclical nature of birth-life-death (samsara) and the notions of rebirth and the prospects of release or liberation from this cosmic cycle. At a more fine-grained level of consideration, this third “view" includes what schol- ars have identified as the nine darsanas (“schools” or “viewpoints”) of classical Indian thought - i.e., Samkhya, Yoga, MImamsa, Vedanta, Nyaya, Vaisesika, Jain, Carvaka, and Buddhist views (See Mohanty 2000, 1 53-8). Finally, it involves an elucidation of 14 THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT OF GOTAMA’S THOUGHT the notions and relations of the “self " and society and social regulation through the ideas of norms, duties, obligations, virtues, karma, and Dharma. Indian Philosophy and/or Indian Religion? What begins to emerge from this series of “views” is, I think, a rather rich and complex understanding of reality that includes features that are both “philosophical” and “religious"/“theological ” 1 in the typical Western senses of these terms. In fact, before delving into the philosophical details of these views, I think it is possible to get a pre- liminary sense of the intellectual context and cultural milieu that supported the social and philosophical development of Siddhattha Gotama and his emergence as the histori- cal Buddha. For example, the Dasyu beliefs in many gods, nature worship, and fertility and puri- fication rituals are clearly (by common Western standards) “religious" kinds of beliefs. These same “religious"/“theological" beliefs are also part of the “Vedic view” of the Aryans who formalized them with ritual texts and the Brahmanical priesthood. But it is also important to recall that this same “Vedic view” includes the purely “philosophi- cal" reflections and arguments of the Upanishads. In fact, when conceived of as a whole, it is useful to think of the Vedas as a complex, simultaneously religious and philosophical reconciliation, merging the pre-Vedic and Aryan views of reality. The Vedas themselves contain virtually every element and theme of the “pre-Vedic view” of the Dasyus as well as the wisdom of their own seers and hearers: hymns for deities, rules for fire sacrifices, music, poetry, magic rituals, and ideas about rta (order), karma (Skt karma: action and its consequences), samsara, and the afterlife. The Upanishads, on the other hand, continue to develop these themes in a more strictly “philosophical” or purely rational way. In fact, it is this philosophical working out of the same themes and their logical implications as the “post- Vedic view” of reality that provides the immediate historical, cultural, and intellectual context within which the life and teachings of Siddhattha Gotama were formed. As a result, I think it is safe to say that the “post- Vedic view” that was formed both during and after the life of Siddhattha is what we in the West would call “Indian phi- losophy" strictly and properly speaking. It is to a finer-grained analysis of this context that we now turn our attention. Siddhattha Gotama’s Cultural and Intellectual Context Like many great thinkers, Gotama was born into a rich, complex, and dynamic social and historical setting. On the one hand, he inherited an Indian culture rich in philosophical and religious beliefs and practices. Not only were his contemporaries interested in securing the material goods necessary both for basic subsistence and for making one’s way through the various stages of life noted above, but they were also profoundly interested in trying to understand the meaning and purpose of life and the fundamental nature of reality in order to realize - in the appropriate kinds of ways - the various aims of life. 15 STEPHEN J. LAUMAKIS In fact, Sue Hamilton (Hamilton 2001, 1) has pointed out that in India it was tradi- tionally believed that the activity of philosophizing was directly associated with one’s personal destiny. She also notes that what we in the West tend to distinguish as “reli- gion” and "philosophy" was actually combined in India in people’s attempts to under- stand both the meaning and structure of life and the fundamental nature of reality. In other words, in India, especially at the time when Gotama was alive, the two activities of doing philosophy and practicing religion were actually two interrelated or interde- pendent aspects of the same inner or spiritual quest. In addition to his personal and cultural wealth, Gotama was born into a society in the midst of great social and political changes. Putting aside for the moment concerns about the actual dates of his birth and death, there is little doubt that he lived at a time when the certainties of traditional ways of thinking and living - in other words, when a historically nomadic and pastoral tribal society morphs into a predominantly agrar- ian one - were being challenged by the new and unsettling problems arising out of the breakdown of tribal federations and the development of powerful monarchies and emerging urban centers. In other words, Gotama lived in the midst of a transition from an agrarian, village-based economy to a city-based form of life with all of its attendant problems and possibilities (Gombrich 1988). Yet, as was the case with the many great thinkers who lived before and after him, Gotama’s life may be seen as the fortuitous coming together of the right man with the right abilities at the right time in the right circumstances bringing about a truly amazing solution to a very complex set of challenges. It is precisely this image of an appropriately qualified person and a portentous opportunity fortuitously and “karmically” coming together - what Peter Hershock (Hershock 1996, 110) refers to as “virtuosity" - that I want to employ as a heuristic to help explain the cultural and philosophical context for the emergence of Buddhism. Basic Elements of the Pre-Vedic View - The Remote Origins of Gotama’s Thought As we have seen, the Dasyu or “pre-Vedic view” of reality (c. 2500 bce), which is sup- ported not by primary texts but rather by archeological evidence and the writings of their successors, is rooted in nature worship and beliefs in multiple gods. Other features of this darsana include purification and fertility rituals, vegetarianism, asceticism, yoga, and some rudimentary ideas about an afterlife and the possibility of rebirth. Although it is not possible to be certain about how these basic beliefs were formed, it is not difficult to imagine an ancient agricultural people and their ordinary problems and concerns. To begin, it is obvious that the basic facts of every human life include practical con- cerns about food, clothing, and shelter. There are also environmental concerns about one’s life and safety in the face of nature and its power, as well as concerns about the dangers posed by wild animals and other human beings. Once these basic biological needs and environmental concerns are met and addressed, it is easy to see how and why ancient peoples would have turned their attention to deeper “metaphysical" ques- tions about the ultimate end and purpose of living and dying, since these are the basic facts of life. 16 THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT OF GOTAMA’S THOUGHT The Meaning, Purpose, and End of Life It goes without saying that little reflection is required for one to realize that many things in the world are beyond human control, and it is often difficult, if not impossible, to know or predict future events and circumstances, such as the weather and seasons and natural disasters. However, it is also quite clear that many of these very same forces and events in nature seem to follow general patterns, even predictable cyclical patterns. The sun rises and sets, the moon waxes and wanes, the tides rise and fall, and the seasons come and go in relative order and stability. It should not be difficult to imagine ancient Indians being concerned with questions about the source or sources of this apparent order and pattern. Furthermore, it is easy to imagine them asking if the order itself is real or merely apparent. Finally, one could imagine them asking themselves, if things are not in their control, then might or must there be something that does control or explain the order and pattern. The best available evidence seems to indicate that the ancient Dasyu way of under- standing and dealing with the ordinary questions and problems of life was to recognize some superhuman or divine sources of power behind or within natural forces and events. They also seem to have realized that nature itself exercised a kind of control over human affairs. The Dasyus recognized the immutable and inexorable truth that humans are born, live, and die, but they also appear to have held the view - based on their burial practices - that death was not the end of life. It is, however, unknown whether they distinguished clearly between rebirth in a different world in some other location or simply rebirth in this world at some future time. Whether they had consid- ered some kind of causal (i.e., karmic) explanation of either possible rebirth scenario is unclear as well. Seeds and Fruit: Actions and their Consequences Consider, for a moment, the same data of experience that we have been highlighting, especially in an agricultural community setting. The sun rises and sets, the moon waxes and wanes, the tides rise and fall, and the seasons come and go in relative order and stability. Humans, plants, and animals are born, grow, mature, and die. Humans interact with one another and the world around themselves, and events and outcomes seem to follow regular patterns. The same kinds of seeds produce the same kinds of trees, which in turn produce the same kinds of fruit and the same seeds all over again. The same kinds of animals produce the same kinds of offspring and the results of similar kinds of human actions tend, always or almost always, to be the same, and, for that matter, even predictably so. In general, when I do action A to object B at time T, the result is always, or nearly always, the same. How can one make sense of this? One ancient Indian account, whose origin and roots are unknown, is to claim that the similarities in outcomes that we experience in our interactions with nature and other human beings are best explained by appealing to the agricultural idea of seeds and their fruits. Actions, whether human or natural, like seeds, produce fruits or 17 STEPHEN J. LAUMAKIS outcomes or effects, based on the kinds of seeds they are. Orange seeds produce orange trees that produce oranges that once again produce orange seeds. Dogs produce dogs that produce more dogs. Humans produce humans that produce more humans. So, by extension, human actions produce outcomes or results that are causally determined by the kind of actions they are. “Good” actions produce “good" effects and “bad” actions produce “bad” effects, fn general, effects follow from their causes in the same way that fruit follows from seeds. In other words, according to the ancient Indians, the world and events happening around us seem to follow law-like, regular patterns. Whether this regularity is real, or apparent and merely perceived, whether it is a necessary relation or merely a statistical probability or correlation, whether it is a real feature of the world or the result of a psychological habit built up over time in human observers, the fact remains that the ancient Indians used the idea of karma to make sense out of and explain what was happening around them. Like the idea of rebirth, the idea of karma provides a plausible and rational explanation for things and events that are happening around us. Moreover, these ideas seem to have been among the most basic insights of the “Indian way" of understanding reality. In fact, they provided the foundation for Gotama's philosophical reflections. Basic Elements of the Vedic View: The Source of Gotama’s Philosophical Concerns What 1 am calling the “Vedic view” of reality (c. 1500-500 BCE) is an understanding of life and reality that emerged from a complex cultural and intellectual process of absorption, assimilation, rejection, and revision of Dasyu beliefs and practices. Although there is much historical ignorance and uncertainty about both the geographical origins of the Aryans as a people and culture and their subsequent arrival and impact on the Indus Valley civilization of the Dasyus, there is no doubt that during the second mil- lennium BCE the Aryans, who spoke and wrote a form of proto-Sanskrit, replaced the Dasyus as the dominant people of the Indus Valley. The basic elements of the Aryan account of the purpose and meaning of life and the fundamental nature of reality are recorded in the Vedas, the Brahmanas, the Aranyakas, and later the Upanishads. These elements, which were “heard” and “remembered" by seer-poets and sages, include an initial polytheism (later replaced by the monism/monotheism of the Upanishads) and formalized ritual fire sacrifices per- formed by priests or Brahmans. Other features of this darsana are a gradual acceptance of vegetarianism, non-violence, asceticism, yoga, karma, and belief in rebirth and the cyclical nature of reality and existence. Just as there are serious scholarly doubts and uncertainties about the formation of the “pre- Vedic view,” there are similar problems and questions about exactly how the basic features of the “Vedic view” were formed. Nevertheless, the elements of what 1 am calling the “Vedic view” have the notable advantage of being recorded in written texts. The texts themselves seem to indicate that the religious and philosophical beliefs and practices of the Aryans underwent two distinct but related types of development. On the one hand, they appear to have absorbed and eventually replaced Dasyu beliefs and 18 THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT OF GOTAMA’S THOUGHT practices. On the other hand, they seem to have undergone an internal development and deepening penetration of vision and understanding of their own insights. In other words, what I want to suggest is that the “Vedic view” sublated the pre-Vedic Dasyu “view” while simultaneously, over a period of some five hundred to a thousand years, deepening its own insight and understanding of reality and the meaning, purpose, and end of life. Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that what I call the “Vedic view” is in reality something far more complex and complicated than the single name I employ to denominate it. In fact, this “view” includes a relative spectrum of historically distinct beliefs about important philosophical concepts and ideas. Despite this oversimplification, I think this way of presenting the “Vedic view” has the advantage of capturing most, if not all, of the important religious and philosophical ideas that came to form the immediate historical, intellectual, and cultural context from which and against which the teachings of Siddhattha Gotama arose. Basic Elements of the Post- Vedic View: The Immediate Context of Gotama’s Thought The post-Vedic “view” (after 500 bce) was a more careful, rigorous, and systematic rational working out of the details of the pre-Vedic and Vedic accounts of things. It was also the source of the nine classical “schools" of Indian philosophy. In fact, it is helpful to think of this third conceptual framework as being constituted by the individual views of its nine schools in the same way that white light is the product of the seven colors of the visible spectrum. Each individual color or school has its own unique fea- tures and history, and when appropriately harmonized they - in good Buddhist under- standing - interdependently give rise to the “post-Vedic view” of things. As we have already noted, this rather complex “view” included a clarification and specification of the roles of the various deities of the pre-Vedic and Vedic views (or their non-existence) and their relations to the ultimate, single source of all things (i.e., Brahman of the Upanishads), a delineation of the details of the varna / color and social caste systems, and the enumeration of the stages of life and the various possible aims of individual lives. It also contained more serious and sustained philosophical reflection and, in fact, vigorous disagreement - in which Gotama participated - over the possible outcomes of the cyclical nature of birth-life-death as well as the notions of rebirth and the prospects of release or liberation from this cosmic cycle. Finally, it involved more sustained philosophical debate about the notions and relations of the “self" and society (i.e., metaphysical and epistemological thinking) and social regulation (i.e., ethical thinking) through the increasingly complex ideas of norms, duties, obligations, virtues, karma, and Dharma. It bears repeating that the living social reality and history of all of this was clearly far more complex and complicated than my simple distinguishing of Indian thought into three “views” would indicate. In fact, the division of Indian thought into the nine classical darsanas is itself a simplification of a richer and more complex spectrum of historically and philosophically distinct views. Moreover, when we turn our attention to these various “schools" we encounter a number of ideologically distinct and mutu- ally exclusive accounts of the meaning and purpose of life and the fundamental nature 19 STEPHEN J. LAUMAKIS of reality. In short, what is commonly designated as the teachings of Siddhattha Gotama is actually just one of these nine competing points of view. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that the darsanas themselves represent, in rather broad strokes, a full spectrum of both logical and real possible positions with respect to the fundamental ideas contained in the pre-Vedic, Vedic, and post-Vedic “views." In the light of the initial sketches of the three “views” already presented, we may now consider these other systems in more detail as constituting the immediate philosophical context of Gotama’s thought. Nine Darsanas It may be helpful to begin our consideration of the nine classical “schools” of Indian thought by noting that the Buddhist tradition 2 itself refers to no fewer than 62 kinds of “wrong views" on matters as diverse as the past, the self, the world, pleasure, the mind, good and bad, chance, the future, life after death, nirvana, and even the teaching on interdependent arising. From what has already been said about the history of the three “views,” it should not be surprising that the roots of Indian philosophical orthodoxy are traced to the Vedas and the Upanishads. In fact, the traditional and perhaps the easiest way of cap- turing the distinctions among the classical schools of Indian philosophy is to categorize them as “orthodox” and “unorthodox" or "heterodox,” based on whether they accept or reject the basic “truth” of the Vedas and the Upanishads. 3 These are, after all, the first written texts that convey the basic elements of what one might call “the Indian view of the world.” Not only were these texts and their words regarded by the religious leaders of ancient India, the Brahmans, as the primary sources of truth about the ultimate meaning and purpose of life and the fundamental nature of reality, but they also were compiled by those with the power, both materially and spiritually, to confirm their truth and insure their acceptance and continuing influence. It should not be surprising, therefore, to see the religious and philosophical landscape of India, especially at the time of the Buddha, defined by one's relationship to the “Vedic view” of reality. Six “Orthodox” Darsanas According to the Indian tradition, six darsanas are recognized as “orthodox.” These are the Samkhya, Yoga, MImamsa, Vedanta, Nyaya, and Vaisesika systems. According to the Samkhya view, whose name means reason or discriminating knowledge, reality, which is ultimately dualistic (i.e., consists of two irreducible modes of being or existence) in nature, can be classified into 25 categories of matter ( prakrti ) and spirit ( purusa ) - the two most basic principles of being. This view also maintained that reality consists of three elements - water, fire, and air - as well as three qualities ( gunas ) that helped to explain the material constitution of things - lightness or mental activity (sattva), energy or activity (rajas), and inertia or dullness (tama). 20 THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT OF GOTAMA’S THOUGHT This view, which is sometimes described as an atheistic naturalism (Mohanty 2000, 4-5), admitted an eternal self, numerically distinct for each individual. As Mohanty claims, “In its mature form, it developed a theory of evolution of the empirical world out of the original, undifferentiated nature” (ibid., 5). In fact, the three qualities or gunas of material being, which were originally in a state of equilibrium, were disturbed by contact with spirit or purusa. The subsequent evolution of the physical world is a progressive and uneven scattering or intermingling of the three gunas and spirit. In order to avoid the logical and metaphysical problem of something coming from nothing, the causal mechanism of this activity is explained by arguing that effects pre-exist in their causes. At the same time, each unique, individual spirit experiences attachment to its materially composite body as a result of failing to distinguish its true “spirit-self” from the composite that is itself a product of nature and its causes. According to this view, release from this condition or moksa, which is a return to the state of an unmixed spirit, is achieved by realizing or coming to know that the “spirit-self” is really meta- physically different from matter and nature. Over time, this speculative metaphysical view of the world came to be paired with the more practical or ethically focused system of Yoga. According to the Yoga view of things, ontological dualism is metaphysically correct, but it also recognizes that, in addition to matter and individual spirits, there is a divine/supreme being, a God/Self that exists. Following the Samkhya idea that there is a real metaphysical difference between spirit and matter, the Yoga view insists that the composite being leads the true spirit-self to mistake itself for the composite. The solution to this misidentification, and ultimately to release or moksa, is the development of discriminating insight or knowl- edge that is achieved through the disciplined meditation of yoga. It is the practice of yoga meditation that enables the true self to overcome its ignorance and liberate itself from its bondage and attachment to the material and physical. The third (and fourth) classical Indian school is called MImamsa, which means exegesis. Without getting too detailed, it should be noted that this system is traditionally divided into an early (Purva MImamsa) and later (Uttara MImamsa or Vedanta) version. In general, holders of this view, at least in its earliest version, disagree with the Samkhya and Yoga belief that knowledge alone is sufficient for release from bondage. According to the early version of this darsana, ritual practice is what is essential for moksa. At the same time, however, those who maintain this early view appear to be ambivalent about the existence of God or a supreme being. On the one hand, they reject typical arguments for God’s existence but, on the other hand, they also recognize an ontological category of potency or power that seems to include supernatural agency. Nevertheless, the most important element of the MImamsa vision of reality (taken as a whole) is its rather elaborate system for understanding and interpreting the Vedas. As part of their science of interpretation, MImamsa thinkers believe that words themselves are the ultimate source of knowledge and that they serve as a direct means of truth. They also argue that true cognition originates from multiple sources, among them perception, logical inferences, verbal utterances, simple comparison, and postula- tion. As Koller points out, the chief concern of Mlmanisa philosophers, at least in its early version, is to work out a theory of knowledge that accommodates scriptural testimony as a valid means of knowledge and, on that basis, to provide a science of 21 STEPHEN J. LAUMAKIS scriptural interpretation that captures and explains the meaning and truth of the Vedas, especially the ritualistic Brahmanas (see Koller 2006, 247). The later MTmamsa or Vedanta philosophers focused their attention on the more philosophical and non-ritualistic Upanishads. While initially accepting the authority of the early Vedas, the Uttarti MTmamsa emphasized knowledge, instead of ritual, as the means to liberation. However, at least some Vedanta thinkers insisted that ritual- type devotion was a means of relating to and knowing Brahman. Not surprisingly, following the Upanishads, they argued that Brahman is the ultimate reality, that the “true self" is metaphysically identical to Brahman, and that knowledge of this truth was essential for moksa. Taken together, the two versions of the MTmamsa exegetical system represent the ritual and gnostic branches of the Brahmanical tradition, whose roots can be traced back to the fifth century BCE. These complementary halves of the Vedic and post- Vedic view ultimately came to be known as the action/fairma and knowledge / jndna interpre- tations of the Vedas. The fifth and sixth classical systems of Indian thought are the Nyaya and Vaisesika views. The Nyaya darsana is fundamentally concerned with questions and problems in logic. Its roots may be traced back to the belief that faulty reasoning and/or logical mistakes are the causes of suffering and attachment, and that one can arrive at the truth and ultimately liberation by correcting fallacious reasoning. In order to root out mistakes in reasoning, Nyaya thinkers analyzed reality into various logic-based catego- ries, all of which could be proven to exist. In fact, the philosophers of this school worked out an entire epistemological theory of logic, rational argumentation, and proof, as well as an account of valid knowledge. Their ideas in logic and epistemology were subse- quently adopted by their “sister system,” the Vaisesika, from whom the Nyaya borrowed their metaphysical views of reality and the self. This sharing of ideas led in time to a nominal joining of the views as the Nyaya- Vaisesika. The Vaisesika contribution to the union was an account of the particularities of all real things. Their pluralistic realism, which involved an atomistic theory of the material world, was rooted in six ontological categories: substance, quality, action, universality, particularity, and inherence. They employed these categories to demonstrate the incom- patibility of spirit and matter. They also claimed that “God” made the physical world out of pre-existent elemental substances. More importantly, they argued that through logical analysis one could arrive at a sound knowledge of all things, including the mind and the true eternal self, and that such knowledge was the only source of liberation from attachment and enslavement to matter. These six darsanas or viewpoints of the Vedas and the Upanishads are collectively referred to as the astika - “so-sayers" (Renard 1999, 90) - systems because they are in general agreement, despite their particular differences, with respect to their acceptance of the authority and truth of what I call the “Vedic view" of the purpose and mean- ing of life, as well as the fundamental nature of reality. Their acceptance of the Vedas and the Upanishads also justifies their designation as the “orthodox” schools. The remaining three classical systems of Indian thought, the Jain, the Carvaka, and the Buddhist darsanas , are collectively referred to as the ndstika - “deniers or rejecters” (ibid.) - systems because each, in their own unique way, rejects the authority and truth of the Vedic scriptures and tradition. 22 THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT OF GOTAMA’S THOUGHT Three “Heterodox” Darsanas According to the Jain view of things, there is a sharp distinction between spirit and matter or souls and bodies. The first kind of beings, spiritual beings (jiva ), are alive, and the second kind of beings, material beings or non-spiritual beings, ( ajiva ) are not alive. Bondage to the cycle of birth, life, death, and rebirth for spiritual beings is caused by their karmic actions. The specifics of this account of rebirth involve the idea that karmic actions by spir- itual beings causally produce material particles that are attracted to the soul's spiritual energy and thereby bind themselves to the spiritual self. The continuing union of the soul and matter that results from karmic action is itself caused by both ignorance and attachment that result from the passions, wants, and desires of spiritual beings. There is, however, a way out of the soul's bondage, through the practice of moral living, meditation, and great ascetic austerities. In fact, the ultimate cause of release is the acquisition of knowledge or insight into the soul's samsaric situation by way of a kind of awakening or extraordinary insight into the true, pure, and unsullied nature of the soul or self. This profound insight also includes the recognition that the only way to experience liberation is to destroy, by ascetic mortification - preferably in a monastic setting - the accumulated “material” karmic consequences of prior actions and avoid all future karmic action. In addition to these ethical and metaphysical claims, Jain thinkers reject the sacrificial rituals of the Vedas as well as the monism of the Upanishads. From the epistemic point of view, the Jains claimed that reality has an infinity of aspects, and that all truth claims can be confirmed by perception, logical inference, or verbal testimony. As a result of their ontological pluralism, they also claimed that all truths are relative to a specific frame of reference. In other words, every claim or propo- sition is true from a certain point of view and false from some other point of view. Given this account of the basic features of their view of reality, it should not be surprising that the Jains deny the existence of a single “God” or divine being but simul- taneously affirm the existence of multiple gods or divine beings. In fact, Jain thinkers insist that each individual soul or spirit has the capacity, through severe ascetic prac- tice, to develop infinite consciousness or omniscience, infinite power or omnipotence, and absolute happiness or eternal bliss. All that is necessary for this ultimate achieve- ment is sufficiently severe ascetic practices that eliminate impure and harmful thoughts, words, and deeds. The second “heterodox" classical Indian view is the Carvaka darsana. According to this materialist "school,” only material things exist, and, as a result, there are no imma- terial beings and hence no spiritual selves. Since matter is the only reality, there is no afterlife (precisely because there is no existence beyond the physical, material world) and, consequently, no karma, no karmic bondage, and no possibility of moksa or nirvana. Like all materialists, Carvaka thinkers maintained that the only reliable source of knowledge is sense experience, and that the goal of life is the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. While individual materialists disagreed about the number and kind of basic material elements from which all material things are composed, they appear to be unanimous 23 STEPHEN J. LAUMAKIS in their denial of moksa or nirvana and affirmation of causal determinism and fatalism. One such thinker, Gosala, claimed that human beings have no freedom to act precisely because all outcomes are causally predetermined by fate, or the laws of material inter- actions. According to this view, despite the internal introspective experience of choice, the actual outcome of events is necessitated by the prior physical conditions that give rise to it. Such a view is, as Gotama saw, obviously at odds with the hedonistic claim which suggests that the purpose of life is to pursue pleasure and avoid pain, because the notions of pursuit and avoidance seem to presuppose, or at least assume, choice or some form of non-determinism. Perhaps it was this inconsistency and other uncertainties about the metaphysics of the self and karma and moksa that led some materialists to defend a complete skepticism with regard to any true knowledge about the meaning and purpose of life as well as the fundamental nature of reality. The Buddha, as we know, had a different view of each of these matters. Yet it was within the context of these competing views 4 and their ongoing debates and disagree- ments that Siddhattha Gotama worked out his own unique philosophical views and eventually became the Awakened One. Notes 1 For an interesting and persuasive analysis of this distinction, see Fitzgerald (2000). For more on the ongoing debate about the status of religious studies and for other views of the matter, see Religious Studies Review 27/2 (2001) and 27/4 (2001). 2 Brahmajala Sutta : The Supreme Net (DN.1. 1-46: Walshe 199 5). The Buddha not only compares these wrong views to a fishnet but also refers to them as a net of views that catches and holds those who hold them. 3 ft should be noted that, even though it is misleading to suggest that both sets of texts share the exact same “view” of reality, I have combined them as part of the “Vedic view” in order to simplify a rather complex situation. 4 ft is important to keep in mind that the “orthodox” /“heterodox” distinction is just one of many different ways of conceptualizing the relationships among the various philosophical darsanas of ancient India. Obviously, there are other possible ways of distinguishing the numerous schools - for example, according to their metaphysical beliefs (about the whole of reality, or about its parts - i.e., the nature of the human person, the soul or spirit or self, nirvana, etc.), their epistemological beliefs (about the nature, origin, and limits of knowl- edge), or their ethical beliefs (about the goals of human living, the elements of the good human life, the standards of morality, karma, etc.). References Fitzgerald, T. (2000). The Ideology of Religious Studies. New York: Oxford University Press. Gombrich. R. (1988). Theravada Buddhism: A Social History from Ancient Benares to Modern Colombo. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Hamilton, S. (2001 ). Indian Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hershock, P. D. ( 1996). Liberating Intimacy: Enlightenment and Social Virtuosity in Ch’an Buddhism. Albany: State University of New York Press. 24 THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT OF GOTAMA’S THOUGHT Koller, J. M. (2006). The Indian Way: An Introduction to the Philosophies and Religions of India. Second edn. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson/Prentice-Hall. Laumakis, S. J. (2008). An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mohanty, J. N. (2000) Classical Indian Philosophy. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Renard, }. (1999). 101 Questions and Answers on Buddhism. New York: Gramercy Books. Waishe, M. (trans.) (1995). The Long Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Digha Nikaya. Boston: Wisdom. 25 2 Dukkha , Non-Self, and the Teaching on the Four “Noble Truths ” 1 PETER HARVEY After reflection on the limitations faced by any sentient being as subject to “aging, sickness and death” (MN.I.163), the person who became known as "the Buddha" or ‘Awakened One” sought that which was in various ways beyond these. After his awak- ening/enlightenment experience, in which he is seen to have experienced that which is the unborn, unaging, unailing, deathless (Skt nirvana ; P. nibbana), 2 he went on to teach others how to experience this. The problem of suffering had prompted his own quest for awakening, and its solution naturally became the focus of his teachings. He sometimes summarized these by saying simply, “Both in the past and now, I set forth just this: dukkha and the cessation of dukkha" (e.g., MN.I.140). The Pali word dukkha (Skt duhkha ) encapsulates many subtleties of meaning, but its application spans pain, suffering, disappointment, frustration, things going badly, hassle, unease, anxiety, stress, dis-ease, unsatisfactoriness, non-reliability of people and things, limitation, imperfection. It sums up the problematic aspects of life: its mental and physical pains, obvious or subtle, and also the painful, stressful, unsatisfactory aspects of life that engender these. The Pali term for the Buddha’s teachings is Dhamma (Skt Dharma), though this term also refers to the basis of his teachings - the nature of reality as known by him, the path of practice which he taught, and its culmination in nirvana. Dhamma is a difficult word to translate, but may be understood as the “Basic Pattern” of things. The term is also used in the plural (and in Roman script without an initial capital letter) for the basic patterns or processes of reality found within this overall Basic Pattern. In what is portrayed as his first sermon (Vin.I.10-12), 3 the Dhamma-cakka-ppavatana Sutta (DCPS), 4 the Buddha highlighted four key aspects or dimensions of existence to which one needs to become attuned so as to become deeply spiritually transformed and end dukkha : (i) the features of life which exemplify dukkha; (ii) the key cause for why we experience such pains; (iii) the reality of an end to dukkha by ending what causes it: and (iv) a path of practice leading to this. He referred to each of these four as an A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy. First Edition. Edited by Steven M. Emmanuel. © 2013 John Wiley & Sons. Inc. Published 2013 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 26 DUIOCHA, NON-SELF, AND THE “FOUR NOBLE TRUTHS” “ariya-sacca” (Skt drya-satya ), which has generally come to be translated as “Noble Truth.” While the Mahayana Buddhist tradition later came to see the ariya-saccas as preliminary to higher teachings, as found in the early sutta (Skt siitra ) collections known as the Pali Nikayas of the Theravada school or the Agamas (Chinese transla- tions of similar early texts), they are subjects of an advanced teaching intended for those who have been spiritually prepared to have them pointed out. When teaching lay persons, the Buddha frequently began with a “step-by-step discourse”: that is, i) talk on giving (darn), talk on moral virtue (slla; Skt sila ), talk on the heaven worlds [positive rebirths as the fruit of generosity and moral restraint]; ii) he made known the danger, the inferior nature of and tendency to defilement in sense-pleasures, and the advantage of renouncing them [by moral discipline, meditative calming, and perhaps ordination]. When the Blessed One knew that the householder Upali’s mind was ready, open, without hindrances [desire for sense-pleasures, ill-will, dullness and lethargy, rest- lessness and worry, and vacillation], inspired and confident, then he expounded to him the elevated D/imima-teaching of the Buddhas: dukkha, its origin, its cessation, the path. (MN.I.379-80) 5 If the mind is not calm and receptive, talk of dukkha may be too disturbing, leading to states such as depression, denial, and self-distracting tactics. The Buddha’s own discov- ery of the ariya-saccas was from the fourth jhdna (Skt dhydna), a state of profound meditative calm (MN.I.249), after he had first used this state as a basis for remembering many of his past lives and for seeing how beings were reborn according the ethical quality of their actions (karma). These first two insights can be seen to have prepared the way for the third, as an overview of wandering for countless lives in the various realms of rebirth according to karma would naturally lead to an enhanced awareness both of the forces leading to repeated rebirths and of their attendant dukkha. While rebirths in the (long-lasting but not eternal) hell-realms, or as a frustrated ghost or as some kind of animal/bird/fish/ insect, are more obviously unpleasant, the relatively pleasant human realm and various heavenly rebirths are also seen to end in death and have their various pains. Pali and Sanskrit make a fair use of compound expressions - perhaps not as much as in German, but more than in English. In such compounds, words other than the last one have no indication of whether they are singular or plural, or how exactly they relate to the last word, as the component words relate in different ways according to compound type. Nevertheless, context is usually a good guide to “unpacking” com- pounds, just as in English we know how to make sense of compound words such as doorway, red-eyed, lamplight, etc. The translation of the compound expression “ ariya- sacca ” as “Noble Truth” (e.g., Anderson 1999), while well established in English- language literature on Buddhism, is the “least likely” of the possible meanings (Norman 1997, 16). To unpack and translate “ariya-sacca," one needs to look first at the mean- ings of each word and then how they are most plausibly related. The term sacca (Skt satya) is regularly used in the sense of "truth,” but, just as its adjectival use can mean either “true" or “real,” so its noun meaning can be either “truth” or “reality” - a genu- inely real existent. The Sanskrit word satya is related to the word sat, “existence/being,” and both can have religious connotations. In the pre-Buddhist Upanisads, Sat (Being) is equated with Atman/SeU and Brahman, seen respectively as the unchanging essence of 27 PETER HARVEY a person and the world, and in the twentieth century Mahatma Gandhi called his method of non-violent social change Satyagraha, “holding onto Truth.” In “ ariya-sacca,” sacca is a noun, and there are three reasons why its meaning here cannot be “truth.” Firstly, it is said that the second ariya-sacca (the origination of dukkha) is to be abandoned (SN.V.422): surely, one would not want to abandon a “truth," but one might well want to abandon a problematic “reality.” Secondly, it is said that the Buddha understood ‘“This is the dukkha ariya-sacca,”' not “The ariya-sacca 'This is dukkha ” (SN.V.422 ), which would be the case if sacca here meant a truth whose content was expressed in the words in quote marks. Thirdly, in some suttas (e.g. SN.V.425), the first ariya-sacca is explained by identifying it with a kind of existent (the bundles of grasping-fuel - see below), not by asserting a form of words that could be seen as a “truth.” In normal English usage, the only things that can be “truths” are propositions - i.e., something that is expressed in words (spoken, written, thought). It seems odd to describe an item in the world, whether physical or mental, as itself a "truth.” “Truth" (and falsity) potentially comes into it only when we try to give a correct description of what there is. Something said about dukkha, even just “this is dukkha,” can be a “truth," but dukkha itself can only be a true, genuine reality. 