← Volver a la ficha del textoThe Psychology
of Nirvana
by
RUNE E. A. JOHANSSON
London
GEORGE ALLEN AND UNWIN LTD
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FIRST PUBLISHED IN I969
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Ajjapi labhaniyam idam (Ti 513)
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Contents
I
Introduction
page 9
2
Method
13
3
The General Background
15
4
Some Preliminary Observations
18
5
Cognitive Functions in Nibbana
21
6
Emotion and Feeling in Nibbana
24
7
The Dynamics of Nibbana
28
8
Nibbana as State of Personality
30
9
Nibbana as Emptiness
34
10
Nibbana as Cessation of Rebirth
38
ii
The Criteria of Transcendence
41
12
A Discussion of U 8 o
51
13
Nibbana and Death
58
14
The Personality Factors and Nibbana
65
15
Ways to Nibbana
85
16
Nibbana and Consciousness
106
17
The Personality of the Arahant
1 16
18
Summary and Conclusions
131
REFERENCES
138
INDEX
139
Introduction
It is a well-known fact that nibbd.ua 1 is the summum bonum of
Buddhism and that a person who has attained this ultimate goal
is called arahant. But here the agreement ends. Nibbana has been
explained in many ways. This could, as a matter of principle, be
acceptable, because Buddhism has a very long history and has
spread over large areas of Asia. It is quite natural that different
temporal and geographical layers of literature should express
different opinions and interpretations. This is one of the reasons
for the diverging views expressed in our scholarly literature.
Different scholars have started from different strata of the
extensive literature and then often generalized their findings
and supposed them to be valid for other strata as well. Buddhism
has often been considered much more homogeneous than it
really is. Abhidhamma works and late commentaries have, for
instance, been taken as good expositions of the older Nikaya
doctrine. In this way we have got more of conflicting views than
of close descriptions of different strata.
Invalid generalizations seem to be one of the cardinal sins
of scholarly works. Views about Buddhism have very frequently
been based on a very limited range of material, most often a
few quotations from the Pah canon. There are, as a matter of
fact, a small number of quotations that appear again and again,
while hundreds of others always pass unnoticed.
Not unexpectedly, the private biases of scholars are often
found to influence their explanations. A scholar who personally
favours a mechanistic philosophy, cannot so easily understand
a dynamic view and has no vocabulary to express it. A Christian
scholar can rarely understand a concept of salvation without
connection with a soul concept. And a scholar who is sympathetic
to mysticism likes to find traces of mysticism in the material
he works with.
1 This is the Pali form of the more well-known Sanskrit nirvana.
9
PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
It is not our intention to review, or criticize, the interpreta-
tions of nibbana which have been presented in the extensive
literature in Western languages. The history of this research
has recently been well described by Welbon (12). Already de la
Vallee Poussin (11) wrote more than forty years ago that too
much had been written about nibbana. It is easy to agree with
him: too much has been written — but this does not mean that
we know too much. Exactly the opposite: our knowledge is
small because too much has been written without adequate
investigation. The intention of the present writer is not to review
what others have written but to make a fresh and independent
attempt to understand . 1 A limited selection of literature has
been selected: the Pali Nikayas. How is nibbana described in
this literature? Does it really admit as many interpretations as
have been expressed in the books written about it? Our aim
is to collect and describe all the evidence as objectively as
possible and if possible let it explain itself and not force any
extraneous explanations upon it.
We shall hasten to admit the limitations of this investigation.
What scholar has not dreamed of the perfectly objective investi-
gation, where facts are exactly described and interpreted? This
ideal has seldom been realized. The investigator is a person: he
brings to his work his particular stock of knowledge, his opinions,
his ambitions, his intelligence. Nobody can transcend himself,
and each step in the investigation is influenced not only by the
objective material itself but also by all the subjective factors.
The present investigation is performed mainly from a psycho-
logical point of view. This is a limitation, because it may mean
that the cultural background of the subject studied has been
neglected. And further: a psychologist tends to describe the
objects of his study by means of a special terminology. Is this
terminology adequate? It is far removed in time and general
outlook from the ancient Buddhist terminology; so already the
1 The investigation was mainly performed during my year as visiting professor
at the Tel-Aviv University, but of greater importance for the method and lead-
ing ideas was my previous year of research at the University of Ceylon. I
especially want to acknowledge my debt to the work of Prof. Jayatilleke.Mr. B.
Cooke, also at the University of Ceylon, has read the manuscript and spared no
effort in order to help me improve it. Margot, my wife, has helped me collect the
material and prepare the manuscript. My deeply felt gratitude goes to them all.
10
INTRODUCTION
use of this terminology may lead to prejudice and misrepresenta-
tion. Then, of course, and most important of all: why psychology?
Is there the faintest trace of evidence that nibbana could be a
psychological concept? Will not this mere assumption lead to a
biased evaluation of the texts?
All these suspicions may be well founded. Still, an investiga-
tion of this type can be justified also, and may offer some hope
of disclosing some so far undiscovered facts. Anybody with a
good knowledge of psychology and its history who reads the
Pali Nikayas must be struck by the fact that the psychological
terminology is richer in this than in any other ancient literature
and that more space is devoted to psychological analyses and
explanations in this than in any other religious literature. A
psychologist immediately finds that he can follow easily much
of this literature, and if he knows Pali he quickly discovers
that the English translators were badly at home in this field.
This makes the psychologist feel generally hopeful: he can
understand, he can do something. And if he, for instance,
becomes interested in the meaning of nibbana, he might put
the question to himself: how far can I, with my special back-
ground, understand nibbana? Nibbana may not ultimately be a
psychological concept, but there may be psychological aspects,
or conditions, or consequences. Exactly how far can I follow?
And if I can follow at all, would it not be desirable to compare
the ancient ways of expression with our modern ways? Human
mind cannot have changed much; only ways of expression
change. So would it not be interesting to try to understand and
express the old experiences in modern terminology? And one
consideration more. Psychology has recently helped semantics
to develop methods for analysing the exact contents of concepts
and define their meanings. Quite possibly these methods could
be helpful in studying a concept like nibbana.
These are then the pros and cons. We have no illusion that
this investigation is the final one of nibbana. But considering
the many different explanations in contemporary literature,
every serious study could be helpful. Why should not psychology
enter and do its duty?
ii
Method
Our method is psychological and semantic rather than historical
or philosophical. It has been used in an earlier investigation of
certain psychological concepts in the oldest Buddhist literature
(6) and has been inspired by a work by Osgood, Suci, and Tannen-
baum (8). It can be described in the following way:
(a) The investigation should be built on literary material
considered to be an historical unit. This means that the times
of composition should not differ too much. This requirement is
difficult to meet in an investigation like this, since so little
is known about the origin of the Pah canon. Our investi-
gation has been limited to the five Nikayas. Not even the
commentaries to these works have been used, as they were
evidently written at a time when the living tradition was
forgotten and many of the concepts had lost their original
meanings.
(b) From this range of literature, the research material is
collected. The ideal is here semantic completeness. According
to the method proposed here, all statements about the concept
under study should be considered, if they contribute anything
at ah to the interpretation. Especially should all contexts be
collected where the relations between the studied concept and
other concepts are indicated.
(c) This material should be confronted with a number of
systematic questions, the research questions, to which the
investigator is trying to find the answers.
(d) All texts that have relevance to any one of these questions
should if possible be put together in such a way that they form
a complete and understandable answer. This means that the
investigator should try to interfere as little as possible at this
stage. The texts should reply for themselves. Theories formu-
lated by the investigator should be limited to an absolute
minimum. His main responsibility is to understand the texts
13
PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
adequately and see how they fit together in order to produce a
comprehensive whole.
(e) The answers thus provided by the texts should be con-
fronted with present-day knowledge and ways of expression.
They should be interpreted in order to be completely understood.
The investigation has been built on the following Pali works
(within brackets, the abbreviations used are given) :
Dlgha Nikdya (D)
Majjhima Nikdya (M)
Samyutta Nikdya (S)
Anguttara Nikdya (A)
Dhammapada (Dh)
Sutta Nipdta (SN)
Iti-vuttaka (I)
Uddna (U)
Thera-gdthd (Ta)
Theri-gathd (Ti)
Quotations are always from the pts editions (numerals refer to
pages, except for Dh, SN, Ta, Ti, where they refer to number of
stanza).
14
The general background
Nibbana was presented in the oldest Pali literature as the
solution of a problem, or rather of the whole complex of
problems, which the existence in samsdra means to a human
being. These problems will be reviewed briefly here, as they form
the constant background for the understanding of nibbana.
They have frequently been summed up into one short
formula, called tilakkhana, ‘the three signs’ (of existence),
according to which ‘all things’ ( sabbe sankhdra ) are dukkha,
anicca and anatta.
Dukkha is usually translated ‘suffering’, and this translation
will be kept here, although it is far too strong. It refers to
feelings of unpleasantness, unsatisfactoriness, difficulty and
frustration. Life in this world is emphatically said to be more
unpleasant than pleasant. There are pleasures, and they were
considered real enough, but they always lead to more suffering:
they are impermanent and ultimately not satisfying. Seen as a
whole, samsdra is unsatisfactory.
Early Buddhism was a very empirical doctrine. The criterion
of knowledge was direct observation. This observation can be
directed either outwards, by means of the senses, or inwards, by
means of introspection. What is experienced through these
processes, was thought to be real (although not uncritically;
dreams, for example, are rejected, SN 360). But nothing per-
manent was found by either process. What was observed was
something ever changing, an endless series of processes, lacking
not continuity but stability. In this way, Buddhism arrived at a
dynamic interpretation of reality: there is no stable, unchanging
reality; rather everything is a process, all the time changing,
produced and disappearing under the pressure of causes. This
is the meaning of the doctrine of anicca, ‘impermanence’.
The third ‘sign of existence’ is anatta, the doctrine that
there is no unchanging, permanent soul (atta). This view
15
PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
certainly built on an empirical, introspective observation, for
introspection shows us nothing but an unbroken series of
processes, a stream of ideas, needs, feelings, etc. By looking
inwards, we find no unchanging entity. The Buddha therefore
made the same observation as Hume made much later, and
he drew the same conclusion: there are processes but no
‘soul’. This fact was not regarded as an obstacle to ‘salvation’.
On the contrary: the belief in a soul ( asmimana , ‘the pride
“I am" ’) was considered a serious obstacle. The identification
with the personality factors was considered to be an aspect of
suffering: riatthi khandhddisd dukkhd, ‘there are no pains like
the factors’ (Dh 202).
The general view of the Buddha was, therefore, dynamic and
built on the causal nature of all things. Even human life was
thought to be governed by the laws of causality, and it was
seen as a link in an endless causal chain, where every new life
was conditioned by a former life, according to the basic idea of
rebirth. In order to understand this idea we must assume a dual
causality: not only the ordinary physical, but also a moral
causality: there is an accumulation of the moral effects of our
actions, and our next life is formed through these accumulations.
We shall try to describe later how this was thought to function,
but it is important to understand from the beginning that this
causal law gives to man his freedom and his limitation. He is
himself the cause of his present state, but he is in every moment
free to transform his future — or to cut off the chain.
Man has by nature a number of traits which condition his
suffering and make him wish a continuation of it. In the Pali
literature, several groups of such traits can be found, the most
frequent of which are the following three: (1) rdga, dosa, moha —
desire, aggressiveness, illusion, (2) the five obstacles: kdma-
chanda, vydpdda, thina-middha , uddhaccakukkucca, vicikicchd —
emotion and craving, ill-will, inactivity and drowsiness,
nervousness and anxiety, doubt, (3) the four dsavd, (obsessions),
which were considered to be the most persistent of all undesirable
traits, namely kdma, bhava, dittha, avijjd — sensuality, wish to be
reborn, (speculative) views, ignorance.
This is then the working-material of Buddhism: man has
these traits by nature, and that is why he is liable to suffering
16
THE GENERAL BACKGROUND
and rebirth. Man wants a continuation of life, he is bound to it
through desires, he has views and biases and he is ignorant.
But the basic attitude of Buddhism was one of optimism: there
is a way to overcome all this and to find something much better:
nibbana. And man is free to follow the way. The law of causality
can be manipulated: new factors can be introduced which change
the future altogether. The present is conditioned by the past:
but we can decide the future by appropriate actions in the
present. All human problems can be solved here and now.
Now this looks very much like a method understandable to a
psychologist: man has to be transformed, and a method is
recommended. To be sure, his present state has been influenced
by his former lives, but not by gods and devils: and his develop-
ment is firmly in his own hands, in the present moment. His
present state can be described in psychological terms. So our
problem is: can this development be described? And can the
ultimate purpose, that which is attained at the end of the road,
be described? Is it a psychological state? Or is it something more?
Is it a mystic state, outside the scope of psychology? Or is it
rather a metaphysical fact, for instance, another dimension of
existence, outside of space and time, or the absolute, the ultimate
reality, which man can learn to experience or be united with?
There are these possibilities and perhaps more. Nibbana could
be in this world or in a different world, or in both. It could be
psychological, ethical or metaphysical — or a combination of
them all.
*7
B
Some preliminary observations
We will start the investigation by collecting some of the
syntactical contexts in which the word nibbana is to be found.
It is a noun and is common as an object to transitive verbs.
We find at least five or six groups of verbs which take nibbana
as object.
1. Most common are cognitive verbs, especially those expres-
sing visual perception. We find, for instance, different forms of
sacchikaroti, ‘to see with one’s eyes’, and passati, ‘see’. In Ti 97
we find addasam . . . nibbdnam, ‘I saw nibbana’. In A I 158 f,
nibbana is given the following cognitive attributes: sanditthika,
‘visible here’, ehipassika, ‘inviting to come and see’, veditabba,
‘to be known’. According to U 28 bhikkhu . . . jaiind nibbdnam,
‘a monk could know nibbana’.
2. Verbs expressing movement are frequent. Examples can
be found in M I 167 nibbdnam ajjhagamam, ‘I came to nibbana’,
SN 228 amatam viguyha, ‘plunging into the deathless (a synonym
for nibbana)’; Ta 119 nibbdnam hadayasmim osiya, ‘settling
nibbana in the heart’.
3. Verbs of acquisition can be found, e.g. in SN 454 nibbdna-
patliyd, ‘in order to attain nibbana’; Ti 432, nibbdnan ca
labhassu, ‘acquire nibbana!’ Ta 637, nibbdnam abhihdraye, ‘may
he gain nibbana’.
4. Nibbana is an object of positive feelings. See, for instance,
SN 86, nibbanabhirato, ‘delighting in nibbana’; SN 228, nibbutim
bhunjamand, ‘enjoying nibbuti’ (a synonym for nibbana) ; M 1 4 ff
nibbdnam ndbhinandati, ‘he does not find pleasure in nibbana’.
5. Nibbana is an object of longing and desire: M I 167,
nibbdnam pariyesamdno , ‘desiring nibbana’; Ta 330 amatam
abhikankhantam, ‘longing for the deathless’.
6. At least twice in the books included in the present investi-
gation (D III 251 and A III 385) we find the expression nib-
bdnam abhijdyati, to be translated ‘he produces nibbana’.
18
SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
This reminds us of the fact that the way to nibbana is described
as a causal process, where each step leads to the next. Dhatn-
matd esd bhikkhave, yam nibbindo viratto vimuttinanadassanam
sacchikaroti (A V 3), ‘It follows naturally that the indifferent
and dispassionate man realizes liberating knowledge and insight.’
According to SN 1062, nibbana can be attained by means of
training: sikkhe nibbdnam attano, ‘he should train himself
towards nibbana’.
To sum up, nibbana can be an object of knowledge and vision,
feelings, desire, approach, acquisition and production. Seen as
a group these verbs give the idea that nibbana might be
something desirable, either external, like a piece of art, or
internal, e.g. some pleasant and valuable inner state which
can be attained.
It should be noted that corresponding to the noun nibbana
there are the verbs nibbati and nibbdyati with the perfect parti-
ciple nibbuta. More common is parinibbdyati which most often
is used with the same meaning as the simple verb. We quote a
few examples. Katham disvd nibbati bhikkhu ? (SN 915) ‘How
will a monk attain nibbana having seen it (i.e. santipadam, ‘the
state of peace’)’? In SN 765 we find parinibbanti andsavd,
‘those free from obsessions attain nibbana’, and in SN 758, the
corresponding participle: te ve saccabhisamayd nicchdtd parinib-
butd, ‘these (i.e. the ariyd) are satisfied from understanding
the truth and attain nibbana’. The verbs seem to describe the
transformation by which nibbana is attained: the person is
‘nibbana-ed’. The literal meaning is ‘to be extinguished (like a
fire)', ‘to be cool’. We shall discuss this metaphor later, but
we note that the usage of the verb agrees with the interpreta-
tion that the attainment of nibbana consists of a transformation
from one state to another, and nibbana would be the name of
the new state.
We turn next to another type of linguistic context. Series
of co-ordinated nouns are very common in the Nikayas. Some
of these series have nibbana as their last link, which could
mean either that all the words are synonyms or that they form
a progressive series with nibbana as their climax. We shall quote
three of these series, the two first of which are found very
frequently.
19
PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
I. I dam . . . brahmacariyam ekantanibbiddya viragaya
nirodhdya upasamaya abhihhdya sambodhdya nibbdnaya
samvattati (D II 251). ‘This monklife leads to complete detach-
ment, to freedom from desire, to cessation, to peace, to super-
knowledge, to the highest insight, to nibbana.’ 2. Etamsantam,
etam panitam, yad idam sabbasankhdra-samatho sabbupadhi-
patinissaggo tanhakkhayo virago nibbdnam (A V no). ‘This is
peace, this is the highest, namely, the calming of all the activi-
ties, the rejection of all attachment, the destruction of craving,
the freedom from desire, nibbana.’ 3. madanimmaddano pipasa-
vinayo dlayasamugghato vattupacchedo tanhakkhayo virago nirodho
nibbdnam (I 88), ‘freedom from pride, restraint of thirst, uproot-
ing of attachment, cutting off of the cycle of existences,
destruction of craving, freedom from desire, ceasing, nibbana’.
This is then the natural context of the word nibbana, and the
three series together give us a small compendium of the chief
values of Buddhism. We find that the majority of the words
concern well-known facts in human experience: desire, craving,
pride, activity, peace, detachment, insight. Only two of the
words give us a hint that we must expect something more,
namely abhinha and vattupacchedo. The former refers to a number
of supernatural achievements which may be attained by means
of meditational exercises and which also are necessary in order
to verify for oneself some of the Buddhist teachings. For
instance, one of the abhinha is the power of remembering one’s
own former existences. The second word refers to the chain of
rebirths which the arahant knows is broken. The word nirodha
may refer either to the highest level of meditation or to the
cessation of vihhana (vihhana, ‘consciousness’, is instrumental
in rebirth). Many of the mentioned concepts will be discussed
in detail later, but our quotations have given us a general idea
of what to expect: evidently nibbana will have very much to
do with our ordinary psychological functions but also with our
ability to know about and change our fate outside the scope of
the present life.
20
Cognitive functions in
nibbana
Vision and knowledge are often said to be important, even
the most important ingredients in the attainment of nibbana.
Consider, for instance, the following reminiscence attributed to
the Buddha himself. Yato ca kho ahatn . . . evatn lokassa assddan
ca assadato ddinavan ca adinavato nissaranaii ca nissaranato
yathdbhutam abbhaniidsim athaham . . . anuttaram sammdsam-
bodhim abhisambuddho paccaflnasim, iidnan capana medassanam
udapddi: akuppa me cetovimutti ay am antima jdti . . . ti
A I 259, ‘But when I comprehended, as it really is, the satisfac-
tion of the world as satisfaction, the misery as misery, and the
escape therefrom as escape, then I understood perfectly and
accepted full Buddha-status, and the knowledge and vision
arose in me: sure is the release of my mind: this is my last
birth. . . This reminds us that Buddha literally means ‘one who
has understood’. 1 The attainment of nibbana is simply des-
cribed as achieved by means of a cognitive process, namely a
realistic appreciation of the pleasures and miseries of human
existence and the way out. Freedom comes as an act of cogni-
tion, here as so frequently when attainment of arahant-status is
described, expressed in the form of one of the so-called arahant-
formulas, preceded by jandti, ‘he understands’.
In A IV 384 the purpose of monk life is defined in purely
cognitive terms: Yam khvassa . . . anHatam adittham appattam
asacchikatam anabhisametam, tassa nandya dassanaya pattiyd
sacchikiriyaya abhisamayaya Bhagavati brahmacariyam vussati.
‘What is not known, seen, attained, realized or mastered — for
the knowledge of that, the vision of that, the attainment of that,
1 The most common translation is ‘enlightened’ which gives wrong associa-
tions. The root budh has nothing to do with light and also does not suggest that
the ‘clarity’ is produced by external agencies.
21
PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
the realization of that, the mastery of that, is the monklife
lived under the Master.' And this which is not known but should
be known is the four truths about suffering ( dukkha ) and its
cessation.
The close affinity between knowledge and nibbana becomes
evident from M I 63, where the Buddha says that by practice of
satipatthdna (mindfulness) during anything between seven years
and seven days, one of two states can be attained: ditthe vd
dhamme anna, sati vd upddisese anagdmitd, ‘either knowledge
in this life, or, if there is some attachment remaining, the state
of non-returning’. A similar connection can be discovered in
A I 8, where it is said to be impossible that: bhikkhu micchd
panihitena cittena avijjam bhecchati vijjam uppadessati nib-
bdnam sacchikarissati, ‘a monk with a wrongly directed mind
will pierce ignorance, attain knowledge and see nibbana’.
Finally a very important definition from A IV 454: Puna ca
param . . . bhikkhu sabbaso nevasahhandsahnayatanam samatik-
kamma sanhdvedayitanirodham tipasampajja viharati, panndya
c'assa disvd dsavd parikkhind honti. Ettdvatd pi kho . . .
ditthadhammanibbdnam vuttarn Bhagavata nippariydyena. ‘And
again, a monk has altogether transcended the level of neither-
ideation-nor-non-ideation and enters and dwells in the ending-
of-ideation-and-feeling. When he has understood and seen, his
dsavd (obsessions) are destroyed. In that meaning the Master
has declared nibbana in this life in the real sense.’ We shall
discuss later the two highest stages of meditation mentioned
here. But we note the fact that nibbana is not said to be
identical with ‘ending-of-ideation-and-feeling’ (it never is, as a
matter of fact) : rather this meditational level, as also the others,
is described as an aid to attaining the liberating knowledge and
to achieving the extinction of the obsessions ( dsavd ). Innumer-
able times, this knowledge is mentioned as the peak experience
by which arahant-status is attained. We shall come back to the
question of dsavd, but we should note that two of them are of
cognitive nature: ditthi, ‘(speculative) views’, and avijjd,
‘ignorance’. The attainment of nibbana therefore implies also
intellectual clarification and complete understanding of the
doctrine.
It follows that this knowledge can be attained by several
22
COGNITIVE FUNCTIONS IN NIBBANA
different means and with individual degrees of difficulty. There
are many stories in the Nikayas about people who suddenly and
without preparation got the insight, and about others who
worked strenuously with meditation for years and then finally
attained it when they, for instance, saw a pretty dancing-girl
(Ta 269) or when they in desperation tried to hang themselves
(Ti 77). In order to explain these differences we must remember
that not only the intellectual capacity is involved but also the
kammic and moral state of the personality: the remaining two
obsessions are of emotional and dynamic nature.
From A IV 454, quoted above, we can deduce something about
the nature of cognition leading to nibbana: the function of
concentration is to make cognition less differentiated and more
comprehensive, less fickle and more stable, until the ultimate
state is absolutely undifferentiated and without flickering.
That the cognition after the attainment has something of this
nature (although nibbana is not identical with any of the levels
of meditation), is explicitly stated in A V 107: amatogadhd
sabbe dhammd, nibbanapariyosand sabbe dhammd, ‘all mental
contents (or: processes) merge into the deathless, have their end
in nibbana'. Dhammd refers to mental representations of all the
differentiated things, in perception or free ideation. Cognition
after the attainment of nibbana is more similar to a comprehen-
sive Gestalt or intuition.
23
Emotion and feeling in
nibbana
We must make a distinction between emotions and feelings.
By feelings we mean the experience of pleasure or discomfort
that normally accompany our perceptions and other conscious
processes. The feelings may become very strong, as in intense
physical pain, but normally they are weak, even unnoticeable.
Emotion is a state of imbalance, such as anger, hate, fear,
anxiety, elation, passion and love. Nibbana is not described as
an emotional state, but certainly as something pleasant, and we
even find rather hedonistic descriptions. See, e.g. D III 131
Cattdro 'me .. . sukhallikanuyogd . . . nibbandya samvattanti,
‘These four types of pleasure-addictions lead to nibbana’ (the
four jhdnas are referred to). The word sukha, ‘pleasure’, ‘hap-
piness’, is frequently used about nibbana, for instance in Dh
203, nibbdnam paramam sukham, ‘nibbana is the highest hap-
piness’. According to Ti 476, nibbdna-sukhd par am n'atthi,
‘beyond the happiness of nibbana is nothing’. It is, however,
difficult to ascertain whether sukha denotes only the feeling
itself. In S I 38 it is said, nibbdndbhirato macco sabbadukkhd
pamuccati, ‘the mortal who delights in nibbana, is freed from
all dukkha’. And in S II 278, nibbana is given the attribute
sabbadukkhapamocanam, ‘freedom from all dukkha’. Now,
dukkha is the opposite of sukha and is usually translated ‘pain’
or ‘suffering’. This word is known to cover not only the feeling
of dissatisfaction but also its backgrounds: frustration, adverse
conditions leading to unhappiness. The constituents of dukkha
are according to D II 305, jdti, jard, maranam, soka-
parideva-dukkha-domanassupaydsa, yam p'iccham na labhati,
samkhittena paftcupddanakkhandhd, ‘birth; old age; death; grief,
lamentation, suffering, misery and despair; not to get what is
wished for; in short, the five factors of attachment’. This
24
EMOTION AND FEELING IN NIBBANA
definition certainly covers the unpleasant feeling but also both
external and internal factors which according to the Buddhist
doctrine make our situation unpleasant. If sukha is the opposite
of dukkha, we should expect it to cover also similar background
factors, or at least the absence of the dukkha factors. In this
case, a phrase like nibbdnam sukham should mean ‘nibbana
is a source of happiness’ and not ‘a state of happiness’. This is
a question of fundamental importance and it can be answered
only when we know whether nibbana is an internal state or not.
The relation between nibbana and the feelings is not simple.
The common word for feelings, pleasant, unpleasant, and
neutral, is vedand, which appears both in the paticcasamuppdda-
series and the khandha- series. The relations between these
series and nibbana will be discussed later, but it should be
mentioned that although the combination sukha vedand can
be found, it is not used about nibbana. The reason certainly is
that vedand is connected with differentiated, detailed percep-
tion and leads to desire, which is opposed to nibbana. In fact,
vedand is described as a danger to nibbana. SN says: vedandnam
khayd bhikkhu nicchdto parinibbuto (SN 739), ‘By getting rid of
feelings, the monk becomes free from hunger and attains
parinibbdna’ . From the context it is clear that these words do
not refer to the ultimate nibbana which the arahant attains
at the moment of death but to nibbana in this life. So they prob-
ably mean no more than what is better described in M I 303:
Sukhaya . . . vedandya rdganusayo pahatabbo, dukkhaya
vedandya patighdnusayo pahatabbo, adukkhamasukhdya vedandya
avijjdnusayo pahatabbo, ‘A tendency to desire is to be got rid of
in pleasant feeling; a tendency to repulsion is to be got rid of in
unpleasant feeling; a tendency to ignorance is to be got rid of
in neutral feeling.’ This looks more like the everyday state of
mind of the arahant: perceptions and ideas come with their
normal feeling-tones, but they are observed with complete objec-
tivity and no emotional reaction is permitted. This is beautifully
expressed in U 8: tasmdt iha te Bahiya evam sikkhitabbam:
ditthe ditthamattam bhavissati, sute sutamattam bhavissati, mute
mutamattam bhavissati, vihhdte vihhdtamattam bhavissati, ‘Then,
Bahiya, thus must you train yourself: in the seen there will be
just the seen, in the heard just the heard, in the imagined just
25
PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
the imagined, in the cognized just the cognized.' One of the
most important purposes of meditational exercises was to
create a permanent control over emotions and desires and a
permanent state of calm. This is one aspect of nibbana: it is
happiness but without differentiated pleasures.
In A IV 414 ff we find a distinction between two types of
sukha. First, Sariputta says: sukham idarn avuso nibbdnam,
‘friends, this nibbana is happiness’. One of the listening monks
then asks: Kim pan'ettha avuso Sariputta sukham, yad ettha
natthi vedayitan ti ? ‘Friend Sariputta, what is then here the
happiness that is not felt in this (nibbana)?’ Sariputta answers:
‘It is this’ ( etad ): Pane 'ime . . . kamaguna, ‘these five types of
sense pleasures’, and, having enumerated them, he sums up:
idam vuccat * avuso kdmasukham, ‘friends, this is called the
happiness of sense pleasures’. Then he goes on to describe the
happiness of monks, vivicc' eva kdmehi, ‘aloof from sense
pleasures’, and mentions the nine levels of meditation and winds
up the discussion by saying that ‘it is in this way that nibbana
should be understood as happiness (sukham)’. The word sukha
is therefore used to denote both pleasures in the ordinary sense
and the special type of pleasure resulting from meditation.
Nibbana is (or is accompanied by) a pleasant feeling of the
latter type. The happiness of nibbana is not called vedana,
because this normally leads to tanhd, ‘desire’. How this manifests
itself in consciousness is not further described, but just as
cognition in this state is more intuitive and holistic and less
differentiated, it is clear that the feeling is something like a
calm, disinterested, undisturbed satisfaction.
This leads us to another common expression. SN 467 mentions
the tathdgata (the Buddha) as: parinibbuto udakarahado va
sito, ‘one who has attained nibbana and is cool like the waters
of a lake’. And the Buddha says about himself (M I 171):
eko'mhi sammdsambuddho , sitibhuto * smi nibbuto. ‘I alone have
attained the highest knowledge, I have become cool and have
attained nibbana.’ This sita, ‘cool’, is quite commonly used about
arahants and was evidently felt to be a good description of the
prevailing feeling-tone in connection with nibbana. To feel
‘cool’ is pleasant in a tropical country, and to be personally
uninvolved means internal freedom.
26
EMOTION AND FEELING IN NIBBANA
There are an additional number of emotional words men-
tioned in connection with nibbana. For instance, SN 593,
sabbasokam atikkanto asoko hoti nibbuto, ‘having overcome all
grief, he is without grief and has attained nibbana’. I 122,
phutthassa. paramd santi nibbdnam akutobhayam, ‘by him is
reached the highest peace, nibbana, with nothing to fear from
anywhere’. Among the many synonyms for nibbana mentioned
in S IV 368 ff, some belong to the domain of feeling, e.g.
santam, ‘peace’; sivam, ‘happiness’; khemam, ‘security’; avyd-
pajjo, ‘kindness’. Another interesting synonym is given repeat-
edly, e.g. A IV 353: anatia-sanni asmimanasamugghatam
pdpundti ditth'eva dhamme nibbdnam, ‘thinking “there is no
soul’’, he attains freedom from the pride “I am”, nibbana in
this life’.
