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Al-Kindis Treatise on First Philosophy: Translation, Introduction
and Notes with a Glossary
Fuad N. Nucho
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Al-Kindi's Treatise on First Philosophy: Translation, Introduction and Notes with a
Glossary
Abstract
It is the purpose of this dissertation to contribute in a modest way to this primary work of translation as
well as to the equally important task of philosophic analysis. The major part of the present work consists
of a translation of al-Kindi's "Treatise on First Philosophy" which is, as far as we know, the first
Metaphysics written by a Muslim philosopher.
Degree Type
Dissertation
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
First Advisor
Federico Corriente
Second Advisor
Israel Efros
Third Advisor
Theodor H. Gaster
Subject Categories
Comparative Philosophy | Cultural History | History of Religion | Intellectual History | Islamic Studies |
Language Interpretation and Translation | Translation Studies
Comments
Library at the Katz Center - Archives Room Manuscript. B753.K5 N834 1969.
AL-KINDI'S TREATISE ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY
Translation, Introduction and Notes
with a Glossary
By
Fuad Ne Nucho
A dissertation
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
The Dropsie College
for Hebrew and Cognate Learning
Philadelphia
1969
APPROVAL
This dissertation, entitled
AL-KINDI'S TREATISE ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY
(Translation, Introduction and Notes)
by
Fuad Ne Nucho
Candidate for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
has been read and approved by
Date
C400. °8 S, Sok. ae we
Page
PREFACE iii
INTRODUCTION 1
le The Philosophical and Theological Background 1
ae The Impact of Greek Thought 1
be The Abbasid Cultural Renaissance 5
Ce Faith and Reason in Early Islam y
2. Al-Kindi's Treatise on First Philosophy 17
ae Al-Kindi's Life and Work 17
be Philosophy, Truth and Religion 23
Ce Theory of Knowledge 30
de From Cosmology to Ontology 34
ee Existence, Essence and Causality 38
fe Unity, Plurality and First Cause 4l
ge The Nature of Divine Unity 47
3- Evaluations and Conclusions 51
@e Epistemological Realism 51
be Metaphysical Absolutism 56
TRANSLATION 69
Chapter I 69
Philosophy and Truth 69
The Significance of Metaphysics 70
The Four Scientific Inquiries 70
Genus and Species 70
Knowledge of First Cause 71
Indebtedness Acknowledged 71
Universal Validity of the Truth 73
Methodology 73
The Traders of Religion 74
The Scope of Knowledge and Revelation 74
Pace
The Necessity of Philosophical Knowledge 75
The Need for Divine Support 76
Chapter II 77
Perception and Conception 77
The Universal and the Particular 78
Conceptual Cognition Illustrated 80
Epistemological Implications 82
Methods of Investigation 84
The Concept of the Eternal 85
Basic Premises 87
The Finite and the Infinite 88
Time, Motion and Change 90
Time, Motion and Coming into Being 93
Chapter III 99
Existence, Essence and Causality 99
The Problem of Meaning 101
The Nature of Unity 104
The One and the Many 112
Plurality without Unity 112
Unity without Plurality 117
Unity, Plurality and Causality 122
First Causes The True One 125
Chapter IV 129
The Relative and the Absolute 129
The Nature of the One 132
The Nature of the True One 142
NOTES 159
A GLOSSARY OF PHILOSOPHICAL TERMS 172
BIBLIOGRAPHY 181
AL-KINDI'S TREATISE ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY (Arabic Text) 186
Il
PREFACE
The new interest in Islamic Philosophy, which began about
a century ago, has gained momentum in our timese This field of
study has attracted scholars in a number of disciplines. The
Orientalist seeks to ascertain the original contribution of Islamic
philosophy and the nature and extent of its influence on Western
thinkinge The Classicist searches this rather unexploited philo-
sophical mine in the hope of finding material that would add to his
knowledge of the heritage of Greece, and his efforts have not been
in vaine The Medievalist studies Islamic philosophy in an attempt
to shed more light on the impact of hellenistic thought upon the
monotheistic religions as well as on the interaction that took place
between these religionse Contemporary Muslim thinkers also have
increasingly been devoting their energies to research in Islamic
el ttaeoiie sane have made significant contributionse Numerous works
that were neglected or lost for centuries are being rediscovered in
libraries of the Middle East, northwestern Africa and Europe. Un-
fortunately, much of this new material cannot be studied immediately
as it has to be first edited and translated.
It is the purpose of this dissertation to contribute in a modest
way to this primary work of translation as well as to the equally
important task of philosophic analysise The major part of the present
Ift
work consists of a translation of al-Kindi's “Treatise on First
Philosophy" which is, as far.as we Know, the first Metaphysics written
by a Muslim philosophere The Treatise is one of a collection of
philosophic essays by al-Kindi which was discovered in Istanbul
four decades age. The bracketed subtitles in the translation were
added by the present writer for the sake of claritye In the left
margin, the numbers 97-162 refer to the pages, and the numbers 5,
10, 15 and 20 to the lines, in the Arabic text which was edited and
published in Cairo in 1950 and a copy of which has been pldced at
the end of this dissertation for the convenience of the readere The
translation is introduced by an account of the philosophical and
theological situation in the early part of the Ninth Century A.De,
a biographical sketch of aleKindi and a discussion of the content
' of this metaphysical work. The Introduction is concluded with an
evaluation of the Treatise and aleKindi's philosophic positione Documen-
tation takes the form of extensive notes which are followed by a glossary
of philosophical terms used in the Treatise.
I wish to express my deep gratitude to The Dropsie College for
the teaching fellowship that was granted me and the opportunity to
study at this outstanding Graduate School. Special thanks are exe
tended to Dr. Federico Corriente, Dr. Israel Efros and Dre Theodor
He Gaster who read this dissertation and whose suggestions were most
helpful. The inspiration and assistance received from Dre Lawrence
Ve Berman, under whom the present work was begun when he was on the
IV
faculty of Dropsie College, is very much appreciated. A word of
personal thanks goes also to Dre Se. De. Goitein of the University
of Pennsylvania under whom I had the privilege to study and whose
competent guidance and helpful stimulation will always be treasured.
Finally, I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to my wife, Aina,
for her constant support and encouragement.
Fuad Ne Nucho
INTRODUCTION
1. The Philosophical and Theological Background
ae The Impact of Greek Thought
The culture in the countries conquered by Islam in the
Seventh Century was essentially hellenistic. The military victories
of Alexander the Great some thousand years earlier had paved the
way for the spread of Greek ideas and ideals in the Mediterranean
world and the Middle East. The process of hellenization was
particularly enhanced by the Greek centers that were established
in Egypt, Syria and Persia. The great cosmopolitan city of
Alexandria played a leading role in stimulating widespread interest in,
and preoccupation with, Greek philosophy and sciencee It was here
that the Hellenic or purely Greek culture interacted and became
infused with Eastern thought and the resultant Hellenistic civi-
lization emerged. Greek became the language of learning and was
most instrumental in molding the world of that day into a wider
cultural unity. Under the aegis of the Roman and Byzantine empires,
the influence of Hellenism continued to color the thinking and life
of the inhabitants of Western Asia and the Mediterranean countries.
Beginning with the Third Century A.D., a new version of
hellenistic thought, Neo-Platonism, made its appearance. This
powerful philosophic system was destined to dominate the speculative
arena of the Middle Ages. Plotinus (2057 - 270 A.D.), the founder
of Neo-Platonism, revived the ancient Greek philosophy but gave
it a religious bent. His fundamental doctrine consists of the
derivation of the world from One supreme entity through a process
of emanatione In the words of Dre Richard Kroner, Plotinus “oute
Platonized Plato" and “dared to fulfill the highest task of all
speculation: to understand the plurality of being out of its
unity, to derive all the contents of thought out of their primary
wl
ground. In the Enneads, Plotinus wrote: “The One is not absent
from anything, and yet it is separated from all things, so that
it is present and yet not present with them."
Because of its philosophic or rather metaphysical monotheism
and its epistemological mysticism, Neo-Platonism found positive
response in Christianity and, later on, also in Islam. It was
instrumental in the conversion of Augustine to the Christian faith
and influential in the shaping of his theology. The Neo-Platonic
system attracted also the minds of pagan thinkers who discovered
in it a religious mood that satisfied their deep spiritual longing.
For our purposes in the present study, we shall follow
hellenistic philosophy as it was taken up by the Syrian Christians
because it is this stream which eventually leads into Islamic
thought. The general bent of philosophy among the Syrian Christians
was Neo-Platonice This was due to the influence of the Syrian
disciples of Plotinus, namely, Porphyry and Jamblichus. While
Porphyry (230 - 300 A.D.) helped popularize Neo-Platonism by
stressing and developing its religious elements, Jamblichus (7? = 330 A.D.)
cast it into politheistic theological forms.” The transplanting of
Neo-Platonism in Syria did not find any opposition because Hellenism
had been naturalized in that region. As Bertold Spuler has pointed
out, the christological controversies in the Eastern Church, which
eventually led to its division into Orthodox State and Monophysite
(Jacobites) and Nestorian churches, indirectly encouraged the further
cultivation of Greek philosophy.’ Particularly the Monophysites
and Nestorians sought in Greek philosophy logical proofs for their
theological self-defence against the Byzantine Church. Especially
in the Aristotelian writings, which they translated into Syriac,
they found the necessary logical ammmition to hold their own theo-
logical ground.
The type of philosophy cultivated by the Syrian Christians was
a Neo-Platonic version of Aristotelianism. Hardly any attention
was devoted to Plato. Two of the outstanding Aristotelian commenta-~
tors were the Nestorian Ammonius and the Jacobite John Philoponus.
The books of the Organon and the Metaphysics of the Greek master
were translated into Syriac. For some time, part of the Enneads
of Plotinus were thought to be the work of Aristotle and was known
as “The Theology of Aristotle." Porphyry's Isagogue was also
attributed to Aristotle.
The Greek heritage, moreover, found an agreeable home in
Persiae Political intolerance and religious persecution in the
Fifth and Sixth Centuries forced the Monophysites and, more so,
the Nestorians to move deeper into the Middle Easte They established
themselves in Mesopotamia and Persia where they continued their
theological and philosophical activities under the tolerant Sassanid
rule. The persecution of the Emperor Justinian of all non-Christians
led to the closing down in 529 A.D. of the Athenian philosophical
schoole” Its scholars, among whom were Aristotelian commentators
and Neo-Platonists, found refuge in Persia where they were patronized
by the Sassanid King Chosroes (Anu-Shirwan, 531-579 A.D.)e Although
most of them returned to Greece after several years when conditions
improved, during their stay in Persia they helped lay down the
ground work for continued philosophic development. Translations of
Greek philosophic and medical works into Persian were encouraged
and financed by King Chosroes.e. A Persian philosophic terminology
was coinede The Syrian scholar Uranius, who was attached to the
royal court, translated considerable works of both Plato and Aristotle
6
into Persian. The Nestorians on the whole excelled in medicine. The
reputation that some of them gained was due to their medical
rather than philosophical achievements. The works of Galen and
Hippocrates also appeared in Persian.
be The Abbasid Cultural Renaissance
At the beginning of the Ninth Century A.D., Baghdad was basking
in the limelight of a Golden Age under the reputable Abbasid caliphate
of H&riin al-RashId (786-809 A.D.). The Byzantine rulers had been
subdued. Peace and order had been established in North Africa. Through
H€rim's political and military skill, the Arab Empire enjoyed a large
measure of internal tranquility. Through his ingenious administrative
ability, the legendary caliph stimulated economic activity and en-
couraged foreign trade. Baghdad developed into a vital shipping
center. Wealth poured into it from numerous provinces of the Empire
as well as from foreign lands.
Through the wise leadership of Harim, himself and educated
man, economic prosperity was made to serve constructive ends. An
era of culture and learning was ushered in and a magnificent civie
lization began to flourish. Architecture experienced a great boom.
Being himself well-versed in religion and literature, Hariin made
his court the center of culture and scholarshipe He initiated
discussion and debate on a high intellectual level. Medicine,
in these fields were entertained at the court where they engaged
in discussion, debate and exchange of ideas. Being himself gifted
in, and addicted to, poetry, al-Ma'mtin generously patronized the
leading poets and stimulated a literary output that was soon to
become a permanent part of Arab heritage.
Al-Ma'mun's reign also marked the appearance of the great
collectors of tradition (hadfth), notably al-Bukhari, as well as
a host of grammarians, philosophers, historians and theologians.
An institute for advanced study and research and a large library
(bayt al-hikmah) were founded in Baghdad. An observatory was also
constructed in the plains of Tadmur .°
Increasingly, al-Ma'mun became fascinated by Greek philosophy
and science. Agents were sent out into all directions to search for
and collect the writings of Greek philosophers, physicians, historians
and geometricianse A competent staff of translators, under the
leadership of the Nestorian Christian Hunayn ibn Ishaq (807-877 A.D.)
was subsidized by the public treasury for the task of translating the
whole corpus of Greek knowledge into Arabic. This valuable under-~
taking was carried out chiefly by Christians, Jews and Persians. At
times, when the Greek original was not available, the translation
was made from the Syriac versione Special interest was cultivated
in mathematics and astronomy. The works of Euclid and Ptolemy were
translated by al-Hajjaj Ibn Yusuf Ibn Matar for al-Ma'mun, who had
an understanding for the practical application of astronomy.>
Supplimentary material was borrowed from Indian sources. The Indian
astronomical book, Sindhind, had been translated for al-Mansfir by
10
Ibrahim al-Fazari.” At the request of al-Ma'mun, Muhammad al-Kha-
warizmi prepared the first independent book in algebra.!!
The most striking feature of the first half of the Ninth
Century was a spirit of intellectual freedom and tolerance which
encouraged philosophic curiosity and scientific objectivity. Freedom
of inquiry and discussion aroused the pursuit of every kind of know-
ledge. Through this open-minded attitude and ideal atmosphere for
learning, the frontiers of investigation and research were extended
into many directions. In this climate of tolerance and objectivity,
as Dre S. De Goitein has indicated, the deep-seated interest in
religion gave birth to the new science of Comparative Religion, as
exemplified in al-Shahrastani's work, The Religions and Philosophic
Schools (al-Milal wa'l-Nihal).2? This “broad tolerance within its
community,” in the words of H. A. R. Gibb, grew out of "the character
of Islam as a strong, self-confident, conquering faith."/3
The Abbasid cultural renaissance, which began in Baghdad,
spread to many parts of the Arab Empiree Older centers of learning
such as the rival cities of al-Kufa and al-Basra continued to
flourishe New centers were established at strategic points through-
out the empire. Outstanding poets like Abu Nuwas, Abu-'1l-'atahiya
and al-Mutanabbi added luster of magnificent poetry to this Golden
Agee A flood of writings in history, geography, biography, lexico-
graphy, rhetoric, zoology, botany and other fields of knowledge made
its appearance.
Al-Ma'mun's brother and successor, al-Mu'tasim (833-842),
showed special enthusiasm for architecture. He built a new palace
outside Baghdad and surrounded it with elaborate gardens and called
it “surra man rata" (he will be delighted who beholds ‘it'). He
also built new canals and erected numerous magnificent structures
including some magnificent mosques. Al-Mu'tasim's reign, however,
marks the beginning of the political decline of Abbasid glory.
ce Faith and Reason in Early Islam
The conflict between faith and reason in early Islam revolved
around the problem of predestination and free will. The influence
of Christianity and Hellenistic thought were, no doubt, important
factors in the development of the controversy. However, the initial
differences of opinion as to whether man's decisions and actions
were predestined or were the product of his own free will were
aroused by contradictory statements in the Koran itself regarding
this matter. Both the advocates of predestination and the defenders
of the freedom of the will were able to claim scriptural bases for
10
their views. Metaphysical determinism is unequivocally expressed,
for instance, in the following passages?
Allah will open the heart of him whom He intends
to guide in the right path, and close the heart of
him whom He intends to lead to err.
It is not for a soul to believe except by the
permission of Allah. !5
He leadeth astray whomever He pleaseth and guideth
unto Himself whomever He pleaseth.
Man's freedom of choice and action, on the other hand, is
indicated in utterances as
We showed them the right way, but they chose error
above guidance.
Truth is from your Lord, so let him who Pi gases
believe, and let him who pleases disbelieve.
We vouchsafed them also guidance, but to guidance did
they prefer blindness.!?
These contradictory views are most probably the result of
Muhammad's own position which underwent a change from a belief in
free will during his Meccan period to that of predestination after
the Hegira.-°
As A. J. Wensinck has pointed out, “the debates on predestination
inaugurated rationalism in Islam! The earliest defenders of reason
and free will were the Kharijites, whose thinking found expression in
their political doctrine concerning the khilafah (succession). They
upheld the democratic principle of election on the basis of qualifi-
11
cation rather than by automatic hereditary succession. Any Muslim,
who possessed the necessary qualifications, the Kharijites insisted,
should be eligible for election to the role of leadership in the
Muslim community. They maintained that the free choice of the whole
community serves as a channel to God's will?
The Kharijite political theory soon led to theological debates
as the Muslim community was compelled to define its stand on matters
concerning who is a Muslim, who is saved or damned and what is the
role of faith and works in the divine act of salvation. The liberal-
ism of the Kharijites was vigorously opposed by the Murji'tites who
stressed the supremacy of faith and predestination over against reason
and free will. The Murjitites refused to pass judgment on behavior
and left this matter exclusively to God.23 This sect advanced a static
conception of faith. It was of the opinion that the faith of the
Muslim cannot be impaired by evil acts and declared conduct and
practice as secondary, but not essential, to faithe
The controversy over the primacy of faith or works took a
strictly theological direction as soon as the ontological question
was raised whether the Muslim's faith and works were the creation
of God or the product of man's free will. The conflict was now
taken up by the Qadarites and the Jabarites. The former restricted
‘gqadar* (God's decree, predestination) and asserted that man is the
author of his own decisions and actions and, consequently, is respon-
12
sible for his conduct .** The Jabarites, on the other hand, persisted
in the belief that divine predestination encompasses also the choices
and acts of man's will. Their position was in line with that of the
@rthodox traditionalists (ahl al-Sunna), who did not hesitate to
condemn the rational method in religion as innovation (bid'ah) and,
hence, as a dangerous and misleading approach to religious knowledge.
The Qadarites did not survive for long as a sect, but their
ideas were adopted and elaborated by their immediate followers, the
Mu'tazilites, who seceded from the Orthodox Muslims and worked out
a type of speculative theology. This new movement started out, as
He Ae Re Gibb has shown, as a reaction against the extremism of both
Kharijites and Murjitites.-> It advocated the conviction that the
Muslim who commits a grave sin does not completely lose his status
and becomes an unbeliever, as the Kharijites said, nor does he remain
a believer, as the Murji'tites thought. Instead, the Mu'tazilites
designated for the sinful Muslim an “Intermediate Position" (al-
manzilah bayn al-mansilatayn).~° This description applied also to
their own theological position as being intermediate between the
Kharijites and the Murjitites. They did not accept the former's
stress on “works” and the Latter's emphasis on "faith" and, instead,
underscored the importance of both works and faith.
The Mu'tazilites became the champions of human freedom and
13
responsibility in Islam. Thereby they sought to safeguard the
nature of God as Infinite Justice. They argued that the determinism
of predestination violates Divine Justice, for it would mean that
God holds man accountable for decisions and actions which he performs
by Divine decree. The Mu'tazilites reasoned that God would not
punish man for deeds he is predestined to carry oute The fact that
Divine rewards and punishments are inevitable implies that man is
the author of his decisions and acts. In their defence of God's
Justice and in their proclamation of a theology that would not
accept any relation between God and evil, the Mu'tazilites referred
to the frequent use of the epithets “the Compassionate, the Merciful"
in the Koran and quoted scriptural passages to support their assertion:
God will not burden any soul beyond its power. It
shall enjoy the good which it hath acquired, and it shall
bear the evil for the acquirement of which it laboured.
God is not unjust towards His servants.7®
The Mu'tazilites did not restrict the alleambracing power
of God by their stress on Divine Justice. It is God who gives man
the power and the freedom of choice, but the nature of the choice
itself between good and evil is entirely left to man's will. How-
ever, man must face the necessary consequences of his responsible
freedome
The Orthodox Muslims reacted vehemently to the Mu'tazilite
doctrine of free will. In the first place, letting man have 'power'
14
over his own actions, they believed, would make him the ‘creator’
of his own acts and this would mean a theological dualism that
encroaches on God's almighty power. Moreover, the Orthodox Muslims
interpreted the Mu'tazilite emphasis on free will as implying a
restriction on Divine freedom and powere For them, God is an
absolute Monarch whose freedom cannot be limited by any external
agency.”? The Mu'tazilites were also accused of making reason
(al-'aql), rather than revelation{wahy), the highest norm. To
quote al-Shahrast4ni,
The principle of the Mu'tazilites is justice in
accordance with what reason postulates from wisdom, that
is, producing acts in the way of what is right and
salutarye There is no decree from eternity; God has
ordered and prohibited and promised and menaced by none
eternal speeche Accordingly, he who is saved deserves
reward on account of his own ackse This is postulated
by reason as applied to Wisdom.
In their epistemology, the Mu'tazilites vested reason with
the supervisory prerogative over all objects of knowledge and
derived the necessity of moral behavior from rational insight
rather than revealed truthe>=
The question of human freedom and Divine Justice led also
to that of Divine Essence and Atributes. The Mu'tazilites were
not only advocates of Divine Justice but also of Divine Unity.
Hence, they called themselves ‘the People of Unity and Justice’
(ahl al-tawhTd a'le'adl). Their defence of the Unity of God was
15
first directed against the metaphysical dualism of the Manichaeans
and the trinitarian doctrine of the Christianse It was quite
probably their struggle on these two fronts that the Mu'tazilites
were first brought into contact with Greek logic and philosophy,
a contact that was soon to usher the cultural renaissance of the
Abbasids spearheaded by the translation of Greek works into Arabice
Within Islam, the Mu'tazilite emphasis on God's Unity took
the form of ridding the concept of God from the anthropomorphism
of the Orthodox believers. The Mu'tazilites vigorously rejected
the belief that God will be literally seen by the faithful Muslims
in heaven and so made every effort to explain away scriptural
Passages that speak of God's face, eyes, hands and throne. This
anthropomorphism, they argued, would mean that God is limited to
one place and this implies that He is finite. The Mu'tazilite con-
viction that God is pure Spirit made them oppose the Orthodox
belief in the divine attributes which, in their view, constitutes
a plurality and, therefore, is a violation of Divine Unity. They
radically denied that God possesses any personal qualities (sifat
dhatiyyah, »shakhgfyyah) except eternity. Al-ShahrastanT writes:
The common belief of the sect of the Mu'tazilites
is, that Allah is eternal (qadfm) and that eternity is
the most peculiar description of His essence. They
absolutely reject all other eternal qualities, sayings
It is by virtue of His essence that He has knowledge,
power and lifes; not because they are eternal qualities
or ideas inherent in Him. For if the qualities should
16
partake of His eternity, which is His most peculiar
description, they would partake of His divinity ee.
and they agree upon this, that will and hear ins and
sight are not ideas inherent in His essence.
A logical consequence of the Mu'tazilite rejection of the
eternity of the divine attributes was their denial of the
eternity of the Koran. Orthodox Islam believed that the Koran,
as the speech (kalam) of God, was uncreated and eternal. It is
"a glorious Koran in a preserved tablet" (lawh mahfiz).>> The
Koran received and communicated by Muhammad was believed to be a
copy of the original tablet preserved in heaven from eternity.
The Muftazilites saw in the doctrine of the eternity of the Koran
the ontological implication of something other than God co-existing
with Him before creation. This meant, in their view, a dualism
that violates the absolute Oneness of God. To guard the Divine
Unity, the Mu'tazilites argued strongly that the Koran was created.
They referred to the Koranic verse “We have made it (jatalnahu)
an Arabic Koran?“ in support of their assertion, but the core of
their argument rested heavily on the logic and dialectic (kalam)
of Greek philosophy.
The rationalism of the Mu'tazilites and their theo-philosophi-
cal position, particularly their dogma that the Koran was created in
time, were enthusiastically adopted and popularized by the Abbasid
chaliph al-Ma'mune The doctrine of the noneeternity of the Koran
17
was decreed by him as an article of faith in 833 and leading
theologians were forced to subscribe to it. A period of fanatical
inquisition followed. The movement that began in liberalism ended
in intolerance. However, it was the adoption of the Mu'tazilite
creed by al-Ma'mun and his brother and successor al-Mu'tasim that
encouraged the translation and study of Greek science and philosophy.
The Mu'tazilites' influence and power began to wane during the rule
of al-Mutawakkil (847-861 A.D.), who reversed the policy of his
predecessors and upheld the theological position of Orthodox Islam.
Though the seteback of the Mu'tazilites ultimately led to their
final defeat, the movement succeeded in leaving its rationalistic
imprint on Islamic theology.
2. The Treatise on First Philosophy
ae Al-Kindi's Life and Work
Al-Kindi was born around 801 A.D. in ui-iiitah.”” where his
father, Ishaq ibn al-Sabbah, was governor under Hartn al-RashTd.
His family belonged to, and provided leadership for, the influential
Arabian tribe Kindah.e Al-Ashtath ibn Qais, one of al-Kindi's
ancestors, along with a delegation from his tribe, had adopted
Islam and pledged allegiance in person to the prophet Muhammad. 2°
During the caliphate of ‘Umar, the tribe of Kindah moved from
18
Arabia and resettled in the newly founded city of al-Kufah in
southern Iraq.
In the source material that is at our disposal at the present,
there is little information about al-Kindi's boyhood and early
upbrininge Orphaned when he was still a child, he was reared in
the intellectual atmosphere of al-Kiiffah. As is commonly known, are
Kufah and its rival city al-Basrah were the great centers of Islamic
learning and culture. It is quite possible that al-Kindi acquired
37 The curriculum at the
part of his formal education in al-Basrah.
time consisted chiefly of memorization of the Koran and mastery of
Arabic grammar and literature. Soon al-Kindi began to devote him-
self to the study of Islamic law (fiqh) and the new discipline of
dialectical theology (kalam). His maturing years, however, brough
about a passionate interest in the natural sciences, medicine and
philosophye
In order to pursue these fields of learning, al-Kindi went
to Baghdad, where Greek and Persian studies were beginning to
attract brilliant minds and where the atmosphere of religious and
intellectual freedom stimulated scientific inquiry and research.
We do not know the teachers under whom al-Kindi studied. There
is no evidence that he acquired a knowledge of the Greek language,
but it is very likely that he became proficient in Syriace Te Je
19
de Boer's statement that in Baghdad, al-Kindi “came to put a
higher value upon Persian civilization and Greek wisdom than upon
old Arab virtue and the Muslim faith?> may be true of his early
years in the Abbasid capital.
Al-Kindi's philosophic interest and outstanding scholarship
brought him to the attention of al-Ma'mfin, the great patron of culture
and learning. Al-Kindi was attached to the ruler's court and cone
tributed no little to the activity of translating Greek works into
Arabic and seni in ‘ supervisory capacity. This important work
of translation was done from original sources and, when these were
lacking, then from Syriac versionse Al-Kindi also engaged in
revising existing Arabic translations such as the Enneads of Plotinus.
Al-Qifti, an early biographer, reports that “many philosophical books
were translated by al-Kindi who clarified their difficulties and
summarized their theories."??
Al-Kindi was highly esteemed by al-Ma'mun, his brother and
successor al-Mu'tasim and the latter's son Ahmad, whose tutor he
OT "aAl-Kindi and his writings," Ibn Nabatah wrote, “embellished
the empire of al-Mu'tasim."41 Al-Kindi became to be known as “The
Philosopher of the Arabs" (faylasuf al-'Arab). He continued to
provide scholarly leadership during the rule of al=-Mutawakkil. Howe-
ever, it was during the reign of this caliph that misfortune befell
aleKindi. The philosopher's prominent position in the court, we
20
are told by Ibn abi Usaibitah, ~ aroused the envy of the sons of
Musa ibn Shakir, Muhammad and Ahmad, whose conspiracy against him
brought the displeasure of the caliph upon him. Al-Kindi was
punished and his huge library was confiscated and transported to
al-Basrah where it was stacked and designated "the Kindian Library."