6 Hence “true reality” is here best for “sacca, " which still keeps a clear connection to “truth” as the other meaning of sacca. What of the term ariya ? As a noun, this means “noble one.” In Brahmanism (which evolved into Hinduism), the term referred to members of the top three of the four social classes, denoting purity of descent and social superiority. In Buddhism it is used in a spiritual sense: the Buddha is “the Noble one” (SN.V.435), and other “Noble ones” are those who are partially or fully awakened and those well established on the path to these states: • Stream-enterers: the first of those with direct experiential insight into all four ariya- saccas, so that they have uprooted certain spiritual fetters (Self-identity view (see below), clinging to practices and vows, and vacillation), cannot be reborn at less than a human level, and will become fully enlightened within seven lives at most (AN.I.235). • Once-returners: those whose insight has weakened the fetters of desire for sense- pleasures and ill-will, whose future rebirths can only include one in the sense-desire realms of humans and the lower heavens. • Non-returners: those who have ended the latter two fetters, and can only be reborn in the higher heavens, where they in time become fully enlightened. • Arahats (Skt arhat ): those who are fully enlightened, having ended the final fetters of attachment to any heavenly realms or experiences, restlessness, conceit and igno- rance. They have experienced nirvana in life, brought dukkha to an end, and cannot be reborn in any form. Their state “in” nirvana beyond death is beyond description. • In each of the above cases, there are also those whose insight places them as defi- nitely set to attain the relevant state. To make clear the spiritual sense of the term ariya, and that being a “Noble one" is something one attains rather than something to which one is born/ the translation “the Spiritually Ennobled” seems most apposite: a person who has been uplifted and purified by deep insight into reality. As an adjective, ariya means “noble,” hence the 28 DUKKHA, NON-SELF, AND THE “FOUR NOBLE TRUTHS” Buddhist path, the practice of which makes ordinary people into Noble ones, is itself clearly said to be “noble.” While a “truth” might be “noble” or, for those who have insight into it, “ennobling,” the case is different when sacca means a “true reality." Insofar as one of the ariya-saccas, the origin of dukkha, is to be abandoned, this is hardly "noble” or “ennobling." In this context, any a must mean “the spiritually ennobled,” and the compound “ariya-sacca" must mean "true reality for the spiritually ennobled.” 8 The ariya-saccas are the most significant categories of existence, and only the spiritually ennobled recognize their full import. Correct identification of them, and deep insight into their nature, is what makes a person spiritually ennobled. Of course, teachings about these true realities are still seen as truths, but such teachings are not themselves the “ ariya-saccas .” The Four True Realities for the Spiritually Ennobled (more briefly, Realities for the Noble Ones), and statements which point to these realities, such as “This is dukkha” form the structural framework for all higher teachings of early Buddhism. They are: (i) dukkha, “the painful," encompassing the various forms of “pain," gross or subtle, physi- cal or mental, to which we are all subject, along with painful things that engender these: (ii) the origination (samudaya, i.e., cause) of dukkha, namely craving ( tanha ; Skt trsna); (iii) the cessation ( nirodha ) of dukkha by the cessation of craving (this cessation being equivalent to nirvana); and (iv) the Noble Eight-Factored Path ( magga ; Skt marga) that leads to this cessation. The DCPS says that the first of the four is “to be fully under- stood”: the second is “to be abandoned”; the third is "to be personally experienced": the fourth is “to be developed/cultivated” (bhdvitabba). To "believe in" the ariya-saccas may play a part, but not the most important part. At the end of the DCPS, one of the Bud- dha’s hearers, Kondanna, becomes a Stream-enterer, yet he responds not with belief in the ariya-saccas but with a kind of transformed vision: the “stainless Dhamma-eye” arises, and he has insight into the nature of these four crucial realities and their rela- tionship: that, as dukkha has an identifiable cause, it can be ended. The same fourfold structure of ideas (x, origination of x, its cessation, path to its cessation) is also applied to a range of other phenomena, such as the experienced world (loka; SN.I.62). This structure may also have been influenced by, or itself influenced, the practice of early Indian doctors: (i) diagnose an illness, (ii) identify its cause, (iii) determine whether it is curable, and (iv) outline a course of treatment to cure it. The first True Reality is the metaphorical "illness” of dukkha (Vibh-a.88), and the Buddha is seen as fulfilling the role of a spiritual physician. Having “cured” himself of dukkha, he worked to help others to do likewise. Dukkha as the First True Reality for the Spiritually Ennobled: The Painful Let us now examine what is said on this first True Reality, for without understanding the central concept of dukkha one is hindered from understanding the others. In the DCPS, the Buddha said: Now this, monks, for the spiritually ennobled, is the painful ( dukkha ) true reality ( ariya- sacca ): [i] birth [i.e., being born] is painful, aging is painful, illness is painful, death is 29 PETER HARVEY painful; [ii] sorrow, lamentation, (physical) pain, unhappiness and distress are painful; [iii] union with what is disliked is painful; separation from what is liked is painful; not to get what one wants is painful; [iv] in brief, the live bundles of grasping-fuel are painful. (SN.V.421) The Atthasalim, a Theravadin commentary, says that the word dukkha is used in a variety of senses, such as; painful feeling ( dukkha-vedana-) ; basis of pain ( dukkha-vatthu -), as in “birth is dukkha painful object ( dukkhdramana -), as in “material form is dukkha" (SN.III.69); condition for dukkha (dukkha-paccaya-), as in “ dukkha is the accumulation of evil ( dukkho pdpassa uccayo)’’ (Dhp.117); place (- tthana ) of dukkha, as in “how dukkha are the hells (dukkha nirayya)" (MN.III.169). The word dukkha has been translated in many ways, with “suffering” as the most common, so that the above passage is generally translated, “Now this, monks, is the noble truth of suffering: birth is suffering . . , but “suffering” is an appropriate trans- lation only in a general, inexact sense. The English word “suffering” is a noun (as in “his suffering is intense”), a present participle (as in “he is suffering from malaria”), or an adjective (as in “the suffering refugees”). If one translates “birth is suffering,” it does not make sense to take "suffering” as a noun, as it is not the case that birth, etc., are themselves forms of suffering - they can only be occasions for the arising of the experi- ence of suffering, things which often entail it. Nor can "suffering” be here meant as a present participle - it is not something that birth is doing: and as an adjective “suffering" applies only to people. However, in the passage on the first True Reality, dukkha in “birth is dukkha . . "is an adjective - as shown by the fact that the grammatical gender changes according to the word it qualifies - but is not applied to a person or to people. The best translation here is by the English adjective "painful,” which can apply to a range of things. In fact, the basic everyday meaning of “dukkha" as a noun is “pain” as opposed to “pleasure” ( sukha ). These, with rieit her-dukkha-nor-sukha, are the three kinds of feeling ( vedana ), with dukkha explained as covering both physical pain - dukkha in the narrow- est sense (DN.II.306) - and un happiness (domanassa), mental pain (SN.V.209-10). Similarly, in English, “pain” refers not just to physical pain but also to mental distress, both of these being covered by the second part of the phrase the "pleasures and pains of life.” One also talks of difficult situations or persons as “a pain" - clearly in the sense of a mental pain, not a physical one. In the DCPS, something to which the adjec- tive dukkha is applied is “painful” in the sense of being in some way troublesome or problematic, either obviously (e.g., physical pain, not getting what one wants) or only on investigation (e.g., being born). It applies to all those things which tire unpleasant, stressful, unsatisfactory, imperfect, and which we would like to be otherwise. Those things that have these qualities can then be described as “the painful,” which seems to be the meaning of the “dukkha" that is then explained above as “birth is painful . . Here “the painful" means both mental or physical pains and the aspects of life that engender these. The first features described as “painful” in the above DCPS quote, (i), are basic bio- logical aspects of being alive, each of which can be traumatic (BW.20-36). The dukkha of these is compounded by the rebirth perspective of Buddhism, for this involves repeated re-birth, re-aging, re-sickness, and re-death. The second set of features refer 30 DUKKHA, NON-SELF, AND THE “FOUR NOBLE TRUTHS” to physical or mental pains that arise from the vicissitudes of life. The third set of fea- tures point to the fact that we can never wholly succeed in keeping away things, people, and situations that we dislike, in holding on to those we do like, and in getting what we want. The changing, unstable nature of life is such that we are led to experience dis- satisfaction, loss, and disappointment: in a word, frustration. The fourth feature will be discussed below. Is Buddhism “pessimistic” in emphasizing the unpleasant aspects of life? Buddhism teaches that transcending the stress of life requires a fully realistic assessment of its pervasive presence. One must accept that one is “ill” if a cure is to be possible: ignoring the problem only makes it worse. It is certainly acknowledged that what is “painful” is not exclusively so (SN.III. 68-70). The pleasant aspects of life are not denied, but it is emphasized that ignoring painful aspects leads to attachment, while calmly acknowl- edging the painful aspects have a purifying, liberating effect. Thus the Buddha says in respect of each of the five aspects of body and mind: The pleasure and gladness that arise in dependence on it: this is its attraction. That it is impermanent, painful ( dukkha ), and subject to change: this is its danger. The removal and abandonment of desire and attachment for it: this is its transcending. (AN.I.258-9; BW.192) Happiness is real enough, and the calm and joy engendered by the Buddhist path help effectively to increase it, but Buddhism emphasizes that all forms of happiness (bar that of nirvana) are fleeting. Sooner or later, they slip through one's fingers and can leave an aftertaste of loss and longing. In this way, even happiness is to be seen as dukkha. This can be more clearly seen when one considers another classification of forms of dukkha: the painfulness of (physical and mental) pain ( dukkha- dukkhatd ), the painful- ness of conditioned phenomena (sahkhdra- dukkhatd), and the painfulness of change {viparandma- dukkhatd; SN.IV.259, SN.V.57, DN.III.216). The Theravadin commentator Buddhaghosa explains the first as “bodily and mental painful feeling,” the third as “(bodily and mental) pleasant feeling, because they are a cause for the arising of dukkha when they change,” and the second as “equanimous feeling and the remaining condi- tioned phenomena of three planes (of existence) because they are oppressed by rise and fall” (Vism.499). Hence, at SN.II.53, Sariputta says: “Friend, there are these three feel- ings. What three? Pleasant feeling, painful feeling ( dukkha vedand), neither-painful-nor- pleasant feeling. These three feelings are impermanent; whatever is impermanent is dukkha ,” and the Buddha says, “This is another method of explaining in brief that same point: ‘Whatever is felt is (included) within dukkha.’ ” When a happy feeling passes, it often leads to mental pain due to change, and, even while it is occurring, the wise recognize it as subtly painful in the sense of being a limited, conditioned, imperfect state, one which is not truly satisfactory. This most subtle sense of dukkha is sometimes experienced in feelings of a vague unease at the fragility, transitoriness, and unsatis- factoriness of life. Nevertheless, if dukkha is perceived in the right way, it is said to lead to "faith" or “trustful confidence” (saddhd; Skt sraddhd ) in the Buddha’s teachings (SN.II. 30). From faith, other states successively arise which are part of the path to the end of dukkha: gladness, joy, happiness, meditative concentration, and deepening states of insight and 31 PETER HARVEY detachment. This suggests that some initial understanding of dukkha supports a spir- itual practice that leads to greater insight into it and ultimately liberation from it. To what extent is “this is dukkha" a description, and to what extent is it a judgment? Many words have aspects of both. For example, “liar” is a description which also con- tains an implicit judgment. When something is said to be “dukkha” as it is a physical or mental pain, the descriptive aspect of its meaning is predominant, though there is an implied “this is unfortunate.” When something is said to be “ dukkha " due to being conditioned, limited, and imperfect, the judgmental aspect is to the fore, for that which is dukkha is here clearly being unfavorably compared to what is unconditioned and unlimited, namely nirvana. The clear message is: if something is dukkha, do not be attached to it. At this level, dukkha is whatever is not nirvana, and nirvana is that which is not dukkha. This does not lead to a useless circular definition of the two terms, for dukkha is that which is conditioned, arising from other changing factors in the flow of time, and nirvana is that which is unconditioned. The Five Bundles of Grasping-Fuel: The Factors of Personality When the DCPS summarizes its outline of dukkha by saying, (iv) “in brief, the live bundles of grasping-fuel are painful,” it is referring to what is dukkha in the subtlest sense. The five “bundles of grasping-fuel" ( upadana-kkhandha ; Skt updddna-skandha ) are the five factors which make up a "person." Buddhism holds, then, that none of the phenomena which comprise personal existence is free from some kind of painfulness. Each factor is a “group," “aggregate,” or “bundle” (-( kjkhandha ) of related states, and each is an object of “grasping” (upadana) so as to be identified as “me”, “I,” "myself." They are also just referred to as the khandhas. The translation of upadana-kkhandha as “groups of grasping” is often found, but it can be misleading. Grasping, upadana, is a specific mental state which would best be classified as an aspect of the fourth khandha (the constructing activities: see below); so there are not five groups that are each types of grasping. Thus “groups (as objects of) grasping” is better. Nevertheless, there are hidden nuances in the word upadana. Its derivation indicates that its root meaning is “taking up.” While it often has the abstract meaning of “grasping,” it also has a concrete meaning as "fuel": the “taking up” of which sustains a process such as fire. Richard Gombrich comments that the suttas are rich in fire-related metaphors due to the importance of lire in Brahmanism, and then argues that the term upadana-kkhandha is also part of this fire imagery (Gombrich 1996, 66-8). The updddna-kkhandhas, then, can each be seen as a “bundle of fuel” (ibid., 67) which “burn” with the “fires” of dukkha and its causes (SN.11. 19-20). They are each sustaining objects of, or fuel for, grasping (cf. Thanissaro 1999, ch. 2). The translation “bundles of grasping-fuel” captures these nuances. That the spiritually ennobled see even the factors making up a person as dukkha shows that their understanding of reality is rather different from that of ordinary people (who are also unlikely to see being born as dukkha). Hence it is said that, while the world sees the flow of agreeable sense-objects as pleasurable, and the ending of this as dukkha, the spiritually ennobled see the transcending of the khandhas and sense- 32 DUICKHA, NON-SELF, AND THE “FOUR NOBLE TRUTHS” objects as what is truly pleasurable (Sn.759-62 and SN.IV.127): nirvana as the blissful state beyond all conditioned phenomena of the round of rebirths. To aid understanding of dukkha, Buddhism gives details of each of the five factors in its analysis of personality (Hamilton 1996). All but the first of these “bundles” are mental in nature, for they lack any physical "form": 1 riipa, “(material) form”: This refers to the material aspect of existence, whether in the outer world or in the body of a living being. It is said to be comprised of four basic elements or forces - solidity (literally, “earth"), cohesion (“water”), heat (“lire”), and motion (“wind”) - and forms of subtle, sensitive matter derived from these (e.g., the visual sensitivity of the eye). From the interaction of these, the body of flesh, blood, bones, etc., is composed. 2 vedana, or “feeling”: This is the hedonic tone or “taste” of any experience - pleasant, painful (dukkha), or neutral. It includes both sensations arising from the body and mental feelings of happiness, unhappiness, or indifference. 3 sahhd (Skt samjha), which processes sensory and mental objects, so as to classify and label them, for example, as “yellow,” “a man,” or "fear.” It is “perception,” “cognition,” mental labeling, recognition, and interpretation - including misinter- pretation - of objects. Without it, a person might be conscious but would be unable to know what he was conscious of. 4 the sahkharas (Skt samskara ), or “constructing activities” (also rendered “volitional formations,” “mental formations,” and “karmic activities’): These comprise a number of processes which initiate action or direct, mould, and give shape to char- acter. The most characteristic one is cetana, “will" or “volition,” which is identified with karma (AN.III.41 5), literally, “action,” that which brings later karmic results. There are processes which are ingredients of all mind-states, such as sensory stimu- lation and attention, ones which intensify such states, such as energy, joy, or desire- to-do, ones which are ethically “skillful” or “wholesome” ( kusala ; Skt kusala), such as mindfulness and a sense of moral integrity, and "unskillful" ones, such as greed, hatred, and delusion. 5 vihhana (Skt vijhana), “(discriminative) consciousness”: This includes both the basic awareness of a sensory or mental object and the discrimination of its aspects or parts, which are actually recognized by sahhd. One might thus also see it as percep- tual “discernment.” There are six types according to whether it is conditioned by eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, or mind-organ. It is also known as citta, the central focus of personality which can be seen as “mind,” “heart," or “thought." This is essentially a “mind set" or “mentality," some aspects of which alter from moment to moment, but others recur and are equivalent to a person's character. Its form at any moment is set up by the other mental khandhas, but in turn it goes on to deter- mine their pattern of arising, in a process of constant interaction. Much Buddhist practice is concerned with the purification, development, and harmoni- ous integration of the five “bundles” that make up a “person,” through the cultivation of virtue and meditation. In time, however, the fivefold analysis is used to enable a meditator gradually to transcend the naive perception - with respect to “himself” or 33 PETER HARVEY “another” - of a unitary “person” or “self.” fn place of this, there is set up the contem- plation of a person as a cluster of changing physical and mental processes, or dhammas (Skt dharma), thus undermining grasping and attachment, which are key causes of suffering. Phenomena as Impermanent and Non-Self 9 Though the DCPS emphasizes dukkha, this is in fact only one of three related charac- teristics or “marks” of the five khandhas. These “three marks” ( ti-lakkhana ; Skt tri- laksana) of all conditioned phenomena are that they are impermanent ( anicca ; Skt anitya), painful (dukkha; Skt dulikha), and non-Self ( anattd ; Skt anatman). 10 Buddhism emphasizes that change and impermanence are fundamental features of everything, bar nirvana. Mountains wear down, material goods wear out or are lost or stolen, and all beings, even gods, age and die (MN.II. 65-82; BW.207-13). The gross form of the body changes relatively slowly, but the matter which composes it is replaced as one eats, excretes, and sheds skin cells. As regards the mind, character patterns may be relatively persistent, but feelings, moods, ideas, etc., can be observed to change constantly. The ephemeral and deceptive nature of the khandhas is expressed in a passage which says that they are “void, hollow”: “Material form is like a lump of foam, and feeling is like a bubble; perception is like a mirage, and the constructing activities are like a banana tree [lacking a core, like an onion]; consciousness is like a (magician's) illusion” (SN. III. 142; BW.343-5). It is because things are impermanent that they are also dukkha. Because they are impermanent and in some sense painful, moreover, they are to be seen as anattd. non- Self. When something is said to be anattd, the kind of “self” it is seen not to be is clearly one that would be permanent and free from all pain, however subtle - so as to be happy, self-secure, independent. While Pali and Sanskrit do not have capital letters, in English it is useful to signal such a concept with a capital: Self. The term anattd is a noun, in the form of the word for Self, atta (Skt dtman), prefaced by the negative prefix an, meaning that what is anattd has nothing to do with “self” in a certain sense: it is neither a Self, nor what pertains or belongs to such a thing (. attaniya , SN.III.33-4; SN.IV.54), as “mine,” or what contains Self or is contained in it (MN.I.300; SN.III. 127-32). It is “empty (sunna; Skt siinya) of Self or what pertains to Self” (SN.IV.54; BW.347). While anattd is often rendered simply as “not-Self,” this translation captures only part of its meaning, as it misses out the aspect of not being anything that pertains to a Self, which “non-Self” includes. This important teaching was introduced by the Buddha in his “second sermon,” the Anatta-lakkhana Sutta (Vin.I.l 3-14; SN.III. 66-8; BW.341-2). Here he explained, with respect to each of the five khandhas, that, if it were truly Self, it would not “tend to sickness,” and it would be totally controllable at will, which it is not. Moreover, as each khandha is impermanent, dukkha, and of a nature to change, it is inappropriate to consider it as “This is mine, this am I, this is my Self" - and doing so will lead to dukkha, due to the gap between how things are and how one is struggling to portray them. The spiritual quest was seen by the Buddha’s contemporaries largely as the search for identifying and liberating a person's true Self. Such an entity was postulated as a 34 DUICKHA, NON-SELF, AND THE “FOUR NOBLE TRUTHS” person’s permanent inner nature, the source of true happiness, and the autonomous “inner controller” (Skt antaryamin ) of a person’s actions and inner elements and facul- ties. It would also need to be in full control of itself. In Brahmanism, this Self was seen as a universal Self (Atman) identical with Brahman, the ground and essence of the world, while in Jainism, for example, it was seen as the individual “Life principle” (fiva). The Buddha argued that anything subject to change, anything not autonomous and totally controllable by its own wishes, anything involved with the disharmony of mental pain, could not be such a perfect true Self or what pertained to it. Moreover, to take anything as being such is to lay the basis for much suffering; for what one fondly takes as one's permanent, essential Self, or its secure possession, actually changes in unde- sired ways. While the Upanisads recognized many things as being not-Self, they felt that a real, true Self could be found. They held that when it was found, and known to be identical to Brahman, the basis of everything, this would bring liberation. In the Bud- dhist suttas, though, literally everything is seen as non-Self, even nirvana. When this is known, then liberation - nirvana - is attained by total non-attachment. Thus both the Upanisads and the Buddhist suttas see many things as not-Self, but the suttas apply it, indeed non-Self, to everything. The teaching on phenomena as non-Self is intended to undermine not only the Brahmanical or Jain concepts of Self but also much more commonly held conceptions and deep-rooted feelings of I-ness. To feel that, however much one changes in life from childhood onwards, some essential part remains constant and unchanged as the “real me,” is to have a belief in a permanent Self. To act as if only other people die. and to ignore the inevitability of one’s own death, is to act as if one had a permanent Self. To relate changing mental phenomena to a substantial self which “owns” them: “I am worried . . . happy . . . angry,” is to have such a Self-concept. To build an identity based on one’s bodily appearance or abilities, or on one’s sensitivities, ideas and beliefs, actions or intelligence, etc., is to take them as part of an “I.” The non-Self teaching can easily be misunderstood and misdescribed, so it is impor- tant to see what it is saying. The Buddha accepted many conventional usages of the word “self” (also “attd”), as in “yourself” and “myself.” These he saw as simply a con- venient way of referring to a particular collection of mental and physical states. But, within such a conventional, empirical self, he taught that no permanent, substantial, independent, metaphysical Self could be found. This is well explained by an early nun, Vajira: 11 just as the word “chariot” is used to denote a collection of items in functional relationship, but not a special part of a chariot, so the conventional term “a being" is properly used to refer to the live khandhas relating together. None of the khandhas is a “being” or “Self”; these are simply conventional labels used to denote the collection of functioning khandhas. The non-Self teaching does not deny that there is continuity of character in life, and to some extent from life to life. But persistent character traits are due merely to the repeated occurrence of certain cittas, or “mind-sets.” The citta as a whole is sometimes talked of as an (empirical) “self" (e.g., Dhp.160; cf. 35), but while such character traits may be long-lasting, they can and do change, and are thus impermanent, and so “non- Self,” insubstantial. A “person" is a collection of rapidly changing and interacting mental and physical processes, with character patterns reoccurring over time. Only partial control can be exercised over these processes; so they often change in undesired 35 PETER HARVEY ways, leading to suffering. Impermanent, they cannot be a permanent Self. Being “painful,” they cannot be a true, autonomous “I,” which would contain nothing that was out of harmony with itself. While nirvana is beyond impermanence and dukkha, it is still non-Self. This is made clear in a recurring passage (e.g. , at AN.1. 286-7), which says that all sankhdras, here meaning conditioned phenomena, are impermanent and dukkha, but that "all dhammas ” are non-Self. “ Dhamma ” (Skt dharma) is a word with many meanings in Buddhism, but here it refers to any basic component of reality. Most are conditioned, but nirvana is the unconditioned dhamma ; both conditioned and unconditioned dhammas are non-Self. While nirvana is beyond change and suffering, it has nothing in it which could support the feeling of I-ness; for this can arise only with respect to the khandhas, and it is not even a truly valid feeling here (DN.II.66-8; Harvey 1995, 31-3). That said, it should be noted that, while “all dhammas are anattd” - “everything is non-Self” - clearly implies that there is no Self, the word anattd does not itself mean “no-Self” - i.e. , does not itself mean “there is no Self.” It simply means that what it applies to is not a Self or what pertains to it. Moreover, the non-Self teaching is not in itself a denial of the existence of a permanent self; it is primarily a practical teaching aimed at the overcoming of grasping. Indeed, when asked directly if “self” (in an unspecified sense) exists or not, the Buddha was silent, as he did not want either to affirm a permanent Self or to confuse his questioner by not accepting self in any sense (SN.IV. 400-1). A philosophical denial of “Self" is just a view, a theory, which may be agreed with or not. It does not necessarily get one actually to examine all the things with which one actually does identify, consciously or unconsciously, as Self or essen- tially “mine.” This examination, in a calm, meditative context, is what the "non-Self " teaching aims at. It is not so much a conceptual idea as something to be done, applied to actual experience, so that the meditator actually sees that "all dhammas are non-Self." A mere philosophical denial does not encourage this, and may actually mean that a person sees no need for it. While the suttas have no place for a metaphysical Self, seeing things as non-Self is clearly regarded as playing a vital soteriological role. The concept of “Self " and the associated deep-rooted feeling of “I am” are utilized for a spiritual end. The non-Self teaching can in fact be seen as a brilliant device which uses a deep-seated human aspi- ration, ultimately illusory, to overcome the negative products of such an illusion. Iden- tification, whether conscious or unconscious, with something as “what I truly and permanently am," or as inherently "mine,” is a source of grasping or attachment; such attachment leads to frustration and a sense of loss when what one identifies with changes and becomes other than what one desires. The deep-rooted idea of “Self,” though, is not to be attacked, but used as a measuring-rod against which all phenom- ena should be compared, so as to see them as falling short of the perfections implied in the idea of Self. This is to be done through a rigorous experiential examination of the phenomena that we do identify with as “Self,” "I,” or “mine”: as each of these is exam- ined, but is seen actually to be non-Self, falling short of the ideal, the intended result is that one should let go of any attachment to such a thing. In doing this, a person finally comes to see everything as non-Self, thereby destroying all attachment and attaining nirvana. In this process, it is not necessary to give any philosophical "denial” of Self; the 36 DUICKHA, NON-SELF, AND THE “FOUR NOBLE TRUTHS” idea simply withers away, as it is seen that no actual instance of such a thing can be found anywhere (MN.I.138; SB. 161-5). Overall, it can be said that: (i) in the changing, empirical self, no permanent Self can be found; (ii) yet one of the constructing activities is the “I am conceit" ( asmi-mana ) - the gut feeling or attitude that one is or has a real Self, a substantial I, expressed in self-preoccupation, self-importance, and ego-feelings; (iii) as a person develops spiritu- ally, their empirical self becomes stronger as they become more centered, calm, aware, and open; (iv) in this process, awareness of all the factors of personality as non-Self undermines grasping, and so makes a person calmer and stronger; (v) at the pinnacle of spiritual development, the liberated person is free of all the causes of dukkha, and thus hicks any “I am” conceit, yet has a mahatta, “great (empirical) self” (It. 28-9; Harvey 199 5, 55-8): they are strong, spiritually developed people. Sensitivity to the above variation in self-language should help one avoid incoherence in presenting ideas relating to the non-Self doctrine. Students sometimes say odd things such as: "Buddhism teaches that there is no self. . . . The self is the five khandhas . . . but these are to be seen as not-self.” Again, while Pali and Sanskrit lack capital letters, the use of them helps signal the difference, clearly implicit in the suttas , between an accepted empirical self and a metaphysical Self which is never accepted. 12 Buddhism sees no need to postulate a permanent Self, and it accounts for the func- tioning of personality, in life and from life to life, in terms of a stream of changing, conditioned processes. As explained in chapter 23, THE CONDITIONED CO-ARISING OF MENTAL AND BODILY PROCESSES, rebirth does not require a permanent Self or substantial “I,” but belief in such a thing is one of the things that causes rebirth. The Second True Reality for the Spiritually Ennobled: The Origin of the Painful In the DCPS, the Buddha talks of the second True Reality thus: Now this, monks, for the spiritually ennobled, is the originating-of-the-painful (dukkha- samudaya) true reality. It is this craving ( tanha ; Skt trsna ) which leads to renewed being, accompanied by delight and attachment, seeking delight now here, now there; that is, craving for sense-pleasures, craving for being, craving for non-existence. So the key origin or cause of dukkha is “tanha.” This literally means “thirst” and clearly refers to demanding, clinging desires which are ever on the lookout for gratification, “now here, now there,” in the changing, unreliable world, demanding that things be like this . . . and not like that. ... It contains an element of psychological compulsion, a driven restlessness ever on the lookout for new objects on which to focus: I want. I want more, I want different. This propels people into situations which open them to pain, disquiet, and upset. We like things to be permanent, lasting, reliable, happy, control- lable, and belonging to us. Because of such longings, we tend to look on the world as if it were like this, in spite of the fact that we are repeatedly reminded it is not. We are good at ignoring realities: spiritual ignorance. Thus arise what are called the 37 PETER HARVEY "inversions" ( vipalldsa ; Skt viparyasa) of mind, of perception or view: looking on what is impermanent as if it were permanent: looking on what is dukkha as if it were happi- ness, or happiness-inducing; looking on what is not a permanent I/Self or its possession as if it were one (AN.II.52). Such a distorted outlook means that we continue to grasp at things which, by their nature, cannot actually satisfy our longings. Thus we continue to experience frustration. Tanhd, then, is not just any “desire,” but a driven desire rooted in delusion. Desire, though, can be also be wise, wholesome, and for good things (Webster 2005b). Chanda, or desire-to-act, can be either unwholesome, like tanhd, or wholesome, and it is a key ingredient of one of the four iddhi-pddas, or “bases of success,” which aid spiritual development (Gethin 2001, 81-103). The stronger a person craves, though, the greater the frustration when the demand for lasting and wholly satisfying fulfilment is perpetually disappointed by a changing and unsatisfactory world. Also, the more things a person craves, the more opportunities for frustration, dukkha. Craving also brings pain as it leads to quarrels, strife, and con- flict between individuals and groups (DN.II.59-61) and motivates people to perform various actions with karmic results shaping further rebirths, with their attendant dukkha. The DCPS identifies three types of craving: craving for sensual pleasures (kdma- tanhd), craving for being (bhava-tanhd) , and craving for non-existence (vibhava- tanhd). The second type refers to the drive for ego-enhancement based on a certain identity and for some mode of eternal life after death as me. The third is the drive to get rid of unpleasant situations, things, and people. In a strong form, it may lead to the impulse for suicide, in the hope of annihilation. Such a craving, ironically, helps cause a further rebirth, whose problems will be as bad as, or worse than, the present ones. In order to overcome dukkha, the Buddhist path aims not only to limit the expression of craving but ultimately to use calm and wisdom to uproot it completely from the psyche. Besides craving, another important cause of dukkha is “views” ( ditthi ; Skt drsti). The Buddha focused much critical attention on views concerning “Self,” which he saw as leading to attachment and thus suffering. Such views can take many forms, but he felt that many of them locate a substantial Self somewhere in the five khandhas, regarding any one of them as being Self, owned by Self, within Self, or having Self within it, leading to 20 such views in all (SN.III.1-5; SB. 216-20). Each of these is known as a “view on the existing group” ( sakkay a- ditthi ; Skt satkdya-drsti ), sometimes also trans- lated as “personality view." However, as the meaning is a view which sees a Self- essence as somehow related to the “existing group” - the five updddna-kkhandhas (MN.I.299) - perhaps the best gloss is “Self-identity view." The non-acceptance of any of these views in the suttas means, for example, that, with regard to material form, the body, it is not truly appropriate to say “I am body,” “the body is mine,” “body is part of my Self,” “I am in the body.” Indeed, it is said that the body does not “belong" to anyone: it simply arises due to past karma (SN.II.64-5). Its associated mental states do not “own” it. Even when specific views regarding “Self" have been transcended, a subtle kind of “conceit” (mana) still remains as a vague and non-specific feeling of I-ness with respect to the khandhas (SN.III. 127-32; BW.402-6). “Conceit” is the basic attitude of “I am": 38 DUIOCHA, NON-SELF, AND THE “FOUR NOBLE TRUTHS” deep-rooted self-centeredness, self-importance, or egoism, which is concerned about how “I” measure up to “others” as “superior,” “inferior,” or “equal” - another key cause of dukkha. A further summary of the causes of dukkha is “attachment ( rdga : sensual and other forms of lust), hatred (P. dosa; Skt dvesa) and delusion (moha)," with attachment and hatred equivalent to craving for and craving to be rid of something, and delusion equivalent to spiritual ignorance (P. avijja: Skt avidya). This ignorance is an ingrained misperception of reality that fails to see and understand the True Realities for the Spir- itually Ennobled (MN.1. 