In short, nibbana is, from an emotional point of view defined
(or said to be accompanied by) happiness, peace, security,
calm, humility, and kindness. As it is also described as ‘cool’, we
must probably imagine these feelings as rather disinterested and
impersonal. This should be a description of the prevalent feeling-
tone of the arahant, but this general freedom from dukkha did
not prevent him from experiencing unpleasant things as
unpleasant.
27
The dynamics of nibbana
Just as there are no strong emotions in nibbana, there are
few needs and no desires. We often find definitions to this effect.
See, e.g. SN 707, aniccho hoti nibbuto, ‘the wantless is in nibbana’,
U 33: sabbato tanhdnam khayd asesaviraganirodho nibbdnam,
‘By the destruction of desires, there is complete disinterest
and cessation: nibbana.’ In S III 190, this is explained by
means of a parable that cannot be misunderstood. Children
play with little sand-castles as long as they are not free from
desire and affection for them. But when this desire and affec-
tion has gone, then they destroy the castles without ever
thinking of them again. Similarly we should lose our desire for
the khandha (the personality factors) and cease to play with
them: Tanhakkhayo hi nibbdnam, ‘for the destruction of desires
is nibbana’.
No human being can live without the motivating factors
which psychologists call needs. The texts also silently assume
that the arahants had these personal needs, of air, food, clothes,
shelter, etc. and that a reasonable satisfaction of them was
permitted. There are no definitions of nibbana in terms of
mortification. It is, however, frequently mentioned that an
arahant was appiccho, ‘wanting little’ (e.g. S I 63, S II 202).
By this expression the existence of needs is admitted, and we
should carefully distinguish these legitimate and unavoidable
needs from tanhd and rdga which are wholly incompatible with
nibbana.
We have already mentioned that the most important aspect
of nibbana is the destruction of the obsessions. One of the four
obsessions is kdma, ‘sense-pleasures’, ‘sense-desires’. As a good
summary of the last three sections, the following definition
may be quoted from S V 8: Yo kho . . . ragakkhayo dosakkhayo
mohakkhayo idam vuccati amatam. ‘That which is the destruc-
tion of desire, of hate, of illusion — that is called "the deathless”.'
28
THE DYNAMICS OF NIBBANA
By tnoka is meant illusion or false cognition, by dosa is meant
the emotion of aggressiveness, and rdga refers to the same
desires that sometimes are called tanhd.
By definition, nibbana is therefore freedom from the emotions
and desires by which egoism and attachment is created: all
definitions are in complete agreement on this point. This does
not mean complete absence of motivation, nor passivity. The
arahant is motivated by pannd, ‘understanding’, metta, ‘friend-
liness’, and karund, ‘compassion’. An active and energetic
frame of mind is frequently mentioned in descriptions of
arahants: atdpi vihardmi, ‘I live active,’ says an arahant about
himself, Ta i. Another arahant says, Ta 437, that he spends his
time practising satta bojjhange indriydni baldni ca, ‘the seven
links of knowledge, the capacities and the powers’, the usual
names of three enumerations, all of which include viriya,
‘energy’.
29
Nibbana as state of ,
personality
In modern books about Buddhist philosophy we are generally
told that human personality consists of th ekhandhd, ‘personality
factors’: rupa, ‘body’, sahrta, ‘ideation’, vedand, ‘feeling’,
sankhara, ‘activity’, and vihhdna, ‘consciousness’. This is not
quite true, since the most important is citta, generally trans-
lated ‘mind’. Citta is the core of personality, the centre of
purposiveness, activity, continuity and emotionality. It is not
a ‘soul’ ( attd ), but it is the empirical, functional self. It is mainly
conscious but not restricted to the momentary conscious con-
tents and processes. On the contrary, it includes all the layers
of consciousness, even the unconscious: by it the continuity
and identity are safeguarded. It has a distinctly individual
form. Its original state is characterized by the defilements
(upakkilesa, M I 36), the emotional imperfections and the
obsessions ( asavd , D I 84). The whole gamut of Buddhist methods
therefore aims at purifying the citta. If this purification is
complete, nibbana is attained: Pahhd-paribhdvitam cittam
sammad eva dsavehi vimuccati seyyathidam kdmasavd bhavasava
ditthdsavd avijjdsava (D II 81), ‘Citta, when thoroughly devel-
oped through understanding, is quite set free from obsessions,
namely from the obsessions of sensuality, becoming, views and
ignorance.’ This is expressed just as clearly in S III 45:
Rupadhdtuyd ce bhikkhave bhikkhuno cittam virattam vimuttam
hoti anupaddya dsavehi . . . vimuttatd thitam, thitattd santussitam,
santussitatta na paritassati, aparitassam paccattahheva pari-
nibbdyati. Khinajati . . . tipajdnati. ‘If a monk’s citta is without
need for the element of form (feeling, ideation, the activities,
consciousness) and is released from it without attachment to
the obsessions, it is immovable by its release: by its immobility
it is satisfied; by its satisfaction it is not excited; without
30
NIBBANA AS STATE OF PERSONALITY
excitement it by itself attains nibbana. And it knows: “Des-
troyed is birth . . ’ This proves that nibbana comes as a
climax after a number of psychological events. Nibbana is
attained through a transformation of citta. We note also that
even patina, ‘understanding’, is attributed to citta. So is anna,
‘knowledge’ (sometimes used for nibbana, M I 63) in D III 53.
The perfect and purified citta is unemotional and stable
(viipasanta, ‘calmed’, D I 71, danta gutta rakkhita samvuta,
‘tamed, controlled, guarded, restrained’, A I 7).
When nibbana was attained, the knowledge came that citta
was free from all the disturbing factors. A clear distinction
between conscious phenomena and the deeper personality
factors was not often made. But it was made at least once,
M I 523, where Ananda is asked whether the arahant always
knows that his obsessions are destroyed, and replies: . . . tassa
carato c'eva titthato ca suttassa ca jdgarassa ca satatam samitam
khind vd dsava, a pi ca kho nampaccavekkhamdnojdndti: khind me
dsavd ti, . . for him whether he is walking or standing or
asleep or awake, the obsessions are certainly (I take va=eva)
destroyed, and moreover, when he thinks of it he knows: "My
obsessions are destroyed.” ’ This indicates that the early
Buddhists, just as well as present-day psychologists, considered
dynamic and emotional factors not only as factors of conscious-
ness but also as more stable factors of personality. In nibbana,
therefore, not only the conscious state was changed, but the
whole personality.
In the present section we are mainly concerned with defini-
tions not covered in previous sections and referring directly to
personality structure. We can distinguish three groups.
1. Descriptions in terms of moral achievements are few, partly
because moral perfection was taken for granted as belonging
to the elementary parts of the Way, partly because these
problems are ultimately solved when their roots are destroyed:
kdma, raga, dosa, tanhd, etc. This aspect is, however, stressed
in such synonyms for nibbana as suddhi, ‘purity’ (S IV 372) and
asankilittha, ‘freedom from impurities' (M I 173).
2. Nibbana is sometimes described in terms of freedom. In
S IV 372, mutti and andlaya, both meaning ‘release’ or ‘freedom’,
are given as synonyms for nibbana. In S III 189 it is said:
31
PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
vimutti . . . nibbdnatthd, ‘release means nibbana’. And, according
to S I 210, nibbdnam Bhagava dhu, sabbaganthappamocanam,
‘Nibbana, said the Master, is the deliverance from every tie.’
See also M II 265: etam amatam yadidam anupddd cittassa
vimokho, ‘This is the deathless: the deliverance of the mind
without grasping.’ Now, vimokha is a technical term referring,
among other things, to certain levels of meditation. In D II 71,
the Buddha says that if a monk has mastered these levels and:
asavanan ca khaya andsavam cetovimuttim panna-vimuttim
ditthe va dhamme sayam abhiilna sacchikatva upasampajja
viharati, ayam vuccati . . . bhikkhu ubhatobhaga-vimutto , imdya
ca . . . ubhatobhdga-vimuttiyd anna ubhato-bhdga-vimutti nttaritard
vd panitatara vd n’atthi, ‘by destroying the obsessions, enters
and stays in that obsession-free liberation of mind and libera-
tion by understanding which he by himself has come to know
and see in this life — then this monk is called ‘‘freed in both
ways” and there is no higher and more splendid “freedom-in-
both-ways" than this’.
All these definitions and explanations are given in terms of
freedom or liberation. Freedom can, of course, mean different
things, e.g. (a) freedom from external obstacles, (b) conscious
freedom, real or illusory, (c) freedom of personality, i.e. freedom
from personal compulsions, obsessions and inhibitions that make
a realistic and purposeful way of life impossible. The Buddha
never means freedom in an external sense, although the monk-
life was designed to achieve a maximum of external freedom.
When he defines nibbana as freedom, he attributes the freedom
to citta. The enemies of freedom are, according to Buddhism,
especially misconceptions about the world and ourselves, clinging
to the world and to the renewed existence in it, immoral and
compulsive habits, laziness, desires and emotions, fears and
worries. These may be overcome either by insight ( paniid ) or
by meditation, or, preferably, by both. Nibbana is, as we have
seen, sometimes defined as the internal freedom, attained by
these means.
3. Of special interest to the psychologist are a number of
definitions in terms of health. M I 511: Evam-eva kho Magandiya
ahan-c’eva te dhammam deseyyam: idan-tam arogyam, idan-tam
nibbdnanti, so tvam arogyam janeyydsi nibbdnam passeyyasi,
32
NIBBANA AS STATE OF PERSONALITY
‘Even so, Magandiya, if I were to teach you the doctrine, saying:
“this is that health, this is that nibbana”, you might know
health, might see nibbana.’ We find abyddhi, ‘freedom from
disease’ as synonym for nibbana in M 1 173 and anitika, ‘health’,
in S IV 371. In S III 4 f, Sariputta explains how it is possible
to have a healthy mind (no dturacitlo) in spite of a sick body:
a healthy mind is to have a correct insight as to the nature of the
khandhd and to avoid identifying oneself with them. This defini-
tion is very similar to the explanation of vimutti given in S II
124 f, so nibbana is both mental health and internal freedom.
A comparison between the Buddhist conception of nibbana and
the modern Western idea of mental health will be made in a
later section.
We have earlier left the question open whether nibbana may
be described as a psychological state or not. It follows from the
discussion in this chapter that it has to be answered in the
affirmative: nibbana is the state of cilia created when the
obsessions and other imperfections have ultimately disappeared
and have been replaced by understanding, peace and ‘health’.
What we have described so far in our attempts at definition is
mainly the new state of citta. In describing nibbana, the texts
most frequently use this ‘citta terminology’ but there is also
another, less frequent and more elusive ‘ vinildna terminology’.
c
33
Nibbana as emptiness
It is said (M III 293 f) that once when Sariputta approached
the Buddha after an afternoon of meditation, the latter commen-
ted on his calm expression and his pure and clear complexion.
Sariputta gave this explanation: Suhnatdvihdrena kho aham,
bhante, etarahi bahulam vihardmiti, ‘Sir, I am now completely
absorbed in the state of emptiness.’ This got the approval of the
Buddha who called emptiness the state of great men (mahdpuri-
savihdra). Now, what is meant by ‘state of emptiness’?
It is not further explained in the continuation of the text,
so we must look for other cues. We can find two explanations.
The first possibility is the emptiness of consciousness that is
developed through concentration. Our text says that Sariputta
had just emerged from solitary meditation. In A V 301 Sariputta
makes exactly the same comment to Anuruddha about his
calm expression, etc. But he gets a different explanation: ‘My
mind is well established in the four states of mindfulness
(satipatthana).’ This parallel indicates at least that exercises in
mindfulness could give the same visible result as emptiness. But
there is also more direct evidence that meditation will produce
a state of emptiness. In S IV 360 the question is asked: what is
the path that goes to the uncompounded (referring to nibbana)?
The answer is: Sunnato samddhi animitto samddhi appanihito
samddhi, ‘the concentration that is empty, signless and undir-
ected’. We shall have more to say about the levels of concentra-
tion later, but we are here reminded of the fact that the general
trend of these levels is to reduce the amount of conscious con-
tents, until the mind is completely motionless and empty: one
of the levels is called dkihcahhayatana , ‘the dimension of nothing-
ness’. And in M III in, the Buddha says: Ay am kho pan ' ,
Ananda, vihdro Tathdgatena abhisambuddho , yadidam sabbani-
mittdnam amanasikdrd ajjhattam suhhatam upasampajja vihari-
tum. ‘But, Ananda, Tathagata has completely understood this
34
NIBBANA AS EMPTINESS
state, namely how to attain and stay in the inward emptiness,
by leaving all signs unnoticed.’ It is evident from these examples,
that the word emptiness was used with reference to a psycho-
logical state attainable through meditation.
It was, on the other hand, also used about nibbana. We can
see the difference in M III 104-108, where all the levels of
concentration are described as levels of progressing emptiness.
A monk starts to meditate in a forest, and then he sees only the
forest, no village and no people: Iti yarn hi kho tattha na hoti,
tena tarn suhham samanupassati, ‘for he regards it as empty of
that which is not there’. Then he passes through the eight first
levels and attains animittam cetosamddhim, ‘the concentration
of mind that is signless’. And the text continues: So evam
pajdndti: Ayam pi kho animitto cetosamadhi abhisankhato
a bhisahcetayito. Yam kho pana kihci abhisankhatam abhisahce-
tayitam, tad aniccam nirodhadhamman ti pajdndti. Tassa evam
janato evam passato kdmdsava pi cittam vimuccati, bhavasavd pi
cittam vimuccati, avijjasavd pi cittam vimuccati. ‘He under-
stands: ‘‘This signless concentration of mind is made up and
intended (willed). But whatever is made up and intended, that
is impermanent and perishable.” When he understands and sees
this, then his mind is freed from the obsession of sensuality, from
the obsession of becoming and from the obsession of ignorance.’
Then comes the arahant-formula, so it is clear that this is a
description of the attainment of nibbana. This is finally expres-
sed in terms of emptiness: So: suhham idam sahhdgatam
kdmdsavenati pajdndti; suhham idam sahhdgatam bhavdsavenati
pajdndti; suhham idam sahhdgatam avijjdsavendti pajdndti.
Atthi c'ev ' idam asuhhatam, yadidam imam eva kdyam paticca
salayatanikam jivitapaccayd ti. ‘He understands: this conscious
state is empty of the obsession of sensuality. He understands:
this conscious state is empty of the obsession of becoming. He
understands: this conscious state is empty of the obsession of
ignorance. And there is only this that is not empty, namely the
six sensory fields that, conditioned by life, are grounded on this
body itself.’
We understand from these quotations that there are different
levels of emptiness and that a sharp distinction was made be-
tween meditation and nibbana: in meditation a ‘signless emp-
35
PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
tiness’ can be attained, but this is still ‘put together’ and ‘willed’
and therefore impermanent and of short duration. The obses-
sions are still not conquered. But when the obsessions cease, a
new type of emptiness is reached, which is difficult to define
psychologically. But in any case it is no longer a temporary
state of undifferentiated consciousness but rather a permanent
state of citta, ‘mind’ (especially the deeper layers of conscious-
ness and the centre of personality) : a freedom from sensuality,
ignorance and the causal conditions for rebirth. We shall find
time and again that nibbana cannot be understood without this
distinction between the unstable, rapidly changing surface and
the deep, unchanging background.
The difference between the two types of emptiness is sharply
formulated in this text, but that is not always the case. Very
often we get the impression that emptiness as a conscious state
is a very important aspect of nibbana itself (and not only as a
preparation for it). When the arahant Uttama calls herself
sunfiatassdnimittassa Idbhinl (Ti 46) , ‘winner of the emptiness and
signless’, she is certainly not referring to the highest level of
meditation but to nibbana. One of the synonyms for nibbana
in the long list, S IV 368 ff, is anidassanam ‘without attributes’.
In A V 107 it is said: nibbanapariyosand sabbe dhammd, ‘all
conscious processes have nibbana as their end’ (this translation
is doubtful, since dhamma has many meanings, of which the
one given here is the most normal, and since pariyosdnd may
mean ‘perfection’ as well). In M I 296 nibbana is called animittd
dhdtu, ‘the signless state (or: element, realm)’.
The most probable explanation of this is that the highest
level of meditation ( safifidvedayitanirodha , ‘the ceasing of
ideation and feeling’) was used so frequently as a stepping-
stone to the realization of nibbana, that some of its characteris-
tics were transferred to nibbana itself, especially the experience
of undifferentiated wholeness that is called suHrlatd. At first,
this looks like a simple confusion of two psychological states,
which must have been closely related in any case, but if we
search further we will find a much closer connection. The
attainment of nibbana is namely also called vinndnassa nirodho,
‘the cessation of consciousness’ (SN 734). And nibbana had to be
exactly that, since rebirth is effected through the medium of
36
NIBBANA AS EMPTINESS
viaiidna and nibbana is the cessation of rebirth. The exact
meaning of this will be discussed later, but it seems clear that the
stream of conscious processes, of which vinndna consists, is
stopped and emptied, usually by means of the meditational
exercises, but perhaps also through insight (panna). What
happens can be best expressed in terms of our distinction above,
between surface and background. Exercises in concentration
concern mainly the surface, but they are a tool towards the
formation of a certain type of background experience: security,
peace, timelessness, ‘emptiness’, which is the ‘stopped’ vinndna
and does not prevent correct perception and clear thinking on
the surface.
To sum up: There are two types of emptiness, one emptiness
of surface-consciousness which is attained by means of concen-
tration, and one emptiness of citta which consists of the constant
freedom from the obsessions and includes also the ‘stopping’ of
vinndna : the second type is nibbana or one aspect of it.
37
Nibbana as cessation of
rebirth
Bhavanirodho nibbdnam (S II 117), ‘the cessation of becoming
(=rebirth) is nibbana’. In SN 467 nibbana is called jatimaran-
assa antam, ‘the end of birth and death’. This is the same as
anto dukkhassa (U 80), ‘the end of suffering’, since suffering is
defined (D II 305) as birth, old age, death, grief, sorrow,
lamentation and despair. One of the basic constituents of
suffering is then the prospect of rebirth, and one of the most
important results of the attainment of nibbana is that the chain
of births is broken for that individual. The order of the words
‘birth’, ‘old age’ and ‘death’ should be noted, because this is
quite consistent in the texts. There is a reason for this. Cf., for
instance, M 1 49 : jatisamudaya jardmaranasamudayo, jdtinirodha
jardmarananirodho, ‘Because of the event of birth comes the
event of old age and death, because of the stopping of birth
comes the stopping of old age and death.’ The meaning is clearly
that nibbana will not save from old age and physical death
in this life but only from a new birth and the old age and death
that would have followed upon it. Contexts of this type give us
a clue to the proper interpretation of texts like M 1 173: . . . jdti-
dhatnmd samdnd jdtidhamme ddinavam viditvd ajatam anuttaram
yogakkhemam nibbdnam pariyesamand ajatam anuttaram yoga-
kkhemam nibbdnam ajjhagamatnsu, ‘Being liable to birth,
but having understood the peril in being liable to birth and
looking for freedom from birth, the incomparable security,
nibbana, they attained freedom from birth, the incomparable
security, nibbana.’ Then exactly the same is repeated for the
following opposites: jard — ajaram, byddhi — abyddhim, marana —
amatam, soka — asokam, sankilesa — asankilittham, ‘old age — free-
dom from old age, illness — freedom from illness, death — freedom
from death, sorrow— freedom from sorrow, impurity — free-
38
NIBBANA AS CESSATION OF REBIRTH
dom from impurity’. The words ajdta, ajar a and amata are
frequently translated 'unborn’, ‘unageing’ and ‘deathless’. Trans-
lated in this way they can easily be understood as referring to
nibbana as something substantial having the attributes of not
having been born, not growing old and never dying — and this is
exactly what has happened. That this interpretation was not
intended can be seen from M I 173: ajdtam is contrasted to
jatidhamma samdna, ‘being liable to birth’, which can only
refer to the personal liability of these five monks to die and
their personal freedom from birth in the future. And amatam
as contrasted to maranadhamma samdna can only refer to their
personal freedom from death in the future as contrasted to their
present liability to death. They would evidently not be helped
by anything external having these traits of being unborn,
unageing and deathless. Rather, life after the attainment of
nibbana is referred to as going on under new conditions and new
expectations: no more birth and therefore no more ageing and
death. It is significant that nibbana here is called yogakkhema,
‘security’ which clearly refers to a state and not a substance, and
reminds us of other synonyms for nibbana, e.g. drogya, ‘health’
(M I 511) and analaya, ‘freedom’ (S IV 372).
This side of nibbana, the cessation of samsdra, is not empirical
in the ordinary sense, as it cannot be described or explained by
psychology or any other science. But all the methods that were
used to attain nibbana are said to lead to this effect, and these
methods can be understood. It is also said that the effective
medium of rebirth is vinndna, ‘consciousness’. The attainment of
nibbana involves, as has already been mentioned, the ‘stopping
of vinMna’, which leads to the stopping of rebirth, just as the
stopping of a car leads to the stopping of the journey. A proper
understanding of this process may be attained by a close study
of the paticcasamuppada-series, the series of dependent origina-
tion consisting of twelve factors of which the eleventh is jdti
and the twelfth includes jard-maranam. The origination of these
is said to depend on the other factors, of which vinndna is one.
By means of the ‘cessation’ ( nirodha ) of these, birth, old age
and death will also cease. Although the cessation of birth cannot
be understood by means of psychology, the methods leading to
the cessation of vinndna can still be followed and described, and
39
PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
a better understanding of the meaning of this cessation can still
be reached through a study of the texts. And it should finally not
be forgotten that to an arahant who was very proficient in
meditation, the process and causal connection were no secrets:
rebirth and the law of kamma were to him empirical facts.
40
The criteria of transcendence
Can the limits of ordinary human experience be transcended?
Can we learn to know the world ‘as it really is’, i.e. independently
of the human sense organs, which are known to give only a very
limited and distorted knowledge of the world? Many philosophers
have held the view that by means of metaphysics we can attain
such transcendent knowledge and even make deductions about,
or intuitively see the ultimate principle of existence. Our next
question is whether the Buddha believed in such transcendent
knowledge and whether he considered nibbana to be a meta-
physical entity.
Generally speaking, the boundaries of our knowledge are not
definitive and inflexible. Atoms are too small for us to see, but
still we know much about them. By means of suitable technical
equipment it has proved possible to collect much knowledge that
was unattainable without it. Thus the boundary between
empirical and metaphysical knowledge has been somewhat
changed.
The Buddha did not know about this method of extending
human knowledge, but there might be others. The boundaries
of the senses are also somewhat flexible, since some people have
sharper vision or more sensitive ears than others. There might
further be a special sense of ‘intuition’, and some psychologists
even today believe in ‘extrasensory perception’, e.g. telepathy,
by means of which our ordinary sense knowledge could be
transcended. These possibilities are not taken very seriously
today, but in the system of early Buddhism they play an
important part. By means of the six abhiUnd, powers that could
be attained through meditation, the disciple could, e.g. read
the minds of other persons, remember his own former existences,
and see how other beings are reborn according to the law of
kamma. He could, briefly, check for himself all the basic teach-
ings of Buddhism: they became empirical knowledge to him.
4i
PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
We should note that when the abi-nnd are enumerated (e.g.
D III 281), asavakkhaya, i.e. the attainment of nibbana, is
mentioned as no. 6. In these contexts nibbana is therefore said
to be attained by means of superknowledge, a type of knowledge
that may be regarded as empirical for the adepts but as trans-
cendent for others. In other contexts, and they are much more
frequent, the final act of insight is, as we have seen, achieved
through panna, which is not a supernatural faculty.
There were certainly beliefs in early Buddhism that trans-
cended ordinary sense knowledge, especially the existence of
gods (which was never denied but was considered very unimpor-
tant), the law of samsara and the principle of moral causality.
Suffering was an empirical fact but some of its causes were trans-
cendent. Through nibbana the causes could be eradicated. Must
nibbana therefore be something transcendent? This does not
necessarily follow, since we have the causes leading to renewed
life within us in this fife. If we learn how to neutralize these
causes in our present life, then there will be no basis ( updddna )
for new becoming (bhava). The problem of suffering can be
solved without a transcendent agency.
Although it does not seem to follow from the human situation
that nibbana has to be a transcendent fact, there is no doubt
that it was considered to be a metaphysical entity in later
Buddhism. Our task is now to see whether this was the case
already in the Nikaya Buddhism.
The criteria of transcendence would seem to be the following:
1. One argument would be that it is not possible to get in
touch with anything transcendent without developing a special
sense for this purpose: it is, e.g. not possible to see God with
our ordinary eyes, so we must develop ‘spiritual’ eyes. Does
the Buddha ever speak about a special sense for experiencing
nibbana?
The answer is, on the whole, no. Possibilities in this direction
are offered by the use of words like panndcakkhu, ‘eye of under-
standing’, and ariyacakkhu, ‘noble eye’, which sometimes are
used to describe the attainment of nibbana. The Buddha says,
e.g. M I 510, Tam hi te Mdgandiya ariyam cakkhum na-tthi yena
tvam ariyena cakkhund drogyam janeyydsi nibbanam passey-
yasiti, ‘So you, Magandiya, have not got that noble eye, by
42
THE CRITERIA OF TRANSCENDENCE
which you might know health, might see nibbana.’ I 52 says
that there are three types of eyes: mamsacakkhu, dibbacakkhu,
panndcakkhu, ‘the bodily eye, the divine eye, and the eye of
understanding’. About panndcakkhu it is said:
yato hanam udapadi
panndcakkhu anuttaram,
yassa cakkhussa patildbhd
sabbadukkhd pamuccati.
‘The eye of understanding, from which knowledge arose, is
unsurpassed. Whoever acquires this eye becomes free from all
suffering.’
There is no further information about the development of
these ‘eyes’ or any indication that they should be understood in
a literal sense. Probably they should be understood as metaphori-
cal expressions for ‘vision’ or ‘knowledge’ of a certain type (this
could of course very well be of transcendent or supernatural
content).
Jayatilleke, who has devoted an authoritative study to the
question of the early Buddhist view of knowledge (4), has arrived
at the opinion that the Nikaya Buddhism was empiristic and
did not recognize any special ‘mystic’ source of knowledge.
‘Buddhism does not make the claim of the mystic that his know-
ledge was derived from a supernatural source’ (4, p. 426).
‘The approach of Buddhism results ... in the elimination of
metaphysics’ (4, p. 433). The term ‘empiricism’ must, however,
be understood in a wider sense than is usually accepted nowa-
days. Knowledge based on extrasensory perception must be
included, and it must be recognized that this source of know-
ledge can be developed through meditation. ‘There is causal
relation between the attainment of mental concentration and
the emergence of this knowledge and insight’ (4, p. 418). ‘It is a
natural and not a supernatural occurrence’ (4, p. 420). As it is
said in A V 3 and 313, Dhammatd esa . . . yam samdhilo
yathdbhutam jandti passati, ‘It is in the nature of things that a
person in a state of concentration knows and sees what really
is.’ According to M I 296, on the highest level of meditation:
indriydni vippasannani , ‘the sense functions are purified’,
43
PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
which suggests a finer and more accurate perception but not the
development of a new and radically different sense function.
In M I 169, the Buddha tells us what he considers important
for a disciple in order to understand his doctrine: pandito . . .
medhavi . . . apparajakkhajdtiko ... so imam dhammam khippam-
eva djdnissati, ‘He is wise, intelligent and with little defilements:
he will understand this doctrine very soon.’ There is no mention
of any special sense or mystic ability.
In this discussion we have found no evidence that nibbana,
as object of the ordinary, although trained, instruments of
knowledge, was thought to be a metaphysical entity.
2. Mystics frequently stress the indescribable or even incon-
ceivable nature of the absolute and their experiences of the
absolute. According to some writers about Buddhism, e.g.
N. Dutt (2, p. 279 f), inconceivability is one of the most prom-
inent features of nibbana. One of his main supports for this
statement is the use of nippapanca, by him translated as
‘inexpressible’. I have found this word referring to nibbana only
in S IV 370, where the word itself is not beyond doubt; its mean-
ing is still more doubtful, and the pts dictionary admits only the
meanings ‘free from diffuseness’ and ‘free from illusion’.
Dutt is a bit unlucky also with most of his further quotations
collected to prove this point. He quotes, e.g. SN 1076: Attham
gatassa na pamdnam atthi, yena nam vajju, tam tassa n'atthi.
This sounds convincing if you translate: ‘That which disappears
is immeasurable, i.e. infinite, and hence there are no words by
which it can be spoken of.’ When you, however, find out that
the stanza refers, not to nibbana, but to the dead arahant, it
becomes clear that it does not prove the inconceivability of
nibbana.
His reference M I 167, ‘it is profound, hard to comprehend,
serene, excellent, beyond dialectics, abstruse, and that it is
only to be realized by the wise within one’s own self’ (Dutt’s
transl.) refers to dhamma and not to nibbana. It tells us that the
doctrine is intellectually hard to grasp but that it can be
understood if you are wise. But the same page does say about
nibbana that it is ajdtam anuttaram yogakkhemam, ‘freedom
from birth, incomparable, perfect peace’ and that it is thdnam
duddasam, ‘a matter difficult to see’. This agrees well with other
44
THE CRITERIA OF TRANSCENDENCE
similar pronouncements. S IV 369 has, among many other
synonyms of nibbana, some which belong here: nipunam,
‘subtle’, sududdasam, ‘very difficult to see’, and anidassanam,
‘without attribute’.
In short, the oldest literature has expressed the idea that
nibbana is difficult to realize but not that it is difficult to
describe. The difficulties to grasp nibbana do, however, not
prove its metaphysical nature, as there are many experiences
in normal conscious life that are found elusive and hard to grasp.
3. Negative descriptions of the Absolute are common in all
mystic religions. ‘The typical theology of the mystics is summed
up in the phrase used of the teaching of Plotinus, ‘‘the negative
theology of positive transcendence’ ” (Spencer, 10, p. 236). The
use of a negative terminology is also quite striking in Buddhism
and has been strongly stressed by various writers. ‘The most
consistently negative of all the mystics was, perhaps, Gotama
the Buddha (following the Pah Canon)’ (Spencer, 10, p. 327).
‘All that he could say about it was by negatives’ (Dutt, 2,
p. 279).
From the material already quoted, this would seem some-
what exaggerated. Perhaps we can obtain more realistic pro-
portions by looking at the biggest collection of synonyms of
nibbana that has been recorded, namely S IV 368-372. Here 32
synonyms for nibbana are given, 10 of which are negative in form.