Not very long afterwards, however, the conspiracy was discovered
and al-Kindi's books were returned to him. In connection with this
incident, the fact must be borne in mind that under al-Mutawakkil,
as it was mentioned earlier, Orthodoxy in Islam regained the upper
hand and, consequently, al-Kindi, with his Mu'tazilite leanings,
was no longer welcomed at the court as he had been under the
liberal caliphs al-Ma'mun and al-Mu'tasime
The works credited to al-Kindi by the earliest biographer,
Tbn al-Nadfm, indicate that he was an encyclopedic writer with
rare competence in numerous fields of knowledge. The 268 titles
of essays listed by Ibn al-Nad¥Im cover a wide range of subjects
such as logic, philosophy, music, psychology, physics, mathematics,
ethics, politics and astronomy. Unfortunately, most of this
scholarly output was lost. A few of his scientific works were
translated into Latin and had some influence on medieval European
thoughte Girolamo Cardanus, the medieval historian, considered
al-Kindi one of the twelve greatest minds in the history of human
21
thought.
The recognition of al-Kindi as an original and profound
thinker has gained increasing support since the discovery of a
collection of his essays by Hellmut Ritter in Istanbul libraries.
The philosophic treatises in this collection were edited and
published in two volumes (1950, 1953) by Professor Muhammad Abu
Ridah (Cairo) under the heading Rasa'il al-Kindi al-falsafiyyah
(Al-Kindi's Philosophic Essays). ">
Al-Kindi's works vary in their length and they are often
addressed to the reigning caliph or to some close friend. At times,
the introduction and the conclusion disclose that the treatise was
written in reply to some inquiry directed to him. Al-Kindi re-
peatedly states in his essays that he writes concisely and with
due awareness and consideration of the degree of intellectual
maturity of his reader.
There is no evidence that al-Kindi was actively engaged in
teaching, except as the private tutor of al-Mu'tasim's son Ahmad.
No doubt, he participated in the discussions and debates that took
place in the presence of the caliph. A contemporary of al-Kindi, the
Mu'tazilite al-Jahiz, a well-known humorist, mentions in his Book (on
the Misers (Kitab al-Bukhala ) that al-Kindf was notorious for his
46
thriftiness. As Abu Ridah has pointed out, the context in which
this reference occurs is not explicit as to whether al-Kindi, the
22
philosopher, is actually meant. 4? In the first part of his article,
"Al-Kindi als Literat," Dr. Franz Rosenthal addresses himself to this
non=complimentary trait of aleKindi's personality, which came down in
the oral tradition and was recorded by several writers, and questions
the authentic reliability of this characterization.”©
At any rate, the
impression the reader gets from al-Kindi's writings seems to be ex=
pressive of the author's generous nature and his readiness to share
especially the fruits of his minds In his ethical treatise “Al-hilah
fi daf* al-ahzen" (The Cure and Prevention of Sorrows), al-Kindi
specifically urges men not to be enslaved by their material needs and
possessions and declares that happiness is dependent more on the
acquisition of intellectual rather than material riches.”
It is most likely that in the pursuit of his intellectual
endeavors, al-Kindi lived aloof from society. Around his comfortable
house in suburban Baghdad, he had a garden in which he reared a variety
of strange and rare animals. Al-Qifti relates that al-Kindi resided
in the vicinity of a wealthy merchant who did not know that al-Kindi
was a great physician. The merchant's son was afflicted by some
serious malady which no physician could cure. Informed by someone
that the prominent philosopher, who lived in his neighborhood, was
also a capable physician, the merchant took his son to aleKindi who
cured him through musical therapy.>° According to alqifti also,
al-Kindi tried in vain to heal himself from some illness from
which he died probably at the age of seventy-two (ce 873 AeDe)eo
23
A “Millenium of Baghdad and al-Kindi" was celebrated in the Iraqian
capital in December 1962 at which a number of papers covering various
aspects of this first Muslim philosopher's thought were read.-
be Philosophy, Truth and Religion
Al-Kindi's “Treatise on First Philosophy” is the longest of
his extant works. It was addressed to the Abbasid caliph ale
Mu'tasim who succeeded al-Ma'mun in 833 A.D. and ruled in Baghdad
until 842 A.D. The complimentary words directed to the caliph at
the opening of the Treatise express a mood which is indicative of
the close relationship which al-Kindi had to his patron and the
high esteem which was accorded him at the court. This is also
substantiated by the fact that “the Bhilosopher of the Arabs" was
granted the privilege to be the tutor of al-Mu'tasim's son Ahmad.
Al-Kindi enjoyed an honorable status at the palace also during the
reign of al-Ma'mun who entrusted him with a role of leadership in
the task of introducing Greek philosophy and science to the Islamic
world.
At the very end of the "Treatise on First Philosophy," ale
Kindi points out that it was his intention to “continue our discussion
with what would naturally fellew.""> The editorial note with which
the work closes states that Part I has been completed (tamma al-
24
juz* aleawwal). It is a matter of speculation whether the continua-
tion of this philosophic work was completed and lost or whether the
projected plans, for some personal or political reason, never
Leterialheese? Whatever the case may have been, the present work,
fortunately, constitutes an integrated whole and its significance
as most probably the first philosophic essay in medieval Islam is
invaluable.
The first chapter of the Treatise deals with the nature of
philosophy and its relation to truth and religion. Philosophy,
as the highest and noblest of man's arts (sina'at), is defined as
the knowledge of the nature of things ("lm al-ashia' bihaq@'iqiha)
as far as this is possible to eames? In other words, philosophy
seeks to know the truth about things. To the question “How can
we be sure that the truth we seek does exist?" al-Kindi replies:
Simply by sheer necessity does the truth exist, for if the truth
is identical with the nature of things, and inasmuch as we know
by empirical experience that things exist, it follows that these
things must have a real nature which is the object of our philoso-
phic euésti
The knowledge acquired by philosophy, al-Kindi emphasizes,
is not an end in itself. It is for this reason that he hastens to
link knowledge of the truth with ethics. In his theoretical know-
ledge (*lm), the philosopher's objective is to attain the truth
25
(igabat al-haqq). In his practical knowledge ("amal), he seeks
to live in accordance with the truth (al-‘tamal biti-haqq).>’ This
stress on the practical implications of philosophy, which al-Kindi
places at the outset of his discourse, is highly significant.
Aristotle had considered theoretical contemplation (theoria) as
the highest and noblest activity of mane?° Apparently, al-Kindi is
not in agreement with this exaltation of ‘theoria' as an end in
itself. In a sense, he anticipates Kant in stressing the primacy
of “practical reason" as we shall have occasion to elaborate later
one
Then aleKindi proceeds by underscoring the Greek ontological
keynote that the search for the truth is inseparable from the search
for causes.”” This prepares the way for his definition of First
Philosophy as the knowledge of the Primary Truth which is the cause
of all knowledge and of all truths, °° Knowledge of the Primary
Truth (al-haqq al-awwal) is identical with knowledge of the First
Cause ('1lm al#illah al-ula).°! The perfect philosopher is he who
devotes himself to the attainment of this supreme goal. This
ultimate Truth, which First Philosophy or Metaphysics seeks to reach,
is the cause of the existence and maintenance of all things.
Al-Kindi concludes this ontological prelude with a reference
to the four Aristotelian causes, the material, formal, efficient
26
and final. °” This is followed by a brief discussion of "the four
scientific inquiries"(al-matélib al-'ilmiyyah): “Whether” inquires
about the existence or non-existence of a thing. “What” attempts
to find the genus of an existent. "Which" seeks to identify its
species, and “why” searches for its final cause or purpose. °°
In our effort to know the truth, al-Kindi reminds us, we must
keep in mind that truth is universal in character. It transcends
all barriers. There can be no monopoly on the truth. Men often
violate and crucify the truth by the narrowness of their minds. We
should never hesitate to assimilate the truth regardless of the
source from which it may come to use 4 Sheer necessity demands
that we do so. For during the brief span of life, a person's
acquisition of the truth can only be fragmentary. Men must cooperate
in their search for the truth. They must gratefully remember that
the bequest of truth they inherited has been the result of serious
search and tireless research of many generations. Indeed, we are
duty-bound to acknowledge our debt to those who have contributed,
in whatever small way, to the fund of knowledge, to say nothing of 6ur debt to
those who have done so in a large measure. Those who have shared
with us the harvest of their minds have thereby facilitated our
investigation and attainment of the truth. They have become our
intellectual in-laws (ansab) and partners (shuraka' ) in knowledge. °°
27
Ale-Kindi is quite severe in his criticism of the men of
religion who reject all philosophical pursuits, the knowledge of
things as they are, and who jump to the conclusion that all philo-
sophical preoccupation is nothing but heresy (kufr). °° Al-Kindi's
obvious liberalism leads him to use very strong language in his
attack against the Orthodox traditionalists with their fanatic
fundamentalism. He describes them as perverters of the truth and
traders of religion and enemies of all that is refined and noble. °’
Al-Kindi's universalistic attitude toward the truth guided
him in his methodology. His method of research seeks first to
review in a comprehensive manner what has been said about the subject
under investigation. After that he proceeds to complete and discuss
what had not been elaborated by others. Héepledges his reader the
necessary sensitivity and regard to the prevalent usages of the
Arabic language and the literary style of the times. °®
Before this introductory chapter is concluded, al-Kindi under~
scores the importance of philosophical knowledge as a vital instrument
for attaining religious truthe In fact, he considers theology (¥ilm
alerububiyyah), knowledge of Divine Unity ("lm al-wahdaniyyah) and
ethics (*im al-fadflah) as falling within the scope of philosophy.°”
He goes on to assert, however, that the knowledge concerning the
Divinity and Unity of God, which is attained by the philosopher is
28
not different from that revealed directly by God to His seeshets.’°
But this revelation to the few does not in any way nullify or
minimize the importance of the philosophical channel for the
realization of Divine Truth. The philosophical method, al-Kindi
insists, is a precious possession (qunyah naffsah) which it is our
duty (wajib) to use and not to lose.’ Even those who are opposed
to philosophy will find themselves compelled by logical necessity
to avail themselves of its services. For their objections to it
are invalid unless they are supported by demonstrative proof which
is itself a part of the philosophic knowledge they reject.’
It has become evident in the course of this first chapter that
al-Kindi wrote his First Philosophy with the purpose of substantiating
and defending both the reality and Divinity of God against two
particular enemies. He was engaged in a battle on two fronts. On
the one hand, as alluded to above, al-Kindi's attack was directed
to the Orthodox traditionalists (ahl al-sunnah) who vigorously opposed
the infiltration of philosophy into Islam and the use of the logical
method in matters of faith. Their fanatical adherence to the doctrine
of predestination made them intolerant, in a very aggressive manner,
of the Mu'tazilite stress on freedom and responsibility. Their
fundamentalistic understanding of the Koran, the Mu'tazilites believed,
was a perversion of religion and a distortion of the reality of God.
The Orthodox doctrine of reward and punishment and the denial of man's
29
freedom of choice and responsibility was an encroachment on God's
Justice. Al-Kindi was determined to defend the freedom of man,
particularly the freedom to use his mind in matters of religion.
He attempted in his First Philosophy to show the Orthodox traditional-
ists the futility of their literalism and the validity of philosophical
knowledge as a path to religious truth.
On the other hand, al-Kindi was equally concerned about the
danger to which his Islamic faith was subjected by the assaults of the
unbelievers (al-kafirun) and the threat to the Divine Unity cfeated
by the dualism of the Manichaeans and the trinitarian doctrine of the
Christians. To the unbelievers he wanted to prove,tby means of the
same dialectic they themselves used, the existence and reality of God.
With respect to the Manichaeans and Christians, it was al-Kindi's
intention in this metaphysical essay to vindicate the truth of the
basic Mu'tazilite doctrine of Divine Unity. These concerns find
expression in the very last section of this first chapter of First
Philosophy where aleKindi appeals to divine support and asks God
"to prove His lordship and elucidate His Unity" and grant him the
guidance that he may “refute by logical arguments (hujaj) the stube
born unbelievers, whose godlessness and shamefulness we seek to
dispel, and the defects and ill-effects of their religious beliefs
we attempt to reveal."!>
30
ce Theory of Knowledge
Before starting his metaphysical inquiry, al-Kindi lays down
the necessary epistemological foundations. The first half of the
second chapter is devoted to this matter. The theory of knowledge
delineated in this context? deals primarily with the channels and
nature of cognition.
Man acquires knowledge through two avenues: his sense organs
and his mind. Corresponding to these two channels are the two modes
of cognition (wujiid): perception (wujud hissi) 4nd conception (wujiid
taqli)/> Our sense perception is a function of our physical nature.
It is direct and immediate. The world we come to know through the
senses is the temporary world of phenomena which is constantly in
flux. Knowledge gained by the senses, al-Kindi points out, is far
removed from the true nature of things because it is a knowledge of
the appearance onlye Nevertheless, sense perception performs a vital
and necessary function. It supplies us with a considerable part of
the raw material which our mind organizes and utilizes, in the form
of images, for its specific task. For ale-Kindi, the world of phenomena
does not reveal the nature of things but, unlike Plato, he considers
it a real worlde
We have been equipped to know not only through our senses but
also through our mindse The objects of our conceptual cognition are
31
universal realities and rational orineiples.” Knowledge obtained
by the mind is nearer to the true nature of things than knowledge
gained by the senses. What we perceive through the senses are particular
things (aleashia' al-juz'iyyah) which are material. These are the
individual (ashkhags) beings and things of the species. What we
conceive by our minds are the universals (al-kulliyy4t) such as the
genera (ajnas) and the species (anvdt) 5°"
Al-Kindi argues quite strongly and convincingly against extreme
empiricism which contends that all knowledge is acquired through the
sensese He would agree with Kant that all knowledge begins with
sense perception, but not with Locke that all knowledge comes from
empirical experience. There are realities which we know directly
through our minds, such as the fact that the states of being (huwa)
and nonebeing (14 huwa) cannot be attributed to an object simultaneous-
ues At one point, al-Kindi turns to outer space to illustrate
his argument and makes the statement that outside the All (jism al-
kull) there is nothing at all neither a void (khala') nor occupied
space (mal').° The truth or falsity of this proposition cannot
be verified by empirical observation. Only our mind can deal with
this problem. We conceive the truth of this assertion logically and
in the following manner: If space, whether empty or occupied, were
to exist outside the All, which is the totality of being, then what
we conceive to be the All could not possibly be the All at all, for
32
the All must contain all existence. Al-Kindi goes on to advance
two logical arguments in support of his premisee He demonstrates
first that space and its content are inseparable entities. Secondly,
he shows that infinity cannot be an actuality because then it would
be limited and ceases to be infinity. Therefore, he concludes,
beyond the All there is nothing at all. This is a logical necessity
and can be conceived only by the minde°*
Al-Kindi discusses the nature of cognition very briefly in the
present contexte Of the mutable world of phenomena which is perceived
by the senses only images are retained by the imagination (al-mugawwirah)
which, in turn, deposits them into the memory (hifg)for eventual use
by the mind.°? While sensory objects require the medium (mutawassit)
of images Anvorder to be apprehended, conceptual knowledge is come
prehended without the instrumentality of images because it is re-
presented by concepts which are grasped directly by the mind. The
concepts have no material existence although the presence of material
objects may help us in their acquisition. But this does not mean,
al-Kindi hastens to add, that the concepts or the universals are
abstracted from material phenomena because they never align themselves
with the material.°4
The attainment of knowledge through perception and conception,
through the senses and the mind, al-Kindi emphasizes, renders our
knowledge of the truth easy in certain respects and difficult in
33
others - easy when we know that these two channels of cognition
are applicable to two corresponding orders of reality, difficult
when we ignore this distinction and try to use the one channel
or the other for the acquisition of all knowledgee He who seeks
to know the universals through empirical experience, al-Kindi
warns, will be disappointed for his efforts will be in vain. His
predicament would be similar to that of a bat in daylight unable
to see what is perfectly visible to us.°>
Al-Kindi would be critical of the attempts of certain
disciplines today which try to be scientific by imitating physical
science in its empirical method. It is because of the confusion
of methods of investigation, says al-Kindi, that many thinkers in
his day were puzzled whenever they directed their inquiries to
metaphysical fields of knowledge and tried to apply the scientific
method in this higher order of realitye We should not use, for
instance, persuasion in mathematics, empiricism in theology, dis-
cursive reasoning in physics or demonstrative proof in rhetoric. °°
Other aspects of al-Kindi's epistemology appear in some of
his other works particularly in his “Treatise on the Intellect"
(risalah fi ale'taql) and the “Treatise on the Nature of Sleep and
Dreams" (risalah fi mahiyyat al-nawm wasatcretvade” The imagination
(al-musawwirah) has a vital role in his theory of knowledge. This
faculty works continuously. During the waking hours, its energies
34
are divided between the senses and the mind rendering its services
to both perception and conception. During sleep, when perception
ceases, it serves the mind exclusively. Dreaming is a form of
thinking?” The highest receiving station in al-Kindi's epistemology,
however, is intuition which he designates as inspiration (ilhadm)
and revelation (wahi) >?
de. From Cosmology to Ontology
Al-Kindi defines physics as “the science of that which moves"
(*ilm kull mutaharr ik) and metaphysics as “the science of that which
does not move” ('ilm ma la yataharrak). © The rest of the second
chapter is devoted to a philosophical analysis of the terms ‘Eternal’
(azalf), ‘Infinite’ (ghayr mutandhi),"Time' (zam&n), 'Motion*
(harakah) and 'Change' (tabaddul).
What is the nature of the Eternal? In the first place, it is
that which is always Being (huwa) and never non-Being (laysa). 91
The Eternal, moreover, is self-sufficient, immutable and has no cause.
It is not made of matter and has no form. It is not a species and
has no genuse The Eternal has no ontological development because it
is itself absolutely perfect. It is not a body and, therefore, it
is immune to corruption and passing away. These qualities of the
Eternal are established by means of a strictly logical argument which
systematically posits the opposite and shows the contradictions that ensuee
Al-Kindi then goes on to demonstrate that the Infinite can
35
never be actuale It is impossible for a body to be infinite in
actuality. >- The truth of this matter is demonstrated by strictly
mathematical arguments which al-Kindi also advances in some of his
other philosophical essays, particularly "The Proof of the Finititude
of the Universe" (Idah tanahi jirm A ne "Fi ma'iyyat ma la
yumkin an yakun la nihayah lahu wama alladhi yuqalu 'la nihayah lahu'"
(On the Nature of that which cannot possibly be Infinite, and that
which is called Infinite), °* and “Fi wahd&niyyat Allah waetanahi jirm
al-'alam™ (On the Oneness of God and the finitude of the Universe). ?”
Having established the basic fact that anything that is
quantitative is necessarily finite, aleKindi proceeds now to prove
that Time and Motion are quantitative entities and, therefore, finite.
This is followed by a penetrating analysis of the nature and inter-
dependence of Time and Motion and their relation to Change. The
arguments presented are reminiscent of Aristotle's discussion of
these categories in his Physics. The famous Aritotelian definition
#96 is stated and the various forms
of Time as “the number of motion
of Motion such as the locomotive, qualitative (transformation - isti-
halah) and quantitative (increase and decrease - rubuw, idmihlal)
are described. <A more elaborate analysis of these matters is found
in al-Kindi's essay “Ibanah ‘an al-tillah al-fatilah lie#'l-kauwn
wa-'l-fasad" (Exposition of the Active Cause of coming into being
and passing away).?/
36
After showing thet Change is nothing but a form of Motion,
and that Time and Motion are ontologically inseparable from ‘magnie
tudes' or 'bodies', al-Kindi goes on to refute the belief that the
universe was first at rest before it was set in motion. [If this
belief were true impossible contradictions would be the result.
These contradictions would follow regardless whether the universe
were assumed to have been eternal or whether it was brought about
out of nothing. If an eternal universe were first at rest and then
moved, it would imply that something eternal underwent a changee But
that which is eternal is immutable, as it was demonstrated earlier.
We know that the universe is in motion and an eternal universe must
have been eternally in motion. If we assume, on the other hand, that
the universe came into being out of nothing, then the very process
of its generation must have involved movement, for generation is a
form of motion. The existence of the universe, in this case, could
not have preceded its process of generation, but must itself be
identical with that process. This means that the universe could
not have possibly existed without being in motions © The conclusion
that is reached from this discussion is that the universe, motion and
time never preceded each other in existence. They are co-existents.
Al-Kindi has so far set the logical stage for a final act that
must be performed before he can move into the heart of his metaphysics.
Through a winding but consistent series of proofs, he attempts to
37
demonstrate the fact that the world, the cosmos, cannot be eternal
and infinite. The existence (inniyyah) of the universe is, of
necessity, finite and must have had a beginning.” In this, of
course, aleKindi is diametrically opposed to Aristotle with his
doctrine of the eternity of the world. He undertakes to prove this
by more than one way, he says, in order to assist those who speculate
in this field to acquire added skill in their effort to penetrate
the frontiers of this field of knowledge.
The crux of the philosophical argument for the none-eternity
and finitude of the universe revolves around the refutation of the
theory that fime can be infinite in actualitye Al-Kindi attempts to
show that Time is finite in both of its dimensions, the past and
the future. Time is a continuous quantity (kammiyyah muttasilah).
This means it has a part, that is, the present (al-an) which is
common to both past and future. The present marks the end of the
past and the beginning of the future. The present renders both the
past and the future as finite because it defines the end of the one
and the beginning of the other. The addition of two definite periods
of time does not and cannot result in infinite time. By implication,
the duration of corporeal bodies cannot be infinite. From this follows
that a body, whether it is a single object or the body of the All
(jism alekull), the universe, cannot be eternal.10°
38
e. Existence, Essence and Causality
As a Muslim advocating the Mu'tazilite theoephilosophical
position which stressed the Justice and Unity of God and the doctrine
of human freedom and responsibility, aleKindi is basically concerned
in his Treatise on First Philosophy with the problem of proving
philosophically both the Existence and Oneness of God and expounding
the nature of Divine Onenesse The discussion so far was only a pre-
paration for dealing effectively with this objectivee He had earlier
established the inevitable necessity of philosophic knowledge as a tool
for attaining Divine Truth but without minimizing the epistemological
importance of intuition and revelation in this matter. Man has the
freedom to use his reason in the search for truth in general, and
religious truth is no exceptione The fact that the Muslim creed
stipulates that God had revealed Himself earlier to other nations
gave all knowledge and truth a universalistic quality. This meant a
divine sanction of their assimilation by the Muslim regardless of the
source from which they may comee Moreover, al-Kindi's logical arguments
in the previous chapter have led to the conclusion that the universe
is not eternal and infinite. It must have had a beginning and, there-
fore, a causee But before he can search for that cause, he must first
prove that it cannot have possibly been the cause of itself. This is
his immediate task at the opening of the third chaptere Can a thing
be the cause (®llah) of its own generation?
39
Al-Kindi proceeds to answer this question by making a hypo-
thetical distinction between existence and essence and describing
the possible conditions:that would result if we had the one (existence
or essence) with or without the other. This is done in order to
determine whether or not there can be a causal relationship between
the existence and essence of one single object. 1°!
Of course, the question of causality does not arise if a thing
had neither existence nor essence, for it would be simply nonexistent,
and it goes without saying that the cause-effect (*illah wa-ma'1lul)
applies only to existing things. Al-Kindi disposes quickly with other
hypothetical situations which would not involve the problem of causality.
This is the case when a thing is assumed of having existence without
essence or essence without existence. This assumption is absurd because
such a thing cannot possibly exist unless it has both existence and
essence. The maxim is posited at this point that the existence and
essence of a thing are saecitieant.°°* The field of causal relationship is
thus narrowed down to things that have both existence and essence. Can
a thing that exists and has essence be the cause of itself? If this
were possible then it would mean that a thing can generate its own
essencee In other words, a thing would be the cause and its essence
the effect. But this would be a contradiction of the logical necessity
that the effect is invariably other than the cause. Therefore the
conclusion must be drawn that if a thing is identical with the cause
and its essence is identical with the effect, then the essence can
no longer be the thing itself. To state the matter differently, if
a thing were the cause of its own essence,then it follows that that
thing and its essence are two different things. But we know by
empirical experience that a thing and its essence are the same thinge
Therefore, it has been demonstrated, that a thing cannot be the cause
of itself. It cannot bring itself into beinge It must have a cause
outside itself.-°°
There is still one matter to be ascertained before al-Kindi
can turn to the main topic of his metaphysics, the One and the Many,
and can inquire into the nature of the Primary Cause of all that exists.
This pertains to an analysis of substance (jawhar) and its relation to
the problem of meaning (ma'na). Philosophy seeks to know that which
has meaning. Meaningful words are either general, universal (kul1li)
or particular (juz'i). Being the knowledge of the true nature of things,
philosophy is not so much concerned with the particular, which cannot
be fully known, but rather inquires into the universal which is whole
and not fragmentary and whose real nature is accessible to knowledge.
Again, the universal, the general, is either essential (dhatI) or
non-essential (ghair dhatT) That which is essential in a thing, like
life in all living beings, is also called substantial, and the substance
makes the very existence (qiw&m) of a thing possible, /94
Moreover, it is the integrative substance (al-jawhar al«jami')
41
that unifies things and makes them wholes and thereby gives them
their forms and generae The differentiative substance (al-jawhar
al-mufarriq), on the other hand, accounts for the unique features
in beings and things such as the rational (al-natiq) among living
beingse It is called differentia (fasl) because it differentiates
things and sets them apart from each other. 2°
Metaphysics deals with that which is universal and substantial
and not with that which is particular and noneessential or accidental
(‘aradi). The existence of the accidental such as property (khasgah),
like the laughter of man and the braying of a donkey, is contingent
on the substance which it predicates (mawdii' lahu) and on which its
existence and continuance (thabat) depends. *°°
f. Unity, Plurality and First Cause
Although essentially a religious book, the Koran deals with
metaphysical and existential problems that are commonly shared by
both religion and philosophy. Its teachings encompass basic theoe
logical and philosophical areas such as the nature of Ultimate
Reality, the world and its relation to God, the origin and destiny
of man, the problem of predestination and free will, the ethical
and ontological conflict of good and evil, truth and error, appearance
and reality, change and permanence, space and time and the certainty
of knowledge.
The Koran, needless to say, is not always clear about these
matterse It is often possible to derive deductively contradictory
views on these issues as it was shown above, for instance, concerning
the problem of predestination and free will. Practical difficulties
relative the "khilafah" (succession) and the nature and scope of "ale
ummah" (Islamic community) raised quite early in Islam theological
questions which pressed for answers. It was only natural that differences
of opinion with respect to doctrinal interpretation of Koranic teachings
should arise and, consequently, various schools of thought should
develope
The fact must be stressed that Arabic philosophy had its own
original problems because it is not, as is commonly asserted, merely
a repetition and reworking of Greek idease There is in it an element
of originality and spontaneity. Prior to its encounter with Greek
thought, philosophical inquiry in Islam revolved around the problem
of causality. In this, the focus of attention was directed to the
question of creation with the primary emphasis placed on the relation
of God to the world. This is one of the basic issues which was
raised early in Islamic thoughte The Koranic concept of the "Preserved
Tablet" (al-lawh al-mahfuz), for example, implied the eternity of
the sacred Book. If this were true, then it would mean that something
other than God coeexisted with Him from eternity. Moreover, the
creation of objects in time by an eternal, unchangeable Will seemed
to be a contradiction to: the intellectual Muslim, for this was inter-
preted by him as indicative of a change in the Divine Will. No
wonder, the oldest Muttazilites tried to solve this problem by
conceiving of the Koranic terms "khalaqa," "bara" and “sana ta" (to
create, generate, make) in such a way © as not to refer to creation
but rather to causality - First Cause = not in time but in essences? ?’