54), and which sustains a series of conditions, including craving and grasping, that lead to dukkha: the conditioned co-arising sequence. The Third and Fourth True Realities for the Spiritually Ennobled: The Cessation of the Painful, and the Path to This The third True Reality is described in the DCPS as follows: Now this, monks, for the spiritually ennobled, is the ceasing-of-the-painful true reality. It is the remainderless fading away and cessation of that same craving, the giving up and relinquishing of it, freedom from it, non-reliance on it. That is: the ending of thirst for the “next thing,” so as to give full attention to what is here, now; abandoning attachments to past, present, or future: freedom that comes from contentment: not relying on craving so that the mind does not fixate on anything, adhering to it, roosting there. When craving and other related causes thus come to an end, dukkha ceases. This is equivalent to nirvana (P. nibbdna), also known as the “uncon- ditioned” or “unconstructed” ( asahkhata ; Skt asamskrta; SN.IV.360-73), the ultimate goal of Buddhism (Collins 1982). As an initial spur to striving for nirvana, craving for it may play a role (AN.II.145; Webster 2005b, 134-5), but this helps in the overcoming of other cravings, is generally replaced by a wholesome aspiration, and is completely eradicated in the full experience of nirvana: nirvana is attained only when there is total non-attachment and letting go. Nirvana literally means “extinction" or "quenching,” being the word used for the “extinction” of a fire. The “fires” of which nirvana is the extinction are described in the “Fire sermon” (SN.IV.19-20; BW. 346: SB. 222-4). This teaches that everything internal and external to a person is “burning" with the “fires" of attachment, hatred, and delusion and of birth, aging, and death. Here the “fires” refer both to the causes of dukkha and to dukkha itself. Nirvana during fife is frequently defined as the destruction of the three “fires” or defilements (e.g., SN.IV.2 51; BW.364). When one who has destroyed these dies, he or she cannot be reborn and so is totally beyond the remaining “fires” of birth, aging, and death, having attained final nirvana. When the Buddha was asked if an enlightened person, after death, “is,” “is not," both or neither of these, he set the questions aside as irrelevant to the spiritual quest, and as all infected with the idea of Self. There has been much speculation on what the Buddha's silence on this matter might imply (Harvey 1995, 208-10, 239-45: 2013, 78-80). 39 PETER HARVEY The fourth True Reality is described thus: Now this, monks, for the spiritually ennobled, is the true reality which is the way leading to the cessation of the painful. It is this noble eight-factored path, that is to say, [1] right view, [2] right resolve, [3] right speech, [4] right action, [5] right livelihood, [6] right effort, [7] right mindfulness, [8] right mental unification. The DCPS also describes this path as a “middle way” (majjhima patipadd; Skt madhyama pratipad ) that avoids two extremes: the pursuit of sensual pleasures and self-mortifica- tion. The path involves wisdom (factors 1 and 2), moral virtue (3-5), and meditative training (6-8) (MN.1. 301 ). It works on both a cognitive and an affective level, with both inward and external aspects. It is also practiced initially at an ordinary level, with ben- efits in this and future lives, and then at a “transcendent” ( lokuttara ; Skt laukottara) level, which leads to the noble states, culminating in arahatship (MN.III.71-8; Gethin 2001, 190-226; Harvey 2013, 81-7). The Cessation of Dukkha Both during life and beyond death, nirvana pertains to the arahat, who has overcome the “disease" of dukkha and attained complete mental health (AN.II.143). But in what sense has an arahat attained the “cessation" of dukkha? To address this question, it is useful to remind ourselves of the key aspects of dukkha: i birth - i.e., being born - which inevitably leads to: ii aging, illness, death: features of life that entail physical and mental pain; iii sorrow, lamentation, (physical) pain, unhappiness, and distress: mental and physi- cal pains; iv union with what is disliked, separation from what is liked, not to get what one wants: various frustrations; v the five bundles of grasping-fuel: the conditioned, impermanent, and non-Self factors of personality. These can then be grouped thus: a physical pain and features of life entailing this; b mental pains and frustration; c impermanent, conditioned factors of personality, mental and physical. Now an arahat or buddha will be free of (a) once their present, final rebirth ends, but until then they are still embodied beings who periodically experience physical pain: "the five (sense-) faculties still remain, through which ... he undergoes the pleasant and the unpleasant, he experiences pleasure and dukkha" (It. 38). However, they are in the main free of (b). It is said that the Buddha remained mindful and clearly comprehending in the face of intense pain from a foot injury, and so did not become distressed (SN.I.2 7). The balanced detachment of the arahat' s mind is such that 40 DUKKHA, NON-SELF, AND THE “FOUR NOBLE TRUTHS” he and the almost enlightened Non-returner are free of aversion ( patigha ) to physical pain, and so add no mental pain in response to it: “he does not sorrow, grieve or lament, he does not weep . . . and become distraught.” One who adds mental pain in response to physical pain is said to be like a person shot with one arrow then being shot with a second arrow (SN.IV. 2 08-9). Indeed, any Noble person, from a Stream-enterer upwards, is not “afflicted in mind” when “afflicted in body." This is because they are free of Self- identity view - they do not relate to any of the khandhas as Self or as related to Self - so undesired change in any of the khandhas (whether bodily or mental ones) does not lead to experiencing “sorrow, lamentation, pain, unhappiness and distress” (SN.III.2-4). An ordinary person (not yet a Noble person) lusts after pleasant feelings and grieves over unpleasant ones; in that a pleasant feeling “invades his mind and remains," this is because his “body (kayo)” is not developed; in that the painful feeling "invades his mind and remains,” this is because his mind ( citta ) is not developed (MN.1. 239-40). Here the commentary explains that "development of the body” refers to insight (vipassana) into pleasant feeling as impermanent, subtly painful (unsatisfactory), and non-Self, while “development of the mind” refers to the development of calm ( samatha ) by deep medita- tive concentration. This illustrates how the Buddhist path works on both cognitive and affective roots of suffering, insofar as both delusion and craving, and their mutual sup- porting, need to be undone. The arahat remains ever calm and does not identify with pain or pleasure as “mine,” but sees them simply as non-Self passing phenomena, as well as withdrawing from physical pain in meditative concentration. As is said in the second century CE Avaddna-sataka (11.384; Dayal 1970 [1932], 15), “the sky and the palm of his hand were the same to his mind.” Even faced with the threat of death, the arahat is unruffled. In this situation, the arahat Adhimutta disconcerted a potential assailant by fearlessly asking why he should be perturbed at the prospect of the end of the constituents of “his” personality: he had no thought of an “I” being here, but just saw a stream of changing phenomena (Thag.715-16). Indeed, anyone who shows any hint of fear, conceit, anger, or any other negative states cannot be an arahat (MN.I.317; cf. Miln.207-8, 186-8; Vism.634-5). The arahat Sariputta says that “There is nothing in the world through the change and alteration of which sorrow, lamentation, pain, unhappiness and distress might arise in me,” even if such change was the death of his teacher, the Buddha - though he would acknowledge the loss of a source of welfare for the world (SN.II.2 74). Accord- ingly, it is said that, when the Buddha died, those disciples who were not arahats grieved, while the arahats “endured mindfully and clearly aware, saying, All conditioned things are impermanent - what is the use of this?’ ” (DN.II.158). Sariputta also taught that, for one who is discontented ( anabhirati ), wherever he goes and whatever posture he is in, he does not experience happiness (sukha) and pleasure - unlike one who is contented (AN.V.121). That said, enlightened ones are not seen as indifferent to their physical needs. In his final illness, the Buddha could be insistent about these. At one time he becomes extremely thirsty, and asks Ananda three times for some water to drink after the latter delays bringing some as the available water is muddy - though Ananda then finds it unmuddy, the implication being that this is by the Buddha’s power (DN.II. 128-9). Perhaps more surprising is that the Buddha is occasionally described in a way imply- ing he experienced mental pain - not in response to physical pain, but in response to 41 PETER HARVEY an actual or potential situation. In his final year, he was once asked by Ananda about the rebirth destiny of 12 local people. Having given answers in each case, the Buddha then says, “Ananda, it is not remarkable that one who has attained a human state should die, but that you should come to the Tathdgata to ask the destiny of each of these who have died, that is a vihesa to him" (hence he tells Ananda a way to work out the answer to such questions for himself; DN.II.93). The Pali Text Society Pali-English Dic- tionary defines vihesa as “vexation, annoyance, injury, worry” and says it is related to the word vihimsd, “hurting, injuring, cruelty, injury.” In this context, though, it prob- ably means something like a tiring, troublesome thing - that the Buddha had not experienced annoyance is shown by the fact that he had actually answered the 12 ques- tions just put to him; but, for an old man, many such questions would indeed be tiring. Indeed the commentary (DN-a.II. 544) here explains that what is meant is that answer- ing such questions would be “a weariness for the body ( kaya-kilamatha ).” Elsewhere, the Buddha says that, just as a doctor whose medicine had failed to cure the blindness of a man would experience “weariness ( kilamatha -) and distress ( vighata ),” so would it be a “weariness ( kilamatho ) and trouble (vihesa)” for him (MN.I.510) if he taught his disciples how to attain the “health” of nirvana, but none of them did so. Indeed, soon after his enlightenment, when he was considering teaching others what he had discovered, he initially hesitated to do so, as he thought that people were so wrapped up in their worldly concerns that they would not understand the profound, subtle, and hard to understand realities he had experienced, such that teaching people would be a “weariness and trouble" for him (MN.I.168; Webster 2005a). In such a case, physical tiredness would no doubt be involved, but were everyone genuinely unable to understand the Buddha (something the Buddha then saw was not the case), then his teaching them would be a pointless exercise, like hitting one’s head against a brick wall. Such an action would clearly be not the act of a wise person, or, indeed, the act of one with compassion for all beings, including himself. This does imply, though, that an enlightened person can experience not only physical pain but at least some mental pains: the pain involved in doing a pointless task or one that taxed their resources of physical and mental energy, especially if these were low as a result of age and/ or illness. The arahat is free of any “distress (vighata)” from other sources: “the distresses and fevers that arise from sense-desire [or ill-will, cruelty, visible forms, or the existing group (sakkaya: the khandhas (MN.I.299)], and he does not feel that feeling” (DN. III. 240). Yet the Milindapahha slightly overstates the case when it says that the arahat feels bodily painful feelings but not mental painful feelings (Miln.445). Here, though, its later explanation shows that it has in mind only mental pain in response to physical pain: An Arahat’s mind is developed, sire, well developed, it is tamed, well tamed, it is docile and obedient. On his being assailed by a painful feeling he grasps it firmly thinking that it is not permanent; he fastens his mind to the post of concentration, and when his mind is fastened to the post of concentration it does not quiver or shake, but is steadfast and composed, although his body, owing to the diffusion of the perturbation of the feeling, bends, contorts itself and rolls about. (Miln.254) 42 DUKKHA, NON-SELF, AND THE “FOUR NOBLE TRUTHS” Arahats can, then, like non-enlightened experienced meditators, periodically experience deep meditative states, the jhanas, which are free of physical pain and can be very joyful or peaceful. These states are still conditioned and impermanent, though, and so come under type (c) dukkha. Moreover, intense physical pain may prevent a person being able to attain jhana or to remain in jhana (cf. SN.1. 120-4). The Buddha, when he had suffered a bout of intense pain that he had endured while mindful and clearly aware, without becoming distressed ( avihahhamano ; DN.II.99), goes on to say that, he, in his eightieth year, is now: old, worn out . . . Just as an old cart is made to go by being held together with straps, so the Tathdgata's body is kept going by being strapped up. It is only when the Tathagata, from not attending to any perceptual signs ( nimitta ), from the cessation of certain feelings, having attained the signless ( animitta ) mental concentration, dwells there, that the Tathdgata's body (kdga) knows comfort (phdsukato ). (DN.II.100) The signless state is one where the mind of a Noble person attends to nirvana as itself “signless” (Harvey 1986; 1995, 193-7), and it may be this state to which the Buddha alludes when he says that he is able, without moving his body, to “stay experiencing nothing but happiness ( sukha -) for up to seven days and nights” (MN.I.94). The later Theravada tradition certainly sees the attainment of the “fruit” states which know nirvana as attained by Noble ones “for the purpose of abiding in happiness here and now” (Vism.700). As for type (c) dukkha, this ends when the conditioned khandhas end at death. The khandhas are impermanent and, “whatever is impermanent, that is painful (dukkha)” (SN.II.53), so, when an aralmt dies, it should be seen that the khandhas have simply ended, and that these were impermanent and dukkha (SN.III.112). In addition, when an aralmt first experiences nirvana during life, or later returns to this experience, there is also access to a state beyond type (c) dukkha. For the developed Theravada tradition, this is explained as a direct seeing and knowing of nirvana as a signless, timeless, and unconditioned realm, though the consciousness of the arahat that knows this is still conditioned. There are various suggestions in the Pali suttas, though, that the arahat' s full experience of nirvana in life is one where consciousness, free of attachment to any object, is able to become entirely objectless and unconditioned, and to itself be nirvana, the timeless unborn, the deathless (Harvey 2013, 79-80: 199 5, 180-226). So, we have seen how, in the early Buddhist texts, dukkha in its various senses is brought to an end for an enlightened person. Their ending of craving, and the igno- rance by which it is conditioned, mean that the ups and downs of life do not upset their calm equanimity, as they are no longer tied to these variable states by grasping and aversion. They also have access to blissful meditative states. Yet they still experience physical pain and can become physically tired and mentally weary at draining repeated questions or the prospect of a fruitless task. Such final limitations and their painfulness end, though, with the end of rebirth - that no longer has craving to cause it - as well as being periodically experienced in life. This then raises the question of whether saying that something is dukkha means that it is: (i) by its very nature “painful” or (ii) “painful” when reacted to with grasping or 43 PETER HARVEY aversion. Both seem to be implied in the suttas of the Pali Nikayas: grasping at anything leads to psychological pain (as what one grasps at does not remain as one wants it to), and aversion makes pain worse, but also conditioned things are to be seen, in themselves, as dukkha in the sense of being impermanent and conditioned, hence limited and imperfect. They may also, in a straightforward sense, be forms of physical or mental pain. The path of early Buddhism and the Theravada school aims initially at lessening the mental pain that the vicissitudes and stresses of life can produce, then at ending the great majority of mental pain, but ultimately at ending the round of rebirths, con- ditioned existence, and both its physical pains and its more subtly painful nature. The Mahayana tradition, though, does not see things of the world as painful by their very nature, for when truly understood with wisdom they are seen as non-different from nirvana. Hence the idea developed in the Mahayana that a buddha, and those advanced on the bodhisattva path leading to buddhahood, could remain in, or in contact with, the world in what is known as “non-abiding" ( apratisthita ) nirvana, clinging neither to the world of rebirths nor to nirvana as something supposedly separate from this (Nagao 1991; Williams 2009, 60, 185-6). Notes 1 Note that two-thirds of this chapter overlaps with part of chapter 3 in the author's Introduc- tion to Buddhism: Teachings, History and Practices. Second edn. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- versity Press, 2013. This material is included here with permission. 2 On the whole, Pali versions of terms are given first in this chapter, except in the case of nirvana, as this is well known in English. 3 Whether or not this was historically so. 4 SN.V.420-4 (BW.75-8: SB. 243-6; Harvey 2007); Slit Dharma-cakra-pravartana Sutra. 5 Translations are the author’s own, in some cases as modifications of published translations. 6 In a few contexts, such as “in truth, in reality,” “truth” and “reality” can be synonyms, but in general they are not, and it aids clarity to translate sacca as "reality" in contexts where this is the force of its meaning. 7 Unless one had already become, e.g., a Stream-enterer in a past life. 8 Harvey (2007, 2009a); and Karl Brunnholzl (2010, 680-1) argues for "realities of the noble ones” from Sanskrit and Tibetan sources. 9 See Collins (1982); Harvey (1995, 17-108; 2009b, 265-74); Siderits (2003). 10 E.g., SN.III.44-5 (BW.342-3); SN.IV46-7 (SB.224-5); SN.IV.133-5 (BW.346-7). 11 SN.I.135; cf. Miln.25-8. 12 Though the Mahayana contains some flirting with “Self" language in relation to the Bud- dha-nature (Williams 2009, 103-28). References Anderson, C. (1999). Pain and its Ending: The Four Noble Truths in the Theravada Buddhist Canon. London: Curzon Press. 44 DUIOCHA, NON-SELF, AND THE “FOUR NOBLE TRUTHS” Brunnholzl, Karl (2010). Gone Beyond: The Prajhapdramita Sutras, the Ornament of Clear Realization and its Commentaries in the Tibetan Kagyu Tradition. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion. Collins, S. (1982). Selfless Persons: Imagery and Thought in Theravdda Buddhism. Cambridge: Cam- bridge University Press. Dayal, H. (1970 [1932]). The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul: repr. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Gethin, R. M. L. (2001). The Buddhist Path to Awakening. Oxford: Oneworld. Gombrich, R. F. (1996). How Buddhism Began: The Conditioned Genesis of the Early Teachings. London, and Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Athlone Press. Hamilton, S. (1996) Identity and Experience: The Constitution of the Human Being According to Early Buddhism. London: Luzac Oriental. Harvey, P. (1986). Signless Samadhis in Pali Buddhism. In Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 9, 25-52. Harvey, P. (1995). The Selfless Mind: Personality, Consciousness and Nirvana in Early Buddhism. London: Curzon Press. Harvey, P. (2007). Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta: The Discourse on the Setting in Motion of the Wheel (of Vision) of the Basic Pattern: The Four Realities for the Spiritually Ennobled Ones. Trans., with notes, at: www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn56/sn56.011.harv.html. Harvey, P. (2009a). The Four Ariya-saccas as "True Realities for the Spiritually Ennobled” - the Painful, its Origin, its Cessation, and the Way Going to This - Rather than “Noble Truths” Concerning These. In Buddhist Studies Review 26, 197-227. DOI: 10.1 558/bsrv.v26i2. 197. Harvey, P. (2009b). The Approach to Knowledge and Truth in the Theravada Record of the Dis- courses of the Buddha: Theravada Philosophy of Mind and the Person: Theravada Texts on Ethics. In Buddhist Philosophy: Essential Readings. Ed. W. Edelglass and J. L. Garfield. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 175-85, 265-74, 375-87. Harvey, P. (2013). An Introduction to Buddhism: Teachings, History and Practices. Second edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nagao, G. (1991). Madhyamika and Yogdcdra: A Study of Mahay ana Philosophies: Collected Papers of G. M. N. Nagao. Albany: State University of New York Press. Norman, K. R. (1997). A Philological Approach to Buddhism. London: School of Oriental and African Studies. Siderits, M. N. (2003). Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy: Empty Persons. Aldershot, and Burlington, VT: Ashgate. Thanissaro Bhikkhu (1999). The Mind Like Fire Unbound. Barre, MA: Dhamma Dana, and at: www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/modern/thanissaro/likeflre/index.html. Webster, D. (2005a). The Weary Buddha or Why the Buddha Nearly Couldn’t Be Bothered. In Buddhist Studies Review 22, 15-25. Webster, D. (2005b). The Philosophy of Desire in the Buddhist Pali Canon. London and New York: RoutledgeCurz on . Williams, P. (2009). Mahdydna Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations. Second edn. London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 45 3 The Conditioned Co-arising of Mental and Bodily Processes within Life and Between Lives 1 PETER HARVEY The Centrality of Conditioned Co-arising A common inscription on Buddhist monuments goes: Of those states that proceed from a cause ( hetu ), The Tathdgata has told the cause. And that which is their stopping ( nlrodha ): The great renunciant has such a teaching (Vin.1.40) A doctrine strongly related to the Four True Realities for the Spiritually Ennobled (usually called “Noble Truths”), particularly the second (the origin of dukkha), is that of paticca-samuppada (P.; Skt pratltya-samutpada). This has been variously translated as: Dependent Origination, Conditioned Arising, Conditioned Co-arising. 2 The understanding of conditioned co-arising is so central to Buddhist practice and development that the Buddha’s chief disciple, Sariputta, said, "Whoever sees Condi- tioned Co-arising sees Dhamma, whoever sees Dhamma sees Conditioned Co-arising” (MN.I.191). Moreover, after his enlightenment, the Buddha is said to have reflected on what he had discovered, initially feeling that it was too subtle for others to understand: This Dhamma won by me is profound ( gambhira ), difficult to see, difficult to understand, peaceful, sublime, beyond the scope of mere reasoning (atakkavacara), subtle, to be experi- enced by the wise. But this generation is delighting in clinging (to the familiar) ... so that this were a matter difficult to see, that is to say specific conditionality ( idappaccatyata ), Conditioned Co-arising. This too were a matter difficult to see, that is to say the stilling (samatha) of all constructing activities, the renunciation of all attachment, the destruction of craving, dispassion, stopping ( nirodha ), Nirvana. (MN.I.16 7) A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy. First Edition. Edited by Steven M. Emmanuel. © 2013 John Wiley & Sons. Inc. Published 2013 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 46 CONDITIONED CO- ARISING WITHIN LIFE AND BETWEEN LIVES This specifies conditioned co-arising and nirvana (P. nibbana) as two aspects of the subtle and profound Dhamma, “beyond the scope of mere reasoning” that was the focus of the Buddha’s experience of awakening. This implies that conditioned co-arising and nirvana are in some way closely related. Nirvana is the stopping, or transcending, of conditioned co-arising. The Buddha also taught that rebirth continues until direct insight into conditioned co-arising is attained (DN.If.55). The Principle of Conditionality In its abstract form, the doctrine states: That being, this comes to be: from the arising ( uppdda ) of that, this arises; that being absent, this is not; from the cessation ( nirodha ) of that, this ceases. (SN.II.28, 70, 78, 95, 96) In its simplest sense, this is the principle of conditionality, applied to all processes, events, and “things," physical or mental, in the universe: they arise and exist due to the presence of certain conditions and cease once their conditions are removed; nothing (except nirvana) is independent. The doctrine thus complements the teaching that no permanent, independent self can be found. The above abstract principle is always intro- duced as a prelude to an enumeration of the 12 conditioned and conditioning finks (nidanas), culminating in the arising of dukkha, hence as an abstraction of an overall pattern from a series of instances of it. The principle can also, then, be seen at work in other examples of conditionality. The standard version of conditioned co-arising, as a series of 12 nidanas is seen for example at Vin.I.l: Then the Blessed One, during the first watch of the night paid attention to Conditioned Co-arising in forward ( anuloma , i.e., arising /uppdda) and reverse ( patiloma , i.e., cessation/ nirodha) mode: from [1] (spiritual) ignorance ( avijjd ) as condition (paccaya) are the constructing activities/ volitional activities/karmic formations/fabrications ( saiiklmras ); from [2] the constructing activities as condition is consciousness (vinnana); from [3] consciousness as condition is name-and-form/mind-and-body/the sentient body (ndma-rupa); from [4] name-and-form as condition are the six sense-spheres (dyatanas)', from [5] the six sense-spheres as condition is stimulation/contact/impingement (phassa); from [6] stimulation as condition is feeling ( vedana ); from [7] feeling as condition is craving ( tanhd ); 47 PETER HARVEY from [8] craving as condition is grasping/clinging (updddjia); from [9] grasping as condition is becoming ( bhava ); from [10] becoming as condition is birth (jdti); from [11] birth as condition is [12] old age and dying, grief, lamentation, physical pain, unhappiness and distress come into being. Such is the arising (samudaya) of this whole painful bundle ( dukkha-kkhandha ). But from the fading away without remainder of (spiritual) ignorance is the cessation/ stop- ping ( nirodha ) of the constructing activities; from the cessation/stopping of the constructing activities is the cessation/stopping of consciousness; [etc., until we come to:] from the cessation/stopping of birth, old age and dying, grief, lamentation, physical pain, unhappiness and distress cease. Such is the cessation of this whole painful bundle. This sequence may be explained from link (1) through to (12) or the explanation may start at (12), then specify (1 1) as its crucial condition, and so on, back to (1). After the formula is given in either versions of this forward/arising ( anuloma ) mode, it follows in reverse/cessation (patiloma) mode. In this form, it describes how the cessation of dukkha comes about due to the complete cessation of spiritual ignorance and the consequent cessation of each following nidana. The Meaning and Nature of Conditioned Co-arising In the term paticca-samuppdda, samuppada comes from sam, “together,” and uppdda, “arising." As explained by the fifth-century Theravadin commentator Buddhaghosa, this means that something can only arise when its conditions are gathered together (Vism.521). Something arises together with its conditions. Paticca means “conditioned,” “having fallen back on," “grounded on,” being derived from pati-i, from which comes the verb pacceti, “it falls back on." From the same root comes the word paccaya, “con- dition" or “foundation.” Synonyms for paccaya are nidana, “ground,” hetu, “cause," samudaya, “origin,” dlidra, “nutriment,” and upanisa, “support.” Thus a paccaya is a supporting ground which helps to set off and feed that which it conditions. Paticca- samuppdda thus means something like conditioned co-arising, grounded co-arising, arising together with conditions. What of the term nirodha, “stopping” or “cessation," in the conditioned co-arising formula? Does this refer to the stopping of a particular instance of “birth," for example, or to the stopping of the whole process of births in a person? It is clear that the latter is meant. DN.II.57 talks of “if there were absolutely no birth at all . . . with the cessation of birth, could aging-and-death appear?” As one Theravadin commentary (MN-a. 11.308) puts it, “stopping" is equivalent to “non-arising (an-uppdda)” : it is the stopping of the process of the rise and fall of instances of, say, feeling. Conditioned phenomena 48 CONDITIONED CO- ARISING WITHIN LIFE AND BETWEEN LIVES are both constantly arising and passing away, but are also subject to final “stopping” or “cessation.” The emphasis is on how types of things arise, so that they can be changed or stopped. Conditioned Co-arising, the Four True Realities for the Spiritually Ennobled, and Spiritual Practice Before looking individually at the 12 links, some general remarks are in order. The teaching explains how dukkha, the first True Reality for the Spiritually Ennobled, comes about, this originating set of conditions being the second True Reality for the Spiritually Ennobled; and the formula in reverse/cessation mode describes the cessation of dukkha, namely nirvana, the third True Reality (AN.I.177). It is also said that the Noble Eight- factored Path, the fourth True Reality, is the way going to the cessation of each of the 12 links, and thus of dukkha (SN.II.43). Note that the twelfth link is summarized as “this whole painful bundle ( dukkha - kkhandha)," which reminds us that the teaching on the first True Reality for the Spiritually Ennobled ends by saying, “in short, these five bundles ( klmndha ) of grasping- fuel (updddna) are painful." In some texts, each of the 12 finks are given the same treatment as dukkha in the Four True Realities for the Spiritually Ennobled, for example: From the arising of (spiritual) ignorance is the arising of the constructing activities; from the stopping of (spiritual) ignorance is the stopping of the constructing activities. This Noble Eightfold Path is itself the course leading to the stopping of the constructing activities . . . (SN.II.43) The Four True Realities for the Spiritually Ennobled relating to dukkha can be seen as an application of the principle of conditioned co-arising focused particularly on dukkha. Its structure - phenomenon, its key condition, cessation of the phenomenon from the cessation of its key condition, the systematic path of positive conditions leading to this - is permeated with the principle of conditionality, which runs through the whole of Buddhist thought and practice. There is even a version of conditioned co-arising (SN.II.30) which continues beyond link 12 to say that, based on dukkha, faith ( saddhd ; Skt sraddha) arises, and then on through various successive states which are part of the path to the end of dukkha. The doctrine thus unites the four True Realities and makes possible a methodological science of moral and spiritual life. By becoming aware of how one is conditioned, one can come to alter the flow of conditions by governing, suspending, or, for skilful ones, intensifying them so as to reduce dukkha, and ultimately stop it entirely by transcending the condi- tions: reconditioning, then de-conditioning. Nirvana is the stopping of the entire sequence of conditions mapped out in the con- ditioned co-arising teaching. With the arising of the Dhamma-seeing Dhamma-eye at 49 PETER HARVEY stream-entry, which knows “whatever is of the nature to arise ( samudaya-dhamma ), all that is of the nature to stop ( nirodha-dhamma )," there is insight into both the way in which the nidanas arise in the conditioned co-arising sequence, and that these condi- tionally arisen dhammas are of such a nature that they can be stopped/transcended in the “stopping/ cessation” that is nirvana. The Dhamma-eye thus sees the four True Reali- ties for the Spiritually Ennobled in seeing: conditioned dukkha states, how they arise, how they stop when their conditions stop, and the Noble Eightfold Path (itself the “best of all conditioned states,” AN.IL 34) as the way to this. The Stream-enterer knows all the conditions and how they can be stopped, and so “stands squarely before the door of the deathless” (SN.II.43): he or she can “see” the nirvana that will later be fully expe- rienced at arahatship. While the path that leads to the experiencing of nirvana is conditioned, nirvana itself is unconditioned/unconstructed (asankhata), just as a mountain is not dependent on the path that leads to it (Miln.269). As the “unborn, unbecome, unmade, uncon- structed" (Ud.80-1), it is “not co-arisen ( asamuppanam )” (It. 3 7-8). Nirvana is not something that is conditionally arisen, but is the stopping of all such processes. Conditioned Co-arising, Non-Self, and the Khandhas Besides explaining the origin of dukkha, the formula also explains karma, rebirth, and the functioning of personality, all without the need to invoke a permanent self. No substantial self can be found which underlies the nidanas, owning and operating them: they simply occur according to conditions. Thus it is inappropriate to ask, for example, “who craves?,” but appropriate to ask what craving is conditioned by, the answer being "feeling" (SN.II.14). Just as Buddhism looks at “how?” rather than “why?” questions, it also looks at “how?” rather than “who?” questions. Nevertheless, in the context of moral discourse, it treats any particular conditioned stream of mental and physical processes as a “person” who is held (except for extenuating circumstances) responsible for “his" or “her" actions. Hence, you are responsible for your actions even though no essential “You” can be found who is their agent. While the live khandha doctrine is an analysis of the components of personality in static form, the 12 nidana formula is a synthesis, which shows how such components arise (SN.II.28) and interact dynamically to form the living process of personality, in one life and from life to life. Each of the five khandhas also occurs in the nidana formula. Consciousness, constructing activities, and feeling occur in both lists. Material form (riipa) is the same as the "body" (part of link 4), and perception (sahha) is part of "mind” ( ndma ); in the form of misinterpretation, it is also tantamount to spiritual ignorance. The 12 T I nk s ( nidanas ) The 12 nidanas are individually explained at SN.II.2-4, and considerable detail is also given in a section of the Maha-niddna Sutta (DN.II.5 5-63). 