Among the positive words we find antam, ‘the end’, saccam,
‘the truth’, dhuvam, ‘the stable’, saniam, ‘peace’, sivatn,
‘happiness’, khemam, ‘security’, suddhi, ‘purity’, mutti, ‘release’,
dipa, ‘the island’, Una, ‘the cave’, etc. In order to get a clearer
picture of the negative terminology, let us start by investigating
what exactly is negated.
(a) One group of negations seem to refer to the social world.
This world is crowded, full of disturbance, trouble and fear.
Nibbana, on the contrary, is asambadha, ‘uncrowded’, akhalita,
‘undisturbed’, nirupatdpa, ‘untroubled’, and abhaya, ‘free from
fear’. These negatives seem mainly to express the feeling of
safety that nibbana inspires: it is free from all nuisance and
disturbance.
(b) Then we find a group concerning our personal conditions
of life. We humans are certainly subjected to birth, becoming,
45
PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
creation, compounding, illness, obstruction, old age and death.
Nibbana, on the other hand, is ajdta, ‘freedom from birth’,
abhuta, ‘freedom from becoming’, akata, ‘freedom from creation’,
asankhata, ‘freedom from compounding’ 1 , abyadhi, ‘without
illness’, anltika, ‘without illness’, andlaya, ‘freedom’, ajara,
‘freedom from old age’, amata or amara, ‘deathless’. This group
looks like a negation of the conventional definition of dukkha.
It seems to describe a perfectly static, and at the same time
ideal state, where everything is permanently well.
(c) If this is true about the general conditions of life, it is
also true about the ethical state. In contrast to the hostility,
aggression and impurities of this world, nibbana is asapatta,
‘without hostility’, avyapajja, ‘harmless’, and asankilittha ,
‘without impurities’.
(d) We have also a group of entirely psychological attributes,
corresponding to our previous findings. In this world, our
consciousness is characterized by ignorance and wrong views:
diffuseness and illusion, grief, sensuality, fear and desires. In
nibbana these are eradicated: nibbana is andsava, ‘without
obsessions’, nippapahca, ‘without diffuseness or illusion’, asoka,
‘free from sorrow’, abhaya, ‘without fear’, viraga, ‘without desire’.
The last two points describe nibbana as a state of ethical
perfection and a conscious state of realism, knowledge, calm,
and detachment.
(e) It is of particular interest to see whether nibbana was
contrasted to the physical world and described in terms of
negations of this world. It is difficult to find any clear examples
of this. The Buddha spoke mainly about human conditions and
human achievements. The negations asankhata, abhuta, akata,
mentioned above, are usually referred to the ‘physical’ group
and translated, ‘uncompounded’, ‘not become’, ‘not made’.
Seen in their context, U 80, it turns out that they too must refer
to human conditions. We have also the negations asankuppa,
unchangeable’, and anidassana, ‘without attribute’, but they
probably describe the psychological state which is a characteris-
tic of nibbana, and therefore contrast nibbana to the usual way
of experiencing and not to the physical world. Seen in isolation
1 These translations are somewhat unconventional. They will be discussed
on p. 39 and p. 53b
46
THE CRITERIA OF TRANSCENDENCE
the mentioned negations could be taken as evidence that the
Buddha believed in a metaphysical ‘antiworld’ — but since
they are ambiguous they have to be fitted into the totality.
(The attributes or synonyms for nibbana quoted here are
mainly drawn from S IV 368 ff, M I 173, SN 1149, A II 247,
U 80, and Ti 512.)
This negatively conceived nibbana is maybe partly a construc-
tion. It is easy to notice the opposites in our world, and the
linguistic arrangement of attributes in pairs of opposites proves
the prevalence of thinking in opposites. It is also easy to detect
the imperfections of our world and to project an image of its
absolute opposite. We can construct a conclusion by analogy
in this way:
Observations
cold
bad
pain
hostile
Opposites
warm
good
pleasure
friendly
Observed opposites
changing
death
birth
conditioned
permanent \
immortality ^ ,
no birth I deduced opposites
unconditioned I
From the observed opposites in our world it is tempting to
conclude that there must be real equivalents also to the
phenomena that lack observable opposites in our world. While
we have no proof that Buddhism to any extent built its idea
about nibbana by this type of analogical reasoning, we know
that the Buddha liked to express himself in opposites. We shall
quote one example: Idha bhikkhave ekacco attand jatidhammo
samdno jdtidhamme ddinavam viditva ajatam anuttaram yogak-
kheniam nibbanam pariyesati (M I 162 f). ‘Here someone, being
liable to birth because of himself, having known the peril in
what is liable to birth, seeks the birthless, incomparable, perfect
peace.’ And the text goes on with the following opposites:
jarddhammo — ajaram, byadhidhammo — abyddhim, maranadham-
mo — amatam, sokadhammo — asokam, sankilesadhammo — asan-
47
PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
kilittham, i.e. ‘ageing — ageless, decay — undecaying, dying —
deathless, sorrow — unsorrowing, stain — stainless’.
4. A fourth criterion of a transcendent reality is to be found
in the content of the descriptions. Characteristically it is said
that this reality is supernatural, independent and unconditioned.
It is said to be the real nature behind the things as we see them
or to be the law or principle governing the world.
Now it has already been pointed out that a very large part of
the definitions and explanations given in the literature are
formulated in psychological, personal terms. From a logical
point of view, we cannot have it both ways: if nibbana is an act
of perception, it cannot at the same time be the object seen, and
if it is a conscious content, it cannot also be the universe in
which this consciousness works. Still, it would be understandable
if a conscious process were projected on the external dimension
and believed to be some external fact.
A process of this type would be especially natural in Buddhism
which simply did not distinguish clearly between the external
and the internal world. As I have tried to show earlier (6), the
language of the Nikayas uses the same word for the physical
stimuli {rupa, sadda, etc.) and their perceptual counterparts.
Conscious functions have a certain freedom from the body.
During a dream, the jiva, ‘life-centre’ (consisting of life, heat,
and consciousness, D II 338) may leave the body in invisible
form: ‘Api nu ta tumham jivaut passanti pavisantam va nik-
khamantam va ti?' — ‘No h'idam bho Kassapa.’ ‘Do they see your
life-centre entering or leaving you?’ — ‘No’ (D II 333). Some of
the supernatural forms of knowledge ( abhifind ) may be under-
stood as ideations interpreted as real. The sixth sense ( mano )
is not treated as different from other senses, and there are. few
indications (e.g. SN 360, quoted previously) that the dhamma,
that is, the ideations perceived by mano, were considered to
be of more doubtful reality than other sense-perceptions. Ceto
(the ‘mind’, more or less identical with citta) can be directed
outwards like radio beams, and the whole world can in succes-
sive segments be suffused mettdsahagatena cetasa, ‘with a
mind full of friendship’ (D I 251) and other feelings. This was
considered to be a real influence.
This seems to indicate that the difference between internal
48
THE CRITERIA OF TRANSCENDENCE
and external, conscious and substantial, is smaller in Buddhism
than we are used to believe now. An idea that we would call
purely conscious could therefore easily by the Buddhists be
conceived as ‘real’ in an external, independent sense.
More conclusive and important evidence for this tendency
to objectify mental phenomena can be found in the levels of
meditation. From the descriptions of these levels, there can be
no doubt that they are entirely subjective states of conscious-
ness. However, they are also objectified and described as real
w'orlds or dimensions of existence. There are living beings in
these worlds and it is possible to be reborn there. See, e.g.
A I 267 Idha bhikkhave ekacco puggalo sabbaso rupasanMnam
samatikkama, patighasanndnam atthagamd, ndnattasanMnam
amanasikdra ananto dkdso ti akasdnancdyatanam upasampajja
viharati. So tad assddeti tan nikdmeti tena ca vittim dpajjati.
Tatra thito adhimutto tabbahulavihdri aparihino kalam kuru-
mdno dkasanancdyatanupaganam devanam sahavyatam uppa-
jjati. ‘Herein, a certain person, by passing completely beyond
consciousness of form, by the disappearance of consciousness of
resistance, by paying no attention to consciousness of manifold-
ness, thinks, “Space is infinite”, and reaches up to and stays
in the sphere of infinite space. He enjoys it, wants it and finds
happiness therein. Established therein, given thereto, generally
spending his time therein and not falling away therefrom, when
he makes an end, he is reborn in the company of the gods who
have reached the sphere of infinite space.’ The same is said,
here and elsewhere, about other levels of meditation. Generally
gods are said to live in these spheres, and it is interesting to
note that the life-span of these beings are said to be longer as
the levels become less differentiated.
Now this would make a perfect system, if also the highest
level of meditation, sanUdvedayitanirodha, were included and
identified with nibbana. Then, nibbana would be quite clearly
described as a transcendent world which the adept could reach
by meditation and in which he could stay forever. Just as the
other levels it would be a special dimension coexisting with
but intersecting our world.
However, sanndvedayitanirodha is not included and it is
not identified with nibbana. There are texts that would seem
49
D
PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
to imply at least a very close relationship (see, e.g. the first
part of U 80, quoted in the next chapter), but they are excep-
tions. Nirodha is frequently mentioned as an aid to the attain-
ment of nibbana; but nibbana can be attained on the other
levels just as well, even without meditation: what is important
is the destruction of the obsessions.
Nibbana could also be a metaphysical reality of a different
type: the principle of our existence or the real nature of the
world, the absolute reality behind the changing phenomena.
The text most often referred to as a proof of this interpretation
is U 80. We will discuss it in a separate chapter.
50
A discussion of U 80
This famous page is certainly one of the most frequently
quoted pages in the entire Buddhist literature. It consists of
three sections (followed, on p. 81, by one much less famous),
preceded by an introduction which tells us that the discourse
was centred on nibbana. We shall discuss each of the sections
in turn.
i. Atthi bhikkhave tad dyatanam, yattha n'eva pathavi na dpo
na tejo na vdyo na dkdsdnailcayatanam na vinndndnancdyatanam
na dkihcanhdyatanam na nevasanndndsanndyatanam n'ayam
loko na paraloko ubho candimasuriyd, tad aham bhikkhave n'eva
agatim vadami na gatim na thitim na cutim na upapattim appatit-
thatn appavattam andrammanam eva tarn, es'ev'anto dukkhassd'ti.
‘There is that sphere wherein is neither earth nor water nor fire
nor air; wherein is neither the sphere of infinite space nor of
infinite consciousness nor of nothingness nor of neither-ideation-
nor-non-ideation; where there is neither this world nor a world
beyond nor both together nor moon and sun; this I say is free
from coming and going, from duration and decay; there is no
beginning and no establishment, no result and no cause; this
indeed is the end of suffering.’
In this section, the word dyatana is used referring both to
some of the levels of meditation (numbers 5 to 8 inclusive) and
to nibbana (not mentioned in the quoted part but in the intro-
duction). As the ninth level (sanhdvedayitanirodha) is missing,
it would seem logical to assume that the section refers to this —
but it is not said so. On the other hand, anto dukkhassa can
refer only to nibbana. Thus formally an identification of nibbana
with the highest level of meditation is avoided here as every-
where else. The description itself seems to admit two interpreta-
tions: (a) an objective world or dimension of existence, where the
objects and conditions of this world are not found, where the
eight first levels of meditation (which are often objectified
5i
PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
to dimensions of existence) are also left behind, and where
there is no rebirth, no death and no suffering; (b) a subjective
experience of the type cultivated in meditation, an experience
in which all the distinctions of this world have disappeared and
in which our ordinary conceptual structure simply does not
apply: an experience of unity and completeness, absolute still-
ness and timelessness.
The former interpretation seems to be confirmed by U 55,
where it is said: evant eva kho bhikkhave bahu ce pi bhikkhu
anupadisesaya nibbdnadhdtuyd parinibbdyanti , na tena nibbdna-
dhdtuyd unattam vd piirattam vd panHayati. (Just as the ocean
does not shrink or overflow) ‘even so, though many monks pass
finally away in that condition of nibbana without any attach-
ment left, yet there is neither shrinkage nor overflow in that
condition of nibbana seen thereby’. The idea is evidently that
everybody attains the same nibbana. That there is no change of
volume is presented as a strange fact, but no explanation is given.
However these two texts are to be understood, it is clear that
they both imply a spatial conception of nibbana. Now we know
about two types of space, an internal, conscious, space, and an
external, ‘objective’, space. The former was a normal experience
during meditation and is frequently described. Although nibbana
is not identified with any meditational state, the spatial type
of experience may in these texts have been transferred to
nibbana.
This problem can probably best be solved by referring to
another famous passage, D I 223, which will be discussed more
in detail later (p. 76). It says that in the vinndna (conscious-
ness) of the arahant ‘water, earth, fire and wind find no footing;
there long and short, fine and coarse, pleasant and unpleasant . . .
stop without remainder’. This text seems to be a description
of a vinndna that has ‘stopped’ and does not flow any more and
therefore will not be instrumental in any further rebirth. In
every arahant this ‘stopping’ must have occurred, either by
means of meditation or by means of pa find, ‘understanding’,
only. As this passage is quite similar to U 80 : 1, it seems prob-
able that both refer to the same experience: it is the conscious-
ness of the arahant that is described. But they do not refer to a
vision or a state of short duration, like sahhavedayitanirodha,
52
A DISCUSSION OF U 80
but to a deeper and more permanent level of consciousness,
which can be characterized as a background of understanding,
calm confidence and freedom from desires: this is sometimes
also called emptiness and signlessness, as we have seen earlier.
This is not a state of meditation but it may be produced by
means of meditation.
2. Duddasam anattam ndma, na hi saccam sudassanam;
patividdhd tanhd jdnato, passato n'atthi kihcanan ti. ‘The self-
less is difficult to see, for truth is not easy to see. Craving is
pierced for him who knows; for him who sees, nothing is.’
This section is very vague, and it is not known for sure
whether anattam (the word itself is doubtful) and kincanam
refer to nibbana. The word saccam is frequently used about
nibbana (cf. similar definitions in M III 245: paramam ariya-
saccam, ‘the highest truth’, and S IV 369, nipunam, ‘the subtle’.
The phrase n'atthi kincanam reminds us of the adjective akih-
cana, sometimes used about nibbana (e.g. SN 1093) or about the
arahant (e.g. Dh 421, where both expressions are combined).
It seems most frequently to mean freedom from worldly posses-
sions but may also refer to other things missing in nibbana, e.g.
impurities and obsessions, or simply the tanhd mentioned just
before. The presence of tanhd and anatta in the quotation sug-
gests that psychological facts are referred to, not some external,
metaphysical truth. If this is correct, the section could be
paraphrased like this: ‘The impersonal state is real ( saccam )
but difficult to experience. The arahant has extinguished his
desire and has nothing left (of it, or of worldly possessions, or of
the obsessions).’
3. A it hi bhikkhave ajdtam abhutam akatam asankhatam, no ce
tarn bhikkhave abhavissa ajdtam abhutam akatam asankhatam,
na yidha jatassa bhutassa katassa sankhatassa nissaranam
panhayetha. Yasmd ca kho bhikkhave atthi ajdtam abhutam
akatam asankhatam, tasmd jatassa bhutassa katassa sankhatassa
nissaranam pahhdyati, ‘Monks, there is a not-bom, not-become,
not-made, not-compounded (condition). Monks, if that not-
bom, not-become, not-made, not-compounded (condition) were
not, no escape from the bom, become, made, compounded
(condition) had been known here. But, monks, since there is a
not-born, not-become, not-made, not-compounded (condition),
53
PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
therefore an escape from the born, become, made, compounded
(condition) is known.’
The adjectives are without a noun, and the interpretation
depends on what noun is implied. The most probable alternative
is padam which is frequently found in similar contexts, nibbana-
padam, accutam padam, asankhatam padam, etc. The word itself
means ‘step’ and is therefore a word of the same class as nibbana
itself, a word signifying a transition, a change, a transformation.
According to the dictionary it has also modal meanings, like
‘principle’, ‘characteristic’, ‘thing’, ‘element’. Since one of the
main functions of nibbana is to transfer the human being from
liability to rebirth to freedom from this expectation, a word
like ‘condition’ seems to be the proper translation. This topic
was discussed in the section about nibbana and rebirth with
reference to M I 173, where the negations ajdtam, ajaram,
amatarn were translated ‘freedom from birth, from old age, from
death’. In the last-mentioned passage it is more self-evident
that the Buddha was referring to personal conditions before and
after the attainment of nibbana and our translation therefore
may seem more natural. Still, the similarity of the two passages
is great and there is no reason to assume that the Buddha in this
case has abandoned his habit to speak about human conditions
and instead is speaking about metaphysical things in which he
never professed any interest. The passage in U 80 starts with the
common negation ajdtam, and the following, less common,
words look like an elaboration of it: freedom from birth, from
becoming, from creation, and from compounding.
The most commonly found translation is: ‘There is 1 some-
thing not-bom , not-become’ , etc . , and this is commonly explained
as referring to nibbana as a metaphysical reality, something
absolute, eternal and uncompounded, the truth behind the
phenomena. We can arrive at this translation also if we add
padam, since this word also can mean ‘element’, as we pointed
out above.
1 The statement of Dutt (2, p. 288): ‘By the use of the word " atthi ”, it shows
that Nibbana is an ens and not a non-ens’ — is, of course, nonsense. 'Atthi' can be
used about anything, things, processes, ideas, illusions, and no conclusions can
be drawn about the nature of its subject. Cf. U 80, quotation no. 2: «' atthi
kincanam, ‘there is nothing’, and the many examples in D II 299 f, e.g. atthi
vedana, ‘there is feeling’, atthi . . . kamacchando, ‘there is . . . sensuous desire’.
54
A DISCUSSION OF U 80
It is, however, not justified to draw such a conclusion from
an isolated passage where the most important word is missing.
It is possible that this passage, which is so ambiguous in
meaning, is one of the starting points for the development of
Buddhism as a metaphysical theory. When it was forgotten
that participles like amata, ajata, asankhata, etc., had a personal
reference, it was easy to give them the concrete, literal meaning
as referring to some concrete reality outside the person,
especially since nibbana really was something impersonal (an-
atta), although not concrete and not outside the person. His-
torical speculations are, however, outside the scope of the
present study.
4. Nissitassa ca calitam, anissitassa calitam n'atthi, calite
asati passaddhi, passadhiyd sati rati na hoti, ratiyd asati agati-
gati na hoti, dgati-gatiyd asati cutupapato na hoti, cutupapdte
asati n'ev'idha na hurarn na ubhayamantare, es'ev'anto dukkhassa
( ti. ‘For him who has attachment, there is unsteadiness; for the
unattached there is no unsteadiness; if there is no unsteadiness,
there is calm; if there is calm, there is no love; if there is no love,
there is no coming-and-going (to birth) ; if there is no coming-
and-going, there is no disappearance-and-reappearance; if there
is no disappearance-and-reappearance, there is nothing here
or there or between them: this is indeed the end of suffering.’
This is one of the many quasi-causal chains leading to nibbana,
making it a caused and produced state (the so-called paticcasa-
muppdda- series is the most well known). This text simply says
that freedom from attachment and desire will lead to freedom
from rebirth; and freedom from rebirth is the same as nibbana;
briefly, without attachment to this life we will not come back.
Seen in isolation, these four quotations can be explained in
various ways, as we have seen, but no partial interpretation could
be correct. We must look for an explanation that fits them all.
We may first notice that they describe three things, just as
most Buddhist texts: (a) life in samsara, (b) nibbana, and
(c) the way leading from the one to the other.
The first of these, the situation of the ordinary man, is des-
cribed in quotation no. 3: jdta, bhuta, kata, sankhala: 'born, be-
come, made, compounded’. More details about the ordinary
human world are given in no. 1: earth, water, fire, air, moon,
55
PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
sun, briefly this material world. To this are added the world of
rebirth ( paraloko ) and some of the dimensions realized in
meditation. The inconstancy and causal structure of all this is
stressed, just as in no. 3. In nos. 2 and 4 something is also said
about this world, although more from the psychological side:
there is tanhd, ‘desire’, and: nissitassa ca calitam, ‘for him who
has attachment there is unsteadiness’.
So far, there is nothing unique in our text: this is the world
of birth and death, as the early Buddhists always described it.
When we pass to the other side, nibbana, we find that the
description is more poor than we are used to, since it consists
only of negations; there is only one positive assertion: ‘truth’.
We are left to imagine what this ‘truth’ can be, which is the
absolute opposite to the ordinary human situation, whether it
is a different objective dimension (which could follow from no. 1),
some sort of ultimate reality (which no. 3 could make us believe),
or a new psychological state, the creation of an internal world
which transcends the imperfect external world, is independent
of it and defies even suffering and rebirth.
It seems, however, to the present writer that the four passages
describe different sides of the same experience. No. 3 describes
nibbana as the end of samsara, a life without expectation of
further birth and khandha- creation. No. 4 describes the way to
this state in terms of a causal transformation: attachment-*
detachment -*calm-*no love->no rebirth ->no suffering. This
text also shows that it is a personal transformation towards a
personal state. No. 2 supplements this picture by adding some
attributes of the experience: selflessness, emptiness, freedom
from desire. No. 1 is also a description of nibbana in terms of
consciousness, as explained above. A level of consciousness is
created, experienced as empty, impersonal, undifferentiated,
peaceful, stable and immovable. Since this inner world was
described by means of spatial metaphors, it is not so strange to
find a spatial description of nibbana, or to find it projected as a
real space. Altogether U 80 f gives a picture of nibbana which
does not disagree with the general idea, which we have described
earlier, but perhaps lays some extra stress on the conscious
side (it uses what we have previously called the viHnand-
terminology).
56
A DISCUSSION OF U 80
In M I 4 we find a statement which reminds us of U 80,
quotation No. 2. Yo pi so bhikkhave bhikkhu arahatn khindsavo
vusitavd katakaraniyo ohitabhdro anuppattasadattho parikkhina-
bhavasamyojano samma-d-annd vimutto, so pi . . . nibbanam
nibbanato abhijdndii, nibbanam nibbanato abhinndya nibbanam
na manna ti, nibbdnasmim na mannati, nibbanato na mannati,
nibbanam me ti na mannati, nibbanam ndbhinandati; tarn kissa
hetu: pariHHdtam tassati vaddmi. ‘Whatever monk is an arahant,
free from obsessions, who has lived the life, done what was to be
done, laid down the burden, attained his ideal, whose fetters of
becoming are destroyed, who is freed by the highest knowledge
. . . he knows nibbana as nibbana; because he knows nibbana
as nibbana, he does not think of nibbana; he does not think of
himself in nibbana; he does not think of himself as nibbana;
he does not think: “nibbana is mine”; he does not rejoice in
nibbana. What is the reason for this? I say it is because it is
thoroughly understood by him.’
In order to understand this we must remember that nibbana
here comes as the last link in a long chain of words, among others:
extension, heat, motion, beings, gods, some of the levels of
meditation (the fifth to the eighth), the seen, the heard, etc.
What is to be brought home is the anatta doctrine: the arahant
does not identify himself with anything in this world. As he
completely understands the world, it offers no problems. He has
no objects of thought, he does not distinguish between himself
and the objects. There are no more concepts, not even that of
nibbana. Not even nibbana is permitted to become an object of
identification, not even of thought. When you are in it, it
cannot be seen from the outside and can therefore be no
concept. The ego is forgotten, the world forgotten, even the
goal forgotten.
This interpretation would agree well with the use of anatta
in U 80. On the other hand, it does not agree with the more
common trend of a certain split: usually the arahant has (a)
an experience of nibbana and (b) at the same time a knowledge
that he experiences nibbana. Usually nibbana is described as
the opposite to this world, not as something to be overcome
together with this world.
57
Nibbana and death
Some European scholars translate nibbana as ‘annihilation’
and understand it as referring to the fate of the arahant in
death. We shall not join the heated and prolonged discussion
on this matter as we are concerned only with understanding how
the word is used in the Nikayas.
Nibbana is the technical term for the extinction of a lamp
or any other fire, and the word was used quite concretely for
this purpose. The Buddha liked to express himself by means of
similes and metaphors. Fire was one of his favourite similes,
and we find, for instance, in his ‘fire-sermon’, S IV 19 f: sabbam
. . . ddittam, ‘everything is on fire’, rdgaggind dosaggind tnohag-
gind ddittam, ‘on fire with the flames of desire, hate and illusion’.
The extinction of this, as of any other, fire is called nibbana.
Ta 415: pappuyya anuttaram visuddhim parinibbahisi vdrind
va joti, ‘by winning the highest purity you must be extin-
guished like a fire by water’. Ta 1060: Kassapo jhayati anupd-
ddno dayhamdnesu nibbuto, ‘Kassapa meditates without fuel
(and: clinging), extinguished among the burning.’ Ta, envois:
kliemantam pdpunitvdna aggikkhandhd va nibbutd, ‘having
attained the ultimate security, like a mass of fire extinguished’.
A I 236: V iHUdnassa nirodhena tanhakkhayavimullino pajjotass'
eva nibbdnam vimokho hoti cetaso, ‘To him who has won freedom
through the cessation of viHndna (consciousness) and the
destruction of craving, the liberation of mind is (like) extinc-
tion (nibbana) of a lamp.’
In all these quotations, nibbana and the corresponding verb
are used as a simile, to point out some correspondence between
nibbana (release) and the extinction of a fire. They seem all to
refer to the attainment of nibbana in this life. We can, however,
not end this discussion of the fire analogy without pointing out
that there are two conditions, or stages, of nibbana, as mentioned
in I 38: saupadisesd ca nibbdnadhdtu anupddisesd ca nibbdna-
58
NIBBANA AND DEATH
dhdtu, ‘The condition of nibbana with the basis still remaining
and that without basis.’ The person who has attained the
former is an arahant, but: tassa tiUhanteva panc-indriyani yesam
avighatattd manapamandpam paccanubhoti, sukhadukkham pati-
samvediyati; tassa yo rdgakkhayo dosakkhayo mohakkhayo, ayam
vuccati . . . saupadisesa nibbdnadhdtu. ‘He has still got his five
senses, through which, as they are not yet destroyed, he
experiences pleasant and unpleasant sensations and feels
pleasure and pain. In him the end of desire, hate and illusion
is called "the condition of nibbana with the basis still remain-
ing”.’ But about the arahant who is to attain the second stage
of nibbana it is said: tassa idheva . . . sabbavedayitdni anabhin-
anditdni sitibhavissanti, ‘to him all things that are sensed here
will become cold and no object of pleasure’. And further:
anupddisesd pana sampardyika yamhi nirujjhanti bhavdni
sabbaso, 'the condition without a basis belongs to the state
hereafter, where all becomings completely cease’.
From this it is clear that a distinction should be made between
nibbana in this life, where upadana still remains, and the state of
nibbana reached by the arahant in the moment of death, when
the upadana is destroyed. The latter process is also very
frequently explained by means of the fire analogy. For instance,
in Ta 702-704 we are told about a Naga who: sariram vijaham . . .
parinibissaty andsavo, ‘leaving the body will be extinguished
(reach nibbana) without dsava' , just as: mahdgini pajjalito
andhdro pasammati, ‘a big flaming fire fades away without
fuel’. And when the Buddha had died, Anuruddha pronounced
the famous stanza (D II 157):
Nairn assdsa-passaso thita-cittassa tadino.
Anejo santim arabbha yam kalam akarl muni
Asallinena cittena vedanam ajjhavasayi:
Pajjotass' eva nibbdnam vimokho cetaso ahuti.
‘His mind was firm, without exhalation and inhalation. When
the sage passed away, free from desire, having found peace, he
endured pain with active mind: the liberation of mind was
(like) the extinction of a lamp.’
In M I 486 f, the question is discussed what happens to a
59
PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
Tathagata in the moment of death. Buddha denies, as always,
both that he is ( hoti ), is not, and neither is, nor is not. Then he
is compared to a fire that is extinguished when there is no more
fuel: Sace pana tam Vaccha evam puccheyya: yo te ay am purato
aggi nibbuto so aggi ito katamam disam gato, puratthimam vd
pacchimam vd uttaram vd dakkhinam vd ti, evam puttho tvam
Vaccha kinti byakareyydsiti. — Na upeti bho Gotama. Yam hi so
bho Gotama aggi tinakatthupdddnam paticca ajali, tassa ca
pariyadana ahhassa ca anupahara andharo nibbuto t' eva sankham
gacchaiiti. — Evam-eva kho Vaccha yena rupena tathdgatam
pahhapayamano pahhdpeyya tam rupam tathagatassa pahinam
ucchinnamulam tdlavatthukatam anabhdvakatam dyaiim anup-
pddadhammam; rupasankhdvimutto kho Vaccha tathagato, gamb-
hiro appameyyo duppariyogaho seyyatha pi mahasamuddo. ‘But
if somebody should ask you, Vaccha: this fire in front of you
that is extinguished, in what direction has that fire gone from
here, east, west, north or south — what would you answer to
such a question? — That does not apply, dear Gotama. For that
fire that burned because of fuel ( upaddna ) consisting of straw and
wood, has consumed this and not been given anything else and
is therefore called "extinguished (nibbuto) through lack of
fuel”. — Just so, the form by which one would like to designate
the Tathagata, that form of the Tathagata is given up, its root
broken, uprooted like a palm, free from further growth or
renewed existence in the future. Tathagata is free from every-
thing called form, he is deep, immeasurable, unfathomable,
just as a deep ocean.’ (The same is said about the other
khandhd.)
From these quotations we can see that the difference between
the two stages of nibbana is not very essential. In this life the
fire can flare up again, as there is fuel left: this is impossible
after death, when there is no more fuel. It is not possible to
obtain a direct answer to the question what happens to the
arahant in death, as the Buddha has always refused to give an
answer (see, e.g. D III 135, D II 68). But some indications can
be gleaned. We know from the last quotation that he is like a
fire that is extinguished. So what was the early Buddhist opin-
ion about the extinct fire? Evidently, it was not thought to be
annihilated, as the Buddha here changes over to another
60
NIBBANA AND DEATH
analogy: the deep, immeasurable ocean. The idea must be that
there is some sort of similarity between the ocean and an extinct
fire, possibly the homogeneity, lack of differentiation and dis-
tinguishing traits, the ‘calmness’ and even distribution. Perhaps
the fire was thought to ‘go back’ to some diluted, ‘calm’ exis-
tence, evenly distributed in matter, when it was extinguished
(but without ceasing to be fire). In any case, the quotation
proves that the Tathagata was thought to continue existing in
some form after death, as the ocean certainly exists.
A statement in M I 140 also proves that there is no essential
difference between a living Tathagata and a dead Tathagata.
Evatn vimuttacittam kho bhikkhave bhikkhum sa-Inda deva sa-
Brahmakd sa-Pajdpaiikd anvesam nddhigacchanti : idam nis-
sitam tathdgatassa vihhanan-ti, tam kissa hetu: Ditthe vdham
bhikkhave dhamme tathdgatam ananuvejjo ti vadami. ‘When a
monk's mind is freed thus, the gods — those with Inda, those with
Brahma, those with Pajapati — do not succeed in their search
if they think: “This is the vinhana (consciousness) of a Tatha-
gata.’’ What is the reason for this? I say that a Tathagata
cannot be known even in this life.’ In this life the arahant of
course exists in the conventional meaning and although he
still has his body and even his citta — a citta in purified and
‘liberated’ form — he cannot be known or recognized. As a
physical recognition could not be any problem, I take it to
mean that his citta or vihhana cannot be studied or even
identified by means of mind-reading (except by other arahants).
