← Volver a la ficha del textoAverroes
on Plato's ‘Republic
ath an Lotroductzon and Notes
ee Ralph Lerner
Averroes on Plato’s Republic
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Averroes on Plato’s Republic
TRANSLATED, WITH AN INTRODUCTION
AND NOTES, BY Ralph Lerner
Cornell University Press
ITHAGA AND LONDON
Copyright © 1974 by Cornelt University
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Preface
You have here. something close to what Abi’l-Walid
Muhammad Ibn Ahmad Ibn Rushd (known to the Latins as
Averroes) wrote toward the end of the twelfth century in
Cérdoba. Little more can be asserted with confidence and
candor because it may be three centuries since anyone last saw
a copy of the Arabic text. What has come down to us is a Hebrew
translation of the Arabic, composed by Samuel ben Judah in
the early fourteenth century in Provence and preserved in eight
manuscripts in varying states of completeness. Based on that
Hebrew translation, there have been one Hebrew summary (by
Joseph Caspi in 1331) and four translations—two in Latin (by
Elia del Medigo' in 1491 and by Jacob Mantinus? in 1539) and
two in English, of which this is the latest. Very much, then,
turns on the capability and accuracy of the two translators who
stand between you and the author. Samuel has. already made
his apologies (see Appendix I); it only remains for me to speak
on my own behalf.
This new English translation is presented in the belief that it
marks an improvement in accuracy and intelligibility over the
pioneering critical edition and translation of E. I. J. Rosenthal.
1“Expositio Comentatoris Averois in librum Politicorum Platonis,’ MS
Siena, Biblioteca Comunale degli Intronati, G VII 3, fols. 158r—-188r. (I have
used enlargements from microfilm.)
? “Averrois Cordubensis Paraphrasis in libros de Republica Platonis,” in
Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis (Venetiia apud Junctas, 1562; reprint
ed., Frankfurt am Main: Minerva G.m.b.H., 1962), ILI, 334v-972v.
® Averroes’ Commentary on Plato's “Republic,” University of Cambridge Oriental
Publications, no. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956; reprinted
with corrections, 1966, 1969); hereafter cited as Rosenthal.
vii
Preface viii
Some of the differences in approach may be mentioned here:
(1) Rosenthal establishes his Hebrew text by using as his point
of departure an early sixteenth-century manuscript, MS B.4 The
present translation is based in large measure on MS A® (dated
1457), the oldest of the extant manuscripts and one containing
a number of unique and superior readings. The strengths of this
manuscript® and its age entitle it to serve as the foundation of a
critical text and of its translation. But as MS A is not without its
defects, I have borrowed readings from other Hebrew manu-
scripts (as given in Rosenthal’s afparatus criticus to his Hebrew
text) wherever the interests of clarity of thought and good
grammar are served. (2) Any translator, confronted with a text
as obscure, difficult, and strange as this one, is sorely tempted to
try to reconstruct a hypothetical Arabic original text and correct
the Hebrew on the basis of a presumed misreading of the Arabic
by the Hebrew translator. I have borne in mind the dangers in
such a procedure, adopting it rarely and then only with re-
Iuctance and caution. Samuel was acutely aware of his short-
comings as a translator of philosophic Arabic; but if his word is
to be taken in this matter, he was tireless in his efforts to provide
the reader with a translation that was faithful to Averroes and
intelligible to one who knew Hebrew but no Arabic. Moreover,
he saw what none of us has seen—Averroes’ Arabic text. (3)
Rosenthal understands Averroes’ intention in this work as the
“Sdentification of the Ideal State with the Islamic, i.e. Shari‘a
State, and the conviction of the superiority of the religious law”
(p. 299). This understanding informs his translation and his
elaborate notes.’ The Introduction to the present translation
*MS Munich, Bayrische Staatsbibliothek, Hebr. 308, fols. 1v-43v.
* MS Florence, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Conventi Soppressi 12,
fols. g4r—129v. (I have used enlargements from microfilm.)
® See the review of Rosenthal by J. L. Teicher, Journal of Semitic Studies, 5
(1960): 176-195, especially pp. 193 f.
7 See the review of Rosenthal by Shlomo Pines, ‘Iyyun—Hebrew Philosophical
Quarterly, B (1957): 65-84.
Preface ix
addresses itself, among other things, to this assertion and offers
an alternative interpretation.
It is a special pleasure to acknowledge publicly the help I have
received from others. Every translator builds on the work of his
predecessors. It is only common courtesy to acknowledge that
their efforts (especially those of Rosenthal) have helped me
through a tangled and by no means unambiguous text—some-
times by providing examples to follow, at other times by leading
me to further reflection on Samuel’s text and Averroes’ intention.
I am indebted to Muhsin Mahdi for his incisive criticisms of
the translation and for giving his counsel unstintingly, promptly,
and with delicacy. I am also grateful to Shlomo Pines for helpful
suggestions concerning some of the more obscure and intractable
passages in this text.
In ways varied and many (as Averroes might say), I have
drawn upon the insights and energies of my guide to the world
of the faldsif2, Leo Strauss. This volume is dedicated to his
memory.
R.L.
Chicago, Illinois
Contents
Introduction
Abbreviations and Symbols
THE TEXT
The First Treatise
The Second Treatise
The Third Treatise
APPENDIX 1
Translator’s Colophon
Copyist’s Colophon
APPENDIX I
Notes to the Hebrew Text
APPENDIX III
Short Titles and Editions Cited
Glossary
Index
xili
171
if! Introduction
Why a Muslim like Averroes should choose to write on Plato’s j
Republic is not immediately self-evident. Of what use is this pagan i
i a closet philosophy to men who already hold what they believe to {
be the inestimable gift of a divinely revealed Law, a sharia? {
Can that Law, which presents itself as complete and sufficient
and which addresses all men, the Red and the Black, be in need i
of supplement or correction? |Further, what has the “lawyer, '
imam, judge, and unique scholar” (as Averroes chooses to |
describe himself elsewhere) to do with those matters that Plato
makes the theme of the Republic? We know that this list of titles
exhausts neither Averroes’ interests nor his qualifications. Aquinas
and Dante have in mind no one else when they speak of the
Commentator on Aristotle’s works. Marrakushi, in his History
of the Maghrib, repeats a first-person account in which Averroes
explains to a pupil how he was led to summarize Aristotle’s :
works in response to the wish of the ruler Aba Ya‘qiib and the |
! urgings of the latter’s chief physician and vizier, Ibn ‘Tufayl. ! 1
i This epitome or paraphrase of the Republic is to be seen, then, ’
as a part of that larger project, for as Averroes himself says at {
| the beginning of this work, he has taken up Plato’s book because -
Aristotle’s Politics “has not yet fallen into our hands” (22.5).
_ But all this, while it accounts for some things, leaves unanswered
i the earlier and more basic question: What is the standing of
j pagan philosophy in the Muslim community? We may say, with
little exaggeration, that almost the first and last words of this
work point to the utility, relevance, even necessity, of political
science (21.7; 105.5-6). Again and again, Averroes quietly points
| xiii
Introduction xiv
out that this practical science, far from being superseded by the
sharia, is no less needed in “‘these cities.” Just how badly needed
is, in a way, one of the larger lessons of the work. Their very lack
of awareness of their sickness is itself a measure of how sick these
cities truly are.
Even if we accept the notion that Plato has something to teach
the adherents of religious Law about the ways of preserving or
restoring political health, it can hardly be said that the Plato
who appears in these pages is altogether familiar. Only a detailed,
point-by-point comparison of this work with the text of the
Republic can disclose the many differences between the two. Least
to be wondered at is the Islamization of the Republic; Greek
divinities and examples are replaced by examples better known
to Averroes’ readers. More remarkable are the substantive dis-
crepancies—celaborations where Plato is brief, omissions, changes
in details, interpolations drawn from Aristotle or Farabi or others.
How much weight ought to be given to these variations from our
text of the Republic must remain a matter of controversy, com-
plicated by the fact that not a single Arabic translation of a
complete Platonic work is known to have come down to us. In
the absence of the text that Averroes had before him when he
sat down to compose this work, we can only hazard some guesses
about the significance of the discrepancies. We cannot even be
sure that they are departures from Plato. Judging from the Arabic
translations of Greek texts that are extant, the translators did
their work with intelligence and skill. Careful readers of this or
of the Hebrew translation will have no difficulty in recognizing
many passages that disclose great fidelity even to the nuances of
Plato’s text. In brief, we cannot know for a certainty whether
whatever of Averroes’ account strikes us as baffling or simply
wrong in the light of our present-day understanding of Plato’s
text does so because of inadvertence or design. Averroes’ thoughts
may not be our thoughts.
In this age in which we are urged on all sides to flaunt whatever
Introduction - xv
we believe we have, this restrained work of Averroes is triply
strange. The faldsifa (as the medieval philosophers are called in
Arabic) do not as a rule strut forth proclaiming their ingenuity,
originality, and superiority over their predecessors. Quite the
contrary: a good deal of their ingenuity and originality is devoted
to concealing their singularities. The present text by Averroes is
a fine case in point, for in truth it is.no simple matter to tell in
every instance whether Averroes is speaking in his own name.
The gentle glidings from “he says” to ‘‘we say” and back again
(with variations en route) lull the senses of the good-natured
reader who nods along as Averroes repeats whatever Plato “says”
or “asserts” or “holds” or “explains.” Every once in a while,
however, that good-natured reader is jolted by various devices
into wondering where Averroes himself stands on these matters.
Sometimes Averroes tells him directly; sometimes he tells him
indirectly. Sometimes Averroes merely plants the question. In
all cases, however, Averroes moves with boldness and determi-
nation in setting before the attentive reader the problems that
matter, the problems posed by the confrontation of classical
political philosophy and the shari‘a. The more that attentive
reader sees, the better trained he becomes in understanding those
problems. Much of his training consists in discerning “what we
ourselves had in mind to explain” (103.15). With a view to
achieving that great good, a useful first step would be to consider
some examples of the different modes in which Averroes chooses
to speak in his own name.
Averroes most evidently speaks in his own name when he
speaks emphatically. On rare occasions he uses the first person
singular, as when he reports, “I have seen many among the poets
and those who grow up in these cities” who prefer tyrannical
rule (101.16); or when he asserts that, despite the fact that an
inquiry of a certain character would more fittingly be made in
the first (i.e., scientific) part of political science, “I deem it
Introduction ‘ ave
appropriate that I mention some of it here” (65.8-9). Even rarer
js Averroes’ use of oaths, as when he swears—“‘upon my life !’—
that the argument Plato has produced showing the pleasure of
the intellect is the greatest pleasure is a demonstrative argument
(104.25); or when he swears that another argument of Plato’s
is true although not demonstrative (104.29-30). The device
Averroes most frequently uses for emphasis is his supplying the
personal pronoun “we” to verbs whose suffixed pronominal
particles already make unmistakably clear who the subject of the
sentence is. The redundant pronoun may thus be understood as
performing the function of italics: “We ourselves follow after
him” (30.23) is tantamount to Averroes’ insisting that the reader
note his emphatic agreement with Plato’s intention or method.
Though the indication of emphasis is unmistakable in this usage,
the identification of the speaker or speakers may be doubtful.
“We,” whether emphatic or otherwise, usually means Averroes;
it is a pluralis maiestatis. But ‘‘we” or “us” may also mean some-
thing like “‘we moderns” (35.12, 18-19) or “we investigators”
(53-19, 29) or ‘“‘we adherents of the shari‘a” (63.3; 66.15)
or “us Muslims” (66.22; 81.4) or “us men” (72.8) or “we
Andalusians” (66.21; 97.6) or “we Cérdobans” (84.22; 96.24).
Even this list is not exhaustive. In ruling out any sort of property
for the guardians, Averroes considers briefly the possibility that
possessing riches may be a virtue. However one decided, that
question would have no bearing on the case of the guardians,
“for we ourselves do not wish them to be simply virtuous but
rather virtuous inasmuch as they are guardians” (42.21-22). Is
it farfetched to say that a founder of cities or a teacher of founders
speaks here?
Averroes confronts us in another way when, at least seven
times, he momentarily puts aside his modest garb as a reporter of
what Plato “‘said” and pronounces a certain problem or topic fit
for inquiry or for penetrating investigation. Whether the bringer
of the shari‘a ought also to be a prophet is a problem of the latter
Introduction xvii
sort. Having stated the problem, Averroes leaves its resolution
open, promising to “investigate it in the first part of this science,
God willing” (61.17-18). What is not left in doubt is that, for
Averroes, the requirements for the Lawgiver are identical with
the requirements for the philosopher, namely, mastery of the
theoretical and practical sciences as well as perfection of the
moral and cogitative virtues (60.22-61.7; 61.11-13). One might
well ask: What does prophecy add, or of what does it consist?
Earlier passages suggest that prophecy is an instrument by which
men are informed of what lies ahead (41.1-2) and of the details
concerning “temples, prayers, sacrifices, and offerings.” But the
prescribing of such details is not exclusively the province of
religious Law (47.24-28). Further, by equating the’ philosopher
and the bringer of the shari‘a (61.14), Averroes in effect denies
that the sharé‘a has any decisive superiority.
Equally portentous in its implications for Islam is Plato’s
“opinion” that the Greeks are the people most disposed by
nature to receive the human perfections, especially wisdom.
This, too, Averroes declares to be a matter in need of penetra-
ting investigation. He immediately brings forth evidence to
contest Plato’s opinion: in fact individuals disposed to wisdom are
by no means limited to Greece, although such individuals are not
distributed uniformly or universally. We might say that non-
Greek nations are disposed to the several human virtues’ being
“broadcast and apportioned among them,” particularly the
nations in the more equable climatic zones (27.1-13). The
context of this discussion is a controversy over the virtue of courage
and the art of war. Following Aristotle, Averroes holds that the
case here is the fairly common one of a virtue serving as a
preparation for an art, and of that art in turn serving to perfect
or complete the virtue. Plato, on the other hand, holds
that war (and hence the virtue on which it depends, cour-
age) exists only on account of necessity (26.19-29). If, then,
Plato is correct about the potentiality for virtué among the various
t
Introduction ‘ xviii
non-Greek nations, there is no call for waging a war to bring
civilization to them. They, or the adults among them at least,
would be fundamentally uneducable. Against this view Averroes
—with Aristotle at his side—takes his stand. In so doing, he both
supports and alters the Muslim conception of the just war. He
now sees that war as depending on the proper natural conditions,
instead of being directed against all men. With nations in the
moderate climes, “it...is not impossible that many of those
who have passed the years of youth should receive the virtues to
some extent... . Could this [degree of virtue] not be established
in them, they would be worthy of being either killed or enslaved,
and their rank in the city would be that of the dumb brutes”
(27.19-23). Where the Koran sees the just war as leading to the
conversion of all mankind to the true religion, Averroes views
the just war as a mode of bringing wisdom to those who have the
natural potentiality for it. With that as his point of departure, it
is not surprising that Averroes holds out the possibility or
probability that many of the conquered will be condemned to
a life of brutishness.
A recurring theme in these pages—the express or implied
comparison of “‘this city” with “these cities’—offers further
evidence of Averroes’ own views. Though these recurrent terms
have more than one meaning in this work, their use by Averroes
is generally free of ambiguity. “This city” may mean the
timocratic city (82.15, 16) or the oligarchic city (83.10; 93.7) or
the democratic city (83.19; 96.1) or the tyrannical city (85.22;
101.10) or the aristocratic city (79.8), but there is no mistaking
Averroes’ intention in any given case. The sum of such meanings
of the demonstrative pronoun is easily surpassed by the number
of instances in which “‘this city” means the city being founded in
the Republic. Paired with “this city” for purposes of contrast is
the term “these cities.” “These cities” are all too well known to
Averroes, his addressee, and his readers: they are the cities that
exist in deed, not in speech; they are “these cities of ours” (84.20).
Introduction xix
Only a few of these pairings can be mentioned here, but they
should suffice to show how Averroes, with great. economy of
language, is able to illustrate and support his intention. (a). This
city has no need for the arts of adjudication and medicine; “under
no circumstances has it either judge or physician.” What are
called adjudication and medicine in this city have only the names
in common with the judging and curing practiced in contem-
porary cities and in the past. Only old-fashioned, Asclepian
illnesses and cures are recognized in this city. ‘“‘They will not
make use in this city (and this is in accord with my cogitation)
of most cures other than cures for externa] things such as wounds,
dislocations, fractures, and the like.” The implications for the
chronically ill—whether in body or in soul—are quickly drawn,
though with a certain ambiguity as to whether killing or suicide
is indicated (37.15-38.18). (6) Just as the wants are not autono-
mous in this city, so the arts that arise to serve those wants are
subject to regulation. Averroes notes the alternating scarcity and
glut attending a market in disequilibrium. Neither the. kinds nor
the numbers of artisans in this city will be “of any chance
number.” Necessary utility is the touchstone that is applied to
all production, be it of cloth or bridles or children (43.28-44.7).
(c) “The women in this city will practice the [same] activities as
the men.” Averroes brings forth evidence to show that women
can hold their own in war. He sees nothing to rule out the
possibility “that there be philosophers and rulers among them.”
A contrast is then drawn between what the Laws or some Laws
prescribe regarding the status of women and what an investi-
gation of the animals indicates. From natural history we are led
to see how unnatural is the prevailing treatment of human
females. “Since women in these cities are not prepared with
respect to any of the human virtues, they frequently resemble
plants in these cities.”” By narrowing or nullifying the capabilities
of women, men contribute to the further impoverishment of
these cities (53.14~54-10). (d) In establishing community of
Introduction "xx
property, women, and children, this city does away with the
major inducements for people to set themselves apart from the
concerns and good of the whole. “It is evident that if all the
things in this city” correspond to this arrangement abolishing
privacy, “‘then it will remove envy and hatred from them as well
as poverty and the other evils found in these cities.” Of the
citizens of this city, Averroes says: ““They are indeed happy. They
are beset by none of the evils besetting the citizens of these cities”
(58.1-14). (¢) Unlike this city, whose “existence necessitates that
those ruling over it be wise, .. . these cities, presently existing,
do not receive any advantage from philosophers and the wise”
(63.6-8). Indeed, if perchance “‘a true philosopher grows up in
these cities, he is in the position of a man who has come among
perilous animals.” For the sake of immediate self-preservation,
he does well to isolate himself from others; but in doing so he
remains in some sense incomplete, for his perfection is attainable
.“only in this city that we have described in speech” (64.23-27).
We may generalize from these examples and say that for Averroes
“this city” is “the, virtuous city,” Plato’s city (79.9, 12, 19, 20;
45-33 52.213 87.19; 93-31-32). In contrast to it are “these cities,”
which are “the ignorant cities” or “the erring cities” (52.13-14,
22; 45.11; 79.11~-18). In going as far as he does in using
“this city’ as the rule or measure, Averroes goes very far
indeed in judging contemporary practice and even the norms
of the shari‘a itself by the standards of Plato’s philosophic
communism.