3 50 CONDITIONED CO- ARISING WITHIN LIFE AND BETWEEN LIVES (Spiritual) Ignorance (avijja; Ski avitlya ) Ignorance complements and supports craving in the causation of dukkha. It shows the effects that mis-seeing has, according to Buddhism, and the importance of seeing things “as they really are.” The niddna of spiritual ignorance is defined as unknowing (annum) with regard to the Four True Realities for the Spiritually Ennobled (SN.II.4). As the principle of con- ditioned co-arising underlies these truths, the first link can be seen, ironically, to be ignorance of this very principle. Conditioned co-arising, then, is a process which can operate only in ignorance of itself. Once a person fully understands it, it can be stopped. The “ignorance” referred to is not lack of information but a more deep- seated misperception of reality, which can be destroyed only by direct meditative insight. It is given as the first link due to its fundamental influence on the process of life, but is itself conditioned by sensual desire, ill will, dullness and lethargy, rest- lessness and worry, and vacillation: the five hindrances to meditative calm. These are in turn conditioned by bad conduct of body, speech, or mind (AN.V.113), hence such karmically harmful constructing activities feed back to help sustain spiritual ignorance. Buddhism, then, sees the basic root of the pain and stress of life as spiritual igno- rance, rather than sin, which is a willful turning away from a creator God. Indeed, it can be regarded as having a doctrine of something like “original sinlessness.” While the mind is seen as containing many unskillful tendencies with deep roots, “below” these roots it is radiant: “Monks, this mind ( citta ) is brightly shining ( pabhassara ; Skt prabhdsvara), but it is defiled by adventitious defilements” (AN.I.10). That is, the deepest layer of the mind is bright and pure (though not yet immune from being obscured by defilements). This represents, in effect, the potentiality for attaining nirvana - but defilements arise through inept interaction of the mind with the world. The idea of defilements as “arriving” or “adventitious” is related to their non-Self nature: they are not an intrinsic part of person, so can be transcended. Even a newborn child is not seen as having a wholly pure mind, however, for it is said to have unskillful latent tendencies ( anusaya ; Skt anusaga ) which are carried over from a previous life (MN.I.433). In the calm of deep meditation, the depth-radiance of the mind is experienced at a conscious level as the process of meditation suspends the defiling five hindrances, just as a smelter purifies gold ore so as to attain pure gold (SN.V.92). More than a temporary undefiled state of mind is necessary for awakening, however. For this, there must be destruction of the four “taints” or “cankers” ( asava ; Skt dsrava): the most deeply rooted spiritual faults, which are likened to festering sores, leeching off energy from the mind, or intoxicating influxes on the mind. These are the taints that flow in relation to sense-desire, becoming, views, and spiritual ignorance, which are seen as conditioning, and being conditioned by, spiritual igno- rance (MN.I.54-5). One can see ignorance, indeed ignore-ance, as a misperception which beclouds the basic radiance of mind. One can perhaps see craving as leading to the willful ignoring of things that one has, in part of one’s mind, or at some past time, realized. People are good at forgetting. This is one reason why Buddhism emphasizes mindfulness, which includes an element of careful “bearing in mind.” 51 PETER HARVEY Constructing Activities (the sankharas; Skt samskaras) The second nidana, “constructing activities” (Harvey 1995, 122-4), are actions of body, speech, or mind (SN.II.4) expressed in both karmically fruitful (generally trans- lated as “meritorious”) and karmically harmful actions of body, speech, and mind (DN. III.217). 4 Ignorance can be seen to condition active impulses in that all actions are performed from the perspective of a particular way of perceiving and construing the world, an outlook and set of beliefs, which provides a motivating framework: a person acts in response to the “world” as it appears to him or her. Prior to enlightenment, all actions will be in some way affected by misperceptions, or at least by correct beliefs which are not based on direct perception, so as to be in some way narrow or incomplete. Actions can bring positive fruits if they are based on some degree of insight into reality, such as the principles of karma or impermanence. In a person who has destroyed spir- itual ignorance, though, actions no longer have the power to “construct” any karmic results. The main “constructing activity” is will ( cetand ) (SN.II. 39-40), that which initiates actions. As it is conditioned, but not rigidly determined, by past events, it has a relative freedom. For example, the arising of anger need not lead on to angry behavior if a person becomes watchfully aware of it, so as to lessen its power. This is because the act of mindfulness brings about a change in the current conditions operating in the mind (Harvey 2007). SN.II. 6 5-6 talks of the constructing activities in terms of willing ( ceteti ), planning, and having an underlying or latent tendency ( anusaya ) towards something: What one wills (ceteti), what one plans (pakappeti ), and what one has a tendency towards (anuseti)'. This is an object ( arammana ) for the maintenance of consciousness. There being an object, there is a support (patittha) for consciousness. When that consciousness is sup- ported and grows, there is the production of renewed becoming ( puna-bbhava ) in the future. [The following Sutta says instead, “there is a descent of name-and-form" here.] When there is the production of renewed becoming in the future, there is future birth, aging and death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, unhappiness and distress. Such is the origination of this whole painful bundle. The same is said to happen if one only plans and has a tendency, or just has a tendency. Having an underlying tendency thus appears to be seen as the most deep-seated and stubborn constructing activity - one that possibly underlies the operation of all the rest, as an unconscious latent disposition. Elsewhere, the seven anusayas are listed as those of sense-desire, aversion, views, uncertainty, conceit, attachment to becoming, and ignorance. The above passage goes on to say that, without even a latent tendency, con- sciousness has no object or support, and so does not “grow” so as to produce future rebirth and hence more dukkha. Consciousness (vinnana; Skt vijnana ) This nidana is the same as the fifth khandha. The most important but not the only context in which constructing activities condition consciousness is in the generation of consciousness in a future life; for it is said that the “evolving” or “conducive” 52 CONDITIONED CO- ARISING WITHIN LIFE AND BETWEEN LIVES (samvattanika) consciousness is the crucial link between rebirths (MN.II.2 62). At death, the momentum set up by constructing activities (including craving) is not cut off, but impels the evolving flux of consciousness to spill over beyond one life and help spark off another. Constructing activities condition consciousness in that they generate tendencies whose momentum tends to make a person become aware of, or think of, certain objects (Harvey 1995, 124-30). For example, if one has decided (a mental action) to look for a certain article to buy, such as a house, one’s mind will automatically notice related things, such as advertisements and “for sale" notices, that were previously not even mentally registered, as suggested by the above passage (SN.II.65-6). What one is con- scious of, and thus the form of one’s consciousness, depends on one's volitions and tendencies. The SN.II.65-6 passage shows that the constructing activities condition consciousness by giving it a certain direction, so that it turns towards a certain object, or kinds of objects, on which to “settle.” This provides it with a supporting and main- taining object, so that it is consciousness of that. The object is an “opportunity” (another meaning of arammana, translated above as “object”) for consciousness to continue to arise, a focus of preoccupation, in which there has been volitional energy invested, where consciousness turns for its sustenance and continuation. A similar point seems to be made at MN.I.l 1 5, which says: “whatever one ponders and reflects on much [e.g., sense-pleasures], towards that is the inclination of the heart.” As consciousness is also conditioned by its objects (and the sense organs), the version of conditioned co-arising in the Mahd-niddna Sutta (DN.II.63) gives “name-and-form” ( nama-rupa ) - i.e. perceived meaningful forms, mental and physical phenomena as objects - as the first link in the chain, followed by consciousness then nama-rupa again, here as mind-and-body, and on through the remaining links as in the standard version. The DN.II.63 passage, then, has consciousness conditioned by the mental and physical phenomena onto which the constructing activities direct it as supporting objects. The conditioning of consciousness by its objects is also seen in a common passage: Visual-consciousness, your reverences, arises conditioned by eye and visual forms: the meeting of the three is stimulation (phassa); from stimulation as condition is feeling (vedand) . . . [then parallel statements for the other sense channels]. (SN.II.73) 5 A person, then, consists of a dynamic interplay between consciousness and the body of other mental and physical states that are either the objects of consciousness or its facilitating complements. In the vortical interplay between consciousness and nama- rupa (Harvey 1995, 116-21), the whole complex of the 12 links of conditioned co- arising and the realm of language is spun out: just this, namely nama-rupa, is the cause, ground, origin and condition of consciousness. Thus far, then, can we trace birth and decay, death and passing away and being reborn, thus far extends the way of designation ( adhivacana -), of language ( nirutti -), of concepts (pannatti-), thus far is the sphere of understanding (panndvacara) , thus far the round (of rebirth) goes as far as can be discerned here, namely nama-rupa together with consciousness. (DN.II.63-4) 53 PETER HARVEY Consciousness hangs around nama-rupa, the other four khandhas, as its “home" (SN. III. 9-10). True renunciation, non-attachment to this conditioned “home,” opens up the possibility of radical “homelessness”: the realm of the unconditioned, nirvana. When there is no craving or grasping, consciousness can be like a sunbeam that lands nowhere, being “unsupported (appatitthita)” (SN.II. 101-5). This simile suggests that consciousness that has “stopped,” being no longer meshed in the network of condi- tions, does not stop existing, any more than a radiant sunbeam does when it is not obstructed by anything. Name-and-Form/Mind-and-Body/ Sentient Body (nama-rupa) This is literally “name and form." This term already had a currency in the (non-Bud- dhist) Brahmanical Upanisads. At Brhaddranyaka Upanisad 1 .4. 7, it means the name and visible appearance of a person, though these are seen to veil the immortal breath within (Br.Up.1.6.3). In Chandogya Upanisad 6. 1.4-6, “name” is what differentiates different things made from the same kind of substance - e.g., clay or iron. In a famous passage at Mundaka Upanisad 3.2.8, nama-rupa means something like individuality: As the rivers flow on and enter into the ocean giving up their names and appearances, So the knower, freed from name and appearance, reaches the heavenly Person, beyond the very highest. (Olivelle 1996, 276) Brhaddranyaka 3.2.12 sees a person's “name” as going with him or her (if unliberated, presumably) after death, as a key ingredient of their particular identity. “Name" is the expression of intention and thought through speech (Chandogya Upanisad 7.1-5), while speech grasps names as sight grasps visible appearances and hearing grasps sounds (Kausitaki Upanisad 3.4). In Buddhism, “name/mind" consists of feeling, perception, will, stimulation, and attention, and “form' /body consists of the physical elements (SN.II. 3): together these are equivalent to the four khandhas other than consciousness (Vibh.136). The name/ mind factors specified can be seen as essential aspects of what makes a person sentient, recognizing and responding to objects - thus the commentator Buddhaghosa, punning, says “it is ‘ndmd because of bending ( namanato ) towards objects” (Vism.558). Thus one might translate nama-rupa as “sentient body,” or “sentience and body,” in Buddhist contexts: the body and accompanying mental states which provide sentience. The sense of individual existence, as in the Upanisads, can also be seen to be meant. The “sentient body” develops in the womb once the flux of consciousness “descends" into the womb, and continues to do so provided that consciousness does not depart (DN. II. 62-3). Indeed the Sarvastivada tradition saw name-and-form as embryonic life prior to the development of the senses (AKB.III.21-4). The embryo starts to develop when there has been intercourse at the right time of the month, and there is an available being who is ready to be reborn (MN.1. 265-6). Outside the womb, the sentient body continues unless consciousness is cut off (DN.II.63), for consciousness, vitality (dyu), and heat make a body alive and sensitive (MN.1. 295-6). Together, consciousness and 54 CONDITIONED CO- ARISING WITHIN LIFE AND BETWEEN LIVES the sentient body encompass all live khandhas of personality, and the interaction between them is seen to be the crux of the process of life and suffering: Indeed, consciousness turns back round onto name-and-form, it does not go beyond. Only in this way can one be born, or grow old, or die, or fall away from one's past existence, or be reborn: that is to say, insofar as consciousness is conditioned by name-and-form, name- and-form is conditioned by consciousness, the six sense-bases are conditioned by name-and-form. . . . (DN.II.32) Here one sees interactive vortex of consciousness and the sentient body, as in the Malia- nidana Sutta. The Six Sense-Bases (ayatanas) and Stimulation (phassa; Skt sparsa ) The next niddna is the six sense-bases or sense-media (ayatanas), which are the five physical sense organs and the mind organ ( mano : Skt manas), the latter being seen as that which is sensitive to mental objects (dhammas) - i.e., objects of memory, thought, imagination, and the input of the five senses. The six sense-bases are conditioned by the sentient body, as they can only exist in a living sentient organism. In turn the sense-bases condition stimulation, which is the "meeting” of a sense, its object, and the related kind of consciousness (MN.I.lll). DN.II.62 omits the sense- bases and goes directly from the sentient body to stimulation, which shows that any analysis in terms of a sequence of conditions can be varied in its detail: the “standard” 12 links are just one way of doing this. “Contact” is a fairly literal translation for phassa, but suggests that a purely physical meeting of sense and object is meant, overlooking the involvement of consciousness. “Impingement" or “impression” are possibilities but “stimulation" signals more the aspect of an initial mental registration. DN.II.62 explains that phassa involves both a “resistance” ( patigha -) and “designation" ( adhivacana -) form. That is, phassa entails both a physical “contact" in the “meeting" of sense and object and a mental “designative contact” in the involvement of consciousness. Buddhism emphasizes that, whatever the external physical world is like, the “world” ( loka ) of our actual lived experience is one built up from the input of the five senses, interpreted by the mind organ (SN.IV.95). As this interpretation is, for most people, influenced by spiritual ignorance, our “lived world” is skewed and not in harmony with reality. Such a world is fraught with dukkha, but it is conditioned and can be tran- scended: “I declare that this fathom-long carcass, which is percipient and endowed with mind-organ, contains the world, and the origin of the world, and the cessation of the world [Nirvana], and the way leading to the cessation of the world” (SN.I.62). This can be seen as about the Four True Realities for the Spiritually Ennobled, with "the world” replacing “dukkha." Feeling (vedana ) and Craving (Tail ha; Skt trsna ) “Feeling” is the same as the second khandha, and refers simply to the pleasant, unpleas- ant, or neither-pleasant-nor-unpleasant feeling-tone that is an aspect of any 55 PETER HARVEY experience. This arises in direct response to stimulation in one of the six sense-chan- nels. It in turn conditions the arising of craving, which is highlighted in the teaching on the True Realities for the Spiritually Ennobled as the key condition for dukkha. Depending on what feelings arise, there is craving (tanka', Skt trsnd) to enjoy, prolong, or get rid of them. While one cannot help what feelings arise initially from sensing something, the extent of craving (and type of accompanying feeling) in response to them is modifiable. People take feeling very seriously, thirsting for the pleasant, trying to push away the unpleasant, and having an attitude of indifference or confusion towards the neutral. Indeed, at MN.III.28 5 it is said: When one is touched by pleasant feeling, if one delights in it, welcomes it, and remains holding on to it, then the underlying tendency ( anusaya ) to attachment ( raga ) lies within one. When one is touched by painful feeling, if one sorrows, grieves and laments, weeps while beating one’s breast and becoming distraught, then the underlying tendency to aversion ( patigha -) lies within one. When one is touched by neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, if one does not understand it as it really is: the origination, the disappearance, the gratification, the danger, and the transcending in regard to that feeling, then the underly- ing tendency to ignorance (avijja) lies within one . 6 The suttas see this as an important aspect of how attachment, hatred, and delusion, the roots of dukkha, are sustained. More complex responses also occur. In reaction to some kinds of unpleasant experience, people become unsettled and confused, and so seek solace by going in search of some pleasant feeling to become attached to . . . like a baby sucking a dummy. In response to neutral feeling, a person may respond with boredom and wanting something to happen, or may like it, and fall into a somewhat dull state. People are often hooked or hijacked by feelings into one or other kind of response. But such responses, while deeply ingrained, are not the only, or most skillful, ones that can occur. The suttas give various descriptions of the way in which mental states arise and operate in the six sense-channels, in response to objects of the six senses. MN.I.l 1 1-12 says: Visual-consciousness, your reverences, arises conditioned by eye and visual forms; the meeting of the three is stimulation (phassa ); from stimulation as condition is feeling ( vedana ); what one feels ( vedeti ) one perceives/interprets/labels ( sanjanati ); what one per- ceives one thinks about (vitakketi); what one thinks about one elaborates (papailceti ); what one elaborates is the origin of the interpretations and reckonings (- sannd-sankhd ) [that come] from elaboration which assail a man in regard to visual forms discernible by the eye, past, future or present. [This is then repeated in a parallel way for the other five sense-channels.] In this description of the perceptual process, after feeling, the terms change from nouns to verbs - “from stimulation as condition is feeling: what one feels one perceives” - i.e., active responses to experience start to occur. The response may be some form of craving, but MN.1. 111-12 talks particularly of the activity of “elaboration” (papafica) which generates assailing “interpretations and reckonings (-sanna-sankha)." This is 56 CONDITIONED CO- ARISING WITHIN LIFE AND BETWEEN LIVES reminiscent of spiritual ignorance, which is a form of misperception. The arising of feeling is a crucial phase in experience, for the next phase may involve either craving or ignorance, or both of these - key causes of dukkha. Hence the importance placed on understanding that all forms of feeling are to be seen as in a sense dukkha (unsatisfac- tory or in some sense painful), so as to engender a more skillful, less habitual response to them, which is not attachment, aversion, or ignore-ance. Regarding all feeling as dukkha/ painful is not about generating actual aversion to feeling. Aversion is dislike directed at something. Buddhism encourages, rather, an attitude of letting go, disen- chantment, turning away (P. nibbida). Unskillful response to feelings also feeds the attitude of “I am”: “the uninstructed ordinary person, touched by feeling born of stimulation by spiritual ignorance, thinks ‘I am’ ” (SN.III.46). The Maha-nidana Sutta (DN.II.66-9) examines the views that "my Self” is feeling, something without feeling, or something that possesses feeling, and sees all as problematic (Harvey 1995, 31-3; 2009, 270-1). Grasping (up ad an a) This term is also found in the expression upaddna-kkhandha, bundle/ aggregate of grasp- ing-fuel. Craving conditions grasping or clinging: having reached for something, one seeks to hold onto it, to wallow in a certain craving-based state. The four forms of grasp- ing are those directed at sensual pleasures ( kama ), views ( ditthi ; Skt drsti ), conduct/ precepts and vows (sTla-bbatupadana), and Self doctrines (atta-vdda) (SN.II.3). Grasping at sensual pleasures is simply an intensification of sensual craving: the mind wanting to hold on to the object of desire such that the whole mind-set is colored by sense-desire and it loses its center of balance. Grasping at views is seen by the Theravadin Abhidhamma text, the DhammasahganI (sections 1214-17), as relating to views other than those on Self (probably to make sense of the latter being separately listed as a focus of grasping). Grasping at a Self doctrine are those views which are forms of grasping at one or other aspect of the body-mind complex as “Self” or “per- taining to Self,” as in “Self-identity view ( sakkay a- ditthi ).” “Views" are beliefs, theories, opinions, or worldviews, especially when they become fixed or dogmatic, so that one identifies fully with a way of looking at something, a way of explaining it (Fuller, 2005). One’s attachment is then such that one is wounded if that theory is criticized, and one is willing to be underhand or not fully honest in defense of the theory. One is also limited in one’s vision by the theory or belief: it is like a pair of blinkers which enable one to see only certain things, narrowing one’s whole outlook on life, like a blind man who mistakes the part of an elephant that he has felt for the whole of what an “elephant” is (Ud.67-9); it may contain some truth, but one needs always to be open to a deepening of that truth or to a balancing by a comple- mentary one. The Buddha was clearly very wary of mere theories or “views," holding that they led to quarrels (AN.I.66) and conceit (Sn. 842-3). Such views are seen as hidden forms of self-assertion, which lead to conflict with those of other opinions, be this in the form of verbal wrangling or ideological wars and bloody revolutions. In this context, it is worth noting that the atrocities carried out by Hitler, Stalin, and the Khmer Rouge were initiated by people who were convinced of a theory which demanded and “justified” their actions. Indeed, Buddhism holds that wrong view feeds bad behavior 57 PETER HARVEY (AN.1. 30-2; BW.2 1 3-14) and that the worst way of doing a bad act is if it is accompa- nied by a view that perversely sees it as “right” (Harvey 2000, 55-6). To be sure, there are what might be called “Buddhist views,” such as belief in the goodness of giving and in karma and rebirth: that what one does matters. Such beliefs are termed “ordinary" (lokiya) “right view,” and, though they lead in the right direction, they are still associated with clinging (MN.lll. 72), as they can be clung to if not tested by wisdom (MN.1.133). One should not even cling to the view that all views displease one, but get rid of whatever view one has and not take up any other (MN.f.497-8). Views, as all else in the conditioned world, are seen to be arisen according to conditions, to be impermanent, and to bring dukkha if clung to (AN.V187-8). Wisdom (panful: Skt prajna), analytically directed intuitive insight, though, is said to be “transcendent" ( lokuttara ) “right view” (MN.lll. 72), and is such that, when it knows, for example, that “all dhammas are non-Self,” this is “well seen, as it really is” (AN.V.188), in a way that goes beyond all speculative reasoning or acceptance of ideas from others. The true aim, then, is not to have a view or belief, even if it happens to be true, but to have direct knowledge “not dependent on another" (SN.III. 135) - in other words, to replace a viewpoint with a direct seeing. Sila-bbatupadana, literally “grasping at conduct/precepts ( sila ) and vows,” is some- times translated as grasping at “rite-and-ritual,” but this is a translation probably influenced by Protestant dislike of rituals. From a Buddhist perspective, one cannot assess a ritual, or someone’s use of it, unless one assesses the extent to which it encour- ages wholesome/skillful, or unwholesome/unskillful, states of mind. Bhikkhu Bodhi's translation of the Samyutta Nikaya (“The Connected Discourses of the Buddha”) talks of grasping at “rules and observances.” As regards grasping at vows: this would clearly relate to certain customs of the Bud- dha’s day, where ascetics vowed to carry out various penances - e.g., the vow to behave like a dog or an ox (MN.I.378). More generally, “grasping at conduct and vows” could be seen as any form of thinking: if only I do something this way, then everything will be all right, ft is over-expectation as regards what guidelines or ethical precepts can provide and can lead to over-rigidity and harping guilt when a precept is infringed. It is making a rule something important only in its own right, rather than also as a help towards something else. This grasping might show itself in regard to politics, religious ritual, personal habits and preferences, and even moral precepts and meditational guidelines. Looking at the four forms of grasping, one can see that they are focused on pleasant experiences, ideas, or actions. Any of these can be objects of clinging, attachment, and rigidity. The Theravadin commentarial tradition sometimes picks out views, craving, and the “I am conceit ( asmi-mdna )” as representing the causes of dukkha and sees the con- templation: “this is not mine, this is not I am, this is not my Self” as counteracting, respectively, craving (“this is mine”), conceit (“I am”), and views (“this is my Self"). Besides the above ways in which craving leads to grasping, the Mahd-niddna Sutta (DN.II. 58-62) has a long aside on craving, spelling out a sequence of conditions set off by it that relate to possessiveness and quarrelling; this again highlights its destructive effect. AN.III. 399-401 highlights the way that craving acts as a “sempstress,” stitching together various things so as to attach one to new situations and rebirths. 58 CONDITIONED CO- ARISING WITHIN LIFE AND BETWEEN LIVES Becoming or Being (bhava ) Bhava is the noun from the verb meaning “is," bhavati (or, in shortened form, lioti), often used to say that something “is” something else - e.g., “the Brahmin is a minister” - rather than being from the verb atthi, to exist, from which comes the word atthitd, “existence.” Many people translate bhava as “becoming," to emphasize the dynamic nature of existence according to Buddhism. “Being" would be a possible translation except for the fact that in English it can have metaphysical associations. Moreover “a being” is used to translate satta (Skt sattva), which is from the same root as atthi. The suttas are brief in their description of bhava. The term is also part of the word puna-bbhava, “re-becoming," a common term for rebirth. Several passages see it as relat- ing to the three spheres of Buddhist cosmology: those of the sense-desire realm of human and lesser rebirths, and the meditation-related realms of (elemental) form and the formless. A passage at AN.I.223 expands on this: “Ananda, if there were no element of sense-desire, and no action/karma to ripen [there], would any sense-desire-becoming be manifested?” “Surely not, Lord.” “fn this way, Ananda, karma is the field, consciousness is the seed, craving is the moisture: for beings hindered by ignorance, fettered by craving, consciousness is supported in a lower element. Thus, in the future, there is re-becoming and production. Thus, Ananda, there is becoming.” Parallel statements are then given for the “element of form," which is "middling," and the “formless element," which is “excellent.” Bhava, then, seems to mean the continu- ation of the whole changing process of life, ongoing existence in one or other world of change - or perhaps the transition phase leading to a new rebirth in one of these. The Theravadin Abhidhamma explains bhava as having two aspects: “karma-becom- ing” - i.e., karmically fruitful and harmful volitions - and "arising (uppat£i)-becoming” - existence in some world as a result of grasping and karma (Vibh.l 3 7). Such a world is meant primarily as a new rebirth, but, arguably, it can also be seen as applying to a “world” in this life - i.e., a situation in which one finds oneself as a result of one's grasp- ing and actions. “Becoming" may also have been intended to refer to an “intermediary becoming” (i antara-bhava ), a period of transition between rebirths. About half the pre-Mahayana schools, including the Theravadins, held that the moment of death was immediately followed by the moment of conception, with no intervening period. The other schools, and later the Mahayana, believed in such an existence. Some Pali sutta passages seem to indicate that the earliest Buddhists believed in it. One refers to a time when a being has laid aside one body and has not yet arisen in another (SN.IV.399-400). Another refers to a subtle-bodied gandhabba. or spirit-being, as needing to be present if sexual intercourse is to lead to conception (MN.1.265-6). Further, nirvana / arahatship may be attained “in between" (DN.IfI.237: SN.V.69-70; AN.IV.7-4) by the most advanced of the various types of Non-returners - Non-returners being those who are almost arahats, but die without attaining arahatship, not returning to “this shore” of the sense-desire 59 PETER HARVEY world (of lower gods, humans, and others) but going on to attain arahatship beyond it. This probably meant they attained it between the end of one life and the start of the next rebirth. SN.II.67 also talks of: When consciousness is supported and growing, there is inclination ( nati ); inclination being, there is coming and going: coming and going being, there is falling away and arising; falling away and arising being, there is, in the future, birth, aging and death . . . This suggests that the between-lives period has three phases: inclining to a further rebirth, seeking it here and there, and falling from one’s previous identity into a new rebirth (Harvey 1995, 95-109). Birth (jail ) and Aging-and-Dying From “becoming” comes “birth” ( jati ), in the sense of the very start of a rebirth, con- ception. It might additionally be interpreted, on a different time-scale, as referring to the constant rearising, during life, of the processes comprising the five khandhas. Once birth has arisen, “aging and death" and various other stressful experiences naturally follow, for the conditioned processes of life are in various ways painful, as explained in the teaching on the first True Reality for the Spiritually Ennobled. While saying that birth is the cause of death may sound rather simplistic, in Buddhism it is a very signifi- cant statement; for there is an alternative to being born. This is to attain nirvana, so bringing an end to the process of rebirth and redeath. Nirvana is not subject to time and change, and so is known as the “unborn”; as it is not born it cannot die, and so it is also known as the “deathless.” To attain this state, all phenomena subject to birth - the khandhas and niddnas - must be transcended. The round of rebirths is existence in time, the conditioned realm of impermanence. Each “birth” is a renewal of this. Confrontation with the dukkha of aging, sickness, and death is said to have been what set the Buddha off on his spiritual quest. In many accounts of the 12 links of Conditioned Co-arising, fathomed at his awakening, he starts at the final link, tantamount to dukkha, and keeps looking back to find what it is conditioned by, going back step by step until he comes to spiritual ignorance. Once the links are all understood, this ends spiritual ignorance, and so allows the whole chain to stop, to be transcended, such that the “unborn,” ''deal bless” Nirvana is experienced. The Links Over Three Lives, and Over a Series of Moments The above shows something of the details of the 12 links, but what kind of time sequence does this whole set of processes cover? The Theravada and Sarvastivada tradi- tions, while they sometimes sees the working of conditioned co-arising as occurring over one or a few moments (e.g., Vibh.147; AKB.III.24d), generally emphasize the twelvefold chain as an explanation of the working of personality over any three lives: past, present, and future (Patis.1.52; Vism.578-8I; AKB.III.21-4). Spiritual ignorance and constructing activities are karmically active states from one's past life which lead 60 CONDITIONED CO- ARISING WITHIN LIFE AND BETWEEN LIVES to the arising of karmically passive states in this life: consciousness, the sentient body, the sense-bases, stimulation, and feeling. In response to feeling, the karmically active states of craving, grasping, and (karma-)becoming arise, which then determine the karmically passive states of one’s future life, namely birth, and aging and death. Of course, spiritual ignorance and constructing activities are present in this life as well as in one's last life, working in union with the other karmically active states: and con- sciousness, etc., arise in one’s next life as well as in this. Note that it is never said that the last nidana, aging and death, is a condition for the first, ignorance. Nevertheless, people may be led to this misapprehension by the fact that the Tibetan “Wheel of Life” has the 12 niddnas around its rim, so that the first and last are shown next to each other. As regards the temporal relation of the links, among them, the sentient body is simultaneous with the sense organs it conditions, while birth comes prior to aging and death. It also makes sense to see spiritual ignorance as a dispositional state that precedes but is also simultaneous with the constructing activities it conditions. The Theravadin Abhidhamma goes into much detail on the kinds of causal links that can exist. The Pattlmna discusses 24 kinds of conditional relations. Some involve temporal succession - e.g., “proximity” or "immediate succession” ( anantara ) conditions apply when a state of consciousness acts as a condition to whatever kind of consciousness immediately follows it, in the next moment. On the other hand, “conascent” condition applies when two states always arise together, simultaneously, as must also be the case with “object” condition, which concerns a sense-object acting as a condition for the consciousness which is aware of it. Conditioned co-arising is about the fact that, when there has been or is ‘A” (among other conditions), B occurs. It is about the concomitance of phenomena and possible patterns in the arising of phenomena, whether over periods of lifetimes or as they flash in and out of existence, moment to moment. The point of focusing on this is in order to transform one’s attitude to things and thus transform the pattern of conditions that is “you.” Fathoming, Stilling, and Transcending the Subtle Web of Conditions While the process may be “profound,” it can be gradually fathomed. This is partly by a person familiarizing themselves with teachings related to it, partly by thinking these ideas through in relation to experience, and partly (and most importantly) by mindful awareness of the flow of actions and experiences so as to observe patterns of relation- ship in these: conditioned co-arising at work. Conditioned co-arising describes a complex of ever changing processes which is ever open to new influences, internal or external, at the cutting edge of the present moment. It describes an open, dynamic system, not a mechanical, rigidly determined one. The chain’s main weak points are primarily craving and spiritual ignorance (Vism.523-6), hence the Buddhist emphasis on calm/restraint and insight/ understanding/ awareness - respective counteractives to these two. The path aims to undermine craving by moral discipline and meditative calming and then destroy 61 PETER HARVEY craving and ignorance by the development of wisdom. Thus AN.I.61 says of samatha (calm) and vipassand (insight), which both “have a part in knowledge ( vijja -)”: “ samatha cultivates the heart-mind ( citta ) and this leads to the abandonment of attachment ( rdga ) . . . vipassand cultivates wisdom (paniid) and this leads to the abandonment of ignorance ( avijjd ).” Thus: A mind defiled by attachment is not set free, nor can wisdom defiled by ignorance be cul- tivated. Indeed, monks, this fading away of attachment is mind-liberation ( ceto-vimutti ) and the fading away of ignorance is liberation-by- wisdom ( pamid-vimutti ). Conditioned Co-arising as the Middle Way As a general point on conditioned co-arising, it should be noted that it presents a "middle” way of understanding that echoes the Buddhist path as a "middle way” of practice. This idea was to be greatly influential on later forms of Buddhism (such as the Madhyamaka, or “Middle Way” school), all of which sought to best express the true "middle” way of understanding reality. In the early texts, the notion is seen in the idea of conditioned co-arising as avoiding the extremes of substantialism - seeing the expe- rienced world as existing here and now in a solid, essential way - and nihilism - seeing it as purely an illusion, non-existent. Rather, the experienced world is a flow of con- stantly arising and passing away processes. This is seen in a passage explaining the deeper meaning of “right view” ( samma-ditthi ), the first factor of the Noble Eight- factored Path ( Kaccayanagotta Sutta; SN.II.17): Usually, Kaccayana, the world depends on the pair "existence ( atthitd )” and “non-existence.” - But for one who sees, with right view, the origin of the world ( loka-samudaya ) as it actu- ally is, there is no non-existence in regard to the world: - and for one who sees, with right view, the cessation of the world (loka-nirodha) as it actu- ally is, there is no [solid] existence in regard to the world. - Usually the world is shackled by bias, clinging and insistence; but one such as this [with right view], instead of allowing bias, instead of allowing clinging, instead of affirming “my Self.” with such bias, such clinging and such mental decision in the form of an underlying tendency to insist, he has no doubt or uncertainty that what arises is only arising dukkha , and that what ceases is only ceasing dukkha, and in this his knowledge is independent of others. This is what “right view” refers to. - “Everything exists” is one extreme; “nothing exists” is the other extreme. Instead of resorting to either extreme, the Tathdgata teaches Dhamma by the middle ( majjhena ): [The Buddha then enumerates the 12 factors of conditioned co-arising, each one conditioning the next, and then the cessation of one leading to the cessation of the next.] It is also said that conditioned co-arising is a "middle” way of being that shows the error of the views that “all is a unity” (or “all is one”) and “all is a diversity" (or “everything is separate”) (SN.II.77). The first of these is exemplified by the Upanisadic idea that 62 CONDITIONED CO- ARISING WITHIN LIFE AND BETWEEN LIVES everything is Brahman, and indeed in some popular presentations of Buddhism. The second sees reality as a collection of separately existing, independent entities. Condi- tionally co-arising phenomena, though, are a network of processes which could not exist apart from one another, yet are not the same as one another. Conditioned co-arising is also seen as a “middle" way of understanding that avoids the extremes expressed in the views “the life-principle (jlva) is the same as the mortal body (sarlra)” and "the life-principle is different from the mortal body” (SN.II. 60-63). Mind and body are each seen as a set of interacting processes, which also interact with each other, and the enlivening factors are not seen as uniquely mental or physical (Harvey 1993). More broadly on the mind-body relationship, the Abhidhamma clearly differentiates between dhammas (basic process-events), which take objects and are thus part of mentality ( ndma ), and those which pertain to material form (riipa). While ndma is centered on citta/consciousness and riipa is centered on the “four great elements" of earth/solidity, water/cohesion, fire/heat, and wind/motion, there is no dualism of a mental “substance” versus a physical "substance": both ndma and riipa refer to clusters of changing, interacting processes. Thus one can talk of a kind of “twin-category process-pluralism” rather than substance dualism. The processes of ndma and riipa also interact with each other from the moment of conception, mutually supporting each other. For a life to begin, there must be the coming together, in the womb, of appropriate physical conditions and a flow of consciousness from a previous life. Life continues while there is “vitality, heat and consciousness” in a person, these comprising a condi- tioned, empirical life-principle (jlva) that is neither identical with nor entirely different from the mortal body (sarlra), but is (normally) dependent on and bound to such a body (Harvey 1993: 1995, 91-5). In the normal situation, mental processes are affected by physical ones in that the physical senses enable there to be types of consciousness that would not otherwise exist (the live sense-consciousnesses), and gives specific kinds of input-content to the mind; the physical support of mind (of unspecified identity, Patthdna 1.5 and 72; Harvey 1993, 33-4) also supports the occurrence of the mind organ (mano) (that which is aware of mental objects) and mind-consciousness. In the normal situation, certain mental processes such as a sense of purpose and energy also lead to the origination of certain types of physical processes (which are also dependent on other physical processes), and some of these, in turn, may be modulated by other mental processes. These modulations (bodily intimation ( kdya-vihhatti ) and vocal inti- mation (vdd-vifmatti): Dhammasahgani 596) lead to specific bodily movements or vocal articulations (Harvey 1993, 34-6). Death leads to the break-up of the normal mind- body interaction in such a way that consciousness, and certain accompaniments, flow on to another life. Four of the many forms of rebirth - the "formless” ones - are anoma- lous in that they remain totally free of material form; but, when there is thus ndma unaccompanied by riipa, ndma itself occurs in a different way from normal, as seen in the names for these realms: the spheres of "infinite space,” “infinite consciousness,” “nothingness," and "neither-perception-nor-non-perception.” The mind cannot simply be separated from the body without it undergoing change. Another anomalous state is that of “cessation," where there is temporarily a living body and yet - at least accord- ing to Theravadin Abhidhamma - no consciousness whatsoever. Again, when ndma restarts after cessation, it does so in a new way, with a deeper level of insight, leading to arahatship or becoming a Non-returner (AN.III.194). Other non-normal patterns of 63 PETER HARVEY interaction between mind and body are found in the cases of development of the “mind- made” body ( manomaya kdya ; DN.I.77) and the exercise of psychic powers such as walking in the air or multiplying one’s body (MN.I.494). As in the cases of the form- less rebirths and cessation, these non-normal cases are dependent on the power of meditation to bring about transformations in the normal pattern of ndma-rupa interaction. Conditioned co-arising is also seen as a middle way between: “the one who does an action [a karma] is [identically] the same as the one who experiences [its karmic result]" and "the one who does an action is [completely] different from the one who experi- ences.” This is seen at SN.II. 18-22, where the Buddha does not accept that dukkha is created by oneself, by another, by both, or by neither. Elsewhere, the Buddha explains this by saying simply that dukkha arises conditioned by stimulation ( phassa ; SN.II. 41). Here he explains it thus: Kassapa, [if one thinks,] “The one who does an action is the same as the one who experi- ences,” [then one asserts] with reference to one existing from the beginning: “dukkha is created by oneself." When one asserts thus, this amounts to the eternaiism. But, Kassapa, [if one thinks,] “The one who does an action is different from the one who experiences,” [then one asserts] with reference to one stricken by feeling: “dukkha is created by another.” When one asserts thus, this amounts to the annihilationism. Without veering to either of these extremes, the Tathdgata teaches Dhamma by the middle: Conditioned by ignorance are constructing activities [etc.]