I will show later that the citta of the arahant in some form
survives death, and in that case the change in death will be
small, as pointed out in our quotation.
In S III 1 12 it is explicitly denied that the arahant is annihi-
lated in death. Sariputta says in a discussion with Yamaka:
Ettha ca te avuso Yamaka dittheva dhamme saccato thetato
tathdgato anupalabbhiyamano, kallam nu te tam veyyakaranam
Tathdham Bhagavata dhammam desitam ajanami, yathd khind-
savo bhikkhu kdyassa bhedd ucchijjati vinassati na hoti param
marand ti? ‘Then, since even in this life a Tathagata is really
and truly untraceable, is it proper for you to assert: “As I
understand the doctrine taught by the Master, a monk who is
free from the obsessions is broken up and perishes when the
61
PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
body is broken up and does not exist after death”?’ This is
denied with the approval of Sariputta.
What Sariputta wanted to stress here is that the anatta
doctrine applies also to the arahant and that he cannot be
identified with any of the personality factors ( khandha ). It is
therefore not possible to define what an arahant really is even
in this life, and so no conclusion can be drawn as to the state
after death. The khandha are anicca and dukkha and therefore
dissolved: this is pointed out in the continued discussion. Two
things should be noted: first that it is denied that the arahant
is annihilated in death, secondly that citta was not mentioned
in this discussion.
The fact that the arahant cannot be known either in this
life or afterwards, is not a universal truth, since arahants
always can recognize each other. We find, for instance, in S I
194 that Maha Moggallana in a company of five hundred ara-
hants could check that they really were arahants: Tesam sudam
dyasma Maha-Moggalldno cetasd cittam samannesati vippa-
muttam nirupadhim. ‘The venerable Maha-Moggallana saw
with his mind ( ceto ) that their mind (citta) was freed without
basis (for rebirth remaining).’ This can only mean that the
arahant has still his citta and that this has kept enough of its
individuality in order to be identified. This fact will not sur-
prise us once we have understood that citta is the agency within
the person which really attains nibbana, as expressed in S III
45: Rupadhatuya ( vedana -, sahhd-, sankhara-, vinhdna-dhdtuyd)
ce bhikkhave bhikkhuno cittam virattam vimuttam hoti anupadaya
dsavehi vimuttatd thitam, thitatta santussitam, santussitatta na
paritassati, aparitassam paccattahheva parinibbayati. ‘If a monk’s
citta is not attached to the element of form (feeling, perception,
activities, consciousness), and is released from the obsessions
without basis, then by its release it is steadfast; by its stead-
fastness it is content; being content it does not become excited;
free from excitement it attains nibbana by itself.’
It is fairly well documented that citta was thought to survive
death. We find, for instance, in S V 370: Yahca khvassa
cittam digharattam saddhaparibhavitam stta-suta-caga-paribha-
vitam, tam uddhagdmi hoti visesagami, ‘(Even if the body is
devoured by crows and vultures) yet his citta, if longtime
62
NIBBANA AND DEATH
practised in faith, virtue, learning and renunciation, soars aloft
and wins the excellent.’ This is said by the Buddha in reply to
Mahanama who has asked what would happen if he were to
die. In Ta 1109 ff, the former theatrical manager, Talapufa, tells
the complete story of his citta : it has followed him during many
existences, it has preached the doctrine to him, but now, when
he has followed its advice, it is still not satisfied but makes
difficulties; but he promises to give his citta adequate training,
and: migo yatha seri sucittakdnane rammam girim pdvisi
abbhamdlinam, anakule tattha nage ramissasi, asamsayam citta
parabhavissasi, ‘just as the free gazelle in the many-coloured
forest reaches a cloud-wreathed splendid mountain-top, so shall
even you, citta, find your happiness on the uninhabited moun-
tain and doubtless reach the beyond’.
The many problems in connection with these quotations will
be discussed in due course, in so far as they are related to the
interpretation of nibbana. Here, we just want to stress that
we are not without information about exactly what is thought
to survive death in the arahant, although in a form that not
everybody can recognize, not even Mara and the gods. We
know, however, that at least the Buddha himself claimed
ability to identify and report about dead arahants: We have,
for instance, the story about Vakkali (S III 1x9 ff), who was ill
and killed himself. The Buddha said about him later: Apatit-
thitena ca bhikkhave vinnanena Vakkali kulaputto parinibbuto
ti, ‘with consciousness not established the noble-born Vakkali
has attained parinibbana’. A similar story is to be found in
D II 91 f, where Ananda tells the Buddha that a number of
people, some monks and some lay people, had died in Nadika,
where the Buddha and his disciples had just arrived, and asks
what has happened to them. He got detailed information, in-
deed, and among them one monk was mentioned as arahant.
We can take these stories to mean that at least the Buddha
himself was able to trace an arahant even after death. After the
quotations given earlier, this would not seem to involve any
fundamental difficulties, as there seems to be small difference
between his state before and after death. One more text is
worth quoting to this effect. In SN 1075, the Buddha is asked:
Atthan gato so uda vd so n’atthi udd.hu ve sassatiya arogo? ‘The
63
PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
man who has gone to rest, is he no more or is he forever free
from illness?’ And he replies: Atthan gatassa na pamdnam atthi,
yena nam vajju, tarn tassa n’ atthi, sabbesu dhammesu samiihatesu
samiihatd vddapathd pi sabbe ti. ‘There is no measure of him who
has gone to rest, by which to define him: that is not for him;
when all dhammd are removed, then all means of recognition
are removed.’ This informs us again that the arahant, when
dead, cannot be found or recognized, but an explanation is
given which is extremely interesting: dhammd are removed.
The pta translation gives the rendering ‘conditions’, but a
more normal translation would be ‘ideations’ or ‘mental con-
tents’, ‘mental processes’. This would give an easily under-
standable psychological meaning. For one of the effects of
meditation is to make the mind ( citta or vihhdna) stable and
empty of mental contents {dhammd). As we know that citta
was thought to survive, it can easily be understood that an
empty citta is more difficult to read and recognize than the more
complicated and desire-ridden ‘normal’ citta: it is more imper-
sonal. In order to ‘read’ a person’s mind, there must be a mind
to read, and this mind must be as differentiated and rich in
content as possible. Sabbesu dhammesu samiihatesu may well
imply the same psychological process as vihhdnassa nirodhena
in A I 236, quoted above.
This chapter has been mainly descriptive, aiming at a
presentation of the facts given in the Nikayas. We have found,
in short, that the word nibbana is used because of the fire
analogy (to some extent, the word updddna and related words
seem to be used for the same reason). Still, it does not imply
annihilation but rather a different type of existence: perhaps
a diluted, undifferentiated, ‘resting’ existence, more or less
impersonal but still recognizable.
64
The personality factors
and nibbdna
The original Buddhism was a psychologically sophisticated
doctrine with a very rich and differentiated psychological
terminology. Psychological knowledge formed a very essential
part of the training for and experience of nibbana. Minute
psychological analyses were one of the aims of meditation,
and an adequate understanding of the own self was considered
a necessary basis for the ultimate achievement.
The psychology of Nikaya Buddhism has not yet been adequa-
tely analysed and described. An early attempt by Mrs Rhys
Davids (9) is superficial and biased. The work of Jayatilleke,
referred to previously (4), is reliable but touches psychological
matters only occasionally. An interesting treatment of some
special questions of psychological interest is found in an article
by him (5). A semantic investigation of three psychological
concepts has been performed by myself and is already frequently
referred to (6). Much patient research is therefore still needed
before we can really understand the meaning of the psychological
terminology of early Buddhism. The interpretation given in
the following comparison between Buddhist and present-
day Western psychology is to a large extent only tentative.
Western psychology usually starts its analysis of human
personality from the organism: the sense organs and the ner-
vous system are the basic structures and their functions consti-
tute the main objects of psychological analysis. Personality
is considered a self-regulating system with only functional
unity. The new-born baby is, however, not an empty structure.
Rather, he has some basic programmes for behaviour, e.g. some
emotional patterns and the basic needs, physiological, sexual
and others. Some of the nervous processes become conscious,
and consciousness is therefore considered secondary to the
65
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PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
physiological processes. Through the senses, there is a con-
tinuous inflow of information, and much of this information is
kept available, through the storing capacity of the central
nervous system. Through this capacity, the doors are open to
a modification of the organism — for good or for bad. The human
personality is conceived as governed by causal laws, and
continually changing: in normal cases there is unity, to be
sure, but this unity is rarely very perfect and conflicts are
common. Within the physiological structure, there is a stream
of processes only and certainly no unchanging soul. There
is a hierarchy of purposes, and some may be fairly constant and
function as organizing forces. These forces, with which the
individual identifies himself, are often called the ego or the
self : they form the core of the person’s image of himself. His
values and norms are sometimes called the superego. This is
the conscience, which tells him what he should be and is
frequently a severe critic of the ego.
There are striking similarities between this interpretation
of the human being and the early Buddhist view, but there are
differences also. By the anatta- and am'cca-doctrines the soul-
lessness and process-nature are stressed. By the paticcasa-
muppada-senes the quality of everything personal as being
caused is pointed out, although this causality is partly of moral
type. In a way, Buddhism also considers conscious phenomena
as secondary to the bodily processes, as citta is called sariraja,
‘born of body’ (Ta 355), but asarira, ‘incorporeal’ (Dh 37), and
vihhdna is said to depend on the body, as we read in D I 76 f:
Ay am kho me kayo rupl cdtum-mahd-bhutiko mdtd-pettika-
sambhavo odanakummas-upacayo a nice' -ucchddana-parimaddana-
bhedana-viddhamsanadhammo, idah ca pana me vihhdnam ettha
sitarn ettha patibaddhan ti. ‘This body of mine has form, it is
built up of the four elements, it springs from father and mother,
it is continually renewed by so much boiled rice and juicy
foods, its nature is impermanence, decay, abrasion, dissolution
and disintegration; and therein is this consciousness of mine,
too, resting, on that does it depend.’ In spite of this depen-
dence the bodily processes are not further analysed, and the
conscious phenomena are always treated as the most important.
This may be one of the reasons why the ‘series of dependences’
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THE PERSONALITY FACTORS AND NIBBANA
(paticcasamuppdda) often seems to mention things in the wrong
order. We axe, for instance, used to consider needs as more basic
than consciousness, and to interpret consciousness as depending
on perception and perception as depending on the sense-organs.
Buddhist thinking seems to have started from what is immedi-
ately given and most important to the person, namely activity
and consciousness. The relations of the rest is to a great extent
implication and activation.
Buddhism emphasizes the impermanence and process-nature
of the human personality more than Western psychology. The
words of Visuddhimagga are famous: ‘Nibbana is, but not the
man that enters it.’ The opinion of original Buddhism is
perhaps best presented by Sister Vajira (S I 135), who was
asked by Mara, how a ‘being’ ( satta ) comes to be. She replies:
Kinnu satto ti paccesi,
Mara ditthigatam nu te.
suddhasankhdrapunjo yam
nayidha sattupalabbhati.
yathd hi angasambhdrd
hoti saddo ratho iti.
evam khandhesu santesu
hoti satto ti sammuti.
‘Why do you take the “being” for granted, Mara? Your opinion
is false. Here is nothing but a multitude of activities, and no
“being” can be found. For just as a combination of parts is
called “car”, just so do we use the word “being”, when all
khandhd (factors) are there.’
Here the functional unity of personality is admitted. This
functional unity is in reality what contemporary psychologists
call ‘personality’. The car has clearly some sort of primitive
personality, an individual constellation of parts; it is capable
of functioning only when all the parts are there. None of the
parts can be called ‘car’, not even all the parts together, if they
are not combined in a very special way. The ‘car-ness’ is some-
thing above but not independent of the parts. A personality is
also not the body, not the perceptual function, not the feeling,
etc., but the proper combination of them. This is what the
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PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
definition of Vajira seems to imply, and modern psychology can
only applaud.
Some formulations seem more radical. We can, e.g. refer to
S III hi, where it is said just before the part quoted above,
and after it has been denied that a Tathagata can be identified
with any of the factors ( khandhd ) individually: Riipd vedand
sahhd sankhdrd vinhanam tathdgato ti samanupassasiti? — No
hetam avuso. ‘Do you regard a Tathagata as body, feeling, per-
ception, activities, and consciousness? — Surely not.’ Here it
seems to be denied that all the factors together constitute a per-
sonality. But it is left unclear whether the combination is meant
as mechanical and unorganic or whether also an organic-
functional combination of the factors would fail to constitute a
personality. As the discussion here is about a Tathagata we
also have the question whether the same would be said about
an ordinary man. After all, something happens to the khandhd
when a man attains nibbana, as we shall find soon. We have also
the final question, whether the khandhd are to be considered an
exhaustive enumeration of all personality factors. Is there
nothing in personality not included in the khandhd ? There cer-
tainly is. Attd is denied, with good reason, but citta is not denied.
Buddhism never had any reason to work out a complete and
scientific theory of personality. The purpose was intensely
practical. This may be the reason why the psychological termin-
ology seems to be arranged in clusters, each cluster belonging
to the analysis of one doctrinal point and seemingly with little
connection with other clusters. The problem was, for instance,
to find out the nature of the ‘soul’ : the result was the khandha-
analysis. Or the problem was to explore our state of dukkha
and its connection with rebirth: out came a causal analysis, in
which our whole mental make-up is involved, in order to ex-
plain how we ourselves create our suffering and rebirth. Or the
problem was to find a moral continuity and a basis for develop-
ment, and we got the concept of citta, the enfant terrible of the
monk, from the beginning endowed with all moral depravities
and bound to the world by means of desires and passions, but
capable of the highest development.
These conceptual spheres were occasionally confronted with
each other but never properly integrated into a comprehensive
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THE PERSONALITY FACTORS AND NIBBANA
theory: they remain three independent deep-diggings in the
same mine. Without a special investigation we therefore cannot
know, whether the words have identical meaning when used in
different spheres; some problems of this type are still not solved.
i. Khandhd. As we have seen from S I 135, the individual is
said to be constituted by khandhd , translated by ‘groups’,
‘aggregates’, ‘factors’. We also find the word updddnakkhandhd,
‘base-factors’, often translated ‘grasping-groups’, although it
should not be forgotten that it also means ‘heap of fuel’ (subject
to the fire of rdga, ‘desire’, without which the individual is
nibbuta, ‘extinguished’, i.e. ‘free’). Khandha in itself can also
mean ‘tree-trunk’ and thus is fit to join the fire terminology.
Birth and death are defined in terms of khandhd. Birth is
khandhdnam pdtubhdvo dyatandnam patildbho (S II 3), ‘appear-
ance of the factors, acquiring of sense-spheres’, and maranam . . .
khandhdnam bhedo (M III 249), ‘death is the breaking up of the
factors’. It is possible to wish for a certain constellation of
factors in a future life: Evamrupo siyam andgatam addhdnam ;
evamvedano siyam andgatam addhdnam, etc. (S III 101). ‘May I
have such a body in future time, may I have such feeling in
future time,’ etc. And just as we can make a painted picture of
a person: evam eva kho bhikkhave assutava puthujjano rupahheva
abhinibbattento (S III 152), ‘even so the ignorant layman creates
and recreates his body’ (etc., the other factors follow). This is
done through the agencies of citta and vihhdna and is made
possible through the law of causality, for
Nayidam attakatam bimbam
na yidam parakatam agham
hetum paticca sambhwtam
hetubhangd nirujjhati.
Yatha ahhataram bijam
khette vuttam viruhati
pathavirasah cagamma
sinehah ca tad ubhayam
evam khandhd ca dhdtuyo
cha ca dyatand ime
hetum paticca sambhuta
hetubhangd nirujjhare ti (S I 134)
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PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
‘This evil shape is not created by itself and also not by somebody
else; it has come to be by means of a cause and ceases by
disruption of the cause. Just as a certain seed, sown in the
field, which grows thanks to the taste of earth and moisture,
these both, just so the factors, the elements, and the six sense-
fields come to be by means of a cause and cease by disruption
of the cause.’
This text is interesting because it describes the human per-
sonality as rather unreal (an ‘image’) and unpleasant. Its birth
is an impersonal process effected by causes, through which a
certain constellation of elements is created.
The factors may be briefly defined as follows:
(a) Rupa means form, external and internal. In this context
we are certain that the meaning is body, as rupa is sometimes
replaced by kdya, ‘body’.
(b) Vedana is usually defined in terms of feeling, e.g. S IV
232: sukhd vedana dukkhd vedana adukkhamasukhd vedana,
‘pleasant, unpleasant, neutral feeling’. These feelings are,
however, not described as subjective evaluations secondarily
added to the sensory process, but rather as an integrative part
of the sensory process itself. They are said to be an immediate
result of contact or stimulation: Phassa-samudaya vedana-
samudayo (M I 51), ‘from the genesis of stimulation is the
genesis of feeling’, i.e. ‘feeling is produced through stimulation*.
And we find classifications of feelings according to sense-fields:
feelings produced by the stimulation of the eye, the nose, the
tongue, the body, the mind (M I 51). We must therefore think
of vedana as something closely related to sensation. Possibly
vedana is conceived as given in the stimulation itself as it is
said to cease when stimulation ceases: phassanirodha vedan-
dnirodho.
(c) Sanfid is usually translated by ‘perception’ and is said
to depend on phassa, just as vedana: Phasso . . . sanndnam
niddnasambhavo (A III 413), ‘the perceptions are causally pro-
duced by stimulation’. The same text says: Chayimd . . . sannd:
rupasaiind, saddasanna, gandhasanna, rasasanna, photthab-
basaflnd, dhammasannd, ‘perceptions are these six: perception
of form, sound, smell, taste, touch and ideas’. From this we can
see that our word ‘perception’ is not entirely satisfactory because
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THE PERSONALITY FACTORS AND NIBBANA
this word can only refer to external things. Buddhist psychology
includes also an internal sense, viano, which by means of
stimulation, phassa, can ‘perceive’ ideas, dhammd. Memory
images, imaginations and thoughts are, therefore, included in
the activity of sahha, and a more adequate translation would be
‘ideation’, in German Vorstellung. Cf. SN 874, sahhaniddna hi
papahcasankhd, ‘what is called illusion has its origin in sahha ’;
devd arupino sahhdmayd (M I 4x0), ‘formless gods made of
sahha'. In A V 105, ten sanna are mentioned that should be
developed, among them asubhasahhd, maranasahha, anicca-
sahhd, virdgasahhd, ‘idea of the unpleasant, of death, of imper-
manence, of freedom from desire’. In these examples, the
translation ‘perception’ is impossible.
(d) Vihhana is the most important of the khandha, as it is
more actively engaged in the process of rebirth. It is the
accumulative, dynamic stream of consciousness, always chang-
ing, always observable, as often as we care to introspect, con-
taining a jumble of perceptual data, memory images, feelings
and desires. It builds on vedana and sahha' yam vedeti tam
sahjdndti, yam sahjdndti tam vijandti (M I 293), ‘whatever one
feels, that one perceives; whatever one perceives, that one is
conscious of’. Memory is rarely mentioned as a separate function
in Buddhism; it is taken for granted that our existence is
accumulative: nothing is really forgotten, and our present state
is continually changed through the effects of the past. Vihhana
is the carrier of these accumulations, and it is conceived as a
stream flowing ceaselessly in time if not made to stop. It must
use the other khandha as a base (S III 9) but is to a certain ex-
tent independent of the body. Mara is on the outlook for the
vihhana of dead persons (S I 122).
(e) Sankhara is motivated, purposeful activity, morality-
causal behaviour. The meaning may sometimes be diluted to
‘process’. Several interesting analyses are to be found in the
Nikayas. The purposiveness becomes clear from S III 60:
Katamd ca . . . sankhara? Chayime . . . cetandkdyd: rupasahcetand
saddasahcetana gandhasahcetana rasasahcetand photthabbasahce-
tand dhammasahcetana, ‘And what are the activities? They are
these six forms of purposeful striving: striving for form, for
sound, for smell, for taste, for touch, for mental images.’ In
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PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
M I 301, three types of activities are distinguished: kayasank-
hdro vacisankhd.ro cittasankharo, ‘activity of body, speech, and
mind’. A further definition follows: Assasapassasd . . .
kdyasankhdro, vitakkavicdrd vacisankharo, sannd ca vedand ca
cittasankharo, ‘inbreathing and outbreathing is activity of body,
thinking and examination is activity of speech, ideation and
feeling is activity of mind’. Here the activity-meaning is quite
clear, but the purposiveness is not stressed, in fact breathing is
completely involuntary.
Sankhdra is sometimes translated by ‘Aawma-formation’, be-
cause all activity has a moral aspect, is morally judged, has
moral causes and moral consequences. There is here a close
co-operation between vinnana and sankhdra : sankhdra is the
effector of the deeds ( kamma ), vinhdna is the accumulator of
the effects. The connection between kamma and sankhdra can
be seen in M I 389: KatamaH-ca . . . kammam kanham kanhavi-
pdkam? Idha . . . ekacco sabydbajjham kayasankhdram abhisan-
kharoti, sabydbajjham vacisankhdram abhisankharoti, sabyd-
bajjham manosankhdram abhisankharoti, ‘And what is the deed
that is black, with black consequences? Here someone performs
a harmful activity of the body, or a harmful activity of speech
or a harmful activity of mind.’ That vinndna is affected can be
seen in S II 82: Avijjagato yam . . . purisapuggalo pannam ce
sankhdram abhisankharoti, punnupagam hoti vihhdnam. ‘If a per-
son, although ignorant, performs a meritorious act, vinfiana
acquires merit.’ It is significant that sankhdra is the producer of
kamma, as the factor of responsibility is entered into the causal
process: the intention behind the act is more important than
the act itself. On the whole, intention, will and desire has an
immense influence upon the process of rebirth, as can be seen,
for instance, in D III 258: Tassa evam hoti — ’A ho vatdham
kdyassa bheda param marana khattiyamahdsaldnam vd brahmana-
mahdsdldnam vd gahapati-mahasalanam vd sahavyatam uppajjey-
yan ti' . So tarn cittam dahati, tarn cittarn adhitthdti, tarn cittam
bhdveti. Tassa tarn cittam hine vimuttam uttarim abhdvitam tatr '
uppattiyd samvattati. ‘And he thinks: “Ah! if only I may be
reborn at the dissolution of the body after death as one amongst
wealthy nobles, or brahmins, or householders!” This thought he
holds fixed, firmly established, and develops it. This thought,
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THE PERSONALITY FACTORS AND NIBBANA
set free in a low sphere and not developed to anything higher,
leads to rebirth in this sphere.' The causal processes of life are,
as we find, complicated. Physical causality is taken for granted,
but in addition we find long-range moral causality, and finally
the last wish of the person: a psychological causality.
The fate of the khandhd in nibbana can to a great extent be
deduced from what we already know. In the living individual,
the factors must be intact and functioning. The body is not
changed, and the perceptual apparatus must function, but it
will not be permitted to stimulate desire and passion. Activity
must to a certain extent go on, but it must be of a kind that
produces no more kamma-eflects. Vinnana must be reduced to
such a state that it will not ‘flow over’ into a new existence.
Let us now explain this further and collect evidence from
the texts.
The arahant Samidatta says, Ta 90, Pancakkhandhd parinnata
titthanti chinnamulaka, ‘The five factors are well understood;
they are still standing, although their root is cut off.’ To under-
stand the factors correctly means to see them as unreal and
unsubstantial and not identify oneself with them. So it is said
in S III 142:
Phenapindupamam rupam,
vedand bubbulupamd.
Marlcik.upa.md sannd,
sankhdrd kadalupamd.
Mdyupamarica vinnanam.
‘The body is like a ball of foam, feeling is like a bubble, ideation
is like a mirage, the activities are like a plantain-trunk, conscious-
ness is like an illusion.’
And further, in S III 168, Arahatd . . . ime pancupdddnak-
khandhe aniccato dukkhato rogato gandaio sallato aghato abadhato
parato palokato sunnato anattato yoniso manasi kattabbd. ‘An
arahant should seriously consider these five base-factors as
impermanent, suffering, illness, a boil, an arrow, an evil, a
disease, an enemy, as decay, as empty and without a self.’ The
exhortative way of expression suggests that the factors contin-
ued to give problems even to an arahant, although the text
goes on to say that natthi . . . arahato uttarikaraniyam, ‘to an
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PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
arahant there is nothing more to be done’. A similar suggestion
can be found in S II 54, where Sariputta says: tathdsato vihardmi,
yathdsatam viharantam dsavd ndnusavanti, ‘I stay so mindful
that the obsessions no longer obsess me (staying so mindful).’
From this follows that exercises in mindfulness (more about
these will be said in the following chapter) were used to keep
the obsessions out. Cf. also S II 239: Yo bhikkhave bhikkhu
arahant khindsavo tassa pahatn labhasakkdrasilokam antardydya
vaddmlti, ‘Monks, even for the monk who is an arahant with his
obsessions destroyed, I say that gains, favours, and flattery are a
danger.’ It is true that the arahant had achieved his aim, but
this achievement had to be kept up by constant training. The
state called nibbana could be lost.
These more general statements can be somewhat clarified
with the help of other texts, separately dealing with the factors.
We find, for instance, something about sankhara and vedana in
S II 82: Yato . . . bhikkhuno avijjd pahina hoti vijjd uppanna,
so .. . n'eva punnabhisankhdram abhisankharoti, na apufifiabhi-
sankhdram abhisankharoti, na dnehjabhisankhdram abhisank-
haroti. ‘When in a monk ignorance is conquered and wisdom is
attained, then ... he does not perform neither an act of merit,
nor an act of demerit, nor a neutral act.’ This seems to mean
that he does not perform any acts of kammic consequence or
kammic relevance. The acts he can still perform must be entirely
free from this aspect. The ideal is, as Dh 368 expresses it, padam
santam sankharupasamam sukham, ‘the tranquil, pleasant state,
where activity is at rest’. A way of reaching it is indicated in
M III 82: Passambhayam kayasankhdram assasissdmiti sikkhati,
‘He trains himself thinking: “I will breathe out calming down
the activity of body.” ’ This forms part of the sati-exe rcises of
the seventh part of the eightfold way. We shall have more to say
about this method, but, briefly, the principle of it seems to have
been to follow each movement, each activity with unflinching
attention and so keep the activity free from desire, free from
kammic effects, as it is said in M I 270, after upatthitakdyasati,
‘with attention fixed on the body’, is mentioned: ossa te papaka
akusala dhammd aparisesd nirujjhanti, ‘these evil unskilled
processes in him are stopped without remainder’.
If the activity is in this way ‘calm’ and ‘pure’, there will be
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THE PERSONALITY FACTORS AND NIBBANA
nothing for vihhdna to store up. But vihhdna has also problems
of its own, mainly through influence from sahhd and vedand, and
there are special methods to cope with them, mainly those
belonging to the samddhi-group. What should be achieved is
stated in M III 223, bahiddhd . . . vihhdne avikkhitte avisate sati
ajjhattam asanthite, anupdddya aparitassato dyatim jatijard-
marana-dukkha-samudaya-sambhavo na hoti, ‘if consciousness is
externally undistracted and concentrated, and internally un-
settled, then, for him who is thus free from grasping and therefore
undisturbed, there will in the future be no generation of birth,
old age, death or pain’. The word asanthite, ‘unsettled’, probably
refers to a vihhdna that has not got any thitiyd, ‘placement’, for
a new rebirth. ‘Unsettled’ therefore should mean ‘free from
conditions of rebirth’; that is with the more conventional ex-
pression which follows, ‘free from grasping’. We find similar
expressions in M II 265: Tassa tam upekham anabhinandato
anabhivadato anajjhosdya titthato na tan nissitam hoti vihhdna m
na tad upaddnam. Anupdddno, Ananda, bhikkhu parinibbdyati .
‘As he does not rejoice in that equanimity, nor approve of it or
cleave to it, consciousness is not supported by it, does not have
it as foundation. A monk without foundation attains nibbana.’
This tells us something about rebirth and about the relation
between vihhdna and upddana. The equanimity (in the context a
result of the 8th j liana, upadanasettham, ‘the best foundation’!)
is itself a state of consciousness, just as the jhdnas. Upddana
therefore is itself a manifestation of vihhdna: there is a feeling of
dependence and need which is a foundation or cause of new life.
A term frequently used about psychological factors in nibbana
is nirodha, ‘ceasing’, also used more or less as a synonym of
nibbana. We find it, e.g. in SN 734, vihhdnassa nirodhena
n’atthi dukkhassa sambhavo, ‘by the ceasing of consciousness
there is no generation of suffering*. Although complete cessation
of vihhdna will take place only in death, the word cessation is
still adequate for nibbana in this life, since vihhdna is a series of
processes, and the meaning is not different from what is said in
the continuation of the text: vihhdnupasamd bhikkhu nicchdto
parinibbuto ti, ‘by calming vihhdna the monk becomes satisfied
and attains nibbana'. Nirodha probably means no more than
‘stopping’ = ‘making still and immovable’.
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PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
An interesting description of the vinndna of the arahant is
found in D I 223, where it is asked, where name and form cease
without remainder. Answer:
Vihhanam anidassanam anantam sabbato paham:
Ettha dpo ca pathavi tejo vayo na gddhati,
Ettha dighan ca rassan ca anum thulam subhasubham,
Ettha ndman ca rupan ca asesam uparujjhati,
Vinndnassa nirodhena etth' etam uparujjhati.
‘The consciousness that is without attribute, endless, drawing
back from everything: there water, earth, fire and wind find no
footing; there long and short, fine and coarse, pleasant and
unpleasant — there name and form stop without remainder: by
the stopping of consciousness this also stops.’ In nibbana
vinndna is said to be stopped, i.e. the flow of conscious processes
has ceased and consciousness has been emptied, either by means
of meditation or simply by means of panna, ‘understanding’.
It is therefore undifferentiated (i.e. free from attributes),
endless (because a resting consciousness contains no sense of
limits), and being undifferentiated, it cannot contain separate
things like water and earth. And so no further processes are
produced and no rebirth can take place: for in rebirth, viHndna
is said to enter the mother’s womb and give rise to name and
form there (D II 63). But, in nibbana, vinndna is stopped: its
processes do not flow any more, there are no more desires mani-
fest and it can therefore not be stationed in this way: Yato ca
kho ... no ceteti no ca pakappeti no ca anuseti, drammanam
etam na hoti vinndnassa thitiya, drammane asati patittha
vinndnassa na hoti (S II 66), ‘But when somebody neither plans,
nor decides, nor has a subconscious leaning, then this basis for
the settlement of vinndna does not exist; and without the basis
vinndna will not become established.’