Averroes is not always so reserved in making such comparisons
and judgments. Occasionally he digresses a bit to elaborate on
the implications of his analysis. Thus, for example, the transfor-
mation of the timocratic man into the oligarchic man is illustrated
by a lesson drawn from more or less contemporary history. The
dynasty preceding the Almohad in Andalus was known as the
Almoravid. “At first they imitated ‘the governance based on the
nomos; this was under the first one of [the Almoravids].” But his
Introduction xxi
successors presided over a continuing decay—first timocracy,
tinged with oligarchy; then, finally and fatally, a regime devoted
to the pleasures. The overthrow of this last was effected “because
the governance that opposed it at that time resembled the
governance based on the nomos” (92.4-8). These beginnings,
however, are not the only similarity between the Almoravids and
the Almohads. There are also analogous or nearly analogous
patterns in their subsequent decline in laws and morals. “You
can make this clear from what—after forty years—has come
about among us in the habits and states of those possessing
lordship and status” (103.8-10). That the present, Almohad, rule
has decayed is suggested by Averroes more than once. But from
what level of excellence has it fallen? The several founders: of
dynasties to whom Averroes alludes in this work appear to have
this in common: their rule originally “‘resembled the governance
based on the nomos” or “‘used to imitate the virtuous governance”
(92.7-8; 89.30-31). Their excellence was at best a quasi excellence,
though even this would be a great improvement over the baseness
that currently prevails. What remains is hardly a vestige: “Only
he among them who is virtuous according to the Legal prescrip-
tions remains in an excellent state [of soul]” (103.11). To follow
in the ways of the shari‘a is to move in the direction of recovering
the earlier resemblance or imitation. &
Perhaps the most interesting, ambiguous, and provocative of
Averroes’ speeches are those which present a controversial
Platonic teaching. By “controversial” I mean one that runs
counter to either generally accepted notions-or the prescriptions
of the shart‘a. A few examples of Averroes’ presentations of these
unsettling thoughts show his different responses to controversy.
(a) At times Averroes openly concurs with Plato. The subject of
base stories is dealt with at length by Plato, and Averroes
emphatically follows in his steps in condemning them. Among
the instances of base stories “generally accepted among us,”
Averroes singles out for censure the custom of saying that God
Introduction , xxii
is the cause of good and evil, that angels can miraculously
transform themselves, that happiness is to be understood as a
reward and suffering as a punishment for men’s deeds (30.22~
31.25). This entire theme of base stories ought properly to be
considered in the larger context of Averroes’ discussion of untrue
stories as such—that is, representations or imitations—where the
reference to Plato is veiled or at least uncertain and where the
lessons to be drawn are that fictions are indispensable for ruling
and teaching the citizens and that whatever the multitude can
learn of the speculative truth through nondemonstrative means—
namely persuasive and affective arguments—is, strictly speaking,
no knowledge at all (25.14-26.2). (6) At other times, Averroes
dissents from what he presents as Plato’s position. I have referred
earlier to Averroes’ parting from Plato on the problem of courage
and adopting a view he reports as attributed to Aristotle. Some
implications of this controversy for the conception of the just war
have been touched upon. A further and necessary implication of
Plato’s position is the rejection of a universal society, a society
envisioned in the remark in which tradition has Muhammad say,
“T have been sent to the Red and the Black.” Averroes can hardly
conceal that such universalism does not accord with Plato’s
opinion; but he is careful to avoid letting this disagreement
become an open conflict between philosophy and the shari‘a by
asserting that the shari‘a view, which is “the indubitable truth,”
is also shared by Aristotle (46.19-21). In siding with Islam against
Plato, Averroes appears to retract whatever concessions he has
earlier made to Plato’s view that all nations are not equally
disposed by nature to virtue. A universal society of true believers
again appears to be both desirable and possible. Yet that this is
not Averroes’ last indication of his views on the matter can be
seen from his treatment of a related controversy. (c) Not all of
Plato’s controversial statements are acknowledged as such by
Averroes. In view of the fact that Averroes sometimes concurs
and sometimes dissents, his occasional silences may also be
Introduction xxiii
regarded as meaningful. Though Plato’s eugenics is notoriously
at odds with the shari‘a of the Muslims, Averroes manages to
discuss “the arrangement of [the guardians’] procreation” in
such an exceedingly guarded fashion that we are compelled to
say that he is silent about the conflict (54.23-55.27). Shortly
thereafter, he appears to accept the notion of a fixed size for this
city (56.23), which implies some kind of birth control (56.18-21)
or colonization or both. Averroes does in fact speak of “virtuous
cities” (97.13; 79-24-25; 57-6), and in that plurality we may
discern an alternative to the universal society that would result
from a. successful war waged against the Red and the Black. In
discussing Plato’s condemnation of unlimited warfare against
enemies of the same stock and place and language, Averroes
writes: “These are to be called ones who have gone astray, not
unbelievers. What Plato asserts differs from what many Law-
givers assert” (59.20-60.5). Averroes leaves the matter by re-
marking on the difference between what Plato teaches and what
Islam, among others, teaches. Averroes does not blur the
contradictory statements by asserting the congruence of the
Koran’s views and Aristotle’s; nor, for that matter, does Averroes
declare where he himself stands. He remains silent on one of the
great points of contention between philosophy and the shari‘a:
whether racial and linguistic unity ought to prevail over religious
diversity.
These examples are only meant to be suggestive of the richness
and many-sidedness of Averroes’ discussion. It is a work laden
with nuances and ambiguities as well as startling assertions.
Without a hint of criticism or misgiving, Averroes not only reports
Plato’s requirement that there be absolute communism of women
and children, but then goes on to treat the necessity of that
communism as proved (57.4-5). Finally, Averroes himself accepts
this communism, along with community of property, concluding
that the necessity, propriety, and utility of all this is self-evident
Introduction ‘ xxiv
(57-23-58.14). As was stated earlier, the word “we” may well
represent different voices. In support of a tentative identification
suggested earlier, I now add this evidence. Averroes says that
“there is no city that is truly one other than this city that we
[anakni] are involved in bringing forth” (44.28-29). That this
“we” is, or includes, Averroes himself is suggested by the repe-
tition of the last phrase a few lines later: “Hence, this city that we
are involved in bringing forth is in itself great in size and possessed
of great power notwithstanding that it has, as Plato says, but one
thousand warriors” (45.13-14). Our suspicions and impressions
are further aroused and perhaps confirmed when, toward the end
of his paraphrase, Averroes invites us to cast our thoughts back to
“the things that we ourselves were praising when we were
attending to the virtuous city” (93.31-32). This sentence happens
to be preceded by “‘He said.” The line separating Averroes and
Plato is momentarily—but totally—blurred.
In one fashion or another, the question with which this
introduction begins is a question for every serious reader of Plato's
Republic: Of what use is this philosophy to me? Averroes clearly
finds that the Republic speaks to his own time and to his own
situation. Now, whatever that relevance may consist of, it cannot
be based on any simple, obvious congruence of Platonic and
Koranic teachings. But if, from the fact that Averroes seems to
accept the Republic’s teaching (at least as far as the practical part
of political science is concerned), we hasten to the conclusion
that he has thereby effected a complete break with Islam, we
would have asserted something undemonstrable in itself and
terribly damaging to Averroes. He does, to be sure, accept that
philosophic teaching, by and large; but as the earlier examples
are meant to show, he uses that teaching critically, selectively.
Perhaps the greatest use he makes of the Republic is to under-
stand better the shari‘a itself. The Koran contains laws that
transcend ordinary human laws—we shall call them the higher
Introduction xxv
part—even as it contains laws that are analogous to ordinary
human laws. This latter part, according to Averroes, presents
two ways that lead to God: “One of them is:through speech, and
the other through war.” The higher part of the Law, which
consists of those regulations. and details: made known to the
adherents of a shari‘a or nomos by a prophet, would appear to
lead men to God through silence rather than speech and through
peaceful actions rather than war. Whether or not the Republic
may be helpful in such matters as well (e.g., by helping men
understand better what it means to act justly toward one’s
fellows), there is at least a strong presumption that the Republic
can help them perceive “the way in which matters are arranged
in those Laws belonging to this our divine Law that proceed like
the human Laws” (26.16-18).
Of physical coercion, or the war of civilization, we need say
little here: it is not the préponderant mode of instruction
followed within the virtuous city. How, then, are men led to
God by speech? In two ways, Averroes says: either through
rhetorical and poetical arguments, or through demonstrative
arguments. The former way is used in presenting the theo-
retical sciences (or rather, certain conclusions reached by
those sciences) to the multitude. The elect few, on the other hand,
learn these matters in “the true ways.” In an apparent reference
to Plato, Averroes goes on to say: “In teaching wisdom to the
multitude he used the rhetorical and poetical ways because they
[sc., the multitude] are in this respect in one of two situations:
either they can know them [sc., the speculative truths] through
demonstrative arguments, or they will not know them at all.
The first [situation] is impossible [for the multitude]. The second
is possible—since it is fitting that everyone obtain as much of
human perfection as is compatible with what is in his nature to
obtain of this and with his preparation for it” (25.14-23). Since
it is by no means impossible that the multitude know nothing of
the speculative truths, and since it is categorically asserted that
Introduction xXvi
they cannot come to know these matters through demonstration,
we are left to deduce that whatever the multitude may come to
know of these speculative truths through persuasive and affective
arguments is, strictly speaking, not knowledge at all, but belief.
Such belief may be useful, even indispensable, but it is no more
to be confused with knowledge than moral virtue is to be mistaken
for intellectual virtue.
If then, knowledge, strictly speaking, or the way to scientific
truth, is the preserve of the few, untruth would seem to be the
legacy of the many. In a certain respect the young potential
guardians and the multitude of citizens are similarly situated.
Neither group can digest a demonstrative argument—the one
because of the temporary underdevelopment of its members, the
other because of its intrinsic nature. Each member of both groups
requires an education in ‘‘music” (as well as gymnastic), an
education that will ‘‘represent” or “imitate” a truth that can be
known demonstratively, albeit not by him. Such imitations render
accessible what otherwise would be inaccessible; but, being
imitations, what they convey is not the real thing. Quoting
Farabi, Averroes proposes an education in which true happiness
“will be imitated by what is believed to be happiness.” It is safe
to say that, according to this argument, the multitude will never
know any better, that their education is, strictly speaking, an
education in an untruth (29.9-30.13; 60.7-12). Averroes reports
Plato’s condemnation of untrue and base stories but says nothing
in this context to preclude the use of noble lies. The subsequent
discussion (30.22—-32.22) is a subtle interplay between reports of
Plato’s views and expositions of Averroes’ own views, culminating
in a defense of kingly lying on the grounds that “untrue stories
are necessary for the teaching of the citizens. No bringer of a
nomos is to be found who does not make use of invented stories,
for this is something necessary for the multitude to reach their
happiness.” Although Averroes reports in this context Plato’s
view that “lying does not befit God’s rulership,” he does not
Introduction Xxvil
preclude the use of invented stories in the shart‘a, or in that part
of it that proceeds like the human Laws.
Plato’s Republic teaches that the best regime will be ruled by
philosophers and that human rulers, or rulers simply—that. is,
all rulers—must lie. No work speaks more cogently or more
pertinently on the theme of the lying philosopher than Plato’s
Republic. If Averroes believed that Islam had been or was on the
verge of becoming the best regime, there was every reason to
consider with all deliberation what Plato had to teach concerning
the ruling—and hence lying—philosopher. Alternatively, if
Averroes believed that Islam was not the best regime, there was
every reason to consider with all deliberation what Plato had to
teach concerning the exposed, vulnerable—and hence lying—
philosopher (64.23-27). Averroes, like kindred souls before and
after him, found utility, relevance, and value in Plato’s Republic
for various reasons. Not the least of these was Plato’s truth about
lying.
It is fair to say that in deciding to paraphrase the Republic,
Averroes is asserting that his world—the world defined and
governed by the Koran—can profit from Plato’s instruction.
Plato is the standard—certainly not “these cities,” not even the
period of early Islam. What now prevails is distinctly second best:
the rule of laws and of interpreters of laws, the parceling of
political governance to the separate hands of warrior and judge
(81.1-8). What might prevail is the true unity of the virtuous
city, the city that Plato constructs in speech. But is its actualiza-
tion a genuine possibility? Or does Plato’s city require that very
rule of philosophers which only the prior existence of Plato’s city
can bring about?
The answer is that it is possible for individuals to grow
up with these natural qualities that we have attributed
to them—developing, moreover, so as to choose the
Introduction xxviii
general common nomos that not a single nation can
help choosing; and besides, their particular Law would
not be far from the human Laws; [if these conditions
are fulfilled} wisdom would have been completed in
their time. This is as matters are in this time of ours and
in our Law. If it should happen that the likes of these
come to rule for an infinite time, it is possible for this
city to come into being. [62.28-63.5]
The human Laws under which the philosophers now live are not
very different from the private Laws of the philosophers. The
Koran does not preclude the possibility of the rule of philosophers.
But that rule or succession of rulers must go on to the end of time
before the truly good governance comes into being. It is this
chain of circumstances that Averroes holds out as the alternative
to Plato’s expulsion from the city of all those over ten years of
age (78.24-29). It is, however, an alternative fraught with diffi-
culties. Not least of these is that “in this time” men and cities
are more easily inclined to good deeds than to good beliefs. Those
who have reflected on these matters will know that these men
and cities are no better than their beliefs, “The cities that are
virtuous in deeds alone are those called aristocratic” (79.1-8).
But it is precisely in the realm of intractable beliefs that the most
radical transformation needs to be effected. All things considered,
Averroes has not exaggerated in declaring that Plato’s manner
of bringing about the emergence of the best regime is “quickest,
easiest, and best.”
T conclude that Averroes is—-and deserves to be regarded
as—the faithful companion of Plato.
Abbreviations and Symbols
Hebr. Ub. Moritz Steinschneider, Die hebritischen Uhersetzungen des
Mittelaliers und die Fuden als Dolmetscher (Berlin, 1893; reprint
ed., Graz: Akademischen Druck- u. Verlaganstalt, 19596).
MPP Ralph Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi (eds.), Medieval Political
Philosophy: A Sourcebook (New York: Free Press of Glencoe,
1963; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, Agora Paperback
Editions, 1972).
Rosenthal E. I. J. Rosenthal (ed. and trans.), Averroes’ Commentary on
Plato’s “Republic,” University of Cambridge Oriental Publi-
cations, no. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1956, 1966, 1969).
ea Readings adopted from MSS other than MS 4,
{] My interpolations.
For full bibliographic information on short-title citations in footnotes,
see Appendix ITT.
Averroes on Plato’s Republic
THE TEXT
2i.
10
Averroes’ [Epitome] of Plato’s Republic [and] Its Scientific
Arguments, Which Is the Second Part of Political Science
[The First Treatise]
* The intention of this treatise is "to abstract” such scientific
arguments attributable to Plato as are contained in the
Republic by eliminating the dialectical arguments from it.
We shall be strict in speaking succinctly of all this. Yet on
account of the ordering of teaching, we ought to preface
an introduction in which the [subject of] study is presented
in due order, for Plato set down ‘this! book only after
[other] books of his on this science. We shall also mention
as well something of the utility of this science, and its
intention and its parts.
We say: This science, known as practical science, differs
essentially from the theoretical sciences. Now this is clear
inasmuch as its subject differs from the subject of each and
every one of the theoretical sciences and its principles differ
from their principles. This is because the subject of this
science is volitional things, the doing of which is within our
power, and the principle of these things is will and choice;
21.1 The Hebrew text of Rosenthal’s edition begins on page 21.
The numbers in the left-hand margins of the present translation show
the page and line numbers of the Hebrew in Rosenthal’s edition. The
numbers in the right-hand margins are the Stephanus numbers of
corresponding passages in Plato’s Republic.
Epitome] MSS: explanation (or: commentary). It is unlikely that
this is Averroes’ heading. He calls this work an epitome at 60.16, below.
Steinschneider discusses the several terms used to distinguish Averroes’
works of commentary; see Hebr. Ub., pp. 52 f.
21.3-4 Averroes opens his epitome of Aristotle’s Physics in similar
fashion (Kitab al-sama‘ al-jabi't, p. 2, in Ras@il Ibn Rushd {Hyderabad,
1365/1946]).
22.
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 4
just as the principle of natural science is nature and its
subject the natural things, and the principle of the divine
science is God (may He ‘be exalted!) and its subject the
divine things. Furthermore, this science differs from the
15 theoretical sciences in that their end is knowledge alone;
if there is anything of action in them it is by accident, as
happens in many of the matters that the mathematicians
study. Now the end of this science is action alone, even
though its parts differ in their proximity to’action. For of
the general rules [whose account] is supplied by this science,
2o the more general is further removed from action and the
less general is nearer, just as in the art of medicine. Hence
it is that the physicians call the first part of the art of
medicine the scientific part, and the second the practical.
That is precisely why this art has been divided into two
parts. In the first part the habits and volitional actions
and conduct are treated generally, and here is made known
a5 their relation to each other and which of these habits is for
the sake of the others. In the second part is made known
how these habits are established in the souls, which habit
is ordered to which other habit so that the resulting action
from the intended habit may become as perfect as can be,
and which habit hinders which other habit. In general, this
part supplies those matters, taken in their generality, that
admit of being actualized. | The relation of what is in the
first part of this science to the second part corresponds to
the relation in the art of medicine of what is in the “Book of
Health and Disease” to what is in the “Book of the Preser-
vation of Health and Removal of Disease.” The first part
of this art is in Aristotle’s book known as the Nicomachea,
and the second in his book known as the Governance [Politics]
and also in this book of Plato’s that we intend to explain
5 since Aristotle’s book on governance has not yet fallen into
our hands. Before we begin a point-by-point explanation of
10
15
20
The First Treatise 5
what is in these arguments [of Plato], we ought to mention
the things pertinent to this part and explained in the first
part that serve as a foundation for what we wish to say here
at the beginning.
We say: It has already been made clear in the first part
of this science that the human perfections in general are of
four kinds—theoretical virtues, cogitative virtues, moral
virtues, and [proficiency in the] practical ‘arts'—and that
all these perfections are only for the sake of the theoretical
ones and a preparation for them in the way in which
preparations preceding an end are for the sake of the end.
It also has been made clear there that either it is impossible
for one man to attain all these virtues or, if it is possible, it
is improbable, whereas it is as a rule possible that [all these
virtues] be found [separately] among a multitude of indi-
viduals. It also appears that no one man’s substance can
become realized through any of these virtues unless [a
number of] humans help him and that to acquire his virtue
a man has need of other people. Hence he is political by
nature. This is not something that is needed for human
perfection alone, but {even] for matters necessary for [mere]
life—matters that man in a certain way shares with the
animals, such as appropriating food, securing dwelling
places and clothing, and generally anything that man is in
need of because of the appetitive or vital faculties within
him. This arrangement exists for various reasons: [a] because
of an unavoidable necessity (e.g., its being impossible for
an isolated man to secure what he needs by way of food,
housing, and clothing); or [6] because it is the easier way
22.9-12 Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1. 13. 1103a3-7, 6. 1. 1138b35-
11gga15, 10. 7. 1177a12-b4; Farabi, Attainment, 2.4-5, 26.11-19 (MPP,
p. 82 n. 6, p. 67). a
22.15-21 Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1, 7. 1og7b8-11; Farabi, Vir-
tuous City, 53.8-13 (Dieterici tr., p. 84).