Another philosophic problem that arose quite early in Islam was
related to the Divine attributes (sifat) of which the Koran speaks
which tended to suggest a plurality. How to reconcile this plurality
with God's absolute unity presented intellectual difficulties which
demanded solutionse
The influx into Islam of many converts from older religious
traditions, chiefly Judaic, Christian and Persian, served to sharpen
the focus on these theological and philosophical problems and to
intensify the urgency for resolving them. For these converts were
formerly adherents of religions that had dealt with these same issues
in a systematic fashion, and not a few of them brought along, as a
part of their intellectual cargo, the very epistemological and
metaphysical ways of thinking which Islam itself desperately needed.
Among these converts were those who had absorbed hellenistic learning
and were experienced in applying the philosophical method to religious
inquiry. They now set out to use their Greek philosophical knowledge
for the vindication of their new Islamic faith.
How can plurality, which we encounter in the world, proceed
from God without the implication that plurality is also present
in the Divine essence? It is to this difficult question that
aleKindi addresses himself in his metaphysics. He attempts to
demonstrate the fact that plurality in the creation does not affect
the Oneness of the Divine essence. Indeed, he goes much further.
He seeks to prove that without the existence of the True One (al-
wahid al-haqq), the Creator who is the absolute One, there can be
no plurality in the world at all. He tries to show that the endless
multiplicity of beings and things cannot be explained unless there
is a Cause which is essentially One.
Al-Kindi ushers the period in Islamic philosophy during which
Greek philosophy was believed to provide the solution to the fundamental
problem of harmonizing faith and reason, It was he who was the first
to introduce into Islamic thought the Neo-Platonic concept of emanation
(fay) 10° as a middle way in his effort to reconcile the Koranic
teaching about creation out of nothing and the Aristotelian doctrine
of an eternal world.
Al-Kindi begins this major part of his First Philosophy which
deals with the relationship of the One and the Many with an investi-
gation of the general characteristics of Unity or Oneness. Unity
is, first of all, continuity which is found in diverse things. Any
individual being or thing may be described as “one.” This applies
to both natural and manemade objects such as a tree and a house.
The tree is “one”, a unity, by natural continuity. The structure
of a house has “one” form by means of accidental continuity brought
about by craftsmanshipe The house became “one" through the unifi-
cation of its partse But unity is not only descriptive of the house
as a whole but also of the individual parts of it, for each part
constitutes “one” parte This is true regardless whether the whole
has similar parts, as in the case of a body of water, or whether it
has dissimilar parts, as it is true of the body of a living being. 1°?
The unity that exists in all individual things, however, is
not an absolute unity because individual things are divisible. This
means that it is a unity by circumstantial necessity. In other words,
the unity which we find in all predicables is not essential but
accidental. And whatever is accidental in a thing is an effect upon
it which is the result of a cause other than the thing itseit.+/°
Moreover, whatever exists accidentally in one object must exist
essentially in another which is necessarily the cause of its accidental
existence. It follows that the unity that is present in the predicables
accidentally must have its cause in another source in which unity exists
essentially. This line of thinking leads al-Kindi to postulate the
existence of the True One (al-wabid al-haqq) in which unity exists
essentially because it is not derived from anything else, +1}
Al-Kindi's next move is to examine the predicables and all
that is related to them and demonstrates at great length that they
all partake of both unity and plurality. Systematically, he sets
forth all the contradictions which would result if only unity or
46
plurality were to exist in them. If the predicables partook of
plurality to the exclusion of unity, then there could be, for instance,
no contrariety or similarity and there cannot be one thing common to
all of them. They would have to be simultaneously at rest and in
motion. But by empirical experience we know that contrariety and
similarity are facts, that the predicables have one thing in common
and they are in motion. Nine such contradictions are advanced as
proofs for the fact that the predicables cannot partake solely of
plurality. +2
In a similar detailed argument, al-Kindi also proves that the
predicables and all that is related to them cannot partake of unity
without plurality. Another set of nine contradictions would ensue. /}3
If they partook of unity only, they would have no differences and no
shapes and there can be neither movement nor rest. But things do have
differences and shapes and are in motion.
On the basis of these two series of proofs, al-Kindi concludes
that both unity and plurality are present in the predicables. It is
in the very nature of things to be ‘one’ and ‘many’, to be wholes and
have parts, to partake of unity and plurality. Unity and plurality
cannot exist separatelye Their existence is interdependent." This
interdependence, moreover, cannot be attributed to chance (bakht) and
coincidence (ittifaq) because this would imply that unity and plurality
must have existed separately, and this has already been proven to be ime
47
possiblee The interdependence of unity and plurality, therefore,
must have a cause. It cannot be self-caused because this would lead
to an infinite chain of causes and it has been shown that nothing
can be infinite in actualitye The interdependent co-existence of
unity and plurality in the predicables must, consequently, be attributed
to an external cause, a cause that is transcendent and ontologically
prior to both unity and pléraiity. 2° This is the First Cause which
is nobler and more ancient than all thingse This First Cause must
itself be either a unity or a plurality. If it were a plurality, it
would also comprise unity, inasmuch as plurality consists of unities.
This would mean that the First Cause is both unity and plurality. This
possibility must be ruled out because it would be identical to saying
that a thing is the cause of itself and it was demonstrated that this
is impossible. Unity and plurality camot be the cause of unity and
plurality. Hence, the only possibility that remains is that the First
Cause is mere Unity, One only (wahid faqat). It is void of plurality. +16
ge The Nature of Divine Unity
Having established the existence of God in terms of a First
Cause that is mere Oneness and pure Unity, al-Kindi devotes now the
final part of his metaphysics to elucidate the nature of Divine Unity.
In the light of what has been said so far, the Divine Oneness or Unity
must be very much unlike the unity that exists in the predicables.
What are its distinctive features? In what sense is it the True
One (al-wahid al-haqq)?
The fourth chapter is devoted to this metaphysical problem.
Al-Kindi begins the investigation with a comparative analysis of the
two terms “the relative" and “the absolute" (al-qawl bi-al-idafah
wa-al-qawl alnmireni). on’ Thereby he seeks to demonstrate the relati-
vity of all descriptive terms and that the only exception to this is
the term "One" as it is applied to the "True One" which alone is used
in the absolute sensee There is nothing, for instance, that is "large"
or “small as suche It is so only inrelation to another thing. An
object may be “larger” than one object and “smaller than another. The
same is true of other magnitudes such as “long and "short," “many” and
"few." They can be used only in a relative sense.
Al-Kindi attempts, not without certain difficulties, to prove
that the magnitude "smallness" as such cannot exist. These difficulties
are created by the number “one” as the smallest number. His only way
out is to subscribe to the view that “one is not a number and that,
therefore, “two is the smallest number. But the “two is the smallest
number only in a relative, not in an absolute, sense. !48 This is so
because the quality of smallness characterizes it only the moment it
is considered in relation to, or compared with, a larger number.
Before al-Kindi concludes that One is not a number, he advances
numerous arguments for and against the idea that One is not a number.
49
If One were a number, then it would have to be a certain quafility,
and anything that is quantitative is divisible. But by definition
the One is not divisible. The One should not be confused with the
matter which it qualifies and on which it bestows onenesse When we
say ‘one house,’ for instance, it is the house that is material and
not the tonee* The house is divisible but the ‘one’ is indivisible.
The ‘one’ is not a composite (murakkab) like the ‘two.' It is simple
119 The One is the
(basit), for it is composed of nothing else.
constituent element of number, for numbers are aggregates of ‘ones’,
but the One itself is not a numbere A number is a magnitude of ‘ones’
or units (wahdaniyyat), a total sum, a putting together of units.
*Two' is the beginning of number and in relation to other numbers is
the smallest because it is the sum of two units while the others are
sums of more than two units.
Having demonstrated the fact that Unity, which constitutes the
essence of the True One, is exclusively absolute, al-Kindi takes up
120
the task now to prove that the True One is neither species nor genus.
Comparisons can be made among things of the same genus. The True One
cannot be compared with anything else because it has no genuse That
which is without genus is eternal, as it was shown beforee The True
One, consequently, is eternale
From this al-Kindi goes on to establish that the True One is
not compounded of form and matter and that it is not a predicable.
30
Because plurality exists in motion, the True One cannot be motion.
Inasmuch as thought in the soul moves from some images to others and
from one passion to another, it follows that that both motion and
plurality exist in the soul. Therefore, the True One cannot be a
121 After a brief discussion in which is shown how the soul
soul.
becomes rational (taqilah), that is, acquires an intellect ('aql) by
means of its union (ittigad) with the species and genera of things,
that is, their universals, al-Kindi draws the conclusion that the
True One cannot also be intellect simply because the universals which
constitute the content of the intellect are a plurality. ?2*
What, then, is the nature of the True One? Negatively, it is
not substance, genus, species, individual, differentia, property,
accident, motion, time, space, subject, predicate, whole, part, soul
or intellect. It is void of matter, form, quantity, quality and relation.
Positively, the True One is the Absolute One (al-w&bid al-mursal) and
nothing but Pure Oneness (wahdah mahd). 1°? The True One is the One-
Itself (al-wahid bi-al-dhat) which never partakes of plurality in any
form. 224 It is indivisible in any manner. The True One, moreover,
is the First Cause (awwal "‘illah) of the unity and plurality which is
found in all individual things. 2? The Unity or Oneness of the Primary
True One (al-wakid al-haaq al-awwal) is identical with its own Beinge
The True One never partakes of plurality although it is the
source of all plurality, for plurality is nothing but the aggregate
31
of unities (jama'at wahdaniyyat). Without the Unity of the True
One there can be no plurality in existing things whatsoever. The
accidental unity and plurality in every existent (mutahawwi) are
the effect of the First Gause, the True One. Thus the emanation
(fayd) of unity and, with it, plurality from the Primmry True One
is equivalent to the process of coming into being (tahawwi). 276
An individual thing comes into being when it acquires its unity from
the True One. It, then, becomes a created thing (mubda'). The Primary
True One, therefore, is the Cause of creation (‘'illat al-ibda'),127
It is the Active Agent (al-fatil), the (First) Mover (al-muharr ik)
which accounts for the beginning of motione Consequently, the Primary
True One, which sets the process of generation in motion is both the
Primary Creator (al-mubdi' al-awwal) and Sustainer ¢alemumsik) of all
2
that exists. The True One created the world ex nihilo.
3-e Evaluations and Conclusions
ae Epistemological Realism
By accepting both perception and conception as necessary avenues
of cognition, al-Kindi was advocating an epistemological realism that
enabled him to bridge the gulf between empiricism and rationalism.
He thus reconciles the empiricism of Aristotle and the rationalism
of Plato, and before so doing he reconciled Plato and Plato by uniting
Plato's Idea of the Good and the personality of the mythical demiurge,
52
the world-architect of the Timaeus, into One Creator-God who is
as ideal as the Idea but as personal and active as the demiurge,
and yet a Creator-God who is neither so intellectual nor so mythical
as Plato's concepts are.
Moreover, through his epistemological realism and through his
emphasis on the application of philosophic knowledge, al-Kindi was
able to solve to an appreciable degree the antinomies of faith and
reason, God and the world, the world and mane This solution was not
a speculative deduction, as metaphysical systems have offered, but
rather moral and quasiemystical. The purpose of theoretical know-
ledge, he says, is to attain the truth. The purpose of practical
knowledge is to live in accordance with the truth. He makes the same
distinction between the “acquired intellect" (al-'taql al-emustafad)
and the "practical intellect" (al-'aql al-zahir)!?9 In this emphasis,
aleKindi can claim affinity to Kant who insisted on the primacy of
"practical reason” rather than “pure reason." This ethical affinity
arises out of significant epistemological similarities in both al-
Kindi and Kant. Both bridged the gap between empiricism and rationale
isme Both recognized that it is the mind which imposes on the une
organized and often chaotic raw material of sensory perception certain
form or order. In other words, the mind is not a mere passive ree
cipient of impressions but an active instrument that turns the flux
of sense data into meaningful order. The structure or constitution
of the mind is revealed in the finished product of the cognitive
53
processe Reality, as we know it, is more made than given; it is
a construct rather than a datum. All that makes the world coherent
and meaningful comes from what Kant calls “the transcendental under-
standing" and of what al-Kindi calls "The True One."
Through his universal conception of truth, al-Kindi was able
to graft Greek philosophy, particularly its Neo-Platonic form, unto
Islamic thought but without doing violence to his religione Having
placed intuition at the top of his epistemological hierarchy, he was
able to maintain the primacy of faith. Aristotle was put in the
service of Muhammad. Reason was made to bow to religious faith in
al-Kindi's metaphysics. What Julius Guttmann says about Philo that
he “adheres to the Jewish concept of revelation and regards the
Torah as the complete and absolute vehicle of God's truth130 4.
also true of al-Kindi in his high regard to revelation and the Koran.
Like Philo, he sought to bring together the two forms of truth, namely,
human knowledge and divine knowledge. Epistemological similarities
are strikingly conspicuous between al-Kindi and the great Jewish
philosopher, Saadia. Saadia, who was born about a decade after ale
Kindi's death, also thought that “the task of philosophy was merely
to provide rational proof of what was already known through revela-
tion,"43!
AleKindi's contribution to Islam resembles that of Ste Augustine
to Christianity. Both strove for a philosophic knowledge of their beliefs.
54
Both were able to harmonize philosophy and religion and both gave
religious faith the primacy in that harmony. Both stressed the
fact that the highest religious truth cannot be attained by reason
and can only be received with the prerequisite illumination and
purification. Al-Kindi and Ste Augustine were both influenced by
Neo-Platonismand each of them replaced the state of ecstasy to which
Plotinus appealed with religious faithe Both did not permit their
respective religions to be suffocated by Greek philosophy. In the
words of Dre Richard Walzer, “in al-Kindi we find a balance unique
in early Islam between an ‘advanced’ theology, based on reasoned
interpretation of revelation, and a philosophy which aimed at utilizing
the totality of our obviously limited human faculties in the under-
standing of God, the universe and man himself 232
In his epistemological emphasis on the primacy of religious
faith and revelation, al-Kindi differed from all later Islamic philo-
sopherse Al-Farabi (870-950 A.D.) enthroned reason on a pedestal ©
and gave revelation a secondary place. He asserted the primacy of
philosophy over religion and yet never ceased to be a devout Muslim.
“The Second Teacher" (second to Aristotle, as al-Farabi came to be
known), attempted to reformulate the Islamic religious tradition from
the point of view of philosophy and he did this in a way that was
not offensive to his fellow Muslims. >> “Philosophy is prior to religion
in time," al-Farabi writes in "The Attainment of Happiness" (tabsT1
al-sa'adah) and “religion is an imitation of philosophy‘!34n his
35
opinion, philosophy and religion must be united in the function
of the philosopher as supreme ruler and lawgiver. The ruler-
philosopher must be able to teach all citizens and thus enable them
to achieve the happiness or perfection he is capable of attaining
by nature.
The psychological process of cognition is briefly discussed
by al-Kindi at the end of his “Treatise on First Philosophy" as well
#135 To know the world of
as in his "Treatise on the Intellect.
phenomena is not simply to copy ite The soul comes to know the
exterior world because the forms of this world are potentially in
the soul. The soul knows when it becomes one with the object of
its cognition. The same is true of cognition of the immaterial
world. Its concepts are potentially in the soul before they are
known through conception. !36 The Neo-Platonic influence on al-Kindi
here is obvious. However, he differed from Neo-Platonism in cone
ceiving of this “innateness" of the truth in the soul as merely
potential rather than actual as the NeoePlatonists had asserted. /3/
In this, one is tempted to say, aleKindi has some affinity to the
seventeenth century German philosopher Leibniz, who thought that
the soul (as every monad) knows the world because it is the world.
The ideas or representations in the soul, according to Leibniz, are
not always conscious, not always distinct and clear. Through cognition,
they become clear and conscious in the soul. !?*
36
In his "Treatise on the Intellect" (risalah fi al-Jaql),
which was translated into Latin and played a significant role in
Medieval philosophy, aleKindi designates four types of intellect.
He accepts Aristotle's distinction between the ‘passive’ and the
‘active’ intellect. The ‘passive’ is the potential which resembles
matter that becomes all things. The ‘active’ intellect is analogous
to the efficient cause which makes all thingse The ‘active’ intellect,
in other words, makes the ‘passive’ intellect become what it apprehends.
Alexander of Aphrodisias had added to these two the intellectus habitus
or adeptus which al-Kindi adopts but divides into two, and this is his
original contribution to the doctrine of the Intellect: "the acquired
intellect" (ale'aql alemustafad) and"the apparent or practical intellect*
(al-taql al-gahir). 19° The purpose of the former is strictly theoretical,
namely, to know reality, and that of the latter is ethical, namely, to
put the “acquired” knowledge into practice.
be Metaphysical Absolutism
One of the oldest and most difficult problems with which the
philosophic mind has wrestled pertains to the relation of the One and
the Many. Granted that Ultimate Reality is One, how can we understand
the plurality of being out of its unity? How can the multiplicity of
things have come out of One supreme entity? In theological terms,
what is the relation of God and the world? How could the endless
varieties and diversities of beings and things in the universe have
37
been derived from One « single Ultimate Unity? Subsidiary problems
are the relations of Being and non=Being, the eternal and the temporal,
the absolute and the relative. Indeed, these and many other philosophic
problems are facets of the basic issue of the One and the Many.
The first extensive discussion of the relation of the One and
the Many appears in Plato's Parmenides in which Plato agrees with the
historical Parmenides in recognizing the distinction between the really
real and the seemingly real, but disagrees with him on conceiving of
the Existent as One only. In Plato's opinion, if this were true it
would lead to nihilism. For him, the Existent is the world of Ideas
with its manifoldness and in the Dialogue, therefore, Plato attempts
to show that the One and the Many are compatible with each other, /4°
The problem of the One and the Many was brought into sharper
focus by the conflict between Aristotelian and the Stoic philosophies.
While Aristotle maintained the transcendence of God, the Stoic philo»
sophers stressed the immanence of God. The problem became more
accentuated as the religious dualism became more pronounced. As Windel-
band has pointed out, the dissatisfaction with contrasting God as
Spirit with matter led to the tendency “to raise the divine being
above all that can be experienced and above every definite content,
or spirit,"141
The conception of God as complete absence of all qualities
58
makes its debut in Judaism in the philosophic system of Philo who
elevated the infinite God far above the finite world and devested
Him of all the predicates known to the human mind. The Christian
142 also
Apologists who were influenced by Philo, particularly Justin,
indulged in this “negative theology" which was the result of widening
considerably the gap between the One and the Many.
It is this same tendency to overexalt the Divine Unity above
everything else that we encounter in Neo-Platonism in even more
exaggerated forme For Plotinus, God is the absolutely transcendent
Being, who is perfect Unity above reason. God is conceived by him
as the Principle which contains plurality in its Unity. 143 "Before
the manifold," Plotinus writes, “there must be the One, that from
which the manifold rises: in all numerical series, the unit is the
first," 144 In the words of Philippus V. Pistorius, “from the teleology
of the universe Plotinus postulates a governing unity, which in some
way must be the author or basis of all existence. 149 The One is
the First who is infinite, formless and precedes all thought and
beinge Plotinus identified the One with Plato's Good as the absolute
beginning and end of all things.
And how does multiplicity proceed from this supreme Unity? What
is the relation of the True One to the Many? The world is generated
from the One, says Plotinus, by a process of emanatione “The One,
being perfect, overflows; and this superabundance produces a thing
59
different from 10146 In relation to the world, which is its over-
flowing by-products, the True One is the highest Good, the Power and
the Force which upholds everything it brings into being. Plotinus
compares the activity of the One with that of the light which does
not suffer at all in its own essence as it shines into the darkness.
This is the philosophic stream in which al-Kindi navigates in
his First Philosophy. It is a Neo-Platonic stream into which mighty
tributaries of Greek philosophers, chiefly of Plato and Aristotle,
flow but which also has a strong undercurrent of Islamic religious
thought. Al-Kindi displays a thorough knowledge of the great philo-
sophers whose views and arguments he utilizes in order to strengthen
his own theoephilosophic position on which he stands firmly.
As Marmura and Rist have clearly shown, 147 in his effort to
prove the existence of both unity and plurality in the predicables,
aleKindi is much indebted to Plato's Parmenides which he regards not
so much as a metaphysical but rather as a dialectical resource. Thus
he utilizes the numerous arguments in the Parmenides for his own
purposes and yet without surrendering his originalitye This is first
evident in the general ontological approach to the antimoniese While
Plato asks negatively as to what would happen to the “Many” if the “One
did not exist, al-Kindi proceeds positively by putting the question:
"Because the "Many exist what are the consequences for Unity?" There
is also a marked difference in their epistemologies. Plato tends to
be strictly rational in his method. Al-Kindi, on the other hand,
is both rational and empirical. He appeals to both logic and
experience. Often our empirical experience affirms what logical
deduction negates. For instance, plurality without unity, says al-
Kindi, would logically lead to the conclusion of the impossibility
of knowledgee “But knowledge does exist," he goes on to say, “our
assumption that it does not exist is a contradiction of the facts. 14
Al-Kindi leans quite heavily on Plato's Philebus when he attempts
to establish the existence of both unity and plurality in all things
and the theory that it is the One who bestows unity on all existences.
Plato calls it “a marvel of nature ee. that one should be many or many
one" and that "the one is many and infinite, and the many are only one. 249
He considered the knowledge “that whatever things are said to be are
composed of one and many, and have the finite and infinite implanted
4150
in them," as “a gift of heaven. Plato divides all things into
four classes: the finite, the infinite, the union of the two, and the
ae He refers, on the one hand, to this union of
cause of the union.
the One and the Many as “being a birth into true being,” *>" and, on
the other hand, he says earlier in the Dialogue that “this union of
them will never cease, and is not now beginning, but is, as I believe,
an everlasting quality of thought itseif." >> Al-Kindi seems to be
much clearer about the derivation of the unity in all things from the
True One. The process occurs in time. Without this unity, says Plato,
things will disintegrate into chaos. Without this unity, insists al-Kindi,
61
things will simply cease to exist.
Al-Kindi's understanding of the process by which the world
comes into being out of the True One is thoroughly Neo-Platonic.
As it was already indicated, he adopts the Neo-Platonic concept of
emanation (fayg) to explain the process of generation. However, he
does not accept the Neo-Platonic intermediaries through which the
emanation takes placee In other words, al-Kindi rejected the Neo-
Platonic Godhead which consists of the transcendent One, the Nous
or Intellectual Principle which reflects the image of the One and
from which the Soul proceeds and from which the world enanatés. !>“
He recognizes only the True One as the Godhead from whom all things
flow directly. God alone is the Creator and Sustainer of the worlde
In this way, al-Kindi adapted the Neo-Platonic speculative system
to his monotheistic faith.
As to the nature of the True One as not being genus or species
or any of the predicables, al-Kindi used the traditional Neo-Platonic
view. Negative theological descriptions of the True One suited the
Muslim philosopher in his effort to draw a sharp line between the
creation and its Creator. The sharp distinction between the two was
expressed by him through the theory that while all things partake of
unity accidentally, unity is present in the True One essentiallye
No doubt, the Metaphysics of al-Kindi shows the powerful influence
of Aristotle. “The Philosopher of the Arabs" shows a remarkable
knowledge of Aristotle's writings especially the Organon, De Anima,
Physics and Metaphysics. One of al-Kindi's essays is devoted to
"the Quantity of the Books of Aristotle and what is required for the
Attainment of Philosophy” (Fi kammiyyat kutub Aristitalts wa-ma yuhta j
ilaihi fi tahsil aldteidatan)e Major dicta and themes of Aritotle's
philosophy appear in aleKindi's Metaphysics and the debt is gratefully
acknowledged. In his argument that the coegexistence of both unity
and plurality in the predicables implies a Transcendent Cause, ale
Kindi utilizes the Aristotelian maxim that infinite regress of the
cause-effect sequence is impossiblee Aristotelian theories such as
pertain to the relation of potentiality and actuality, that infinity
can never be actuality, and the law of contradiction that "the same
attribute cannot belong and not belong to the same thing at the same
time and in the same respect," as well as the analysis of causes,
substance, time, space, motion and change by Aristotle are all
extensively used in al«Kindi's First Philosophy.
The famous Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of the world
was unconditionally rejected by aleKindi.e He maintained that the
movement of the world is not coeeternal with the First Cause, the
Unmoved Mover, the True One. Being is finite and net eternal. God
alone is eternal. Al-Kindi's solution to the problem of infinity
is based on strictly mathematical foundationse The basic Islamic
dogma that God is the Creator ex nihilo and that He is the Sustainer
of all that He has created are vigorously reaffirmed by al-Kindi.
63
This is the view that prevailed in Islamic philosophy, despite the
pro-Aristotelianism of Ibn Sfna and Ibn Rushd with respect to the
eternity of the world, a view that was reaffirmed by the great al-
Ghazali in the eleventh century.
Most of the outstanding Medieval Jewish philosophers took a
similar stand and defended the biblical tradition of creation out of
nothing by the One True God. The Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity
of the world was the first of thirteen theories which Saadia refuted
in the first treatise of his important work The Book of Beliefs and
Opinions (kitab al-amanat dabahel Uaekekt).” Gene of the proofs he
advances are of Mu'tazilite origin and, therefore, resemble those used
by al-Kindi. The same is true of the arguments which Saadia develops
to prove the existence and Oneness of God in the second chapter on
"The Unity of God." Striking similarities may be observed also
between al-Kindi and Bahya ibn Bakuda who was born in the latter part
of the eleventh century and lived in Spain as a judge (dayyan) in the
Jewish communitye His first attack in his “Book of Guidance to the
Duties of the Heart (kit&b alehidayah ila fara'id alequlub) in defence
of God's existence and Unity is directed to the dahriyyah (materialism)
which advocated the eternity of the worlde His prrofs which are
Similar to those of the mutakallimiin(dialectical theologians) of Islam,
are chiefly teleological. Like al-Kindi, Bahya was influenced by
Neo-Platonism and thus like him asserts, through a purely conceptual
deduction, that unity (of God) precedes plurality (of the world) .!??
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He echoes aleKindi and the Neo-Platonic tradition when he writes:
"The True One cannot be described with an attitude which necessitates
plurality, change, subdivision or transformation in any way #198
An additional reference must be made in this comparative
religious thought, namely, to the great Jewish philosopher Moses
Maimonides (1135-1204). There are significant resemblances between
aleKindi and Maimonides not only in their common disagreement with
the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of the world but also in
a number of related matters such as in their efforts to reconcile
philosophy and revelation, their conceiving of philosophic knowledge
as a means for appropriating the content of revelation and regarding
their philosophic task of doing so as a religious one, and indeed in
their intellectualist conception of faithe However, the two philosophers
differ sharply in their attitude and reaction to the NeoePlatonic
Aristotelian ontological process of emanation. While al-Kindi seems
to acquiesce with it and incorporates it into his Metaphysics without
any reservation, Maimonides makes it the target of his attack as he
finds it in fundamental opposition to the Jewish doctrine of creation.
For him, the question whether the world was eternal or created was
basically a question whether the cosmos emanated from God by necessity
159 In the words of Guttmann,
or whether it was freely created by Him.
“"Maimonides' discussion of this problem is guided by the desire to
replace the Aristotelian system of necessity by a system of freedom
compatible with divine sovereignty, and in keeping with the voluntaristic
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character of the Jewish idea of oa?
As a Mu'tazilite thinker, it was natural that aleKindi should
adhere to the Islamic teaching of a creation ex nihilo and thus
boldly oppose one of the most basic ideas of Greek philosophy that
being can never come out of non=beinge Thus in this decisive issue,
al-Kindi the philosopher bows to aleKindi the theologian. He is in
full agreement with his Islamic faith on this fundamental tenet and
in this respect differs from all the important Islamic philosophers
who came after hime The element of emanation that al-Kindi injected
into the creative act of God is balanced by his conception of the
True One, the Creator and Sustainer, as having life and nb pn This
means that emanation is not the work of a blind necessity but of a
Divine Will. It is the result of a free creative act. 16
Unlike al-Kindi, al-Farabi, Ibn SIna and Ibn Rushd adopted the
Neo=-Platonic theory of an eternal creation. Al-Faradbi tried to solve
the problem of the One and Many by his Theory of the Ten Intelligences.