. (SN.II. 20) “Eternaiism” is taking oneself and one's world as containing eternal, fixed essences. This may take the form of ideas of some essential Self or I which will be untouched by death: an immortal soul, “me” forever. ‘Annihilationism” is identifying oneself totally with the present khandhas, especially just the body, taking oneself and one’s world as being totally destroyed at death; more generally, it denies the continuity of cause and effect in life. The above passage emphasizes that neither “eternaiism” nor “annihilationism" applies as regards what happens to a being after death: rebirth is the continuation of a changing, conditioned process, not the continuation of an unchanging Self or a com- plete end of ongoing personal continuity. After death, a changing personality-flux flows on. Given long enough, this may become very different from how one is now: and yet what will be then will have developed out of how one is, and acts, now. Of a person in two consecutive rebirths, it is said, “He is not the same and he is not different” (Miln.40): “he” neither retains any unchanging essence nor is wholly differ- ent. No unchanging “being” passes over from one life to another, but the death of a being leads to the continuation of the life process in another context, like the lighting of one lamp from another (Miln.71). One might put this by saying that a being in one life is a different “specific-being” than in the next, yet part of the same “continuity- being.” The “later” being is a continuation, or mental evolute, of the “earlier" one on which he is causally dependent. They are linked by the flux of consciousness and the accompanying seeds of karmic results, so that the character of one is a development of the character of the “other.” This principle of “not the same and not different" can be seen to apply equally within the present life. 64 CONDITIONED CO- ARISING WITHIN LIFE AND BETWEEN LIVES All of this implies that, when the relationship of conditionality is properly under- stood, it makes one-sided views impossible. If one focuses too much on the “thingness” of things, one must attend to the conditions that make these things possible - and remember that final nirvana brings the whole flow of conditions to an end. If one focuses too much on the ephemeral “thinglessness” of things, one must attend to the dynamic ongoingness of life that the flow of conditions makes possible. The Type of Relationship Conditioned Co-arising Concerns Apart from the specifics of how one nidana (“ground", "foundation”, “source” - i.e., conditioning link) is said to act as the condition ( paccaya ) for the arising of another, how is this kind of relationship conceived of in general? While the standard formula of 12 nidanas is most common, there are also variations on this, which emphasize the contribution of other conditions. These variations show that the “that” of the abstract formula is not a single determining cause but a major condition, one of several. It is clear that a nidana is seen as a necessary condition for that which it conditions, but not as a necessary and sufficient condition, otherwise when a buddha or arahat experienced feeling they would inevitably experience craving, which they are beyond. Feeling can be seen as only one among the conditions for craving: a necessary condition, perhaps the predominant one, but not itself sufficient on its own to cause craving. What is also necessary, and is lacking in an enlightened person, is spiritual ignorance or mis- perception and the consequent lack of inner calm. Thus the Theravadin commentator Buddhaghosa says: Here there is no single or multiple fruit of any kind from a single cause ( karana ); nor a single fruit from multiple causes. . . . But one representative cause and fruit are given in this way, “with spiritual ignorance as condition are the constructing activities.” (Vism.542) The idea that nothing has a single cause is worth bearing in mind when reflecting on various differences of opinions in society, and sometimes in science: one side holds that “x causes y,” the other that “no it doesn't, as there can be cases of x yet no y” (e.g., smoking for years yet no lung cancer), or "no, y is caused by z.” It may be that y depends for its arising on both x and z (along with some other conditions), so the crucial ques- tion is not really “what is the cause of y?” - though it may be useful to focus attention on a particular condition, especially if it is a necessary (if not sufficient) condition for y, and is one that can be altered. In general, what is decided on as “the cause” of some- thing is simply the last condition for it that falls into place. If one thing on its own could cause something else, then that thing would be producing that effect continuously, rather than only sometimes, dependent on other conditions. Apart from this issue, how is the relationship of one nidana acting as the key condi- tion for the next conceived? Various kinds of similes for the process are given in the suttas : • hydraulic similes: each of the nidanas is referred to as a “support” ( upanisa ) (SN.II. 32) or “nutriment" (dhdra) (AN.V.113-14) for the next, just as, when tarns are filled up 65 PETER HARVEY with rainwater, they then fill up lakes, which then fill up rivers (cf. SN.II.118). This suggests that, once a link is of sufficient strength, it causes the next to “swell” or “fill out” by “feeding” it. • organic similes: SN.II. 87-93 (cf. AN. V. 4-5) compares the way in which looking for things to grasp at leads to craving, and on to dukkha, to the way in which a tree with a good root system, sending up sap, flourishes for a long time. This suggests that each link feeds and nurtures the next, enabling it to grow. • fire similes: SN.ff.86 uses afire simile to illustrate the same process as at SN.II. 8 7-93: a lamp supplied with fuel and having its wick regularly trimmed will burn for a long time. So, one link “fuels” the next. • mechanical similes: SN.II.114-15 illustrates the mutual dependence of conscious- ness and name-and-form with the image of two sheaves of reeds which lean against each other. So one link lends support to another. The General Nature of Conditioned Co-arising At SN.II. 2 5-7, it is said: What, monk, is Conditioned Co-arising? Aging-and-death, monks, are from birth as condi- tion; whether Tathdgatas arise or not: this elemental fact ( dhatu , or "principle”) just stands ( thita ), (this) basic-pattern-stability ( dhamma-ttthita-ta ), (this) basic-pattern-regularity (dhamma-niyama-ta): specific conditionality ( ida-ppaccaga-td ). A Tathdgata awakens to this and breaks through to it. Having done so, he teaches it, makes it known, establishes it, discloses it, analyses it, elucidates it. “See” he says, ‘Aging-and- death, monks, are from birth as condition" [this is then repeated for the relationship between each of the rest of the niddnas]. Elsewhere it is said: “First, Suslma, comes knowledge of D/iamma-stability ( dhamma - tthiti-hdna), afterwards knowledge of nirvana' (SN.II. 124; cf. SN.II. 56 and 58). That is, the conditioned co-arising sequence is seen as a reality which a buddha simply discov- ers, then teaches others about. It is a principle of causal regularity, a Basic Pattern ( Dhamma ) of things that, once one has directly understood it, one can experience that which transcends it, nirvana. After discussing all the links in the twelvefold chain, the above SN.II. 2 5-7 (cf. Vism.518) then says: So, monks, that herein which is: actuality (tatha-ta or “reality," “as-it-is-ness,” “suchness," “thusness”), not unreality ( a-vitatha-ta ), invariability (anannatha-td, lit. not otherwiseness): 66 CONDITIONED CO- ARISING WITHIN LIFE AND BETWEEN LIVES specific conditionality ( ida-ppaccaya-ta ) - this, monks, is called Conditioned Co-arising. And what, monks, are conditionally co-arisen ( paticca-samuppana ) dhammas ? Aging-and- death, monks, is impermanent, constructed (sahkhata), conditionally arisen, subject to (-dlmmma) destruction, vanishing, fading away (viraga-), and cessation (nirodha-). Birth is impermanent . . . [and so on for the other nidanas ]. (SN.II.26) One might perhaps sum this up by saying that, within the overall Basic Pattern that is Dhamma, specific basic patterns (dhammas) flow into and nurture each other in complex, but set, regular patterns. They do not exist on their own, but arise in specific ways from the particular cluster of dhammas which sustain them. Mahayana Developments In the Mahayana movement, various uses were made of the idea of conditioned co- arising. The Madhyamaka school saw it as implying not only that phenomena were dependent on one another for their arising but also that their very nature was both causally and conceptually interwoven, such that they were empty of svabhava : both inherent existence and inherent nature. The Yogacara school saw the stream of dependent mental processes as generating the subject-object split and hence the idea of an inner “Self" and the “things” “it” craves. The Chinese Huayan school saw all phenomena in the entire universe, and of all times, as "interpenetrating" one another, with each one as the cause of the entire universe - i.e. , without it, the universe would be different, not only in lacking this item but also in lacking all its influences. They did, though, also talk as if all phenomena were fluid forms of an underlying principle (Ch. li) that was empty of any fixed form, but not empty of the qualities of buddhahood: the “buddha-nature. ” Notes 1 Note that around 1,000 words of this chapter overlap with part of chapter 3 in the author's Introduction to Buddhism: Teachings, History and Practices. Second edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. This material is included here with permission. 2 Key sources for this doctrine are: • the Niddna Samyutta - twelfth samyutta of the Samyutta Nikaya (SN. 1 2 ): vol. II, pp. 1-1 3 3 , of the Pali Text Society edition of the text in Pali and, in translation, Bodhi (2005, 533-620). Some of the 92 suttas are also found on the Access to Insight website: www. accesstoinsight.Org/tipitaka/sn/index.html#snl2 [note that its volume and page refer- ences, as given here, are in square brackets, with volume number in small roman letters. The page numbers given are just that of the start of a sutta]; • the Mahd-niddna Sutta - fifteenth sutta of the DIgha Nikaya (DN.15): vol. II. pp. 55-71, of the Pali Text Society edition of the text in Pali and, in translation, Walshe (1996, 223-30), Bodhi (1995, which includes its commentary) and also on the Access to Insight website by Thanissaro Bhikkhu: www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/dn/dn. 1 5. 0.than.html: 67 PETER HARVEY • the interpretation of the developed Theravada tradition can be found at Vibh.135-92; Vibh-a.130-213; Vism.517-86, 98-605; and of the Sarvastivada tradition at AKB. III. 21-36; • contemporary books on the topic are Payutto (1994); Johansson (1979); Jones (2011); Kalupahana (1986). There are also various relevant articles in Philosophy East and West, many of which can be read online at: http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/cfb_phil.htm. 3 Though this misses the first two of the standard 12 links and replaces them with “name-and- form" as the condition for consciousness (which then, as in the standard version, is the condi- tion for “name-and-form") and also does not explicitly mention the six sense-bases. 4 Plus in “imperturbable” constructing activities, leading to rebirth in the formless realms. These are listed separately from the karmically fruitful ones, as the latter lead to experiences of happiness, while the formless realms have a neutral feeling-tone. 5 At SN.II.73, this sequence then runs on from craving up to dukkha, as in the second half of the standard series of 12 links. This thus shows that the standard sequence of all 12 links is intended as just one talk-through of a complex situation. 6 Cf. MN.1. 303, which says that neutral feeling is pleasant when there is understanding of it, but painful when this is lacking. References Bodhi, Bhikkhu (1995). The Great Discourse on Causation: The Mahdniddna Sutta and its Commentar- ies. Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society. Bodhi, Bhikkhu (2005). The Connected Discourses of the Buddha. Boston: Wisdom. Fuller, P. (2005). The Notion of Ditthi in Theravada Buddhism. London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon. Harvey, P. (1993). The Mind-Body Relationship in Pali Buddhism: A Philosophical Investigation. In Asian Philosophy 3(1), 29-41. Harvey, P. (1995). The Selfless Mind: Personality, Consciousness and Nirvana in Early Buddhism. London: Curzon Press. Harvey, P. (2000). An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics: Foundations, Values and Issues. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Harvey, P. (200 7). “Freedom of the Will” in the Light of Theravada Buddhist Teachings. In Journal of Buddhist Ethics 14, 35-98. Atwww.buddhistethics.org/14/harvey2-article.pdf. Harvey, P. (2009). The Approach to Knowledge and Truth in the Theravada Record of the Dis- courses of the Buddha; Theravada Philosophy of Mind and the Person; Theravada Texts on Ethics. In Buddhist Philosophy: Essential Readings. Ed. W. Edelglass and J. L. Garfield. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 175-85, 265-74, 375-87. Johansson, R. E. A. (1979). The Dynamic Psychology of Early Buddhism. Oxford: Curzon Press. Jones, D. T. (2011). This Being, That Becomes: The Buddha’s Teaching on Conditionality. Cambridge: Windhorse. Kalupahana, D. J. (1986). Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Olivelle, P. (1996). Upanisads: a New Translation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Payutto, P. A. (1994). Dependent Origination: the Buddhist Law of Causality. Bangkok: Buddhad- harnma Foundation. Walshe, M. (1996). Long Discourses of the Buddha. Second rev. edn. Boston: Wisdom. 68 Part II Major Schools of Buddhist Thought 4 Theravada ANDREW SKILTON History and Context The Theravada monk is for many Westerners the iconic image of the Asian Buddhist. Theravada is the tradition of Buddhism associated with South and South-East Asia. 1 Its monks, called bhikkhus, are shaven-headed and typically wear robes ranging in colour from a deep yellow, through ochre, to maroon, with minor variations in the details of how robes are worn. Non-monastic followers wishing to express this identity while at temples or during festivals wear white and are known as updsakas (male) and upasikas (female). The Theravada nuns ( bhikkhum ) order appears to have died out by the thirteenth century (Skilling 1994). There has been considerable resistance to the idea of its recent revival from the East Asian female ordination lineage in 1996, on the rationale that ordination is predicated on an assumption of an uninterrupted lineage of transmission. Women in Theravada countries who wish to practice their Buddhism more intensively often undertake extra regulations and assume a recognized enhanced status somewhere between lay and full monastic - in Thailand, for example, such women are called mae chi and may have separate quarters within a temple. 2 Collectively, the Theravada Buddhist community is designated by the term sahgha. A widespread understanding of the term takes it to incorporate monastics only, although another that it includes both lay and monastic followers. A more restrictive term, ariya-sangha, “community of noble members,” is understood to designate only those who have made specific progress on the path to awakening or enlightenment. Theravada is the majority religion in Sri Lanka, Burma (Myanmar), Thailand, Cam- bodia, and Laos. There are significant Theravada Buddhist minorities in South Vietnam, Yunnan Province (People's Republic of China), and Bangladesh; and significant Theravada Buddhist communities in countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, and the Buddhist homelands of India and Nepal. There are also widespread activities and representation of Theravada in many Western countries serving both immigrant A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy, First Edition. Edited by Steven M. Emmanuel. ©2013 John Wiley & Sons. Inc. Published 201 3 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 71 ANDREW SKILTON communities and local converts. In the second half of the twentieth century significant representation of South-East Asian Theravada Buddhists also appeared in relation to immigration from the region to the USA, Canada, and Australia. Important cultural and literary archives from Theravada Buddhist countries are preserved in Western countries with former colonial influence in the region, notably France and the United Kingdom, as well as Denmark and Germany. New initiatives are under way to create film and/or digital archives of some national literatures, for example in Cambodia and Laos. 3 The title “Theravada” is Pali language, meaning “doctrine ( vada ) of the Elders ( them ),” and is a self-assigned term expressing the belief that the tradition is continuous with and embodies the positions and values of the community of elders who were the personal disciples of the historical Buddha. In this sense the title implicitly dissociates its followers from perceived “divergences” from the Buddha’s “original" teaching. His- torically, such differentiation was actually between a range of other non- and pre- Mahayana schools of Buddhism that developed in India. Since none of these other schools have survived as such into the modern period, from the modern perspective Theravada is to be distinguished from the Mahayana and Vajrayana Buddhisms of Tibet, Mongolia, Nepal, China, Korea, Vietnam, and Japan. At present thetitleTheravada is applied to Buddhist communities derived largely from the hegemonic influence of a single politically powerful temple tradition based at the Mahavihara Temple in Anurad- hapura, Sri Lanka. It seems likely that this title is used anachronistically, resulting from what might be seen as a strategic attempt by adherents of the Mahavihara temple (Sri Lanka) in the twelfth century to link it to this tradition, during a period of major reform under Parakramabahu I (1123-1186) (see Bechert 1993; Collins 1990). Considerable his- torical confusion surrounds any such claims of identity due to the ambiguity of textual and inscriptional evidence for a them community on the mainland of the subcontinent before this time. To understand this we need to know that the Pali language is a close relative of the Sanskrit language, in which we find the parallel term sthavira, “elder.” In any given occurrence of the term sthavira/ them, in text or epigraph, it can be difficult to determine whether this refers to one and the same or indeed any institutional entity. This linguistic observation gains substance in connection with the broad narrative of historical development of the Buddhist community in India. Tradition records that, after the demise of the Buddha ( parinibbana ), the community of his followers developed in harmony until a schism ( satigha-bheda ) occurred between two parties, one of which in the sources is entitled the sthavira or “elder” community. The other party was called by consensus the “great/large community” ( maha-sahgha ), implying, one reasonably assumes, that was the larger party. It should be understood that the sources for this division are not unanimous on the time, place, or basis for the split. It appears that the divergence could have been either doctrinally based, revolving around matters of dis- puted doxicological principle, or around matters of monastic regulation. 4 Buddhist monastics, by definition, are bound by a comprehensive set of regulations that govern their personal and communal behavior. These regulae are codified in com- prehensive monastic legal codes ( vinaya ) and enacted through precisely worded legal instruments known as kammavaca. This also combines with the principle of lineage, expressed by the term nikaya, which emphasizes the descent of monastic observance 72 theravAda through rules inherited by every monk from the local and regional monastic commu- nity within which the individual monk takes ordination. Variations in the regulations observed makes communal life problematic. Individual monks or groups of monks cannot reside together, or necessarily co-own property, or manage collective resources if they observe divergent monastic legal codes that enjoin different, or differently worded, or even just differently interpreted, rules for the individual and community. Our historical sources variously tell us that the Sthaviras were the group that sought either to adapt the monastic regulations or to preserve them unchanged, or that refuted various erroneous doctrinal positions (termed “heretical theses” in some secondary sources). The original Sthavira community thus constitutes, historically, a relatively intangible but religiously iconic identity that exerted a powerful appeal to incumbents at the Mahavihara who wished to assert their legitimacy and worthiness for patronage by activating more or less mythical links to these archetypal “elders." The history of the Theravada tradition as we know it is therefore properly pursued in relation to institutions in Sri Lanka and later South-East Asia. Theravada identity is also therefore partly about the transmission and observation of distinctive monastic regulations, and indeed the field of monastic law (alongside Abhidhamma and Pali grammar) has clearly absorbed considerable intellectual activity in Theravada coun- tries - as it did in medieval European Christian monasticism - as much as doctrinal matters. The Pali Canon The claim of continuity made by the Mahavihara was not as arbitrary as this rather brief account of the historical background might suggest, for the same Mahavihara tradition was also an institution that was instrumental in the preservation and exegesis of a body of scripture that preserves some very early material that may indeed have been a part of the literary heritage of the Sthavira community. This brings us to the Pali canon - i.e., the canon of scriptural literature preserved in the Pali language by the Theravada tradition. This canon was inherited and possibly partially formed by the Mahavihara tradition of Sri Lanka and, insofar as we can tell from limited manuscript remains and translations into Tibetan and Chinese, had its counterparts in other canons of scripture passed down by other Buddhist traditions of the subcontinent in other, albeit allied, languages, including Sanskrit and other Prakrits like Pali. While these other canons survive only piecemeal, if at all, the canon in Pali appears to survive intact and complete in its Indie language. It was allegedly put into writing late in the first century ce, although secure evidence for its content dates from comprehensive commentaries composed in the fifth century CE (see below). Analytic descriptions of the Pali canon are easy to locate, and so I shall survey the whole only briefly here (Hinuber 2000; Norman 1983). It consists of three major sec- tions, the first of which is the vinaya-pitaka, “the collection concerning discipline,” containing a large body of case law on monastic regulations governing the conduct of individual monks and nuns and of the community at large, both in its internal arrange- ments and in its relations to secular society. The remaining two sections are usually of far greater interest to the general subject of the present volume, and are the sutta-pitaka, 73 ANDREW SKILTON "the collection of discourses,” and the abhidhamma-pitaka, “the collection of advanced teachings.” The sutta-pitaka contains discourses on the teaching of the Buddha, commonly called the Dhamma, usually presented in the voice of the Buddha as a historical per- sonality, in a more or less elaborate historical setting located in ancient North-East India. The content is varied in tone and genre, its focus on conduct or doctrine, and its age. Without doubt some parts of this collection, such as the Thera- and Thengdthd or the Sutta Nipdta, are very ancient and may go back to the very time of the Buddha and his immediate disciples. Other parts, for example the Khuddakapdtha (“Short Texts”) or Buddhavamsa (“ Lineage of the Buddhas”), are very likely of later compilation, post-dating the historical Buddha by several centuries. The sutta-pitaka contains five subdivisions - also denominated nikdya, here in the sense of “collection" - each of which shows considerable signs of editorial activity, which suggests that, in general, in their present form these subdivisions postdate the time of the Buddha himself. The final major section of the Pali canon, the collection of advanced teachings (Abhidhamma), consists of seven substantial treatises that seek to abstract the doctri- nal and philosophical principles enunciated piecemeal in the sutta-pitaka and arrange them systematically (Potter 1996). While undoubtedly later compilations from an his- torical point of view, these, too, are regarded formally as the words of the Buddha and are otherwise anonymous (see below). This synthetic and abstracting agenda perhaps qualifies the Abhidhamma as a philosophical corpus proper. However, while being more explicitly “philosophical” in intent, it remains the least studied and least well under- stood of the three canonical collections in Western scholarship. The canon is accompanied by important layers of additional para-canonical literature (see table 4.1). The vinaya is supported by legal instruments ( kammavaca ), by Table 4.1 Canonical and para-canonical Pali literature vinaya pitaka sutta-pitaka abhidhamma-pitaka Canonical Khandhaka ddgha-nikaya “long texts" Dhammasangani Sutta-vibhanga majjhima-nikaya “medium texts" Vibhanga Parivara anguttara-nikaya "numbered texts" samyutta-nikdya “thematic texts" khuddaka-nikdya “minor texts" Dhatukathd Puggalapanhatti Kathavatthu Yamaka Patthana Para-canonical kammavaca commentaries and commentaries to commentaries and sub-commentaries to each text sub-commentaries each nikdya sub-commentaries manuals compilations apocrypha to each text treatises “finger manuals” Visuddhimagga 74 theravAda commentaries and sub-commentaries that include revisions and amendments to monastic legislation found in the vinaya, and by manuals that compile regulations in more systematic and practical arrangements useful for the functioning of the monastic legal system (see Hiniiber 2000; Crosby 2006). The sutta-pitaka is accompanied by layers of commentary and sub-commentary that elucidate context, locutions, grammar, and doctrine in the sutta texts, as well as by so-called apocryphal sutta materials and compilations of suttas, extracts, and so on, that serve to facilitate teaching and delivery of sermons. The Abhidhamma is supported by commentaries and sub-commentaries on the primary treatises, as well as by secondary treatises that elucidate specialist areas of thought and doctrine and summaries of the Buddhist path as a whole, of which the most famous is the Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosa. With the exception of two parts of the sutta-pitaka and two of the abhidhamma-pitaka, the whole of the canon proper has been translated into English in volumes published by the Pali Text Society, as well as individual parts by other translators and publishers. 5 Translation of the supporting literature is much less advanced and at present its investigation requires a working knowledge of Pali language at least. It should also be noted that, while the above discussion focuses on canonical and related materials, there has also been a tradition of composition in Pali and vernacular languages across a very wide range of literary genre, including those that overlap with philosophical interests, over the period between the redaction of the canon itself - prob- ably complete by the beginning of the Common Era - and the twentieth century. The history of the tradition that preserves this literature is poorly understood for the medieval period. The Mahavihara tradition was exported from Sri Lanka throughout South-East Asia during the first half of the second millennium of the Common Era. More recent centuries show a picture of complex interactions between South-East Asian countries and Sri Lanka, which is formally regarded as the source of orthodox Theravada lineages throughout the region. In the modern period this picture is modu- lated by reform activities, usually implemented by centralizing governments, which promote particularly the Dhammayuttika Nikaya (founded in 1833 in Thailand) and standardized editions of the tipitaka. However, recent research is beginning to shed light on other influences at work in the region. These can be seen in residual traces of the Sarvastivada school in northern Thailand, and in other non-normative or pre-reform practices throughout the region preserved in peripheral areas that have resisted or been missed by centralizing reform processes which have otherwise created a relatively uniform Theravada culture. At this stage of our understanding these differences appear most clearly expressed in practices (liturgy and meditation), although it is also clear that the ideological and cultural background to these features are of interest philo- sophically (Crosby 2000). It has also become apparent that Western assumptions about the primacy of the Pali canonical texts may not hold true for pre-reform establishments. The evidence of local libraries (where they have survived) suggests that local communities used textual resources in which canonical texts were relatively poorly represented (McDaniel 2008 ). In the light of this account of its history, it should be apparent that claims that Theravada represents the Buddhism of the personal disciples of the Buddha must be treated with considerable circumspection. It is. however, a regrettable feature of at least the so-called Anglo-German school of Buddhist studies (Conze 1967,2) that Theravada 75 ANDREW SKILTON literature and doctrine have been treated as just that, with a significant amount of early Western scholarship assuming that they are an authentic witness to what the authors wish to see as “original" Buddhism. This is perhaps the inevitable outcome of a cultural concern with origins and foundational texts rather than what might be called the “developed church,” and this is reflected in our existing histories of Theravada, which offer considerable material on “origins” and the contemporary period but leave an uncomfortable gap for the intervening two millennia. Theravada Doctrine The major philosophical work of the Theravada is expressed through the sutta- and abhidhamma-pitakas and the literature and ongoing traditions that developed in particu- lar from the latter. In the first of these, this is expressed as doctrinal statements authori- tatively uttered by the Buddha as a result of his insight into the nature of reality. In broad terms we can summarize the major areas of distinctive Buddhist doctrine expressed in suttas under four related heads. They are overwhelmingly concerned to demonstrate the Buddhist “truth” ( sacca ) of impermanence (anicca) and its corollary: 1 anatta (Skt anatman) "non-sell " - i.e., t lie absence oi an eternal unchanging essence within the individual person or indeed the external world. This is typically demon- strated both analogically and reductively. The classic analogy takes a manufactured object, such as a carriage, or a plant, such as a banana “tree,” and by taking it apart asks an interlocutor to identify an enduring essence apart from the constituent components. The reductive strategy takes us to the next heads, where we encounter two types of reductive analysis employed: 2 diachronic analyses of causal relations involved in the experienced world (Karuna- dasa 2010). The term for this is paticcasamuppada, “conditional arising.” 6 The devel- oped account of this doctrine describes a process of mutual conditioning across time of 12 nidana or “links." These are most famously known from the outermost “rim” of the popular Buddhist image known as “the wheel of life." Here each com- ponent acts as the condition upon the presence of which the next link arises. Old-age and death (12) are seen as the determining condition for further arising of ignorance (1), and thus a vicious cycle is established. The links are shown in table 4.2. From a soteriological viewpoint, this "causal mechanism” is seen as the process by which unenlightened beings remain embroiled in suffering, and it is interpreted as operating both between lives (Buddhism assuming rebirth after death) and within a single lifetime, even momentarily within moments of consciousness. While it appears to be deterministic, exegetes identify an opportunity to opt out of this cycle between craving and attachment (links 7 and 8). 3 Three synchronic - i.e., non-causal - analyses of the experienced world are also frequently discussed and rehearsed in the suttas. These are the khandhas, “aggre- gates,” dyatanas, “sense fields," or dhdtus, “elements.” The khandhas are five groups or aggregates of ultimates: materiality ( rupa ), hedonic feeling (vedand), appercep- tion (sahha), volition ( sahkhdra ), and consciousness (vihhdna). The dyatanas are 12: 76 theravAda Table 4.2 The twelve nidana or "links" 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 avijja sahkhdra vifmdna namarupa saldyatana phassa vedand tanhd updddna bhava jdti jard-marana ignorance [mental] formations consciousness mental and physical [aggregates] six sense fields contact hedonic feeling/sensation craving attachment becoming birth old age and death the six senses plus their corresponding sense bases: the eye and visible objects, the ear and sounds: nose and odor, the tongue and tastes, the skin and touchable objects, and the mind and mental objects. The dhatus, in this context, comprise the 12 agatana plus a corresponding consciousness, vihhdna, for each sense. Each of these analyses is considered to account exhaustively for experienced phenomena, their application demonstrating the lack of need to posit fictional essences to explain identity and continuity. 