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 6
(e.g., its being possible for Zayd not to till the soil and sow
seeds [beyond his own needs], but if he tills and sows [with
a view to others’ needs too] he will live at greater ease) ; or
[c] because it is the best way, for if a man has chosen an art
since his early youth and has practiced it for a long time,
his performance in that art will be better. That is one of
the causes that led Plato to hold it inappropriate that any
of the citizens engage in more than one art, as we shall state
later on. Hence the employment of a man in more than one
art is either altogether impossible or, if possible, not best.
Since it is impossible that the human perfections be attained
other than in different individuals within a given popu-
lation, | the individuals of this species are all different in
natural disposition corresponding to the difference in their
perfections. For if each individual among them were
potentially prepared for all human perfections, nature
would have wrought something in vain; for it is absurd
that there be something possible whose realization is
impossible. This matter has already been made clear in
natural science. The sense[s too] attest that individual
humans exist with such characteristics. All the more is this
evident in the noble perfections, for not every man is fit to
be a warrior or an orator or a poet, let alone a philosopher.
All this being as we have characterized it, there ought to
exist an association of humans—[an association] perfect in
every species of human perfection and [whose members] are
helped to their completion in that the less perfect follows
the fully perfect by way of preparing for his [own] perfec-
tion, and the more perfect aids the less by giving him the
principles of his perfection. A case in point is horsemanship
and the art of bridle-making: the art of bridle-making serves
the art of horsemanship as a preparation, and the art of
The First Treatise 7
horsemanship prescribes for it the best form for the bridle
and how they [sc., the two arts] may associate in a single
intention. The various kinds of priority of rank of one art
over! another are discussed in the first part [of political
science]. If, however, such an association does not exist,
the human virtues either will not be attained at all or their
attainment will be defective. In general, the relation of all
these virtues to the parts of this city will be [as] the relation
of the faculties of the soul to the parts of a single soul, so
that this city will be wise in its theoretical part through
which it rules over all its parts in the manner in which a
man wise in the rational part rules through it over all the
faculties of the soul—i.e., the part [of the faculties of the
soul that is] linked to reason rules the spirited and appetitive
part in which the moral virtues are to be found. Hence it
[sc., the city] will draw itself toward appropriate objects in
the measure and time judged by intellect. It will also be
courageous in [its] spirited part, but at the place and in
the measure and in the time required of it by wisdom, just
as a man will be courageous in [his] spirited part only when
he uses it in the case, time, and measure required by
intellect. It is the same with moderation and with each and
every other virtue. In general, it will possess all the cogi-
tative and moral virtues; and priority of rank within it will
correspond to the priority of rank of these virtues. This is
the very justice that Plato investigated in the first book of
this book and explained in the fourth book. It is nothing
more than that every human in the city do the work that is
his by nature in the best way that he possibly can. | This is
only conceivable when the parts of the city are in submission
to what theoretical science and those who rule over it decree.
Hence it is evident that this part—i.e., those who possess
the theoretical sciences and the one who rules over them—is
predominant within it. Just as justice in the soul of each
i 23.12-15 Aristotle Wicomachean Ethics 1. 1. 1094a9-15.
10
15
20
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 8
consists in every one of its parts doing only what it has to do
in the appropriate measure and at the appropriate time—
this necessarily occurring in the parts of the soul only when
intellect rules over them—so too in the case of the city. You
ought to know that some of these virtues are ascribed to a
city because they are in one of its parts—such as wisdom
and courage—while others are ascribed to it because they
are in all of its parts—such as justice and moderation. This
is evident in itself. But whether the virtue of liberality is in
all parts of this city or only in one part of it is something
that we shall investigate later on, because there is room for
inquiry here. If all this is as we have described it (it having
already been made clear in the first part of this science what
these virtues are unqualifiedly), then three’ things remain
to be done here for a complete knowledge of them. [a] One
of them is understanding the conditions given which any of
these [virtues] can be actualized. For example, it has already
been said what courage is unqualifiedly and that it is some-
thing in the soul intermediate between rashness and timidity
—a habit by which a man acts courageously in the appro-
priate way and in the appropriate measure and time. But
at the moment of one’s acting on it, this definition is in
need of particular conditions; otherwise it would be im-
possible to act [in accord with that definition]. The end of
knowledge in this [matter] is only, as Aristotle says, that
one should act, not that he should know. [6] The second
concerns how these virtues may be established in the youths’
souls and gradually develop in them, how these [virtues]
may be preserved once they have been completed, and also
24.10-t1 For liberality, see 72.24, below, and note thereto.
24.12-13 Aristotle Wicomachean Ethics 2. 7. 1107a33~b14, 5. 1129a-
1138b, 6. 7. 1141a9-b8.
24.18-20 Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 2. 2. 110425-9, 6. 1106a13-24,
1106b36-1 10742, 9. 1109@20-30, 7. 10. 1152a8-9.
25
go
25.
The First Treatise 9
"how! the vices may be removed from the souls of the bad.
In general, the case here resembles that in the art of
medicine, the latter part of which encompassés and makes
known how bodies can grow up in health, how one preserves
it, and how one removes diseases from them when they have
departed from [the condition of] health. Just so is the case
here. [c] The third thing is that we should describe which
habit and which virtue when joined to some other virtue
will make the effect of that virtue more complete, and which
habit hinders which other habit. Just as the physician will
tell which thing joined to what other thing in the body will
lead to health and preserve ‘it’, so is the case here. All this
can be understood only by knowing the ends of all these
perfections and what is intended through them inasmuch
as they are a part of a city, just as the preservation of the
health of the organs and their restoration to it is understood
for the most part only by knowing their relation to the other
organs and their rank among them. |
After having made all this clear, we shall state through
explanation the way in which each and every virtue comes
to exist in the citizens’ souls and how to bring this about.
You ought to know, besides, that however possible it may
be to formulate these in speech, that does not yet suffice to
bring them about in deed in cities and nations until such
time as the cogitative faculty is joined to it, as is the case in
the art of medicine. Hence it is satd that the governance of
cities is appropriate for the old in whom knowledge of the
theoretical sciences is associated with long experience; just
as the physician will only be complete when, together with
24.23-25 Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1. 13. 1102a16-26, 5. 9.
1197a9-17, 10. g. 117gb2g-1180a5 ; Averroes, Decisive Treatise, 22.8-23.14
(MPP, pp. 182 f.),
25.2-8 Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 6. 7-8. 1141b8-1142a90, 10. 9.
1180b28-118rbi2.
10
45
20
25
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 10
knowledge of the immutable universals of the art, there is
realized in him through experience the cogitative virtue—
[the virtue] through which he can actualize them [sc., the
universals] in matter. All this has been made clear in the
first part of this science; we return, then, to what we were
about.
And we say that the virtue of courage is that with which
Plato began to introduce the discussion of the bringing-
about of these virtues. As we have said, the way of under-
standing how it is attained by the citizens and preserved
with respect to them in the most perfect manner [requires
that] we consider what is primarily intended by the actions
of this virtue in the city. We say that there are two ways by
which the virtues in general are brought about in the souls
of political humans. [2] One of them is to establish the
opinions in their souls through rhetorical and poetical
arguments. This is limited to theoretical sciences presented
to the multitude of humans, while the way by which the
elect few learn the theoretical sciences are the true ways, as
shall be stated later on. In teaching wisdom to the multitude
he used the rhetorical and poetical ways because they [sc.,
the multitude] are in this respect in one of two situations:
either they can know them [sc., the speculative truths]
through demonstrative arguments, or they will not know
them at all. The first [situation] is impossible [for the
multitude]. The second is possible—since it is fitting that
everyone obtain’ as much of human perfection as is
compatible with what is in his nature to obtain of this and
with his preparation for it. Furthermore, their believing
what they endeavor to believe of [what pertains to] knowl-
edge of the first principle and of the final cause, as far as it is
25.15 Compare the following discussion (to 26.11) with Farabi,
Attainment, 31.8-33.8, 40.2-41.11 (MPP, pp. 71 f., 77 £.); and Averroes,
Decisive Treatise, 15.9-13, 21.4-22 (MPP, pp. 176, 181).
go
26.
10
The First Treatise au
in their nature to believe, is useful with regard to the other
moral virtues and practical arts, which they were being
prepared [to acquire]; and once the moral virtues and
practical arts are established in their souls in this. first way
they can also be led toward performing the actions of these
arts and virtues through the two kinds of arguments to-
gether, namely persuasive and affective arguments, which
will move them toward the [good] qualities. ‘This first way
of teaching will mostly be possible only for whichever of
the citizens grew up with these things from the time of his
youth, Of the two ways of teaching, this one is natural. | [6]
The second way [of teaching], however, is the way applied
to enemies, foes, and him whose way it is not to be aroused
to the virtues that are desired of him. This is the way of
coercion and of chastisement by blows. It is evident that
this way either will not bé applied to the members of the
virtuous city or, if it is applied, it will be nothing other than
the training that is most effective for learning discipline,
namely the art of war and military training. As for the other
nations, which are not good and whose conduct is not
human, why there is no way of teaching them other than
this way, namely to coerce them through war to adopt the
virtues. That these two ways of teaching the multitude are
natural is clear from how the heads of households instill
discipline in their children, youths, and servants. Also
similar to this is the way followed by those who govern cities
that are not good: they castigate their people by means. of
disgrace, occasional flogging with rods, and execution. But
that city which we are describing in speech will minimize
the occurrence of this way in it—i.e., discipline secured
through coercion. This way, however, will be necessary with
26.1 applied] or: he applies.
26.6 conduct} or: guidance.
26.13-14. See 41.6-7, below.
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 12
respect to the other nations—-those without; in the case of
the coercion of difficult nations, nothing will be without
war. This is the way in which matters are arranged in those
"Laws" belonging to this our divine Law "that? proceed
like the human Laws, for the ways ‘in it) that lead to God
(may He be exalted!) are two: one of them is through
speech, and the other through war. Since this art of war is
not completed other than by a moral virtue by which it
draws near to what is appropriate and in the appropriate
time and measure—i.e., the virtue of courage—it is neces-
sary that this virtue be found in virtuous cities as a "prepa-
ration’ for this activity. It may be seen from the character
of this virtue that it will not complete its activity unless the
art of war is joined to it, as is the case with many of the
moral virtues and practical arts. For it is apparent in many
of the virtues that they are only preparatory for the sake of
the arts, and many of the arts for the sake of the virtues.
This is what Aristotle asserts about the wars of the virtuous
city, according to what Abi Nasr [al-Farabi] reports. But
26.14-15 Avicenna, Metaphysics, 10. 5 (453-2-7) (MPP, p. 108).
26.16 The word “Law,” in its capitalized form, is used in this
translation consistently and exclusively to render rah (= shari‘a). By
his cartier contrast between nations whose governance or conduct is
human and those that are nonhuman (26.6), Averroes in effect iden-
ifies human governance with that of the virtuous city, or human Law
with the philosopher’s law. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the
Koran is being praised here for its conformity to the latter. For the
superhuman part of the shari‘a, see 47.24-28, below.
26.19, 23 art of war] MSS: partial art. Reading al-harbiyyah for a
presumed al-juz*iyyah in the Arabic. Compare variant reading to Farabi,
Attainment, 25.18, in Alfarabi’s Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, p. 154.
26.25-26 Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1. 1. togqgai-18; Farabi, At-
tainment, 24.9-26.19 (MPP, pp. 66-68).
26.27 There is no positive identification of what work of Farabi is
being referred to here. Pines, p. 75, draws attention to Farabi’s enu-
meration of perfect—i.e., self-sufficient—communities, of which one
type encompasses the entire inhabited earth: Virtuous City, 53.8-19
(Dieterici tr., pp. 84 £.). See note to 46.20-21, below.
The First Treatise 13
from what we find concerning this in this book of Plato’s,
why according to him this part [of the soul, sc., courage] is
not prepared for this end [sc., war] but rather is on account
of necessity. This is due either [a] to a primary intention of
removing from other cities that which they [sc., the members
of the virtuous city] detest, namely their "money’—and
this, either because of necessity or in search of the best—or
[6] to a secondary intention in relation to guarding against
what might possibly harm the city from without. | This
opinion would only be correct if there were but one class of
humans disposed to the human perfections and especially
to the theoretical ones. It seems that this is the opinion that
Plato holds of the Greeks. However, even if we accept that
they are the most disposed by nature to receive wisdom, we
cannot disregard [the fact] that individuals like these—i.e.,
those disposed to wisdom—are frequently to be found. You
find this in the land of the Greeks and its vicinity, such as
this land of ours, namely Andalus, and Syria and Iraq and
Egypt, albeit this existed more frequently in the land of the
Greeks. Furthermore, even if we accepted this, we might
perhaps say regarding the other virtues that it is not im-
possible that one kind of nation be "more! disposed by
nature with respect to some virtue, The example of this is
27.2-6 Compare Plato 435e-436a. The men of Egypt are there
classed among those distinguished for their love of money. In Attainment,
38.14-17 (MPP, p. 76), Farabi repeats the report that philosophy in
ancient times existed among the Chaldeans, moving then from Iraq to
the Egyptians and thereafter to the Grecks, from whom the Syrians and
finally the Arabs received it. See also Maimonides, Yemen, 8.15-16
{Cohen tr., p. iii), for the characterization of the Syrians, Persians, and
Greeks as the most expert and learned of the nations; and Astrology,
3951-13-20 (MPP, p. 230), on the follies of the Chaldeans and Egyptians,
among others. Averroes is conspicuously silent about the Arabs. See the
discussion in Muhsin Mahdi, Jén Khaldin’s Philosophy of History (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Books, 1964), pp. 199-201.
10
15
20
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 14
that the part of wisdom is more in the Greeks, and the
spirited part in the Kurds and the Jalaliqah. There is room
here for penetrating investigation. It might be thought that
where ‘the part’ characterized by wisdom is most present,
there the virtues are most appropriate and most established
—i.e., established by nature. However one accounts for the
matter, the majority of the kinds of nations are indeed
disposed that these virtues be broadcast and apportioned
among them, and particularly [those in] the two equable
climates—i.e., the fourth and the fifth. It seems one might
say in argument for Plato that it is possible for humans to
excel in these virtues only if they have been raised with
them from youth, but if these have been lost to them after
these years have passed, this is no longer possible for them.
If that is so, there is no case here for coercing under a
virtuous governance one who has already come of age and
grown up. But even so, it would be necessary that they be
coerced by taking their children from them ‘and ordering"
them toward the virtues. It also is not impossible that many
of those who have passed the years of youth should receive
the virtues to some extent, in particular those who have not
been raised under.a governance close to a very virtuous
27.9 The Jalaliqah or Jilliqiyyan are the warlike and courageous
inhabitants of Jillaygiya, an area that is wider than that covered by
Galicia in Spain, extending from the Duero to the Bay of Biscay and
the Atlantic to Castilla in the East. See Abdurrahman Ali El-Hajji,
“Christian States in Northern Spain during the Umayyad Period,”
Islamic Quarterly, 9 (1965): 47, n. 1.; also, his edition of al-Bakri, The
Geography of al-Andalus and Europe (Beirut, 1968), 71.2-3, and map
opposite p. 64. (Mahdi).
27.10 ‘This is not Averroes’ last word. Sec 46.20-21, below.
27.13 Aristotle Politics 7. 7. 1327b23-24; Ibn Tufayl, Hayy, p. 20
(Gauthier tr., p. 18 and n. 4).
27.21-23 Farabi, Political Regime, 87.7-17 (MPP, p. 42); Avicenna,
Metaphysics, 10. 5 (4536-9) (MPP, p. 108); Ibn Tufayl, Hayy, pp. 147,
153 (MPP, pp, 158, 160). See also Maimonides, Guide, II 36 (79b)
(Pines tr., p. 372).
25
go
28.
The First Treatise 15
governance. Could this [degree of virtue] not be established
in them, they would be worthy of being either killed or
enslaved, and their rank in the city would be that of the
dumb brutes.
After it has become clear from this speech what was
intended concerning just wars, it is proper that. we
proceed with what Plato says about choosing those
natures that are disposed with respect to these virtues and
about what stratagem should be employed in establishing
them in their souls and so accustoming them to them [sc.,
these virtues] that the actions proceeding from them would
be most fully consonant with this virtue. We say that Plato
holds that not a single man among the citizens should grow
up with more than one art, This is because not every man is
fit by nature for more than one art. Further, only by
growing up with it from youth does a man acquire the habit
by which the ‘activity’ of the art is improved. | Now if a
man will not succeed in the tournament game called tornet
and the sport of horse-racing without persisting in both of
them and growing up with them from youth, so ought to be
the case in the art of war. Moreover, since many of the arts
are being perfected at the same times and ‘their times!
coincide, busying oneself with more than one art will neces-
sarily frustrate the actions of them [all]. It is on account of
all this that Plato asserts that the guardians should be cut
off from the other arts. He also holds that in choosing from
among the [different] natures for this activity, the fitting
[candidate] would be one who joins to bodily strength
quickness of movement and keenness of sense so that he
instantly perceives a thing, runs to inquire into it, and
grasps it. It is like the case of the nature of a puppy and of
the dog used in hunting, for there is no difference between
10 the two natures as far as what is required of it for guarding.
27.24 Paragraphing supplied.
15
20
25
go
Averroes on Plato’s Republic : 16°
These, then, are the bodily dispositions that the guardian
and the warrior ought to have. As for the qualities of the
soul, it is required of him that he be ‘spirited’ by nature,
for one who has no spiritedness will be unable to become
heated or to repel. In this matter the case of man is like the
case of the other animals, except that it might be thought
difficult for one formed with these qualities in his body and
soul to be able to hate and to love. For two opposite things
ought to be associated together in these people: one of them
is that they have utmost "love! and feeling for the citizens;
and the other, utmost force and grief for their enemies. On
account of this it is thought impossible that a man be formed
by nature with these two dispositions. But the guardian will
not be much of a guardian unless these two dispositions are
associated together in him. As for its being thought im-
possible, why its possibility may be observed in many of
the animals. An example is the dog of strong dispositions,
who is formed with a similar nature. He is one of the most
companionable of things toward one who frolics with him
and the opposite of this toward whomever he does not
recognize.
He says: It is a condition for being a guardian, therefore,
that he by nature love the one whom he knows. This nature
is, without a doubt, a philosophic nature, for in choosing
the thing with a view to knowledge and wisdom he is by
nature virtuous. And he will hate whomever he does not
know, not because of some prior harm the other had caused
him, "but? for his very ignorance of him; just as his love for
one whom he knows will not be because of some prior good
the other had caused him but because of his very knowledge
[of him]. The same is the case with the animals to whom we
previously compared the guardian. That is, on coming face
to face with a man unknown to him he will hate him even
without there being any prior harm caused him by the
ai6ab
29.