God is the One who is Necessary by Himself. He is an Intelligence,
knows Himself and can be known./°? From this Necessary One flows the
first intelligence which is the first step toward plurality. The chain
of emanations continues until the tenth intelligence from which emanate
eh Al=Farabi extolled the
the human soul and the four elements.
intellect so highly that revelation was rendered unnecessarye His was
a religion of the mind in the light of which he set out to draw the
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blueprints of the ideal society. !° Both Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd
assimilate the Neo-Platonic ontology and stress the primacy of reason
in their metaphySical«systems but not without certain modifications.
It was al-Ghazali, known as the Defender of Islam (hujjat al-Islam),
who about a century before Ibn Rushd reaffirmed the doctrine of creation
by God ex nihilo and the primacy of religion and revelation over
philosophy and reason.!56 In the struggle in Islam between Philosophy
and Theology," writes Simon Van Den Bergh, “Philosophy was defeated,
and the final blow to the philosophers was given in Ghazali's attack
(in his book The Incoherence of the Philosophers - tahafut al-falasifah)
on Philosophy which in substance is incorporated in Averroés' book
(The Incoherence of the Incoherence - tahafut al-tahafut) and which he
tries to refute. 167
In conclusion, it may be said that al-Kindi's First Philosophy
constitutes, as far as we know, the first systematic effort to weave
Greek philosophy into the religious thought of Islam within the frame-
work of Mu'tazilite theology. In it “the Philosopher of the Arabs"
expounds a Metaphysical Absolutism for the purpose of defending the
theological position of the Mu'tazilites in general and their dogma
of the Divine Unity (aletawhId) in particular. The Mu'tazilites, who
called themselves The People of Justice and Unity (ahl al-'adl wa-ale
tawhId), directed their attack against the unbelievers, the Christian
doctrine of the Trinity, the dualism of the Manicheans and the literalism
and anthropomorphism of the Traditional Orthodox Muslims. Al-Kindi's
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Metaphysics contains philosophical ammunition for the fight against
these enemies of true Islam. God is conceived as Absolute Oneness, the
creative Source of all unity and plurality in the world, who endowed
man with a mind to be used freely in the attainment of Divine Truth.
The work gives evidence of the author's original and logical mind
which is able to assimilate philosophical ideas and dialectical methods
and to use them for religious endse To quote Professor Ahmad Fouad
Bl-Ehwany, “al-Kindi opened the door for the philosophical interpreta-
tion of the Qur'an, and thereby brought about an accord between religion
and philosophy."?°8
Indeed, al-Kindi's First Philosophy is the first
attempt in Islam to harmonize faith and reason, speculation and revela-
tion, religion and philosophy, an objective that continued to be a
major characteristic of Islamic philosophy. As the first Muslim philo-
sopher or, perhaps more accurately, philosopher of religion, al-Kindi
pioneered in the difficult task of translating Greek works into Arabic,
probably in a supervisory capacity, and, therefore, in coining g new
9
Arabic philosophical taiiasieny:”
Through his Epistemological Realism also, which gave validity
to knowledge acquired by perception, conception and intuition, al-
Kindi exercised a considerable influence on later Islamic philosophers
as well as on Medieval Jewish and Christian philosophical theologians.
His treatises on the Intellect and Prophecy initiated a series on these
same subjects by the other Islamic philosophers. As mentioned above,
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his “Treatise on the Intellect" was translated into Latin and had
some impact on Medieval philosophy. With al-Farabi (known as the
Second Teacher = al-mu'allim al-thani - second to Aristotle), al-Kindi
can rightly claim to be one of the founders of Islamic philosophy.
While al-Kindi may be compared with Ste Augustine in Christianity,
as noted earlier, al-Farabi resembles St. Thomas Acquinas in whose
philosophical theology Aristotle conquers Plato.
Professor Richard Walzer'g@ Outstanding work in Classical and
Islamic philosophy has shed considerable light on the value of the
new material in the field of Islamic philosophic thought for the
history of Greek philosophy. It is thanks to al-Kindi, for instance,
that we possess today the only remnant of an ancient commentary on
Aristotle by Plotinus. Mistakenly known then as The Theology of
Aristotle, this document was translated into Arabic, at aleKindi's
request, for the benefit of his royal pupil Ahmad, the son of ale
Mu'tagim.?/°
In the same context, Walzer writes:
We are indebted to aleKindi, as to many other Arabic
philosophers, for new material for the history of Greek
philosophy. The arguments he uses are not always to be
traced in such Neoe-Platonic works as we possess in the
original Greek, and so add to our knowledge of Neoe
Platonism, and treatises on the soul on Neo-Platonic
lines have yielded new fragments of a lost dialogue, the
Eudemus, written at a period when he still adhered to
Plato's theory of the immortality of the soul.!/1
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TRANSLATION
CHAPTER I
AL-KINDI'S TREATISE ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY
Addressed to al-Mu'tasim bi-Allah
Unto you, who are the son of the noblest masters and the bonds
of happiness, may God grant a long life. He who adheres to your
counsel shall be blessed in time and eternity. May God adorn you with
all the robes of virtue and purify you from all the stains of vice.
(PHILOSOPHY AND TRUTH)
Among man's arts, philosophy occupies the highest rank and noblest
position. It may be defined as the knowledge of the nature of things
as far as this is possible to mane In his theoretical knowledge (*ilm),
the philosopher's objective is to attain the truth (isabat al-haqq). In
his practical knowledge ('amal), he seeks to live in accordance with
the truth (al-'amal bi-al-haqq).e We must bear in mind, however, that
our philosophic preoccupation is not an eternal activity, for it comes
to an end and we abandon it once we reach the truth.
It must emphatically be stated that the search for the truth
is inseparable from the search for causesSe The cause of the existence
and maintenance of everything is the truth. Anything that has existence
(inniyyah) has realitye Consequently, the truth exists by sheer
10 necessity simply because there are existent beings and things.
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101
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(THE SIGNIFICANCE OF METAPHYSICS)
The noblest philosophy, exceeding any other in importance,
is First Philosophy. By First Philosophy I mean knowledge of the
primary Truth which is the cause of all truth. The perfect and
noblest philosopher is he who achieves full knowledge of this highest
Truth; for knowledge of the cause is nobler than knowledge of the
effect. We acquire full knowledge of every intelligible when we gain
complete knowledge of its causee A cause may be material, formal,
efficient, that is, initiator of motion, or final, namely, identical
with the purpose for which an object exists.
(THE FOUR SCIENTIFIC INQUIRIES)
The scientific inquiries are four, as we have established
elsewhere in our philosophic statements: “whether, "what," "which!
or "why." “Whether” inquires solely about existence. An existant
must have a genus, and "what" searches for that genuse “Which looks
for the speciese “What" and "Which" together seek to find the kind.
"Why" inquires into the final cause, for it aims at knowing the
absolute cause.
(GENUS AND SPECIES)
It is quite evident that the moment we know the matter of which
a thing is made, we also become cognizant of its genuse Similarly,
when we comprehend the form of an object, we gain knowledge of its
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kinds; and knowledge of the kind implies knowledge of the species.
An object is defined when its material, formal and final causes are
known, and to define an object is to know its nature.
(KNOWLEDGE OF THE FIRST CAUSE)
Knowledge of the First Cause has properly been called First
Philosophy, for it is the source of all other philosophic knowledge.
It is first in nobleness, in genus, in certainty of cognition. It
is first in time, for it is the cause of timee
(INDEBTEDNESS ACKNOWLEDGED)
The truth makes it imperative that we refrain from depreciating
those from whom we have benefited even if it were in a modest way in
‘small matters, not to speak of those who have enriched us in a large
measure in significant areas of endeavore Those who do not attain the
whole truth but do share with us the fruits of their minds become our
intellectual in-laws and partnerse Their contributions have paved
for us the way to discover a great deal of knowledge which eluded
them. As it was observed by great noneArab philosophers before us,
no seeker of the truth worthy of the name has ever attained complete
knowledge solely by his own efforts. Of course, there are those
whose search yields nothing, while others have to be content with
finding fragments of knowledge. However, the partial knowledge obtained
by various minds, when assembled, does add up to a picture that is
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meaningful and valuable.
10 We are duty-bound, therefore, to show our genuine gratitude
to all those who have contributed in any manner, whether modestly or
generously to the growing heritage of knowledge. By imparting to us
the harvest of their thinking, they have thereby facilitated our
investigation of the facts that are still hidden from use Their
discoveries have become stepping-stones on which we were able to
move forward on the path of truthe Without the efforts of those who
have gone before us, we could not have possibly acquired, within the
brief span of our lives and research, the entire wealth of knowledge
we found at our disposal at the beginning of our journey. This
accumulated fund of knowledge indeed accelerated our progress in
finding answers to the problems we set out to solvee We must always
15 gratefully remember that the capital of truth we inherited has been
the result of serious search and tireless research of many generations.
It goes without saying that no one person during a lifetime of
concentrated intellectual activity can gain as much knowledge as may
103 be gathered through the cooperative effort over the years. It was
Aristotle, the leading Greek philosopher, who rightly said that we
must never neglect to thank the parents of those who contribute to
the common treasury of truth for they are the cause of their being
and, indirectly, enhance our attainment of the truthe
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(UNIVERSAL VALIDITY OF THE TRUTH)
We should not hesitate to appreciate and assimilate the truth
5 regardless of the source from which it may come to use We should
not be ashamed to receive it from those who differ from us in their
race and belief. Truth is universal and transcends all barriers.
Any honest seeker of it is entitled to it. Truth being to him the
highest value, he will naturally honor all discoverers and transmitters
of the truthe Obviously, truth never degrades use On the contrary,
it constantly and consistently ennobles use
(METHODOLOGY)
We do well, therefore, as we endeavor. to. perfect: our’ species
which is in line with the truth, to adopt in the present study the
same principle that has guided us in all our investigations. We shall
10 begin by stating in a comprehensive and lucid manner what the ancients
had said on the subjecte Then we shall proceed to discuss, to the best
of our ability, the areas which require further elaboration. This
we shall undertake with due regard to the present usages of the Arabic
language and of the literary style in our timese And whenever necessary,
we shall give a detailed analysis of that which is complex and ambiguous
in order to safeguard ourselves against the possible misinterpretation
of those of our contemporaries who claim to be thinkers, but who in
fact are not worthy of the name because they are hopelessly alienated
15 from the truthe They are void of the qualities which adorn the men of
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independent thought. Instead of upholding the truth, they crucify
it by the narrowness of their mindse These enemies of the truth
diligently pursue that which is common and passionately appropriate
that which is mediocree The poisonous envy which permeates their
animal natures blinds them to the light of truthe It makes them
look down at all who excel in the very virtues which they themselves
lacke These men misrepresent the truth and are the enemies of all
that is refined and noblee Their primary concern is to guard the
positions which they have illicitly created, unworthily occupied
and efficiently use to rule and dominate.
(THE TRADERS OF RELIGION)
Unfortunately, these perverters of the truth are nothing but
traders of religione Having sold their religion, they are left
without a religion, for what is sold is no longer ownede A trader
in religion, therefore, is inevitably an irreligious mane Moreover,
he who refuses to acquire the knowledge about the true nature of
things and calls those who do so unbelievers should not claim to be
aman of religione
(THE SCOPE OF KNOWLEDGE AND REVELATION)
Knowledge of the nature of things or things as they actually
are implies the knowledge of divine truth and divine unity. It
encompasses ethics ("lm al-fagflah) and acquaintance with all that is
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useful and with the means of acquiring ite Indeed, knowledge of
the truth demands that we steer away from all that is harmful and
guard ourselves from ite All these facts we learn from the true
prophets who communicated them to us from God, may His praise be
exalted.
The true messengers of God = may they be blessed ~- have surely
professed the lordship of God alone. They have indeed preferred the
necessity of abiding in the virtues that are acceptable to Him, and
of avoiding the vices which contradict: the virtpes in their essence.
It is our duty, therefore, to adhere to, and spend our every
effort in pursuit of, the truth for the reasons mentioned above and
which we are about to expound.e
(THE NECESSITY OF PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE)
Even those who are opposed to acquiring it (knowledge of the
nature of things = philosophy), will be compelled by logical necessity
to yield to it. For their attitude toward philosophical knowledge
must inevitably take one of two directions, namely, that its acquisition
is either necessary or unnecessarye If they say that it is necessary,
then they would impose upon themselves the obligation of acquiring ite
On the other hand, if they should say that philosophical knowledge is
not necessary, then they will find it necessary to support their state-
ment by a demonstrative proof. But the very giving of a demonstrative
proof is itself a part of the philosophic knowledge which they reject.
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They must, therefore, appropriate this valuable possession (knowledge
of the nature of things or philosophy), if not willingly, then by sheer
necessity.
(THE NEED FOR DIVINE SUPPORT)
We call upon Him who has full knowledge of our secret thoughts
and is aware of our endeavors to prove His lordship and elucidate His
unity, to refute by logical argument the stubborn atheists, whose godles-
ness and and shamefulness we seek to dispel, and the defects and ill-
effects of their religious beliefs we attempt to reveal, beseeching
Him to shield us and all true believers with His protecting care and
to enable us by His great power to reach the goal which we have set
before us, namely, the victory of truth and truthfulness. We pray Him
to help us reach the spiritual altitude of those whose intentions and
actions are acceptable to Him and to whom He graciously granted success
in life and triumph over those who have disregarded His grace and
ignored His truth.
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CHAPTER II
Having introduced our discussion with some pertinent facts,
we shall proceed now to set forth our thesis in a systematic way.
There are two kinds of cognition (wujiid) by which man acquires
knowledgee The first is sense perception which is easily accessible
to us but far removed from the true nature of things. It begins to
Operate the moment we are born. We share it with all members of our
species as well as with the animal world in general. Our cognition
through the sense organs is direct, immediate and of brief duration
because the objects of our perception are in a state of flux, constante
ly undergoing change of location, quantity and quality. The change
occurs in the direction and speed of their movement. Their quantities
may increase or decrease. At one moment they may be equal to each
other, at another moment be unequale Their qualities may change and
thus become stronger or weaker, resembling each other at one time and
differing from each other at another. Such is the mutable world of
phenomena, always in flux. Its images are retained by the imagination
(mugawwirah) which, in turn, deposits them into the memory (hifz).
The objects of our sense perception are retained as images in man's
soul. Because they have no permanence in existence, their true nature
eludes us even though they are very near to our sense organs by which
they are perceived immediately. All that is perceived is invariably
material (hayulf) and is inevitably corporeal (jirm).
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(THE UNIVERSAL AND THE PARTICULAR)
The other source of cognition, which is nearer to the true
nature of things (tabi'ah), but not as easily accessible to us (as
sense perception) is knowledge obtained by the mind (wujiid al-'aql)
or conception. It is not without a reason that our knowledge is
acquired through two channels, the senses and the mind. For the objects
of our cognition are both universal (kulliyyah) and particular (juz'tiyyah).
By universal we mean the genera (ajnds) of the species (anw&'), and
the species of individual beings and things (ashkhas). By particulars
we mean the individual beings and things of the species.
Particular things that are material are perceived by the senses.
Their genera and species, however, are not accessible through perceptione
They cannot be known by sense perception but rather by one of the
developed faculties of the soul, namely, that which makes us human
(al-insaniyyah), known as man's intellect (al-'aql al-ins&nf). While
individual things are perceived by the senses, the images of these
perceived objects which appear in the soul belong to the faculty which
uses the sense organse However, concepts signifying species and all
other universals cannot be represented by images in the soul because
images always presuppose empirical experience. The reality of such
concepts is ascertained in the soul by means of primary, rational
principles (al-"aw&'il al-'qliyyah alema'qulah). This is a logical
necessity. Being (huws and non-being (la huwa}, for instance, are
states that cannot be attributed to one object simultaneously. This
type of cognition is the function of the soul and not the senses. This
is true by sheer necessitye Conceptual knowledge does not require
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a medium (mutawagsit). It cannot be represented by images in the
soul because a concept has no color, sound, taste, smell and cannot
be touchede Conceptual knowledge is comprehended without the instru-
mentality of images (idr&k 14 mithali).
That which is material (haytilani) is capable of being represented
by images through sensation in the soul. The non-material (148 hayulani)
may be found in conjunction with the material. An example of this is
the form (shakl) which is identified by means of the color because it
corresponds to the area covered by that color. But it is only acciden-
tally that the form is recognized by means of visual perception (al-
hiss al-basar1) because it is equivalent to the periphery the object
that is perceived by the visual sense.
It may be supposed that the form is represented in the soul as
an after-effect (lahiqah) of our total sensory perception, an after-
effect that we experience immediately following our perception of the
color. This sensation is identical with the periphery of the color
which we perceive as the form. But, it must be stressed, our cognition
of the periphery as identical with the form is a mental process which
has occurred only accidentally by means of sense perception. In
reality, the form is not perceived (but rather conceived by the mind).
All universals have no material existence although the presence of
material objects may lead us to conceive theme This does not mean that
the universal is abstracted from material phenomena because it never
aligns itself with the material. It never appears in the soul as an
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image and we should not suppose that it does. This fact we must
admit, for we are led to it by necessity.
(CONCEPTUAL COGNITION ILLUSTRATED)
Let us consider the state sent that outside the totality of
being, the All (jism alekull), there can be no existence of any space,
either empty (khala') or occupied (mala'). We mean there can be neither
empty space nor a body at all. This assumption can have no representa-
tion (by images) in the soul because "no void and no occupied space"
are things that cannot be perceived by our senses. Their experience
cannot follow any sense perception and thus appear in the soul as an
image even if this were only a supposition. That such a space, empty
or occupied, does not exist beyond the All is a truth conceived by the
mind by logical necessity by means of premises which we wish to point
out.
By the void (al-khala') is commonly understood a vacant space,
a space without any occupant (mutamakkin). But a space and its content
are constructs, that is, they are not separate entities. By necessity
(idtiraran), The existence of space implies that it is a space for
somethinge It must inevitably have a content. By the same token, an
object is invariably found somewhere, in some placee Therefore, a
space without a content is inconceivable. Although the void is defined
as an empty space, we must conclude that the absolute void (al-khala*
al-mutlaq) cannot possibly have any existence (wujiid).
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Moreover, if the content of space is corporeal, then it follows
that the corporeality of the All (jism al-kull) would be either in-
finite or finite in quantity. But it is axiomatic that nothing can
be infinite (laningyata lahu) in actuality (bi-al-fi'l) as we shall
show after a while. Therefore, we must conclude, the corporeality of
the All cannot be infinite in quantity. This means that beyond the All
there can be nothing at all. Because if there were, then this additional
content would have to be corporeale Logically, we will then have to
assume that beyond this content there is more content and so on ad
finitum(bil# nihayah). This would necessitate the existence of a
corporeal object that is infinite in quantity. Thus infinity will have
to be an actuality. This is a logical contradiction and cannot be truee
Therefore, we conclude that beyond the corporeal All there is nothing
at all. For, as we have demonstrated, beyond it there can be no space
or anything corporeal filling that spacee This is necessarily so
(wajib igtirdran). For this conclusion there can be no image in the
soul because by logical necessity this reality is conceived only by
the mind (wujtd ‘"aqlf).
Whoever seeks to know metaphysical (fawq al-tabi'ah) realities,
which are incorporeal and have no material associations (tuqarin ale
hayuli), will never find images or replicas of them in the soul. Meta-
physical truths can be known only by intellectual investigation
(al-abh&th al-‘'aqliyyah).
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Commit to your memory this basic premise (muqaddimah) that it
may be your guide in the search for all truths and a light dispelling
from your intellectual vision the darkness of ignorance and the sorrow
of perplexity. May God keep you in all the virtues and guard you from
all the viceSe
(EPISTEMOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS)
The use of these two channels of cognition (perception and con-
ception) renders (our attainment of) the truth easy in certain respects,
difficult in others. The intelligibles, for instance, can be compre-
hended only by the mind. He who seeks to know them as images (of
empirical experience) will do so in vaine His predicament would be
Similar to that of a bat in daylight unable to see what is perfectly
visible to use
It is for this reason that many speculative thinkers (nagirfin)
have been puzzled whenever they have directed their inquiries to
metaphysical matters. Their problem lies in searching for metaphysical
images in their soul and thus applying the method they are accustomed
to but which is applicable only to sensory knowledge. This is certainly
an immature approach, namely, to use the short-cut of the familiar
means to reach all ends. Naturally, the process of learning is
facilitated when the subject matter has a resemblance to what is already
familiar. This fact may be substantiated by the speed with which speech-
making, letter-writing, story-telling and poetry are learnt, for they
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are all areas which involve the ability of speaking and relating
which is acquired early in life.
These thinkers have also encountered difficulties in their
investigation of physical phenomena due to their application of the
mathematical method which must be restricted to the non-material.
For the corporeal, the physical, is subject to change, such as motione
Nature (tabi'ah), on the other hand, is the primary cause ('illah
awwaliyyah) of motion and rest.
All that is natural must be material. The mathematical method
cannot be applied for the investigation of natural phenomena. Mathematics,
being immaterial, may be applied to that which is not natural. Its use
in the natural sciences will yield no results and is bound to be con-
fusinge
It is imperative, therefore, that anyone who is engaged in research
in one of the sciences should inquire first about the cause of the subject
matter investigated by that particular field. Our search for the cause
of natural objects, for instance, would lead us back to the first natural
principles (awa'il al-tabf'ah) which account for all motion. We conclude,
therefore, that the natural applies to everything that is in motion.
Natural science or physics, then, is the science of all that is in motion.
Metaphysics, by contrast, deals with that which is not in motion, for
nothing can ever be the cause of its own coming into being (tillat kawn
datihi), as we shall explain later. Thus the cause of motion cannot be
motion, and the cause of a moving object (mutaharrik) cannot be a moving
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object. Metaphysics is, then, the realm of that which is motionless.
The knowledge of metaphysical realities, we conclude, is the knowledge
of that which does not move.
(METHODS OF INVESTIGATION)
Demonstrative knowledge (wujud burhani) should not be sought in
every inquiry, for not every intellectual problem can be solved by
demonstration. This is so because not all things can be proven true.
There are demonstrative proofs for certain things, but we cannot prové
the proof itself. If this were possible, then the chain of establishing
demonstrative evidence would go on infinitely. This would mean that
nothing at all could be proven true and thus nothing at all could be
known, because a thing is known only when we can trace its beginning.
Thus knowledge of any kind would be an impossibility. If we want to
know, for example, what is man, who is a living, thinking and dying
being, and we did aie understand what is meant by the terms “living,
thinking and dying,” we obviously would not know what man is.
Similarly, persuasion (iqn&') should not be used as a tool for
establishing facts in mathematical sciences (al-'ulum al-riyadiyyah).
Demonstrative proof should be our method in this areae If we used
persuasion in mathematics, then our knowledge would be mere opinion
(ginniyyah) and cannot be scientific("4imiyyah).
Moreover, analytical speculation (nagar tamyfzi) into a field
of knowledge requires particular method of investigation and verification
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that may not be applicable to other fields. Overlooking this episte-
mological necessity and the indiscriminate use of methods, whether it
be the persuasive, comparative, objective, empirical or discursive,
have led many analytical thinkers astray in the pursuit of knowledge
in their respective fields. The refusal to make distinctions between
the various objects of knowledge and the arbitrary and persistant
adherence to one method of investigation, regardless of the subject
matter of knowledge, account for the failure of many to acquire any
knowledgee The method of inquiry that must be adopted is determined
by the area of knowledge that is pursuede We should not use, for
instance, persuasion in mathematics, empiricism in theology (al-%lm
al-ila&hi), discursive reasoning (al-jawami' alefikriyyah) in the
inquiry about first natural principles, demonstrative proof in rhetoric
(balaghah) or for substantiating another proof. If we take this basic
matter into consideration, the goals of our search and research become
accessible. On the other hand, if we disregard this fundamental truth,
we will lose sight of our aims and fail to realize our objectives.
Having indicated these guideposts well in advance, we shall now
introduce the essentials (of metaphysics) which we need in this art.
(THE CONCEPT OF THE ETERNAL)
The Eternal (al-azali) is that which is never Non-Being (laysa)
but is Being (huwa) in the absolute sense (mutlaqan). The existence (hawiyyah)
of the Eternal has no ontological development. The Eternal is that which
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is self-sufficient and has no cause. It is not object, predicate,
has no agent and no end = we mean that for which it exists - for there
are no primary causes other than these.
Moreover, the Eternal has no genus (jins), for if it had a genus
it would itself be a species (naw'). <A species is a composite (murakkab)
of the genus, which it has in common with others, and the differentia
(fas1) which distinguishes it from others. This would mean that the
Eternal is made of matter, namely, its genus with which its form or any
other form (surah) may be combined, and of form which is uniquely its
own and is not shared by any other. Thus the Eternal is made of matter
and form. But it has been proven that it is without matter and form;
and this is a contradiction that cannot be possible. Therefore, it must
be concluded that the Eternal has no genus.
Again, the Eternal is immune to corruption which is a change of
form but not of primary substance (al-ha3mil al-'awwal). This primary
substance, which is its existence (aysa) does not undergo any change.
The process of decay in an object is not the result of reecreation of
its existence (ta'yfs aysiyyatihi). Alteration in»an-ob}ect*isscaused
by its nearest opposite with which it shares the same genuse Heat, for
instance, is changed by means of the cold and not by dryness, sweetness,
length or anything else simply because these qualities are not the
nearest opposite to heate Related contraries (al-addad al-mutaqaribah)
are of the same genus. A decaying object has a genuse If the Eternal
decays, it must have a genus. But it has been established that it is
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without a genuse This is an impossible contradiction. We conclude,
therefore, that the Eternal is immune to decay.
Inasmuch as change (ist ihalah) is substitution (tabaddul), the
Eternal is immutable because it is never substituted by something else
and does not develop from a state of imperfection (naqs) to a state of
perfection (tamam). For development (intiqadl) is a form of change, and
the Eternal does not develop into a state of perfection because it it
is immutable. That which is perfect is characterized by a canditiion
of constancy (hal thabitah) which is the basis of its excellence. The
imperfect lacks this constancy and this excellence. The Eternal cannot
be imperfect because it is impossible for it to develop into a condition
by which it attains excellence. This is so because it cannot possibly
change into any any state that is more perfect or more imperfect. By
necessity, the Eternal is perfect. Inasmuch as a body (jirm) has genus
and species, and the Eternal has no genus, therefore the Eternal: cahnot
be a body.
We can make the conclusive statement that no eternal body or
anything else that has quantity (kammiyyah) or quality (kaifiyyah)
can be infinite in actuality (biealfi'l), and that which is infinite is
only potentially (ff al-quwwah) ‘so.
(BASIC PREMISES)
This leads us to state several primary premises that are certain
and are intelligible without the medium (of sense perception):
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(a) All bodies (ajram) of which none is larger than the rest are
equal (mutasawiyah).
(b) The distances (ab'ad) between the farthest ends of equal bodies
are congruent potentially and actually.
(c) That which is finite cannot be infinite.
(d) If a body is added to one of equal bodies it renders it larger
than the rest and larger than it was before the addition was made.
(e) If two bodies finite in size were joined, the resultant body would
also be finite in size. This is necessarily true also with
respect to any quantity or anything quantitative.
(£) The smaller of two bodies of the same genus is smaller only in
comparison with that other body or part of ite
(THE FINITE AND THE INFINITE)
If from an infinite body one were to take a body finite in size,
the remainder would be either finite or infinite in quantity. Assuming
the remainder to be finite in size, if then the separated body, which
is finite in size, were added to it, the resultant body would be finite
in size. But this resultant body is the same as the original one
before anything was separated from it which was infinite in size. This
is an impossible contradiction.