It remains to be said about vinndna, that it is probably one
aspect of citta or a name for some of the processes of citta. Both
are said to be involved in rebirth, but we should of course not
understand this as a dual rebirth: the instrumental processes
are the vinndna- processes of citta. The basis of rebirth (aram-
rnana, upddana) is the intense wish (upadana) to go on living.
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THE PERSONALITY FACTORS AND NIBBANA
When viiindna has stopped, there are practically no viiindna -
processes left in citta, and there is no base for rebirth. Evidently
the arahant has conscious processes as long as he lives. This
may be explained in two ways, and it cannot be decided which
is the more correct. There may be two layers of citta: one surface
layer which consists of the everyday processes, perceptions and
reflections, and one deeper layer that is undifferentiated. Or
perhaps D I 223 really describes the highest level of meditation
which was considered the most normal stepping-stone to nibbana
and therefore in this text simply was described as a characteristic
of nibbana itself.
S II 82, partly quoted above, has also something to say about
vedand : So sukham ce vedanam vedayati, sa aniccati pajdndti,
anajjhosita ti pajdndti, anabhinanditdii pajdndti. ‘If he feels a
pleasant feeling, he knows it is impermanent, he knows it is not
clung to, he knows he does not enjoy it’ (this is repeated for other
types of feelings). This text comes immediately after an arahant
formula, so we know it refers to an arahant, and it shows that
feelings are normal in nibbana; what is new is that they no longer
give rise to desire and attachment. The same idea is expressed
in D II 157, which has already been quoted. It is said about the
Buddha that he endured pain (vedand) with active mind; so we
know that feelings were not unknown to him.
What happens to the factors when an arahant dies can be
seen in U 93, where it is said about Dabba Mallaputta who had
just died: abhedi kayo, nirodhi sannd, vedand pi'tidahamsu
sabba, vupasamimsu sankhard, vinMnam attham agamd. ‘The
body is broken, ideation is stopped, all feelings are cooled, the
activities are calmed down, consciousness has gone to rest (or:
gone home) . ’ The choice of verbs is interesting, since most of them
suggest stopping or reaching immobility rather than annihila-
tion. This is in good agreement with the Buddhist view of the
process-nature of personality, and it also suggests that the
psychological factors may ‘go home’ and continue to exist, just
as the body will exist in a different form after death.
2. The paticcasamuppada-senes is a series of (at least mainly)
psychological factors, in order of dependence. Its main purpose
seems to have been to explain the human state of suffering (with
rebirth as its main component) and to find a way to eliminate it.
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PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
I have tried to show earlier (6) that no strict causality and no
strict time sequence was intended, and that the later interpreta-
tion that three successive lives are covered cannot be correct.
The main reasons are, first, that many other arrangements of
factors are to be found in the Nikayas and, secondly, that the
whole purpose would be defeated by this interpretation. A
closer scrutiny of the factors will reveal that the relations
between them is usually a vague dependence or correlation,
sometimes implication, sometimes activation. They may all be
more or less simultaneous, as they should be, because our present
dukkha depends on our present avijjd, etc. ; otherwise, how could
we get rid of dukkha and achieve the only goal promised by
Buddhism? The paliccasamuppada- series therefore amounts to
another analysis of personality in order to find the factors of
importance for the attainment of nibbana.
If this interpretation is correct, it is perhaps most realistic to
represent the series as shown in the figure on page 78. This
arrangement would mean that each factor in itself leads to suffer-
ing but that, when analysed, it will be found to involve the
succeeding factors. There are indications that this interpretation
may be true. We find, for instance, that avijjd is an dsava, just as
bhava. As such, it is said to cause suffering in its own right,
without the intervening links. Vihhdna is said to lead to rebirth
without other finks being mentioned. And in D II 308 it is said
that tanhd directly leads to suffering. It happens, on the other
hand, that a dependence in the reversed direction is mentioned:
vihhdna is, e.g. said to depend on ndmarupa and sankhdra on
phassa (S III 101).
Next, a short definition of the finks will be given.
Avijjd: Katamd ca . . . avijjd ? Yam kho . . . dukkhe ahhdnam
dukkhasamudaye ahhdnam dukkhanirodhe ahhdnam dukkhani-
rodhagaminiyd patipaddya ahhdnam (S II 4). ‘What is ignorance?
Not understanding suffering, its origin, its cessation, and the
way leading to the cessation of suffering.’ This is an intellectual
factor, involving lack of insight into the human situation and
the Buddhist method of salvation.
Sankhdra and vihhdna have already been discussed.
Ndmarupa is an old philosophical concept and is usually
translated ‘mind and matter’, ‘soul and body’. This agrees fairly
78
THE PERSONALITY FACTORS AND NIBBANA
Paticcasamuppada, ‘the chain of dependencies’, ‘the chain of
correlations’. Because of ignorance, the volitional activity
influences, enriches and (by accumulation) charges consciousness,
which, when analysed, turns out to consist of, or work through,
internal and external material, organized according to the six
sense modalities, activated by stimulation which gives rise to
sensations with their feeling-tones, by means of which desires are
activated. Desire leads to attachment which is the foundation of
becoming and rebirth, etc. : suffering.
well with the analysis found in S II 3: Katamahca . . . nama-
rupam? Vedand sahha cetand phasso manasikdro, idarn vuccati
namam. Cattdro ca mahdbhuta catunnahca mahabhutanam
upaddya rupam. Idarn vuccati rupam. ‘What is name and form?
Feeling, ideation, purposive striving, stimulation, attention:
this is called name. The four elements and the form derived
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PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
from them: this is called form.’ The first group clearly consists of
psychological functions. The rupa- group is perhaps bodily
processes (SN 1074 speaks about namakdya instead of namarupa
which supports this interpretation). In this way, we would arrive
at the translation ‘psychophysical processes’. We can under-
stand that consciousness can give rise to both conscious and
bodily processes and also that consciousness depends on both
types of processes. This is perhaps exactly what D II 62 f is
intended to express, when it is first said: Vinnana-paccayd
ndma-rupam, ‘name-and-form depends on consciousness’, and
soon after: Ndmarupa-paccayd vinndnam, ‘consciousness de-
pends on name-and-form’.
Another way of translation would be ‘internal and external’,
referring to the fact that all vinnana-processes are conscious but
some have originated from external stimulation, others from
consciousness itself. In this case, namarupa would become a
purely psychological concept, although the contact with the
external world is still stressed.
Vinnana implies the six sense-modalities, salayatana, which
should probably not be translated ‘the six sense-organs’. These,
in turn, imply the fact of six-fold stimulation, phassa. Stimula-
tion gives rise to feelings, and these are a basis for the desires,
tanha. All these factors in the centre of the series are certainly
not causal; they are rather a further analysis of the vinnana-
processes, and the arrangement is one of implication and
correlation rather than causality. The wMawa-processes are
analysed into six types; these six types imply corresponding
six types of stimulation; on stimulation we react by feelings and
these activate desire. Even namarupa, if explained as ‘internal
and external’, can enter into this, because the five first types of
vifffiana are stimulated from the external world, while the sixth
type is mano-vinnana, i.e. processes produced by the internal
sense. Ndmariipa can therefore be explained as a preliminary
analysis of the conscious processes into two types, which is then
carried on to a six-fold analysis.
The next link is updddna. This term is not perfectly under-
stood and has perhaps got its place in the series because of its
double meaning. Its function is to build a bridge between
‘desire’ and bhava, ‘becoming’, the latter probably meaning
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THE PERSONALITY FACTORS AND NIBBANA
‘preliminary selection of one of the three rebirth-worlds’: the
world of kdma, ‘sense-pleasure’, rupa, ‘form’, and arupa,
‘formlessness’ (this according to S II 4). This could be explained
as a process of wish-fulfilment. It is an established psychological
fact that desire produces an emotional investment into its
object and strong conscious images relating to the same object.
If we, for instance, strongly desire a continuation of life, this
desire will strengthen the conscious stream by adding more
emotions and ideations, and this will be felt to be a causal factor
towards new life. If this investment and strengthened conscious
activity were upaddna, we would perhaps choose a translation
like ‘attachment’, ‘clinging’, which is exactly the conventional
translation.
On the other hand, we have already pointed out that upaddna
means ‘fuel’ and that this meaning might be the reason for its
position in the series. But as ‘fuel’ it would function as a causal
factor producing a new life, as we just pointed out, and we
arrive at another conventional translation, ‘basis’, ‘foundation’.
After this hypothetical discussion, let us look at the texts.
The conventional analysis is given in D II 58: kdmupddanam vd
ditthupadanam vd silabbatupaddnam vd attavadupaddnam vd,
‘either clinging to sensual things, or clinging to (speculative)
views, or to mere rules and ritual, or to belief in a self’. This
explanation does not fit into the system very well, but we may
note that the mentioned objects of clinging are all illusions,
misunderstandings and prejudices: so they are mental contents
inflating consciousness and leading it astray. The general func-
tion may therefore be as hypothesized.
The fuel-explanation is to be found in S IV 399 'f. Seyyathapi
Vaccha aggi sa-upadano jalati no an-upaddno, evam eva khvdham
Vaccha sa-updddnassa upapattim pahhapemi no anupdddnassa ti.
‘Just as a fire with fuel blazes up, but not without fuel, even so
do I declare rebirth to be for him who has fuel, not for him who is
without fuel.’ And further: Yasmim kho Vaccha samaye imah ca
kayam nikkhipaii satto ca ahhataram kdyam anupanno hoti, tarn
aham tanhupadanam vaddmi; tanhd hissa Vaccha tasmirn samaye
updddnam hoti ti. ‘At a time when a being lays aside this body
and rises up again in another body, for that I declare desire to
be the fuel (or: foundation). Indeed, desire is at that time the
81
F
PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
fuel (foundation).’ Here the birth of a new individual is said
to be similar to the flaring up of an old fire provided with new
fuel. The previous individual provides the fuel, and this fuel is
here identified with tanhd, ‘desire’. This simile is also used in
Ta 1060, already referred to: ‘Kassapa meditates without fuel
(clinging), extinguished among the burning.'
The series of dependences was evidently never meant to be
the definite series, since there are several modifications and
alternatives. In S IV 86, there is a different series which the
writer as a psychologist would certainly prefer. Cakkhum ca
paticca rape ca uppajjati cakkhuvihndnam; tinnam sangati
phasso; phassapaccayd vedand; vedanapaccaya tanhd; tassdyeva
tanhaya asesavirdganirodha bhavanirodho ; bhavanirodha jdtini-
rodho; jdtinirodhd jardmaranam sokaparidevadukkhadomanas-
supdyasd nirujjhanti. ‘Depending on eye and forms arises eye-
consciousness. The coming together of the three is stimulation.
Depending on stimulation is feeling. Depending on feeling is
desire. But by utter passionless ceasing of desire comes ceasing
of becoming. By ceasing of becoming comes ceasing of birth.
By the ceasing of birth comes the ceasing of old age and death,
of sorrow and grief, of woe, of lamentation and despair.’ (The
text repeats the same about the other senses and their objects.)
We see that all the factors that we found difficult to explain
above have disappeared. From the modern point of view it
seems very logical to start from the sense processes: the objects,
the sense-organs and the processes of stimulation. That these
stimulations are received and evaluated in terms of feelings, is
also good psychology. The needs and desires are nowadays
considered to be as basic facts as the sense-processes, and they
would not be placed in a dependent position by modern psycho-
logy, but the Buddhist way of thinking can also still be accepted.
From the Buddhist point of view it is very significant, that the
formulation changes on this point, because the desires are the great
problem, and the series goes on to explain that rebirth is stopped,
if desire is stopped. No updddna is put in here, but desire leads
directly to its fulfilment, and we can explain this transition,
just as the others, as a result of immediate introspection into
the inner causality: wishes produce images of their fulfilment.
The fate of the factors of the series in nibbana is in principle
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THE PERSONALITY FACTORS AND NIBBANA
simple to explain and is expressed in the conventional way in
our quotation. The key word is nirodha, ‘cessation’. The inter-
pretation of this should be the same as when referring to the
khandha : it must be taken literally only after death. It can be
applied also to the living arahant, but imperfectly. The ‘cessa-
tion’ of all these factors does not mean that he is unconscious,
or unable to function in this world. His ignorance is dispelled,
and knowledge, wisdom has replaced it. His actions are free
from kammic consequences, his consciousness calm and stable,
his perceptual apparatus functions but is under control and does
not activate desires. This interpretation will be further checked
in our chapter on the personality of the arahant.
3. We have already discussed the word citta and have found that
it is a name for the core of personality, mainly conscious but
including also the subconscious processes on which continuity
depends. It is not a soul, but it reminds of the ‘ego’ of Western
psychology: the person knows that citta is what he is; he usually
identifies himself with it but need not do so; he can observe his
citta, discuss with it, train it, punish it, and so on.
To some extent, it is possible to map the relations between
citta and other psychological factors. Sahhd and vedand are
called citta-sankhdra, so we know that the perceptual processes
affect citta. We also know that the working of citta is called
sankhdra. The relation of citta to viniidna is not so clear-cut. There
are texts that simply identify viniidna with citta, and others that
identify viniidna with sannd and vedand. Viniidna is more
frequently said to be actively engaged in rebirth, and citta is
more frequently said to attain nibbana. Nibbana is attained
through the stopping of viniidna. The relations must be close,
and probably viniidna is a function of citta, a name for certain
ciita-processes. When in the case of ordinary rebirth, both are
said to undergo this process (never in the same context, always
in different), then we may assume a simple identification. In
the case of a living person, there should be no identification,
because somebody should experience the function of viHUdna
and also experience that it has stopped: that is citta. Citta can
go on functioning (vijjd, pahhd, mettd, karuna are still to be
found) and can observe viniidna and other khandha as being
still (cf. S HI 45, quoted above).
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PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
The relation of citta to the paticcasamuppdda- series has been
indicated by relating the obsessions to citta, as two of them are
contained in the series: avijja and bhava. The factors, as patic-
casamuppanna (‘generated by dependence’, M 1 191) also become
included in the series by implication. Tanka, ‘desire’, is often
said to belong to citta. We find, in short, that most of the
paticcasamuppdda-f&ctoTS are either functions of citta or
independent organic functions influencing it.
84
Ways to nibbana
the main road to nibbana was ariyo atthangiko maggo etassa
nibbdnassa sacchikiriydya (S IV 252), ‘the noble eight-fold path
for the realization of this nibbana’ :
sammdditthi, right view
sammasankappo , right purpose
sammdvdcd, right speech
sammakammanto, right action
samma djivo, right livelihood
samtndvdyamo, right effort
sammdsati, right mindfulness
sammdsamddhi, right concentration
The first two parts are concerned with intellectual understand-
ing, the next three with moral training, and the last three with
meditation techniques. They are not equally necessary: only
the intellectual part seems really indispensable, when the moral
qualifications are satisfactory. Sila in itself cannot lead to
nibbana, but only to punna, ‘merit’; it is, however, an in-
dispensable precondition.
1. Usually, we get the impression from the texts that nibbana
is attained only after some period of training, but there is also
plenty of evidence that nibbana could be attained by a sudden
understanding, for instance as a result of a sermon. A typical
passage is to be found in M III 20. Imasmim kho pana veyydkara-
nasmim bhanilamdne satthimattanam bhikkhunam anupaddya
dsavehi cittdni vimuccimsu, ‘And while this exposition was being
spoken, the minds of as many as sixty monks were freed from
the obsessions with no foundation left.’ In most of these cases,
the persons that had this experience were monks, who could be
supposed to have previous training in meditation, but it could
happen also to lay people: Mahavagga, p. 16 (cf. Ta 117), tells
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PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
how a rich merchant and his son Yasa attained nibbana after
only a short instruction without any knowledge of meditation.
2. Let us next see whether there were any preconditions to
be met before entering on the road to nibbana.
External conditions do not seem to have existed. Monkhood
was considered a very helpful way of life and was greatly re-
commended but no condition for attaining nibbana. Both sexes
were considered equal in this pursuit, social position or race was
of no consequence (A III 385), and also not personal appearance:
one of the Buddha’s most highly esteemed disciples was a
dwarf.
To attain nibbana was easy to some and difficult to others.
Kammic differences may account for these differences. As the
achievement was greatly intellectual in nature, it must have
been facilitated by high intelligence. As one of the arahants
expressed it in Ta 71: Susukhumanipunatthadassind matikusalena
nivdta-vuttind samsevitabuddhasilind nibbanam na hi tena
dullabhan ti, ‘For him who can see the truth, although it is very
subtle and refined, and has a skilful mind but still is humble in
conduct and follows the Buddha’s norm — for him nibbana is
not hard to find.’ Two basic traits are stressed here: ability to
understand and humbleness. Cf. D II 123: pahhd-paribhdviiam
cittam sammad eva asavehi vimuccati, ‘a mind supported by
understanding is set quite free from the dsavd'. Two other traits
are mentioned in S II 195: andtapi anottdpi abhabbo sambodhdya
abhabbo nibbdnaya abhabbo anuttarassa yogakkhemassa adhiga-
mdya, ‘a man without energy and without carefulness is unable
to attain to insight, to nibbana, to security from bonds’. But on
the whole, the Buddha seems to have believed that a person who
really wanted (i.e. was kammically mature enough to want) to
attain nibbana, also was capable of doing so and he stressed the
importance of training infinitely more than natural endowment.
3. The Nikayas are full of enumerations of bad traits that
should be got rid of, but how to do it is rarely said. The modern
tendency to treat all moral problems as behaviour problems and
to correct them by means of behaviour training and ‘re-condition-
ing’ was not invented. The Buddha believed in self-control, and
one should be kdyena samvuto, vacaya samvuto, manasa samvuto,
‘self-restrained in behaviour, word, and thought’ (D III 97), and
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WAYS TO NIBBANA
he believed that the human being was free to stop doing what he
did not any more want to do. But he was well acquainted with
another type of training: training of the mind through medita-
tion, and he believed more in the power of the mind and intel-
ligence than we are used to do. His moral training followed the
principle of keeping good ideas constantly in mind and gently,
but persistently, pushing everything undesirable out of
consciousness. This method would seem to be a typical example
of what Western psychologists call repression and would seem
to lead to the same effects. For an idea pushed out of conscious-
ness is, according to the modern view, not annihilated but
continues its subterranean life and may produce neurotic
symptoms. However, the whole process, as exercised in medita-
tion, is, as we shall see later, very different from the process of
repression, and 'dissolution' may very well turn out to be a more
correct word. If an idea, e.g. a certain egoistic desire, is
‘dissolved’ instead of repressed, it may well be a case of real,
and harmless, disappearance. This whole method needs further,
especially experimental, investigation.
4. The two main methods are meditation and understanding,
( panna ). They are usually combined, as it is stated in Dh 372,
n'atthi jhanam apahhassa paiind n'atthi ajjhdyato: yamhi
jhanam ca panna ca sa ve nibbdnasantike, ‘There is no meditation
for one who is without understanding, no understanding for
one without meditation; he who has both meditation and
understanding is close to nibbana.’ That this combination
gives the best result, although the ultimate achievement is
attributed to panna, becomes clear from D II 91: samadhi-
paribhdvitd panna mahapphala hoti mahanisamsa, pahha-
paribhdvitam cittam sammad eva dsavehi vimuccati seyyathidam
kdmdsavd bhavdsava ditthdsava avijjdsava ti, ‘Understanding
when reinforced with concentration, will produce good result
and profit ; when the mind is reinforced with understanding, it is
quite set free from the obsessions, that is, from sense-pleasure,
becoming, wrong theories, and ignorance.’ A common formula-
tion of the relation between meditation and understanding can
be found, e.g. in A IV 448, where the Buddha tells Ananda
about his own experience: So kho aham Ananda, aparena
samayena sabbaso nevasaiindndsanndyatanam samatikkamma
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PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
sannavedayitanirodham upasampajja vihardmi, panndya ca me
disvd dsavd parikkhayam agamamsu, ‘And presently I passed
wholly beyond the sphere of neither-ideation-nor-non-ideation
and entered and stayed in the ending of ideation-and-feeling,
and by seeing and understanding, my obsessions were de-
stroyed.’ The experience of nibbana evidently will not come as
an automatic result of even the highest level of meditation, but
an act of understanding is also needed. This is also expressed in
the compressed formula, D III 230: Asavanam khayo panndya
sacchikaraniyo , ‘The destruction of the obsessions is to be
realized by means of understanding.’
A further confirmation can be found in U 33: evam etarn
yathdbhiitam sammappannaya passato bhavatanhd pahiyati . .
sabbaio tanhdnam khayd asesavirdganirodho nibbanam. ‘Whoever
sees this (that by the ending of upddana there is no production of
suffering) as it really is by perfect understanding, his desire of
becoming disappears . . by the complete extinction of
desires there is dispassion, cessation without remainder,
nibbana.’ This would seem to imply the meaning, that a com-
plete intellectual understanding of the relations expressed in
the paticcasamuppada-series will bring about the disappearing
of desire, which is nibbana. This is also implied in the patic-
casamuppada- series itself, as the first link of this is avijja,
‘ignorance’; a person who has eradicated ignorance is called
pannd-vimutto , ‘released by understanding’. See the definition
in A I 61: avijjd-viragd pannavimutti ti, ‘through dispelling of
ignorance comes release by understanding’.
In the Nikayas we find many enumerations of factors leading
to nibbana. There is, for instance, the line in D II 123: Silatn
samadhi patina ca vimntti ca anuttard, ‘morality, concentration,
understanding and the highest release’. And a similar list is to be
found in S V 200: Pancimdni bhikkhave indriydni. Katamani pari-
ca ? Saddhindriyam viriyindriyam satindriyam samddhindriyam
pannindriyam. Imesam kho bhikkhave pahcindriyana m samattd
paripurattaarahamhoti. ‘There are these five functions. What five?
The function of faith, of energy, of mindfulness, of concentration
and of understanding. By the completion and fulfilment of these
five functions one becomes an arahant.’ (Cf. the collection of
similar lists compiled by Jayatilleke, 4, p. 396). In lists of this
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WAYS TO NIBBANA
type we usually find pahhd as the final factor before nibbana
and after the meditation factors, sati and samadhi. There are,
however, also lists that do not mention the meditational factors,
e.g. A III 434: Idlia bhikkhave bhikkhu saddlio hoti, hirimd hoti,
ottdpi hoti, draddhaviriyo hoti, pahhavd hoti, kdye ca jivite ca
anapekho hoti. Imehi kho bhikkhave chahi dhammehi sammandgato
bhikkhu bhabbo aggam dhammam arahattam sacchikdtun ti. ‘Here
a monk has faith, modesty, conscientiousness, firm energy,
understanding and is without desire for action and life. If a
monk is provided with these six things, he will be able to realize
the chief thing, arahantship.’
By the quotations given so far we have proved the close
connection between understanding and the attainment of
nibbana, but we have also indicated that there are two ways to
nibbana, both involving understanding. The difference between
these are well described and documented by Jayatilleke
(4, p. 466 f). The method which includes both meditation and
understanding permits the person to verify for himself, by
means of superknowledge, all the doctrines of Buddhism, and
nothing would need to be accepted on faith only. In S I 191,
the Buddha says that of the five hundred arahants surrounding
him, satthi bhikkhu ubhato-bhdga-vimuitd atha itare pahhdvimuttd
ti, ‘sixty are freed in both ways, and the others (i.e. 320, as 120
had some special powers, certainly in addition to being “freed-
in-both-ways”) are freed by understanding'. This distinction
agrees with a classification given in D III 105: seven types of
people are mentioned, of which the two first are ubhato-bhdga-
vimutto and pahhd-vimutto.
A person who is pahhd-vimutto is, therefore, a person who
has not meditated and has no super knowledge but is still an
arahant. It is explained exactly so in S II 119 ff, where a number
of disciples admit that they have none of the powers usually
claimed to result from meditation. The reason they give is:
atha kho pahhd-vimuttd may an ti, ‘we have been freed by
understanding’. Usually a distinction is made between cetovi-
mutto and pahhdvimutto , and they are frequently mentioned
together. E.g. (D III 78) bhikkhu dsavdnam khayd anasavam
ceto-vimuttim pahhd-vimuttim ditthe va dhamme sayam abhihhd
sacchikatva upasampajja viharati, ‘By the destruction of the
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PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
obsessions, a monk enters and stays in that obsession-free
freedom of mind and freedom by understanding which he by
himself has experienced and realized.’ A person who has attained
to these two types of vimutti, is called ubhato-bhdga-vimutta ,
‘freed both ways’ (D II 71, already quoted).
In A I 61, cetovimutti is derived from samatha, ‘calm’, and
pahhdvimuUi from vipassand, ‘introspection’. Samatho ca
bhikkhave bhavito kam attham anubhoti? Cittam bhaviyati.
Cittam bhavitam kam attham anubhoti? Yo rdgo so pahiyati . —
Vipassand bhikkhave bhavitd kam attham anubhoti? Pahhd
bhaviyati. Pahhd bhavitd kam attham anubhoti? Yd avijjd sd
pahiyati: rdgupakkilittham vd bhikkhave cittam na vimuccati
avijjupakkilitthd vd pahhd na bhaviyati. Imd kho bhikkhave
rdgavirdgd cetovimutti avijjavirdgd pahhdvimutti ti. ‘If calm is
developed, what profit will it lead to? The mind is developed. If
the mind is developed, what profit will it lead to? All desire is
abandoned. If introspection is developed, what profit will it
lead to? Understanding is developed. If understanding is
developed, what profit will it lead to? All ignorance is aban-
doned. A mind defiled by desire is not freed, nor is understanding
developed if defiled by ignorance. Indeed, this ceasing of desire
is the freedom of mind and this ceasing of ignorance is the free-
dom by understanding.’ This text tells us that cetovimutti is
connected with the development of the mind and methods
applied in order to eradicate desire: this probably refers to
meditation. However, much more is involved in cetovimutti,
which cannot be explained here.
Pahhd is here said to be a fruit of introspection. But it can be
derived from other sources. D III 219 speaks about three types
of pahhd : cinta-mayd pahhd, suta-mayd pahhd, bhdvand-mayd
pahhd, ‘understanding based on (or consisting in?) thinking,
learning, development’. This suggests that pahhd is mainly,
not a process of investigation, learning or training, not the
struggle with a material at all, but a final act of understanding,
when the structure becomes clear and completely mastered.
The Gestalt psychology of our time has recognized that the laws
of thinking are very similar to the laws of perception and that
they may perhaps be derived from the latter. In the same way,
pahhd is sometimes described as a process similar to visual
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WAYS TO NIBBANA
perception, and, indeed, paHtid and hdna are often combined
with verbs like passati and dassati, ‘see’. Such a description is,
for instance, found in M I 279 f. ‘It is like a pure, limpid, serene
pool of water in which a man with vision standing on the bank
might see oysters and shells, also gravel and pebbles, and shoals
of fish moving about and keeping still. It might occur to him:
This pool of water is pure, limpid, serene. . . .’ And then the text
continues: evam-eva kho . . . bhikkhu: idam dukkhan ti yathdbhu-
tam pajdnati, ‘even so a monk understands as it really is: this is
suffering', etc. And further: Tassa evam jdnato evam passato
kdmdsavd pi cittam vimuccati, ‘when he knows thus, sees thus,
Iris mind is freed from the obsession of sense-pleasures.’ The text
goes on to mention the other obsessions and ends up with an
arahant-formula. This is a very concrete description of the pro-
cess involved: a man sees a scene and then makes a conscious
reflection by means of which he understands the meaning of
everything he sees; this is an act of pahha. In the same way, he
can by introspection see himself, how he is caught in a vicious
circle of causality, how everything in his life is caused and only
leads to suffering, further exactly what those causes are and how
the law can be used to counter-act the effects — and we can
understand how this vision and understanding can lead to an
experience of liberation. Even dynamic factors (desires,
emotions) may be influenced, diverted or dissolved, by a causal
analysis of their origin and their effects. This is not commonly
recognized in contemporary psychology, but the matter has
never been properly investigated. The early Buddhists may have
observed that this is possible, as we repeatedly find phrases like
cetaso upakkilese pahiidya dubbali-karane (D III 101), ‘weaken-
ing the corruptions of the mind by understanding’. It is not
quite clear what is meant by the ‘corruptions’, but certainly
emotional and dynamic factors were included.
A very precise account of how pannd was held to function in
such cases can be found in M I 91: Yato ca kho Mahandma
ariyasdvakassa: appassada kama bahudukkhd bahupaydsd,
ddinavo ettha bhiyyo ti evam-etam yathabhutam sammappahhdya
sudittham hoti, so ca annatr'eva kdmehi annatra akusalehi
dhammehi pitisukham adhigacchati ahhah-ca tato santataram
atha kho so anavatti kdmesu hoti. ‘But when an ariyan disciple
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thinks: "Sensual pleasures give little satisfaction but much
suffering and much trouble, and the danger from them is
greater”, and he comes to see this, as it really is, through perfect
understanding, and he attains zest and happiness apart from
sense-pleasures, apart from unskilled processes, and something
better than that, then he is not seduced by the sense-pleasures.’
Here, sensuality is analysed ideationally, dissolved and replaced
by other values, and a new happiness is attained by substitution.
5. We must finally describe how meditation is related to
nibbana. It is a very extensive subject, and we can deal with
it only briefly. Our chief problems are to find out what psycho-
logical purposes are served by these methods, how the methods
conduce to the attainment of nibbana and how some psycho-
logical factors are affected by the training.
The methods of meditation are traditionally divided into two
groups, sati, here translated ‘mindfulness’, and samddhi, here
called ‘concentration’. We shall deal with these two groups
separately, beginning with the sati group.
The sati exercises are usually described as preparatory to
samddhi. Here are some of the exercises mentioned in the main
text, Mahd-satipatthdna suttanta (D II 290 ff ) :
(a) A certain bodily function is selected and then closely
followed by the attention. For instance, breathing may be
selected. So sato va assasati, sato passasati. Digham va assasanto
‘Digham, assasdmiti ’ pajdndti, digham vd passasanto ‘Digham
passasamiti’ pajdndti (D II 291). ‘He breathes out mindful and
breathes in mindful. When making a long exhalation he knows:
“I am making a long exhalation”, and when making a long
inhalation he knows: "I am making a long inhalation.’ ” This
means that the entire consciousness is directed towards the
breathing process. Every single aspect of it becomes conscious,
the sensations from the nose, the throat, the muscles of the
abdomen. No other ideas or sensations are allowed to disturb
this constant watching of the breathing process.
Or sati may be practised while walking. The meditating person
walks slowly and tries to follow each muscular movement with
his consciousness, lifting the right foot, moving forwards, putting
the foot down, contact with the floor, etc., and all the time
reflecting that he is making these observations. Again, full
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absorption in this process is required, and nothing else is per-
mitted to enter consciousness.
Or some purely mental process may be observed in the same
way: bhikkhu sukham vedanam vediyamd.no 'Sukham vedanam
vediydmiti’ pajdndti (D II 298). ‘While feeling a pleasant feeling,
the monk knows: “I am feeling a pleasant feeling." ’ In this case,
a pleasant feeling is exposed to persistent conscious observation.