10
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‘The First Treatise 17
other; | "and on seeing? a man known to him he will frolic
with him even though no good has come from him. Indeed,
we have made this nature a condition for being a guardian
in order that he have these two opposite dispositions in
consummate [form]: love for everyone whom he knows,
namely the citizens, and hatred toward whomever he does
not know, namely the enemies without. For-love or hatred
grounded in advantage and disadvantage would prevent
this [union of opposites], turning enemies into chiefs and
chiefs into enemies. This is self-evident. It has, then, been
made clear from all this that the guardians and the fighters
ought to be in their natures philosophers, lovers of knowl-
edge, haters of ignorance, spirited, quick of movement,
strong in body, and with keen sense[s}. As for the mode of
teaching them discipline and bringing them up, that will be
in two ways: one of them ‘through’ gymnastic, the second
music. Gymnastic is for acquiring true virtue for the body,
and music is for the discipline of the soul and its acquiring
virtue. This discipline—i.e., discipline through music—is
usually prior in time because the faculty for understanding
precedes the faculty for exercise. By ‘“‘music” I mean
imitative arguments having a ‘melody! from which the
citizens receive discipline. It is only intended that they
[sc., the arguments] have a melody because thereby they
become more thoroughly effective and more fully moving to
the souls. For the art of music, as has been made clear, only
serves the poetical art ‘and carries forward! its intention.
The arguments by which the citizens are disciplined are, as
we have said, either about scientific things or about practi-
cal things. These arguments are of two kinds: demonstrative
arguments, [and those that are] dialectical, rhetorical, and
29.17-29 Averroes, Decisive Treatise, 6.15-21, 15.9-16, 19.10-20.1
(MPP, pp. 169, 176, 179 f.); Maimonides, Guide, I 33 (36b-37a) (Pines
tr., pp. 70-72).
37748
25
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30.
Averroes on Plato’s Republic . 18
poetical. The poetical arguments are more particularly for
the youths. If, when they grow up, some one of them is fit
to move on to a [higher] stage of learning, he [sc., the ruler]
brings that about in him, to the point that one of them
arises who has it in his nature to learn the demonstrative
arguments. They are the wise. He who does not have this in
his nature remains at the stage beyond which there is no
possibility in his nature for him to pass. This would be either
at [the stage of] the dialectical arguments or at the two
ways common to the instruction of the multitude, namely
the rhetorical and poetical, the poetical being more widely
common and more particularly fit for the youths. The
theoretical things, for the most part, are the concern of all
[students of] divine [science], except for whatever of this it
is thought ought to be imitated as far as possible by “all!
men in relation to the completion of their intention and
goal, and particularly the humans of whom we spoke—for
example, as when he [sc., Plato] says of the dead that they
are alive in some other manner than the untrue fables
declare. As for the theoretical things which ought to be
imitated to the most exalted degree, why Abi Nasr [al-
Farabi], in his book “On the Degrees of Being,” has spoken
of them, and this may be brought over here from there. | As
for the practical matters, they too are matters that have
been made clear in this science. Of the imitations, as he
says, some come close [to the original], some are remote
[from it}, some are correct, some untrue. An example of an
untrue one would be if you were to represent a ‘man’s!
29.32 Farabi'’s Political Regime opens with a discussion that might
suggest such a title for that work, though it was not known by that
name. The quotation that Averroes reproduces a few lines below is
drawn from Farabi's Attainment.
30.2 Farabi, Political Regime, 85.6-10, 14-17, 86.11-87.4 (MPP, pp.
40 £.); Virtuous City, 69.19-70.16 (Dieterici tr., pp. 110-112).
30.3 represent} Same root as “imitate” and “imitation,” above.
10
20
The First Treatise 19
form by an ox’s form. Now these ought not to be used at
all in this city for they are very harmful. Similarly the
remote ones ought as far as possible to be rejected. But the
imitations that come close [to the original] are those that
ought to be made here, just as we imitate the first principle
and the second principles “by their likenesses among politi-
cal principles. The divine acts are imitated by the acts of
the political principles, and the acts of the natural powers
and principles are imitated by their likenesses among the
voluntary powers and arts. The intelligibles among these
are imitated by their likenesses among the sensibles, such as
the imitation of matter by privation or ‘darkness’. The
kinds of ultimate happiness—that being the end of the acts
of the human virtues—are imitated by their likenesses
among the goods that are believed to be the end. The
happiness that is truly happiness will be imitated by what
is believed to be happiness. In general, the ranks of the
beings in existence are imitated by their likenesses among
ranks of place and time.”
Plato says that what is most harmful for children is that
they hear untrue stories during their childhood, for they are
ready at that time easily to accept whatever forms they
wish them to accept. Hence one should guard against their
hearing any of the untrue imitations at this time, and in
general guard the beginning of their upbringing with utmost
watchfulness, for the beginning of every action is very
weighty. And we shall beware, as Plato says, of accustoming
their souls to, and leading them by, base fables even more
than we beware of "the harm to their bodies from snow'!—
this [especially] when we hand them over while they are
yet! small to wet-nurses, who train them. Later, ‘when.
30.6 second principles] The reference is to the causes or principles
of the heavenly bodies.
30.6-13 Farabi, Attainment, 41.1-10 (MPP, pp. 77 f.).
25
30
Averroes on Plato’s Republic ¥ 20
they have become strong’, they lead them to temples and
houses of sacrifices. But the untrue ‘and base" stories will
not achieve the purpose. Plato recounts of this what was
generally accepted in his time and warns against it. We
ourselves follow after him and also recount of this what is
generally accepted among us. We say: Among these base
imitations—in accord with what has been explained in the
theoretical sciences—is the custom among humans of saying
that God is the cause of good and evil. But He is perfectly
good; He neither does evil at any time whatever nor is the
cause of it. The statement concerning this made by the
Mutakallimiin among the people of our time—{to the effect]
that good and evil are not to be conceived in relation to
God (may He be exalted!), but that “all” actions [in them-
selves] are good—why that is a sophistic statement whose
absurdity is apparent. For by this account neither good nor
evil would have a fixed nature in itself, but would be good
or evil by fiat. Evil ought, therefore, to be attributed to
another principle, as this is said of Ashm’day and the
demons, though these imitations too are bad in another
respect. For if a youth hears from the outset that there are
30.26 our time] This phrase may include more than contempo~-
raries; often it refers to our epoch, the time of universal, monotheistic
religions, as distinguished from pagan times.
30.27 in themselves] MSS: associated (or: persisting) with Him.
‘The emendation is made in the light of the fuller discussion in Averroes,
Exposition, 113.13-15 (Mueller tr., p. 104). By this argument of the
dialectical theologians, it would be impossible to blame anything done
by men who are not living under the Law, since the praise or blame
attached to deeds stems solely from the prescriptions of the Law.
30.28 Averroes, Decisive Treatise, 24.5-8 (MPP, p. 183). See also
Maimonides, Guide, I 71, 73-76 (gyb-98b, 104b-123a) (Pines tr., pp.
175-184, 194-231), for a systematic presentation and refutation of the
arguments of the Kalam.
go.go Ashm’day] The chief of the demons. Steinschneider conjec-
tures that Averroes had originally written Iblis, “the didbolos of the
Arabs” (Hebr. Ub., p. 225).
31
10
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The First Treatise 21
demons that cause walls to tumble upon people, that they
cannot be held fast with locks, that | they see but cannot be
seen, that they exist wherever they wish, that they are
clothed in whatever form they wish, it is certain that he will
not end up a distinguished guardian. For these things will
implant soft-heartedness and fear in the youths’ hearts and
establish these in them. Even baser than this is saying of the
angels as well that they can change themselves into different
forms, and this because it is the work of miracles. Hence,
evil ought rather to be attributed to the imitation of matter,
as when one attributes evil to darkness or to privation,
Many things belong to the class of those attributing evil to
God; they will not be concealed from one who looks at
them ‘closely’, Also among the imitations that are not good
are imitations of happiness as being a recompense for actions
through which happiness ordinarily is attained and a reward
for renouncing actions through which happiness ordinarily
is not attained, and of suffering as punishment for re-~
nouncing virtuous actions and clinging to defective actions,
For the virtues that come to pass from such imitations are
closer to being vices than virtues. Hence the moderate one
among them is only moderate regarding pleasure ‘so as to
obtain an even greater pleasure". Similarly the courageous
one is not courageous because he holds death to be good but
because it is a thing over which fear of an even greater evil
takes precedence. Similarly the just one will not refrain
31.7 imitations of happiness] Compare the following passage (to
31.24) with Farabi, Aphorisms, 82.10-84.3, 34-6-35.5 (Dunlop tr., pp.
61 £., 33 £).
gi.11-12 Contrast Averroes, Incoherence, 585.3-6 (Van den Bergh
tr., 1: 361): “... the doctrine of the beyond in our religion... is
more conducive to virtuous actions than what is said in others. Thus to
represent the beyond in material images is more appropriate than
purely spiritual representation. ...” Pines, p. 81, n. 35, suggests that
this passage be considered in the light of the peculiar polemical purposes
of the Incoherence.
Averroes on Plato’s Republic = 22 The First Treatise 23
from the property of humans because he holds this obliga- be oppressed ‘and enslaved! rather than to die in war. Such +—
tory in itself but leaves it alone so as to attain thereby twice stories as these "ought" to be rejected concerning theoretical 387
as much hereafter. Moreover, his movement toward many go matters. As for the stories that ought to be rejected con-
of the noble virtues will be for the sake of the base things— gz. cerning practical matters, why they are the stories | that
since most of the imitations concerning recompense are only
of sensual pleasures—so that a man would only be coura-
geous, just, faithful, and have virtues predicated of him, in
order that he might copulate, drink, and eat. All this is
self-evident to one trained in the sciences. It seems that the
dispositions that come to pass in the soul from these imita-
tions resemble the dispositions that come to pass in those
who restrain themselves—they are not virtues at all. One
ought rather to believe that happiness comes to pass from
the actions that bring it about, in the way in which health
comes to pass from nutriments and medicines. This is
conduce to baseness and defectiveness. So it is necessary that
women’s songs be kept from them and that they not hear
them. This is because none of them ought to believe that his
companion’s death is something grievously hard for him to
bear, and that in death [his companion] has been overtaken
by an evil because of which he will mourn and weep over
him. The opposite ought to be the case with the guardian—
ie., either he will not be grieved about it at all, no matter
what beloved, companion, or relation is missing; or he will
grieve but little, enduring such sorrow as comes upon him
patiently and well. Weeping, too, is an activity of "women
and’ weak souls, very far from the nature of the guardian; |_
hence prophets and chiefs ought not to be characterized as
i likewise the case with [actions that bring about] suffering,
I in the way in which wisdom comes to pass from learning.
| Hence, if happiness were represented as the health of the being fearful.
; 25 soul, and its immortality and eternal life, that would be a 10 He said: They ought not to be lovers of laughter, for in [~
fitting story. even barely indulging his soul with powerful laughter, a 28% |
il Plato said: Such guardians as these, if they wish to be of [~ man will have need of a powerful countermeasure to remove
| utmost strength and courage, ought not to be frightened by 3860» from that condition. That is why the righteous and the
forewarnings of what might meet them after death. If some chiefs ought not to be characterized by excessive laughter.
one of them should imagine such things, he would choose to He said: They ought to be exhorted with exceptional —
diligence for zeal for the truth, for lying does not befit God’s 38
i 3t.22-24 Averroes, Decisive Treatise, 19.2-3 (MPP, p. 179).
gt.24-25 On religion as representation or similitude, consider the
larger context of Farabi’s remarks quoted earlier by Averroes at 30.6-13.
See Farabi, Attainment, 40.5-41.12, 44.2-13 (MPP, pp. 77 f., 79 £.). Just
as there may be a variety of virtuous nations or cities, so may there be
a variety of virtuous religions (Farabi, Political Regime, 85.14-86.10
[MPP, pp. 40 f.]; Ibn Tufayl, Hayy, pp. 136, 144 [MPP, pp. 153, 157])-
31.26-30 Some light is cast on this passage by the fuller discussion
in Farabi’s Book of Religion where he distinguishes between opinions and
actions. (1) Opinions may concern (a) theoretical matters—among
which Farabi lists a description of death and the afterlife, and accounts
of the happiness and misery attained by men in that afterlife; and
Trulership’ or the angels or the multitude of humans—i.e.,
they ought not [even] to come close to it. So if some artisan
or some other of them be found to be lying, he ought to be
punished. The multitude ought to be told that when one of
followers, their actions, and what they come to. (2) Actions comprise
(a) what one-does in speech wherein, among other things, rulers are
praised or blamed; and (6) estimations of actions and transactions
among people, and defining what is just in these cases (Alfarabi’s Book
of Religion and Related Texts, ed. Muhsin Mahdi [Beirut, 1968], 44.14-
|
i, (6) volitional things—descriptions of both good and bad rulers and their 46.10).
20
25
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33-
Averroes on Plato’s Republic z 24
the multitude lies to the chiefs, there is a possibility of harm
resembling the harm that comes when an invalid lies to the
physician about his sickness. But the chiefs’ lying to the
multitude will be appropriate for them in the respect in
which a drug is appropriate for a disease. Just as it is only
the physician who prescribes a drug, so is it the king who
lies to the multitude concerning affairs of the realm. That is
because untrue stories are necessary for the teaching of the
citizens. No bringer of a nomos is to be found who does not
make use of invented stories, for this is something necessary
for the multitude to reach their happiness. Above all, they
ought to reject statements that conduce to [preoccupation
with the] pleasures. This is prevalent in the poems of the
Arabs. They will listen to statements warning them to shun
them [sc., the pleasures] and against indulging in them, for
self-control—as Plato says—can only be [found] together
with moderation and shunning the sensual pleasures, as will
be made clear from his statement in what follows. The
greatest of the acts of self-control is that these people faith-
fully obey the great ones among them and become chiefs
ruling over the pleasures rather than those whom the
pleasures rule. Hence it is inappropriate to decide that they
should listen to statements that incite them to such acts [of
self-indulgence]. Hence it is most harmful of all if the great
ones and the chiefs are described as having even one of
these dispositions, and even if only for a brief time. Nor is it
appropriate that they hear statements exhorting them to
hold and acquire property, | for more than anything else,
possessions hinder these arts as is said hereafter. The youths
ought to be warned against listening to this and what
resembles it. You know that the poems of the Arabs are
filled with these evil things. It would therefore be more
92.17-22 Ibn Tufayl, Hay, pp. 153 £ (MPP, pp. 160 f.); Averroes,
Decisive Treatise, 22.8-23.8 (MPP, p. 182).
390
10
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20
25
The First Treatise : 25
harmful than anything else to accustom youths to them
from the outset. This, then, is the sum of the discussion
concerning the class of customary fables.
Plato does not leave it at letting it be known which fables
ought not to be listened to by the guardians, but also
distinguishes the [manner of] speech they are not permitted.
He says: Narrative statements tell either of past or present
or future things. These stories and legends are one of three
kinds: either simply a story in which a simple story is told of
the thing without imitation, or else a story with an imitation
of the thing being told about. Imitation is of ‘two! kinds:
either imitation of voice or looks, or imitation through
imitative words. Poetry among the ancients, at first, mostly
imitated through voice and looks. Finally, they fell upon
imitation through words, this imitation being more appro-
priate for the art of poetry since one imitates through the
statement itself, not through something external. The Arab
poets mostly make use of imitations of the latter class—i.c.,
imitation through words.
After Plato explained the kinds of narrative statements
and explained that they are of two kinds—one, statements
without imitations; the other, statements wherein the thing
being told about is imitated through looks, these being the
most powerful imitations for them [sc., the Greeks]—he then
investigated whether or not these guardians ought to imi-
tate, and if so, what are the bounds of the permissible
imitations. He explained that they ought not to be per-
mitted to imitate, for—as has been said—in this city each
and every human turns ‘only’ to one activity that he may
thereby be more prepared for it and better at it. The same
holds for imitations: i.e., if we wish that a man be a good
imitator, he should do well at one kind of imitation. Hence
93-23 Literally: The staternent concerning imitations is this very
statement.
rc
ag2c—
394e
395
Averroes.on Plato’s Republic 26° The First Treatise
i 27
ig we find that the nature of some humans is such that they i
sound of
surpass at imitations consisting in blame while others Tonly? ce nace es the! pound of the sex and: thevecund:ot
| do well at praise (as is said of Tbn al-Taham, that he could I ay: There ore ee ae L
praise, but not blame). This being SO, as they ought not to the "Arabian’ custom of descsihiny pa ait that follow
be permitted to imitate everything, there is no need for them 15 imitations that come close .to bei shea tne and thee
to engage in even one kind of imitation. But as they un- all this, poets in this city Hi yg = = aie Because of
doubtedly choose to imitate something, they should—from imitate everything. And thi ght not to be permitted to
go their youth—imitate what is becoming to them, patterning activity of a Dice ieleaion will akeape angel [2] The
themselves after those who possess strength, a sound mind, one’s] imitation to one kind € good only if one [restricts
j 34. freedom, and other such dispositions. | But they ought not Moreover, the imitati € he 2 me case of the arts, [6]
to approach the imitations of the base and vicious because bearing on whether eid i picid of what has no
o be chosen or shunned
i
| the prolonged continuance of imitations dating back to
. as is th i
| youth will establish a disposition and nature in both body etn omabey a ny of the poems of the Arabs), is
il and soul. That is why he said that the most highly regarded the poets in this cit a i need in this city. Rather,
| of people ought not to imitate the actions of women crying zo describe illustrious ah oug! ; only to be permitted to
i 5 out in their throes of birth, or women copulating with their eral, the moral virtues Ju hak naa probity, and, in gen-
husbands, or women—"believing themselves already’ fit not to be permitted eae ay ee ets this city ought
for rulership—quarreling with their husbands, or women so also is the case with painters The sinten whatever,
mourning, crying, and lamenting. Nor will they be per- a this city, and in particular which 'y ought not to paint in Cc
| mitted to pattern themselves after handmaidens and slaves, *° sicigus: Ag for the vt ever of them paints the *°¢
nor imitate drunkards or madmen. Nor is this all: we will 25 and the south should [ne pre nae ah ene en
Pn a not on ew
not leave them to imitating the craft of tanners or rave [also] see good things so that anual oncaeid but
il makers or other such crafts, for just as 1¢ 1s not permitte in them in every respect. In a simi 8 bevestal lished
H 10 them to practice these crafts, so is it not permitted them to dwells in a health fae : ae psy tale a id
imitate them. Even less suitable would be permitting them that is brought ab eacaranaed ee from everything
to imitate the prancing of horses, the braying of asses, the and the like e by way of sweet savors, herbs,
athe ; ioe then, in sum is what Plato says about the fables 7
! through which the guardians are to be trained. After this [~
a 93-25-26 The distinction between imitations that consi
ie corresponds to the comedy and tragedy A
he lets it be known which class of i o~
melod:
lies ought to be used gage
and those that consist in prais
Farabi’s discussion: “In tragedy
: mentioned in Plato 395a. Consider ae
7 good things are mentioned, praiseworthy matters which are an example go with these fables in teachi .
| for others to emulate. . . . In comedy evil things are mentioned, personal melody occurring i ng them. As has been said, a
\ satires, blameworthy characteristics, and reprehensible habits” (Arthur hyth 8 n a narrative is composed of three things:
J. Arberry, “Farabr’s Canons of Poetry,” Riviste degli Studi Orientali, 17 : rhythm, harmonic mode, and the speech to which th
i [1937]: 269.16-17, 21-22 {Arberry tr., pp. 275 f.]). The MS versions of ie
F this poet’ 1, making his identification uncertain. i
poet 's name are corrup! making his 1 ication uni al 94-12 the sea] Following Plato 396b; siaa: ann
35.