Suppose now that the remainder were infinite in size. If then
what was taken away from it were again added to it, it would either
become larger than what it was before the addition was made or equal
to it. If it becomes larger than what it had been, it would mean that
10 an infinite body has become larger than an infinite bodye We know
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that the smaller of two bodies is maller in relation to the larger
of part of it. Thus one of the two objects, both supposedly infinite,
is smaller than the other one or part of ite If in size the smaller
body ranks second to the larger one, then it inevitably ranks second
to part of it. The smaller body could be said to be equal to part
of the larger.
However, two bodiés>arécequal when the distances between the
periphery of their common features (mutashabihatuhuma) are equal. They
are consequently finite, for equal bodies which are dissimilar have,
nevertheless the same number of equal units (quantitative), although
their ends may differ in plurality (kathrah) or‘quality or both. Thus
they are finite. (According to our argument), the smaller of the two
bodies would have to be both infinite and finite, and this is an
impossible contradiction. Therefore, we must conclude, that neither
of the two bodies (mentioned above) is larger than the other.
Moreover, if the body does not become larger than what it had
been before anything was added to it, this would mean that a body has
been added to another body without resulting in any increase. Thus
the total sum of the two is equal to the one, although the one to
which it was added is only part of the whole as well as part of of
the two parts that have been rejoined. Consequently, the part is
equal to the whole (al-kull). And this is a logical impossibility.
It has thus been demonstrated that a body cannot possibly be
infinite. The same argument leads also to conclude that nothing
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quantitative can be infinite in actuality.
(TIME, MOTION AND CHANGE)
Time is a quantitative entity. Therefore, it cannot be infinite
in actuality, for it has a beginning and an ende All things that are
predicated by that which is finite are necessarily finite. Thus all the
categories implied in a body such as number, space, time - which is
divided by motion - and all that constitutes a body in actuality is
also finite, because the body itself is finite. The body of the whole
(universe) is finite. The same may be said of all that it contains.
Inasmuch as it is possible by imagination (bi-alwahm) to increase
the totality of being continuously, namely, to imagine a larger universe
indefinitely, therefore the possibility (imk&an) of imagining a larger
universe can go on infinitely. Thus potentially, the universe (jirm
al-kull) is infinite, because potentiality (of it being so) and possibili-
ty (of our imagining it to be so) are identical. In other words, that
which is finite can be so only potentially. Al that is inherent in what
is infinite in potentiality is also potentially infinite. This applies
to motion and timee To sum up, that which is infinite is infinite only
in potentiality. Nothing can be infinite in actuality, as we have showne
Because that is a logical necessity (ieee the principle that infinity
cannot be an actuality), it becomes evident that time cannot be infinite
in actuality. For time is the duration of the totality of being. If
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time is finite, it is so by virtue of the fact that the existence
(inniyyah) of the universe is finite, for time itself has no independent
existence.
Moreover, there can be no body existing without time, because
time is the number of motion. It is, in other words, a duration
measured by motion (barakah). Whenever there is motion there is bound
to be timee The absence of motion isthe absence of timee
Again, motion implies a body that moves. There can be motion
only when there is a body, for without it there can be no motione
Motion is a form of change. This change may involve the location of
any or all the parts of an object with or without its focal point{markaz).
This is known as locomotion (al-harakah al-mak&niyyah). The change of
location may also be the result of the movement of any or all of the
parts of a body away from, or nearer to, its focal pointe This would
be identical with the processes of growth (rubfw) and dissolution
(igmihlal) respectively. If the change involves the predicative
qualities (al-kaifiyyat al-mahmflah) of a body only, then it would be
identical with transformation (istihalah). But if the change takes
place in its essence (jawhar), the process would be equivalent to
generation (kawn) and decay (fasad).
Every change marks the duration (muddah) of a body. In other
words, change and time are ontologically inseparable, and so are motion
and bodies, for wherever there is motion, there must of necessity be
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a body. The existence of a body necessitates the existence of motione
Without an body there can be no motion (for there would be nothing to
move) e
The postulated existence of an immoveable body would mean that
motion is an impossibility, definitely or indefinitely, or that it is
a possibility. If motion is a definite impossibility, then it would
mean that it is non-existent (laisat bimawjiidah) while the body exists.
But (we know that) motion does exist; and this is an impossible contra-
diction. When there is an existing body, then the complete absence of
motion would be impossible. Theiexistence of:ai body renders the’ existence
of ‘hotion a possibility, for motion exists in some bodies by necessity.
The possibility of a condition in a body may be postulated on the basis
of its actuality in other similar bodies. Let us say, for instance,
that the ability to write is not an actuality in Muhammad. But we can
assume its existence in him as a possibility because other men can
actually write. Thus the fact that motion necessarily exists in some
bodies leads us to conclude that it must necessarily exist in bodies
in general. Therefore, wherever there is a body, there is inevitably
motion alsoe It has been said that there can be a body without motion.
If this were true, it would mean that a body can be in motion and at
rest simultaneously. But this is inconceivable (mubal1) and an impossible
contradictione Thus we conclude that the existence of a body without
motion is impossible, and that wherever there is a body, there must
necessarily be motion alsoe
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(TIME, MOTION AND COMING INTO BEING)
We may suppose that the universe was originally at rest and
that it moved because it was possible for it to do soe This supposition
is necessarily false because 4f the universe were first at rest and then
moved, it must have come into being out of nothing (kawn ‘an laysa) or
existed eternally (lam yazal). If it came into being out of nothing,
then being (aysa) has come out of nonebeing (laysa), and this is a process
of generation (kawn) which must involve movement. This fact was stated
above when we described the nature of motion and pointed out that genera-
tion was one of the forms of motion. If the existence of the universe
did not precede the process of generation, it must itself by identical
with that process. The generation of the world, therefore, could not
have possibly preceded motione
It has been asserted that the universe existed first without
motion. This means it was at rest, but (we have shown that ) it did
not exist without motion. This is an impossible contradictione Therefore,
if the universe were generated out of nothing, it could not have possibly
preceded motion.
On the other hand, if the wniverse were eternal and at rest (sakin)
and then it moved because it was possible for it to do so, this would
imply that the eternal universe underwent a change (istabal) from
actual rest to actual motion. But that which is eternal ds:immutable;
as we have demonstrated earlier. The universe is then mutable and
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immutable, and this illogical and cannot be possiblee The universe
could not have been eternal and at rest in actuality and then moved
in actuality. But the universe is in motion. We must conclude that
the existence of the world did not precede its movement at all. There-
fore, wherever there is motion there must also be a body (that is in
motion), and wherever there is a body there must also be motion.
It has been pointed out that time is ontologically not prior to
motione This means that time does not necessarily precede the universe
in existence because there can be no time without motion. Moreover,
the universe and motion co-exist. There cannot be one without the
other. Similarly, it is inconceivable to have a body without duration
(muddah), for there can be a duration only of something that exists.
Furthermore, the duration of a body implies motion, because a body and
motion are absolutely inseparable, as it has been showne The duration
of a body, which is invariably simultaneous with the existence of that
body, is measured by the movement which inevitably coexists with it.
This establishes the fact that the universe is not ontologically prior
to timee We conclude that the universe, motion and time never precede
each other in existence.
The fact has been elucidated that time cannot be infinite for
the simple reason that a quantity (kammiyyah) or anything quantitative
(dhii kammiyyah) can never be infinite in actualitye All time must
actually come to an ende Moreover, Gorporeality does not precede
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time. The existence (inniyyah) of the universe cannot possibly be
infinite. Of necessity, it must be finite. This means that the
universe cannot be eternal. And although this truth has been
delineated by what we have advance, we shall attempt to prove it in
another way in order to enable those who speculate in this field to
acquire added skill (tamahhur) for penetrating (tawalluj) its frontiers.
To begin with, change may take the form of composition (tarkfb)
and assimilation G'til&f), that is, the assembling (jam') and harmonious
arrangement (nazm) of thingse A body is a threeedimentional substance
having length, breadth and depth. It is composed of the substance
(jawhar) which is its genus, and of the dimensions (ab'&d) of length,
breadth and depth which constitute its differentia. A body is made up
of matter (hayfilf) and form (sftrah).
Furthermore, composition is equivalent to the change in a
condition which itself is not a compound. If other words, composition
is motion, for without movement no composition can take placee A body
is a composite. Without motion there>cah be nobbodies. Corporeal
bodies and motion cannot ontologically precede each other.
Again, time exists through the instrumentality of motion because
motion is change, and change marks the duration of that which is
changinge Thus motion measures the duration of the change in a body.
Time is a duration computed by by motion. All bodies have a duration,
as we have stated earlier. By this we mean the duration of their
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existencee Corporeality does not precede motion, as we have already
explained. Corporeal existences do not precede duration which is
measured by motion. We arrive at the same conclusion that corporeal
existences, motion and time do not precede each other ontologically.
They co-exist. Therefore, if time were actually finite, the existence
of bodies will necessarily be also finite in actualitye This conclusion
is inevitable if composition and assimilation were a form of change.
We would not have reached this conclusion if composition and assimi-
lation were not a type of change.
We shall attempt now to show in a different way that time cannot
be infinite in actuality in both its past and future aspects. Let us
proceed by assuming that each period of time is repeatedly preceded
by another until a period of time is reached that is not preceded by
any othere In other words, we shall go back in time until a dis-
connected interval is reached which is not preceded by another dise
connected interval. In our opinion, things cannot be otherwisee For
the alternative would be a sequence of time intervals that would
stretch into the past infinitely. This would mean that we can never
determine the length of an exact interval stretching from a definite
point in time into the distant past because such an interval cannot
be designated if its far end is in infinity. And if a period beginning
with a definite point in time and ending in infinity were measurable
and knowable, then that which is infinite is also finite. This is an
impossible contradictione
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Moreover, if no definite period of time can be reached (in
the past) without finding that it is preceded by another and that
by still another and so on infinitely - and that which is infinite,
its distance cannot be crossed and its end cannot be reached, for
one cannot expect to cover infinite time and reach a definite period
of time - but (by empirical experience we know that) a definite time
can be reached. Therefore, time is not infinite and must necessarily
be finite. By implication, the duration of corporéal bodies 4s not
infinite. Likewise, a body cannot be without a certain duration
because its existence is not infinite but finite. Therefore, a body
can never be eternal.
Similarly, the future cannot be infinite in actuality, for as
we have demonstrated, if the past, up to a definite point in time,
cannot be infinite (the same would be true of the future). Periods
of time do continue to follow each other repeatedly. But if any-length
of time is added to a segment of time that is already finite, the
total time resulting from this addition would also be finite. If
this were the case, the alternative would mean that the addition
one finite quantity to another finite quantity results in an infinite
quantity (and this is illogical).
Time is a linked quantity (kammiyyah muttasilah). By this we
mean that it has a part that is common to both past and future, namely,
the present (al- &n), which marks the end of the past and the beginning
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of the future.
A definite period of time has two terminations, one at the
beginning and the other at the end. If two limited periods of time
were joined together by a moment that is common to both, the other
end of each of them would still be definite and known. It has been
argued that the total sum of the two periods would be finite. This
would mean that the ends in question are simultaneously finite and
infinite, which fs a contradiction that must be rejected. Therefore,
if a limited period of time were added to another limited period of
time, the sum of the two cannot be infinite. For whenever a limited
time is joined to another limited time, each of these two segments
of time will still have a definite end on one side. We conclude that
the future cannot be infinite in actuality.
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CHAPTER III
(EXISTENCE, ESSENCE AND CAUSALITY)
Our preceding discussion may now be followed by an inquiry
into the possibility as to whether or not a thing can be the cause
(Yllah) of its own generation (kawn dhatihi). We shall attempt to
argue that this is impossible, for a thing cannot be its own cause,
that is, the cause of its own coming into being (tahawviyhu),. whether
out of something else or out of nothinge Some would argue that in
certain situations, being (ka'in) is generated out of some specific
thing. For a thing, in the first place, may exist (aysa) and be without
essence (dh&atuhu laysa). Then a thing may be non-existent (yakfin laysa)
and yet have an essence (dhatuhu aysa)e Moreover, a thing and its
essence may not have any existence. Finally, a thing may exist and
have an essence.
To begin with, if a thing had neftther existence nor essence,
then that thing would be nothing (la shay") and its essence would also
be nothing. This would mean that no cause-effect (la'{illah wala ma'lul)
sequence is involved, for such a sequence is applicable only to existing
things. In this case, therefore, a thing cannot be the cause of its own
generation, for there is absolutely (mutlaqan) no cause. To argue
that a thing can be the cause of its own becoming woald be then illogical.
It is impossible for a thing to be the cause of itself when that thing
is nothing and its essence is also nothing.
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The same conclusion is reached if a thing had an essence but
without having a (concrete) existence, for in this case it would also
be non-being (laysa), nothing and as such it would be neither cause
nor effect, as we have shown earlier. Therefore, it cannot be the
cause of its own being. To assume that a thing can be the cause of
its own being would be an absurdity in the event a thing had an essence
without a concrete existencee
The same result applies when the essence of a thing is identical
with another object, for mutable existents may undergo a change in
some of their parts only without the rest being affectede Such a
change could dissolve the existence of a thing without having any
effect on its essencee But when a thing ceases to exist then its
essence becomes other than itself. However, we know that a thing is
identical with its essence. Therefore, in this case a thing will have
to be both itself and other than itself. This is self-contradictory
and is likewise an impossibility.
This conclusion isalso true if a thing exists but without its
essencee This would be the case when its essence happens to be other
than itself. Such a condition may be due to the fact that the existence
and essence of a thing undergo dissimilar changese This, however, would
be in conflict with the fundamental truth that a thing and its essence
are identical. Therefore, the hypothesis of having an existing thing
without its existing essence must be rejected because it is a sheer
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impossibility.
We arrive at the same consequence when a thing has both
existence and essence. Even under these circumstances, a thing cannot
be the cause of its own being for the simple reason that otherwise
a thing would be generating its own essence. This would mean that
a thing would be the cause and its essence would be the effect, but
the effect is invariably other than the cause. Thus if it so happens
that a thing is identical with the cause and its essence is identical
with the effect, then it dis Sot ‘Bhat the essence can no longer be
the thing itself. But we know that a thing and its essence are
identical. According to the present argument a thing and its essence
would have to be two different things while in reality they are the
samee Both views cannot be correct. Therefore, we conclude that a
thing cannot be the cause of its own generation when both it and its
essence are existing entities.
Obviously, a non-existing thing cannot be the cause of its non-
existing essence, for in this postulated instance the thing and its
essence cannot be identical, while in actuality they are the samee
Thus we have established as true the basic principle that a thing
cannot be its own cause. It cannot bring itself into being.
(THE PROBLEM OF MEANING)
Having demonstrated the above truth, we shall now proceed by
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stating that a word (lafz) may or may not signify a meaning (ma'na).
That which is void of meaning cannot be the object of knowledge and,
therefore, is of no concern to philosophy which seeks to know that
which has meaning.
Meaningful words are either general (kul1I) or particular (juz'T!).
Philosophy does not seek to know particular things because they are
incomplete entities, and what is incomplete and fragmentary cannot
be fully known. Being the knowledge of the true nature of things,
philosophy inquires into the universal which is whole and whose real
nature is accessible to knowledge.
The universal, the general, is either essential (dhatf) or
non-essential (ghayr dhatI). By the essence of a thing we mean that
which constitutes its very substance (muqawwim dhat aleshai') and that
by whose existence a thing comes into being and is maintained (thabat).
Without an essence, a thing disintegrates and decays (intiqag wafasad).
Life, for instance, is the essence of a living being (hayy), the very
core which makes it what it ise The absence of life means the setting
in of corruption and dissolution. Thus life is essential in all
living beings, and that which is essential is also called substantial
(jawharf)e It makes the very existence (qiwam) of a thing possible.
Substance may be integrative (jami') or differentiative (mufarriq).
That which is integrative apples to many things giving each its name
( ism) and its definition (hadd) and thereby unifying it and making
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it whole. The integrative which names and defines many things may
apply to individual entities (ashkhas) as individual men. As such,
it is called form (surah), for all individual men have the same form.
The integrative may also characterize many forms such as the living
and thus applying to all forms of living beings as man and maree This
is called genus (jins), and the one genus is applicable to all these
formSe
The substance that is differentiative, however, dtcounts for: the unique
features in the definitions of things. The rational (al-natiq), for
instance, differentiates the living beings from each other. This is
what is called differentia (fasl) because it differentiates things and
sets them apart from each other.
The non-essential, on the other hand, is the very opposite of
what has just been describede Its existence depends on that which it
predicates (al-mawgi' lahu) and which is also the source of its con-
tinuance (thabat). Without the subject which it predicates it ceases
to exist. It is inseparable from the substance for which its serves
as a predicate. It is for this reason that it has been called accident ~
(‘arad).
An entity whose existence is contingent on the substance is
found in one individual thing, a characteristic of its own, distinguishing
from the rest such as the laughter of man and the braying of a donkey.
It is called property (khassah) because it belongs to one specific
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thinge The accidental may also appear in many things like whitee
ness in paper and cottone It is called common accident (‘'arag *'ammT)
because it is commonly shared by many thingse
A word that has meaning is either genus, form, individual,
differentia, property or common accident. All these may be classified
under two headings: substance and accident. Genus, form, individual,and
differentia are substantial. Property and the common accident are
accidental. Moreover, a meaningful word may also be universal (kull1)
or particular (juz'i), integral (mujtami') or disparate (muftaria).
Inasmuch as we have discussed these concepts earlier, we shall proceed
to investigate the problem of unity.
(THE NATURE OF UNITY)
What are the things in which the One or unity may be said to
exist? The One (al-wahid) is found wherever there is continuity
("la kull muttagil) and in those things that do not partake of plurality
kathrah). This is equivalent to saying that unity may be descriptive
of diverse things as genus, form, individual, differentia, property
and common accident and all what has been mentioned above.
The individual may be natural (tabi'tiy) as animal or plant
and the like or it may be man-made (sina'iy) as house and so on. There
is a natural continuity about the housee Its. Its structure is
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continuous by accident, that is, by means of the occupation (of house-
building). The house is one as far as its natural parts are concernede
Its structure is one by virtue of craftsmanship. The house became one
by accidental unification (ittihad) (of its natural parts). But the
house itself is one by natural unification.
Unity may also be said of wholes and parts. It may be applied
to everything and to some things. It may be supposed that there is
no distinction between the "all" and the “évery", for “all"may be said
in connection with things that have similar or dissimilar partse We
say, for instance," "all" the water, and water has similar parts, and
"all" the body which is composed of bones and fleshe It applies to
other things that have dissimilar parts as “all" the generation which
has different individualse “Every”, on the other hand, is not applied
to things with dissimilar parts. One does not say, for example, "every"
water. However, “every may be used with different things that are
accidentally assembled or that are unified by some meaning, even though
each individual thing may stand on its own, independent of the others.
"All", on the other hand, may be applied to any conglomeration of
things whatever the means of their unification. Thus we do not say
"every" water because water is not made up of different things each
standing on its own by its very nature. But we say "all" the water
because water is a conglomeration of similar part$e
Likewise, there is a distinction between "part"(jug') and “some
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(ba'g). “Part” is a designation of that which measures the whole,
dividing it into equal quantities (aqd@r mutasa@wiyah). “Som is that
which cannot be used as a measuring unit for the whole which it divides
into unequal quantities. The “some”, which divides the whole into
unequal portions, is, nevertheless, part of that wholee
Unity, then, is ascribed to all the categories (al-maqflat) and
all that is derived from them whether it is genus species, individual,
differentia, property, common accident, whole, part, evéry (part) or
some (of the parts). (Unity is attributed to genus) because genus
exists in all its species, for it is a category consistently applied
to each of theme (The same is true of the ) species which is present
in each of its individuals for it is invariably said of each of them.
Likewise the individual which is a wnity by circumstantial necessity
but which is itself divisible. Thus the individual is not a unity
in essence. Its unity is accidental not essential and is in reality
non-existent. That which is not én reality essentia&f in a thing must
of necessity be accidental. Whatever ds accidental in a thing is
caused by something other than itself. The accidental in a thing is
an effect upon it (athar ffh), and an effect is relative (mugaf)
and is the result of a cause (min mu'athtbir), Therefore, unity (wabdah)
in individual things is necessarily an effect of a cause (athar min
mu'aththir).
The species is descriptive of many things which differ as
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individualse It is, therefore, a plurality because it comprises
many individuals and is also composed of things, for it has genus
and differentia. An example of this is man whose constituent elements
are the qualities of living (hafy), thinking (n&tiq) and dying (mayyit).
Thus the species is essentially a plurality with respect to its
individuals as well as its structure (tarkib). The unity (wihdah)
that characterizes it is circumstantial and not essential. Therefore,
it does not possess unity in reality, for the unity that it has is only
accidental. That which happens to a thing accidentally is caused by
some other agent. Accident in a body is an effect upon it, and the
effect is relative (mud&f), for it is the result of a cause. It
has, then, been established that unity in the species is necessarily
an effect of a cause also.e
The genus covers many things that differ in their species which
is indicative of what a thing is (ma‘iyyat al-shay'). It is, therefore,
a plurality because it has numerous species each existing independently.
It is thus a plurality in this respect. This means that unity in it also
does not exist in reality, for it appears in it only in an accidental
mannere An accident in a thing has an external causation. The accident
is an effect in a thing and is, therefore, relative. The effect is the
result of a cause. We conclude that unity in the genus is likewise
an effect necessarily caused by another agent,
The differentia embraces many things having different species which
identify what a thing is (ayyfyyat al-shai'). The term comprises all
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the individuals of the species under which this differentia comes
indicating its classification. Thus the differentia is a plurality
with respect to the species and the individuals that belong to these
species. The unity that is apparent in it, therefore, is not real.
Its presence is only accidental. An accident has its causation outside
the thing in which it occurs. It is, consequently, an effect in the
thing in which it happens, and that which is effect is relative, for
it is the result of a cause. It must be concluded that unity in the
differentia is also an effect of a cause.
Property is said of one species and of all the individuals that
belong to ite It substantiates the existence of a thing which of
necessity must be particulare Property is, therefore, a plurality
because it exists in numerous individual things, and because it is
motion which is particular. Thus the unity present in property is also
not real, for it is accidental. That which is accidental in a thing
is caused by another agente. It is, therefore, an effect which is
relative and is the result of a causee Consequently, unity in property
is also an effect of a causee
The common accident is also said of many individual things.
Therefore, it is a plurality because it is found in many individual
entities. The common accident is either a quantity which is disposed
to increase or decrease and is, therefore, particular. Or it may be
a quality (kayfiyyah) which has a propensity to assimilate that which
is similar or dissimilar, stronger or weaker. Thus quality can
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accommodate contrariety (ikhtilaf) and is, therefore, a plurality.
This means the unity present in it is not real unity because it is
accidental. Accident, as we have already shown, is an effect of a
causee It must then be concluded that unity in common accident is
likewise an effect of a cause.
"The all" (al-kull) applies to the categories (al-maqfil&t) which
are composed of parts and this is true of all the categories. Any
category (maqfilah) to which the "all" is applied has also parts
because every category is a genuse This means it has forms, and every
form has individual things. The “all", then, is a plurality because
it has many divisions. The unity that it manifests, therefore, is
not real, for its is accidental and thus an effect, as we have
demonstrated before with respect to all that is accidental.
The same is true of “every” (jamI'), for it is a designation
that applies to many assembled things. Therefore, it is a plurality.
The unity that is present in it is not real, for it is accidental
and, consequently, an effect of a cause, as it was pointed out abovee
The particular is either essential or accidental. The parts
of the essential may be similar or dissimilar. That which has similar
parts is a plurality. An example of this is water whose every part
is truly water and is itself divisible. Every part of water, which
is water in its perfect form, is a pluralitye The essential which
has dissimilar parts is also a plurality. By “dissimilar parts" we
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different parts such as the animal's body which is composed of
flesh, skin, nerves, veins, arteries, ligaments, dermis, diaphragms,
bones, brain, blood, gall, mucus and all that constitutes the body
of a living being. All these are dissimilar, and each part of the |
body which we have just enumerated is itself divisible.
The particular which is accidental, on the other hand, is
implied in the particular which is essential. An instance of this
is the length, width and thickness in the flesh and bones as well
as in the other parts of an organism, and to which we can add the
color and taste and other accidentals. The particular that is accidental
follows the essential in its divisions. Therefore, it has parts and is
a plurality. We conclude that unity in the particular is also not reale
Both natural and accidental continuity have parts. The natural
continuity of the house, for instance, lies in its form which has
sides. Its accidental, that is, manemade continuity consists in the
assembling of the material of which it is constructed as the stones,
mortar and the parts of its bulke Thus it is a plurality also. Its
unity, then is not real.
As we have mentioned above, a thing may be said to partake of
unity in relation to another thing. An illustration of this is the
mile which signifies unity when we refer to “one mile" as a whole or
general (measurement) for distances covered by a flung arrow (ghalwat).
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But in relation to the parasang (farsakh), the mile represents only
a part. On the one hand, the mile is continuous and unified because
the specific distances of a flung arrow (ghalwét) are continuous and
unified in it. Thus it is a whole, an "ali" (kull) for such distances.
On the other hand, the mile is disconnected (munfagil) from other miles,
namely, the miles which add up to one parasang. Therefore, the unity
present in it is not real also, for it is accidental.
To sum up, the categories we have investigated do not invreality
partake of unitye In each of them, unity exists accidentally. Whatever
happens to a thing accidentally must have its cause in something other
than the thing itself. It is the result, therefore, of some external
causation. An accident, in other words, is an effect of some external
cause, and cause and effect are always inseparably related.
Moreover, whatever exists accidentally in an object must exist
essentially in another. This fact must be underscored that accidents
which appear in an object exist essentially in anothere Having demonstrated
the fact that unity is present in the categories only accidentally, we
must now draw the conclusion that unity in them is not particular, that
is, it is whole and general, not essentially but accidentally, and
inasmuch as as the accidental existence of unity in one thing must
necessarily be attributed to another in which unity exists essentially,
it follows that the existence of the True One (al-w&bid al-haqq) must
be postulated whose unity is not an effect caused by another.e Further
light needs to be shed on this realitye
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(THE ONE AND THE MANY)
All predicables (maqiilat), whether perceived by the senses
(al-hiss) or conceived by the mind (al-'aql) must relate to unity
and plurality in one of the following ways: each existent can be
either (1) one or many, or (2) both one and many, or (3) one only,
or (4) many onlye
(1. PLURALITY WITHOUT UNITY)
If the predicables were supposed to consist of plurality only,
then they could not possibly share in one common state or meaninge
But the truth of the matter is that they do share in one common state
and meaninge Therefore unity (in them) co-exists with plurality. We
have assumed that unity does not exist. This means that unity is
both existent (aysa) and non-existent (laysa), and this is an im-
possible contradiction.
Similarly, if the predicables partook of plurality to the
exclusion of unity, then plurality would have no contrariety at all
because such contrariety (khilaf) can only be unity. If the predi-
cables had no contrariety, they would necessarily have to be identical.
But in reality they are not identical, for identity (ittifaq) would
imply having one state or meaning in commone But the predicables
cannot be simultaneously identical and noneidentical. This is illogical.
Thus the existence of unity is inevitable.