4 The outcome of these processes of analysis is the identification of various ultimate constituents, which come to be known as dhammas. The function of dhammas is to provide the impersonal building blocks that demonstrate the absence of “self” or essence by accounting sufficiently for mental and physical phenomena and the process of conditional causality. The organization and accounting of dhammas, the way they interrelate, in particular in relation to pursuing the path to enlighten- ment and omniscience, become the primary concern of Theravada Abhidhamma, Aside of these concerns, suttas address a range of doctrinal and philosophical sub- jects: from psychological and practice dimensions of the Buddhist message, to accounts of the Buddhist path, to discussions of more recognizably philosophical subject areas such as kamma - i.e., action - in, for example, the Malia- and Cula-kammavibhanga- suttas : The Great and Lesser Expositions of Kamma (MN.II1.248ff. and 254ff.), or episte- mological issues, as in the Cahki-sutta (MN.II.354ff.). While the didactic stance of Theravada is thus profoundly committed to positive statements about the nature of “the way things truly are,” we should note that there appear to have been issues on which the Buddha chose to remain silent. These “unan- swered questions” ( avyakata-paiiha ) concerned whether or not the world is eternal or finite, the relationship of the body to the self, and whether or not the Buddha “exists” after death.' Also noteworthy is the untypical radical apophasis recommended in the Atthakavagga, “Section of Eights," one of the very earliest canonical texts of the Sutta Nipdta (Norman 2001, 90-111). 77 ANDREW SKILTON Focus of the Theravada Abhidhamma In that the Abhidhamma is an anonymous technical literature, it has yielded to chrono- logical analysis largely through doctrinal and structural investigation. In this respect it is generally agreed that the core of these texts are the matika - i.e., bare lists of items - presented in the Dhammasangani, the first volume of the seven. There are two abhidhamma-mdtikd, one consisting of 100 dyads - i.e., pairs of opposites - and the other of 22 triads - i.e., sets of threes - giving a total of 122 categories. (A third matika lists 42 miscellaneous terms from the suttas.) These matika are elaborated through suc- cessive discussion to create the canonical volumes of Abhidhamma. Each of the Abhid- hamma treatises is therefore constructed from the “matrix" which is the essential embodiment of the subject of the treatise. We can of course speculate that, in origin, these matika functioned as mnemonic devices for retaining a body of doctrinal informa- tion but evolved into a methodology for its investigation. The Canonical Abhidhamma The most immediately interesting ( although not necessarily the most important) of the Abhidhamma treatises is the Kathavatthu , or “subjects of debate.” This is the only Abhidhamma text associated with a human author, Tissa (active 218 years post parinibbana), who, however, supposedly only expanded a list of subjects compiled by the historical Buddha. Thus 217 topics of dispute with other Buddhist traditions are raised and refuted from a Theravada point of view. The decisive and final consideration is sometimes the citation of authoritative scripture, but arguments are also resolved on the basis of consistency with general principles and categories, rectification of terms, and the universal validity of statements. The Kathavatthu is therefore a major resource for understanding how the Theravada differentiated itself from other Buddhist tradi- tions. The points, all matters of doctrine, cover a broad range of topics, but a review shows that the following areas, some partly overlapping, were particularly fruitful for the process of mutual differentiation: 1 how to understand the doctrine of the absence of a “self,” anattd 2 action, kamma, and its outcomes 3 the nature of the Buddha and the arahat 4 the nature of enlightenment 5 the nature of consciousness ( vihhdna ) and the mind 6 meditation states (jhdna ) 7 analyses of the experienced world 8 perception and the senses and their organs 9 the nature of matter 10 the nature of the Buddhist path and of specific points of attainment on it 1 1 volition 12 cosmology. Nor is Kathavatthu without more ephemeral interest. For example, Tissa recorded the Theravada refutations of claims by other Buddhists that the Buddha’s faeces smelt of 78 Table 4.3 The canonical Abhidhamma texts and their translations theravAda Pali titles Pali Text Society translations Dhammasangani Buddhist Psychological Ethics* Vibhanga The Book of Analysis' 1 Dhatukatha Discourse on Elements 11 ' Puggalapannatti A Designation of Human Typei' Kathavatthu Points of Controversy v Yamaka "The Pairs” Patthdna Conditional Relations (incomplete)" i Rhys Davids (1993). v Aung and Rhys Davids ii Thittila (1969). (1915). iii Narada (1962). vi Narada (1969-81). iv Law (1922). perfume (xviii 4); that animals go to heaven (xx 4); and that non-human beings perform sexual intercourse while disguised as arahants (xxiii 2). The Kathavatthu thus helps us build a rich and nuanced picture of the issues over which the Theravada considered itself a distinctive tradition. Also of more immediate interest, in that it illustrates the contrasting approaches to understanding topics according to the sutta and Abhidhamma methods, is the Vibhanga. This treatise reviews 18 topics - aggregates ( khandha ), sense bases (dyatana), elements (dhatu), etc. - firstly giving a discursive explanation, often by quoting from the sutta pitaka; secondly by applying synonyms and numerical formulae; and finally through an interrogative format which incorporates the matrix of the Dhammasangani. The last two treatments exemplify the Abhidhamma method, both by definition and by integrating the topics considered with the overall structure of the Abhidhamma through the mdtikd. The Dhatukatha considers all dhammas (ultimate constituents) in the light of whether or not each is or is not included in, or associated with, the three analytic structures of the aggregates ( khandhas ), sense bases ( ayatanas ), and elements (dhatus). The Puggalapannatti classifies types of person according to an ascending numerical structure: chapter 1 looks at types of single persons; chapter 2 at types of pairs of persons; chapter 3 at types of triads of persons; and so on. The Yamaka gets its name from its strategy of contrasting paired questions, as in the dyad mdtikd of the Dhammasangani, usually in the form; “Is it the case that A is B?” and “Is it the case t hat B is A?” Through this method it seeks to establish conceptual preci- sion in relation to Abhidhamma terminology. The Patthdna is probably the latest and certainly the largest of the canonical Abhid- hamma works and is also held in the highest esteem. 8 It achieves both of these through systematically applying each of 24 types of conditionality to every component of the abhidhamma mdtikd from the Dhammasahgini. Since, however, the mdtikd can be com- bined in six different ways, and, furthermore, that conditionality itself can be reviewed from four formally different perspectives (positive, negative, positive-negative, negative- positive), we thereby have another set of 24 categories. The Patthdna applies the 24 types of conditionality, in these 24 modes, to each of the 122 components of the mdtikd. The result is a spectacularly complex account of reality from a causal point of view. 79 ANDREW SKILTON The written and printed texts of the Patthana are always abbreviated because of the high numbers involved. These last two texts illustrate well the observation “the Abhidhamma Pitaka is intended to divulge as starkly and directly as possible the totalistic system that underlies the Suttanta expositions and upon which the individual discourses draw” (Rewata Dhamma and Bodhi 1995-2011), although this was surely a system constructed ret- rospectively. However, the Patthana, despite its daunting level of abstraction, has con- siderable popularity in Burma and is the content of devout recitation. There are several traditions of interpretation, and specialist study retreats are a popular venue for Burmese lay Buddhists. Perhaps it should not be forgotten that widespread Buddhist tradition maintains that the abhidhamma-pitaka was taught by the Buddha directly to his mother (by this point in his career she is residing in a lower heavenly realm). It is a cliche of Western scholarly tradition that doctrinally “rich” texts and traditions are the preserve of (male) monastic specialists, but more recent research in Theravada coun- tries has revealed that lay people of both sexes can be creatively involved in the trans- mission and elaboration of this type of material. 9 Abhidhamma Commentaries These last observations bring us neatly to the issue of commentary. As already indi- cated, there is a suite of commentaries on the canonical Abhidhamma texts. These are all attributed to Buddhaghosa (fifth century), a highly educated brahmanical convert who travelled to Sri Lanka from India to draw on its rich and renowned commentarial archives. His method involved the synthesis and critical selection from a wide range of commentarial sources available to him at the Anuradhapura Mahavihara and the composition of his exegesis in the Pali language. Such was his brilliance and authority that alternative commentarial voices were effectively silenced, and his writings, with occasional reference to or quotation of earlier commentators, are now all we have for the texts concerned. His work covered commentary on vinaya-, sutta-, and abhidhamma- pitakas, although gaps in his coverage were filled largely by another exegete by the name of Dhammapala (eighth-ninth century). Buddhaghosa’s works thus represent a com- mentarial horizon beyond which it is very difficult to see. His best-known and possibly most important work, entitled Visuddhimagga, “The Path of Purification,” was not so much a commentary as a summary of the Buddhist path. In this he constructs a suc- cinct yet comprehensive survey of the Buddhist path under the traditional rubric of slla, samadhi, and pahhd, “morality, meditation, and understanding." These are distrib- uted across four sections, the extra section being placed between meditation and under- standing and consisting of a remarkable summary of Theravada analyses of phenomena and conditionality, under the title "the soil in which understanding grows.” A compre- hensive manual of Theravada doctrine and path, the Visuddhimagga has subsequently exerted an extraordinary influence over Theravada scholarship, being widely cited, quoted, and extracted by later authors. Less individually influential, but constituting a definitive and authoritative lens through which the canonical texts are understood, are Buddhaghosa’s commentaries proper (see table 4.4). 80 theravAda Table 4.4 Commentaries on the Abhidhamma books and their translations Canonical Abhidhamma texts Buddhaghosa's commentaries Translation Dhammasahgani Atthasdlim The Expositor 1 Vibhanga Sammohavinodani Dispeller of Delusion “ Dhatukatha Puggalapahnatti Kathavatthu Yamaka Patthdna * ' Pahcappakarana “Exposition of the Five [Books]" i Pe (1920-1). ii Nanamoli (1987-91). Inevitably the commentarial traditions synthesized by Buddhaghosa made distinc- tive contributions to Theravada doctrinal development beyond that in the sutta- and abhidhamma-pitakas. Distinctive contributions include developing the concept of the momentary character of dhammas (ultimate constituents), designated by the term khana, and a detailed account of the momentary process of consciousness - i.e., the arising, sustaining, and decay of moments of awareness, designated cittavithi. These doctrines are the ultimate expression of the principle of impermanence, anicca, in Theravada philosophy. The commentaries also complete an exhaustive classification of cittas, “mental states," and of the components of the material world ( rupa ) in primary and secondary forms. Crucially also the commentaries work up a definition of dhamma (ultimate constituent) as “that which bears its own-nature” ( Atthasdlim 39; Ronkin 2005, 112). While there is evidence from inscriptional and textual sources that scholarly monks specialized in the memorization of specific sections of the canon, or indeed the whole of it, including the Abhidhamma (which in the form of its matika seems to bear the traces of such mnemonic necessity) (see Adikaram 1946), it is also apparent that the canonical texts are themselves somewhat intractable and over the centuries were displaced in favor of shorter treatises that performed the same work as the canonical texts but in a more digestible format. In the Burmese tradition, which has maintained an active engagement with Abhidhamma into the contemporary period, nine such texts are known as the “little finger manuals" ( let than), the most important of these being the Abhidhammatthasangaha (tenth-eleventh century). The Abhidhammatthasangaha is praised for its succinct and elegant summary of the entire Abhidhamma and as such is the foundation text by which Burmese monks are trained in the subject. Before looking at the canonical texts proper, trainees must first memorize Anuruddha’s work in its entirety (see Carbine 2011, 147). Once the Abhidhammatthasaiigahaismastered,student monks move on to study theDhammasanganl, Dhatukatha, Yamaka, and Patthdna in partial qualific ation for the nationalDhammacariya degree. 10 Although for the majority of studious monks the Abhidhammatthasangaha is sufficient, and those who sit for the Dhammacariya degree tackle only four of the abhidhamma-pitaka texts, memorization of considerably larger quantities of material is not only possible but also a highly revered achievement. In the last 60 years a small 81 ANDREW SKILTON Table 4.5 The "little finger manuals'’ Title Author Translation 1 Abhidhammatthasangaha Anuruddha A Manual of Abhidhamma 1 2 Namarupapariccheda Anuruddha “The Determination of the Mental and Physical [Aggregates]” 3 Paramatthavinicchaya Anuruddha “The Discrimination of Ultimate Meaning” 4 Abhidhammdvatara Buddhadatta "Introduction to Abhidhamma” 5 Rdpanipavibhdga Buddhadatta The Classification of Forms and Formless Things “ 6 Saccasahkhepa Dhammapala “Brief Account of the Truths” 7 Mohavicchedam Kassapa “Destroyer of Doubt” 8 Ndmarupasamasa Khema The Summary of Mind and Matter m 9 Namdcdradlpaka Saddhamma-jotipala “Illuminating the Action of the Mind” i Narada (1980). ii Exell (1992). iii Saddhatissa (1987). number of monks have managed to memorize the entire vinaya- and abhidhamma- pitakas plus a significant portion of the sutta-pitaka, thus qualifying for the advanced degree (and title) “Tipitaka-dhara.” There are currently seven holders of this remark- able achievement, and there have been only 12 since the examination procedure was introduced in 1948. The examinations take place annually in December. 11 We should bear in mind that, while such study involves the mastery of a large body of complex Abhidhamma material that we would describe as philosophical in character, the char- acter of the engagement that is thus cultivated does not map easily onto the critical training pursued for a philosophy degree in Western universities. Yet this kind of learn- ing by heart is regarded as a precursor both to philosophical engagement and to medita- tion practice in much living Abhidhamma practice. The Abhidhammatthasangaha is concise and has as a result inspired numerous com- mentaries from the twelfth century through to the twentieth (Rewata Dhamma and Bodhi 1995-2011). If the texts just discussed are the tools by which Asian Theravada educational tradi- tions access Abhidhamma, and in this sense constitute the curriculum for Buddhist philosophy in Theravada countries, we should also note that Western engagement with philosophical dimensions of Theravada have taken a different route. There are at least two contemporary Theravadas: the Theravada of Asian countries, which of course varies regionally and locally, and the Theravada of the Western imaginaire. The latter is a construct of Western scholars working with the textual materials of the Theravada tradition as they have become available in critical editions (themselves a product of Western scholarship), and focusing not necessarily on the materials that are used in Asia but on those which they have identified as closest to the Buddha (this being reflected in the publishing history of the Pali canon in Europe). The construction of this Western Theravada Buddhism is therefore a handmaid (or should it be niece?) 82 theravAda of the essentially nineteenth-century search for Buddhist origins and the “historical Buddha.” Peter Skilling suggests that The centering of "Theravada” in the Pali canon, above all in the “four main Nikayas,” is a child of the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. It has grown up to become what we might call a “new Theravada,” largely anglophonic but increasingly international in influence and outreach. This new trend should be respected and recognized as one of the Buddhisms active today. But should it be read back into the past? (Skilling 2009, 72) It seems to the present author that a proportion of Western scholarship on Theravada doctrine and philosophy participates in this transnational, anglophone, satin-based Theravada insofar as it focuses on selected sutta texts, rather than on the developed systematic philosophical literature of Abhidhamma, and also insofar as it imports into the materials terms and concepts that originate in the Western philosophical context. This makes such essays neither illegitimate nor uninteresting, but we should be aware that such debates as are raised on this basis may not be recognizable or relevant to traditional Theravada scholars and cannot automatically be said to represent the actual or historical philosophical concerns of the Theravada tradition. Notes 1 Theravada Buddhism has been known in Western scholarship under a number of designa- tions: Ceylonese Buddhism, Southern Buddhism, HInayana, and, in more politically correct times, srdvaka or “mainstream” Buddhism. 2 Functionally similar statuses are observed in Sri Lanka, where such women are known as dasasil mdtayo (“10 precept mothers”); in Burma, where they are known as thilashin “having moral standing": and in Cambodia, where they are don chi. The re-establishment of the bhikkhuni saiigha is a subject of ongoing progress and controversy, the latest most notable development being the ordination by Ajahn Brahmavamso of bhikkhuni in Australia and the subsequent reaction of the Thai Sangha hierarchy. 3 The Cambodian Edition Manuscripts Fund (FEMC) at http://khmermanuscripts.org/; and the Digital Library of Lao Manuscripts at www.laomanuscripts.net/. 4 Much attention has been paid to determining the character and causes of such splits. See Bareau (1955); Nattier and Prebish (1977); Cousins (1991); and Skilton (1994) as useful introductions to this debate. 5 See the Pali Text Society website: www.palitext.com/. 6 Also translated as “conditioned co-production,” “dependent origination,” “dependent arising.” 7 Cula-Maluhkhyaputta Sutta (MN.II.97ff.). 8 The Patthana fills 2,500 pages of the 1957 Burmese tipitaka edition. 9 For example, chapter 4 of the Abhidhammatthasahgaha (see below), dealing in detail with the cognitive process ( cittavithi ), is elaborated as a Shan lik long verse text entitled Abhidhamma Kammatthan. See Scott Collection, Cambridge University Library, in which there are several copies of this text. See Crosby and Khur- Yearn (2010) on the lik long texts of Shan State (North-East Burma). My knowledge of the living traditions of Patthana practice comes pri- marily from the current PhD research of Pyi Phyo Kyaw at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London, under the supervision of Kate Crosby. 83 ANDREW SKILTON 10 Jotika Khur- Yearn (personal communication, 10 November 2011). 1 1 Printed English-language sources on the Tipitakadhara system are scarce. See Kyaw (nd.). References Adikaram, E. (1946). Early History of Buddhism in Ceylon. Colombo: M. D. Gunasena. Aung, S. Z., and Rhys Davids, C. (trans.) (1915). Points of Controversy. London: PTS. Bareau, Andre (1955). Les Sectes bouddhique du Petit Vehicule. Paris: Ecole frangaise d’Extreme-Orient. Eng. trans. forthcoming as The Buddhist Schools of the Small Vehicle. Trans. S. Boin-Webb, ed. A. Skilton. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Bechert, Heinz (1993). The Nikayas of Medieval Sri Lanka and the Unification of the Sangha by Parakramabahu I. In Studies on Buddhism in Honour of Professor A. K. Warder. Ed. N. K. Wagle and F. Watanabe. Toronto: University of Toronto, Centre for South Asian Studies, 11—21. Carbine, Jason A. (2011). Sons of the Buddha: Continuities and Ruptures in a Burmese Monastic Tradition. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter. Collins, Steven (1990). On the very idea of the Pali canon. Journal of the Pali Text Society 15, 89-126. Conze, Edward (1967). Recent Progress in Buddhist Studies. In Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies. London: Faber. Cousins, LanceS. (1991). The “Five Points” and the Origins of the Buddhist Schools. The Buddhist Forum, Vol. 2: Seminar Papers 1988-1990. Ed. T. Skorupski. London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 27-60. Crosby, Kate (2000). Tantric Theravada: A Bibliographic Essay on the Writings of Frangois Bizot and other Literature on the Yogdvacara Tradition. Contemporary Buddhism 2, 141-98. Crosby, Kate (2006). Sariputta’s Three Works on the Samantapdsddika. Journal of the Pali Text Society 28, 49-59. Crosby, Kate, and Khur- Yearn, Jotika (2010). Poetic Dhamma and the Z are: Traditional Styles of Teaching Theravada amongst the Shan of Northern Thailand. Contemporary Buddhism 11, 1-26. Exell, R. (1992). The Classification of Forms and Formless Things. Journal of the Pali Text Society 16, 1-12. Hiniiber, Oskar von (2000). A Handbook of Pali Literature. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. Karunadasa, Y. (2010). The Theravada Abhldhamma: Its Inquiry into the Nature of Conditioned Reality. Hong Kong: Centre of Buddhist Studies, University of Hong Kong. Kyaw, Pyi Phyo (nd.). The Centennial Commemorative Inscription of the Most Venerable Mingun Tipitakadhara Sayadaw U Vicittasarabhivamsa. Unpublished paper. Law, B. C. (trans.) (1922). A Designation of Human Types. London: Luzac. McDaniel, Justin Thomas (2008). Gathering Leaves & Lifting Words: Histories of Buddhist Monastic Education in Laos and Thailand. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Nanamoli, Bhikkhu (trans.) (1987-91) The Dispeller of Delusion. 2 vols. Henley on Thames: PTS. Narada, Ven. U. (trans.) (1962). Discourse on Elements. London: PTS. Narada, Ven. U. (trans.) (1969-81). Conditional Relations. 2 vols. London: PTS. Narada, Ven. U. (1980). A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma: Being Abhidhammattha Sangaha of Bhadanta Acariya Anuruddha. Fourth edn. Colombo: Buddhist Publication Society. Nattier, Jan, and Prebish, Charles S. ( 19 77). Mahasanghika Origins: The Beginnings of Buddhist Sectarianism. History of Religions 16, 237-72. Norman, Kenneth R. (1983). Pali Literature, including the Canonical Literature in Prakrit and San- skrit of All the Mnaydna Schools of Buddhism. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz. 84 theravAda Norman, Kenneth R. (2001). The Group of Discourses. Oxford: PTS. Pe, Maung Tin (1920-1). The Expositor. London: PTS. Potter, Karl (1996). Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. VII: Abhidharma Buddhism to 150 A.D. Ed. Robert E. Buswell. Jr., Padmanabh S. Jaini, and Noble Ross Reat. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Rewata Dhamma, 11, and Bodhi, B. (1995-2011). Introduction to Narada Mahathera’s A Compre- hensive Manual of Abhidhamma. At www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/bodhi/abhiman.html (accessed 18 October 2011). Rhys Davids, Caroline (trans.) (1993 [1900]). A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics. Third edn. London: PTS. Ronkin, Noa (2005). Early Buddhist Metaphysics: The Making of a Philosophical Tradition. London: Routledge. Saddhatissa, H. (1987). The Summary of Mind and Matter. Journal of the Pali Text Society 11. 5-31. Skilling, Peter (1994). A Note on the History of the Bhikkhuni-sangha (II): The Order of Nuns after the Parinirvana. World Fellowship of Buddhist Review 31, 29-49. Skilling, Peter (2009). Theravada in History. Pacific World: Journal of the Institute of Buddhist Studies 11, 61-93. Skilton, Andrew (1994). A Concise History of Buddhism. Birmingham: Windhorse. Thittila, Ven. U. (trans.) (1969). The Book of Analysis. London: PTS. 85 5 Indian Mahayana Buddhism JAMES BLUMENTHAL Background The ideas, topics, and parameters of Indian Mahayana philosophy are immense and diverse. The overarching label covers a wide range of issues, thinkers, and methodologi- cal approaches to the philosophical enterprise. And yet, within this breadth and diver- sity, Mahayana philosophies, like all Buddhist approaches to philosophy, have at their foundation a common soteriological aim. The Buddha described the fundamental cause of our suffering as a basic ignorance (avidya) about the way things are and how they function. Due to our ignorance we create dysfunctional habits of mind that inevitably lead to further patterns of thinking, speaking, and acting that result in dissatisfaction and suffering. Because the seeds of these afflictions are uprooted only when one is able to replace the ignorance with insight, a primary purpose of the Buddhist philosophical enterprise is to point out as precisely as possible the nature of our misconceptions which keep us in bondage and suffering. Such conceptual presentations can serve as founda- tions for meditative exercises leading to a direct, unmediated experience of insight that is the basic requirement for liberating oneself from suffering and its causes - the achievement of nirvana. Thus the soteriological goal of achieving the liberative state of nirvana provides the basic aim and orientation of all Buddhist philosophy, including the Indian Mahayana. Nevertheless, what distinguishes Mahayana when compared with non-Mahayana is that the achievement of one’s own liberation is seen as a penultimate goal. Driven by great compassion for the suffering of all living beings and the altruistic wish to do all that is possible to be of maximum benefit to others in their pursuit of freedom from suffering, Mahayanists aspire to become full-fledged buddhas rather than mere arhats because it is as buddhas that they can be of greatest benefit. This fundamental motivation for all Mahayana is referred to by the term bodhicitta. Perhaps the most classic description of bodhicitta, the altruistic and compassionate A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy. First Edition. Edited by Steven M. Emmanuel. © 2013 John Wiley & Sons. Inc. Published 2013 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 86 INDIAN MAHAYANA BUDDHISM motivation of the bodhisattva, is found in Santideva's famous treatise A Guide to the Bodhisattva’s Way of Life (Bodhisattvacaryavatara). 1 The path leading to buddhahood with this motivation is the path of a bodhisattva. Discussions of this altruistic motiva- tion of a bodhisattva are contrasted in Mahayana literature with the motivations and paths of Hearers (srdvakas) and the Solitary Realizers ( pratyekabuddhas ). These two ideal figures discussed in early mainstream Buddhism describe the achievement of arhatship as their final goal. As such, upon achievement of arhatship they enjoy the bliss of nirvana and cease to take rebirth among the suffering beings of samsara. Mahayanists describe this as a somewhat selfish goal that lacks compassion for the welfare of others. In contrast, the bodhisattva commits to continue to be reborn among the suffering beings of the world until every last living being has achieved liberation. This bodhisat- tva sentiment is summed up in the famous stanza from A Guide to the Bodhisattva’s Way of Life by Santideva: As long as space endures And as long as sentient beings remain May I, too, abide To dispel the miseries of the world . 2 The particulars of the distinguishing characteristics of the bodhisattva progressing on the Mahayana path and the so-called HInayanists 3 (Solitary Realizers and Hearers) progressing on their paths find their foundational presentation in Mahayana literature in a text attributed to Maitreya called The Ornament of Clear Realizations (Abhisamaydlamkdra). This path system literature consists of map-like descriptions of the various states of consciousness of practitioners as they ascend the path from its beginning until the achievement of buddhahood. Commentaries give detailed descrip- tions of the types of obstacles present in consciousnesses at various stages and the means by which they are removed (see below). In addition to the critical role of compassion and bodhicitta in Mahayana thought and practice is the prominence of the related idea of skillful means (updya). Generally the idea refers to the multitude of skillful methods a buddha might employ to lead disciples effectively on the path. This sentiment is presented on numerous occasions in the 8,000 stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra, where, for example, it is explained that, though the Buddha’s teachings all are of the taste of great compassion, they take a variety of forms to most effectively address the needs of particular individuals and situ- ations (Conze 2001 [1973]). In addition, the idea of skillful means is succinctly addressed in the Flower Ornament Siitra, when the Buddha says, “In this world there are four quadrillion names to express the four Holy Truths in accord with the mentalities of beings, to cause them all to be harmonized and pacified” (Cleary 1993, 276). Probably the most famous account of skillful means drawn from a siitra source is that found in the Lotus Sutra, where the Buddha employs a parable. The enormous home of a very wealthy man has caught fire. The home has only one door. The wealthy man has three sons, who are engrossed in playing games inside the burning house and are unaware of the lire. The father first tells them they are in grave danger from the fire and must leave the house at once. Not understanding the fire or the danger, they ignore him and continue to play their games. Then he decides to try another tactic. He entices 87 JAMES BLUMENTHAL them with promises of deer carts, ox carts, and goat carts outside, objects with which he knows they enjoy playing as they customarily have enjoyed them in the past. This promise of gifts motivates them to run out of the burning house as quickly as possible. When they get out of the burning house, the father gives each a carriage drawn by a white ox and covered in jewels. The Buddha explains that the father was not guilty of misleading his sons by enticing them with three different types of carts to suit their present mentalities. He was using skillful means. In a similar way, the Buddha teaches three different vehicles, but all culminate in the bodhisattva vehicle leading to bud- dhahood. He could have taught the bodhisattva path originally to them all, but not everybody was inclined to the bodhisattva path at the time. Some would benefit more from the Hearer’s path or Solitary Realizer’s path. Thus, according to the Lotus Siitra, he used skillful means at appropriate times to offer a variety of teachings including also the Hearer’s path and the Solitary Realizer’s path - those best suited to each type of person - while knowing that, in the end, all culminate in the bodhisattva path leading to buddhahood. In the Mahayana tradition, the notion of skillful means has been employed in a variety of contexts to provide a theoretical justification for hierarchically organiz- ing varying and competing Buddhist philosophical systems. In these settings the common argument is that the Buddha offered a spectrum of explanations with vary- ing degrees of philosophical subtlety to accord with the predispositions and mentali- ties (karma) of the variety of Buddhist disciples. Thus, in one context or to one group of disciples, he may have taught that things exist and, in another, that all phenomena lack inherent existence. It is argued that, over the centuries, a variety of Buddhist philosophical systems emerged (e.g., Vaibhasika, Sautrantika, Yogacara, and Madhya- maka) in response to his varied descriptions of reality to different disciples. Later Bud- dhist inheritors of this diversity needed to make sense of it all, including what seemed like internal inconsistencies. Understanding the variations as a byproduct of skillful means has been a useful hermeneutical tool. Often these hierarchical presentations valorize the pedagogical utility of engagement with “lower’’ systems of thought as philosophical stepping-stones that ripen the mind for understanding the higher systems, and ultimately the highest (whichever that may be according to the indi- vidual or school presenting the hierarchy at hand). There are many examples of vari- ations on this theme, from the P’an-Chiao systems of China to the various tenet-system texts ( siddhanta , grub mtha) or doxographies of India and Tibet. Though the notion of “schools” of Mahayana philosophy can mistakenly lead one to infer a relative homogeneity among thinkers and systems of ideas, the description of Mahayana as largely falling into two main schools, Madhyamaka and Yogacara (with numerous sub-schools and/or varying interpretations within those schools), does provide a taxonomy that is useful in approaching Mahayana systems of thought. This is how many Indian Mahayanists, including doxography authors such as Bhaviveka , 4 Santaraksita , 5 and Bodhibhadra , 6 go about organizing the Indian systems of thought in their presentations of Indian philosophical views. Mahayana teachings rely on siitras attributed to the Buddha that most likely were not publicly known until centuries after the historical Buddha's passing and are gener- ally not accepted by non-Mahayanists as authentic scriptures in the sense of having actually been taught by the historical Buddha. Such siitras, including the corpus of the 88 INDIAN MAHAYANA BUDDHISM Perfection of Wisdom Sutras (Prajndparamitdsutra), The Siitra Unraveling the Thought (Samdhinirmocanasutra), and the Entrance to Lanka Siitra ( Lahkavatdrasutra ), among others, are the primary canonical sources for Mahayana philosophers such as Nagarjuna (c. 1 50 ce) and Asanga (c. 325 CE). Moreover, there are several key ideas that signal a Buddhist philosophical system as belonging to the Mahayana. Perhaps foremost among these, and the central subject of the siitras mentioned above, is the notion that all persons and phenomena are properly characterized by the term “emptiness” ( sunyata ). Different Mahayana thinkers will describe the contours of emptiness in varying ways (discussed below), but the basic idea that persons and phenomena are empty of an enduring essence, or an independ- ent, absolute way of existing, is an idea common to all. Though emptiness is interpreted variously by different Mahayana philosophers, it is nonetheless a key marker that dis- tinguishes Mahayana from non-Mahayana. Rather than simply use the term “selfless- ness” ( anatman ), Mahayanists argue that emptiness, with all that that term means and implies, is a much more subtle description of the nature of reality. In addition, empti- ness or “essencelessness” is said to be an apt descriptor not only for persons but for all phenomena, whereas Mahayanists contend that non-Mahayanists generally discuss non-Self only as it applies to persons. Some argue that this is simply a more subtle and refined rendering or development of basic pan-Buddhist ideas that trace back to Buddhism’s earliest period, namely ideas such as impermanence ( anitya , annica), dependent-arising ( pratityasamutpdda , praticcasamuppada), and selflessness. However, the Mahayana characterization of all entities as being empty of essences is contrasted with non-Mahiiyana depictions of the world of samsara, which is populated by suffering sentient beings as being fundamen- tally constituted by irreducible dharmas, infinitesimally small particles that are the real building blocks of the phenomenal world. Mahayanists reject the notion of irreducible dharmas that are true and real. By rejecting the real or essential existence of even the supposed building blocks of the phenomenal world, Mahayana thought began to look like a quite radical departure from earlier mainline Buddhist thought. By denying the essential reality of the dharmas, Mahayanists are left to explain the everyday experience of the unenlightened. In other words, they need to explain conventional reality. This is done in a variety of ways by Mahayana philosophers, including by way of variations of schema such as the two truths - ultimate truth (paramartha-satya) and conventional truth ( samvrti-satya ) - and the three natures - constructed nature (parikalpitasvabhdva), the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhdva ), and the perfected nature (parinispannasvabhdva) - as well as by way of epistemological schemas and systems of analysis advocated in the pramdna tradition.' Historically two major “schools" of Mahayana philosophy emerged in the early centuries of the Common Era and continued to be commented upon, interpreted, and revised for roughly a millennium in India, not to mention further interpretations from Tibet and East Asia. The earlier of the two, the Madhyamaka, was first articulated and systematized by Nagarjuna on the basis of his interpretation of the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras in the second century. His thought and its proper interpretation has been the topic of extensive and ongoing commentary, analysis, and debate across Asia and beyond for nearly two millennia. Among the notable Indian Madhyamaka thinkers were Aryadeva (c. third century CE), Buddhapalita (470-540 CE), Bhaviveka 89 JAMES BLUMENTHAL (500-570 ce ), 8 CandrakTrti (600-650 ce), Santaraksita (725-788 CE) and Kamalaslla (740-79 5 CE). The second of the Mahayana schools to emerge, Yogacara/Cittamatra, was first systematically presented by Asanga and his half-brother Vasubandhu in the fourth century on the basis of more recently publicly known siitras such as The Siitra Unraveling the Thought ( Samdhinirmocanasutra ) and The Descent into Lanka Siitra ( Lahkavatarasiitra ). Subsequent thinkers associated with the Yogacara school include the groundbreak- ing Buddhist logician-epistemologists (pramana thinkers) Dignaga (c. 450 ce) and Dharmaklrti (c. 625 CE), as well as subsequent commentators such as Devendrabuddhi (c. 650 CE), Sakyabuddhi (c. 675 CE), Sthiramati (c. sixth century CE) and Dharmapala (d. 561 CE). Madhyamaka The foremost thinker and so-called founder of the Madhyamaka school of Mahayana philosophy was Nagarjuna, who authored several important philosophical trea- tises, the most famous of which is The Fundamental Verses of the Middle Way (Mulamadhyamakakarikd). The central idea in Madhyamaka philosophy is the notion that all persons and phenomena are empty of essence (literally “own existence,” svabhdva) of any enduring or independent nature. On first glance this does not seem like a particularly radical idea for a Buddhist to posit, since in the earliest teachings the Buddha taught impermanence and dependent-arising, two ideas which when consid- ered together seem to imply the emptiness ( simyata ) of all things. However, early Bud- dhist attempts to systematize the view focused on reducing the gross phenomena of the world to irreducible particles, which were described as the ultimately real building blocks of the phenomenal world. Thus, according to early systematization of Buddhist thought into