10
15
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 28
melody is set. As for the statements to which "melodies" are
composed, | it has already been stated of what character
they are to be. What remains to be discussed is what he says
as to which of the melodies and which of the rhythms are
appropriate for these, Plato asserts that the melodies making
use of fear and fright will not be suitable for them, just as
speaking without a melody about this class [of fear-inducing
things] will not be suitable for them. Nor will these be
appropriate: the soft modes used at a drinking party and
weddings, and in general melodies with many changes, for
these people are not idlers. Only two kinds of modes need
to be composed ‘with respect to them’: first, the kind that
conduces ‘the soul to courage and perseverance in wars;
second, the kind that conduces’ the soul to whichever of
the vittues he intends for it to accept with ease, calmness,
and quietness. The determination of what these composi-
tions Tare’ belongs to the art of practical music.
Plato, however, defines them by ascribing them to people
generally known in his time for the making of melodies.
This teaching has decayed ‘in this time of ours’. Hence
there ought not to be left in the city any of the instruments
still in use, such as the instrument called the tambourine
and many other instruments. Plato commanded that the
only instruments to be left in the city are those called the
lyre and the cither.
He said: And for the country folk a sort of pipe. This also
will be the case with the rhythms. We ought to choose from
among them the kind that is not ordinarily among women
or idlers, but rather the kind that makes for courage of the
35-15 a sort of pipe] The MSS have “customs,” probably. because
of a mistaking of al-siyar for al-sabz (i.c., al-surndy), a small flute with a
wide mouth. (In written Arabic, the difference between these two words
is slight.) The instrument is mentioned and illustrated in Farabi’s
Kitab al-mistga al-kabir, ed. Gh. A. Khashabah (Cairo, 1967), p. 787,
n. 3, and illustration on p. 788 (Mahdi). s
399
20 Plato asserts that when those are chosen in whose nature [~
402
The First Treatise 29
soul and an easy conjoining with whatever is desired to be
joined to it. These rhythms were generally known in Plato’s |_
time, but in this time of ours we ought to investigate them.
there is a possibility of accepting these virtues and who
moreover are brought up in this musical upbringing, they
will reach the utmost in self-control, courage, strength of
soul, love of “beautiful? excellent things, and [in] their
desire for justice? in both small forms [and large], and in
shunning pleasure. For there is nothing at all in common
between a sound mind and pleasure. That is because pleas-
25 ure throws a ‘sharp-'minded man into a perplexity re-
36.
sembling a madman’s, all the more when he goes to excess.
For example, the pleasure of copulation, more than any-
thing else, will drive a man mad. Hence ‘pleasure! should
not be mixed with the desire of the musical one; rather he
should desire ‘only the beautiful’ with self-control. But
pleasure has something in common with baseness of soul
and the other vices. | This being so, it is improper for the
desirer and the desired—if the one is to desire rightly and
the other is to be desired especially—that their desire turn
to pleasure or have anything in common with it. Hence a
nomos ought to be laid down in this city that love and desire
between them be like the love that is between fathers and
sons. This is the end at which the activity "of music! aims.
5 This, then, is the sum of what Plato mentions here con-
cerning the subject of music. After this he takes up men-
tioning gymnastic, food, and in general the things through
which true virtue is acquired—not that this is unqualified
true virtue, as Galen and other physicians say of this, but
that this is true virtue through which is realized that virtue
of the soul which is designed for the activity of guarding,
10 namely the virtue of courage. Gauged in this respect,
gymnastic and food not only acquire health for the body,
pee
403a-
4036
(f
r
410b-—
4120
Averroes on Plato’s Republic go
but also acquire "virtue! for the soul in the purpose that has
been designated for it. An example is simple gymnastic,
which acquires health for. the body but also moves the
spirited part of the soul and renders it stronger than it had
been. Hence Plato commands that we not deal insufficiently
with these [guardians] by using gymnastic without music or
music without gymnastic. This is because using music by
itself renders the soul soft and lax in the utmost quietness
and calmness, particularly when one makes use of its soft
kinds. Gymnastic, too, by itself renders the soul savage to
the utmost degree, impervious to persuasive arguments,
becoming rather an extreme misologist, as we see happening
in fighters of "gross! disposition and in the undisciplined.
Hence these two arts, as Plato says, work on the spirited
kind and the philosophic kind of the parts of the soul so
that the virtue intended for guardianship is prepared "from
their mixture). That is to say, he will bear the utmost
delight and love toward citizens, and strength toward those
without.
He said: The gymnastic that they ought to practice is the
simple, straightforward gymnastic suitable for war. As for
food, we ought to restrict them to simple foods that combine
easy availability with a strengthening of their bodies for
what is desired of them, such as roasted meat and simple
beets cooked with water, salt, and oil. If they grow accus-
tomed to meals other than this and miss them while in camp,
they will fall gravely ill. Hence these ought not to become so
habituated in their gymnastic, meal, drink, and passions of
The First Treatise gr
would need a guardian. All this being so, drunkenness and
meals of varying types are forbidden to the members of this
city; similarly, sweets and whatever resembles them in kind.
In general, their way with food and gymnastic resembles
their way with music, namely that they only make use of
these simple kinds alone. That is because music that is not
simple produces evils in the soul, while gymnastic that is not
simple produces illness in both body and soul. The absence
of discipline in music and unrestrained gluttony in food and
drink, if they increase in the city, will of necessity bring with
them the need for two arts—the art of adjudication and the
art of medicine. Nothing is more indicative of the citizens’
evil dispositions and the baseness of their thoughts than
"their being in need’ of judges and physicians. This is
because these [citizens] have no virtue at all of their own,
but ‘only’ attain it through compulsion. The greater the
body’s need for these two arts and the more they heap
honors on them, the further they are from what is right.
Hence, among the properties of this city is that it has no
need for these two arts and that under no circumstances has
it cither judge or physician. If there be such, it is [only]
homonymous with the medicine and adjudication per-
formed in cities today. For if the food for these is gauged
with respect to quantity, benefit, time, and [as being of]
good quality, and their movement is of this character, it
seems that they will have no need for many of the cures
made in this time of ours and in the past. Plato thinks that
these illnesses, originating in these cities, are new, not
having been matters of watchful concern to the sect of
Asclepius, and that these words by which they are desig-
nated are also new—i.e., these illnesses whose cause is a bad |_
mixture of matter, such as abscesses, fevers, and so on. All
a cause of their falling ill. For these people, as Plato says,
need health just as a dog has need of keen sight and
37. _ hearing | more than anything else. Hence they ought not to
get drunk, for of [all] human beings the guardian least of
all and last of all should get drunk. Otherwise the guardian
: 30 their soul, that if they are separated from them it would be
| 37-10-14 Avempace, Governance, 8.6-9.5 (MPP, p. 126).
|
25 wounds, dislocations, fractures, and the like. They will have [~
38.
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 32
this being as we have characterized it, they will not make
use in this city (and this is in accord with my cogitation) of
most cures other than "cures for external ‘things’ such as
need there of a physician to distinguish one in whom there ‘Sher
has appeared a defect that can be cured from one in whom
there has appeared a chronic defect that cannot be cured.
The former will be cured; the latter will be let come to
grief, even if it were possible to keep him alive through
medicines but [at the cost of] his no longer participating n
any of the city’s affairs. This, then, is what Plato asserts
go about the defective ones: namely that there is no need to
cure anyone for whom it is impossible that he truly have all
the virtues. This is because with the disappearance of al
being’s end, for the sake of which it was brought into being,
there is no [longer any] difference between | its nonexistence
and its existence. Hence Socrates chose death over life when
he saw that it was impossible ‘for him! to live a human life.
And since every one of the people was only brought into ee
being that he might live as a part of this city so that he ee
undertake some action for it, with the disappearance of this
5 usefulness from him, death is better for him than life. Hence
the physicians try to sever from the body any limb that is
already rotting and whose efficacy has been rendered nuga-
tory, such as rotting fingers and Trotting" molars. ‘More-
over’, if we leave such as these in the city they will com-
monly be a cause for the birth of [additional] defectives.
You can make this clear by considering craftsmen bent on
their work. When they fall sick they ask the physicians to
purge them with an emetic or vomiting or blood-letting
ro that they might thereby return quickly to their work. If he
prescribes this, they obey his orders. But if he orders a
38.1-2 Farabi, Plato, 19.3-7 (Mahdi tr., p. 64).
5
20
25
The First Treatise 33
regimen for them that suspends their activity for a long
while, they reject what he says as if they reckoned their
lives to be useless if they are unable to perform through
them those actions that they ordinarily perform. The only |_
ones eager for life notwithstanding a chronic defect are
those who loiter at street corners; they are idlers. As for
the defectives for whom it is possible to tive without being
cured but who cannot possibly further the existence of the
city in any way: some humans [hold that] they ought to be
killed; some humans assert that they ought to be spared.
As for the assertion of those who would place the burden’
Jof caring] for them upon the citizens—it is of no account.
This, then, is what leads to the need for a physician in this
city: ie., that he cure external injuries and distinguish
chronic defects from those that are not chronic. It might
"be thought’ that there also will be need for him in this
city for another matter: namely gauging food with respect
to time, arnount, and condition for each and every indi-
vidual, time, and place. This is done through the cogitative
faculty, which he acquires through experience. Hence the [~
physician will not be of this character until—[over and 4°84
beyond] his study of theart of medicine—he hasencountered
many of the illnesses and experienced this in others and in
himself. By experiencing illnesses in himself he acquires for
himself'a knowledge that he could not acquire by perceiving
them in others. A judge too will be needed in this city to
consider whoever has a bad nature and does not accept the 4°9,
cure—i.e., reproof of the soul; him he will have killed. As
for the one who possibly can accept discipline, him he will
castigate. His knowledge of this will come only after long
experience, because knowledge of the causes of wrongdoing
only comes to him after he has investigated them in others.
38. ea Compare Avicenna, Metaphysics, 10. 4. (447.12-18) (MPP,
P. 104).
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 34
It is one of his prerequisites that his soul be not bad but
virtuous from the outset, having grown up on simple music.
jo His case is not like the case of the physician, for the phy-
sician is not harmed if he is sick in body. But the judge
cannot possibly be an upright judge if his soul is bad, for a
bad soul {| knows neither virtue nor itself. Virtue, however,
knows itself and the badness in others through long ex-
perience. Hence it js laid down as a condition for a judge
that he must undoubtedly The? old, for youths know only
the good—that is, youths who have been brought up on
d fables. It is in this manner, then,
nd the art of medicine exist in
39-
simple music and goo
5 that the art of adjudication a:
this city.
| nature of that one who is desi
| He said: There ought to be chosen that one among them
who is most virtuous and who most loves the advantage of
the citizens and who is most disciplined. This will be only if
various conditions are combined in him, among them that
1o he not depart from this opinion against his will. This is to be
understood in various respects, among them that he will be
moved from it by compulsion (as when beset by sorrow and
fear), and by deception and falsehood (as when being
deceived by one of the appetites or forgetting over time).
This is because there are two kinds of opinion. In one kind,
a man departs from his belief. willingly—'this is false
opinion—just as shunning evil can be only through =
willing so. In the other kind, a man departs from his belief
against his will—this is correct opinion—just as the good is
taken away from a man other than through his willing so.
15 This will be through compulsion, as we have said, be it by
force or deception or falsehood. Hence one ought to beware
of these changes in him whom one would have neither forget
38.31 upright] Other MSS: expert.
Further, after this he states the criteria for choosing the oie
, we
red as head of these guardians. atas
The First Treatise 35
what he is led to believe concerning the obligation of doing
whatever is most advantageous for the city nor ever be
deceived about it. And they should also be tried in things
whereby something of this opinion might be generated in
them—i.e., pleasure—and similarly they should be meas-
20 ured [by means of] terrors. Whichever of them is perfect in
all these dispositions, is not to be moved from his opinion,
standing up to ‘the test’ like gold refined in fire—why this
is the one who ought to be ruling over the city, and he ought
to guard it; and he should be honored in his life and death
and burial and in the other ways by which the living seeks
to commemorate the dead.
Now we shall explain the other conditions that ought
25 to be made for the chiefs—namely the moral and theo-
retical virtues. For the chiefs in this city are undoubtedly
the wise in whom are combined, along with wisdom
these virtues and others [as well], in accord with what
we shall recount of this in what is to come. Since it is
possible for one born in the class of guardians not to be
disposed by nature to be a guardian—even though this will
happen infrequently—it also is possible that one born in
40. one | of the classes of citizens other than that of the
guardians be fit to be a guardian—though this too is rare.
That is because each ‘class’ will copulate only within its
own class—i.e., the guardians will copulate within the class
‘of guardians’, and similarly farmers, for example, within
the class of farmers. These being formed by nature for the
activity in which they ordinarily engage, their children’s
5 nature will usually be of that nature since father and mother
usually transmit only what resembles the substance of the
two of them. But since, as we have said, this [generation of
39-18-19 Literally: and similarly they should tell of terrifyiny
things. :
39.24 Paragraphing supplied.
10
5
20
25
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 36
like by like] may be thrown into confusion, and since the
thing that "most? leads to—and is the most powerful of
causes of—the destruction of ‘this! city is that someone
carries on an activity in it to which he is not disposed by
nature, Plato ‘cleverly provided” that a story be adopted in
the city by which the guardians and the rest of the multitude
may be persuaded to transfer their offspring from class to
class. The story is this. We shall say "to them: You" are the
chosen and the exalted. You were generated in the womb
of the earth with this disposition of yours, your weapons,
and the rest of this before you were completed. When you
were completed the earth brought you forth. "She? is a
mother to you, and you are brothers. Your opinion con-
cerning this is a foundation of the city, an opinion—if
anyone makes war against it—of one who has great feeling
for his brethren born of one earth and one mother. You as
a whole are a community of classes of citizens, brothers in
that she was your mother, But when God created you, He
had in view whichever of you would be fit "to be chief! and
mixed refined gold in His bringing him into being; that is
why they are most honored. He also had auxiliaries in view
and mixed silver in their being. He also considered the poor
and the other working craftsmen and mixed iron in the
being of some of them and bronze in others. Since you have
all been generated—notwithstanding that you are of one
class—you are of different kinds. For the most part, an
offspring born to each of you will resemble him in kind.
Sometimes [however] silver will be born of gold, and gold
of silver, and similarly with each and every kind in accord
with this analogy—i.e., that gold or silver will be born of
bronze, and the reverse. Hence God commanded the chiefs
that in nothing should they take ‘such’ care in guarding as
in their care in guarding their children, directing their
natures, and examining what is mixed in them. If the son is
4i4de
ats
41.
10
The First Treatise 37
bronze they will not leave him in the midst of the other
children? but rather admonish him with coercion in accord
with what is due his nature and thereafter thrust him out
among the craftsmen and the poor. If it should also happen
that these [latter] generate gold or silver, they will honor
them and appoint the one who is suitable and appropriate
to rulership. And it is due to his care [for the city] that | the
prophet announced that the ruin of this city will only come
to pass when its chief "who guards’ it is of iron or bronze.
This story will be transmitted to them through music from
youth, just as the other stories are transmitted to them.
When he finished this he said that the settlements of these
chiefs and guardians of the city ought to be raised above
the city and that if there is one of them who does not wish
to accept the Law he will be smitten, and also so that if an
enemy from without approaches the city they will attempt
to seck him out, pursue him, and avenge themselves upon.
him. When he had set the bounds of their dwelling places
he investigated whether guardians ought to possess anything
by which they might be singled out from the citizens by way
of their dwellings or otherwise. He said: There is nothing
more ugly in shepherds than that the dogs they have reared
with a view to guarding whatever they wish them to, should
depart from that disposition on account of their hunger or
their fear Tor some other bad’ habitude [and go on] to harm
the sheep and to injure them, thus turning into the opposite
of [watch-] dogs—'wolves!. So is it with the guardians:
namely that it is among the most injurious of things that
41.1 prophet] Plato 415¢: oracle.
41.6-7 The virtuous city too has a shari‘a (see also 44.23), which men
can be and are compelled to obey. But for Plato wisdom, unlike obe-
dience, is not a product of compulsion (25.17; 26.1-15). A Muslim
believer in the war of civilization presupposes the coincidence of wisdom
and the shari‘a: by being compelled to obey the Law, men are brought
to genuine wisdom.
416
15
20
25
42.
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 38
"they have! a disposition that necessarily leads to injury to
the citizens, especially since they are more powerful and
stronger than the other citizens. Of this, then, above all
other things, ought one to be wary in the mighty. (You can
make this clear from the cases of the mighty taken from
these cities, for on the death of the tyrant who had been
subduing them, they turned on the grazing [flock] and
devoured them.) Of this matter concerning the guardians,
above all other things, ought we to be wary: namely that
there be in them a disposition by which they leave off being
good guardians [or], even more, cease being guardians
altogether. It is easy to show that none of them ought to
have any possession, neither dwelling nor tools nor anything
else. But they will have a claim ‘against’ the other citizens
for what will suffice them for food and clothing. Of gold and
silver they have no need at all. Rather we shall tell them:
You have in your souls something of "a divine’ [sort of] this
[sc., gold], which God has given in its place. Because of this,
there is no need of that [sc., gold] from which there arise
damages to others. You are not allowed to mix the virtuous
gold that was given to you with the gold of mortals, for the
money of [such] people is employed in many illicit pursuits
[while] the gold in you is pure, refined gold. You cannot
handle gold | or silver, or store them up beneath the rafters
of the houses, nor seck after them, nor drink in vessels of
silver For’ gold. The acquisition of property is harmful to
the guardians because if they acquire land and houses and
money, each will appropriate for himself and want to isolate
17 the mighty] Aa-tagifim. This also implies irascible, merciless.
ee The ‘allowing pcs {to 42.2) should be compared with
Plato 416b-417a for several discrepancies, among which are the absence
from Averroes’ text of Plato’s explicit references to education, the
provision against any locked doors, and the requirement of common
messes, Averroes furthermore converts Socrates’ indirect speech into a
direct address to the guardians.