Moreover, plurality without unity would imply that the predicables
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are dissimilar (la mutashabiha), for things that are similar must
necessarily have at least one thing in common. Our supposition
of the existence of plurality without unity would rule out the possibility
of having one thing that is common to all of them. This means that
the predicables are dissimilar. But as a matter of fact they are
similar (in a negative way) in not having unitye However, they cannot
at the same time be both similar and dissimilar. This is an impossible
contradictione We conclude that it is inconceivable not to have
unitye
Again, plurality without unity would also mean that the predicables
are in motion inasmuch as the absence of unity would negate the
existence of one state of beinge This would imply that they cannot
be in a state of rest (sukfin), that is, without change (mutaghay yir)
or motion (muntagil). And if they cannot be in a state of rest they
must be in motione But plurality alone would likewise necessitate
the absence of motion because motion is a form of change of place(makan) or
quantity (bi-kam, lite change in the "how much"), or quality (bekayfa,
lit. change in the “"how') or substance (jawhar). Change is equivalent
to becoming other than it had beene But a state other than plurality
is unitye Without the possibility of unity, plurality would be immune
to change. Our presupposition of the noneexistence of unity would
mean that change of plurality is also non-existent and that movement,
consequently, cannot existe In other words, plurality without unity
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would lead to the conclusion that the predicables are without motion
and at the same time not at rest, as we have demonstrated beforee This
is contradictorye Therefore, unity must of necessity exist in the
predicablese
Furthermore, plurality to the exclusion of unity would imply
that the predicables either have or do not have individual things
(ashRhas). If they were composed of individual, then these individuals
of plurality (ashkhas al-kathrah) are or are not single units (ahad,
lite. ones). If they were not single units, then they would have to
be an infinite plurality (katbrah bila nihayah). If a section is
separated from that which is infinite, notwithstanding the remainder
being larger than what was separated from it, this severed section
would have to be either finite or infinite in plurality. If its
plurality were finite, and we have supposed it to be infinite, it
would mean that it is simultaneously finite and infinite in plurality.
This is a logical contradiction. If, on the other hand, its plurality
were infinite, and we know that it is smaller than the remainder, the
implication would be that one infinity is larger than another infinity.
This is also self-contradictory, as we have shown earliere
The individual entities of plurality are, therefore, by necessity
ones (ahd), that is, single units. Thus unity exists because each
individual is one, that is, a unity. To the earlier statement that
predicables partake of plurality only, we must now add that they
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do not partake of plurality onlye And yet unity is present in them.
This is contradictorye We would arrive at the same contradiction
if we supposed the predicables not to consist of individual entities
or of plurality, for plurality signifies assembled individual things.
Things cannot be simultaneously a noneplurality (1a katbrah) and a
plurality. Therefore, it is inevitable that unity must be present
in the predicablese
Likewise, plurality without unity would result in the impossibi-
lity to define any of the individual entities of plurality. For
definition (hadd) is one thing applicable to one meaning. If there
were no oneness in plurality, no definition could be made because
there would be nothing that could be defined (mahdtid). But the
individual entities of plurality are defined for they are definablée.
Thus they are both defined and indefinable. Again, this an impossible
contradictione We must here also assert the necessary existence of
unity in the predicablese
Plurality without unity would also mean that plurality cannot
partake of number since one, that is, unity is the beginning of number
and number, moreover, is a plurality compsed of ones (ahad). A plurality
exceeds another by the additional ones or single units it hase There-
fore, if there are no ones, there can be no numbere And if there
were a plurality without ones, it could not be numbered. But plurality
can be numbered. Consequently, the ones or unity are present with
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plurality. Our assumption that plurality contains no ones or single
units is, therefore, a contradiction of empirical evidence. Thus
it is impossible not to have ones, single units, that is, unity.
Once again, to have the many without the one or plurality
without unity would mean the impossibility of knowledge (ma'rifah).
This is so because knowledge involves description (rasm), the
description or picture of the known object in the soul of the knower
as that object exists in one particular statee For if it were not
in one specific state, which would make it possible for the soul
of the knower and the picture of the known object to be united, knowledge
would be impossiblee But knowledge does exist and, therefore, the
one state also existse Consequently, unity is a reality. Our
assumption that it does not’ exist is a contradiction of the facts.
Unity cannot but exist.
Likewise, plurality without the one or unity would lead us
to argue that each predicable is either a thing or noething. If
it were a thing, then it must be one. Thus unity coeexists with
plurality. We have assumed that the predicable is merely plurality.
This means that it is both a plurality without unity and a plurality
with unity; and this is contradictory. If the predicable were no-thing,
then neither can it form a plurality nor can itself be a plurality.
It was assumed to be a pluralitye Thus it is simultaneously a
plurality and a noneplurality, and this is illogical. We conclude
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that the predicable cannot be without unity.
It has thus been demonstrated that it is impossible for some
things to partake of plurality only simply because nothing can be
mere plurality. For an existent can be either some-thing or no-thing.
If it is some-thing, then it must necessarily be onee If it is nothing,
then it cannot be plurality. Thus an existent cannot be a plurality.
But the fact is that it is a plurality. This is an impossible contra-
diction. Therefore, it is impossible for some things to partake of
plurality to the exclusion of unitye
Our investigation has shed light on the fact that the predicables
or things in general cannot be plurality without being also unity
simply because it is impossible for some things to partake of plurality
without also partaking of unitye At the same time, it has also become
clear that unity cannot exist without plurality. Without exception,
nothing can be a plurality without its being a unitye
(2. UNITY WITHOUT PLURALITY)
We shall now argue that if the predicables partook only of unity
without plurality, contrariety (muga ddah) would have to be ruled out
because an opposite (didd) is an opposite of another thing and “otherness"
(ghayriyyah) involves at least two things, and two things constitute
a plurality. Thus the absence of plurality means the absence of
contrariety. But if there is contrariety then there must also be
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plurality. Since contrariety exists, therefore plurality must’ also
exist. We have supposed it to be noneexistent.e. This would mean that
it is both existent and noneexistent, and this is self-contradictory.e
We conclude that it is impossible not to have plurality.
Also, unity without plurality would mean the absence of exception
(istithna'), for exception applies to one or more things other than
that to which the exception is madee In other words, exception implies
plurality. It is an empirical fact that both the exception and that
to which the exception is made do exist. Therefore, plurality exists
alsoe We have supposed it to be noneexistent. This would mean it is
both existent and non-existent, and this is an impossible contradiction.
Consequently, the existence of plurality is inevitablee
Moreover, mere unity without plurality would exclude the
possibility of difference (tabayun), for in order to have difference
there must be a minimum of two thingse Two or more things constitute
a plurality. Without plurality difference is inconceivable. If
there is difference, then there must necessarily be plurality. Asa
matter of fact difference does exist. Therefore, plurality exists
alsoe We have assumed its non-existencee This would mean it is
simultaneously being and non-being, and this is a contradictory
impossibility. We conclude that plurality necessarily exists.
Furthermore, mere unity without plurality would rule out agree-
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ment (ittifaq) and disagreement (ikhtilaf) as well as continuity
(ittis#l) and separation (iftiraq). For these conditions are possible
when there are at least two things, and two things comprise a pluralitye
Without plurality there could be neither agreement nor disagreement.
But agreement and disagreement are empirical factse Consequently,
Plurality existse We have assumed that it does not exist. This means
that at one and the same time it exists and does not existe This is
illogical. We conclude that it is impossible not to have plurality.
Again, unity to the exclusion of plurality would necessarily
eliminate the possibility of a beginning (ibtida'), a middle (tawassutt)
and an end (akhir), for these can exist only in things that have parts.
The one has no beginning, middle or end. However, a beginning, middle
and end do exist. Therefore, things which have parts must necessarily
exist and such things are obviously more than one. Consequently,
plurality exists in that which is more than onee We have supposed
plurality to be non-existent. This is self-contradictorye We conclude
that plurality exists by sheer necessitye
Once again, mere unity without plurality would rule out the
possibility of a thing having a particular shape (shakl). Shapes
(ashkal) are composed either of curved or straight lines or of both.
They may also be formed by curved or straight surfaces or both. Shapes
that are circular or spherical must have a focal point (markaz) and
10 a circumference. That which is composed of curved lines and curved
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surfaces or of straight lines and straight surfaces or a combination
of these two possibilities must necessarily have angels and ends and,
therefore, constitute a plurality. Thus wherever there are shapes
there must also be plurality. But shapes do exist. Consequently,
plurality is an existing reality. We have assumed that it does not
existe. To say that it both exists and does not exist is self-contra-
dictorye We conclude that it is impossible not to have plurality.
Likewise, mere unity without plurality would exclude the
possibility of both motion and rest in the predicables, for the
movement of an object is equivalent to a change of place, quantity,
quality or substance, and all these constitute plurality. That which
is at rest is at rest in a specific place. Yet some of tts parts
are elsewhere. Thus both terms "place" and "parts" imply a plurality
because “parts” are more than one part and “place” consists of top,
bottom, front, back, right and left. By its very nature (bitib&'ihi),
"place" necessitates the existence of plurality. For place is other
than the occupant (alemutamakkin). An occupied place implies an
occupant. height implies that which is high, diminution that which
diminishes, change that which changes, existence that which exists, and
decay that which decays. Negation (nafy) of all these entities would
necessitate the existence of plurality, for to refer t6-a thing as”
not existing, not decaying, not rising, not diminishing or not changing
would constitute a subject (mawdii') and predicate (mahmiil), a subject
)
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that is predicated by a negation of limited thingse Therefore,
if there is rest there is bound to be plurality. Without plurality,
there can be neither rest nor motion. But rest and motion do exist.
Consequently, plurality exists alsoe We have assumed its non-existence.
This would mean that it both exists and does not exist, and this is
an impossible contradiction. Therefore, plurality inevitably exists.
Thus it has been demonstrated that it is impossible for a thing
to exist without partaking of plurality, because without plurality
it can neither be in motion nor at rest. But the fact is that nothing
perceptible (shay' min al-mahstsah) or anything related to things
perceptible can neither be in motion nor at reste Therefore, not
a single thing can be without plurality.
Likewise, unity alone without plurality would eliminate the
possibility of a part or a whole existing at all, for the whole is
the sum of the parts which are at least two in number, and two parts
constitute a pluralitye Thus without a plurality there can be no
whole, and without a whole there can be no part because the whole
and the part are inseparably related. The existence of the one
presupposes the existence of the other. The one cannot be without
the othere We are then led to say that things are not wholes and
that they do not have partse But empirically things are wholes and
have partse This would mean that the whole and the part are
simultaneously being and nonebeing, and this is self-contradictory.
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The part is also one. Therefore, if there is a part, then
there is unity. Similarly, the existence of the part implies the
existence of the whole, for without a part there can be no wholee
And if there were neither part nor whole, then nothing could possibly
exist. If nothing existed, then there can never be anything perceptible
(mahsus) or conceivable (ma'qul), and there can never be unity in
anything perceptible or conceivable. If we assume that there is no part
and no unity, it follows that there can be no part and whole and,
consequently, no unitye We have supposed that unity exists. This
would mean that it both exists and does not exist, which is illogical.
Therefore, we conclude that plurality must inevitably exist.
It has thus been proven that none of the predicables mentioned
above could partake of unity without partaking of plurality also for
the simple reason that there cannot but be parts and wholes, as we
have showne The preceding investigation has also demonstrated the
fact that there can be no plurality without unity in any of the
predicables which were discussede Part of the discussion has also
shown that there can be nothing that partakes of unity without
partaking of plurality also.
(3. UNITY, PLURALITY AND CAUSALITY)
It has become clear, therefore, that unity and plurality cannot
exist separately and independently. All the predicables mentioned
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earlier partake of both unity and plurality. It is a sheer necessity
that the one and the many be present in all things such as we have
enumerated abovee Having established the fact that &£t is in the very
nature of things to be both unity and plurality, it must now be stated
that unity can be either distinct (mubayin) from plurality or the two
(unity and plurality) are interdependent. If unity were distinct from
plurality, that is, if unity existed separately, we would have the
same contradictions which were pointed out when the possibility of
unity without plurality was postulated. The same would be true of
plurality (if it existed separately).
The one alternative that remains is for unity and plurality
to be interdependent (musharikah), namely, coeexisting in all perceptible
objects and all that is related to them. In other words, anything
that partakes of plurality partakes also of unity, and wherever unity
is present, there one finds also plurality.
Having demonstrated the co-existence of plurality and unity in
all sensory objects and all that is related to them, it must now be
pointed out that this simultaneity or coeexistence (ishtirak) (of
unity and plurality) can be due either to chance (bakht), that is,
by coincidence (ittifaq) without a cause, or is the result of a cause.
If it were due to chance, then we would have to assume that unity
and plurality had existed separately» But to this condition (sepatate
existence of unity and plurality) would be applicable all the contra-
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dictions (@mujalat)which we have encountered when we searched for
plurality without unitye And how is it possible to have plurality
and unity simultaneously if they were distinct? Is not the many
simply a plurality of ones, an assembled group of unities? Therefore,
unity must exist with plurality. Things cannot be otherwise. More-
over, If they were distinct, how could possibly by mere unity, when
they are two things (unity and plurality), and two things constitute
a plurality? We conclude that it is inconceivable for unity and
plurality to be distinct.
We could return to the possibility of attributing the cause
of the (assumed) distinctiveness (of unity and plurality) to chance.
But this distinctive features are existences (inniyyat) and to these,
too, apply the logical contradictions which we have encountered.
Therefore, unity and plurality could not have possibly been separate
and then have united (ittafaqat) by chance, that is, without a cause.
Hence, the only possibility that remains would be to say that the
interdependent co-existence of unity and plurality must have been
the result of a cause and that this condition must have prevailed
from the beginning when they came into being.
Having established the necessity of a cause to explain their
interdependent simultaneity, we must go on to say that this cause can
either be from within itself (internal) or other than itself, that
is, external and separate from ite If we suppose the cause to be
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from itself, it would necessarily have to be part of the self. This
would be identical to saying that the part (as the cause) is ontoe
logically prior to the rest (as the effect). Since the cause pre-
cedes the effect in existence, as we have shown in our Book on the
Differences (kit&b ‘la alemuba&yanah), it follows that any sensory
object or that which isrelated to it, we mean all things, would have
to be either mere unity (wa hdah faqat) or mere plurality (kathrah
faqat) or must be both unity and plurality simultaneously. If it
were mere unity (or mere plurality), the ensuing result (ieee contra-
dictions) would be similar to what was encountered earlier. Con-
sequently, unity and plurality must eodeexist interdependently. This
interdependent co-existence must be the result of either chance or
a cause from within or from without. If it were due to chance, the
same contradictions would follow which have already been indicated.
If it were self-caused, the consequence would be a chain of causes
that is infinite. But it has been demonstrated that nothing can be
infinite in actuality. Therefore, we must conclude that the inter-
dependent co-existence of unity and plurality cannot be self-causede
(4. FIRST CAUSE: THE TRUE ONE)
The only possibility that remains would be to attribute the
interdependent co-existence of unity and plurality (in predicables or
perceptibles in general) to a cause other than themselves (unity and
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plurality), a cause that is transcendent and nobler than, and onto-
logically prior to, both unity and pluralitye For the cause precedes
the effect in existence, as we have shown in our essays on Differences,
a cause that is separate from bothe For simultaneity is a necessity
in coeexistents, as we have shown earlier, and it is caused by some
exterior agent. If this were the case, we would have an infinite
chain of causese But infinity in causality is an impossibility, as
we have demonstrated. This is so because nothing can be infinite in
actuality.
Moreover, this transcendental cause cannot be of the same genus
as unity and plurality, for nothing can be ontologically prior to
other things of the same genus. For instance, neither the substance
of man's humanity (al-insaniyyah) nor that of the horse's animality,
which are both of the same genus, the living, could precede each
other ontologicallye The cause exists prior to the effect. Therefore,
the cause that accounts for the interdependent co-existence of unity
and plurality in things that are many and one cannot be found in a genus.
If it (the transcendental cause) does not have a genus in common
with them (unity and plurality), it does not also share with them one
similarity. For things that are similar are so with respect to one
genus, One species, such as redness, redness and shape, and shape and
so one Therefore, the cause of the interdependent co-existence of
plurality and unity in things that are many and one cannot be located
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in a genus or similarity or form. This is so because it is the
very cause of its (simultaneity of unity and plurality) being and
continuity and must, therefore, be higher, nobler and older than ite
It has thus been demonstrated that all things have a First
Cause ('illah '&1a ) which does not partake of any of their genera,
forms and similarities and has nothing in common with any of theme
This First Cause is higher, nobler and more ancient than all things.
It accounts for their coming into being as well as for their continuous
existence.
This Cause must itself be either one or many. If it were many,
then it comprises unity, inasmuch as plurality is the configuration
of onese This would mean that this First Cause is both a plurality
and a unity. Consequently, we would have to say that the cause of
plurality and unity is unity and plurality. In other words, a thing
is the cause of itself. But the cause must be other than the effect.
A thing is then other than itself, and this is an impossible contra-
diction. Therefore, we must conclude that the First Cause cannot
be a plurality or both a plurality and a unitye Hence, the only
possibility that remains is that the First Cause must be One only
(wahid faqat) without plurality in any way.
Thus we have delineated the fact that the First Cause is One.
The One (or unity) is found in all things that are caused. We have
discussed above the variety of forms the one or unity takes in sensory
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objects and related things. We must now elucidate the nature of
unity in the predicables as well as the nature of the True Unity
(al-wahdah al-haqq) and the meaning of unity allegorically (bi-al-
majaz) and in reality (bi-al-haqfqah). This is our objective in the
following chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
We shall now discuss the type of unity that exists in the
predicables (al-maqulat) and the nature of the One in Truth (al-
wahid bi-al-haqq) and the One when it is used in the allegorical
(bi-al-majaz), rather than the real, sense.
(THE RELATIVE AND THE ABSOLUTE)
Beginning with the necessary premises, the fact must be
stated that "the great" and "the small," “the long" and "the short,"
“the many” and “the few are terms used to describe things in a
relative (bi-al-Idafah) rather than absolute (qawl mursal) sense.
Thus a thing is described as “great” in relation to, or comparison
with, something that is smaller. It is said to be "small" when it
is compared with something that is greater. Likewise, a matter
or affair is described as great in contrast to a matter that is
small or minor. <A mountain is depicted as small in relation to
another mountain that is bigger.
If the word "big" were applied in an absolute manner to that
to which bigness may be ascribed, and in the same way the term "small¥,
we would be referring to something infinite that can never (battah)
exist in actuality (bieal-fi'l) or in potentiality (bi-al-quwwah).
This would be the case because there could not possibly be anything
bigger than that which is described as big in an absolute manner.
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Thus the absolutely large cannot be infinite actually or potentially.
For if something other than it that is larger existed actually or
potentially, then it itself could not be said to be absolutely large
because the existence of something larger would render it comparatively
small. If this were not the case, then that which is larger than it
would by comparison be either smaller than it or equal to it, and
this selfecontradictorye Therefore, we conclude, nothing could
possibly be larger, actually or potentially, than that which is
absolutely large.
This argument means that a magnitude (*azIm) exists
which cannot be doubled in actuality or in potentiality. To double
a thing is to double its quantity (kammiyyah), and this doubling of
its quantity exists either actually or potentially. Therefore, a
magnitude twice as large as the absolutely large exists in actuality
or in potentiality. Thus the absolutely large can be doubled. The
resultant double (gi'f) is a whole to that which is doubled, and
that which is doubled is equal to half the double, and the half
(nisf) is part of the whole. This would mean that which is doubled
is part of the double.
This all adds up to the conclusion that the absolutely large
is both a whole and a part. If the double of the absolutely large
is not Larger than the absolutely large, then it will have to be
either equal to it or smaller than it. If it were equal to it, an
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absurd contradiction (ms hal shanT') would result, namely, the whole
would be equal to the part, and this is illogical. A more absurd
impossibility would ensue if the double of the absolutely large were
to be smaller than the absolutely large.
Inasmuch as the whole is larger than the part, it follows that
twice the magnitude of the large, which was thought to be absolute,
exceeds in size the large that is supposed to be the absolutely
large. Now what is meant by the expression “the absolutely large"
is simply that magnitude which nothing can surpass in sizee Thus
we must conclude that "the absolutely large” is not a magnitude that
is large absolutely. Therefore, it is either not great at all or
it is relatively large, for the term “large” cannot be used in the
absolute but rather in the relative sense.
If the absolutely large is not large, this would be equivalent
to saying that being is identical to non-being (huwa 1a huwa), and
this is a contradiction of termse Moreover, if the absolutely
large were equal to the relatively large, then the two words “absolute”
and "relative" would have to be synonymous (mutar&difan), applying
to one thing, a thing in comparison with which nothing could be
smaller. For it has already been established that nothing can ever
be larger than the absolutely large, potentially or actuallye
By the same argument (tadbir) it could &@lso be proven (yatabayyan)
that a thing can be described as small only relatively and not
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absolutely. The terms “large” and "small" may be used to describe
any quantity. The terms “long” and “short, on the other hand, are
applied to describe a continuous quantity (kammiyyah muttasilah) to
which they strictly belong and not to any other kind of quantity.
But these terms are also used relatively and not absolutely. The
proof (bayan) for this fact would be the same as that advanced for
the terms "large" and "small." When we come to the words "few and
"many" we find that they are applied to a discrete quantity (kammiyyah
munfasilah). What has been said of the terms large and small, long
and short, is also true of “many, namely, it may be used only in
a relative and not in an absolute sensee This fact is proven by
what has been stated before inasmuch as the argument is the samee
As to the term "few" (aleqalil), it may be supposed that it
could be used in the absolute sense, namely, when "two" is thought
to be the beginning of number and all numbers other than "two" would
then be lager than the “two. On the basis of this supposition,
"two" as the smallest number would be, therefore, identical with
"the absolutely few," because it can never be "many" for there is
no number smaller than ite
(THE NATURE OF THE ONE)
If the "One" were a number, and there is nothing less than
the One, then it would be equivalent to the “absolutely few." But
this conjecture cannot be true because if we considered the One a
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number, a considerable absurdity would necessarily follow. For if
the One were a number, it would have to be a certain quantity; and
if the One were a quantity, then quantitative characterisitcs would
necessarily have to be attributed to ite In other words, it would
have to be equal (to certain things) and unequal (to others). If
thus the One had units, some equal to it, others unequal to it, then
the One will have to be divisiblee For the smaller unit must come
after the largest unit of after some parts of it. This would mean
that the largest unit is equal to some units, and is, therefore,
divisible. But the One is not divisible. Its divisibility, then,
exists and does not exist, and this is an impossible contradiction.
We conclude that the One is not a number.
Our saying “One, however, should not be interpreted to mean
the material (hayulI) constituent of the One, namely, the substance
(tunsur ) which is found in the One and thereby becomes One. It is
the substance that exists and not the One (or oneness). Likewise,
that which is formed of matter may be enumerated by number, but is
not a number itself. For instance, when we say "five horses," it
is understood that the horses are enumerated by five which is a number
but which does not consist of matter. The material is in the horses.
Thus our saying "One" should not be construed in such a way as to
lead to that which derives its oneness from the One (i.e. the material)
(al-muwahhad bi-al-wahid). Our saying "One" should be understood
to suggest oneness or unity (W@hdah) itself, and this unity is never
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divisible.
If One were a number and not a quantity, and the rest of
the numbers, namely, two and the numbers that follow it, also
constituted quantity, then the One would have to be classified
under a category other than quantity. Therefore, the One and the
other numbers are all said to be numbers by virtue of the similarity
of their names rather than their natures. Consequently, One is a
number by name only and not by nature. For numbers are not used
except in rel&ion to one thing. The various branches of medicine,
for instance, are related to the one science, medicine, and the
medical drugs (alemubri'at) are related to the one process of healing
(al-bar' ) e
But how can this hypothesis (gann) be true? In other words,
if the One were a number, it would necessarily have quantitative
characteristics which are equal and unequal (to other quantities).
This would mean that besides the One there are other ones some of
which are equal to it while others are either more or less than the
One.e But if this applies to the One, it must also be applicable
to all other numbers. In other words, a number would have a
synonym (samf) that is equal to it and another synonym that is
smaller and still another that is larger. Number three, for instance,
would have other threes, some equal to it, others smaller and still
others that are larger. This would be the case with each number.
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Now if this is not true of numbers about which we have no
doubt (that they are numbers), it cannot also be true of oneness
(al-wahdaniyyah). If our saying that the characteristic feature
(khassah) of number as well as of anything that is quantitative
is to be equal (to certain things) and unequal (to others) means
that each number has another number similar to it and another number
that is dissimilar to it, namely, larger or smaller than it, it
would follow that two is not a number. This conclusion is based
on the fact that there is no number less than two, but that there
are numbers larger than two. If two were considered a number on
the basis that it has a number equal to it, namely, another two,
and that it has numbers unequal to it, namely, those that are larger,
we would have to conclude that One is also a number because it has
a number equal to it, that is, another One, and numbers that are
not equal to it, namely, two and all the numbers which follow. If
this were true, then One would have to be a quantitye The One and
the other numbers would then be quantitative. Thus if the One is
not a number by name, it must be a number by nature.
Again, the “ne must be either a number or not a number. [If
it were a number, it would have to be an even (zawj) or an odd (fard)
number. If it were an even number, it would have to be divisible
into two part that are similar (mutamathil) in their oneness. But
the One is indivisible. To say that it is both divisible and ine
divisible would be selfecontradictory. Furthermore, if the One
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contained single units, then it is a composite of such units. This
means it is constituted of its own essence. It is thus One and at
the same time units. But the One is One only and not Ones or units.
To say that it is both One and Ones (unity and plurality) would be also
self-contradictory.
If the One were not an even number, it would have to be an odd
number. Now an odd number, when divided into two, would have two
parts that are dissimilar in the number of their units. This would
mean that the One is simultaneously divisible and indivisible, and
that it is Ones and not just One, and this is an impossible contra-
diction. Therefore, we must conclude that the One is not a number.
It must, however, be pointed out that this manner of difining
the odd number may be supposed to be legitimate only after the proof
has been established that One is not a number. Otherwise, what
would prevent anyone, who considers the One a number, from defining
an odd number as the number whose division into two parts would have
two sections that are dissimilar in the number of their units? This
definition would apply to the One which of necessity is indivisible.
If it has not been demonstrated by the previous discussion that
One is not a number, the following argument will then have to be
advanced: The basic element which constitutes a thing is not necessarily
identical with the thing itself. The vocal letters, for instance,
from which speech is composed, are not equivalent to the speech itself.
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For speech is a harmonious sound meaningfully arranged to indicate
a certain thing with respect to time. The letter, on the other hand,
is a natural sound which does fot have any components. If that which
is generally considered a number were composed of Ones or single
units, then the One is the constituent element of number. Therefore,
the One itself cannot be number. Furthermore, the One has no con»
stituent element from which it is composed and which also becomes
the constituent element of the numbers that are formed of groupings
of Ones. This would render the One a number whose basic substance
is also the substance of all the recognized numbers. In this way,
the One could be considered a number.
It may be supposed that the One is the constituent element of
Two, and the Two the constituent element of Three, simply because
the Two is contained in Three. If Two, which is a number, is the
constituent substance of Three, the conclusion is drawn that One,
which is the constituent substance of Two, must also be a number.
This supposition, however, is not true because Two, which is a
composite, if thought to be the constituent substance of Three,
has itself the One as its own constituent substance. But the One,
while being the constituent element of Two, is itself without a
constituent element. The One is not a composite. Unlike the Two,
it is simple (basTt). The Two, on the other hand, is a composite
(murakkab) made up of the simple One. But a number cannot be partly
simple, which constitutes its basic substance - and by “simple” we
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mean that which is composed of nothing else = and partly composite
made up of that simple element.
It may be believed, however, that this is the case in composite
substance (alejawhar al-murakkab) such as a body that is composed
of two simple substances, namely, matter (‘unsur) and form (giirah).
It has been argued that substance has three components: two are
simple, namely, matter and form, and the third is a composite of these
two, in other words, formed matter (al-'unsur al-musawwar), which is
the body itself. In a similar fashion, number is believed to be
composed of simple parts, the One, which is the constituent substance
of what are accepted as numbers, and of the recognized number itself,
which is a composite of the simple One.