schools such as the Vaibhasika, while gross, dependently arisen phenom- ena such as books and so forth are mere conventional truths and do not ultimately exist as books, the partless particles of which books are constituted do ultimately exist, have essences or svabhdva, and are ultimate truths. Nagarjuna’s Madhyamaka thought puts forth a new way of describing ultimate and conventional truths. He goes to great lengths to reject the existence of svabhavas entirely, thus undermining the ultimate reality of even the building blocks of the phenomenal world as described by earlier Buddhist thinkers. It is the rejection of svabhavas that is the recurring theme and guiding insight of his (and the Madhyamaka tradition’s) most important treatise, The Fundamental Verses of the Middle Way. Nagarjuna frames much of his thought as coursing a philosophical middle way between two extremes. On the one hand, he rejects eternalism, the idea that anything endures for more than a moment. On the other, he rejects nihilism in the sense of an absolute nothingness where phenomena do not exist tit all. Ultimately phenomena have no essences. Conventionally they do exist merely as momentary, dependently arisen phenomena. Thus the rejection of essences, while unsettling from a Vaibhasika per- spective, does not entail full-fledged nihilism, according to Nagarjuna. It is the middle way between these two extremes from which the Madhyamaka (“Middle Way”) school derives its name. 90 INDIAN MAHAYANA BUDDHISM The critical link between ultimate and conventional truths for Nagarjuna is the idea of dependent-arising ( pratityasamutpada ). The central role of dependent-arising as a bridge between conventional and ultimate truths and Nagarjuna’s rejection of essences means that his rejection of essences is fundamentally a rejection of the independent existence of anything. All existent phenomena exist in dependent relationships with other phenomena. Because entities are fleeting and depend for that fleeting existence on other momentary entities that cause them to arise, they must not have essences. Nagarjuna thought that the Vaibhasika idea that there could exist irreducible particles that were not dependency arisen or dependent upon relations with other entities and therefore had essences was absurd. According to Nagarjuna, entities depend on fleeting causes for their momentary existence and/or on relations to other entities for their conventional identity. All entities exist in dependence upon relationships. Conventional truths are those dependent entities upon which those who are ignorant of the way in which they actually exist superimpose essences and fixed identities. They exist merely as dependent entities but without the essences that ignorant persons habitually impute to them. All Buddhist schools agree that the removal of ignorance and the cultivation of experiential insight are the necessary conditions for the elimination of suffering. The details about how this ignorance and insight are described lies at the heart of the dif- ferences between Buddhist philosophical schools. The Vaibhasikas argue that the basic ignorance one must overcome is the mistaken belief that there exists a truly existent self (atman), an essential or enduring and independent personal identity. According to Nagarjuna and the Madhyamikas, all entities, not just persons, lack an enduring inde- pendent essence or identity. To see things as they really are - the basic insight required to uproot the afflictions that keep people bound in suffering - is to see the emptiness of all persons and phenomena. Nagarjuna's first commentator, Aryadeva (c. third century CE), was universally accepted as an authoritative interpreter of Nagarjuna's thought by all subsequent Madhyamaka philosophers, but consensus seems to have ended there. Disagreements and debates about the proper understanding of Nagarjuna’s thought and insights by later Madhyamaka commentators continued until the end of the Buddhist era in India. Perhaps the most noteworthy disagreement, one that became particularly promi- nent for Tibetan inheritors of Indian Madhyamaka but certainly one that is grounded in Indian Madhyamaka debates, concerns the role of “independent inferences” ( svatantranumana ) in Madhyamaka discourse. Since Dignaga (c. 450 CE) developed the earliest systematic form of Buddhist logic, his method became the standard among most Buddhist philosophers, including most Madhyamikas. Yet a heated debate over the appropriateness of the use of independent inferences commenced soon afterwards in the writings of some early Madhyamaka philosophers. Though the debate lay dormant for several centuries in India, the issue arose again towards the end of Bud- dhism there and became a critical point of contention among Tibetan interpreters of Indian Madhyamaka. Buddhapalita (c. 500 CE) was the first Madhyamika after Dignaga to comment on Nagarjuna. He did not employ independent inferences, but rather used a method of reasoning he believed to be consistent with Nagarjuna’s own, one which drew out the consequences ( pmsanga ) or logical absurdities entailed in asserting the existence of 91 JAMES BLUMENTHAL essences. It does not appear that Buddhapalita saw himself as doing anything radical. However, the next Madhyamaka commentator, Bhaviveka (c. sixth century CE), took great exception to Buddhapalita's failure to use independent inference to establish the view of emptiness. He argued that it was alright for Nagarjuna, as a “root text" or treatise author, to use only consequences, but that it was the duty of a Madhyamaka commentator to establish the view of emptiness with independent inference. Without establishing the view, he argued, one runs the risk of falling into the extreme of nihil- ism. In response, Candralurti (c. 625 CE) came to Buddhapalita's defense, arguing that he was exactly correct in his methodology of using only consequentialist reasoning. Moreover, Candrakirti argued that Bhaviveka was making a fundamental methodologi- cal error in utilizing independent inferences to establish the view of emptiness. In an argument further developed by Tsongkhapa (1357-1419 CE) in Tibet, Candrakirti argued that the utilization of independent inferences was actually incompatible with holding Madhyamaka tenets, because the very use of this method of reasoning would entail acceptance of the absolute, independent existence of those entities whose empti- ness of independent existence a Madhyamika is ostensibly attempting to establish. The reason is that independent inferences require valid establishment by both the propo- nent and the opponent of a commonly appearing subject of an argument. To use an example, if the book is the subject about which one is trying to establish the emptiness of an inherent nature in the book, that subject (the book) must be commonly known to both participants in the debate. It must appear in precisely the same way to both the proponent and the opponent of the argument if the argument is to make sense. In order for such a criterion to be met, Candrakirti argues that the book must have some abso- lute independent mode of existence such that it can appear in precisely the same way to the advocates of each side of the argument. According to the textual record that remains, it seems that for several centuries the vast majority of Madhyamaka philosophers utilized independent inferences and seem to have ignored Candraklrti’s argument. There is evidence that in the late period (elev- enth-thirteenth centuries) in India, particularly in Kashmir, Candraklrti’s interpreta- tion and methodology began to gain support. Discussions of the role of logic and conceptual thinking were central issues of debate among Tibetan authors (some of whom studied in Kashmir with late Indian followers of Candrakirti) from the eleventh to fifteenth centuries (see Vose 2009). In fact the issue became so prominent among Tibetan doxographers that sub-schools of Madhyamaka are commonly distinguished according to the type of reasoning they employ. 9 Followers of Bhaviveka generally who utilize independent inference are categorized as “Svatantrika-Madhyamikas” (dbU ma rang rgyud pa) and followers of Candrakirti who favor the use of consequentialist rea- soning are categorized as “Prasangika-Madhyamikas" (dbU ma thal 'gyur ba ). Yogacara/Cittamatra The Yogacara school (also known as Cittamatra) of Mahay ana philosophy also makes use of the technical term “emptiness” ( sunyata ) in its descriptions of the essenceless way in which things are said to exist, yet the details of the way this is explained are 92 INDIAN MAHAYANA BUDDHISM strikingly different from those of their Madhyamaka counterparts. Early Yogacara thinkers, such as Asanga and Vasubandhu, place a much greater emphasis on the mind (citta) or consciousness ( vijhdna ) and its role both in the way in which entities are mis- takenly perceived under the sway of ignorance and in the descriptions of how entities exist. While Nagarjuna described entities as empty of essences ( svabhava , literally “own nature”) in and of themselves, early Yogacarins described entities as empty of essences that are utterly distinct from the consciousness perceiving them. Entities are empty of subject-object duality. A marked emphasis is placed on the role of consciousness and the subjectivity implicit in the perception of all entities. Put another way, Nagarjuna describes emptiness in terms of a lack of independence from relationships with causes, parts, others, and so forth. Asanga and Vasubandhu describe emptiness in terms of a lack of independence in the relationship between an object and the consciousness per- ceiving it. Perhaps the most important source for this emergent school of thought was The Sutra Unraveling the Thought. In the sutra, a disciple named Paramarthasamudgata respectfully asks the Buddha to explain the apparent contradictions between his expla- nation of entities in earlier discourses (those referenced by Vaibhasikas), in which he describes entities as existent, and those in later discourses such as The Perfection of Wisdom Sutras (those utilized by Nagarjuna and subsequent Madhyamikas), in which he says all entities are empty of real essences. The Buddha’s response details what will later be systematized by Asanga and Vasubandhu as a Yogacara theory of three natures (svabhava) and corresponding non-natures (asvabhdva), or elements that the three natures lack . 10 The Buddha explains that when he said all phenomena have a nature he meant that they have these three natures, and when he said they were empty of having natures he meant that for each of those three there is a corresponding lack of nature. The three natures are: the constructed nature (parikalpitasvabhava) , the depend- ent nature (paratantrasvabhdva), and the perfected nature ( parinispannasvabhdva ). The theory of the three natures is the centerpiece of Yogacara thought. All entities are said to be of three natures. In keeping with the critical role played by consciousness in Yogacara thinking, each of the three natures describes entities in part in terms of their relationship with the subjects perceiving them. The dependent nature plays a critical role in the three-nature theory because it serves as the basis for explaining the other two natures. The notion of entities being dependency arisen is an idea basic to all Buddhist thought and is incorporated into Yogacara thought here. All phenomena are characterized by their dependent natures in that they all depend on consciousness. Such phenomena are said to be empty of self-production. Independent self-production entails eternalism because an object's nature would be to (re)produce itself continually as itself with a nature to reproduce itself again, and so on. A constructed nature is ignorantly imagined to be utterly distinct from the consciousness perceiving it. In other words, it is mistakenly taken to exist independent of its relationship with the conscious- ness in which it appears. In that sense, the notion of an object existing in a dualistic relation to consciousness is an ignorant mental construction not reflecting the reality of the situation. According to the Yogacarins, this is the ignorance that needs to be purged and replaced with insight in order to uproot suffering and its causes. It also 93 JAMES BLUMENTHAL happens to be our ordinary way of experiencing the world. Since no entity actually exists this way in the world, its corresponding non-nature is its lack of existence by way of its own characteristics. The perfect nature is the nature of entities reflective of this insight about how they actually exist, as empty of independence from consciousness, empty of subject-object duality. Its corresponding non-nature is its lack of any of the qualities of the constructed nature. Given the three-nature theory, Asanga and Vasubandhu need to explain what it is that causes these experiences of objects in the first place. Nagarjuna explains the expe- rience of conventional truths, the objects of the phenomenal world, in terms of their dependency arisen nature and a causal relationship between objects of consciousness and the perception of those by consciousness. For the Yogacara thinkers, this all really begins and ends with consciousness itself. Buddhist philosophers other than Yogacarins all describe humans as having six types of consciousness, the five sense consciousnesses and the mental consciousness. Yogacarins describe two additional consciousnesses: the afflicted mentation ( klistmanas ) and the storehouse consciousness ( alayavijnana ). The cause of our perception of a phenomenal world is not material objects, but the ripening of karmic seeds (blja) that are all maintained in our storehouse consciousness. When the karmic seed for seeing a particular book comes to fruition, I experience that book. The cause is the seed in the consciousness, and the experience of the object is a projec- tion that, under the sway of ignorance, mistakenly conceives of its objects as distinct. The seventh consciousness, afflicted mentation, is simply that consciousness that wrongly imputes a notion of self ( atman ) to the storehouse consciousness, mistakenly considering it to be a real self. Later Yogacara thinkers, for example Dignaga and Dharmaklrti, in conversation with non-Buddhist philosophers of language, epistemologists, and logicians, developed sophisticated theories of perception that went on to influence later Madhyamaka think- ers such as Bhaviveka (c. 500-570 CE) and Santaraksita (725-788 CE), among others. These developments included formal methods for logical argumentation that not only enabled Buddhist philosophers to posit criteria for establishing the validity of their own theories but also gave them the basic structures for debating with other Buddhists and their non-Buddhist counterparts. Public debates among representative philosophers from rival schools were a relatively frequent occurrence in India during this period, and royal patronage of monasteries and traditions was often at stake in the more celebrated encounters. Related to the increasingly sophisticated treatments of theories of perception were varying accounts of what it means when early Yogacarins claim that subject-object duality is a function of ignorance. Some argued that the ignorance refers to the percep- tion of duality but does not impact the contents of perception. Figures such as Deven- drabuddhi argued along these lines and were categorized by later Indian and Tibetan doxographers as “Proponents of True Representations” ( satydkdravdda . mam bden pa). The opposing stance on this issue, advocated by Yogacarins such as Sakyabuddhi, held that the representations in the experience, the contents of perception, were mistakenly construed due to ignorance in addition to the basic misconception of subject-object duality. Such figures argued that the contents of the perception of an ignorant being are false, and are thus referred to as Yogacara “Proponents of False Representations” (allkakaravada, mam brdzun pa). 94 INDIAN MAHAyANA BUDDHISM Yogacara-Madhyamaka Several later Mahayana thinkers in India, such as Aryavimuktsena (c. 450 CE), Kamalaslla (c. eighth century ce), Ratnakarasanti (c. eleventh century ce), attempted to construct ways of reconciling the major streams of Mahayana philosophy. Perhaps the most prominent among those attempting to reconcile the two streams of thought came from Kamalaslla’s teacher, Santaraksita. He was a syncretic philosopher who attempted to bring early Yogacara thinking along with the logico-epistemological insights of Dignaga and Dharmaklrti into a fundamentally Madhyamaka framework. Santaraksita’s approach was to incorporate Yogacara ideas into a Madhyamaka two truths framework at the stage of conventional truth, and a fundamentally Madhya- maka analysis was employed in presentations of ultimate truth. At the same time he integrates many of the elements of Dharmaklrti’s epistemology, including his theories of perception, use of inferential reasoning, acceptance of the reflexive awareness ( svasamvedana ) of consciousness, and rejection of objects that are utterly distinct from consciousness. In fact the last of these is incorporated into Santaraksita’s presentation of the two truths. Santaraksita describes conventional truths in ways that clearly borrow from his Yogacara predecessors. He claims that conventional truths are not utterly separate from consciousness perceiving them and should be understood properly in this way by relying on the Yogacara system. However, while he urges reliance upon Yogacara ways of describing the ultimate, the perfected nature, he does so by explaining this to be merely an appropriate way of describing the conventional in his fundamentally Mad- hyamaka system. The incorporation of Yogacara insights at the level of conventional truths is used as a stepping-stone for Santaraksita. One can begin with conventional analysis to realize that objects are not distinct from consciousness, and then go on to an ultimate Madhyamaka analysis through which yogis know there is no essence or nature at all, even in consciousness. In his further elaboration, Santaraksita describes conventional truths as dependently arisen, impermanent, and causally efficacious. He particularly stresses functionality and causal abilities of conventional truths, leading the reader to categorize his particular type of Yogacara advocacy (if one must, since he himself refrained from describing himself as anything other than a Madhyamika) in doxographical terms as a “Proponent of True Representations." By bringing together the Madhyamaka thought of Nagarjuna, the Yogacara thought of Asanga and Vasub- andhu, and the pramana thought of Dignaga and Dharmaklrti into a single coherent philosophical system, Santaraksita may be seen as representative of the final major development in Indian Mahayana philosophical thought. 11 Mahayana Path System It is frequently explained in commentaries that the explicit teaching of the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras was the emptiness of inherent existence or own natures in entities and that the implicit teachings were the teachings on the Mahayana path system. The path system was said to have been explicitly taught first in a text attributed to Maitreya 95 JAMES BLUMENTHAL entitled The Ornament of Clear Realization. There were 2 1 Indian commentaries written directly on The Ornament of Clear Realization in addition to other treatises dealing with the topic of the Mahayana path system, such as Kamalaslla’s three treatises referred to as Stages of Meditation I, 11, and 111 ( Bhavanakrama ). The Mahayana path system is a description of states of consciousness and the obstacles to liberation and buddhahood one encounters as one ascends from the beginnings of the path to complete buddha- hood. The details are dizzying in their complexity. The system is structured around five paths, ten bodhisattva grounds ( bhumi ), three realms, 12 and two types of obstacles to be removed. There are, of course, differences in interpretation of the details. Here we will present a basic outline of the structure with the caveat that, for individual thinkers, the devil, so to speak, is in the details. The text describes two general categories of obstacles that need to be removed in order to achieve the primary types of Buddhist soteriological goals. In order to achieve arhatship and liberation from samsara, the practitioner needs to remove all of the afflic- tions or afflictive obstacles (klesavarana) from the root. These are disturbing emotions such as greed, anger, jealousy, and so forth. In order to achieve buddhahood, not only do all the afflictions need to be removed, but also all of the knowledge obstacles ( jheyavarana ) or obstacles to omniscience need to be removed from the root. These are variously described as the subtle stains of karmic residue, the mistaken appearance of inherent existence in the perception of a bodhisattva after rising from meditative equi- poise on emptiness, and so forth. The fundamental structure of the Mahayana path system rests on five hierarchically organized paths: the path of accumulation ( sambhara-mdrga , tshogs lam), the path of preparation ( prayoga-marga , sbyor lam), the path of seeing (darsana-mdrga, mthong lam), the path of meditation ( bhavana-marga , sgom lam), and the path of no more learning ( asaiksa-marga , mi slob pa’i lam). Path in this context should be understood as a state of consciousness. Their descriptions revolve around the types of realizations and the details of the removal of the two types of obstacles on the ascent from the beginning to the state of buddhahood. The path of accumulation marks the entrance to the Bud- dhist path. In the Mahayana context it is said to be indicated by the achievement of samatha concurrent with aspiring bodhicitta. Mahayanists mark the beginning of the path for a Hinayanist as the achievement of samatha concurrent with the generation of renunciation. The culmination of the second path, the path of preparation, is dis- tinguished by the individual’s first accurate conceptual understanding of emptiness. The beginning of the path of seeing is indicated by the practitioner’s first direct realiza- tion of emptiness in meditative equipoise. This also marks the first of the ten bodhisat- tva grounds. Prior to the cultivation of a direct realization of emptiness it is said that the practitioner can merely temporarily subdue the afflictions, but that on the basis of a direct realization one can begin to remove them from consciousness entirely, or from the root such that they will not reappear. From the beginnings of the path of seeing, which is concurrent with the first bodhisattva ground up through the end of the seventh bodhisattva ground, the afflic- tions that keep a person bound in samsara are systematically removed. Thus at the beginning of the eighth bodhisattva ground, which occurs on the path of meditation, the individual achieves arhatship and thus liberation from samsara. This is described in Mahayana literature as still short of the achievement of buddhahood. The difference 96 INDIAN MAHAYANA BUDDHISM between the achievement of arhatship and the achievement of buddhahood is the removal of the knowledge obstacles. This takes place on the eighth through tenth bodhisattva grounds, concurrent with the path of meditation. Though there are some debates regarding the descriptions and means by which the knowledge obstacles are removed, a standard position is that they are removed or purified by the immense merits a bodhisattva generates from their great compassion and the actions they take on that basis. Thus it is compassion that distinguishes the Mahayana path leading to buddha- hood from the non-Mahayana paths culminating in arhatship. The path of no more learning, sometimes referred to as the eleventh ground, is the state of buddhahood, which is marked by the thorough eradication of all the afflictions and knowledge obstacles. The Mahayana traditions are distinguished by their soteriological goals, their meta- physics, and their methods. These are worked out in a long and detailed history of philosophical argumentation, polemics, and scholasticism. As such, Indian Mahayana continues today, as it has for nearly two thousand years, to inspire the critical inquiry of some of the world’s greatest philosophical minds and the contemplative investiga- tions of some of the tradition’s greatest adepts. Notes 1 For an English translation, see Santideva, A Guide to the Bodhisattva' s Way of Life. Trans. Vesna Wallace and B. Alan Wallace. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion, 1997. 2 Translation by feffrey Hopkins: www.bodhicitta.net/The%20Teaching%20on%20Aspira- tionaI%20Bodhicitta.htm. 3 Hinayana is a pejorative term that began to be employed in India several centuries after the early public emergence of Mahayana. It is not a label that applies to any living school of Buddhism but is most profitably used as a marker indicating a theoretical type of Buddhist with no compassion or concern for the welfare of others. It is used in Mahayana literature as a pedagogical device to contrast with non-Mahayana thought. 4 Bhaviveka, Blaze of Reasoning ( Tarkajvdld ). 5 Santaraksita, Compendium on Reality ( Tattvasamgraha ). 6 Bodhibhadra, Treatise Assembling the Essence of Knowledge (Jhanasarasamuccayanibandhana). 7 The pramana tradition was initially closely related to the Yogacara school and was soon embraced by most Madhyamikas as well. See the sections in this volume on Epistemology (Part Illb) and LANGUAGE AND LOGIC (Part IIIc) for further discussion of the pramana tradition. 8 Following Ruegg's dating (1981, 61). 9 Recent evidence has come to light to suggest the origins of the terms “Svatantrika- Madhyamika” and “Prasangika-Madhyamika” may actually trace back to the late period of Indian Madhyamaka in Kashmir. See Drefus and Tsering (2009-10). 10 This scene in this sutra represents a critical juncture in the emergence of Buddhist herme- neutics. For Buddhists, hermeneutics largely revolves around theories and methods for discerning which discourses of the Buddha are to be considered definitive (and what that means) and which require interpretation from among the enormous body of discourses attributed to the Buddha. We also find in the Sutra Unraveling the Thought the first mention in Buddhist canonical literature of a framework of “three turnings of the wheel” as a hermeneutical strategy for interpreting the apparent contradictions in the Buddha's 97 JAMES BLUMENTHAL teachings. "First turning" teachings are those early discourses that are made most use of by philosophical schools such as the Vaibhasikas and Sautrantikas. “Second turning" teach- ings are associated primarily with the corpus of Perfection of Wisdom Sutras that formed the canonical basis for the Madhyamaka school. “Third turning” sutras are those used primarily as canonical sources for the Yogacara school. A wide variety of interpretive schemas have been employed for interpreting these teachings and concepts. 1 1 For more on Santaraksita and his syncretic approach to Mahayana, see Blumenthal (2004, 2009). 12 The three realms are the desire realm, the form realm, and the formless realm. References Blumenthal, J. (2004). The Ornament of the Middle Way: A Study of the Madhyamaka Thought of Santaraksita. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion. Blumenthal, J. (2009). Santaraksita. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. Edward N. Zalta. At http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/saantarak-sita/. Cleary, T. (trans.) (1993). The Flower Ornament Scripture. Boston: Shambhala. Conze, E. (trans.) (2001 [1973]). The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines & its Verse Summary. San Francisco: Grey Fox Press. Dreyfus, G., and Tsering, Drongbu (2009-10). Pa tshab and the Origin of the Prasangika. In Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 32(1-2). Ruegg, David Seyforth (1981). The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz. Vose, K. (2009). Resurrecting Candrakirti: Disputes in the Tibetan Creation of Prasangika. Boston: Wisdom. 98 6 Tibetan Mahay ana and Va] ray ana DOUGLAS DUCKWORTH Introduction The culminating philosophy and practice for Buddhist traditions in Tibet is what is found in tantra, or Vajrayana. Yet Tibet is unique in the Buddhist world in that it is a place where not only the traditions of tantra (for which it is widely known) are prac- ticed, but where the epistemological traditions of valid cognition ( pramana ) and what came to be known as Prasangika-Madhyamaka also took root. It is hard to underesti- mate the significance of this fact, and the enormous influence this convergence had upon the distinctive forms of philosophical and contemplative practices that flourished in this culture. In particular, the intersection of valid cognition (inspired by Dharmaldrti) and Prasangika-Madhyamaka (inspired by Candrakirti) led to a vibrant philosophical tradi- tion in Tibet. The deconstructive critiques of Madhyamaka and the systematic phenom- enology of Yogacara had already come to a synthesis in India, in the works of Santaraksita in the eighth century. As one of the first Buddhist scholars to visit Tibet, Santaraksita was particularly influential in the early transmission of Buddhism in "the Land of Snow." His tradition of Yogacara-Madhyamaka - which presents the con- ventional truth in accord with Yogacara and the ultimate truth in accord with the Madhyamaka - was a powerful synthesis that he brought to Tibet in the formative era of the assimilation of Buddhism there. The systematic philosophy of Yogacara-Madhyamaka contrasts sharply with Prasangika-Madhyamaka. Candrakirti, who was renowned in Tibet as a proponent of Prasangika, had argued against central positions of Yogacara, namely, that there could be minds without objects and that awareness was reflexive (self-aware) by nature. Since Candrakirti came to be widely accepted in Tibet as the definitive interpreter of Nagarjuna after the twelfth century, Yogacara, despite its importance, tended to take a back seat A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy, First Edition. Edited by Steven M. Emmanuel. ©2013 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Published 201 3 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 99 DOUGLAS DUCKWORTH to Prasangilta in most Tibetan representations of philosophical systems. However, the philosophical view of Yogacara by and large can be seen in Tibet to be transposed into Vajrayana, and it is Vajrayana that is held as supreme among all Buddhist paths in the traditions there. Vajrayana takes bodily presence as fundamental to the path of awakening, since the body is seen to contain wisdom. Also, bodily processes become central loci of meaning - processes such as birth, sex, and death are inscribed with resonances and significance as they structure worlds and correlate with a grand cosmological narrative. As opposed to the reductive conceptual analyses of abstract, propositional thought, tantra is a philosophy rooted in the body. It is (embodied) "philosophy in the flesh” in the way that Lakoff and Johnson (1999) use the term; or, better yet, a philosophy of “flesh" in a Merleau-Pontian sense - that is, (enminded) bodily flesh interpenetrating with the sensing flesh of the world (see Merleau-Ponty 1968). It is thus perhaps futile to make sense out of the Vajrayana out of context, for it is first and foremost an embodied phi- losophy, a topic that does not lend itself easily to armchair theorizing, for it calls for a participatory orientation - part and parcel with lived (yet dying), unspoken (yet speak- ing), and unacknowledged (yet knowing) performative dimensions. But with this in mind (and body), we can perhaps here get a feel for some of the features that come to define Buddhist philosophy in Tibet. Philosophical Vajrayana (that is, Vajrayana as philosophically articulated) shares a strong continuity with the Mahayana and also represents a clear break from it. The constructive role of mind (Yogacara) and the universality of emptiness (Madhyamaka) both play predominant roles in Vajrayana. Yet with Madhyamaka there can be a ten- dency to reify emptiness (at the expense of appearance), and there is a tendency in Yogacara to reify the mind (and disregard body, which is also a denigration of appear- ance). Philosophical Vajrayana professes a system that serves as a corrective to both of these tendencies: by applying the unity of appearance and emptiness (appearing-emp- tiness) and body-mind in an integrated theory-practice. Philosophical Vajrayana The “resultant vehicle” of Vajrayana is called such due to taking the effect as the path (Tsongkhapa 1995, 15-16). In the “causal vehicle” of sutra one relates to the Buddha as the goal of a causal process of transformation. However, in the resultant vehicle of tantra the approach is different; one does not see a separate Buddha “out there” to be attained in a distant future, but the Buddha is approached as an immanently present reality accessible right now. One of the most important themes that extends into Vajrayana from Mahayana is buddha-nature {bde gshegs snying po, tathagatagarbha) . While many of the practices of the Vajrayana are also shared with Mahayana, and are not different from simply ritual Mahayana, 1 the practical application of the theory of buddha-nature in Vajrayana takes on a distinctive form. According to Tsongkhapa (1357-1419), the renowned forefather of the Geluk (dge lugs) tradition, what distinguishes Vajrayana is the practice of deity yoga (Tsongkhapa 199 5, 21) - that is, identifying with the Buddha, or the appearing aspects of the divine (or buddha-) nature. 100 TIBETAN MAHAYANA AND VAJRAYANA According to Longchenpa (1308-1364), an important figure in the Nyingma ( rnying ma) tradition (the “old school" of translations in Tibet), in the causal vehicle one sees buddha-nature as a future event of a causal process, while in the resultant vehicle one sees buddha-nature as the immanently present reality, qualitatively indivis- ible from its effect, the Buddha (Longchenpa 1996, 1169-70). Not all Buddhist sects in Tibet follow Longchenpa's formulation vis-a-vis buddha-nature, but perceiving the qualities of the Buddha here and now is an essential part of the practice of tantra, not only in his tradition but across all major Buddhist sects in Tibet. Arguably, the underly- ing philosophy behind the practice of deity yoga is the presence of buddha-nature within being(s). That is, buddha-nature can be seen as the philosophical underpinning for the practices of tantra. 2 In any case, the descriptions of the world in certain (Highest Yoga) tantras radically differ from the negative appraisals of the aggregates, causality, and consciousness that we see in early Buddhists siitras. In particular, these tantras invert the categories that are commonly expressed as negative in sutras and form the basis of a distinctive Vajrayana philosophy and practice. For instance, in Vajrayana the truth of suffering arises as the essence of the truth of cessation, and the truth of origin (that is, afflictions and karma) likewise becomes the truth of the path (Mipam 2000, 443). Also, the five afflictions are described as the nature of the five wisdoms in tantra; they are the unceas- ing display of awareness. And in certain traditions, such as Kdlacakra and the Great Perfection (rdzogs chen), the world is seen at its core not as a product of karma but as, more fundamentally, an expression of wisdom (Kongtriil 2002, 120-35). In this way, the dominant categories of early Abhidharma, such as the five aggregates, are com- pletely overturned and creatively inscribed with positive meanings. This directly paral- lels how the permanence and purity of buddha-nature in sutras that are classified in Tibet as the last “wheel of doctrine” ( dharmacakra ) overturns the descriptions of imper- manence, suffering, and so on, in the first wheel of doctrine. Yet while Vajrayana is commonly mistaken for the content of the Buddha’s third turning of the wheel of doctrine, the content of the three turnings is siitra, not tantra. Before saying more about Vajrayana and the nature of the relationship between sutra and tantra, we will first briefly survey a range of ways in which Madhyamaka is represented in Tibet. Madhyamaka takes the place of the highest philosophical view (in the causal vehicle) among Tibetan Buddhist sects, and seeing how different traditions formulate the view of Madhyamaka is an important part of understanding how these traditions relate to tantra and negotiate the relationship between Madhyamaka and Vajrayana. Variations of Madhyamaka An influential representation of Madhyamaka is found in the claim of “other- emptiness” ( gzhan stong) made famous by the Jonang (Jo nang) school. In the Jonang tradition, to affirm that the ordinary objects of relative truth exist in reality - such as tables and chairs that exist merely in ignorant, dualistic perspectives - is to fall into the extreme of essentialism. On the other hand, to say that the ultimate truth does not exist and is devoid of its own essence is to stray to the other extreme, the extreme of nihilism. 101 DOUGLAS DUCKWORTH Avoiding these two extremes is the Middle Way in the Jonang tradition. Followers of this school claim to avoid the extreme of essentialism by maintaining that relative phenomena do not exist in reality, and to avoid the extreme of nihilism by affirming that the ultimate truth really exists. Dolpopa (1292-1361) is known as the forefather of the Jonang tradition. He famously claimed that the ultimate truth is not empty of itself, but is “other-empty." For Dolpopa, what is other-empty exists within reality; it is real and empty of what is other - the unreal. In this way, the ultimate truth is not empty because it is the true ground of reality; it is “empty" only in the sense that it lacks all relative phenomena. He went on to claim that all phenomena of the relative truth are “self-empty” - that is, they are utterly absent in reality (Dolpopa 1976, 300-3). Relative phenomena are self- empty because they are empty of their own respective essences and not because they are lacking with reference to something extrinsic to themselves. Tsongkhapa, who came to be known as the forefather of the Geluk tradition, criti- cized Dolpopa's interpretation as realist by arguing that it misrepresented the genuine meaning of the ultimate truth of emptiness. He said that the ultimate truth is not to be understood as one thing being empty of another, but must be known as a mere absence of true existence. Significantly, Tsongkhapa laid out a distinctive interpretation of Prasangika and distanced himself from Yogacara. 