—
417
10
15
20
The First Treatise 39
himself from the citizens by assembling as much property as
is possible for him. ‘They will thereby turn into enemies of
the citizens, haters of them; similarly, one with another.
For the most part they will not kill, except for their [own]
wealth—not for the sake of the citizens. In general, what
will happen to them in their relations with the citizens and
with one another—enmity, hatred, and mutual fraud—is
like what happens to the inhabitants of these cities. Some-
times this is a cause of their conspiring against the citizens
and devouring them. In general, citizens will have for them
the status of enemies, and they [sc., the guardians] fear
them [sc., the citizens] just as they fear the enemies without
—-and their war will be with them. Or they [sc., the guard-
ians] may wage an occasional [external] war-——but for the
sake of their [own] lives and wealth. If an enemy harms
them and they are able to rescue the citizens, they [sc., the
guardians corrupted by private wealth] will do so and
especially if they have imposed a tribute upon them by
plundering the citizens. Possessions, too, hinder them from
the business of guardianship. If they "wage war on account
of their possessions’ their guardianship of the citizens will
be incidental; they will fight when possessions require it of
them and flee from war when that is not their expectation.
This is something that necessarily happens to them when
they are propertied. Because of all this, if we wish the
guardians to be in the best condition as guardians, it is
obligatory that they have nothing at all. Even if the posses-
42.11-12 Plato 417b: property-holding guardians fear the enemies
within far more than those without. Averroes goes on to elaborate upon
what is treated very briefly in the Republic.
42.19-23 Speaking emphatically in his own name, Averroes forbids
the guardians to own property. This principle is extended to all classes
of the city in 43.1-14 and reiterated in 60.7-12, and forms the basis
of his just-completed condemnation of “these cities” in 41.17-24,
42.7-10.
ke
{ayenlth and riches were a virtue, it would not be
; “Pbligutory for guardians as guardians that they be rich.
' Bor we ourselves do not wish them to be simply virtuous but
rather virtuous inasmuch as they are guardians. Imagine
someone saying: You have forbidden these people the most
as exalted thing by making them auxiliaries—[making them],
just as Plato said, paupers possessing nothing. This is like
someone’s saying to one who has drawn a man’s form: You
have not put the noblest color on the noblest part, for you
are obliged to paint the eyes—since they are the noblest
part—with the noblest of colors, which is purple, not black.
This is silly, for it is not fit that the appearance of the eye
be fair simply, but rather in respect of "the activity of the
go eye that comes to pass from it. The case with guardians
is similar: it is not fit that we seek for them the simply
exalted thing, but rather in respect of their being guardians
—assuming that wealth is a virtue. |
43 When it became clear to him, with respect to the guard-
ians, that they ought not to possess anything, he also
considered the case of the artisans and workers among the
members of this city. Ought we to permit them possessions
so that they receive wages for their work and [consequently]
i have possessions from it? He found this case identical with
| the other, since it was clear to him that nothing is more
a 5 harmful to this city than the entry of poverty and wealth.
For if we permit the artisans to acquire possessions through
their work, the end of their work will be acquisition and
A] the return they get from the [proper] arrangement of their
wealth. Their usefulness to the citizens will be a kind of
accident, their work being not for the sake of what results
[from it essentially] but rather for the sake of their -posses-
sions. This being so, they frequently become confused about
I
I,
W
43:6 Essentially, as distinguished from the accidental benefit, viz.,
money.
dhyonrom on Plato’s Republic 40
rc
419-
420
10
20
25
The First Treatise qt
the end that is truly the end—namely usefulness to the
citizens. For if they have a sufficiency, they "detest! their
work so that they shun it or become idle artisans. If [on the
other hand] they are needy, the tools and everything needed
for it [sc., their craft] will be too dear for them, and their
work will be shoddy. This being as we have characterized it,
it can be seen that Plato asserts that there is no wealth in
this city for anyone in particular to acquire and to use as
he wishes. This being the case, they have no transactions in
gold or silver, nor will they need them at all in this city.
For gold and silver, as has been explained in the Nicomachea,
are only needed in these cities because of the difficulty of
transactions; and they also serve as an intermediary be-
tween diverse things so that there may be an equality in
transactions involving things wherein it is difficult to gauge
the existence of equality. A case of the difficulty of trans-
actions: for example, a farmer who wishes to have an iron
plow has nothing to give a smith in exchange other than
food. But if the smith has no need of food but rather has
need of clothing, for example, or something else, their
transactions cannot be completed. They need to set up
something that is potentially all things, so that when a
farmer gives it to a smith and takes an iron plow from him,
the smith has already taken all that he wishes for and has
need of. Similarly with each and every one of the other
citizens. When the farmers have what is needed by them
and the citizens, they gather the food; and the smiths make
whatever tools are needed by the citizen; and similarly the
weavers, builders, and the others. There will be a kind of
money in the city with which all these tools and provisions
will be paid for. Then they distribute them among the
citizens in the measure that each kind has need of. This is
43-15-17 Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 5. 5. 1193a19-b28.
43-24 make] MSS: take.
go
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15
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 42
with respect to the necessary arts in particular, not to the
unnecessary arts wherein the sole intention is pleasure, such
as the art of the perfumer, the painter, the sculptor, "the
maker of ringstones’, and other such things in these cities.
It is evident that they will have no need at all of dinar or
dirham. Nor will the numbers of artisans in this city be of
any chance number, so that at one time things will be scarce
and at another time | be in a glut, with the arts consequently
being useless, as we see happening with barbers and others
in these cities. Where the art has some necessary utility for
all citizens, they will take a sufficient number of artisans
for it, such as the art of farming and weaving. And where
the art has some necessity only for some class of people,
they will also take a [proportionate] number of artisans for
it, such as the art of bridle-making. Hence none of the
members of this city will copulate when he so desires or
with whom he so desires, but rather in a fixed measure so
as to preserve that class whose [determined] number is
intended in the city, as shall be stated hereafter when we
speak of the guardians’ copulations.
After it became clear to him that this city would not
make use of gold or silver, a doubt seized him concerning
war with other cities whose lord is wealthy and powerful.
He says: Perhaps it will be too weak to kill the likes of these.
When he considered the matter it became clear to him that
the case is the opposite of what is thought. For wealth and
prosperity cause their possessors to be contumacious, leading
them to neglect the study and drill of war. But when these
guardians grow up in the manner we have stated and attain
the martial quality, being also disposed by nature to this,
their standing among the wealthy and prosperous is that of
the wolf ‘among! the fattened flock. It is possible for these
to battle with twice or thrice their number. (You can see
this clearly in communities that grow up in the desert,
422
20
25
The First Treatise 43
[these people] being [both] tough and poor. They quickly
subdue communities that are at ease and prosperous, as
happened to the king of the Arabs with the king of Persia.)
Also, when this city wages war with another, it must wage
war with either two cities or one. If it wages war with two
cities, the case here is very easy. For if they rush ‘their
envoy! to one of those two cities with supplication and
entreaty, saying to them—“We ourselves make use of nei-
ther gold nor silver, for this is not permitted us by our Law,
but it is permitted you. Rise "and wage war’ together with
us so that we take "away their’ property and their posses-
sions’”’—if they do this they quickly will be friends with
whatever nation they deal with ‘in this way’. Someone
might say: Perhaps the members of that city to whom
- dominion has been given, once they have attained pros-
45.
perity and filled their hands with loot, will thereby be able
to wage war against this poor city. But the case is not as it
might seem, for there is no city that is truly one other than
this city that we are involved in bringing forth. | The rest of
the cities are truly many cities notwithstanding that their
dwellings are in one place, for their politics is for the sake of
the governance of the household rather than the governance
of the household being for the sake of the governance of the
city. Hence if you assemble a single city, that is [only] by
accident, The case of the virtuous city and its parts is like
the case of the body as a whole: for the hand or the foot,
for example, exists only for the body as a whole, [not the
body] ‘for the sake of” its limbs. But the opposite is the case
with these cities: their assembling together as a whole is
only through a kind of compulsion in order to preserve the
household. This is self-evident to one who has even a bit of
44-19 A reference to the conquest of Persia (636-42) by Muslim and
non-Muslim Arabs under the command of the raty Chmar. <
45-1-3 Avempace, Governance, 6,2-6, 7.7-11 (MPP, pp. 124 f.).
10
20
25
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 44
training in this science. In general, as Plato says, these
cities "first? break down into two cities, one the city of
poverty, the other the city of wealth. Furthermore, from
each of these two cities many others branch off. If, in
addition, the impoverished members of this city are given
the possessions of the wealthy, why then waging war against
one of these ignorant cities would be like waging war against
two cities. Hence, this city that we are involved in bringing
forth is in itself great in size and possessed of great power
notwithstanding that it has, as Plato says, but one thousand
warriors. For they are like those warriors of whom it is said
that ‘twenty’ free men will vanquish two hundred. Now
since this city will not be of any chance size, the virtuous
community will result from it. It ought not, however, to be
so small that neighboring nations vanquish it, nor so large
that the benefits from plowing, sowing, and the rest would
become costly for them.
He said that the rulers ought to determine for them the
extent of this city as to largeness or smallness, and determine
for them, for example, the number of guardians among
them and the proportion of each and every class of artisans.
The case of this city is like the case with natural beings.
Human actions cannot be completed if they are performed
in any happenstance scale of smallness (as is said in tales of
people whose height is a handspan or a cubit), or in any
happenstance scale of largeness either (as it is said that in
the past there have been people whose height was sixty
cubits, and the like). Rather [one must take one’s bearings
by] the scale that is found in the majority of people. This is
45-11 ignorant cities} Averroes’ characterization, taken over from
Farabi and repeated in 52.13-14, 22. See Political Regime, 87.5, 87.18-
102.13 (MPP, pp. 41, 42-53); and Virtuous City, 67.1-69.4. (Dieterici tr.,
pp. 106-109).
45-15-19 This goes beyond Plato 423a, as docs the subsequent
discussion.
rc
4238-
423¢
10
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The First Treatise : 45
to be found not only in natural matters but also in artificial
matters, for it is not by any chance measure that there
results from a rhythm the mode for which it was designed.
This being so, a questioner might ask, saying: What will be
the extent of this city, and what { will be the number of
guardians in it? We say that this will vary according to the
time, the place, and the nations that are near it. Hence the
actualization of this and [maintaining] its health turn on
the political cogitative faculty—i.e., the experiential faculty
that gauges "these’ general things so that they come to
exist in matter in actuality. Plato asserts that it suffices if
the guardians in that city—it would seem that this is in
accord with his time and according to the nations that were
near to them—come to one thousand warriors. Galen took
exception to him on this, saying that if he [sc., Plato] had
comprehended ‘this! time of ours he would know that this
is absurd, alluding thereby to the strength of the realm that
existed in his time. But what appears from Plato is that he
did not make that statement wishing it to be unalterable
like the other general things that he mentions here. Rather
he said this in accord with his time and in accord with his
people, i.e., the Greeks. If we see that this city is [not] fit to
wage war with fall’ the inhabitants of the earth, could
Plato then not see it? But perhaps someone will say that
Plato meant ‘only’ that no assemblage in a single city ought
to be more than this assemblage—i.e., in a single place.
Moreover, many cities could be taken out of this [one city]
in accord with the proper size. Nevertheless, the case of this
gauging [of proper size] also will vary according to the
localities. But each and every one of the virtuous com-
munities ought to be of a limited area, i.e., for each one of
46.1-4 See note to 25.2-8, above.
46.6-8 Presumably this criticism was made in Galen’s paraphrase
of the Republic, which has not come down to us.
|
|
!
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Averroes on Plato’s Republic 46°
them. Yet if these communities be of a determined number
intended to limit them, then the truth of this ought to be
shown by the conformity of this opinion to the natural
climates or all the natural people. This is alluded to in the
saying of the Lawgiver: ‘I have been sent to the Red and
the Black.” If this be the [correct] opinion, Plato does not
favor it; but it is Aristotle’s opinion, and it is the indubitable
truth. He says that the lording-it-over expressed by a com-
mand such as this—i.e., that this city have a limited size—is
more trifling for them than what we previously ordered
them to do. Namely that it was proper that a bronze son
born to guardians be thrust out among the others [like him],
and that a golden or silver son born to these others be thrust
out among the guardians. This is commanded of the
citizens’ offspring so that they might be one in nature, since
every one of the humans in it [sc., the city] corresponds to
one particular job, and that is the job for which he is
46.17-19 In opposition to the view just presented of having a large
number of virtuous communities of limited area, Averroes here suggests
the possibility (and immediately hereafter the desirability) of having
a limited number of virtuous communities, each of which might be co-
terminous with an entire climatic zone, perhaps even encompassing all]
of mankind, On the causes of the natural differences between nations,
resulting in distinct national characters, sce Farabi, Political Regime,
70.8-71.9 (MPP, pp. 32 f.).
46.19-20 This Tradition (hadith) is used elsewhere by Averroes to
point to the universal significance of Muhammad's mission (Decisive
Treatise, 7.3-4, ¢7-9-11 [MPP, pp. 169, 178]; Exposition, 102.20 [Mueller
tr., p. 95]). Our text here reads ba‘al ha-trah, rather than maniah ha-torch,
which is also translated later as Lawgiver.
46.20-21 See Jézef Biclawski (ed. and trans.), Lettre d’Aristote 4
Alexandre sur la Politique envers les Cités, Polskie] Akademii Nauk, Komitet
Nauk o Kulturze Antycznej, Archiwum Filologiczne, no. 25 (Wroclaw,
1970), 4.2,'4.5, 10.5 (Arabic text, pp. 93 f., 44; French tr., pp. 59, 60,
66). Compare Aristotle Politics 7. 4. 1326a5-b25. For the political
necessity that might require the military conquest of one virtuous city
by another, leading ultimately to the universal sway of a single law, see
Avicenna, Metaphysics, to. 5 (453-10-454-2) (MPP, pp. 108 f.).
30
47-
10
The First Treatise 47
naturally suited. In general, all these commands and the
lording-it-over them to observe all these nomoi and the
others that we shall mention hereafter regarding copulation,
procreation, and the rest, are no great matter that would
afflict people like these. They are all trifling matters for
them if they guard them by bringing them up well in the
education that we have mentioned—i.e., music and gym-
nastic. | Hence one ought to be extremely wary of making
any innovation in music apart from what the ancient nomoi
have laid down. For if this were done, disease would easily
be transmitted to the city without anyone’s being aware of
it. This would not cease by settling calmly and quietly in
the dispositions of the soul, but [rather continue] until the
matter finally turns into the destruction of the Laws and
the nomoi. This is evident from the case of those people who,
having grown up with such general nomoi and general
Laws, are able, by themselves, to arrive at many ‘partial!
nomoi ‘and good disciplines, such as honoring parents,
remaining silent before elders, and other such’ practical
‘nomoi!. Hence partial things like these ought not to be
laid down as nomoi, That is because the general Laws,
when firmly established, will lead the citizens to these partial
nomoi easily and by themselves because everyone only
moves toward that which his upbringing in discipline and
This! nature move him toward. If [they are] good, then
[it is toward the] good, or if [they are] bad, then [it is
toward the] bad. But if one strives to lay down these partial
nomoi without laying down the general ones (as happens to
many "legislators'), why he is on the level of one who would
heal diseased people who are unable to derive any benefit
from that by which they might be healed on account of
their excessive desire for food, drink, and copulation. That
is because their diseases will change markedly for the worse
on account of these medicines. Hence anyone who strives to
424,
425
—
426
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 48
lay down partial nomoi such as these will not cease im-
proving their affairs ‘as long as he lives’, and they will rely
on him. He will think that he is attaining an end thereby,
but he will not attain it. You can make this clear from the
cases of many of the legislators whose accounts have reached
us. The case of striving to improve these cities is, as Plato
says, like one cutting off a single head of the [many-]headed
serpents. He is doing something useless since they will emit
their poison with their remaining heads. This being so, one
ought at first only to lay down general nomoi like these,
which have already been mentioned and which will be
spoken of yet again in this book. He said: But as for the
nomos to be laid down concerning temples, prayers, sacri-
fices, and offerings, which will imprint in the souls humility
and the extolling of God and the angels, why he would
leave them to what God (may He be exalted!) commands
through prophecy. It is as though he asserts that these are
divine things, and that whatever of these there is in cities’
we ought to acknowledge as such, for they [sc., the divine
things] are, as it were, common to all the Laws and con-
ventions of the nomoi. Since Plato, at the beginning of this
book, had already investigated what justice is and refuted
what was said concerning justice by the opinions generally
accepted in This’ time, he promised first to make known
the nature of | justice in the city and then to make known
the nature of justice in the individual soul, being as it is
more evident in a city. He said: An example of this would
be if a particular man were ordered to read a script with
47-24-26 In addition to substituting prophecy for the Delphic Apollo
of Plato 427b, Averroes supplies on his own the reasons for this nomos,
Humility does not appear in the Republic.
47-26-28 Knowledge of these divine things comes through prophecy
since these transcend ordinary human understanding. ‘Though’ super-
human in this sense, these things are not peculiar to the Koran, but are
to be found in every sharf‘a and in every nomos.
The First Treatise 49
tiny letters from afar, and we knew that the selfsame book
with large letters was to be found in another place close by
him. We comprehend that it is right that we direct four
attention] first to that book with broad lines and read it
first. And after we comprehend it, then it will be possible
for us to read the book with tiny letters with ease. Similar
to this is the “case? with justice in the city and in the
particular soul. But as we have said, before making known
the nature of justice through definition, he began to explain
how life in the just city is. Having reached this point in it
[sc., the Republic], he wished to make known the nature of
justice since it could already be seen quite clearly there
from what he says about the life of the city. Similarly, it is
also evident from this very thing [sc., from the life of the
city] that it [sc., the city] is wise, courageous, moderate,
Tand just. He proceeded” to investigate what is the nature
of each one of these four virtues that exist in this city, and
in which part of it it is to be found. He began with wisdom,
saying that it is clear that this city is wise, possessing
knowledge. That is because it [displays] fine understanding
in all things to which the Laws and nomoi point, which we
ourselves will mention by recounting them. Good govern-
ance and good counsel are undoubtedly a kind of knowl-
edge. But 'we' cannot say that good governance and good
counsel are in this city on account of wisdom in the practical
arts such as agriculture, carpentry, and so on. Since this is
so, then it [sc., the city] can only’ be wise through that
knowledge on whose track we are. It is evident that this
wisdom can only be completed through knowledge of the
end of man since this governance moves in that direction.
And it is evident that we can only perceive the end of man
48.19-23 Farabi, Attainment, 15.16-16.5, 16.15-17.9, 20.3-22.5,
26.11-19, 39.9-40.2 (MPP, pp. 61 f., 64 f., 67 f., 76 £); Political Regime,
79-3-80.4 (MPP, pp. 36 £).