This belief is not true, for this is a converse comparison
(tamthf1 taks{). The primary, simple substances (al-jawahir al-f1a
al-basitahf, from which a body is made, are matter and form. But
the body itself, even though it is composed of mattercand form, -:it
is so composed only accidentally, for by nature it is nothing but
a body, that is, composed of matter and dimensions (ab'ad), which
are identical with its forme Neither matter nor the dimensions,
which are the form, can separately become a body, which comes into
being only as the result of their unione
Thus the One, which is the basic substance that constitutes
what is commonly known as number, cannot itself be number. For
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number is the aggregate of Ones. It is made up of Ones or units
in the same sense as the body is substances because it is composed
of substancese Of course, nothing can prevent us from designating
names and giving definitions to the constituent parts which go into
the making of things, such as “the living" (al-hayy) in living beings
and "substance" in substances, and what we have in mind here are the
essential and not the accidental names. This discussion leads us to
conclude that the One is the constituent element of number, but itself
is positively not number.
Thus it has been demonstrated that One is not a number. The
definition that is used of number is rather a comprehensive (muhTt)
description of number. By this we mean that the number is a magnitude
("izam) of units or ones (wahdaniyyat), a total sum of units and a
putting together of units.
Two, therefore, is the beginning of number. Considered by itself
without thinking of the other numbers, Two would not by nature seem a
small number. The quality of “smallness” or “few-ness" (al-qillah)
becomes its characteristic the moment it is considered in relation to,
or compared with,a larger number. It is then that it (the Two) may be
described as small or “few, because all other numbers are larger than
it. Thus Two is few or not many in relation to other numbers. However,
by its very nature, the Two is a doubling (tad'T£) of the One, a sum
of two Ones. It is, then, made up of two Ones, and that which is a
a composite must have parits and it is the whole or the total of its
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partse But the whole is larger than the parte Therefore, number
Two is not small by nature.
The terms “large” and "small", “long” and “short,” “many” and
"few't cannot be used in an absolute but only in a relative sensee
Each may be related only to another thing which has the same genus
and not to that of another genus. The word "largeness," for example,
if it referred to a body, could then be related only to another body
and not, for instance, to another surface (sath), line (khatt),
space (mak&n), time (zaman), number ('adad) or speech (qawl). As
an illustration, one cannot say: ‘a body larger or smaller than a
surface, line, space, time, number or speech’ but rather ‘a body
larger than (another)body.' The same rule applies to all the other
categories (mentioned above). In other words, it is incorrect to
use the terms ‘larger’ or ‘smaller’ to compare things of different
genera.
Nor could one say: ‘a surface larger or smaller than a line,
space, time, number or speech' but rather ‘a surface larger orasmaller
than (another) surface;' and not ‘ta line larger or smaller than a
space, time, number, speech or line, ' but rather ‘a line larger or
smaller than (another)line;' and not ‘a place larger or smaller than
a time, number or speech,’ but rather ‘a place larger or smaller than
(another) places" and not ‘a time larger or smaller than a number, speech,
but rather 'a time larger or smaller than (another) times; and not
‘a number larger or smaller than a speech'but rather ‘a number larger
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or smaller than (another) number;' and not 'a speech larger or
smaller than any of the rest of qualities! but rather ‘a speech
larger or smaller than (another) speech.’
Likewise, it would be incorrect to say: ‘a body longer or
shorter than a surface, line, space, time, number or speeche’ One
would be utterly mistaken in making the statement that ‘a body is
longer or shorter than a surface, line or place. If it is supposed
that the length of a body were longer or shorter than the length of
a surface, line or place, then the comparison would be referring only
to the length of each of these categories, and the length is only one of their
dimensions and this dimension is a line. Therefore, when we say that a
hody, surface, line or place is longer or shorter what we really mean
is that the line of this is longer than the line of that. For in this
case we would be having varieties of the same continuous quantity
(al-kammiyyah al-muttagilah).
Time is also a continuous quantity. But because time does not
have an overtly recognizable line, it could not, therefore, be saids
"a body longer or shorter than time.* Obviously, length and shortness
cannot be applied to anything in comparison to another except if they
were of the same genus even though both may have length and shortness.
The two things will have to be either bodies, surfaces, places or periods
of time. Length and shortness in themselves, however, cannot be
applied to number or speech except with reference to the duration of
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time in which they take placee Thus we can say: a long number,
meaning in a long timee Similarly, it may be said: long speech,
meaning of long duration, not that the qualities of length and
shortness can be applied directly to speech and number.
Similarly, the terms "many" and "few" are used to designate
things of the same genus. Take, for instance, number and speech.
It would be incorrect to say: “a speech more or or less than a number,"
and “a number more or less than a speech." It would be correct to say3
"a number more or less than (another) number," and “a speech more or
less than (another) speech."
(THE NATURE OF THE TRUE ONE)
What has been established in the preceding argument leads us
to conclude that the One cannot really be related to anything else
of a similar genus. This would be possible if the One itself had a
genus. But the True One (alwahid al-haqq) has no genus at all. We
have shown earlier that whatever has a genus cannot be eternal (azalT)
and that the eternal is void of genusee Therefore, the True One is
eternal. The True One never multiplies itself in any form and cannot
be related to, or compared with, anything else. It has neither matter,
which would render it divisible, nor form consisting of genus and
speciese That which has these (matter and form) multiplies through
its constituent elements. Moreover, the True One is never a quantity
(kammiyyah) and also does not have a quantity. That which is quanti-
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tative is also divisible, for every quantity or anything quantitative
is prone to increase or decrease. That which decreases is divisible,
and what is divisible is capable of multiplying in some form. It has
been said that plurality (kathrah) is present in all the predicables
(al-maqulat) and anything that is implied in them, that is, genus,
species, individual, differentia, property, common accident, whole,
part and all (the rest). Likewise, the One may be said to be present
in all the numbers that follow ite Therefore, the True One cannot be
one of thesee
Motion exists in any of these, that is, in any body which is
matter and form, for motion is movement (naqlah) from one place
to another (locomotion), increase, decrease, generation,,decay or
transformation (istigalah). Moreover, motion partakes of plurality
because space is quantitative and, therefore, divisible. That which
in sections is divided by the different locations. Consequently, it
is a plurality. Locomotion (al-harakah al-emakaniyyah), it must be
concluded, partakes of plurality.
Increase (rubuwiyyah) and decrease (naqsiyyah) also partake of
plurality, for the movement of the extremities (nihayat) of that which
increases or decreases is divided by reason of its taking place in
the different locations extending between the points before and after
the increase or decrease.
The same may be said of generation and decay, for the processes
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of generation and decay, from their beginning to their end, are
divided by means of the intervals of time during which they occur.
> Thus the movements of increase and decrease, generation and decay,
are all divided (into parts). Similarly, transformation of a thing
into its opposite (gidd)or toward perfection (tamam) is also divided
by means of the periods of time in which it occurs.
Thus all movements are divisible but are also unified (mutawahhidah)
because every movement in its totality is One. This is so by virtue of
the fact that every absolute whole (al-kull al-mutlaq) partakes of
unity. This is also true of any part of the whole, for an absolute
part (al-juz' alemutlaq) also constitutes a unity. No if plurality
exists in motion, it must then be inferred that the True One is not
motione
10 Inasmuch as all things that are perceived by the senses or
conceived by the mind must exist either by nature objectively (ft ‘aynihi) or
subjectively (fi al*fikr), or by accident in our speech or writing,
it follows that motion exists in the soul. What is meant by this
is that thought (al-fikr) moves from the images (suwar)of some objects
to the images of other objects as well as from one of the soul's virtues
and passions to another such as anger and fear, joy and sorrow and
so one Thus thought is capable of partaking of both plurality and
unity. Because each plurality consists of a whole and parts, it
15 can be measured. What has just been described happens accidentally
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to the soul and thereby the soul partakes of plurality and unity.
The True One, therefore, cannot be a soul.
If the logical course of thought is traced back, it would
lead to the intellect (al-'aql). The intellect contains the species
of things, for a species and that which is prior to it (i.e. genus)
are conceivable (ma'qil). The individuals (aleashkhas), on the other
hand, are objects of sensory perception. By individuals we mean
particular things which do not determine the names and definitions
of objects. The fact that the species unite with the would is an
evidence that they are conceivable. The soul conceives in actuality
(bi-al-fi'1) when the species are united with it. Prior to this
union (ittihad), the soul's conception was only in potentiality
(bi-al-quwah). It always takes another agent to change anything from
potentiality to actuality. Without this agent a thing is a thing only
potentially. But this agent (mukhrij, lit. producer) must itself be
in actuality. The rationality of the soul is turned from potentiality
into actuality by means of the universals themselves (alekull fat
aty&nuha). This process is identical with the unification of the
species and genera of things, which are their universals, and the
soul. It is through this merger (ittihad) that the soul becomes
rational ('aqilah), that is, acquires an intellect ('ql). To say that
the soul has an intellect is the same as saying that it contains the
universals of things. These universals, which by being in the soul
have moved from potentiality to actuality, are identical with the soul's
Acquired Intellect (al-'ql alemustafad). The Acquired Intellect had
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existed in the soul only potentially. The universals are, therefore,
the Efficient Intellect (al-'ql bi-al-fi'1l) which moved the soul
from potentiality to actuality. Inasmuch as the universals are
multiple (mutakathirah), as shown above, it must be concluded that
the Intellect partakes of plurality. The Intellect may be considered
Primary and multiplee But somehow it partakes of unity because it
is a universal, a whole, as has been demonstrated, and a whole is
One and partakes of unity. Thus True Unity (al-wihdah bi-haqaq).
In our language, the synonyms (al-asma' alemutaradifah) 'blade'
and ‘'knife'* are both used to designate the iron instrument of slaughter.
Synonyms are said of One thinge The ‘blde’ and the ‘'knife' are One
thing. But this One is also multiple because its substance ('unsur)
and its designations are multiples In this case, the iron instrument
of slaughter is the substance of the synonyms ‘sharp edge,' ‘blade*
and ‘knife,* and is itself divisible and multiple. Likewise, the
terms by which it is identified are multiple. The True One, we must
conclude, cannot be synonymous with anything.
Moreover, there are in our utterances words that have a resemblance
to names, such as the lion which is called dog and the star which is
also called dog. Both are One as far as the name is concerned which
is ‘doge' The substance of this 'dog* is multiple,that is, the lion
and the stare Neither of these similar terms is the cause of the other,
for the star is not the cause of the lion, and the lion is not the
cause of the star. However, there are cases in which the things that
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share the same name can be the cause of each other. Examples of
this are the terms ‘the written’ (al-makhtut), ‘the spoken’! (al-
malfuz), 'the contemplated! (al-mufakkar ffhi) and 'the thing-itself'*
(aletayn aleqatimah). The ‘written’, itself a substance (jawhar)
spells out that which is ‘spoken’, which is also a substance; and
the 'spoken’, which is a substance, expresses that which is *thought
about', which is likewise a substance. Moreover, the ‘contemplated’,
which is substance, represents the 'thing-itself,* which is also a
substance. The One may be ascribed to all of these, namely, ‘the
thing-itself' (al-tayn fi dhatiha), *the idea’ (al-fikrah), 'the utterance!
(al-lafz) and 'the inscribed’ (al-khatt). The thingeitself is the
cause of the 'thingein-thought! (al-'ayn fi al-fikr), and the thing-
in-thought is the cause of the 'thing-ineutterance'’ (al-'ayn fi al-
lafz), and the thingein-utterance is the cause of the 'thing-in-
writing’ (al-‘ayn fi al-khatt). This kind of One is also multiple
because it is used to designate many things. Therefore, the True
One cannot be One of mere resemblance of namese
One may be said of things whose substance is On@e However, the
substance may undergo change either by action (fi'l), effect (infi'al),
relation (igafah) or by some other way. For example, the door and
the bed, which are made of one substance - wood or any other substance
of which things with various forms are made - and thus it is said that
the door and the bed are of One substance. But these (the door and
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the bed) are also ‘many’ with respect to their substance, which
is multiple and is made up of parts and ‘many’ with respect to their
formse Thus it is possible for things whose primary substance is
One to be multiple with respect to that substance simply because
it exists in numerous forms.
The expression "One in substance’ (wahid bi-al-'unsur) may
also be applied to things with reference to One specific thing in
them but which, by necessary implication, would refer to another
thing also. An example of this is when we speak of decay as it
manifest in an object and, by implication, involves also generation
inasmuch as the decay of one thing may be at the same time the
generation of another. Therefore, it may be said that the existent
(al-ka'in), in this case, is in actuality identical with that whose
substance is decaying. This is another instance of multiplicity
because the one substance is used for several forms.
This kind of potential Oneness, namely the 'One in substance’,
may be said of things which apply to One thing and imply another.
Growth (rubt), for instance, designates increase but also implies
decreasee For that which increases has the potential to diminish.
Thus we may refer to the One process of increase-decrease. In other
words, this dual process may apply to the one and the same thing.
But this One thing is also multiple with respect to substance because
the substance belongs to several forms due to the process of increase}
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decrease, expansion-contraction (alerubu wa-al-damr). The True
One, therefore, can never be substancee None of the various things
that are One in substance qualify to be called "The One."
The One may be used to describe that which is indivisible,
as we have pointed out. That which is indivisible is so either
actually or potentially. A thing may be indivisible in actuality
due to its hardness (salabah) as it is the case with a diamond. But
a diamond has parts by necessity because it is a body and, consequently,
is multiple. A thing may also be indivisible by reason of its minute}
ness which eludes the action of a dividing instrument (al-alah al-
qasimah). It is indivisible simply because there is no device that
can divide ite But the fact remains that it has parts because it is
a magnitude ("izam) and has been subject to diminution (alestghar).
It is, therefore, multiple.
A thing may also be described as indivisible in actuality even
though it may undergo continuous separation, for through this separation
it does not digress from its basic naturee Its definition and name
continue to be applicable to the separated parte This is true of all
continuous magnititudes (al-a'zam al-muttasilah), namely, a body,
surface, line, space and timee Needless to say, a part separated
from a body is also a body, a surface severed from a surface is a
surface, a line taken from a line is a line, a place disconnected
from a place is a place, and a time separated from a time is a time.
156
147
share the same name can be the cause of each other. Examples of
this are the terms ‘the written’ (al-makhtut), ‘the spoken’ (al-
malfuz), 'the contemplated! (al-mufakkar ffhi) and ‘the thing-itself'*
(ale'ayn aleqa'imah). The ‘written', itself a substance (jawhar)
spells out that which is ‘spoken’, which is also a substance; and
the ‘spoken’, which is a substance, expresses that which is thought
about', which is likewise a substance. Moreover, the ‘contemplated’,
which is substance, represents the 'thing-itself,* which is also a
substancee The One may be ascribed to all of these, namely, ‘the
thingeitself* (al-‘tayn fi dhatiha), "the idea’ (al-fikrah), ‘the utterance'®
(al-lafz) and 'the inscribed’ (al-khatt). The thingeitself is the
cause of the 'thingeinethought! (al-tayn fi alefikr), and the thing-
in-thought is the cause of the 'thingeineutterance! (al-'ayn fi ale
lafz), and the thingein-utterance is the cause of the 'thing-in-
writing’ (al-'ayn fi alekhatt). This kind of One is also multiple
because it is used to designate many things. Therefore, the True
One cannot be One of mere resemblance of namesSe
One may be said of things whose substance is On@e However, the
substance may undergo change either by action (fi'l), effect (infi'al),
relation (igafah) or by some other way. For example, the door and
the bed, which are made of one substance - wood or any other substance
of which things with various forms are made - and thus it is said that
the door and the bed are of One substance. But these (the door and
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148
the bed) are also ‘many’ with respect to their substance, which
is multiple and is made up of parts and ‘many’ with respect to their
formse Thus it is possible for things whose primary substance is
One to be multiple with respect to that substance simply because
it exists in numerous forms.
The expression "One in substance’ (wahid bi-al-'unsur) may
also be applied to things with reference to One specific thing in
them but which, by necessary implication, would refer to another
thing also. An example of this is when we speak of decay as it
manifest in an object and, by implication, involves also generation
inasmuch as the decay of one thing may be at the same time the
generation of another. Therefore, it may be said that the existent
(al-ka'in), in this case, is in actuality identical with that whose
substance is decayinge This is another instance of multiplicity
because the one substance is used for several forms.
This kind of potential Oneness, namely the 'One in substance’,
may be said of things which apply to One thing and imply another.
Growth (rubt), for instance, designates increase but also implies
decreasee For that which increases has the potential to diminish.
Thus we may refer to the One process of increaseedecrease.e. In other
words, this dual process may apply to the one and the same thing.
But this One thing is also multiple with respect to substance because
the substance belongs to several forms due to the process of increase-
157
10
149
decrease, expansion-contraction (al-rubu wa-al-damr). The True
One, therefore, can never be substancee None of the various things
that are One in substance qualify to be called "The One.”
, The One may be used to describe that which is indivisible,
as we have pointed out. That which is indivisible is so either
actually or potentially. A thing may be indivisible in actuality
due to its hardness (salabah) as it is the case with a diamond. But
a diamond has parts by necessity because it is a body and, consequently,
is multiple. A thing may also be indivisible by reason of its minute~
ness which eludes the action of a dividing instrument (al-alah al-
qasimah). It is indivisible simply because there is no device that
can divide ite But the fact remains that it has parts because it is
a magnitude (*izam) and has been subject to diminution (al-stghar).
It is, therefore, multiple.
A thing may also be described as indivisible in actuality even
though it may undergo continuous separation, for through this separation
it does not digress from its basic naturee Its definition and name
continue to be applicable to the separated parte This is true of all
continuous magnititudes (al-a'zam al-muttasilah), namely, a body,
surface, line, space and timee Needless to say, a part separated
from a body is also a body, a surface severed from a surface is a
surface, a line taken from a line is a line, a place disconnected
from a place is a place, and a time separated from a time is a time.
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150
All these are never divided actually or potentially into anything
other than their speciese Each of them is permanently susceptible
to differentiation (tafsi1) and multiplicity within its own species.
Furthermore, a body multiplies by means of its three dimensions
(ab'ad) and six ends (nihayat), a surface by means of its two
dimensions and four ends, and a line by means of its two dimensions
and two ends. Similarly, a space is multiplied or increases in pro-
portion to the dimensions and ends of its occupant. Likewise, time
is increased by means of its ends which are the moments (anat) of
time that designate those ends. This is similar to the points that
indicate the two ends of a line.
Moreover, the One may be said of anything whose parts are
Similar. Such a thing is indivisible because whatever is separated
from it retains the same definition and name. But this also is
subject to multiplicity even though it is not divisible (in the real
sense). In other words, everything is permanently susceptible to
division.
Reference may also be made to what is indivisible actually or
potentially, for such a division would result in the loss of its
essence. An illustration of this is “the One man" or man as a unity,
such as Muhammad and Sa'fd, and "the One horse," as ‘al-ra'tid' (the
explorer) and 'dhii al-'iq&l'(the one with the hobbled hoofs). The
158
10
151
same may be said of all natural individual things that have magnitudes,
as well as of accidental things and of species, genus, differentia,
property, common accident. If any of these is divided it ceases to
be what it is (lam yakun huwa ma huwa). But it is multiple by virtue
of its components and its constant differentiation. All these may
also be described as partaking of unity, for each constitutes a
continuity.
The One is ascribed to that which cannot be divided into anything
else. That which is indivisible because it is not continuous applies
to two things: First, that which is not continuous, not compound,
and has nothing in common with other thingse An example of this is
the numerical One (al-wahid al-'adadi) which is not a continuous
entity. In other words, it has dimensions and endse But the fact is
that it is a continuous thing and is indeed indivisible and indescrete
(14 munfasil). At the same time, it is also multiple with respect to
its components which we can count. This numerical One is the measure
of all thingse The other thing (that is indivisible because it is not
continuous) is the vocal letters (huriif al-aswat) which are not
continuous. The causes which render the numerical One indivisible
cannot be set forthe The numerical One is a measure for the vocal
utterances only.
The One is a designation that is said of that which is indivisible.
It cannot be divided because it has no part that has any resemblance
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20
159
152
to it or to anything else. It is also common. Whatever has this
quality may be one of two kindse The first of these is circumstantial
(lahu wad') such as the point of a line which constitutes its end.
It has no parts because it represents the termination of one dimension,
and the end of a dimension is not a dimension itself. On the other
hand, this termination of the line is multiple by reason of being
subject to past and future and by being common to both.
The designation One is also applied to that which as a total
entity (kulliyyah) cannot be divisible. When one says ‘One pound,!
for instance, it is implied that it ceases to be 'One pound!’ the
moment a portion is separated from it, that is, from the total
quantity of the pounde In other words, the "One pound’ would no longer
be a whole, It is for this reason that the One may be more appropriate}
ly ascribed to a circumference (khatt aledaé'irah) than to any other
line because a circumference is a complete whole. The circumference
contains the whole circle perfectly and is a complete whole. Whatever
is constituted in this manner is also multiple by virtue of its
differentiation. Among the things to which the One may be applied
as a designation, it is the indivisible which is the most qualified
to have Unity ascribed to it.
Our discussion has elucidated the fact that the One may be
One essentially or accidentallye The term One may be used in an
accidental sense as in a common name, synonyms or a designation that
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153
contains many accidents. This may be illustrated by sayings the
writer and the orator are One, whether the reference is to one specific
man or to man in general; or the man and the writer are One and sO OMe
On the other hand, if the One is used in an essential sense, it would
apply to all the things mentioned above which partake of unity. This
is so because in essence they are One, that is, they have the same
substance in commone The essential may be differentiated primarily
by continuity when it is a substance, by form when it is a species,
by name when it is both substance and form, or by genus when it is
continuity.
That which is One by virtue of its continuity is One either by
substance or by amalgamation (ribat). This is called One in number
or shape. That which is One in form applies to things which have the
same definition. That which is One in genus refers to things whose
predicates are identical. Things which have the same name are,
therefore, equal and necessarily One. Things which as One by reason
of their equality (musawat) are the things that have One common relation
such as medical things which are all related to medicine.
Each of these things we have just mentioned, namely, that which
constitutes Oneness in number, form, genus and relation follows (with
respect to unity and plurality) that which precedes rather than that
which follows it (in the order indicated). In other words, if a thing
is One in number, it would be also One in form; and if it is One in
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160
10
154
form, it would be also One in genus; and if it is Qme in genus,
it would be also One in relatione On the other hand, if a thing
is One in relation, it would not necessarily be One in genus; and
if it is One in genus, it would not necessarily be One in form;
and if it is One in form, it would not necessarily be One in number.
It has thus been established that over against unity stands
plurality. Plurality characterizes all the varieties of existences.
A thing is said to be multiple either because it is not continuous,
that is, descrete (munfasil) or because its substance is divisible
into forms or its forms into genus or relatione The fact has also
been elucidated that individual existence (huwiyyah) applies to
anything that owes its being to the Onee Individual existence,
therefore, is a designation of all that owes its identity to the
various forms of the Onee
It has so far been proven that the True One (alwahid al-haqq)
is not one of the intelligibles (al-ma'qulat). It is neither substance,
genus, species, individual, differentia, property, common accident,
motion, soul, intellect, whole, part, all, few nor is it related
to anything else. The True One is the Absolute One (wahid mursal).
It is immune to multiplicity. It is not compound and is not ‘many’.
It is not identical with any of the existences mentioned above even
though they partake of unity in one form or another. Whatever is
is implied in their names does not apply to the True One. All the
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155
things we have enumerated are the simplest (absat) manifestations
of the True One or, more correctly, its simplest descriptions, and
an intensified form (of their unity) would not constitute the True
Onee It follows that the True One is void of matter, form, quantity,
quality, relation and cannot be described by any other category. It
has no genus, differentia and is not individual, property, common
accident or in motione It simply eludes any description that would
negate its being truly Onee Consequently, the True One is solely
Absolute Oneness (wihdah mahd). In other words, it is nothing but
pure Unitye Any unity other than the True One is necessarily multiple.
Therefore, unity which is accidental in all things is other than the
True One as we have shown before.
The True One is the Onewitself, the One in essence which never
partakes of plurality in any way. It is indivisible in any manner
within itself or with respect to anything else. The True One is not
time, space, subject, predicate, whole, part, substance or accident.
It is immune to any form of division or multiplicity. The unity
found in all other existences is not identical with ite This unity
is accidental, and whatever exists accidentally in things has its
has its cause elsewhere. For whatever is found in things exists
accidentally or essentiallye Nothing can be infinite in actuality.
The First Cause (awwal ‘illah) of the unity which is found in all
individual things is the True One whose unity is not derived from
any other source (than itself). For the cause-effect sequence cannot
156
10 be infinite at its inception. Thus the cause of unity in all
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162
individual beings and things is the PrimafyTrue One (al-wahid al-
haqq aleawwal). Anything that receives unity from a source other
than itself is an effect (ma'lul). All Oneness other than that of
the True One is metaphorical and not real Gneness. The source of
Unity in all objective existences is outside their own being. This
implies that its plurality is not selfecaused, for it is a fact that
each existent is multiple and is not absolutely One or is not Unity
in the absolute sense. The Absolute One never partakes of plurality.
Its Unity is nothing other than its own Beinge
If unity and plurality exist simultaneously in all sensory
objects and anything that is related to them, and if unity in all
of these is an effect of a cause (athar min muathir), occurring in
them by accident and not by nature, and, moreover, if plurality is
nothing but the aggregate of unities (jama'at wahdaniyyat), it
follows as a matter of sheer necessity (idt iraran) that without unity
there could never be plurality. This leads to the conclusion that
the coming into being of any plurality is brought about by unity.
Without unity, plurality cannot possibly have any existencee There=
fore, every existent (mutahawwi) is an effect (infi'al) that is
brought into being out of nonebeing (mA lam yakun)e Consequently,
the emanation (fayd) of unity from the Primary True One is equivalent
to the process of coming into being (tahawwi) of every sensory object
(mahsts) and anything that is related to it. An individual thing
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comes into being when it acquires unity.- Thus the cause of genera-
tion is identical with the True One whose unity is not derived from
any other source because its very essence is unity or oneness. The
cause of Being cannot re non-Being, and that which is not non-Being
(laysa lam yazal) must be a created thing (mubda'), namely, it owes
its existence to a causee Thus that which is brought into being is
created. If the cause of coming into being is the Primary True One,
it follows that the cause of creation ("lat aleibda') is the Primary
True One. The cause which accounts for the beginning of motion or
that by which motion is initiated, namely, the (First) Mover, is the
Active Agent (al-f4'il). Consequently, The Primary True One, being
the cause which sets the process of generation into motion which is
the effect, is itself the Creator (al-mubdi') of all that exists. There
can be no existence (1a huwiyyah) without unity. In fact, acquiring
unity (tawahhud) and coming into being are the same thinge Unity is
the backbone (qiwam) of all that exists. The disappearance of unity
would mean the simultaneous (ma*an) and immediate (bila zam&n) oblitera-
tion of all existing beings and things. The True One is, therefore,
the Primary Creator (al-awwal al-mubdi') and Sustainer (al-mumsik)
of all that He has created. Without His sustenance (imsak) and power
every existent would disintegrate.
As we have set out to do, we have explicated the distinctions
between the types of unity for the purpose of shedding light on
the nature of the True One, the (First) Cause and Creator, the
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158
powerful Sustainer, as well as to understand unity in the metaphorical
sensee Such a unity is derived from the True One, may He be exalted
far above the descriptions of the unbelievers.
We shall continue our discussion with what would naturally
follow. This we shall attempt to do through the support of Him whose
perfect Will is all-powerful and whose gracious bounty is inexhaustible.
10)
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
INTRODUCTION
Richard Kroner, Speculation and Revelation in the Age of Christian
Philosophy (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1959), pe 89f
Enneads, VI, 9 (Thomas Taylor's trans., 1895, ede by G. R. Se Mead,
Ge Ge Bell & Sons, Ltd., London, 1929).
Wilhelm Windelband, A History of Philosophy, trans. by James He Tufts
(New York: The Macmillan Co., 1901), pe 215
Bertold Spuler, “Hellenistisches Denken im Islam," Saeculum 5 (1954),
De 181
Ludwig Stein, "Das erste Auftreten der griechischen Philosophie unter
den Arabern," Archiv fiir Geschichte der Philosophie, VII, pe 352
Ibid., pe 353
Wiltiam Muir, The Cali hate, ed. by T. Me Weir (Edinburgh, 1924), pe.