3 He said that Prasangika alone has the correct interpretation of Madhyamaka, and argued that other Buddhist phi- losophies fall short of the authentic view. Tsongkhapa marks an important line between the old and new schools of interpretation of Madhyamaka in Tibet. In the Geluk tradition, the genuine ultimate truth is always emptiness and appear- ance is always the relative truth; emptiness and only emptiness is the ultimate truth. In this tradition, to undermine the reality of ordinary appearances, such as tables and chairs, is to stray to the extreme of nihilism. Yet to say that the genuine ultimate truth is anything other than emptiness (that is, that the ultimate truth is anything other than a lack of true existence) is to stray to the extreme of essentialism. Madhyamaka accord- ing to this tradition is in between these two extremes. The Geluk tradition's formulation of Madhyamaka emphasizes how the two truths are experienced from the perspective of an ordinary sentient being. The Jonang tradi- tion, on the other hand, describes the two truths by emphasizing how they are experi- enced from the perspective of a buddha. In contrast to these two influential traditions, the Nyingma tradition represented by Mipam (1846-1912) asserts the Middle Way as unity ( zung ’jug). In unity, there is no duality, so the duality of sentient beings and buddhas has also dissolved. In the Nyingma presentation of the Middle Way as unity, to claim that anything stands up to ultimate analysis is to fall to the extreme of essen- tialism. Wisdom or even a divine mandala cannot be found when its true nature is sought by analysis. Thus, for Mipam, there is no true essence in anything, and the posi- tion that nothing ultimately exists is the claim of “self-emptiness” (Mipam 1987, 450). With this, his Nyingma tradition claims to avoid the extreme of essentialism. On the other hand, to deny the reality of what does indeed exist conventionally - for example, saying that tables and chairs do not exist in ordinary perspectives, or that wisdom and divine mandalas do not exist in the perspectives of sublime beings ( ’ phags pa, dry a) - is to fall to the extreme of nihilism. By asserting the conventional existence of these phe- nomena, his tradition claims to avoid this extreme (Mipam 1990, 420). 102 TIBETAN MAHAYANA AND VAJRAYANA A late Nyingma commentator, Botriil (1898-1959), regards the Nyingma position above as “self-emptiness” (rang stong ) in contrast to the (Geluk) claim of “emptiness of true existence” (bden stong) and the (Jonang) claim of "other-emptiness” ( gzhan stong). He makes this distinction based on three different ways of identifying the object of negation among three different representations of Madhyamaka in Tibet: (1) other- emptiness (Jonang/Yogacara), (2) emptiness of true existence (Geluk/ Svatantrika), and (3) self-emptiness (Nyingma/Prasangika) (Botriil 2011, 37). He states that the primary object of negation in (Jonang) “other-emptiness” is inauthentic experience, the primary object of negation for the (Geluk) “Svatantrika” is true existence, and the primary object of negation in (Nyingma) “self-emptiness” is any conceptual reference. Accordingly, he says that the two truths can be said to be (1) different in the sense of “negating that they are one” (gcig pa bkag pa) in the context of other-emptiness, (2) “the same with different contradistinctions” (ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad) in the contexts of (Geluk) Svatantrika discourse, and (3) "neither one nor many” ( gcig du bral) in (Nyingma) Prasangika discourse (ibid., 149-50). In this way, he outlines three different approaches to Madhyamaka. Despite the differences on the surface between these three traditional representations of Madhyamaka, we find a lot in common within their interpretations. Aside from a varied degree of emphasis upon certain aspects of a Buddhist worldview, we do not necessarily find a substantial difference between the Jonang, Geluk, and Nyingma inter- pretations. We can see this when we look beyond the language of self-emptiness and other-emptiness to see that all three traditions accept a fundamental appearance/ reality distinction - the Buddhist doctrine of two truths - whereby it is held that ( 1 ) phenomena do not exist in the way they appear to an ordinary being (in which case appearances do not accord with reality), and (2) appearance and reality accord without conflict in the undistorted perception of a buddha. Also, all these traditions accept that: (1) the undistorted perception of ultimate truth is not the distorted appearance of relative truth (other-emptiness), (2) relative phenom- ena are not found when their ultimate nature is analyzed (emptiness of true existence), and ( 3 ) emptiness in essence is inexpressible (the ultimate of Prasahgika-Madhyamaka) . Furthermore, in none of these traditions is emptiness the utter negation of everything - it is not utter nihilism because some type of presence remains. It is presence that becomes the primary subject matter of tantra, a topic to which we now turn. Tantric Distinction Madhyamaka holds the top place in a hierarchy of four philosophical systems (grub mtha, siddhdnta) - Vaibhasika, Sautrantika, Mind-Only, Madhyamaka - and each school can be seen in an ascending scale as transcending the limitations of the previous one. The hierarchy of views can also be seen to extend through to tantra, whereby Vajrayana offers the next philosophical paradigm that resolves the shortcomings of the preceding level of the system (Madhyamaka), while incorporating its insight. In this light, tantra marks a distinct philosophical horizon. The hierarchy of views in the four philosophical systems of siitra appears to be based upon an internal principle of emptiness - the higher the view, the more 103 DOUGLAS DUCKWORTH increasingly ineffable, indeterminate, or essenceless ultimate reality is acknowledged to be. That is, the philosophical systems of siitra can be seen to depict a hierarchy based upon the empty quality of reality - the higher the view, the more comprehensive is the explanation of emptiness. The increasingly immanent presence of the divine (Buddha), however, better represents the internal logic guiding the hierarchy of views within Vajrayana, the vehicle of tantra. In the context of the four or six classes of tantras, 4 we see how the hierarchy shifts from the principle of increasing transcendence (emptiness) - as it is in siitra - to the principle of immanence. That is, the higher the view, the more the wisdom and body of the Buddha become accessible as an immanent presence in reality. We can see how the discourses of Madhyamaka deal explicitly with ontology and its deconstruction, what is and what is not, whereas a unique subject matter of tantra is a particular type of experience or subjectivity. In the philosophical systems represented within the “causal vehicle" of non-tantric Mahayana, the empty aspect of luminous clarity (’ od gsal), the fundamental nature of mind, is emphasized, and, in the “resultant vehicle” of Vajrayana (i.e. , tantric Mahayana), the emphasis is on the aspect of clarity (gsal cha). Although luminous clarity is addressed in siitra, the aspect of clarity is not as fully developed as it is in tantra (Botriil 2011, 96-9). Emptiness is a quality of objects, as well as a quality of subjective minds, whereas the aspect of clarity concerns the aspect of appearance, and specifically subjectivity, or awareness. By subjectivity, I do not mean a mode of consciousness that necessarily relates to a world as a subject encapsulated in a world partitioned into a metaphysical subject-object dualism. Rather, I use subjectivity simply to refer to phenomenological awareness, “being aware.” In Vajrayana, this interior space of subjectivity exhibits modes of awareness (ways of relating to experience) that are coarse and modes that are subtle. Rather than representing the habitual patterns of the coarse (dim and dull) registers of consciousness, the emphasis of Vajrayana is to elicit a direct encounter with the most subtle nature of awareness. This nature of mind, the fundamental intelligence that is “bright” and “clear,” is disclosed in tantra more directly and extensively than in siitra. Thus, the primary distinction between siitra and tantra is made in terms of the subject - or, in other words, the shift from siitra to tantra can be seen as a move from ontology to subjectivity, from substance to spirit. We see a parallel shift in Hegel’s critique of Spinoza's pantheistic ontology, in what he calls “Spinozism.” In his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion he says: “God is the absolute substance. If we cling to this declaration in its abstract form, then it is certainly Spinozism or pantheism. But the fact that God is substance does not exclude subjectivity" (Hegel 1984 [1827], 370). Likewise, the nature of deity in Vajrayana is not a sub- stance; rather, it is a dynamic subjectivity, the awareness of emptiness and appearance in unity. Deity (Buddha) is not an abstract intellectual category that is a simple meta- physical absence or negation, for it is an experiential presence that is known - actual- ized and embodied. The mind of the deity is wisdom's subjectivity and appearance is the divine body (and sound is divine speech - mantra). That is, the universe - inside and out - is the (speaking) mind-body of the Buddha, the dharmakaya. The subject in tantra is empty (while aware), beyond words (while expressive), and transcendent (while embodied). 104 TIBETAN MAHAYANA AND VAJRAYANA The philosophy of Vajrayana maintains that the subject is wisdom (fiu I can ye shes) and that appearances are divine ( snang ba lha ) (Mipam 2000, 44 3-5 7). In sutra, appear- ances are seen to be illusory; in tantra, however, appearances are also seen as divine. Thus, a “correct relative” ( yang dag pa'i kun rdzob, samyaksamvrti) of sutra is the “incor- rect relative” (log pa’i kun rdzob , mithyasamvrti) in tantra. As for the ultimate truth, while there is some disagreement in Tibet about a distinction in view between sutra and tantra concerning the realized object (emptiness free from constructs), there seems to be no disagreement about the realizing subject being a more subtle awareness in tantra. 5 For the Geluk school, Prasangika-Madhyamaka is the highest view, and thus, for this school, there is no difference between the view of sutra (i.e., Prasangika-Madhyamaka) and that of tantra (Tsongkhapa 1995, 18). While the dominant Geluk tradition makes the tantric distinction based solely on method, this is not the case for Tibetan traditions that assert what we may call "philosophical Vajrayana” and make an explicit distinc- tion between sutra and tantra based on a philosophical view as well. In such cases, we see more of a role for Yogacara analyses, such as the phenomenological reduction (snang ba sems su bsgrub), both in coming to terms with emptiness in Madhyamaka and in the philosophical formulation of Vajrayana. In the case of the Nyingma school, “unity” is the key. For Mipam, for example, unity functions both to integrate the discourses of siitra and tantra and to bring together the discourses on emptiness and appearance in the second and third turnings of the dliar- macakra as representative of the "definitive meaning” (nges don, nithdrtha). For this tradition, the world of tantra is also reflected within the presentation of Madhyamaka, as opposed to the Geluk and Sakya traditions, which maintain a more strict separation between these two discourses. 6 In the Jonang tradition, Prasangika-Madhyamaka is not the highest view even within the philosophical systems of the causal vehicle. We can see with “other- emptiness" how a view of emptiness in sutra (and emptiness articulated as an implica- tive negation) yields to a view of tantra, one that is not bounded by the constraints that delimit ultimate truth to a negative referent. An implicative negation (ma yin dgag, paryudasa-pratisedha) plays an important role in Vajrayana, where emptiness, or open- ness, becomes “emptiness endowed with all supreme aspects” ( mam kun mchog ldan gyi stong pa nyid). With the Jonang tradition, other-emptiness in Madhyamaka reflects directly the pregnant (fullness of) emptiness in the Kalacakratantra. This suggests how, in [Highest Yoga] Tantra, terms come to be charged with exalted values ( sgra mthun don spags ), values that tend to overturn their meanings within the sutra system, as in the case with the afflictions. Vajrayana as Pantheism Vajrayana in Tibet is pantheist to the core, for, in its most profound expressions (e.g., Highest Yoga tantra), all dualities between the divine and the world are radically undone. Although there may be a variety of pantheisms, in Concepts of Deity, H. P. Owen characterizes “pantheists" in general as follows; “'Pantheism' (which is derived from the Greek words for ‘all’ and ‘God’) signifies the belief that every existing entity 105 DOUGLAS DUCKWORTH is, in some sense, divine” (Owen 1971, 65). A definition of pantheism from the Encyclopedia of Philosophy states: “Pantheism essentially involves two assertions: that everything that exists constitutes a unity and that this all-inclusive unity is divine" (MacIntyre 1971, 34). Both of these definitions reflect the view of philosophical Vajrayana. In his depiction of the “goal" of pantheism, Michael Levine, in Pantheism: A Non- Theistic Concept of Deity, echoes a characteristic of the “resultant vehicle” of Vajrayana ( and Mahayana more generally): “The pantheist eschews any notion of their [sic] being further goals; for example, the theist’s beatific vision; personal immortality; nirvana: and even Spinoza’s ‘blessedness,’ interpreted as something other-worldly” (Levine 1997, 347). Levine apparently has in mind a nirvana that is conceived as separate in space (i.e., non-Mahayana nirvana) and time (i.e., non-tantric nirvana), not the integral vision of the Buddha in Vajrayana as an immanent, perfected reality that can be accessed in this body right now. 7 Rather than being conceived as a separate transcendent world, in Vajrayana the divine is seen within the world, and the infinite within the finite, as is characteristic of pantheism. As Hegel states: “The real infinite, far from being a mere transcendence of the finite, always involves the absorption of the finite into its own fuller nature” (Hegel 1873, 78). Compare this sense of the infinite with the (“bad”) infinite of classical theism in Owen's statement: “The ‘in' in ‘infinite’ is to be taken as a negative prefix. It means that God is non-finite. In order to arrive at a true notion of him we must deny to him all those limitations that affect created being" (Owen 1971, 13). Such a notion of the infinity of God negates the world and makes God an imagined “other” that is separate from the finite world. Such a dualism has the consequence that God becomes valorized at the expense of a devalued world. With Vajrayana, by contrast, (ultimate) value is not forged at the expense of the (relative) world. Rather, the realm of the Buddha is discovered no place other than in this world and in this body. A devaluation of finite being is not limited to the modern world, or even to classical theism. We can see similar instances of devaluation of body and world in other forms of South Asian monastic traditions, including medieval Mahayana and modern Theravada. Sankara’s (c. eighth century) brand of Advaita Vedanta also shares this feature of world denial, where the world is an illusion that does not exist in reality. In the case of Sankara, union with Brahman entails the dissolution of appearances - an end to the realm of mdyd along with the world of plurality and difference. In contrast to the acosmism exemplified by Sankara, we see a close parallel with the pantheism of Tibetan Vajrayana in the non-dual tantric synthesis of Abhinavagupta's (975-1025) Kashmiri Saivism, where appearance ( dbhdsa ) is a modality of the divine. A principal difference seems to lie in the fundamental role played by compassion in Buddhist Vajrayana, which is the staple of all Mahayana practices. Notes 1 Indeed, if we had access to living communities of Buddhist Mahayana practice in India, as we have in Tibet, we can reasonably speculate that we would find many rituals (e.g., buddhdnusmrti) that resemble Vajrayana practices. 106 TIBETAN MAHAYANA AND VAJRAYANA 2 The importance of buddha-nature in tantra is reflected in the words of Tenzin Gyatso, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama: The substance of all these paths [Guhyasamaja, Kdlacakra, Great Perfection] comes down to the fun- damental innate mind of clear light. Even the sutras which serve as the basis for Maitreya's com- mentary in his Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle [Uttaratantra] have this same fundamental mind as the basis of their thought in their discussion of the Buddha nature, or essence of a One Gone Thus (Tathagatagarbha, De bzhin gsliegs pa'i snying po), although the full mode of its practice is not described as it is in the systems of Highest Yoga Tantra. (Dalai Lama 1984. 224: emphasis added) In the context of explaining a Geluk view, Jeffrey Hopkins affirms: “The fact that emptiness (and the mind fused with it in realization) is called a deity is similar to calling the emptiness of the mind Buddha nature” (Hopkins 2009, 51). 3 At least two of Tsongkhapa’s eight unique assertions of Prasangika are rejections of central tenets of Yogacara: (1) the unique manner of refuting reflexive awareness and (2) the neces- sity of asserting external objects as one asserts cognitions (Tsongkhapa 1998, 226). 4 The four classes of tantra are Action Tantra (bya rgyud, kriyatantra), Performance Tantra ( spyod rgyud, caryatantra), Yoga Tantra (rnal ’byor rgyud, yogatantra), and Highest Yoga Tantra ( bla na med pa'i rgyud, anuttaratantra). In the Nyingma tradition, there are six: the first three are the same as above, but in place of Highest Yoga Tantra there are the three “inner-tantras” (nang rgyud): Mahayoga, Anuyoga, and Atiyoga (the Great Perfection). 5 Kongtriil stated that proponents of "self-emptiness” claim that the only difference in tantra is the subject (yul can), and not the object that is free from conceptual constructs: on the other hand, proponents of “other-emptiness” claim that there is a difference in the object (yul) as well (Kongtriil 2002, 716). Sakya Pandita (1182-1251) stated that there is no view higher than the freedom of constructs taught in the “perfection vehicle” of sutra: "If there were a view superior to the freedom from constructs of the perfection [vehicle] , then that view would possess constructs: if free from constructs, then there is no difference [in view between tantra and the perfection vehicle]” (translation mine) (Sakya Pandita 2002, 308). 6 In the Geluk tradition, the strict siitra-tantra distinction is textually enshrined in Tsong- khapa’s two great works: The Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path and The Great Exposition of the Stages of Mantra, which deal respectively with topics of sutra and tantra. 7 Pantheism in North-West European traditions has historically been rejected and seen as horrible, not because it is irrational, but because it is pagan. Pantheism does not buy into the metaphysical assumptions of classical theism: there is no separation into a God/ world duality. Hegel and Spinoza were labeled “pantheists” and even atheists, although they them- selves did not describe their own views with those terms. Hegel even denied that Spinoza was an atheist: rather, he said that Spinoza had “too much God.” We see an interesting point of departure in the works of Hegel for considering the relationship between the divine and the world in Buddhist thought. In particular, we can see this within Hegel’s insight into the nature of the infinite. Hegel distinguishes between a “bad infinite," which is a series of finite things, and a true infinite that encompasses the finite. Charles Taylor describes Hegel’s infinite as follows: The true infinite for Hegel thus unites finite and infinite ... he refuses to see the finite and the infinite as separate and over and against each other . . . The infinite must englobe the finite. At its most basic level this reflects Hegel's option for an absolute which is not separate from or beyond the world but includes it as its embodiment. (Taylor 1975, 240) 107 DOUGLAS DUCKWORTH References Botriil (2011). Distinguishing the Views and Philosophers: Illuminating Emptiness in a Twentieth- Century Tibetan Buddhist Classic. Introduced, translated and annotated by Douglas S. Duck- worth. Albany: State University of New York Press. Dalai Lama, the Fourteenth, Tenzin Gyatso (1984). Kindness, Clarity, and Insight. Trans, and ed. Jeffrey Hopkins. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion. Dolpopa ( dol po pa shes mb rgyal mtshan, 1292-1361) (1976). ri clios nges don rgya mtsho [The Mountain Doctrine: Ocean of Definitive Meaning]. Gangtok: Dodrup Sangyey Lama: Eng. trans. in Jeffrey Hopkins, Mountain Doctrine: Tibet's Fundamental Treatise on Other-Emptiness and the Buddha-Matrix. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion, 2006. Hegel, G. W. F. (1873). The Logic of Hegel: Translated From the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences. Trans. William Wallace. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Hegel, G. W. F. (1984 [1827]). Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. Trans. R. F. Brown et al., Vol. 1. Berkeley: University of California Press. Hopkins, Jeffrey (2009). Tantric Techniques. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion. Kongtriil (kong sprul bio gros mtha y as, 1813-1899) (2002). shes bya kun khyab [Encyclopedia of Knowledge]. Beijing, China: Nationalities Press. Lakoff, George, and Johnson, Mark (1999). Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought. New York: Basic Books. Levine, Michael P. (1997). Pantheism: A Non-Theistic Concept of Deity. London: Routledge. Longchenpa ( klong chen rab 'byams, 1308-1364) (1996). theg pa chen po’i man ngag gi bstan bcos yid bzhin rin po clie'i mdzod kyi ' grel pa padma dkarpo [White Lotus: Autocommentary of the Precious Wish-Fulfilling Treasury], Published in mdzod bdun [Seven Treasuries]. Ed. Tarthang Tulku, Vol. 7, 139-1544. Sichuan, China. MacIntyre, Alasdair (1971). Pantheism. In Encyclopedia of Philosophy. New York: Macmillan. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice (1968). The Visible and the Invisible. Trans. Alfanso Lingis. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press [this is Merleau-Ponty 's last and unfinished work where he introduces the vital notion of "flesh” (fr. chair), which is a subject matter that can speak to the mind-body integration in Vajrayana]. Mipam (’ju mi pham rgya mtsho, 1846-1912) (1987). dim ma sogs gzhung spyi i dka gnad skor gyi gsung sgros sna tshogs phyogs gcig tu bsdus pa rin po che’i za ma tog [Difficult Points of Scriptures in General], In Mipam's Collected Works (Dilgo Khyentse's expanded redaction of sde dge edn), Vol. 22, 427-710. Kathmandu, Nepal: Zhechen Monastery. Mipam {’ju mi pham rgya mtsho, 1846-1912) (1990). dbu ma rgyan gyi mam bshad 'jam byangs bla ma dgyes pa’i zhal lung [Words that Delight Guru Manjughosa: Commentary on the Madhyamakalamkara], In dbu ma rgyan rtsa 'grel. Chengdu, China: Nationalities Press: Eng. trans. in Thomas Doctor (trans.), Speech of Delight: Mipham’s Commentary on Santaraksita's Ornament of the Middle Way. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion, 2004. Mipam ('ju mi pham rgya mtsho. 1846-1912) (2000). spyi don 'od gsal snying po [Overview: Essen- tial Nature of Luminous Clarity], Chengdu, China: Nationalities Press; Eng. trans. in Dharma- chakra Translation Group, Luminous Essence: A Guide to the Guhyagarbha Tantra. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion, 2009. Owen, H. P. (1971). Concepts of Deity. New York: Herder & Herder. SakyaPandita (sa skya pandita, 1182-1251) (2002). sdom gsum rab dbye [Clear Differentiation of the Three Vows]. In Jared Douglas Rhoton, trans., A Clear Differentiation of the Three Codes. Albany: State University of New York Press. Taylor, Charles (1975). Hegel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 108 TIBETAN MAHAYANA AND VAJRAYANA Tsongkhapa (tsong kha pa bio bzang grags pa, 1357-1419) (1995). sngags rim chen mo [The Great Exposition of the Stages of Mantra]. Oinghai, China: Nationalities Press. Eng. trans., Tantra in Tibet. Trans, and ed. Jeffrey Hopkins. London: George Allen & Unwin. 1977. Tsongkhapa (tsong kha pa bio bzang grags pa, 1357-1419) (1998). dgongspa rab gsal [Thoroughly Illuminating the Viewpoint]. Sarnath, India: Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies. Tsongkhapa ( tsong kha pa bio bzang grags pa, 1357-1419) (2000 [1985]). lam rim chen mo [The Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path]. Oinghai, China: Nationalities Press. Eng. trans. in The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment. 3 vols. Ed. Guy Newland. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion, 2000-4. 109 7 East Asian Buddhism RONALD S. GREEN Historical Context It is unclear exactly when and how Buddhism first entered China. Traditionally it was believed to have arrived with the translators Kasyapamatanga and Dharmaraksa, who came to Luoyang from Central Asia in 266 CE. However, early records indicate Bud- dhists were already in the country between the first century bce and the first century CE. By the late Han dynasty (206 bce-220 ce) Chinese intellectuals had developed sophisticated literary and philosophical traditions. They legitimized and maintained their aristocratic positions by instituting Confucian-based theoretical and bureaucratic systems of governing. Over time, however, greed and nepotism contributed to the cor- ruption of the Han bureaucracy, which became a factor in widespread peasant revolts. This internal chaos was fertile ground for cultivating alternative views on social and metaphysical reality. The most successful of these were associated with the develop- ment of East Asian Buddhist philosophy. Various historical events around this time had long-term consequences for this development. In the late Han period, a group of Chinese intellectual dissidents left the capital for the provinces. They were attracted to philosophical Daoism (which rejected the social philosophy of Confucianism), observed meditative practices to attain release from attachment to mundane circumstances, and hoped to realize their place in the natural world. Subsequently, in the late Six Dynasties period (222-589), a time of disu- nity in China, others who were influenced by this group established a movement to discuss metaphysics and other philosophical issues in ways we might compare with later Zen koans. Developing a type of philosophical discourse called "pure conversation” (iitfli qingtan), participants criticized the socio-political establishment from the stand- point of insightful wisdom ( prajna ) and practiced Buddhist meditation ( dhyana ). By the fourth and fifth centuries, Buddhist priests were actively involved. This Daoist-Buddhist syncretism movement helped popularize Buddhism, which in turn enabled monks to A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy, First Edition. Edited by Steven M. Emmanuel. © 2013 John Wiley & Sons. Inc. Published 2013 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 110 EAST ASIAN BUDDHISM exercise social influence. Such influence eventually contributed to the four major Buddhist persecutions in China and further shaped the development of Buddhist phi- losophy in East Asia. Another important factor in this development is that linguistic and cultural dif- ferences made it difficult to compose accurate translations from Sanskrit. Buddhist philosophical terms such as sunyatd (“emptiness”) were unfamiliar to the Chinese. To deal with this, early translators used a style known as “matching meanings” (|&tt geyi) that assigned what they considered rough Daoist equivalents to troublesome Buddhist concepts. Emptiness was translated as “original nothingness” benwu ), a term used by neo-Daoists such as Wang Bi (226-249 CE) to describe cosmology and cosmogony. Other terms, including “nirvana” and “buddha," were transliterated much as they are in English. It took nearly 500 years for Chinese Buddhists to abandon geyi, and its remnants remain at the heart of much of East Asian Buddhist thinking. Later trans- lators, among them Daoan (312-385) and Kumarajlva (344-413), used different strategies that sent East Asian Buddhism in yet another direction. Kumarajfva's tran- slations were in a polished literary style that increased their popularity. But his transla- tions were not always precise. For example, he did not distinguish between a stupa (mounds where Sakyamuni's and other sages' ashes were allegedly buried) and a chaitya (a site for worship). The Sui dynasty (589-618) reunified China and honored Buddhism. But because of the persecutions of the previous period, Sui Buddhists wanted to create an original Chinese Buddhism that was equal, if not superior, to that of India. Three features dis- tinguished the native schools that developed during the Sui and early Tang (618-907) periods. 1 There was a shift from the identification of Indian and Central Asian founders to native Chinese founders. This was facilitated by the establishment of a Confucian- based patriarchal system consisting of Chinese monks. 2 Doctrinal classification systems (panjaio ) were developed to evaluate the relative merits of various Buddhist philosophical teachings. These were designed to prove the superiority of Chinese Buddhist traditions compared to one another and to Indian Buddhism. 3 What has been called a positive worldview developed in contrast with the Indian notion of duhkha, suffering or perpetual dissatisfaction. This was in line with cen- turies of Chinese predilection for viewing our natural state in positive terms, as seen in diverse writings by Daoists and Mencius. In the seventh century a new translation tradition emerged with the potential of supplanting the Chinese developments with the philosophy of Indian Buddhism. This was epitomized by the style of Xuanzang (600-664), who had traveled to India to break away from Chinese interpretations and learn native Buddhist philosophy. Even though Xuanzang's translations may have been closer to the originals in many respects, a large number of Chinese Buddhists preferred the meanings they had grown up with, in the old-style translations of Kumarajlva and others. Very soon after his time, philosophical and political conflict arose over Xuanzang's interpretations and eventually the old Chinese understandings prevailed and developed further. Ill RONALD S. GREEN Table 7.1 outlines the Chinese patriarchal system. It indicates the shift from Indian and Central Asian to Chinese founders, which is not only an ethnic change but a doc- trinal one. The philosophies of these East Asian Mahayana schools and the Zhenyan tradition are described below. 1 Table 7.1 Buddhist philosophical traditions and founders/systematizers Six Dynasties period Sui-Tang period Weishi (Yogacara): Vasubandhu (fourth century) Faxiang: Kuiji (632-682) Sanlun (Madhyamaka): KumarajTva (350-409) New Sanlun: Jizang (549-623) Niepan: Dharmaraksa (231-308) Tiantai: Huiwen (sixth century) Huayan: Buddhabhadra (359-429) Huayan: Dushun (557-640) Pure Land: Tanluan (476-542) Chan: Bodhidharma (c. fifth-sixth century) Faxiang Jp. Hosso; K. Beopsang) Faxiang is the Chinese version of Yogacara, systematized in India by the brothers Asariga and Vasubandhu. The two had many gifted students, including Dignaga (c. 480-540), famous for developing Indian formal logic. Dignaga was followed by Dharmapala (530-561) and his disciple Sllabhadra (529-645). The Chinese monk Xuanzang risked his life by violating an imperial ban on traveling abroad so he could study Yogacara in India. Arriving in 629, he studied under Sllabhadra and other masters. He returned to China in 645 with many Sanskrit manuscripts, most related to Abhidharma and Yogacara. Xuanzang became engrossed in his assignment by the emperor to head a massive scripture translation project at the newly built Cien temple. Meanwhile, one of his top students, Kuiji (632-682), set about systematizing what would be the controversial first Chinese developments of Faxiang. One of his detractors was another student of Xuan- zang, the influential Korean monk Woncheuk (613-696). Woncheuk left Cien temple and wrote his commentaries on the Yogacara texts, which eventually became standard in China and throughout East Asia. In contrast, the Japanese monk Ddsho (629-700) studied closely under Xuanzang and Kuiji. In 660 he introduced Kuiji’s version of Faxiang to Japan under the name Hossd. However, Hossd’s doctrinal foundation was soon changed to Woncheuk’s version by other Japanese monks who subsequently returned from China and by Korean monks living in Japan. The words Faxiang, Hossd and Beopsang literally mean “dharma marks” or “ dharma characteristics” (Skt dharma laksana). In this case, as in the Abhidharmakosa, dharma means the elements of existence. That is, dharma is what we might cautiously call phe- nomenal reality. However, how the elements of existence are cognized is described differently in the Abhidharmakosa and the later Faxiang tradition. The Abhidharmakosa identifies the mind ( citta ) as the source which produces sensations. Its detailed analysis of the process of cognition is in terms of sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch- 112 EAST ASIAN BUDDHISM consciousnesses, what we can logically and empirically verify about reality. Again noting the anachronism and cultural differences, we could conditionally see this approach as "psychological” in that it attempts to understand the mind by analyzing its functions. In contrast and with the same qualifiers, we can call Yogacara’s approach to mind “phenomenological.” While Yogacara is as logical and empirically oriented as the Abhidharmakosa, its methodology and assumptions are different, based in part on meditative insights. In a sense, then, the Abhidharmakosa maps the mind in terms of elements of existence, from the outside in; Yogacara does the same from the inside out. Yogacara analysis proceeds by indentifying and observing eight components of mind or “consciousnesses” (Skt vijhdna) and their interactions. One point of contention among adherents to Yogacara theory that gave rise to East Asian strains is the inter- pretation of the cognitive function of the eighth of these, the alayavijhana or storehouse consciousness. The aldyavijhdna is considered the repository of our past actions or karma. In short, it is the part of the mind that takes sights, sounds, etc., and interprets them according to present circumstances. Perception is conditioned by memories of past experiences deposited in the alaya. For Faxiang, cognition involves four elements: (1) the perceived, (2) the perceiver, (3) awareness of the perceiver perceiving, and (4) awareness of that awareness. Other Yogacara commentators disagree. Of these four elements of cogni- tion, Sthiramati (c. 420-5 50) acknowledged only the first, Nanda (c. sixth century) the first two, Dignaga the first three, and, finally, Dharmapala all four. Faxiang follows Dharmapala's interpretation. Faxiang traditionally relies on six sutras and eleven sdstras for theoretical grounding. Foremost is the Treatise on Consciousness-Only (Ch. Cheng Weishi Lun) sometimes called by its Sanskrit equivalent name Vijhaptimdtratdsiddhi-sdstra. 2 The text was com- posed by Xuanzang, translating Vasubandhu's Thirty Verses on Consciousness-Only (Skt Trimsikd-vijhaptimdtrata) and incorporating three of ten commentaries on it that Xuanzang discovered in India, including that of Dharmapala. The Treatise on Conscious- ness-Only gives the details of the four elements of cognition based on Dharmapala's tradition and different from the Yogacara traditions developed by other Indians. Like other Yogacara traditions, however, Faxiang finds that the world as we ordinarily know it is a mental fabrication. Another important factor in Faxiang’s eventual philosophical divergence from Indian traditions is Yogacara’s adherence to gotra theory. Accordingly, sentient beings are predestined by karma to be born into one of five lineages. These are sravakas, pra- tyekabuddhas, bodhisattvas, indeterminate beings, and icchantikas with no aptitude for awakening. These five gotras are first described in the Sutra of the Explanation of the Profound Secrets (Samdhinirmocana-sutra), 3 a prominent Yogacara text. Like Indian Yogacara, the early Faxiang tradition of Xuanzang and Kuiji adhered to this under- standing. Gotra explains five basic dispositions, addressing, for example, why some people have no interest in Buddhism or any ability to understand it. However, there was a large problem in this for some Buddhists. Gotra theory appears contrary to the deeply held Chinese belief that all sentient beings have buddha-nature, meaning they are innately enlightened. This is the key ingredient to the positive worldview of East Asian Buddhism. Buddha-nature is accepted by the large and influential Ekayana traditions, including Tiantai and Huayan. For this reason, some of the panjiao schemes of Chinese 113 RONALD S. GREEN Buddhist traditions classified Faxiang as only quasi-Mahayana. Likewise, Woncheuk rejected gotra theory in his version of Faxiang that was adopted as orthodoxy in China, Korea, and Japan soon after Xuanzang’s time, and to the dismay of Kuiji. Another departure came when Chinese Buddhists decided to rewrite the section on bodhisattva ethics found in the Indian Discourse on the Stages of Yogic Practice ( Yogacarabhumi-sastra ) dated to the fourth century. Referring to gotra, the original text says those who are bodhisattvas must acknowledge this and act accordingly. Among the acts described as appropriate for those of the bodhisattva gotra are those opposing an unjust ruler and offering material support to the politically oppressed. This may have been the policy of early East Asian Yogacara, influencing the social projects of Ddsho and his alleged disciple Gyoki (668-749), who was called a bodhisattva in Japan. However, the Chinese apocryphal text Fawang-jing , 4 while almost certainly based on the Yogacarablmmi-sastra, omits references to gotra and opposition to unjust civil authority. Given the Chinese partiality for Confucian morality and buddha-nature, as well as the direction of support from the court, it is perhaps unsurprising that the bodhisattva vows of the Fawang-jing soon eclipsed those of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra. The latter became obsolete throughout East Asia. Sanlun (— fira; Jp. Sanron; JC. Samnon) The name Sanlun means "three treatises.” The three treatises that serve as main texts for the tradition are the Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way (Skt Mulamadhyamaka- kdrika; Ch. Z hong lun), 5 the Twelve Gate Treatise (Skt Dvadasadvdra-sastra; Ch. Shier men lun), 6 and the One Hundred Verses Treatise (Skt Sata-sdstra, Ch. Bai lun). 7 The first two were written by Nagarjuna (c. 150-250 CE) and the third by his disciple Aryadeva (c, 170-270). Sometimes another text is added, the Treatise on the Prajndpdramitd Sutra (Skt Mahaprajhapdramita-sastra; Ch. Da zhi du lun), attributed to Nagarjuna and trans- lated by Kumarajfva. 8 Then the tradition is called Silun, “four treatises." Because three of these four texts were translated by Kumarajfva, he is considered the founder of what is called old Sanlun. Later, the monk Jizang (549-623) systematized the ideas and contributed to the methodology of the tradition. He thereby came to be known as the founder of new Sanlun. The philosophy of old and new Sunlun is grounded in Indian Madhyamaka philosophy. However, there are distinct differences between these traditions. In the sixth century, Indian Madhyamaka split into two schools: Prasangika, founded by Buddhapalita (c. 470-540), and Svatantrika, founded by Bhaviveka (c. 500-570). Prasangika attacked the claims of all schools of