49-
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 50°
through the theoretical sciences. Hence this city is neces-
sarily spoken of as wise in two kinds of knowledge simul-
taneously—i.e., the theoretical and the practical. That part
in which this wisdom will be is the smallest of its [sc., the
city’s] parts, namely the philosophers. That is because these
natures occur less frequently than the other natures—i.e.,
[the natures of} the possessors of practical arts. It is evident
that this wisdom ought to be firmly established in the ruler
of the city and rule over it. This being so, the heads of this
city are necessarily the wise. We have then told of the
knowledge on whose account this city is said to be wise and
in which of its parts [it resides]. |
As for the courage ascribed to this city, why it consists in
preserving this opinion as explained and seeking to strength-
en it in all natural people in every case of strength and
weakness. By “strength” I mean such as fear and anxiety;
by “weakness,” such as the desires. It is evident that the
multitude in this part will be of this’ character only if we
inculcate in them the characteristics that we have men-
tioned and try them by means of those’ proofs—i.e., music
and gymnastic. For once they are of this character it will
be difficult for fear or desire to uproot this opinion from
their ‘souls, But if, in the course of their being governed,
they imagine these things [sc., fear and desire], it would be
easy to remove and transfer this opinion from their souls.
48.25 the philosophers} Averrocs’ substitution for Plato 428e: the
supervising and ruling part.
49-t-5 According to Plato 429b, a city is called courageous by virtue
of the courage of that part which does its fighting for it. Similarly
Averroes in this text (24.7-8, 49.16-21). Yet here a “multitude” is seen
as being, in some sense, courageous; and all “natural people” are to
receive some kind of education in music and gymnastic. Such termi-
nology underlines, as it were, the qualified character of this courage,
expressed by its designation as “political courage” in Plato 4goc. True,
unqualified courage goes beyond the city and, as such, is not to be
expected from all “natural people.”
10
15
20
25
The First Treatise ' 5r
An image of this is, as Plato says, what dyers do. When they
want to dye camiet so that it is colorfast, they first "choose?
white from améng the colors of the garment. Then they
prepare it beforehand and ready it with not a few things to
receive the color so that the camlet receives the color in as
good a manner as possible; so that when the color is put
down and permeates it, it is impossible to eradicate it by
washing it with scouring agents. As for the garment that
has not been so prepared, its color will be washed out from
it when washed with scouring agents. So is the case with
the guardians. If they are not brought up with the education
we have described and if their natures are not chosen [with
deliberation], it is doubtful whether this opinion will [not]
be eradicated from their souls and its color removed, for
pleasure is the most powerful scourer of the virtues and
most effective in eradicating them. Similarly with anxiety
and fear. :
It is clear in what thing of this city this virtue—ie., 479
courage—is to be found and also to which part it is to be
ascribed. This can ‘only’ be ascribed to it [by virtue of]
these people whose natures we have chosen for guardianship
and whom we have arranged to maintain this part. For it
is clear that cities are not said to be courageous or timid in
all their parts or in just any part—i.e., the moneyed class
or the ‘class’ [engaged in] the practical arts—but only in
the guardian class.
We have then perceived what this virtue is and to which
of the parts of the city it is to be ascribed. It remains for us
to speak of the two remaining virtues, namely moderation 45°4¢
and justice: what they are, and to which of the parts of the
city they are to be ascribed.
We say that moderation is some middle way in eating,
drinking, and copulation. The moderate one is the indi-
vidual who, on his own, can always be on this middle way.
—
go
50.
‘ 10
|
|
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 52
That is why it is said that moderation is some kind of
conquest and forcing of the soul from pleasures and desires.
It has been said that the moderate one is more powerful
and stronger than himself. This means that, seeing that man
has in him a nobler part--namely reason—and a base
part—namely the appetitive soul—if the nobler is more
powerful and stronger than the baser and the baser is in
submission to it, then it is said that this man is stronger
than himself. But if he is humbled by the baser, whether
because of upbringing or otherwise, it is said that he is
weaker than himself and licentious. | This being so, it is
evident that this city will be more powerful than the others
and stronger than ‘itself! and that this virtue ought not to
be in one particular class of citizens “but in the rulers! and
the general multitude. For not a single human activity is
called human for the virtue that it attains other than
moderation. The case here is not like the case with wisdom
and courage, which are ascribed to the city in that they
are in a part of it. This virtue, however, ought to be spread
throughout the city ‘and’ transmitted to the generality
fiom the beginning of [its] growth in one way—i.e., the
unanimity in it. Its opposite should be rejected. We have
said, then, what moderation is and how it is ascribed to the
city. The fourth virtue remains, the investigation of which
goes back to the beginning of the matter, namely justice.
We say that equity in this city—and self-control, which
is the work of justice—is nothing more than what we were
saying it was in the previous account concerning the govern-
ance of this city. "Namely, we ourselves have already said
. man] MSS: part.
fone weer than himself and licentious] Following Plato 4gtb.
More literally, but less intelligibly: that he is more fully submissive in
his soul and that he is irreversible. ;
50.6 unanimity] Following Plato 432a; MSS: the quickness,
—_
43t
432ab
51.
Tt
o
20
25
The First Treatise 53
that every single one of the people in this city ought to lay
hold? onto [only] one ‘of the activities of the city7: namely
that activity to which he is disposed by nature. "This is
that’ equity which gives preservation and duration to the
city as long as it is to be found persisting in it, and it gives it
the three powers that we have finished discussing. This will
be when the opinion of the lords and the multitude concur
in ‘preserving! what the nomoi oblige them to, so that this
disposition comes to be found in the youth, women, slaves,
freeborn, rulers, and multitude, and in general in all its
parts. That is, every one of them will perform the activity
that is his by nature and will not long for what does not
belong to him. This being so, this city will be just in "their
associating together in it’, for the equity in it consists "only?
in every one of its citizens doing what is singularly his.
This is political justice; just as perversion in cities, which is
the cause of injustice, is nothing more than each and every
one of its citizens growing up in more than one thing and
transfering ‘from thing’ to thing, from activity to activity,
and from rank to rank—and this, notwithstanding that it is
thought not to be harmful to the city in the practical arts.
Its harm will be very evident in the transfer of classes from
one to the other, as when one who is parsimonious and
wealthy is transferred, [thanks] to his parsimony, so as to
enter the class of warriors or, even more, the class of chiefs.
This leads to many evils. You can make this clear | from
[what happens in these] cities. It has then been made clear
from this statement what justice is and that it is something
that exists spread over all parts of this city.
50.15 the three powers] Le., the three virtues,
50.21 Aristotle MNicomachean Ethics 5. 6-7. 1134025-1135a14. The
term “political justice” does not appear in the Republic,
50.26, 27 class] Plato’s eidos. Rather than the usual sig, hakhanah
is used here.
434
10
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 54
When he had finished making known the nature of justice
in cities, he set out to consider whether it is the selfsame
thing in the individual soul. If this in fact corresponds to
what was said of this in the city, then it is right. If not, then
he would reconsider what was said of this in the city. For
things differing [only] in smallness and greatness are of one
class, and there is nothing in the one that is contrary to
what is in the other. Hence whatever must necessarily be
justice and equity in the individual soul is the selfsame thing
in ‘the’ individual city.
He said: We have already said that equity in the city
consists in each of the three natures—i.e., the calculating
nature, the spirited nature, and the appetitive nature—
doing what is appropriate for it in the appropriate measure
and in the "appropriate’ time." It is on account of this? that
we say of this city that it is wise, courageous, and moderate.
Even if’ these three kinds exist in the individual soul, there
is neither self-control nor justice in the individual soul unless
these faculties exist in the true manner in which they exist
in the city, so that the cogitative part rules over the other
faculties and the other faculties are in submission to it. It is
clear from this that if these faculties were not in the soul it
would be impossible for them to be in the city, for these
things cannot exist in it other than through humans. It has
already been made clear in physics that there are two
opposing faculties in us: one, cogitation; the other, appetite.
This is evident in that we may have an appetite for some-
51.10 tebha* ha-habhanah—calculating, in the sense of reasoning,
deducing.
51.13 The faculties of the soul must be in the same relation to each
other as are their analogues in the virtuous city.
51.17-18 cogitation ,.. appetite] Plato 499d speaks of logismos and
alogiston. Aristotle De Anima 3. g. 432426 refers to logon and alogon. (Cf.
Nicomachean Ethics 1. 13. 1102a26-28: this is an exoteric distinction.) See
also De Anima 3. 10. 433a9 ff.
435
The First Treatise 55
thing and yet not do it. Appetite is partly desire and partly
20 spiritedness. It is also evident in that spiritedness oftens wars
against desire and rules over it as though it were an instru-
ment of ascendancy "by! which it [sc., cogitation] rules over
them. Hence it is that we frequently grow angry at what
the desires bring [us] to thoughtlessly. If all this is as we
have characterized it, these three faculties exist in the soul
in the way they do in the individual city. Indeed, the cause
of their being in the city is the very cause of their being in
25 the individual soul. The justice and equity in the individual
52
soul consist in every one of its parts doing what it has to do,
as is the case in the city. Hence the cogitative kind will be
ruling if it is wise or helped by the entire soul. And the
spirited kind will obey and submit to it, heatedly aroused
by it "and’ battling with the other kind [sc., the desiring
kind]. This harmony in the individual soul is achieved
through music and gymnastic. For gymnastic | strengthens
the spirited soul and gives it courage, while music renders it
disciplined, submissive to cogitation. If these two parts grow
up in accord with this description, they will turn to that
other part and discipline it. The particular individual is
called wise precisely on account of that part because of
5 which we called the city wise; and the names “courageous”
and “moderate” are predicated of the very same parts. For
the courageous individual is one who always preserves what
cogitation orders and commands him—by “always” I mean
through times of fears and anxieties and desires. "Thus', in
what has preceded, we have been defining political courage.
Similarly, the wise individual is only he in whom the
cogitative part forever rules over the other parts, ‘as’ is the
case Tin’ the city. Similarly, the case of the moderation of
ro the "particular? individual is the same as the case of the
51.21 thoughtlessly} Literally: without cogitation.
442cd
5
20
25
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 56
moderation of the city. Hence, the individual stamped with
the nature of this city will be of the utmost virtue just as
this city is of the utmost virtue.
It has then been made clear from this that the equity and
justice in the individual soul are identical with the equity
and justice in the city. From this it can be seen that the
deceit and injustice in the individual soul are identical with
the deceit and injustice in the ignorant cities. This is nothing
more than when one of these faculties’ that is not fit to rule
sets itself up as chief and rules over them, as when the
spirited soul or ‘the desiring soul’ rules. The case here is
like the case with the body’s health and disease. Just as its
health consists only in the equibalance of the humors and
nature’s ruling over it, and its disease consists ‘only’ in
their being dispersed contrary to nature and their ruling
over it, so is the case with the soul. Its health consists in its
linking up with the cogitative part, and its disease consists
in its [sc., some other part of the soul’s] ruling over it [sc.,
the cogitative part]. Thus virtue is some kind of health and
beauty, and vice is some kind of disease. Just as health is
one, so is virtue one. Hence the virtuous city is one. The
vices, however, are many and varied, just as the diseases
are many and varied. Hence the ignorant cities are many
and varied, save that they are comprehended under four
classes, according to what he says later on. The virtuous
governance has two designations: One is kingship, "and
that is when [there is only] one who is in charge of it. The
second is aristocracy’, and that is when ‘they have’ more
52.13-14 ignorant cities] Plato 444a-b speaks of lack of Jearning. See
note to 45.11, above.
52.25-26 aristocracy] Consider Averroes’ comments in his epitome
of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Kitab ‘ilm md ba‘d al-tabi‘a: “In general, the
case with the world is like the case with the city of good [men] [or: the
aristocratic city]. For even though it has many rulers, it ascends to a
single rulership and aims at a single end; otherwise it would not be one
44sed
go
53-
10
The First Treatise 57
chiefs than one. Having completed the statement con-
cerning the classes of virtues that are in this city, he returns
to what remains in the case of the guardians, namely the
inquiry concerning how they copulate, the upbringing of
their children, and the manner of their procreation.
We say that it is clear that if we wish the natures of these
guardians to be preserved through procreation—i.e., that
for the most part they should procreate their like—it cannot
be that they copulate with any chance women, | but [rather
only with] women who resemble them in nature "and who?
have grown up with something like that training. This is
obligatory not only for guardians but for each and every
class of citizens. Hence it is [a subject] fit for investigation
whether there exist among women natures resembling the
natures of each and every class of citizens—and in particular
the guardians—or whether women’s natures are distin+
guished from men’s natures. If the former is the case, then
as regards the activities of the city, women would have the
very same standing as men in those classes, so that there
would be among them warriors, philosophers, rulers, and
the rest. But if this is not the case, then women are only fit
in the city for activities that men in general are unfit for,
as if you were to say upbringing, procreation, and the like.
And we say that women, in so far as they are of one kind
with men, necessarily share in the end of man. They will
differ only in less or more; i.e., the man in most human
activities is more diligent than the women, though it is not
impossible that women should be more diligent in some
{city]. But just as it is in this way that the city continues to exist, so is
the case with the world. Hence the household cities (a/-mudun al-
manziliyya) decay quickly, for the unity that they possess is in a way only
accidental” (Compendio de Metafisica, ed. and Spanish trans. by Carlos
Quirés Rodriguez [Madrid: Maestre, 1919}, 4.39 [Arabic text, p. 145];
German trans. by S. Van den Bergh, Die Epitome der Metaphysik des
Averroes [Leiden: Brill, 1924], p. 123). See note to 79.1-8, below.
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 58
activities, such as is thought concerning the art of practical
music. That is why it is said of melodies that they are
perfected when men produce them and women do them
well. If this is so, and the nature of men and women is of one
kind, and the “nature” that is of one kind "turns’ to only
one activity in the city, then it is evident that the women in
this city will practice the [same] activities as the men,
except that they are weaker at it. Hence it is obligatory
that the less recondite activities be handed over to them.
This will be brought to light with evident clarity through
investigation. We see women sharing arts with men except
that they are weaker at it, although most of the women in
[some] art may be more diligent than the men, as in the art
of weaving, sewing, and other such ‘arts. As for! their
sharing in the art of war and the rest, why this is made clear
from the inhabitants of deserts and the “City of Women”
[Daghida]. Similarly, too, since some women are formed
5 with eminence and a praiseworthy disposition, it is not
impossible that there be philosophers and rulers among
them. Since it was thought that this class existed only
infrequently among them, some Laws ruled out women’s
being priests—i.e., the high priesthood. Some [other] Laws,
however, not ruling out [the possibility] of this existing
among them, rejected ‘this’. This is already clear from
investigation of the animals—i.e., that it is fitting that there
20
53-23 This is the famous “‘City of Women” whose inhabitants were
every bit as tough as the Jalaliqah (see note to 27.9, above). Idris!,
Nuzhah, MS Bibliothéque Nationale (Paris), No, 2221, fol. 344a, says
that it is an island in the Atlantic and can be reached from the city of
Daghida (among others), of which the Daghir (or Dajir!) of MS A
may be a variant. E!-Hajji, in his edition of al-Bakri, Geography, pp.
169-170, gives other references for the City of Women (Mahdi).
Rosenthal, accepting emendations of Baneth and Levi della Vida, trans-
lates “inhabitants of deserts and frontier villages.” See Rosenthal, 1966
reprinting, p. 165, n. 3.
53-24 eminence] or: clarity, purity. zkhith or zakith.
54
5
The First Treatise 459
be female guardians. This refers to the animals to whom we
previously compared the guardian. We see this | in female
dogs who guard what their males guard and strike at hyenas
just as their males strike at them, save that they are weaker
at this. That is why nature sometimes, but rarely, gives the
male an instrument with which he can fight that is not in
the female, "as is the case with the boar’, But since the
fighting instruments of those animals whose wont it is to
fight are for the most part common to the male and the
female, it [sc., nature] intends that the female also perform
this activity. The competence of women is unknown, how-
ever, in these cities since they are only taken ‘in them’ for
procreation and hence are placed at the service of their
husbands and confined to procreation, upbringing, and
suckling. This nullifies their [other] activities. Since waren
in these cities are not prepared with respect to any of the
human virtues, they frequently resemble plants in these
cities. Their being a burden upon the men ‘in these cities?
is one of the causes of the poverty of these cities. This is
because they are to be found there in double the number of
men, while not understanding through [their] upbringing
any of the necessary actions except for the few actions—like
the art of spinning and weaving—that they undertake
mostly at a time when they have need of them to make up
for their lack of spending [power]. This is all self-evident.
This being so—and it is clear from the case of the females
that they are to share with the males in war and the rest—it
is fitting that, in choosing them, we seek for those very
natures that we sought for in the men and that they should
be trained in the same way through music and gymnastic.
He said: They have no ‘cover’ on them when they [~
practice gymnastic with the men, since they will be devoid +57"
54-11 necessary] Le., in contradistinction to noble activities.
Averroes on Plato’s Republic : 60
of [everything save] virtue. When it became clear to "him?
that the women will stand guard "just as! the man does,
and that these female guardians will be with the men in
the same place—since none of those who are virtuous
guardians in this city has a dwelling "in which’ to isolate
himself—and that their meals are to be taken as one, he
said that necessity undoubtedly will bring them [sc., the
women] to desire copulation. But copulation ought not to
be permitted them whenever they wish and with whomever
they wish, since we wish that this activity be human among
them and that their copulations not be of any chance
character. The arrangement of their procreation wil! be the
best possible with respect to their conditions of guardian-
ship, but at fixed times and with determined individuals
and characteristics. ‘This is, as it were, common to the other
conventions and Laws, though as it appears the adherents
of the Laws differ from one another in the force of the
statements, We ourselves will explain here briefly what
Plato asserts about these things.
We say: As for the time during which these guardians
will engage in copulation, he holds that its determination
turns on the preservation of their kind. Thus also the
increase or diminution [in frequency} of copulation: this
varies in accord with the wars that occur | and other such
things that necessitate an increase in copulation or its
diminution. As for which individual in this city should
copulate with which other individual, why [they should be}
the "individuals? who resemble one another “with a view"
to preserving the good natures in their offspring. When one
54.21 he said] A new paragraph begins here in MS A.
54-21 to desire copulation} Plato 458d does not single out women in
this respect.
54-23 human] Plato 458d: holy.
54-26 adherents of the Laws] or: religionists. <
55-1, 2 individual(s)] prat, rather than the usual ish, is used here.
The First Treatise or
wishes to raise hunting dogs or raptorial birds, he takes care
to mate the excellent natures with the excellent nature so
that the offspring will be of that character. All the more
ought care to be taken of this matter in this city. This is
precisely why it ought not to be permitted in the city for
anyone, with a view to having children, to copulate at any
age he wishes, but fonly] during the prime years, namely—
as Plato says—from twenty to thirty in women and in men
from thirty to fifty-five. As for the arrangement under which
he holds it to-be proper for these guardians to copulate and
have children, why it is that these women be common to
all the men, no one woman living alone with one man as is
the case in these cities, and that their children also be
common. As for the community of women, it is to be of
this character: namely that the women dwell together with
all the men, only without ¢opulation being permitted them.