486
Ibide, pe 508f
Carl Brockelmann, History of the Islamic Peoples, transe by Joel
Carmichael and Moshe Perlmann (New York: Capricorn Books Edition, 1960},
Pe 126
Ibid. om De 126
Ibide, De 126
Cf. Se D. Goitein, Studies in Islamic History and Institutions
(Leident Es Je Brill, 1966), pe 67
He Ae Re Gibb, Mohammedanism (New Yorks: Oxford University Press -
Galaxy Edition, 1962), pe 3f
Koran 63126
Koran 103100
Koran 13:27; 16:95; 74334
Koran 41:17
159
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
160
Koran 18329
Koran 41316
Cf. Article on Kadar (decree) and bibliographical references in the
Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam (Ithaca, N.Y. Cornell University
Press, i561), pe 200
A. J. Wensinck, The Muslim Creed (Cambridge, 1932), pe 53
Alfred Guillaume, Islam (Penguin Edition, 1954 ), pe 112
Wensinck, The Muslim Creed, pe 38
We Montgomery Watt, Islamic Surveys I: Islamic Philosophy and
Theology (Edinburgh: The Edinburgh University Press, 1962), pe 31f
We Montgomery Watt, Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam
(London: Oxford University Press, 1948), pe 63
Koran 23 286
Koran 22:10
Guillaume, Islam, pe 1313; cf. Wensinck, The Muslim Creed, pe 62
Quoted by Wensinck, The Muslim Creed, pe 62f (from al-Shahrastani,
kitab al-milal wal-nihal, I, pe 30).
Ibid., p. 63
Ibid. » Pe 75
Koran 85322
Koran 43:3
Al-Kindi's full name is Abu Yusuf Ya'qfib ibn Ishaq al-Kindi. Medieval
Arab biographers elaborate on the geneological background of al-Kindi
and are in general agreement concerning his descent, but they are
silent about the exact date and place of his birth as well as about the
year of his death.
Gustav Filigel states, on the authority of al-Nawai (born 1233 A.D.), the
Shafi'i jurist and traditionalist, that al-Ash'ath, upon his return to
Yemen and after the death of Muhammad, deserted Islam. Thereupon, Abu
Bakr, the first Chaliph, sent his troups and subjugated him. Al-Ash'tath
33
54
35
56
57
162
Abu Ridah, Rasa'il al-Kindi al-falsafiyyah (al-Kindi's Philoso-
phical Essays), Vole I (Cairo, 1950), pe 162
Al-Mu'tasim who ruled from 833 to 842 A.D. was al-Ma'mun's brother
and successor and, like him, subscribed to the Mu'tazilite doctrinal
position. The fact that al-Kindi, at the opening of his Treatise
on First Philosophy, addresses and dedicates this important work to
al-Mu'tasim may be regarded, as Dre Richard Walzer has shown (Greek
into Arabic, Pe 176), as “external evidence” of al-Kindi's theological
kinship to the Mu'tazilites. [It is possible that Part I of this
metaphysical work was written during the last years of al- Mu'tasim's
reign and that the opposition of the succeeding caliph, al-Mutawakkil,
to the Mu'tazilites might have made aleKindi abandon his plans to
write Part II because of the danger to his life this would have
entailed.
Abu Ridah, ope cite pe 97-4 Al-Kindi's description of philosophy as
an art (sind "at) and his definition of it as the knowledge of things
as they are ('ilm al-ashya' bi- haqaiqiha) are in line with the
Hellenistic tradition which gave to philosophy the practical meaning
of an art, based upon scientific principles (Cfe Seneca, Epistle 89).
The Arabic term film has a wider connotation than the English word
"knowledge.e* With th the advent of Greek philosophy in the Islamic
world, ‘ilm acquired the meaning of 'scientific' and thus it is more
akin to the German term Wissenschaft. The definition of philosophy
as tilm of things as they are, therefore, must be understood to
Signify the methodical work of thought through which we come to know
reality. In his Treatise "On the definitions and Descriptions of
Things," al-Kindi lists six definitions of philosophy that were known
to the ancients (al-qudama'): (a) Love of wisdom, (b) Imitation of
God in His works for the purpose of attaining perfection in virtue,
(c) Elimination of lusts, (d) Selfeknowledge, (f) Knowledge of eternal,
universal things - their existences, substances and causes (Abu RIdah,
Ope Cite pe 172f)- Cfe Aristotle, Metaphysics 1005b 6f where philo-
sophy is conceived as the study of the nature of all substances.
Abu Rfdah, OPe cite 97
Ibide, De 97. Al-Kindi's division of philosophy into theory ('ilm)
and practice ('amal) appears also at the beginning of his Treatise
"On the Five Substances" which has come down to us in its Latin
translation "liber de quinque essentitis."' (Professor Abu Ridah has
included this work and an Arabic retranslation of it in Vol. II of
Rasé'il al-Kindi al-falsafiyyah, pe 8ff). In this work, al-Kindi
states that the division of philosophy into theoretical and practical
corresponds to the division of the gdoul into mind and senses, thought
and sensation (ope cite pe 8) Cfe Franz Rosenthal, “From Arabic
Books and Manuscripts, VI," Journal of the American Oriental Society,
38
39
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
163
Vol. 76 (1956), ppe 27-31. In this article, Dre Rosenthal quotes
a brief statement by al-Kindi “On Theory and Practice” (al-'ilm wa-
ale'amal) which appears in a MS. in Istanbul (kit&b al-MusIqfI by
Hasan Ibn Ahmad Ibn ‘Ali aleKalib). After stating that "theory and
practice are the beginning of virtues" (awwal al- fada'il), al-Kindi
goes on to divide 'theory' (*ilm) into the physical, mathematical
and theological divisions, and ‘practice' (‘'amal) into ethics,
economics and politicse The theoretical subdivisions, as Dre Rosenthal
has pointed out, correspond to the well-known Aristotelian classifi-
cation of the sciences (Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 1026a 19). The
practical subdivisions appear in the later Aristotelian literature
but not in Aristotle's own writings.
Al-Kindi seems to be in disagreement here with Aristotle who considered
theoretical contemplation (theoria) as the highest and noblest activity
of mane However, the distinction in objectives between "theoretical"
and "practical" knowledge which al-Kindi stresses echoes Aristotle's
statement that “the end of theoretical knowledge is truth, while that
of practical knowledge is action" (Metaphysics 993b 20f).
Abu Ridah, ope cite pe 97 Cfe Aristotle, Metaphysics 993b 23 where
it is said that “we do not know a truth without its cause," and 994b
30-31 "For we think we know only when we have ascertained the causese
Cf. also Posteror Analytics 71b 9-12, 94a 20.
Abu Ridah, ope cite pe 98 61 Ibide, pe 101
Ibid., pe 101. Aristotle discusses these four causes or inquiries
in his Metaphysics 1013a 24f. Cf. also Posterior Analytics, Book II,
89b 21-26 and 94a 21-23,
Ibide, pe 101
Ibide, Pe 103
Ibide, pe 102 This is basically Aristotle's attitude. Cf. Metaphysics 993a 31ff
Ibide, Pe 104
Ibid., Pe 104
Ibide, pe 103 - This procedure is reminiscent of Aristotle (Metaphysics).
Ibide, Pe 104
Ibide, Pe 104
Ibide, pe 105
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
164
Ibide, pe 105. According to Richard Walzer ("The Rise of Islamic
Philosophy," Oriens, Vol. 3 (1950), p. 9), this argument of the
inescapable necessity to use philosophica] knowledge has its origin
in Aristotle's lost work Protrepticus which was imitated in the
Hortensius of Cicero. This work, in turn, influenced Ste Augustine's
religious development. The same argument was used in similar
circumstances by Clement of Alexandria (Strom. VI, 18 (pe 515, 3lff.e
StHhlin). Cfe Me Pohlenz, Die Stoa (GUttingen, 1948), pe 415; II
(1949), pe 200. Cfe also Aristotle's concept of “the necessary,"
(Metaphysics 1015a 20-1015b 16).
Abu RIidah, ope cite pe 105. Al-Kindi must be referring here to the
adherents of rival religions, particularly the Manichaeans and the
Christians. Cfe Ibn al-Nadfm, Fihrist No. 167-169; T. J. de Boer,
"Kindi wider die Trinitu#t," tected acln souitent Festschrift ftir
Theodor Noeldeke, Giessen (1906), Vol. I, pp. 9-281; and Yahya Ibn
"Adi's Reply to aleKindi Ciiceaaa ‘ala al-Kindi) in defense of the
doctrine of the Trinity (in Arabic), MS. Vati Arabo, 123 and 127, pp.
99-110, Biblioteka Apostolica Vaticana, Rome.
Abu Ridah, op. cite pe 106. Al-Kindi is most probably the only Muslim
philosopher who uses the term "“wujfid' to signify ‘cognition! and
*knowing'. The word is derived from the root 'wajada," 'to find'.
Thus “wujiid' has the connotation of 'finding' (Cf. the Arabic dictionary
alemunjid which states that 'wajada’' (to find) is also used to connote
‘alima (to know)). The later Muslim philosophers use ‘wujuid' for
*being' and ‘existence’ as well as the 'universee' To determine
whether al-Kindi identifies *existence’ and 'cognition,’ in the
Berkeleian sense (For George Berkeley, “to be is to be perceived,"
esse is percipi - cf. his Treatise Concerning the Principles of
Human "Knowledge - 1710 = sece 33) would require further study of
al-eKindi's epistemology. ‘Al-wujfid al-burhani' (Abu RIidah, ope cite
Pe 111) is used by al-Kindi to signify 'demonstrative kioeladee:?
Abu Ridah, Ope cite pe 107
Ibide, De 107
Ibide, pe 107
Ibide, pe 108ff
Richard Kroner, Speculation and Revelation in Modern Philosoph
(Philadelphia ‘the Westminster Press, 1961), p- 173f%, 194ffs
Abu RIidah, ope cite pe 107
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
165
Ibide, Pe 109
Ibid., pe 109f. Al-Kindi's argument in refutation of the existence
of the Void does not differ from that of Aristotle's dealing with
the same problem in his Physics, Book IV, Section B (213a-214b).
That space is not perceived by sense but by the mind is an argument
that appears in Plato's Timaeus (Be Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato,
New York: Random House, 1937, pe 32)«¢ Cfe also Raphael Demos, “The
Receptacle," Philosophical Review, Vol. XLV (1936), p. 535ff.
Abu Ridah, ope cite pe 106. Cfe Aristotle's De Anima, Book III,
Sections 3, 8 (427b 27-429a 9 and 431b 20-432a 13).
Ibide, pe 108
Ibide, pe 110
Ibide, pe 112
Ibide, ppe 353-362, 293-311
Ibide, pe 295ff. Imagination is considered by aleKindi as a secondary
source of cognition. It receives the images of sense perception and
deposits them in the memory for eventual use by the minde The
imagination also registers the mental images of the mind and stores
them in the memorye The recollective function of the imagination
consists of reproducing both the sensory and mental images from the
memory and placing them at the disposal of the mind for its organizing
and synthesizing work. What al-Kindi says about the nature of dreaming
as a form of symbolic thinking and about the interpretation of dreams
might be of interest to psychoanalysis.
In order to understand the place and importance of intuition as a
séurce of knowledge we must turn to aleKindi's “Treatise on the
Quantity of Aristotle's Books and what is required for the attain-
ment of Philosophy" (kammiyyat kutub Aristutal{Is wa-ma yuhtaju fi
tahgfl al-falsafah), Abu RIdah, op. cit. pp. 372-376. Here he seems
to conceive of intuition as a radace lite function of the mind that
is capable of receiving hidden realities (al-umfir al-khafiyyah al-
haqqiyyahO, that is, transcendental truth. The context t in which
aleKindi deals with this matter is quite significant. Into the survey
of the Aristotelean syllabus as it existed then, he injects rather
abruptly a discussion on the fundamental distinction between the
"human sciences" (ale'ultim aleinsaniyyah) and “divine knowledge" or
theology (al-'ilm ale-ilahi), the distinction, in other words, between
philosophic and religious knowledge. The former, as exemplified by
the works of Aristotle, al-Kindi points out, is attained through
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
166
systematic investigation and deliberate effort (talab wa-takalluf).
Much of religious knowledge, he goes on to say, fs attained by
reason but only through a long and weary detour of philosophic
inquirye There are, however, certain transcendental truths of
religion which the mind can neither reach nor comprehend. These
truths are apprehended by intufttion and without strenuous research
and time-consuming methods (bila talab wa-la takalluf wa-la bihflah
bashariyyah wae-la zaman). But this avenue of cognition is not open
to all, according to aleKindi. It is limited to the prophets whose
religious knowledge is communicated to them without the human devices
C(hiyal) of logic and mathematics and is received directly and immediate-
‘lye The conditions which the prophets must meet to qualify and prepare
for the receptivity of these hidden truths are not intellectual but
moral and spiritual, namely, the purification (tathIr) and illumination
(inarah) of their souls. But this preparatory process takes place
through God's support (tatyf{d) and help (tasdId) and by inspiration
(ilham) and messages (rasa'til). Al-Kindi cites two tenets of Islam
which confronted the Greek mind with insurmountable difficulties,
namely, the resurrection of the body and the creation of the world
out of nothinge Certainty about such truths, he stresses, is directly
imparted by God to the minds of the prophets.
Abu Ridah, ope cite pe 111
Ibide, Pe 113. The term ‘laysa' is a composite of '1&* (not or none)
and ‘taysa' (to be, being). As Soheil Afnan says, aleKindi has “a
passionate attachment" to these terms, aysa and laysa and words that
are derived from them such as aysiyyah, laysiyyah, tatyis, mu'tayyis
and aleaysat (Philosophical Terminology in Arabic and Persian, Leiden:
Ee Je Brill (1964), De 97f)e The first appearance of the root aysa
is found in the Arabic translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics which
was performed by Ustath for al-Kindi (Soheil Afnan, ope cite pe 97).
Most probably, aleKindi took the term from the Syriac ayth. Its use
after al-Kindi was short-lived.
Abu Ridah, ope cite pe 116
Ibide, ppe 186~ 192
Ibide, Ppe 194-198
Ibide, PPe 201-207
Ibide, pe 117. Cf. Richard McKeon, The Basic Works of Aristotle
(New York: Random House, 1941), Physics 219b 2. Al-Kindi does not
give the definition in its entirety and omits the words “in respect
of ‘before’ and tafter'." Cf. also Aristotle's Metaphysics 986a 17
where reference is made to the Pythagoreans with respect to their
theory of numbers.
167
97 Abu RIidah, ope cite pp. 214-237. This important Treatise opens
98
99
100
101
with the teleological argument for the existence of God. In the
phenomenal world we see the evidence (dalalah) for the planned
designing of a First Designer (tadbIir mudabbir awwal). in the
course of his discussion, aleKindi refers a few times to his First
Philosophy and identifies God as al-Inniyyat al-Yaqq (the True Being
or True Existence) who is never nonebeing but is always Being (pe. 215).
God is also called al-Hayy al-Wakid (the Living One) who is never
plurality. He is also altillat al-Dlah (the First Cause), the Efficient
and Final Cause as well as the Creator of all things ex nihilo (al-
mutayyis al-kull ‘an laysa)(pe 215, 219). Only at the very end of
his “Treatise on First Philosophy," aleKindi equates the First Cause
with the True One (al-wahid al-haqq), Abu RIidah, ope cite pe 161. He
is the Primary Cause of Greation and motion (pe 162). In his essay
"On the First, True, Perfect Agent and on the imperfect (one) that
is an agent only metaphorically" (alefa'il al-haqq al-awwal, al-tamm
waema al-fa'til alenaqis alladhi huwa bieal-majaz), he identifies the
First Cause as the Creator (al-mubdi'), the exalted One (pe. 183).
Abu Ridah, op, cite pe 118f
Ibide, pe 120. There is no general agreement as to the origin of
the term inniyyahe Abu al-Baqa', in his work al-kulliyyat (The
Universals), Cairo, 1903, pe 76, derives the word from inna, the
Arabic particle of emphasis which stresses the actual existence of
an object. Some mystics pronounced the word aniyyah and derived
it from ana, the first person singular. This is what "Abd al-Karim
aleDjili (died about 1417 A.D.) does in his book aleIns&an al-kamil
fi ma'rifat aleawakhir wa-al-awa'il (The Perfect Man as conceived
by Modern and Ancient People), chapter 27. In line with this,
Muhammad Iqbgl in The Development of Metaphysics in Persia (pe 153)
translates the term “Ieness." Dre Abd al-Rahm&an Badawi, who
pronounces the word &niyah, is of the opinion that it is the arabi-
zation of the Greek term fiva. (to be). As Abu RIdah has convincingly
shown (ope cite pe 98f), this is not likely and the resemblance of
terms is only coincidental. T. J. de Boer believes that the word
€niyah represents the Platonic “being” or "existence" (Curie, Ov )
as the highest category but that it takes its name from the Aristotlian
"thatness" (072 ), existence as distinguished from the “whatness"
(Arabic: mahiyyah)(The Encyclopedia of Islam, Suppliment 1938, E. J.
Brill, Leiden & Luzac, pe SEE} The plural inniyyat is used by al-
Kindi to signify ‘individual created being and things' (Abu Ridah,
Ope cite pe 97). Since alFarabi, the words wujiid and mawjiid were
used in philosophical language to denote “being and “existing."
Abu Ridah, OPe cite De 121f
Ibide, pe 123
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
lll
112
113
114
115
116
117
119
168
Ibid.e, pe 124
Ibide, pe 324
Ibide, pe 125
Ibide, pe 125
Tbide, pe 126
Je Obermann, "Das Problem der Kausalitt bei den Arabern," (Wiener
Zeitschrift ftir die Kunde des Morgenlandes, Vol. 29 - 1915), pe 325
Abu RIidah, ope cite pe 162
Ibide, ppe 127-131
Ibide, pe 128
Ibide, pe 132
Ibide, pp. 133-136
Tbhide, ppe 136-140
Ibide, Pe 140. Al-Kindi's highly formalized dialectical argument is
reminiscent of Plato's Parmanides which ends with what has been called
the *portentous conclusion! that "whether one is or is not, one and
the others (the many) in relation to themselves and one another, all
of them, in every way, are and are not, and appear to be and appear
not to be.” (Be Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato, pe 140)
Abu RIdah, ope cite 142
Ibide, Pe 143. Cf. Plotinus, Enneads, VI, 9: “The One is not absent
from anything, and yet it is separated from all things, so that it
is present and yet not present with them." Dre Richard Walzer is
probably right in his contention that “al-Kindi has his ultimate
philosophical roots in the Athenian school of Proclus" (Greek into
Arabic, Narvard University Press, 1962, pe 202), althought it is not
possible at the present to determine the connecting link. The fact
that ale-Kindi accepts the validity of astrology, says Walzer, places
him in the vicinity of the same Neoplatonic trend which has its source
in Procluse Cfe E. Re Dodds, Proclus, The Elements of Theology, Oxford
1933, De 107 ff.
Abu RIidah, ope cite pp. 143-146 118 Ibide, ppe 146-151
Ibide, p. 149 120 Ibid., p. 153
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
169
Ibide, p. 154
Ibide, pe 155
Ibide, De 160
Ibide, Pe 161
Ibid., pe 161
Thide, pe 162
Thide, pe 162
Tbide, Pe 162
Ibide, pe 358
Julius Guttmann, Philosophies of Judaism (New York: Holt, Rinehart
& Winston, 1964), pe 29
Ibide, pe 63
Richard Walzer, "The Rise of Islamic Philosophy." Oriens, Vol. 3
Me Me Sharif, opecit. p. 454ff
Muhsin Mahdi, Alfarabi's Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle (trans.
with Introduction) (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Division of
the Macmillan Company, 1962), pe 44f
Abu Ridah, ope cit. 155f, ppe 353-358
Ibid., pe 354ff
Enneads, I, 2, 5
Wilhelm Windelband, A History of Philosophy (New York: The Macmillan
Coe, 1901), transe by James He Tufts, pe 462
Abu Ridah, Ope cit. PPe 353=358
Richard Kroner, Speculation in Pre-Christian Philosophy (Philadelphia:
The Westminster Press, 1956), pé 181
Windelband, ope cite pe 236f
Apology, I, 6l1ff
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
170
Enneads, V, 9, 6
Enneads, V, 3
Philippus Villiers Pistorius, Plotinus and Neoplatonism (Cambridge:
Bowes & Bowes, 1952), De 4
Enneads, V, 5, 2
Michael E. Marmura and John Me Rist,"AleKindi's Discussion of Divine
Existence and Oneness." Mediaeval Studies, Vole 25 (1963), pe 347f
Abu Ridah, Ope cite pe 135
B. Jowett (trans.), The Dialogues of Plato (Random House, New York,
Ibid., pe 348
Ibide, pe 355f
Ibide, Pe 359
Ibide, De 347
Philippus V. Pistorius, ope cite pe 2, 17
Abu Ridah, ope cite ppe 363-384
Saadia b. Joseph, kita&b al-amanat wa-al-i'tiqadat (Book of Beliefs
and Opinions), Arabic Text (edited by S$. Landauer), pe 63f
Bahya ibn Pakuda, kitab al-hidayah ila fara'ig al-guige (Book of
Guidance to the Duties of the Heart), Arabic Text (edited by Ae S.
Yahuda), 56
Ibide, Pe 63
Moses Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed (hidfyat aleba'irfin).
Munk's Arabic edition. Vol. II, pe 25
Julius Guttmann, ope cite pe 165
Abu RIidah, op. cit. 168 (definition of ‘iradah - Will), 252
For the possible dependence of aleKindi on John Philoponus in this
respect Cf. Richard Walzer, Greek into Arabic (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1962), pe 190ff
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
171
Al-Farabi, Risalah fi Ara' Ahl al-Madfnat al-Fadilah (Essay on the
Opinions of the Noble City), Leiden, 1895, ppe 5-10
Ibide, pp. 58-59
Al-Farabi excelled as a political philosopher and was greatly in-
fluenced in this respect by Plato's Republic. His interest in
political theory was stimulated by the pressing problems of his
times particularly concerning the khilafah (succession) and the
ideal ruler. In his work, quoted in the preceding notes, al-Farabi
discusses the characterist les 6fthe ideal state and the necessity
of its being ruled by the philosopher-eking.
Simon van den Bergh, Averroes' Tahafut al-Tahafut (The Incoherence
of the Incoherence) (Osfords Oxford University Press, 1954). In
this work we find the substance of al-Ghazali's arguments which
Averroes (Ibn Rushd) states and attempts to refute.
Ibide, Pe xi
Me Me Sharif, ope cite Pe 427
Al-Kindi wrote a “Treatise on the Definitions and Descriptions of
Things" (Risalah fi hudiid al-ashya' wa-rusumiha), Abu Ridah, op. cite
ppé 353-358, which deals essentially with philosophical termse Cfe
Se M. Stern, “Notes on al-Kindi's Treatise on Definitions," Journal
of the Xoyal Asiatic Society (1959), pp. 32=43.
Richard Walzer, "The Rise of Islamic Philosophy," p. 10
Ibid.e, pe 10. Another work through which Neo-Platonic thought reached
the the Arabs was the pseudo-Aristotelian De causis, an abridgment of
Proclus" Elements of Theology «Richard Walzer, Greek into Arabic, pe 9,
209 note 2).
A GLOSSARY OF PHILOSOPHICAL TERMS
OLY ST
ee
re ie
LE ee i
2s |
the future
effect
cause
assimilation, coordination, harmony
the eternal
existence, being
a priori, rational or first principles
to bring into being, to create, generate
generation, creation
what a thing is, identity
disparity, difference
research, investigation, inquiry, study
chance
bringing something out of nothing,
creation ex nihilo
the Creator
innovation
transformation, exchange
demonstration, proof
empirical evidence
simple
invalidity, nullity
dimension, distance
prove, delineate, explicate
172
173
perfection, completion
perfecting, final (cause)
constancy, permanence, stability
substantiation, confirmation, proving
exception
body, corporeal object
part, particular
divisible
body, organism
the all, totality of being, cosmos
integrative, collective
discursive reasoning
substance, essence
metaphorical
impossible, illogical
inevitable
transformation, alteration
proof, argument
definition
definite, finite
motion, movement
locomotion
the mover
sensation
sensory object, perceptible
psy
Jad! (521
(cpiUe) 26,231
4312)
Ss!
(Lys) Sen
ap lS
sys)
coAbh) su 2t
Cre
. aR
($34) 3's
CH) es
ic ay
Geel oe oh
(bs) Calne
jo
Oe pale ba ae
! 4,3
ay Beet
174
the truth
Primary Truth
reality, true nature (of things)
memorization, retention
memory
predicate, object
contingency, possibility
property
the void, empty space
the absolute void
contradiction, inconsistency
contrariety, the opposite
continuous, permanent, constant
realization, comprehension, apprehension
time, eternity, destiny
essence, self; essential, intrinsic
essential (non-éssential, contingent)
opinion, view, notion, proposal
divinity, lordship
theology, religious knowledge
synonymous
absolute
description, image
compounded, composite, complex
compound, composition
175
basic element, constituent
symbolic, representative
mathematics
time
immediate, instant
disappearance, cessation, vanishing
eternal, permanent
at rest, motionless
equality, equivalence
similar
condition, provision
participation, having in common
individual, particular, specific
shape, form
truthfulness
verified, established, proven
form
imagination
conceptualization, abstraction
correlation, relation
correlated, relative
opposite, contrary
necessity
disintegration, dissolution
nature, reality
176
by nature, inherent, intrinsic
physics
first philosophy, metaphysics
problem, inquiry
assumption, belief
non-being, nonexistence, nothingness
accident, contingency
accidental, non-essential, contingent
knowledge
magnitude
intellect, mind, reason
the acquired intellect
the apparent, visible or practical intellect
the potential intellect
the active intellect
intelligible, comprehensible
the opposite, antithesis
antithetical, inverse
cause
first cause
material cause
formal cause
efficient cause
final cause
the cause of itself, self-caused
177
caused, effect
knowledge of the nature of things,
knowledge of things as they actually are
known, intelligible
mathematical
matter
meaning, connotation
mutable, changeable
otherness, alterity
to assume
assumption, hypothesis
void, vacuum
difference, incongruity, disparity
differentiative
corruption, decay
differentia
disconnected
agent
in actuality
philosophy
first philosophy, metaphysics
emanation, outflow
magnitude
premise
178
refutation, disproof
faculty, force, potentiality
in potentiality, potentially
persuasion
proposition, statement, hypothesis
predicable
to constitute
constitution
existence, sustenance
plurality, multiplicity
many
whole, general, universal
coming into being, generation
creation ex nihilo
perfection, entelechy
quantity
quantitative
quality, modality, state
qualitative
ambiguity, equivocation
consequence, aftereffect
nonebeing, nothing, nonexistence
image, picture, model
symbolical, allegorical, representative
similar, homogeneous, resembling
( ONG)
179
absolute, pure, genuine
duration, interval
sustainer, upholder
the past
space, place
occupant
possible, contingent
possibility, contingency
occupied or filled space
impossible, prohibited
essence, substance
essence, quiddity
school of thought
relation, proportion, affinity
speculation
speculator, thinker
the speculative science
analytical speculation
negation, nonentity
obliteration, disintegration
contradiction, inconsistency
finitude, end
finite, definite, limited
infinity, limitless
(ei) ee
180
species
being, existing
non-being, nothing, nonexisting
existence, identity, he-ness, it-ness
coming into being out of nothing
necessity
necessary, imperative, duty
cognition, knowledge, universe
sense perception
conception
the True One
unity, unit
oneness
the True Unity
pure or absolute unity
union, unification, amalgamation
delineation, elucidation
circumstance, position, convention
subject
truth, certainty
/ BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Fi al-Falsafa al-Ula — Tratado sobre la Primera Filosofía
Al-Kindi