No attempt is made to change or suppress the feeling, it is only
objectively observed. Other types of mental contents are
similarly watched. If his mind is full of desire, he knows that it
is so, if it is free from desire, he knows that it is so (D II 299).
(b) These exercises are passive and are performed in a relaxed
state of both mind and body. They may be combined with some-
what more active exercises. When meditating on the body, one
may, for instance, call up the idea of the impermanency of the
body or concretely visualize one’s own body in a state of
decomposition.
(c) The exercises may go on to include intellectual analyses.
The body is analysed into its parts, hair, nails, teeth, skin, flesh,
etc.,andtheanalysismaygoon to a higher level of abstraction, and
the body is seen as built up from the four primary elements: earth,
water, heat, and air (D II 294). The own personality is similarly
analysed according to the usual, doctrinal lines of thought
(D II 301 f): . . . bhikkhu dhammesu dhammanupassi viharati
pahcas ' upadanakkhandhesu; . . . bhikkhu ' Iti riipam, iti riipassa
samudayo, iti riipassa atthagamo’ ... ‘a monk, as to ideas,
continues to consider these from the point of view of the five
base-factors . . .; the monk (reflects): “Such is form (body),
such is the genesis of form, such is the going to rest of form” ’
(and so on, regarding the other khandhd ). Then comes a different
approach: . . . bhikkhu dhammesu dhammdnup . ssi viharati
chasu ajjhattika-bdhiresu ayatanesu; . . . bhikkhu cakkhun ca
pajdndti, rupe ca pajdndti, yah ca tad ubhayam paticca uppajjati
samyojanam tan ca pajdndti, yathd ca anuppannassa samyoja-
nassa uppddo hoti tan ca pajdndti, yathd ca uppannassa sam-
yojanassa pahdnam hoti tan ca pajdndti, yathd ca pahinassa
samyojanassa dyatim anuppddo hoti tan ca pajdndti, ‘the monk,
as to ideas, continues to consider ideas from the point of view of
the six internal and external sense-fields; . . . the monk under-
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stands the eye; he understands the forms; he understands the
fetter that arises on account of these two; he understands how a
new fetter is produced; he understands how to get rid of a fetter
that has arisen; he understands how a fetter once got rid of will
not be produced again’ (etc., for the other senses).
After this, the analysis goes on to include the seven factors of
enlightenment and the four noble truths. This description of the
saft'-exercises shows how sati naturally leads over to panM and
how close the connections are between different parts of the
Way.
(d) The Buddhist disciple may finally experiment with
deliberate changes of perception. We have, for instance, a group
of eight fields of mastery (attha abhibhdyatandni , D II no).
The exact meaning of them is unclear, and without a thorough
investigation it is preferable not to speculate. But they certainly
involve ability to produce changes in perception. The fifth field
of mastery is described as follows: Ajjhattam arupasanfii eko
bahiddhd-rupdni passati nildni nila-vannani nilanidassandni
ntla-nibhdsdni, ‘without ideating form internally, a man sees
external forms as blue, blue-coloured, blue-looking, blue-reflect-
ing’. The sentence seems to refer to experiments with subjective
change of the colours of seen objects. In one phase of the experi-
ment, all objects are seen as blue, in the next (the sixth field)
as yellow, then as red, etc.
In S V 119, an exercise aiming at a change of feeling-tone is
mentioned: So sace akankhati: Appatikkiile patikkiilasanni
vihareyyanti , patikkulasanni tattha viharaii. ‘If he desires: “Let
me stay conscious of repugnance in what is not repugnant,” he
stays so, conscious of repugnance.’ Then other variations of this
exercise are described. In this way a meditating disciple could
learn to master his evaluating mechanism completely: a dis-
gusting object could be experienced as neutral or pleasant, and
a pleasant object could be experienced as unpleasant.
After this classification of some of the most characteristic
sati-exe rcises, we will turn to the question of their purposes.
These exercises are in many ways related to the ultimate aim of
Buddhism.
(a) There is, first of all, the general purpose to keep the mental
contents under constant control. A disciple should be able to
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decide what ideas, even perceptions, should be allowed into his
consciousness and he should be able to keep other ideas out. He
should also be able to keep his conscious contents fixed and still.
This aim is very frequently described in the Nikayas, e.g. in
S IV 1x2: Etha tumhe bhikkhave indriyesu guttadvdra viharatha!
Cakkhund rupam disvd md nimittaggahino ahuvattha manuvyah-
janaggahino, yatvddhikaranam enam cakkhundriyam asamvutam
viharantam abhijjhd domanassd pdpakd akusald dhammd
anvasavcyyum tassa samvardya patipajjatha! Rakkhatha cakkhun-
driyam cakkhundriye samvaram dpajjatha! ‘Come you, monks,
remain guarding the doors of the senses! Seeing a form with the
eyes, be not misled by its outer view, nor by its lesser details.
But since coveting and discontent, evil, unskilled processes
might overwhelm one who dwells with the visual sense un-
controlled, you should apply yourselves to such control, set a
guard over the visual sense and attain control of it.’ The same is
then said about the other senses. How a contemporary layman
understood this we can see from the continuation of the text.
The listening king gave an example from his own fife: A ham
pi . . . yasmim samaye arakkhiteneva kayena arakkhitdya vacdya
arakkhilena cittena anupatthitaya satiyd asamvutehi indriyehi
antepuram pavisdmi, ativiya mam tasmim samaye lobhadhammd
parisahanti. ‘I myself, whenever I enter my harem with body,
speech and mind unguarded, without fixed mindfulness, without
control of my senses — then lustful processes overwhelm me.’
Mindfulness was therefore used as a means of controlling the
perceptual and ideational apparatus.
(b) Sati-exe rcises were further used to produce relaxation of
body and mind. ‘ Passambhayam kayasankhdram assasissdmi 1 ti
sikkhati, . . . ' passambhayam cittasankhdram assasissdmi’ ti
sikkhati. ‘Calming down bodily activity I shall breathe out: so
he trains himself . . . Calming down mental activity I shall
breathe out: so he trains himself (A V 111). Mindfulness was
considered the normal way of meeting the vicissitudes of this
life, even death: nikkhipissam imam, hay am sampajdno patissato
(Ta 1002), ‘I shall lay down this body, knowing and mindful.’
The Buddha’s disciple, Anuruddha, was asked, S V 302, why all
pains that he met with in life did not make any impression on
his mind, and he replied: Catusu me avuso satipatthanesu
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supatitthitacittassa viharato uppannd sdnrikd dukkhd vedand
cittam na pariydddya titthanti, ‘Because I stay with my mind well
settled in the four applications of mindfulness, arising bodily
pains do not overwhelm my mind.’ It is also said, on the same
page, that the arahant ‘generally spends his time with his mind
well settled in these four applications of mindfulness’: araham
. . . imesu catusu satipatthdnesu supatitthacitto bahulam viharati.
And thanks to his exercises in mindfulness, the arahant is said
to live a very pleasant life: ye ca . . . bhikkhu arahanto . . .,
tesam dndpdnasatisamddhi bhavito bahullkato dittheva dhamme
sukhavihdrdya ceva samvattati satisampajanildya ca, ‘For those
monks who are arahants .... concentration on mindful in-
breathing and out-breathing, if developed and seriously prac-
ticed, conduces to pleasant living and mindful understanding
even in this life.’
(c) As already pointed out, these exercises lead to better
intellectual understanding and provide a foundation for panna.
By visualizing the own person as something that arises and
disappears, something that is built up from innumerable parts
that continuously change and finally dissolve, the anicca- and
a -doctrines are understood and even proved.
(d) The world is, according to Buddhist opinion, impermanent,
ever changing, and therefore a cause of suffering. So is also the
individual person. The practicing Buddhist must therefore make
himself independent of these things and look for something more
permanent, more pleasant, more valuable. Now it is easy to
come to this conclusion by intellectual reasoning, but to perceive
the world and the own person as valueless is another matter.
SaA-exercises may be helpful, if the instability of perception is
stressed. Even normal perception is not stable. There are, for
instance, always double images, although they are usually
disregarded. Straight lines do not seem straight, the depth
vision is not always correct, etc. By consciously attending to
things like after-images, double images, the pulsating in the
eyes, the changes during movement, it is possible to get the
impression that this is a very shaky world. The world may very
well seem unreal, lacking in substance. In neurasthenic states,
this impression is enhanced, and the affected person actually has
the impression that the things around him are like ‘a lump of
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foam’ ( phena-piyda ). Impressions of this type were actively
produced by some saft'-exercises aiming at changing the im-
pressions, e.g. making the objects seem all blue. Through these
exercises a feeling of unreality, impermanence, and diminished
value could be created.
(e) One of the most important effects of mindfulness was to
purify activity, to free activity from kammic consequences and
therefore to promote morality. This is expressed in many ways
in the Nikayas. Ekdyano aya.ni . . . maggo sattdnam visuddhiyd
. . ., yadidam catla.ro satipatthdna (D II 290), ‘This is the one
and only path leading to the purification of beings . . ., namely
the four applications of mindfulness.’ According to S IV 112,
already quoted, mindfulness is a way of getting rid of ‘evil,
unskilled processes’. All actions normally have a moral aspect
and therefore have causal consequences for both the present and
the future life, because they are performed with desire. During
mindfulness, desire and emotions, actually all types of mental
content except the action itself, are kept out of consciousness,
and they can have no causal effects at all, in a kammic sense.
This is indicated in Ta 807: khiyyati nopaciyyati evam so carati
sato; evam apacinato dukkham santike nibbdna vuccati. ‘For him
there is diminishing, no heaping up; so he lives mindful; so he
does not collect suffering; about him it is said: “nibbana is near”.’
The ‘heaping up’, here mentioned, certainly refers to the kam-
mic effects of actions, and its disappearence is here explicitly
related to mindfulness. That the activities are ‘calmed’ does not
mean that no more actions are performed, rather that they
should be performed mindfully. The monk arahants were not
inactive; when they were not meditating, they were busy beg-
ging their food, visiting new places, explaining the doctrine,
settling disputes, etc., and the lay arahants had still their
worldly occupations. In Ti 275 it is said about the Buddhist
monks: kamtnakdmd analasa kamma-setthassa karakd, ‘they
are fond of work, they are not lazy, they do the best work’,
and further, in 277: kdyakammam suci nesam vacikamman
ca tadisam, manokammam suci nesam, ‘their bodily work
is pure, and so is their speech-activity; their mental work
is pure.’
Mindfulness is therefore considered as one of the most im-
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portant means for attaining moral perfection. Desires, nervous-
ness, emotions and bad conscience disturb both the mind and
behaviour and create detrimental affects for the future. By
means of sati they can all be kept out of consciousness and by
this process they are believed to become eradicated completely.
Even the dsavd, the most persistent of the detrimental ideas that
invade consciousness (the word probably means ‘influxes’) can
be influenced by means of sati, as it is said in S II 54 \yathdsatam
viharantam dsavd ndnusavanti attanam ca ndvajdndmi, ‘I do not
deny that I ( attanam ) live so mindful that the influxes no longer
flow.’ In this way, this type of exercise goes a long way towards
the attainment of both understanding and nibbana.
The highest type of meditation is called samddhi, ‘concentra-
tion’. A certain level of mental and behavioural development is
required before these exercises can be undertaken. To these
requirements belong spotless moral behaviour, self-control and
proficiency in mindfulness. We find this well summed up in
D I 71: So imind ca ariyena sila-kkhandhena samanndgato imind
ca ariyena indriya-samvarena samanndgato imind ca ariyena
sati-sampajannena samanndgato imaya ca ariydya santutthiyd
samanndgato vivittam sendsanam bhajati, ar annum rukkha-mulam
pabbatam kandaram giriguham susdnamvana-patthamabbhokdsam
palalapunjam. ‘Endowed with the whole body of noble virtues,
with noble sense-control, with noble mindfulness and compre-
hension, and with noble contentment, he chooses a solitary
resting-place — a forest, the foot of a tree, a hill, a mountain glen,
a rocky cave, a chamal place, a heap of straw in the open field.’
Here, the background is given, and a suitable setting for the new
exercises is suggested.
The first task is to master the five hindrances ( nivarana ),
namely kdma-cchanda , ‘sensuality and desire’, vydpada, ‘agres-
siveness’, thina-middha, ‘inactivity and drowsiness’, uddhacca-
kukkucca, ‘nervousness’, vicikiccha, ‘doubt’. This is done by
means of mindfulness (D II 300), and when they are conquered,
the meditating disciple is prepared to enter into the first stage of
samddhi, called the first jhdna. His mental state at this moment
is one of profound peace, satisfaction, joy and freedom: Tass'ime
parka nivarane pahine attani samanupassato pamujjam jdyati,
pamuditassa piti jdyati, piti-manassa kayo passambhati, passad-
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WAYS TO NIBBANA
dha-kdyo sukham vedeti, sukhino cittam samddhiyati (D I 73).
‘When he sees that these five hindrances are eliminated in him-
self, then happiness is bom, to happiness joy is added, with his
mood joyful his body becomes relaxed, his relaxed body feels at
ease, and as he feels at ease his mind becomes concentrated
(enters samadhi).’ There are nine stages of samddhi. They are
briefly characterized below.
Characteristics present
1. vivekaja pitisukha,
‘joy and happiness born of
seclusion’
vitakka, vicar a,
‘reasoning, investigation’
2. ajjhatta sampasddana,
‘inner tranquillity’
cetaso ekodibhava, ‘one-
pointedness of mind’
samddhija pitisukha,
‘joy and happiness born of
concentration’
3. upekhako, ‘on-looker’,
‘neutral’
upekhd-sukha , ‘happiness of
neutrality’
sato, ‘mindful’
sampajdno, ‘understanding’
4. upekhd-sati-pdrisuddhi,
‘pure neutrality and mind-
fulness’
Characteristics eliminated
kdma, ‘sensuality’
akusald dhammd,
‘unskilled processes’
vitakka, vicdra,
‘reasoning, investigation’
vivekaja pitisukha,
‘joy and happiness born of
seclusion’
piti, ‘joy’
sukha, dnkkha, ‘happiness,
pain’
somanassa, domanassa,
‘elation, dejection'
upekhd-sukha, ‘happiness of
neutrality’
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PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
Characteristics present
5. dkdsdnahcdyatana, 'the
sphere of infinite space’
6. vihhanahcdyatana ,
'the sphere of infinite
consciousness’
7. akihcahhayatana,
‘the sphere of nothingness’
8. nevasahhdndsahndyatana,
‘the sphere of neither-
ideation-nor-non-ideation’
9. sahhavedayilanirodha,
‘cessation of ideation
and feeling’
We find that these are successive stages of concentration and
abstraction. The exercise starts from a rather normal state of
consciousness, although all sense-desires and other types of
emotional and unethical contents are already eliminated. Next,
all thought-activity and some pleasant feelings (or perhaps
rather emotions, as piti is not a form of vedand, but something
stronger than that; in M II 204 it is said to be like a fire that
burns without fuel, as it has nothing to do with sense-pleasures
and is not ‘unskilled’). On the third level, more of the pleasant
feelings disappear, and mindfulness, i.e. an extremely con-
trolled and unified consciousness, appears although there are
still some weak feelings left. These feelings disappear altogether
on the fourth level (although the more elementary feelings
classified as vedand are still there), and a mindful neutrality
prevails. Then most of the contents disappear from conscious-
Characteristics eliminated
rupa-sahha, ‘idea of form’
patigha-sahha, ‘idea of sense-
reaction’
ndnatta-sahhd,
‘idea of diversity’
dkdsdnancdyatana ,
‘the sphere of infinite space’
vihhanahcdyatana ,
‘the sphere of infinite
consciousness’
akihcahhayatana ,
‘the sphere of nothingness’
sahha, vedand,
‘ideation, feeling’
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ness, and the disciple visualizes the idea that space is unlimited.
This idea evidently still has some form and is visualized as
something external. On the sixth level the extra-ideation is
replaced by a final introspection, and the unlimited space is
changed into an internal emptiness, an empty consciousness.
But this is still an idea, and there is still a distinction between
internal and external. A little more of this distinction disappears
on the seventh level, when the idea ‘nothing exists’ is produced.
The eighth level is transitory and not always mentioned as a
separate level. The final task is to make every idea, every sannd
disappear, even the idea of nothingness. This is done on the level
of nirodha, where the last trace of differentiation is gone and no
idea and no feeling is experienced.
The final level of nirodha is sometimes by European scholars
explained as unconsciousness. We sometimes get that impression
from the texts themselves. It is, for instance, said about
Sariputta, that he got a terrible blow on his head by a demon
once when he had attained ‘a certain level of concentration’
[anhataram samddhim, U 39). He did not notice anything but
admitted afterwards that he felt a slight headache ( sise thokam
dukkham)\ And we have the story about the Buddha who, al-
though sanhi samdno jdgaro, ‘conscious and awake’, did not
notice that ‘the falling rain began to beat and to splash, and the
lightnings to flash forth, and the thunderbolts to crash’ (D II
131). It is not said that the Buddha on this occasion was
absorbed in the nirodha- state, and this may explain the word
sah-hi, ‘conscious’. But the terminology is not always strict, and
some sort of conscious activity is certainly retained, as it is so
often said that on this level, understanding is attained, and with
it a knowledge that the obsessions are destroyed and that this is
the last birth. It is, therefore, an act of knowledge or conviction,
an impression of ultimate integration and holistic comprehen-
sion that in some way can coexist with an otherwise totally
undifferentiated consciousness. It may therefore also not be
correct to call it a state of trance, as trances are usually said to
be accompanied by concrete visions and strong emotional
experiences. The nirodha- state is certainly pleasant but in a very
vague way. It is mainly emptiness but is accompanied by
intellectual clarity.
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Western writers sometimes identify the nirodha- level with
nibbana (e.g. Northrop, 7, p. 350). It is clear from what we have
already said that this cannot be true, but a few more indications
may be mentioned.
Meditation does not automatically lead to a realization of
nibbana, as Anuruddha points out, A I 282: Araddham kho pana
me viriyam asallinam upatthitd sati asanmtthd passaddho kayo
asdraddho samahitam cittam ekaggam. Atha ca pana me na
anupdddya asavehi cittam vimuccati 'ti. ‘Strenuous and unshaken
is my energy. Mindfulness is set up in me untroubled. My body
is calmed, not perturbed. My mind is concentrated, one-pointed.
Yet for all that my mind is not freed from the obsessions with-
out grasping.' In M III 37-44, it is said that also an evil man
may be able to practise meditation and reach the eighth level.
As to the nirodha- level, our text keeps silent about the evil man
and only points out that a good man may use it as stepping-
stone to understanding.
On the other hand, it seems that nibbana can be realized on
any one of the levels. See, for instance, M I 435 f : . . . bhikkhu . . .
pathamam jhdnarn upasampajja viharati. So yad-eva tattha hoti
rupagatam vedanagatam sannagatam sankharagatam vihhdnaga-
tam te dhamme aniccato dukkhato rogato gandato sallato aghato
dbddhato parato palokato suhhato anatlato samanupassati. So tehi
dhammehi cittam pativdpeti, so tehi dhammehi cittam pativdpetva
amatdya dhdtuya cittam upasamharati: etam santarn etam
panitam yadidam sabbasankhdrasamatho sabbiipadhipatinissaggo
tanhakkhayo virago nirodho nibbdnan ti. So tattha-tthito
asavanam khayam papundti. ‘. . . a monk enters and remains in
the first jhdna. Whatever occurs there of form, feeling, ideation,
activity or consciousness — he sees them as impermanent,
suffering, a disease, a boil, a sting, a misfortune, an affliction, as
alien, as decay, empty, not-self. He turns his mind from these
things, and when he has done that, he focusses his mind on the
deathless state, thinking: “this is peace, this is the excellent,
namely, the calming of all activities, the rejection of all clinging,
the destruction of desire, dispassion, ceasing, nibbana." If he is
steadfast in this, he attains destruction of the obsessions.’
Exactly the same is said about all the seven first levels, and this
fact probably means that all the levels are equal in this respect:
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the destruction of the obsessions can be experienced on any of
them.
The same conclusion can be drawn from other texts. M I 270
describes, how nibbana can be realized with the fourth level as
starting-point, by this process: when the monk sees a form with
his eyes (on this level, there is evidently still perception of
external objects!), he does not feel attracted but also not repel-
led: by sati he gets rid of emotional reactions. He still feels
vedana, ‘feelings’, but ‘he does not delight in that feeling, does
not welcome it or persist in clinging to it’ (so tarn vedanam nabhi-
nandati ndbhivadati ndjjhosaya titthati). Therefore, he has no
nandi, ‘feeling of delight’. But without nandl, there is no
updddna, and without updddna, there is no bhava ; and so the
argument goes on, according to the paticcasamuppada-series,
and it is proved that the whole ‘mass of suffering’ (dukkhak-
khandha) is stopped. It is also significant that the Buddha died
in a state of meditation: he passed through all the nine levels,
but when he expired he was on the fourth level, not on the
highest. On one occasion (A IV 448) he told Ananda about his
own attainment of nibbana: Ydvakivan cdham Ananda imd nava
anupubbavihdra-samdpattiyo na evam anulomapatilomam samd-
pajjim pi vutthahim pi, neva tavdham . . . sammdsambodhim
abhisambuddho paccannasim. ‘And as long as I did not attain to
and emerge from these nine successive states, both forwards and
backwards, I did not completely, as one wholly awakened,
realize the full perfect awakening.’ This text shows that all the
levels of samadhi were considered as an instrument, a means to
an end. None of the levels was nibbana, and he had to emerge
from them all, but all could be used as a platform for the final
realization.
When this has been said, it can still be admitted that very
frequently the experiences obtained during meditation were
considered extremely important and therefore could be included
in the definitions of nibbana itself. Meditation was, after all,
the means by which the monk could experience for himself how
the Buddhist principles functioned: he could observe how the
desires disappeared, how consciousness was unified and stopped,
how the internal causal process led to its own destruction. By
super-knowledge, he could also verify all the Buddhist doctrines
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PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
(see Jayatilleke, 4, p. 466). This explains why it has never been
possible to give a short and clearcut definition of nibbana. It
has never been possible to ascertain exactly how much of the
meditational experiences are essential. If much is included, we
may get an impression of a metaphysical world and transcendent
knowledge, if little is included we get an impression of a pure
personality state or conscious state, where intellectual clarity
and emotional equanimity prevail.
Finally a few words about some of the psychological factors.
We have already seen from M I 436 and M I 270 that the
personality factors still function, at least on the lower levels of
samadhi but are divested of value. Forms are seen but evoke no
interest. Feelings give rise to no desire. On a higher level they
all go to rest. Consciousness is expanded to become unlimited
( viharati appamdnacetaso, M I 270, ‘he stays with immeasurable
mind’). Ideation is changed: Siyd Anemia bhikkhuno tathdrupo
samddhi-patildbho, yathd neva pathaviyam pathavisahhi assa, na
dpasmim dposahhi assa . . . sahni ca pana assd 'ti (A V 7). ‘A
monk’s attainment of concentration may be such that he is
unconscious of the earth in earth, he is unconscious of the water
in water . . ., but still he is conscious.’ Ideas and perceptions
are still there but they seem less real and have no importance.
Of special interest is vifinana, as it is said to form the link to
the next existence. As one of the khandhd it is rejected (M 1 436,
quoted previously) but not extinguished, but as one link in the
paticcasamuppdda- series it has ultimately to ‘cease’ (and:
Ayarn . . . atthangiko maggo vinhananirodhagamini patipada,
‘this eightfold path is the way leading to the cessation of con-
sciousness’, S III 61). In the ordinary exposition of samadhi, it is
mentioned only on the sixth level, where it is said to become
unlimited. However, in M I 293, the fifth, sixth, and seventh
levels are attributed to mano-vihhdna , ‘the consciousness of the
internal sense’: Nissatthena h'dvuso pancahi indriyehi parisud-
dhena mano-vihhdnena kirn neyyan ti? — Nissatthena h'dvuso
pancahi indriyehi parisuddhena manovihndnena ananto akaso-ti
dkdsdnahcdyaianam neyyam, anantam vihhdnan-ti vihhanah-
cdyatanam neyyam, na-tthi kiheiti dkihcahhdyatanam neyyan-ti.
‘What is knowable by purified consciousness of the internal sense
isolated from the five sense-organs? Thinking: “Space is un-
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WAYS TO NIBBANA
limited”, the sphere of infinite space is knowable by pure
consciousness of the internal sense isolated from the five sense-
organs: thinking: “Consciousness is unlimited”, the sphere of
infinite consciousness is knowable; thinking: "Nothing exists”,
the sphere of nothingness is knowable.’
From this we know that vinndna is still active up to and in-
cluding the seventh level and actually is the instrument of their
attainment. This statement seems to be confirmed by D II 69
where most of the lower levels of samddhi (including the seventh)
are objectified to worlds of existence and rebirth: vinndnatthitiyo,
‘establishments of consciousness’. This means that viHndna must
be able to get into contact with these same levels already in this
life. What happens to viilndna on the level of nirodha is not
explicitly stated. But it is probably one aspect or one part of
citta and probably continues a dormant existence when the
activities of citta (saMa and vedand) cease. And we know that if
nibbana is attained, vinndna ‘ceases’.
105
Nibbana and consciousness
We have by now collected most of the material referring to
nibbana in the Nikayas. A picture of great complexity has
emerged, and it remains for us to organize the material into a
consistent theory.
We shall start by recapitulating the main types of definition
found in the texts.
1. Nibbana is defined as an event, a process, a transformation,
e.g. dsavanam khayo, ‘the destruction of the obsessions’,
bhavanirodha, ‘the cessation of becoming’, vimutti, ‘release’.
Even the word nibbana itself belongs to this group, and the
corresponding verb nibbdyati, ‘to be extinguished’, is in the
ordinary language used about fire, but in Buddhist contexts it
has the meaning ‘to attain nibbana’.
2. There are definitions which suggest a state (of mind or
personality), for instance the definitions in terms of feelings:
sukham, sivam, ‘happiness’, asokam, ‘freedom from sorrow’,
khemam, ‘security’, paramd santi (I 122), ‘perfect peace'.
Further: drogyam and similar expressions for ‘health’. We have
also found a number of perfect participles that literally express
a state as a result of an event, e.g. nibbuto, ‘extinguished’,
sitibhuto, ‘grown cool’, vimutto, ‘released’.
3. A number of expressions refer to general conditions of
existence. We have found some of them in M I 173: ajdtam,
‘freedom from birth’, ajaram, ‘freedom from ageing’, amatam,
‘freedom from death’. These words do not mean that the arahant
will not grow old and die, but rather that his conditions of
existence will be different in the future: he will not be bom and
therefore not again grow old and die.
4. Metaphorical expressions are very common, e.g. dipa,
‘island’, lena, ‘cave’ (S IV 372), samo bhumibhdgo ramanlyo,
‘the delightful stretch of level ground’ (S III 109).
5. There are finally non-metaphorical definitions in terms of
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NIBBANA AND CONSCIOUSNESS
external, and possibly metaphysical, facts or objects, e.g.
pa.ra.mam ariyasaccam (M III 245), ‘the highest truth’, dyatanam
(U 80), ‘sphere’, ‘dimension’.
According to the legend, the experiences that caused the
prince Gotama to leave his palaces and become a wandering
ascetic was his confrontation with illness, old age and death.
These facts of life seem to have followed him always and
constituted his main problem. But a further development can
be noticed. He found that no man can avoid old age and death
in the present life: there is no escape. But they were found to
depend on another fact of life, namely birth, and the repetition
of this can be prevented. Here we have the beginning of the
paticcasamuppdda-senes. The present circumstances of a human
life — birth, illness, sorrow, old age, death — were summed up
into the word dukkha and were found to depend on the cease-
lessly evolving processes that make up the rest of the series, all
of them personal factors. Through a ‘stopping’ of these factors,
release can be attained. This is the core of Buddhism.
But in another sense, he found an escape. He found that it is
possible to create something within the own personality that
does not change and does not grow old: citta can be made im-
movable and vinnana ‘stopped’.
Citta, which we have called the core of personality, the
functional, empirical self, the organizing factor which produces
the continuity in the endless succession of processes, is by nature
a centre of emotions, desires and moral defilements. It is partly
conscious, partly subconscious. It has also intellectual capacities
and is capable of being transformed: asavehi ciltani vimuccimsu
(SN, p. 149), ‘their minds were freed from the obsessions’. This
is one of the event-definitions of nibbana. And: vimutti nibbdna-
ttha (S III 189), ‘release is the meaning of nibbana’. Citta attains
nibbana. Nibbana is also a name for the state attained by citta:
cittam me susamdhitam vimuttam (Ta 1), ‘my mind is well
composed and free’. A citta that is freed from the obsessions is
not reborn: andvattidhammam me cittam kdmabhavaydti (A IV
402), ‘my citta is not of such nature that it will return to the
plane of sense-pleasures’. In this way we can join the three first
types of definitions enumerated above. They all centre around
the new state and conditions of citta.
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PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
Thus a new type of health ( drogya ) is created, to be con-
trasted with the old problem of illness. This is not a negative
state: this should be pointed out since it is so often maintained
that nibbana can only be defined negatively. All freedom is not
something negative. As a matter of fact, each of the four dsavd
which are eradicated through the attainment of nibbana has its
positive counterpart:
kdma^-santi, ‘peace’ (M I 504)
bhava -*-dhuvam, ‘the constant’ (S IV 370)
avijjd^-vijjd, panna, ‘understanding’
dittha -r-sammdditthi, ‘right understanding’
The three first of these positive expressions are, as we have
seen, important parts of the definitions of nibbana. A
‘nibbana-ed’ ( nibbuta ) citta, free from obsessions, is therefore
calm and unperturbed by desires, constant and unchanging
(more often called accutam than dhuvam), in a state of deep and
correct insight.
We can easily understand that a state of personality can be
constant and permanent. The mature character is firm and
consistent; it is not motivated by whims and emotions. This was
one aspect of nibbana, but more was implied. We know that
nibbana was the end of rebirth and that the medium of rebirth
was vinfiaiia, the stream of conscious processes. Now in nibbana
vinndna is said to ‘stop’, and thereby the kammic process,
carried by it, also stops, and this is the end of rebirth. A ‘stopped’
vinndna cannot again be established and give rise to new ‘name
and form’ after death. This is not so easy to understand if
viWldna signifies the conscious processes as we understand them:
the stream of ideas, memories, perceptions, feelings and impulses
which all the time flickers across our inner eye. Every moment
something is ‘conscious’, usually to be replaced by something
different soon afterwards. How can this process stop, and if it
stops, how can normal life go on?
We know how the process can be stopped — by meditation.
On the highest level, sanndvedayitanirodha , there is no more a
differentiated consciousness. But this is not a permanent state,
as nibbana should be, and, after all, sanndvedayitanirodha is
never identified with nibbana.
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NIBBANA AND CONSCIOUSNESS
A way out of this dilemma is to describe the nature of the
subjective experiences in nibbana. We have already quoted
some of this material.
We observe, first, a certain cleavage in the process of medita-
tion. The mind is more and more emptied, but on each level the
monk knows exactly what he has achieved, e.g. D I 184,
dkincanfidyatana-sukhuma-sacca-sanni yeva tasmim samaye hoti,
‘he becomes at that time conscious, subtly but genuinely, of
the level of nothingness’. And even when the great experience
comes, he makes the conscious reflection that it has come:
vinmttasmim vimuttamhiti ndnam hoti (S IV 20), ‘in the freed
comes the knowledge: I am free!’ We must draw the conclusion
that, although vihhdna is ‘stopped’, still an act of differentiated
understanding can take place, so the ‘stopped’ virthdna refers
to a different layer of consciousness than the momentary surface
processes. This is confirmed in M I 523, where it is said that in an
arahant the obsessions are always destroyed, but he knows it
only when he reflects on it (quoted above, p. 31). This is a most
important distinction. There are simply, according to the early
Buddhist analysis, two layers of consciousness: what we called
the momentary surface processes and the background con-
sciousness. The latter is an habitual state, developed through
knowledge, through meditation, through the cessation of all
emotions and desires. This constant background is always there
and can always be reverted to. It may be described as an inner
refuge, and some of the metaphorical expressions common
about nibbana seem to describe it well. Some of them can be
found in S IV 368 ff: saranam, ‘refuge’, lena, ‘cave’, tanam,
‘shelter’. This ‘stopped’ state of vinhana is therefore one aspect
of nibbana: the inner refuge, the quasi-conscious constant
background of knowledge, peace, security, confidence and
satisfaction, which is always in the background and, of course,
very often fully conscious.
We find several other descriptions of the subjective aspect
of this state. We find in S V 302 that citta can remain intact in
spite of painful bodily feelings ( saririkd dukkhd vedand cittam na
pariydddya titthanti). So in this case the word citta is used for
this peaceful, uninfluenced background. In A V 207 we find the
expression anuddhato viharati ajjhattam vupasantacitto, ‘he
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PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
remains unshaken, with a calm mind internally’. A very informa-
tive simile is found in M I 279 and other places: ‘It is like a pure,
limpid, serene pool of water in which a man with vision standing
on the bank might see oysters and shells, also gravel and pebbles,
and shoals of fish moving about and keeping still. It might occur
to him: this pool of water is pure, limpid. . . . Even so, a monk
understands as it really is: this is suffering. . . This simile
makes it easy for us to understand, across the centuries, what it
is all about. Even we can have this calm, unperturbed perception
and make the reflection that we have it. And it is clearly said
what this simile will explain: the inner state of understanding
which is one of the most important sides of nibbana; again the
cleavage into surface and depth.
We will finally again remind of M I 487, where the Tathagata
is called gambhiro appameyyo duppariyogdho seyyathd pi
mahasamuddo, ‘deep, immeasurable, unfathomable as the great
ocean’. This occurs in a discussion about the fate of the Tathagata
after death but it is all the same a description of his present
state, nibbana. If we try to visualize a conscious state that
could be best described by these words, we will arrive at the
type of ‘below-the-surface’ state just referred to, a completely
undisturbed state of passive comprehension, an unlimited, dis-
interested and problem-free inner space. This is again a descrip-
tion of nibbana.
The state of this ‘immovable, unfluctuating mind’ (asamhiram
asankuppam cittam, Ta 649) is often described in terms of
emptiness, and we find nibbana described as sunnatd, ‘emptiness’
(M III 108, Ti 46) animitta, ‘signless’ (Ti 46), and anidassana,
‘free from attributes’ (S IV 370). This may mean many things:
freedom from impurities, from obsessions, but referring to
consciousness, especially the type of emptiness produced by
means of meditation. Since the most normal way of attaining
nibbana was meditation and since the main concern of the ara-
hant was to maintain what he had achieved, namely this
‘immovable, unfluctuating mind’, by means of meditation, it is
natural that some of the descriptions of nibbana have borrowed
terms that more properly belong to the area of meditation.
The ultimate aim was to attain freedom from rebirth, and
the old age and death which is a consequence of it. This attain-
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NIBBANA AND CONSCIOUSNESS
ment is seen as an automatic product of the destruction of the
obsessions and the ‘stopping’ of vinndna. Vinndna is stopped
through the formation of the refuge of calm understanding,
which we have described. This vinHana is felt to remain un-
disturbed forever, it cannot again be established and create a
new personality for itself, because there are no more unsatisfied
impulses, no more unfulfilled possibilities: there is complete
security for the future.
The nibbana of the Nikayas is then a transformed state of
personality and consciousness. In none of the innumerable cases
where the attainment of nibbana is referred to as the destruction
of the obsessions, is it ever suggested that this transformation is
not enough: the new state is ‘the end of suffering’. It is however
quite natural that this could be misunderstood. A new ex-
perience was created, a very great experience that came to be
the dominating fact in the monk’s life. Could this experience be
purely subjective? Could something so important be only
personal? Was it not rather a perception of something more
‘real’, the ultimate metaphysical truth? This belief became
dominating in the Abhidhamma: ‘The general point is that
nibbana is distinct from sense objects and is neither a mental
event nor a concept. Then nibbana or the Absolute is a single,
i.e. uncompounded, element, a Real ( Paramattha Dhamma)
existing in its own right’ (Jayasuriya, 3, p. 149). The attainment
of nibbana would then be a perception of this reality or a merg-
ing into it. We have found traces of this interpretation in the
Nikayas, but they are rare and unimportant. It may have
started from a misunderstanding of negations like ajata and
amata, which came to be understood literally as ‘not bom, not
dying’, whereas the original meaning was ‘freedom from birth
and death’, referring to the individual whose problems were to
be solved. The whole point of Buddhism was actually missed
by this misunderstanding. On the other hand it can be under-
stood that an important experience was projected and reified
like this, because it would seem more ‘real’, more universal,
more superhuman. Any produced state was difficult to make
enough permanent, enough clear, enough perfect to meet the
ideal. By projecting it, the monk became free from something
of the individual responsibility. The task was no longer entirely
hi
PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
his. He could be excused if he was able to see only brief glimpses
of the great vision. This was then the beginning of the trans-
formation of Buddhism. In the Nikayas we can still see the
doctrine in its overwhelming freshness and intensity. But the
metaphysicians took over and it was changed from a living
concern into just another theory.
A Semantic Differential
A good method for mapping the exact meaning of a concept is
to construct a semantic differential (13). In this the task of
definition is divided into a series of decisions. We can avoid the
fascination of vague labels which mars so many discussions of
Buddhism, and rather build up a description by using a great
many variables. In this way, even the big questions can finally
be answered.
Our semantic differential is constructed as a kind of rating
scale: a series of descriptive expressions are collected, and in
each case we rate its applicability on and importance for the
definition of nibbana. We start with the easiest decisions and go
on to the more difficult ones.
Semantic differential for nibbana
0 = no applicability or no connection
1 = uncertain connection
2 = correlated but not necessary for definition
3 = necessary precondition or byproduct
4 = essential part of definition
Description of nibbana
1. pleasant
2. knowledge . .
3. liberation
4. a transformation of citta
5. permanent . .
6. attainable in this life
7. absence of desires
8. an experience
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NIBBANA AND CONSCIOUSNESS
0
I
2
3
4
9. a level of ethical achievement
X
10. a feeling
X
11. a state of meditation
X
12. emptiness . .
X
13. freedom
X
14. peace of mind
X
15. freedom from rebirth
X
16. an event, process . .
X
17. a state
X
18. conditions and expectations
X
19. conscious state
X
20. an impersonal state
X
1
21. self-realization
X
22. achieved by causal process
X
23. annihilation
X
24. immortality
X
25. a personal achievement . .
X
26. real . .
X
27. entity
X
28. supernatural knowledge . .
X
29. supernatural power
X
30. a supernatural state
X
31. knowing the absolute
X
32. merging into the absolute
X
33. union with God
X
34. a dimension of existence . .
X
(X)
35. ultimate truth, Ding-an-sich
X
(X)
36. universal, superindividual
consciousness
X
The concept nibbdna
37. consistent . .
X
38. indefinable
X
39. subjective . .
X
40. empirical
X
41. psychological
X
42. metaphysical
X
(x)
PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
Comments
1. sukha, Dh 203.
2. ahhdya nibbutd, S I 24, 'having attained nibbana through knowledge';
sambodhdya nibbanaya, D II 251 '(leads to) . . . the highest insight, nibbana';
Ti 432, bodhim, ‘perfect knowledge'.
3. multi, S IV 372, 'release'.
4. S III 45; D II 81; M II 245, cittassa vimokho, 'the release of citta' .
5. SN 204, nibbdnapadam acculam, 'the unchangeable state of nibbana'; S IV
370, dhuvam, 'the constant'. Nibbana is therefore defined both as the event of
attainment and the subsequent state.
6. A I 1 59 . . . sanditthikam nibbdnam hoti akalikam ehipassikam opanayikam
paccattam veditabbam viAiluhi, 'Nibbana is visible in this life, immediate,
inviting to come and see, leading onward, to be experienced personally by the
wise.'
7. tanhakkhayo, S III 190, ‘destruction of desire'; SN 707 aniccho, ‘without
wishes’.
8. A I 159, see above, no. 6.
9. M I 173. asankilittha, ‘freedom from impurities'; S IV 372 suddhi, 'purity';
S V 8, rdgakkhayo dosakkhayo mohakkhayo, 'the destruction of desire, hate and
delusion’.
10. Nibbana is sukha but cannot be defined as a feeling.
11. See discussion in the text.
12. Ti 46; M III 104 ff. See special chapter.
13. Ta 1165, nibbdnam sabbaganthapamocanam, 'nibbana is freedom from every
tie'. M I I2i f.
14. I 122, paramd santi, ‘perfect peace’.
15. S II 117, bhavanirodho, 'cessation of rebirth".
16-18. Definitions in terms of an event are just as common as those expressing
a state. It is, however, quite clear that nibbana refers mainly to a state (see
no. 5) and that the event-definitions are just a somewhat careless way of
expressing the beginning of this state. The conditions and expectations referred
to in no. 18 (e.g. freedom from birth, from ageing, from death) are really a
result of the attained state and not to be considered as independent definitions,
although usually presented as such in the texts.
19. NibbSna is often defined in terms of consciousness, but this word can mean
different things. Nibbana is not consciousness in the sense of conscious content
in the present time, but it may be a predominant conscious attitude, a half-
conscious background. This we have expressed as a state of citta and is more a
state of personality than of consciousness in the European sense.
20. anattarn, U 80. As emptiness (Ti 46) and animitta, 'signless’, nibbana is an
impersonal state. It can, however, not be understood as completely impersonal.
And as long as the arahant is alive, his khandhd still exist.
21. I 57, bhdvitatta, 'with cultivated self’ used about aTathagata. This frequent
expression and others of the same type could lead us to believe that nibbana
is self-realization. The texts are not always clear, but probably attd in these
contexts is simply used for citta.
22. A V 3.
23-24. Nibbana is called ajdta and amata, which is usually translated 'unborn'
and ‘deathless’ but probably means 'freedom from re-birth and re-death’.
Nibbana certainly involves immortality in some form.
25. The personal striving is always stressed, e.g. Dh 80 attanam damayanti
panditd, ‘the wise discipline the self.
NIBBANA AND CONSCIOUSNESS
26. saccatp, S IV 370, 'real’, 'true'.
27. In U 80, nibbana is called ayatanam, 'a dimension’, but even this word may
be used about psychological states. The negatives in U 80: ajatam, etc., could
refer to a metaphysical entity but we have explained them differently.
28. Supernatural knowledge ( abhiHAa ) may be important for the attainment of
nibbana but not necessary.
29. Meditation may lead to the development of supernatural powers, but these
have no place in the definition of nibbana.
30. The decision here is a matter of taste: nibbana is certainly not statistically
‘normal’. But since it may be attained by means of a natural, causal process, we
prefer not to call it supernatural. It is never defined as supernatural.
31. This would amount to metaphysical knowledge. By abiUnd the arahant may
know things that from our point of view are ’transcendent’, but metaphysical
knowledge is never stressed as part of the definition of nibbana.
32. 33. There are statements in the texts which could be quoted as proof for
these views, e.g. Brahmabhiita (D III 84), ’Brahma-become’, and amatam
vigayha (SN 228), ’merging into the deathless’, but they are too isolated to
carry much weight.
34. This definition might follow from U 80, but we have preferred another
interpretation, which makes this page more consistent with other definitions.
35. Nibbana is often said by writers about Buddhism to be a name for a
supramundane reality or metaphysical ens. This is one of the possible interpreta-
tions of U 80, but we have found this explanation improbable, see discussion
in the text.
36. If the interpretation of nibbana as a metaphysical ens were true, then one
possible form of it could be universal consciousness. D I 223 (vOManam
anantam . . .) could be explained in this way, and also a few other descriptions
that probably have been transferred from the experiences during meditation.
37-42. These descriptions are chosen in order to define the nature of the concept,
o here means ‘no’ and 4 ‘yes’. Nibbana is not considered to be a consistent
concept since statements are found in the texts which agree badly with the
general picture. In many of these cases, however, we do not know whether the
reason for this is not an incorrect interpretation from our part. The final
interpretation in this book aims at a consistent theory, and according to this
nibbana is an empirical psychological concept belonging to the personal,
subjective sphere of experience.
The personality of the
arahant
'Arahant' means literally ‘worthy’ and is usually translated
‘the perfect man’, ‘the ideal man’, ‘saint’. The arahant is the
end product of the Buddhist development, as is expressed by
the so-called arahant formulas, e.g. I 38: . . . araham . . .
khindsavo vusitavd katakaraniyo ohitabhdro anuppattasadattho
parikkhinabhavasamyojano sammadahhavimutto, ‘an arahant who
has destroyed the obsessions, who has lived the life, done what
was to be done, laid down the burden, attained the goal, broken
the fetters of becoming, won freedom by perfect knowledge’.
He is the man who has realized nibbana, as can be seen from the
context from which the last quotation was taken but also from
many other contexts, e.g. S IV 252, where arahatta, 'arahant-
ship’, is given exactly the same definition as nibbana, namely:
Yo kho dvuso rdgakkhayo dosakkhayo mohakkhayo idam vuccati
arahattanti, ‘The destruction of desire, hate and illusion — that
is called arahantship.’
What are the criteria of arahantship? There are two criteria,
and both have been mentioned previously. One of them is purely
subjective: the fact is realized by means of understanding, a
personal conviction that the aim has been attained. The other,
less often mentioned, is objective: a person who is already an
arahant may examine the mind (citta) of others and by means of
his superknowledge find out whether it is freed or not (S I 194,
A IV 204). The former, subjective criterion is in Pali expressed
by: arahattapattim vydkaroti, 'he declares the attainment of
arahantship’, as in A II 157, or: ahham vydkaroti, ‘he declares
(final) understanding’, as in S II 51. A declaration of this type
has to be accepted as final: Yena kenaci pi Sariputta pariyayena
kulaputto ahham vydkaroti, atha kho vyakatam vydkatato
datthabbanti (S II 51), ‘In whatever way a clansman declares
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(final) understanding, the declaration must be considered as
such.’
The subjective criterion was liable to be misunderstood, and
final understanding could be claimed prematurely or falsely.
This was recognized by the Buddha himself: . . . idh' ekacce
moghapurisd hasamdnakd mahhe annattt vydkaronti (A III 359),
‘there are some foolish fellows here who declare knowledge
braggingly (or: jokingly?), it seems’. Something similar is said
in M II 252: santi pan' idh' ekacce bhikkhu adhimdnena pi ahham
vydkamsu, ‘there are also some monks here, who out of over-
conceit, declared knowledge’. For a layman it was quite im-
possible to know whether a certain person was an arahant or
not (A III 391, S I 78).
To this looseness of the criterion comes a looseness of the
definition, as the majority of all arahants were only pahhdvi-
muttd, ‘freed by understanding’, and only a minority were
advanced enough in meditation to see for themselves the truth
of the basic teachings (see S 1 191, referred to above). Frequently
we get the impression that nibbana was attained through a
sudden insight like a conversion (see M III 20, quoted on p. 85).
One gets the impression that this was especially common at the
beginning of the Buddha’s career and that he demanded more
later. This general impression is confirmed in S II 224, where
Kassapa refers to the fact that there were fewer arahants then
than before and asks for an explanation. The Buddha replies:
saitesu hdyamanesu saddhamme antaradhdyamdne bahutarani
ceva sikkhdpaddni honti, appatardca bhikkhu ahhdya santhahanti,
‘When beings decrease and the true doctrine disappears, there
are more rules and fewer monks are established in knowledge.’
It is not clear why he says that the true doctrine tended to
disappear in his own lifetime, as his teaching certainly was
successful, but we note that the rules had increased in number
and the number of arahants had decreased.
As Buddhism is usually explained by writers at the present
time, arahantship appears as an unreasonably high ideal. It is
certain that to some it seemed difficult, nearly impossible, to
attain: for instance to Siha who worked for seven years and then
in desperation tried to hang herself. The Buddha usually pre-
scribed training in meditation during a minimum of seven days
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(e.g. M I 63), but we have found that the demands for panndvi-
mutti were less than that. Even in cases when exercises were
used, the insight might come quicker. We have, for instance, the
story about Bahiya (U 6), who suddenly decided to find out
what the Buddha’s teaching was all about and found him on
his way to the usual begging round and insisted on being taught
at once. After some protests because of the unsuitable time, the
Buddha relented and told him in a few sentences how he should
train himself, and then left him. Bahiya immediately started to
apply the teaching, but before the Buddha had returned from
his begging round, perhaps two or three hours later, he was
attacked and killed by ‘a young calf. When the Buddha returned
and saw what had happened, he pronounced Bahiya as pari-
nibbuto. As to the timing, this is probably one of the most
precise accounts that we can find. The background of Bahiya is
not known, but he was probably a monk although not familiar
with the Buddhist way.
From accounts of this type we must draw the conclusion that
the changes of personality affected through attaining arahant-
ship may not always have been profound. We should also not
expect any great homogeneity among the arahants, also not very
great differences between arahants and followers on other levels
of development. This is clear from texts like A I 23 ff, where the
Buddha’s most important disciples are enumerated and des-
scribed but without mentioning whether they were arahants or
not. Ananda, for instance, was the Buddha’s personal attendant
and one of his chief disciples and a successful teacher for many
years without being an arahant.
The arahants during the Buddha’s lifetime must have been a
rather heterogeneous crowd. There were extremely gifted,
serious and devoted men like Sariputta and Anuruddha, but
there were also fakes. There were men who had attained every-
thing that could be attained by meditation, but there were also
many with a very brief, although serious confrontation with
the teaching.
As it is most common nowadays to stress the perfection, the
homogeneity, even the lack of individuality, of arahants, let us
investigate this matter a bit more closely. It would be preferable,
in an analysis of this type, to classify the traits in two ways,
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namely in common traits and individual traits, on the one hand,
and in traits demanded by definition and traits empirically
observed, on the other. They could be combined into one system,
as shown below. We shall, however, find that there will be no
individual traits demanded by definition and that the texts
never distinguish between observed and required traits. So we
are left with two categories, required common traits and
observed individual traits.
i. In spite of the great differences as to type and extent of
preparation for arahantship, similarity is required in a great
number of respects. As arahantship in principle was considered
attainable by everybody (although ‘individual differences in
mental endowment’, indriyavemattatam, M I 437, were recog-
nized), the similarities must mainly consist in acquired traits.
The whole concept of arahantship would have broken down
rapidly, if too many disciples had shown themselves unable to
reach it for congenital reasons.
Common
Required
Observed
Individual
A generalized description of the Buddhist Ideal Man can
easily be compiled from the Nikaya literature.
In general, we get a picture of monkish activities, virtues and
attitudes. This is natural, since life as a monk was chosen for the
purpose of reaching arahantship. Most arahants were monks.
However, monkhood was never considered to be a condition for
reaching arahantship. Many lay arahants are mentioned, in
A III 450 f, for instance, twenty-one are enumerated. The
method they are said to have followed consists of six steps:
Buddhe aveccappasadena, dhatnme aveccappasadena , sanghe
aveccappasadena, ariyena silena, ariyena nanena, ariyaya
vimuttiya, ‘perfect faith in the Buddha, in the doctrine, and in
the order, noble morality, noble knowledge, and noble release’.
This is not the ordinary eight-fold way, and the different types of
meditation are conspicuously missing. But we cannot draw
the conclusion that meditation was not permitted to, or
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practised by laymen. On the contrary, exercises in both sati and
samddhi must have been quite common among lay followers.
The mother of Nanda, Velukantakupa, for instance, used to
practise the four jhanas, according to A IV 63 ff. In principle it
was therefore considered quite possible to combine a worldly
profession with Buddhist training and arahantship — possible
but hardly normal, because there are indications that the lay
arahants felt inferior and were also considered as such.
The arahant is supposed to personify the Buddhist moral
ideal. He should be so imbued with the basic virtues that it is
impossible for him to act otherwise, as it is said in M I 523:
abhabbo khinasavo bhikhu sancicca panarn jivitd voropetum,
abhabbo khinasavo bhikku adinnam theyyasankhdtam addtum,
abhabbo khinasavo bhikkhu methunam dhammam patisevitum,
abhabbo khinasavo bhikkhu sampajanamusd bhdsitum, abhabbo
khinasavo bhikkhu sannidhikdrakam kdme paribhunjitum
seyyatha pi pubbe agdriyabhuto. 'A monk, whose obsessions have
been destroyed (he is explicitly called arahant in the preceding
sentence), is unable to kill a living creature intentionally, to take,
by means of theft, what has not been given, to have sexual
intercourse, to speak a deliberate lie, to store up and enjoy
objects of pleasure, as he did formerly as layman.’
These are the ordinary negative formulations, but we find
also more positive expressions, e.g. A I 211 f : ydvajivam arahanto
pdndtipdiam pahdya pdndtipdtd pativiratd nihitadanda nihita-
satthd lajji daydpannd sabbapanabhutahitdnukampino viharanti,
‘as long as they live, the arahants, by abandoning the slaying of
creatures, are abstainers from the slaying of creatures, have laid
aside the rod and the sword; they are modest, show kindness,
remain friendly and compassionate to all living beings’. The
text then points out that the arahants avoid stealing, unchastity
and deception, using somewhat more positive formulations
than in the former quotation. It continues: Ydvajivam arahanto
. . . surdmeraya-majjapamddatthand pativiratd, . . . ekabhattikd
rattuparatd viratd vikdla-bhojand, . . . naccagitavadita-visuka-
dassandmdldgandhavilepanadhdranamandanavibhusanatthdnd
pativiratd, . . . uccdsayanamahasayana pativiratd nicaseyyam
kappenti mahcake va tinasanth drake vd. . . . 'As long as they live,
the arahants . . . abstain from indulgence in alcoholic and
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intoxicating drinks which cause laziness, . . . live on one meal
a day, abstaining from food at unseasonable hours, refrain from
going to exhibitions of dance, singing and music, from the use
of garlands, perfume and cosmetics, from wearing adornments
and decorations, . . . abstain from the use of high, wide beds,
and make their bed lowly, on a pallet or on a spread of straw.’
Some positive formulations are also to be found in A V 205:
iti bhinndnam va sandhdta sahitdnam vd anuppaddtd samag-
gdrdmo samaggarato samagganandi samaggakaranim vdcam
bhdsita hoti. ‘Thus he reconciles those who are at variance and
confirms the friendly. He delights in harmony, finds pleasure
therein, rejoices in harmony and utters words that make for
harmony.’ Yd sd vdcd nela kannasukhd pemaniya hadayangamd
port bahujanakanta bahujanamandpd, tatthdrupim vdcam bhdsita
hoti. ‘Whatever speech is blameless, pleasing to the ear, affec-
tionate, speech that goes to the heart, is urbane, delights many
people — such speech does he utter.’
To the early Buddhists, the conscious processes were much
more important than behaviour. This is certainly one explana-
tion why the general impression of the arahant is one of passive
perfection rather than social, extravert action. Another is that
no feeling of collective responsibility existed. It was the main
task of the individual to perfect himself and leave the wheel of
existences; he could bring no other with him: kammasetthassa
kdrakd: ragam dosam pajahanti (Ti 275), ‘they do the best work:
they drive out desire and hate’. This is self-centred and lonely
work. Still, social activity existed, and an arahant could nurse
sick colleagues (see, e.g. S IV 56), although he usually preferred
to preach to them.
It was not forbidden to an arahant to work for his living, as
we have seen, but it was not encouraged. All fundamental
questions in this connection were simply avoided. According to
SN p. 13, the Buddha was once reproached by a farmer for not
working: ‘You should plough and sow too; only when you have
done that, you should eat!’ The Buddha avoided the reproach
by saying that he did just so: ‘Faith is the seed, austerity the
rain’, etc.
Still, bodily activity did exist, and the problem of the arahant
was to keep it free from kammic effects. This was done by means
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of sali, and it is said, S V 302, that ‘the arahant generally
spends his time with his mind well established in these four states
of mindfulness’: araham . . . imesu catusu satipatthanesu supa-
titthitacitto bahulam viharaii. And so: kdyakammam suci (Ti 277),
‘the bodily work is pure’.
The typical extraverted work was, as we have seen, verbal:
vacikamma, consisting in teaching, settling disputes, giving
advice, discussing. As the arahants are completely without
egotism (asmimdno samucchinno, ‘the pride "I am” is rooted
up’, S III 83), their teaching is gentle and they are careful not
to offend (SN 632, akakkasam vinnapanim, ‘teaching gently’,
ndbhisaje kanci, ‘he offends nobody’). They are friendly towards
everybody: sabbamitto sabbasakho sabbabhutdnukampako , ‘every-
body’s friend, everybody’s comrade, compassionate towards all
beings’ (Ta 648). They are tolerant ( labhantu labhakama, ‘may
those earn who want to’, says Kassapa, S II 198) but are not
afraid of correcting others; at least, it is said about Sariputta,
S I 63: pdpagarahi dyasmd Sdriputto, 'the venerable Sariputta is
a censor of the bad’.
The arahant is therefore not free from activity, but all
activity must be of a type permitted by the laws of morality
and performed in such a way that no kammic consequences are
produced. According to modem psychology no activity is
possible without motivating forces (usually called needs, desires,
etc.). So what are the motivating forces behind the acts of the
arahant?
The answers given by the texts seem somewhat contradictory.
First, the physiological needs are still there, although severely
disciplined. The arahant still becomes hungry and is permitted
to eat, although frugality is encouraged. The sexual need is
supposed to be completely mastered, and Ananda says, Ta 1039,
that for twenty-five years he has been free from ‘thoughts of
sense-pleasures’, kamasannd. It was permitted to satisfy reason-
able needs of physical comfort. The social needs were more
problematic, as they have strong moral overtones, the egotistic
ones having negative value and the altruistic ones positive value.
The arahants are anejanto, ‘free from desire’, and tanka tesam na
vijjati, ‘no thirst is found in them’ (S III 83). Now, we know
from D II 78 that only ‘wrong wishes’, papikamm icchanam,
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are forbidden and from D II 279 that behaviour is of two types,
one that can be recommended (sevitabbam) and one that should
be avoided [asevitabbam) . The former gives rise to kusald
dhammd, ‘skilful processes’. From this we could draw the con-
clusion that the arahant is free from needs leading to immoral
acts only and has kept or acquired motivation for good acts.
This can, however, not be the whole truth, as he is not very keen
on activity of any type: Natthi . . . arahato uttarikararixyam,
‘for an arahant there is nothing further to be done’ (S III 168).
According to S II 82, already quoted, he ‘does not perform an
act of merit, not an act of demerit and not a neutral act’.
According to SN 636, puiinail ca papan ca ubho sangam upaccagd,
‘he has passed good and evil, both being fetters’, and he ‘is rid
of likes and dislikes, cool’: hitvd ratin ca aratin ca sitibhutam
(SN 642). He is often called akincana, translated ‘man of
nothing’ (e.g. S I 141). This seems to indicate a more advanced
level, where little motivation, in either direction, is left. He
seems unconcerned, an outsider, a stranger. He is anaHHaneyyo
(SN 364), 'not to be led by another’. He ‘does not agree with
anybody and does not quarrel with anybody’, na kenaci
samvadati na kenaci vivadati (M I 500). He ‘sees security all
ways’, khemam passati sabbadhi (SN 953). He has ‘no hope,
neither in this world nor beyond’, asayassa na vijjanti asmim loke
paramhi ca (SN 634). In spite of this, he is ‘active’, dtdpi (Ta 1).
From a psychological point of view it is beyond doubt that if
there really is nothing more to attain and no hope, there can be
no activity. If the arahant still acts, it may be that he responds
to very weak motivations that do not become conscious, or that
he acts from conscious motives, e.g. mettd, ‘friendliness’, karuna,
‘compassion’, which he approves of but does not count as meri-
torious or even as motives at all. Anyway, his attitude remains
friendly, even helpful, but still ‘cool’. He is uninfluenced and
enjoys complete inner freedom. He is based on nothing and
never tries consciously to achieve anything. When an arahant
conquers an opponent in a dispute and even calls him ‘stupid
fellow’ ( moghapurisa , D III 27), we are to assume this to be a
spontaneous outflow of a personality that is in reality disinter-
ested but continues to act in a friendly, helpful and ethical
manner because his previous training has created a ‘second na-
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ture’ of this type. His actions are in this way not motivated by
a desire to win anything by them.
If we try to solve the contradictions in this way, we cannot
avoid an impression of machine-like perfection, a clock, once
drawn up and continuing to work impersonally and uninten-
tionally. There may be texts that give this impression, but at
least the warm and vivid descriptions of the Buddha’s own
activity swear against it. So the contradiction remains: either
the Buddha did not live up to his ideal or the ideal was sometimes
badly formulated.
Since the arahant is free from desire (we can say this, at least)
and is therefore detached and independent, his emotional
state is correspondingly calm, undisturbed, confident, free from
fear and free from worries. He is happy and content, even if
blamed or persecuted. A few quotations may show this. So
vissattho gacchati, vissattho titthati vissattho nisidati vissattho
seyyam kappeti (M I 175). ‘He walks confidently, stands con-
fidently, sits down confidently, goes to sleep confidently.’ He is
akkodhana, ‘free from anger’, and anussada, ‘free from pride’
(SN 624). He is santo, ‘calm’ (SN 946), apelabheravo , ‘free from
fear’ (Ta 5), santusito, ‘content’ (Ta 8), samyojaniyehi vippa-
mutto, ‘freed from fettering ideas’ (SN 363), na paritassati, ‘he
does not worry’ (SN 621). He is sukhin, ‘happy’ (S III 83), and
akkosam vadhabandhan ca aduttho — titikkhati, ‘endures, without
ill will, insult, blows and fetters’ (SN 623). The arahant is there-
fore not without feelings, and pleasant feelings are even
important to him (S III 168). Although he was not interested in
the dance and music of that time (as being too sensual?), he was
not without aesthetic sensitivity, and aesthetic enjoyment was
not considered an obstacle. There are in the Nikayas plenty of
references to appreciation of scenic beauty. The Buddha some-
times commented on the beauty of a place, and Ta 1062 speaks
about bhumibhdga manoramd, ‘districts delightful to the mind’.
The individual constellation of the feelings and emotions of a
person are said to constitute his temperament. The temperament
is believed to be congenital to a very great extent and has much
to do with the needs, their directions and strength. Now in the
arahant the structureof the needs has become profoundly changed,
through training and understanding: it has become weaker and
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what is left has been redirected towards accepted values. In this
process the temperament has changed also and has become to
some extent similar in all arahants: calmness, slowness in motion,
carefulness, freedom from fear and worries are some of these
common temperamental traits.
There are similarities in the cognitive processes also. The
perceptual apparatus is of course still intact, but the use made of
it may have changed as a result of the new attitudes and values
and the meditational exercises. Perception and thinking is in
the ordinary person not altogether realistic and objective.
There are usually some distortions from the needs (you exag-
gerate what you want to see) and defence mechanisms (a fact
that is flattering to you is seen as more important). Unrealistic
influences of this type would be expected to diminish in the
arahant, as his needs are less strong or redirected (sublimated?)
and he has no egotism. This is also pointed out for instance in
M I 4: . . . araham . . . pathavim pathavito abhijdnati, ‘the
arahant . . . knows earth as earth’, etc. And, therefore: patha-
vim ndbhinandati , ‘he does not rejoice in the earth’. In A III 378
we find this statement: samma-vimuttacittassa bhikkhuno bhusd
ce pi cakkhuvihneyyd rupd cakkhnssa dpdtham agacchanti, nev' -
assa cittam pariyddiyanti, amissikatam ev'assa cittam hoti,
thitam dnejjappattam, ‘If forms cognizable by the eye come very
strongly into the range of vision of a monk whose mind has
attained the perfect release, then they do not obsess his mind
and his mind is untroubled, firm and composed.’ These texts tell
us that the perceptions of the arahant remain isolated: they are
not changed to suit personal interests and they are also not
allowed to disturb his peace of mind. That they still may become
sources of disturbance becomes evident from M III 107 f: atthi
c'evdyam darathamattd, yadidam imam eva kdyam paticca
salayatanikam jivitapaccayd ti, ‘there is only this degree of
disturbance, namely the six sensory fields that, conditioned by
life, are grounded on this body itself’.
Since most arahants had devoted much time to exercises in
meditation, we must ask whether the cognitive processes are in
any way modified by these exercises. We might expect greater
control over the conscious processes, greater stability and less
mixture of cognitions and emotions. In D III 226 it is said that,
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when a monk sees an object with the eye, then: rakkhati cak-
khindriyam, cakkhindriye samvaram dpajjati, ‘he guards the
visual sense and attains to mastery over it’. This is an example
of a technique called samvarapadhdnam, ‘effort of control’. The
next technique is also of interest here, namely pahdna-padhdna,
‘effort of repression’. Part of the definition is: uppannuppanne
pdpake akusale dhamme nddhivaseti pajahati vinodeti byantikaroti
anabhdvam gameti, ‘when evil, unskilled processes have arisen,
he will not endure them but puts them away, represses, extermin-
ates and destroys them’. This is a technique well known to
psychoanalysts and by them called repression. The psycho-
analytic repression is an ego-defence consisting in an active
forgetting of embarrassing and compromising facts. The pahdna
is a similar ‘forgetting’, but the early Buddhists probably never
noticed that repression does not lead to annihilation and that
repressed material may continue to influence consciousness
indirectly, from its hiding place in the unconscious layers of
personality. For the Buddhists, repression is simply a method of
control and purification.
The arahants are said to be clever in discussions, and their
wisdom is profound: gambhira.pa.nnam medhavim maggdmaggassa
kovidam . . . (SN 627), ‘he who has profound wisdom, is intelli-
gent, skilled in all ways . . However, theoretical exercises
were not encouraged, and ditthi, ‘speculative views’, was counted
as one of the obsessions. The arahant is even defined as one
without ‘thoughts’, vitakkd (U 71): yassa vitakkd vidupita
ajjhattam suvikappita asesa . . . na jdtim eti, ‘he whose thoughts
are destroyed and cut off without remainder internally ... he will
not go to birth’. By meditation he can attain different types of
supernatural knowledge. These are described in D I 77—83.
Most important of these are dibbd sotadhdtu, ‘clair-audience’,
by which he could ‘hear sounds both human and celestial,
whether far or near’; cetopariyahdna, ‘telepathic knowledge’ or
mind-reading; pubbenivdsdnussatinana, ‘retrocognitive know-
ledge of past existences’, by means of which he can remember his
past existences and verify the fact of rebirth; sattanam cutupa-
paiaMna, 'knowledge of the decease and survival of beings’, by
means of which he can see how the law of kamma has worked in
other beings, how they have lived and what type of rebirth they
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have got. To this is always added dsavakkhayandna, ‘knowledge
of the destruction of the obsessions’ which, then, here is counted
among the supernatural achievements. As a matter of fact, every
arahant had to know for himself that his obsessions were
destroyed — this was the criterion of arahantship. Usually this
act of insight was achieved through patina, which could be
developed even without meditation.
2. We may well ask whether this ideal, as we have described it
just now, is human. Can it be realized by human beings? And, if
it is realized, are there any individual traits left in the person?
It is difficult to get clear answers to these questions, as they
were not anticipated in the texts. What we can do is to look
for descriptions of individual arahants.
With regard to individual differences, it is interesting to
note that the Buddha always took individuality for granted,
and he seems to have liked to comment on differences among his
disciples. Our chief source of knowledge about such differences
is perhaps A I 23 ff, where twenty-eight monks are mentioned
as foremost in some respect. Unfortunately, no distinction is
made between arahants and not-yet-arahants, so we cannot
restrict the following discussion to arahants.
The following differences of psychological interest are
mentioned in this text:
(a) memory
(b) knowledge
(c) understanding, intelligence
(d) wit (Vangisa was patibhdnavant, ‘witty’)
(e) power of meditation
(f) supernatural power of different types
(g) energy
(h) pedantry (Maha Kassapa is called dhutavdda, ‘one who
inculcates punctiliousness’)
(i) charm (Upasena Vangantaputta was samantapdsadika,
‘altogether charming’)
(j) ability to speak
(k) ability to teach
(l) social habits (some are said to have loved seclusion, e.g.
Sariputta)
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(m) power of reconciliation (Kaludayi was good at that, while
Anuruddha, according to A II 239, never intervened)
(n) interest in austerities (Kassapa had strong inclinations to
asceticism, according to S II 202)
(o) faith
We find that this list covers most of the commonly observed
personality differences, with the exception of all moral traits and
all abnormalities. The list implies that there are individual
differences also with regard to traits in which an arahant should
be perfect, e.g. knowledge, understanding and energy.
S II 155 describes a situation, where the Buddha watches
groups of his disciples walking to and fro in the neighbourhood.
He notices that the groups are somewhat homogeneous and that
similar people feel attracted to each other. So, those ‘of great
understanding’ (mahapanna) have flocked around Sariputta,
those ‘of great magic power’ ( mahiddhikd ) are in Moggallana’s
group, those ‘who have learnt much’ ( bahussutd ) follow Ananda,
and monks ‘with evil wishes’ ( papiccha ) have chosen Devadatta
(who certainly was no arahant).
We may conclude that it was considered natural, that even
arahants kept their individual traits and developed new ones
during the course of training. Only moral imperfections were
supposed to be completely eradicated.
Did the arahants live up to the ideal? Is it correct to call them
‘the perfect ones’? We may be sceptical, as we find perfection a
rare guest on this planet. And considering the different quali-
fications of the arahants, in terms of abilities, length of training,
etc., we feel inclined to expect even less. It is difficult to find an
objective answer to the questions, as we have no external source
of information, but only Buddhist accounts. But if we collect
what information we can get from the latter, we have to admit
that the most important disciples of the Buddha must have been
men of great ability and unusual moral stature. A doctrine that
can produce such extraordinary results is really one of the rare
culminations in the spiritual history of mankind. When this is
said, it can still be admitted that perfection is a relative concept
and that the arahants were after all only human beings. The texts
do not criticize the arahants, but they tell about incidents that
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THE PERSONALITY OF THE ARAHANT
we think unexpected and inconsistent. Why did, for instance,
Mahanama Sakka, mentioned in A III 451 as one of the lay
arahants, not know what would happen to him ‘if he died at
that very moment’ (S V 369)? Why was it necessary for the
Buddha to console and reassure him on that point? This ignor-
ance is rather unexpected in an arahant. And was the behaviour
of the famous Kassapa, praised by the Buddha as one of his
most accomplished disciples, really quite satisfactory as it is
related in S II 214 ft? Here two episodes are related. The first
one describes how Kassapa and Ananda go to the nuns’ quarters
in order to instruct them. One of the nuns was disappointed that
the instruction was given by Kassapa and not by Ananda.
‘Should a needle-peddler try to sell a needle to a needle-maker?’
Kassapa heard this remark as he left and later pointed out to
Ananda, how much greater his own achievements were and that
the Buddha had praised him, Kassapa, before the Order and not
Ananda. Certainly a modern psychologist would call this self-
assertion and self-defence.
In the other episode Kassapa rather violently took Ananda
to task: sassaghalam marine carasi kulupaghdtam marine carasi . . .
Navayam kumdrako mattam anndsiti, ‘indeed you are wandering
about a spoiler of corn, indeed you are wandering about a troubler
of famihes, . . . This youngster does not know the limit’. Whether
this was intended as an insult we do not know, but so it was
understood both by Ananda and by one of the listening nuns,
as we can see from their remarks.
One more incident can be culled from A IV 206. It is related
that one evening the Buddha did not dismiss the monks at the
usual time and remained sitting together with them, throughout
the night. In the morning Mahamoggallana discovered the
reason: one of the persons present was not morally pure. With
the approval of the Buddha he forcibly threw him out and bolted
the door: tarn puggalam bdhdyam gahetvd bahidvarakotthakd
nikkhdmetvd sucigliatikam datva . . ., ‘he seized the man by the
arm, thrust him outside the porch and bolted the door’.
Quite frequently we are told in the texts that arahants are
tempted or frightened by Mara (e.g. Ta 46) or that they dream of
beautiful fairies (e.g. A IV 262). To this a psychologist would
comment, that although their conscious life perhaps was
129
1
PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
completely purified, the deeper and unconscious layers in their
personalities were not so. Some traces of the old desires and
insecurities were still there and found their outlet in the only
way still permitted to them: projected as external appearances.
Since they were seen as external facts they were accepted and
could even be described in the texts.
The related episodes are difficult to interpret. Maybe Kassapa
was entitled and even obliged to reproach Ananda. But it was not
permitted to boast about personal achievements, as we know
from A V 158, where a monk who is ‘boasting about his achieve-
ments’ (1 nkatthi adhigamesu) is called ‘immoral’ ( dussllo ). And,
according to A V 156 f, a monk who is angry ( kodhano ) or envious
(issuki) or finds fault with others ( upandhi ) cannot ‘reach in-
crease, growth and maturity in his dAawwwa-discipline’. And
certainly the Buddha usually found better methods of coping
with people than throwing them out: arahants should be day-
apanna sabbapanabhutahitanukampino , A I 211, ‘endowed with
kindness, friendly and compassionate to all creatures and all
beings’. So from an absolute point of view these incidents must
be seen as shortcomings and inconsistencies. But since they are
left without comment in the text they were evidently accepted
as normal. This can only mean one thing: the absolute point
of view should not be applied. The idea that arahantship was a
superhuman degree of perfection is incorrect. The individuali-
ties of the arahants were taken for granted and were respected,
and self-assertions and defence mechanisms were to a certain
extent considered as normal and permitted. And, if we are not
mistaken, the idea of an Absolute Ideal is a European inven-
tion!
130
Summary and conclusions
W e have tried to construct a comprehensive theory of nibbana,
a theory based on all the most ancient texts, a theory with as
few contradictions as possible. Especially, we have tried to find
out how far nibbana can be described in psychological terms.
Our results, such as they are, may be summarized in the follow-
ing way.
The descriptions found in the texts belong to several
spheres:
We may speak about the transformation sphere. Nibbana is
never described as the natural state of a human being but always
as the result of a dramatic change. It is something that has to be
achieved, by means of practical training and intellectual effort.
Just as everything was conceived to follow causal laws, so
was also the attainment of nibbana thought to be a causal
process.
By means of this transformation, which seems to have been
the basic and all-important part of the attainment of nibbana,
citta was transformed. Citta is not simply the mind and also not
simply personality but something of both: the organizing centre,
the conscious core of personality, often described as an empirical
and functional self (but not attd), perhaps ultimately analysable
into processes. The new, transformed state of citta is nibbana:
a state of fulfilment in which all needs and emotions have gone,
a state of calm contentment and of complete intellectual in-
sight. It is a state of internal freedom, where all dependence,
insecurity and defence have disappeared. Ethical behaviour has
become second nature, and the attitude towards others is friend-
liness, acceptance and humility.
This transformation is most often referred to as the destruc-
tion of the ’obsessions ( asavakkhayo ): sensuality, becoming,
speculative views and ignorance. This is described as the end of
the development, and nothing more is required of the disciple.
131
PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
It is then the main fact about nibbana, although more is
involved.
There is, secondly, the rebirth sphere. Every human being is
subject to rebirth, according to the Buddhist doctrine, and the
form this will take is decided through the law of kamma, a moral
law of causality. But by the attainment of nibbana, the chain
of births is interrupted. This is evidently, from a psychological
point of view, a transcendent theory, but something of it may
still be understood, because the law is said to work through the
medium of vihhdna, ‘consciousness’. This leads us to the third
sphere.
There are many definitions belonging to the sphere of con-
sciousness, since nibbana is said to be happiness ( sukham ),
peace ( santi ) and security (khemam). It is intellectural clarity
\pahhd, ahhd): the type of clarity, wholeness and immobility
that can come after a long struggle with a difficult problem,
when the solution suddenly is found, and the consciousness
is suddenly transformed and becomes calm, structured and
relieved.
Nibbana is often described as the ‘stopping’ of vihhdna,
which (to judge from SN 734 and 735, and D I 223) means the
same as ‘calming’ and ‘emptying’. In nibbana, vihhdna has
become calm and undisturbed; since the activity ( sankhara ) has
become pure, vihhdna no longer accumulates kammic effects.
The sensory processes no longer lead to emotions and desires.
As there are no desires and no kammic accumulations, there will
be no more rebirth. Psychologically we have tried to explain
this in terms of observed internal causality. Desire leads to its
own prolongation, and so does equilibrium. Needs are observed
as causal factors, and strong attachment to life is experienced
as leading to new life.
Ordinarily vihhdna carries the energies that ‘flow over’ to the
next existence and create the new individual. But if vihhdna is
‘calm’, ‘stopped’, it cannot ‘flow over’ but remains stable.
VihhdrM is the stream of differentiated conscious processes;
therefore it normally affects citta or is simply a name for some of
the activities of citta ( cittasankhara ). In nibbana the vihhdna-
processes stop and citta attains stability and freedom.
When we speak about nibbana as a fact of consciousness, we
132
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
have to choose our words very carefully in order to cover all
the facts. A knowledge can be present in the surface-conscious-
ness, and it can be stored below the surface. The processes even
of the surface-consciousness can be made to stop, especially by
means of meditation, but only temporarily. Therefore, this
temporary state of surface-consciousness cannot be identified
with nibbana. But by eradicating all desires, by habitual efforts
to concentrate, by perfect understanding, a half-conscious,
permanent background can be created, a background of peace
( santi ), satisfaction ( sukha ), purity ( suddhi ), freedom ( andlaya ).
It is impersonal ( anatta ), cool (sitibhuta), empty (sunna), even
undifferentiated ( animitta , anidassana). It is a state of health
(drogya), an inner refuge ( atta-sarano anahha sarano, D II ioo),
which is always there (accutam) and can always be actualized
or reverted to but may not always be actually noticed. This state
of citta and vinndna is nibbana, as seen from the aspect of con-
sciousness. A person who has nibbana does not always think of
nibbana, and his surface-consciousness still functions.
In ordinary rebirth sometimes vinndna and sometimes citta
is said to carry on the identity. But when an arahant dies, the
viHMna-pTocesses ‘go home’, and the ‘stillness’ and ‘emptiness’
of citta makes it survive, free and anonymous (except for other
arahants). That is, citta is very little changed by the physical
death, as it was considered incomprehensible even before. This
we have, at least, found to be the most reasonable interpretation
of the obscure hints which are scattered in the Nikayas.
There are, fourthly, traces of a metaphysical sphere of
descriptions to be found in the texts. We have found two
trends.
There is the tendency to describe nibbana as a separate
dimension of existence, outside samsdra, the absolute opposite
to our world, where none of the imperfections of this world is to
be found: ‘where there is neither this world nor a world beyond
nor both together nor moon and sun’ (U 80). Even though many
monks pass away in that condition of nibbana, there is no
shrinkage nor overflow (U 55). This way of describing nibbana
is also found in D I 223, where this ‘anti-world’ is ascribed to the
stopped vihhdna of the arahant. We can therefore explain it as
an experienced world projected as a real world. This experienced
133
PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
world could be produced by means of meditation and could
easily be experienced and described as real.
There is also another trend that has been much stressed in the
later development, a tendency to describe nibbana as a meta-
physical substance, transcending space, time and causality, a
supramundane reality, with independent existence. Nibbana is,
according to these writers, attained by complete understanding
of or perhaps merging into this reality. There are few traces of
this trend in the Nikayas, mainly in the form of negations like
ajdtam, amatam, akatam, asankhatam, translated ‘unborn,
deathless, unmade, uncompounded' (esp. U 80). We have
pointed out that this translation may not be correct and that the
intended meaning was ‘freedom from birth, freedom from death,
freedom from creation, freedom from putting together’. This
translation would set us back to the personal plane with which
discussions of nibbana are usually concerned. Even if we trans-
late in the traditional way, these words need not be taken as
referring to a supramundane reality but to experiences in the
vihhdna of the arahant (D I 223) : experiences of something time-
less, unchangeable, inexpressible, in which distinctions and
opposites do not exist. Again, there would easily arise a tend-
ency to project experiences of this type outside consciousness
and interpret them as perceptions of something external and not
only as subjective ideations.
Since experiences of the types we have discussed in the two
last paragraphs are typically developed by means of meditation
and since meditation was so extensively practised by the early
arahants, we feel inclined to speak about a meditational sphere
of description rather than a metaphyscial sphere. It seems very
probable that some of the many descriptive terms used about
nibbana, especially many of the negative ones, came from the
sphere of meditational experiences, e.g., animitta, accuta, suhha.
These experiences were then seen as more or less essential to
nibbana itself and became part of the definitions. At some stage
they became the starting-point for metaphysical interpreta-
tions.
The problem of the Buddha was the human situation here
and now: the suffering as conditioned by impermanence, kamma
and rebirth. To eradicate suffering and stop the chain of causes
134
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
leading over to new life was his aim. Although this aim leads
beyond the scope of psychology, the means he found to this end
can as we have demonstrated, mainly be understood as empirical
and psychological: nibbana is mainly a psychological fact. But
if this is true, nibbana can be compared to similar concepts in
our time. The ideal state, according to modern psychological
thinking, is called mental health. It is legitimate to compare this
concept to nibbana, as the Buddha himself frequently described
nibbana as health (e.g. M I 173, 511, Dh 204).
Mental health has been defined in many ways. We shall
confine ourselves to mentioning one typical definition. R. B.
Cattell (1, p. 261-264) has found three characteristics in a healthy
person:
1 . A daptation, i.e. effectiveness of living. By means of (a) adapt-
ation to moral norms, and (b) adaptation to the physical and
social world, normal chances of survival are assured to the person
himself and to the society in which he lives.
2. Adjustment, i.e. freedom from internal friction. A person who
is free from inner conflicts will waste little energy on doubts and
repressions. He is stable and has high resistance to trauma. He
feels happy and relaxed.
3. Integration, i.e. an harmonious structure of values and pur-
poses. The healthy person has a single goal or an harmonious
set of goals and he is capable of long-circuited behaviour.
Comparing this conception of health to nibbana, we find simi-
larities but also important differences.
(ia) With regard to the adaptation to the moral norms, the
similarity is great. The Buddha, however, stressed the impor-
tance of morality much more than the modem psychotherapists.
(b) In our time the social adjustment is considered extremely
important. Society is considered more important than the
individual. The primary task of each individual is to find his
place in society and work for the benefit of society. The Buddha
thought differently: to him only the development of the indivi-
dual was important, and nibbana meant individual freedom, even
from society. Social adaptation to the sangha was demanded,
but a greater ideal was to extricate oneself from society and live
alone in the forest. Still, the monk was usually not un-social: his
attitude should be one of universal friendliness and helpfulness.
135
PSYCHOLOGY OF NIRVANA
But social and economic effectivity was a completely alien idea
to him. His life did not lead to the reproduction of the race and
he was physically independent only when society provided for
him. His training encouraged an introvert attitude — which ac-
cording to modern standards is unhealthy.
(2a) Both nibbana and mental health should lead to happiness
and satisfaction. The background of this feeling is also similar:
insight, a realistic self-evaluation, a sense of success and self-
fulfilment.
(b) Freedom from inner conflicts is common to both.
(c) A stable emotional life is also required by both definitions.
Excessive emotions and strong desires have no place in a
mentally healthy person, but motivational forces should not be
lacking, they should only be stable and well balanced. Buddhism
goes further and demands total ‘calming’ of all emotions and
desires. An arahant should 'demand little’.
3. The arahant was of course an integrated and harmonious
personality. He had also a strong and consistent structure of
values. But he no longer worked to realize his values, because
he had already realized them. Still, he could live and act like an
‘ordinary’ person. His intelligence functioned freely and
effectively. He was helpful. He could appreciate beauty. But he
was ‘disinterested’ because he had nothing more to attain. This
gave him an independence which we rarely find in our time. This
is one of the great differences between nibbana and mental
health. Buddhism stressed independence in judgment and action
much more than our psychotherapists. Because of its greater
consistency and radicalism. Buddhism could make its followers
much more ‘whole’ and secure. The modem concept of mental
health builds on a narrow balance between opposites: self-
assertion and altruism, dominance and humility, strong needs
and self-control, success and modesty. Both are considered
important but both can be developed only to a point of equili-
brium which easily leads to conflict: the ideal of harmonious
integration is therefore difficult to realize.
In a word, although we have found great similarities between
nibbana and the concept of mental health, the differences
predominate, because they are expressions of very different
philosophies. The psychologist stresses society, the personal
136
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
success and effectiveness in this world, the unceasing activity
(towards badly defined, even dubious and contradictory, goals).
The Buddha stressed the individual development to internal
freedom and intelligent judgment, ‘disinterested’ action, balance
and stability.
137
References
1. Cattell, R. B., Personality (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1950)
2. Dutt, N., Early Monastic Buddhism (Rev. ed., Calcutta
Oriental Book Agency, Calcutta, i960)
3. Jayasuriya, W. F., The Psychology and Philosophy of
Buddhism. An Introduction to the Abhidhamma (Y.M.B.A.
Press, Colombo, 1963)
4. Jayatilleke, K. N., Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge
(George Allen & Unwin, London, 1963)
5. Jayatilleke, K. N., Some Problems of Translation and
Interpretation (Univ. of Ceylon Rev., Peradeniya, vol. 7, pp.
212-223, vol. 8, pp. 45-55)
6. Johansson, Rune E. A., Citta, Mano, Vihhdna ... a
Psychosemantic Investigation (Univ. of Ceylon Rev., Per-
adeniya, vol. 23, 1965, p. 165-215)
7. Northrop, F. S. C., The Meeting of East and West (The Mac-
millan Co., New York, 1946)
8. Osgood, C. E., Suci, G. J., and Tannenbaum, P. H., The
Measurement of Meaning (Univ. of Illinois Press, Urbana,
1957 )
9. Rhys Davids, C. A. F., The Birth of Indian Psychology and
its Development in Buddhism (Luzac, London, 1936)
10. Spencer, S., Mysticism in World Religion (Penguin Books,
London, 1963)
11. de la Vallee Poussin, L., Nirvana (Beauchesne, Paris, 1925)
12. Welbon, G. R., The Buddhist Nirvana and its Western
Interpreters (Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1968)
138
Index
abhinna, 'superknowledge’, 20,
41, 48, 89, 115
activity, 29, 7if, 97, I2if, 123
ajar a, 'freedom from old age’,
38!, 106
ajata, ‘freedom from birth’, 38-9,
54, 106, hi
amata, ‘freedom from death’, 39,
106
anaUa, ‘no soul', 15, 53, 55. 57,
96. I 33
anicca, ‘impermanence’, 15, 66,
96
anna, ‘knowledge’, 31, 132
annihilation, 58, 61, 64, 77
arahant, 29, 6if, 74, 89, no,
116-30
lay arahants, 120
ariyacakkhu, 'noble eye’, 42
arogya, ‘health’, 39, 108, 133
asava, ‘obsession’, 16, 22, 30, 106,
131
atta, ‘soul’, 'self, 15, 30, 68, 131
attitude, social, i2if, 135
avijja, ‘ignorance’, 16, 22, 78
dyatana, ‘sphere’, ‘dimension’,
5 if . 107
basis, 42, 59
bhava, ‘becoming’, 16, 38, 42, 80,
106
Buddha, ‘one who has under-
stood’, 21
Cattell, R. B., 135
causality, 16, 66, 68, 73, 91, I3if
— , moral, 16, 73
cessation, 36-40, 83
cetovimutti, ‘freedom of mind’,
90
citta, ‘mind’, 22, 30-3, 36f, 48,
61-4, 76f, 83, 107, 131, 133
cognition, 21-3, I25f
concentration, 23, 34, 92, 98
consciousness, 20, 23, 3of, 34, 52,
ioof, 104, 106-9, hi. 114,
121, 132
— , universal, 115
coolness, 25f, 133
death, 58ft
desire, 28, 72, 124
dhamtna, ‘idea’, ‘mental process',
23. 36. 48, 64, 1 19, 123
dibbacakkhu, ‘the divine eye’, 43
differences, individual, 127!
dittha, ditthi, ‘(speculative) view’
16, 22, 108, 126
dosa, ‘aggressiveness’, 16, 29
dreams, 15, 129
dukkka, ‘suffering’, 15, 22, 24, 107
Dutt, N„ 44f, 54
dynamic nature of reality, 15
ego, 66, 83
emotion, 24, I24f
139
INDEX
empiricism of Buddhism, I5f, 40,
42!
emptiness, state of, 34-6, no
energy, 29
feeling, 24b 70, 77, 124
fire analogy, 58#
freedom, 3iff, 123, 131, 136
fuel, 58-60, 8if
Gestalt, 23, 90
happiness, 26
health, 32f, 39, 108, 133, 135!
'ideation', the activity of sahha,
in German ‘Vorstellung’,7of,
104
ignorance, 22, 78
inconceivability of nibbana, 44
insight, 23, 32f, 37, 42, 108, 131
intelligence, 86f, 126
introspection, gof
Jayasuriya, W. F., in
Jayatilleke, K. N.,43,65, 88f, 104
jhana, ‘the four first levels of con-
centration, 24, 98, 102
kama, ‘sensuality’, 16, 28, 98f, 122
kamma, ‘work’, 72f, 97, 121, 126,
132
karuna, ‘compassion,’ 29, 123
khandha, ‘personality factor’, 28,
30, 62, 65ft, 69-77
knowledge, ‘supernatural’, 20,
48, 89, 116, 126
liberation, 32, 8gf
mamsackk.hu, 'the bodily eye’, 43
mano, ‘internal sense’, 71, 48, 97
material of the investigation, 14
meditation, 26, 32, 35, 49, 52f,
92-105, 109, 134
140
memory, 71
method of investigation, I3f
metta, ‘friendliness’, 29, 123
mind (citta), 36, 64, 83, 86f, 131
mindfulness, 22, 34, 74, 92-8, 100
moha, ‘illusion’, 16, 29
monkhood, 86, 1x9
namarupa, ‘name and form’,
‘mind and matter’, 788
needs, 28, I 22 f
nirodha, ‘cessation’, 20, 75, 83,
xoxf
nivarana, ‘hindrance’, 98ft
Northrop, F. S. C., 102
obsessions, 16, 22, 36
opposites, 47
optimism of Buddhism, 17
Osgood, C. E., 13
pada, ‘step’, ‘condition’, ‘state’,
‘element’, 54
pahna, ‘knowledge’, "understand-
ing”, 29, 37, 52, 88-91, 127,
132
pahhacakkhu, ‘eye of understand-
ing’, 42
path, eightfold, 85ft
paticcasamuppada-series, 'the ser-
ies of dependent origination’,
39, 67, 77ff, 107
perception, 48, 70, no, 125
— , changed, 94
— , extrasensory, 41, 43, 126
personality, 30, 65ff, in
phassa, ‘control’, ‘stimulation’,
70, 80
Plotinus, 45
processes, 15!, 66f, 77, 107
projection, 48, 56, in, 130, 133
raga, ‘desire’, 16, 29
reality, absolute, metaphysical,
50, 54f, hi, 115, 134
rebirth, 38-40, 132
reification of meditational levels,
49
relaxation, 95
repression, 87, 126
responsibility, 121
Rhys Davids, C. A. F., 65
riipa, ‘form’, 30, 70, 81, 100
samadhi, ‘concentration’, 34, 92,
98-105
sankhara, ‘activity’, 30, 71-4
sanna, ‘perception’, 30, 70, 83,
100
sannavedayitanirodha, ‘ending of
ideation and feeling’, 22, 36,
49, 5if, 100, 108
sanli, ‘peace’, 132
sali, ‘mindfulness’, 74, 92-8, 122
salipatthana, ‘state of mindful-
ness’, 22, 34, 92-8, 122
self, 30, 66, 107, 1 14, 131
self-control, 86, 95
semantic differential, ii2f
sila, ‘moral training’, 85
soul, 15, 30
space, internal and external, 52
Spencer, S., 45
stages of nibbana, 58-60
state (of mind, of personality), 33
36, 55, I07f, nof, 135
suddhi, ‘purity’, 31
sukha, ‘happiness’, 24-6, 132
surface vs. background, 36, 77,
I09f, 133
survival, 61-4, 133
tanha, ‘thirst’, ‘desire’, 26, 28f, 80
temperament, 124ft
thinking, 90, 99, 125
training, moral, 87, I20f
transcendence, 41ft
understanding, 22f, 86-91, 116
unity, functional, 67
upddana, ‘basis’, ‘fuel’, 42, 59f,
75*. 8off
de la Valine Poussin, L., 10
vedand, ‘feeling’, 25f, 30, 70, 75-7,
83, 100, 103
vimutti, ‘liberation’, 33, 88-90
vinnana, ‘consciousness’, 20, 33,
37. 39. 52, 61, 64, 71, 75-7,
80, 83, I04f, 108, 132
vipassana, ‘introspection’, 90
Welbon, G. R., 10
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