When the rulers hold that necessity points to procreation,
they order that weddings for grooms and brides be celebrat-
ed in the city. They bring sacrifices, offer donations, and
institute prayers in which they call on God (may He be
exalted!) that He may be gracious unto. them; and they
order that a poem be sung using verses and lines suitable
for weddings. In general they take the meetings of the
citizens [as occasions for] these gatherings. Then, after this,
the men and women gather together; and they [sc., the
rulers], acting subtly in the drawing of lots, draw lots among
them for the women. The drawing of lots makes it appear
that whatever befalls each and every woman is only some-
thing begotten by chance and accident. Thus [the men]
hold that [the women] are common to them [all], but in
55-4, 7 excellent, prime] The same word as that translated as
“virtuous.”
55-8 Plato 460c: A woman’s prime is from twenty to forty; a man’s
from twenty-five to fifty-five.
25
10
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 62
fact the drawing of lots concerns what is to be born among
comparable kinds. That is, the good kind of women are
allotted to the good kind of men, and the bad to the bad,
without any of the citizens other than the lords being aware
of this. (Galen has mentioned that there is a book ‘of his!
on this kind of drawing of lots; it is the one called Deceptive
Lottery.) By proceeding in this way two [advantageous]
things are joined: first, what they hold concerning the
community of women; second, the preservation of the good
nature in procreation. What can be imagined with regard
to one of these [classes] can be imagined as well in many
[other] respects. |
He said: Then the women ‘are separated” from the men
and dwell with those among them who are pregnant until
their delivery. When they have been delivered of children,
it is incumbent upon them not to see their children; the
offspring are transferred to one another or to governesses
and wet-nurses if the mothers do not have enough for
suckling. This "he did’ in order that they see that they
have their children in common so that every one of them
holds the offspring of all members of that? class to be his
children, and the children hold all these parents to be their
parents. And all this is for the sake of love. This being so,
there are no relatives in this city other than parents, grand-
parents, sons, daughters, grandchildren, brothers, and sis-
ters. This city has ranks: child is an acknowledged rank,
and parent is an acknowledged rank, and similarly the
rank of grandparents; so that all children wax in praise of
all the parents in the manner in which parents [customari-
ly] are esteemed, and the parents love all the children with
the love with which children [customarily] are loved. That
55-24 Deceptive Lottery] According to Baneth, the Hebrew corresponds
to qurat idhan.
56.9 child... and parent] or: son. . . and father.
Ld
20
25
The First Treatise 63
is why the copulations in this city are only between brothers
and sisters. "But the copulation of parents with children is
forbidden since they [sc., the children] are lower [im rank];
similarly that of children with parents since they [sc., the
parents] are higher [in rank]. And this is so "only? so that
parental esteem not be mixed with the contempt associated
with copulation, nor filial love with the love of [sexual]
desire. Once: ‘the children’s’ esteem for parents fails, the
city necessarily is ruined. This cause is operative in all
Laws, even though they differ from one another in deter-
mining this [and even though] their nomoi too are not
congruent with one another. Age is one of the conditions
laid down concerning copulation. As to whether one who
has passed the years for copulation [i.e., the prescribed
years for procreation] is permitted to copulate in the city
for the sake of ejecting the’superfluous [semen in his body]—.
since of the superfluities the ejection of this is most truly
necessary-—why there is room for inquiry here. Plato permits
it on condition that no offspring of theirs be seen [alive] in
the city. But this [copulation] too ought to be determined
according to what will preserve health. It is evident that
these weddings are to be repeated among them according
to the need for procreation—i.e., frequently or seldom—
since this city indeed is to be of a fixed size forever. This
also depends on how many women become pregnant at
each and every wedding. Galen, due to his ignorance of
Plato’s intention, became confused in trying to understand
from Plato whether or not these weddings ought to be
repeated. For if they are not repeated, each and every man
is left with a particular woman; and therewith the com-
munity [of women] ceases and mutual love is negated. Each
one of them will love to bring good things for his or her
spouse more than he will love doing so for others; and it
will turn into [a city of] households, not a single city. This
57-
10
1S
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 64
is clear to one who has been trained in this | science. This
being so, it is even more farfetched than all this to permit
an individual to dwell in a separate house, for no one in
this city possesses any thing of his own. Rather, the case of
their community is like the case of the community of the
limbs of the body. A man ought only to copulate with
women during those weddings for that measure of time
that he knows the woman is most likely to become impreg-
nated. This, then, is what Plato asserts concerning the
community of children and women.
Then, after this, he undertakes to bring proof of the
necessity of these communities. He begins, saying: He who
governs these cities is obliged in his governance to aim for
the greatest good for the city just as he ought to remove the
greatest evil from them. Now there is no greater evil in the
governance of the city than that governance which converts
a single city into many cities, just as there is no greater good
in cities than that which joins them together and makes
them one. This being so, it is clear that community in
advantages and damages will lead them to be bound to
the city and befriend it. This is because the citizens, if they
live, all live together, and if they are killed, are killed
together. Their joys and their sorrows in this are of a piece.
The separation of the citizens and the removal of each from
his fellow in such matters as these confuses them and
destroys their assemblage. This is when some of them are
joyful and others of them sorrowful, even sometimes [going
to the point] that some of them rejoice in the sorrow of
others. That is why it is said that people’s being near other
people is advantageous. In general, there is nothing more
productive of evil and confusion to the city than its citizens’
saying of some particular thing, “This is mine and this is
not mine.” As for the cities in which what is laid down for
one is laid down for the association [as a whole] and what
462
20
25
go
58.
The First Treatise 65
befalls him is closer to being what befalls all, why that is the
city that is joined, compounded together, and natural. For
the case of the community between the parts of these cities
and the cities is like the case of the community between the
limbs of an animal’s body and the rest of the body as regards
pain and pleasure. The entire body is pained by a single
finger’s hurt so that this pain is confirmed upon the whole
body and one says that it is feeling weak. The same is the
case with joys and pleasures. All this being as we have
characterized it and since the cities whose association we
wish to be virtuous ought to be of this kind, why it is evident
that that community of children and women of which we
have spoken is one of the most necessary of things. For it
will not be possible for any one of these guardians to
designate another as either unrelated to him or as a relative.
Rather, every one of them whom he encounters he will hold
to be his father or grandfather or mother or grandmother
or brother or sister or son or daughter. Hence, as we have
said, they will treat parents with shame before them and
esteem of them as prescribed by the general nomos. This is
the greatest good for the city—i.e., that in joys | and
damages its parts be to its whole as the case of the limbs of
a single body to the body. The case of the community of
children and women resembles their community of proper-
ty. That is why we said that it is not fitting that any one of
them have a dwelling of his own or something by which he
would be isolated so that one of them would dwell in his
house without ‘the others’ as much as it was possible for
him to do so, and the others also would do likewise. Still
less ought he to have a child of his own and women of his
own [for thereby] evils of his own and damages of his own
will come to pass, sometimes Tbeing'—as we have said—a
cause of the growth of evils besetting others. This is the
cause of the disputes occurring among citizens of this city
10
20
25
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 66
over money, children, and women. It is evident that if all
the things in this city are in accord with this, then it will
remove envy and hatred from them as well as poverty and
the other evils found in these cities. Hence there will be no
need in them {sc., the citizens of this city] for instituting
fines on account of the taking of property, theft, and other
such things as occur in these cities. Rather, these people are
of the utmost elevation and happiness. They are indeed
happy. They are beset by none of the evils besetting the
citizens of these cities. All of this is self-evident to one who
has investigated these associations.
After it became clear to him that these communities [of
children, women, and property] were necessary and that
the women ought to guard along with the men—i.e., the
women of the guardians—whether standing guard in the
city or going out to war, just as female dogs do with their
males—i.e., that they share with them in everything having
to do with guardianship—he undertook to investigate
whether their children [too] ought to go out to war for the
sake of becoming expert in it by observing them, as is done
in the other arts, so that when they had become perfected
they would begin doing it. This happens in many of the
arts, such as the art of smiths and others, who keep their
children in their presence so that they might for a time
observe them and what comes out of it [sc., the art]. ‘This
is prior to their doing anything [themselves], for there is no
‘small’ difference between learners who contemplate the
crafts from the very outset and those who do not observe.
Since this exists in the other arts, all the more should this be
the case with the guardians’ children, considering that we
wish guardians of the utmost expertness to emerge from
them. Moreover, when their children go out to war their
58.8 women] Plato 464e: relatives.
59-
10
The First Treatise 67
zeal for killing is strengthened, as one sees happening with
most animals. When fighting in the presence of its offspring,
it becomes more emboldened thereby than by all other
things. However, it is not intended that the youths, on
account of their softness and weakness, should be killed
while attending the parents or that they should on occasion
endanger ‘their [parents’] lives’, Hence their parents, who
possess the requisite knowledge, ‘ought’ to consider | [the
chances of} war. Whoever among them [sc., the youth] is
timid will not go forth to it, and whoever of them is without
timidity will go forth to it. Also, this is to occur [only]
Fafter’ they have become proficient at riding horses. We
shall cunningly provide for their security [by making them
mount] old horses, and they shall be in a place from which
they may view the battle. They shall lay down nomoi in
this city that anyone who leaves the center of battle or
throws away ‘his! arms or does any act of cowardice and
weakness shall come back to be one of the artisans who
work with their hands. As for whichever of them is seized
prisoner, we only deliver him to the enemies without our
caring about him evermore since he has so entangled him-
self on his own that he was caught as a ram is caught. Hence
a nomos ought ‘to be laid down" that they are not to strip
the dead, for many an army has been lost through this
activity—excepting whichever of them takes his [sc., the
slain’s}] weapons, needing to take weapons only because his
own knife or sword has been broken. And Plato permits
every one of these guardians, while in camp, to welcome
59-6-10 The reason given for indifference to the fate of soldiers held
prisoner by the enemy is Averroes’ own. In leaping over from 468a to
46gc-d, Averroes may be suggesting that soldiers are captured and
armies defeated because they are diverted from the fighting by the
prospect of battlefield looting. Such prisoners are not worth a moment’s
thought.
468a
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 68°
whomever he wishes and kiss him for this will lead therm to
fight [more eagerly].
He said: It is fitting that the choicest of these guardians
be honored with singular honors in the city, with sacrifices
and offerings being brought to thern and eulogies and songs
composed about them. "As for! those of them who die in
war, why it is obligatory to speak of those who die in this
way as turning into angels walking on earth, pure and holy,
guarding humans against falling into evils and vices. It is
also fitting to "bury? them in a unique manner and in a
unique place and to use their "tombs’ as temples in which
to pray. Something like this is done with one who has died
otherwise than through having been killed [in battle] if he
was praiseworthy in conduct.
When he completed this he investigated whether the
citizens ought to enslave one who was of their class and
The First Treatise 69
unbelievers. What Plato asserts differs from what many
Lawgivers assert.
He said: As for any not of their class, why it is permissible
for the guardians to do all these acts to them. This, then, is #7?"
the explanation of what Plato says concerning the training |_
of this particular class of the city—i.e., the guardians—and
how there is community among them. You ought to know
that much of what he says concerning community and
upbringing in music and gymnastic is common to all classes
of the city, even though gymnastic differs from class to class.
Similarly with the fictions that they transmit to them
through music: namely that every kind be moved by the
affective speeches only toward the activity designated for it
by nature. Only Plato does not lay this down so as to
mention these things for each and every class of citizens
since this depends in proximate potentiality on what he
[spoke] their language in common with them—by “class” +— said about the guardians, What we have yet to set apart in
I mean the stock and the place—or whether the brunt of #75) discourse is the speech concerning the class of the wise, as
war upon them ought to reach [the point of] burning down
their houses and cutting down ‘their trees’. He said that it
was not fitting that this class, which is one, do this to its
own class. Thus, it is not fitting that Greeks, for example,
enslave Greeks, burn down their houses, and cut down their
trees. It is more fitting that what is like this be called
severing and mutilation rather than be called war, for such
a war resembles the strife that breaks out between members
of a single household or between lovers. | When, therefore,
this strife breaks out among some class of people, the
guardians ought to lay down a nomos for them not to
destroy their houses, cut down their trees, or enslave them.
These are to be called ones who have gone astray, not
59.16 angels] A near-quotation from Hesiod in Plato 46ga is further
altered by Averroes’ substituting “angels” for “demons.”
he did subsequently. We shall speak concerning the recog-
60.4. The command to exterminate idolaters ought to be understood
as an act required by ‘human opinion,” not as an expression of God’s
vengefulness, according to Maimonides, Guide, I 54. (66a) (Pines tr.,
pp. 126 f,). Consider also Averroes’ remarks on extirpative war in his
Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, 1137524: “And you can
understand this from the laws laid down with respect to war in the Law
of the Muslims because the command in it pertaining to war is very
general to such a point that they destroy, root and branch, whoever
differs with them. Now there are times in which peace is more to be
preferred than war. However, since the Muslim multitude make this
edict of war generally valid despite the impossibility of destroying their
enemies completely, great damage has attained them on account of
their ignorance of the intention of the Lawgiver, the blessings of God
be upon him. It is therefore proper to say that peace is preferable at
times to war.” The Hebrew text and English translation appear in the
review of Rosenthal by Lawrence V. Berman, Oriens, 20 (1968-1969):
439. This subject is treated with delicacy in Avicenna, Metaphysics, 10. 5
(453-2-454.2) (MPP, pp. 108 f.).
i 59.18 pray} Plato 46ga: worship at the tombs as at those of demons. 60.7-12 See note to 49.1-5, above.
Averroes on Plato’s Republic jo
nition of the natures that are disposed to this; and what is
15 the manner of training them; and, when they have become
perfected, what is the manner of their rule and lordship
over the city. We make this the conclusion of the first
treatise of this epitome. The Second Treatise
Since this governance can only come into being if it is
possible—and perchance happens—that the king is a phi-
losopher, and since this also holds for ‘its’ preservation
after it has come into being, and since it was his intention
20 to speak of the natures of these [individuals] and the manner
of their education, he began first by describing the philoso-
; pher. He said: He is the one who longs for knowledge of
what is and inquiry into its nature apart from matter. This
may be discerned, according to his opinion, in the statement
concerning forms. You ought to know that the philosopher,
according to the primary intention, is the one who has
attained the theoretical sciences [by virtue of] the four
e4 conditions that have been enumerated in the book on
f 25 demonstration. One of those conditions is that he have the
ability to discover them [sc., the theoretical sciences] and
|
to teach them. There are two ways of teaching them: One
of them is the way of teaching the elect few; this is teaching
by demonstrative arguments. The second is the teaching of
61. the multitude; this is teaching | by persuasive and poetical
arguments. It is evident that this will not be fulfilled in him
unless he is wise in practical science and moreover has the
cogitative virtue by which those things that have been
explained in practical science are brought about in nations
and cities, and has the great moral virtue by which the
5 governance of cities and justice are chosen. Hence, if the
i 60.26 See 25.14-33, above.
7
10
15
20
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 72
philosopher longs to reach his ultimate perfection, this will
come to be if he has already attained both the theoretical
and practical sciences and both the moral and cogitative
virtues, and especially the greatest of them.
[The term] “king” initially indicates, in [its] primary
intention, the one who rules in cities. It is evident that the
art by which he controls the governance of cities will be
completed only if all these conditions are combined in him.
The case of the Lawgiver is also like this. Although this
word initially indicates one who has the cogitative virtue
by which practical things are brought about in nations and
cities, he has need of those [same] conditions. Hence these
names are, as it were, synonymous—i.e., “philosopher,”
“king,” “Lawgiver”; and so also is “Imam,” since imam in
Arabic means one who is followed in his actions. He who is
followed in these actions by which he is a philosopher, is
an Imam in the absolute sense. As to whether it should be
made a condition that he be a prophet, why there is room
here for penetrating” investigation, "and we shall investi-
gate’ it in the first part of this science, God willing. Perhaps
if this were so, it would be with respect to what is preferable,
not out of necessity. As it has already been made clear what
the philosopher is, and as it has already been made clear
that only such people as these can be the ruler of this
virtuous city and govern over it, we ought to mention the
61.8-16 Farabi, Attainment, 41.17-43-19 (MPP, pp. 78 f.); Virtuous
Cily, 59.11-19 (Dieterici tr., p. 94). Where Averroes has “Lawgiver,”
he who lays down the Law, Farabi has “‘legislator,”” he who lays down
the nomoi.
61.17 penetrating investigation] Averrocs’ disinclination to commit
himself here on this point suggests that one ought not simply to assume
as necessarily divinely revealed that shari‘a brought by the Lawgiver
mentioned a few lines above.
61.22 Compare the following account with Farabi’s enumeration in
Allainment, 44.15-45-9 (MPP, p. 80); and Virtuous City, 59.14-60.11
(Dieterici tr., pp. 94-96).
25
go
62.
10
The Second Treatise 73
qualities that will be found in these chiefs by nature. They
are the natural conditions in a king. One of them—and this
is the most distinctive—is that he be disposed by nature to
the study of the theoretical sciences. This will be if, by his
natural disposition, he can recognize what is essential and
distinguish it from what is accidental. The second, that he
be retentive, not forgetful. For it is impossible for anyone
lacking these two qualities to learn anything. That is be-
cause he will not cease being always weary to the point that
he abandons learning and reading. The third, that he love
learning and choose it and have a wonderful longing for all
parts of science. For as he says, one who longs very much
for a thing will want all of its kinds; for example, the lover
of wine desires all [kinds of] wine, and similarly the lover of
women. The fourth, that he love truth and hate falsehood.
For he who loves knowledge of what is, | as such, is a lover
of truth; and he who loves truth cannot be a lover of false-
hood; hence he whose way this is, will not be a lover of
falsehood. The fifth, that he despise the sensual desires. For
when someone’s desire fixes on something with the utmost
intensity, his soul is deflected from the other desires. Simi-
larly with these, since they already incline with all their
‘souls! toward study. The sixth, that he not be a lover of
money. For [love of] money is a desire, and desires are not
becoming in these people. The seventh, that he be of
enlarged thought. For one who yearns for knowledge of the
whole and of all things that are and does not wish [his}
knowledge of things to be limited to whatever is affirmed
on the basis of unexamined opinion is [indeed] of very
enlarged thought. Hence there is no proportion whatever
{of anything] to this cogitative soul. The eighth, that he be
courageous. For one who has no courage will be unable to
despise the nondemonstrative arguments on which he has
grown up, and especially if he has grown up in these cities.
20
25
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 74
The ninth, that he be so disposed that he moves on his own
toward whatever he holds to be good and beautiful, such as
justice and the other virtues. This is so if his appetitive soul
has firm faith in thought and cogitation.
To be added to these is that he be eloquent so that his
tongue lead him [to express] whatever is in his "thoughts?
while he is speculating. Moreover, he should be able to
light quickly upon the middle term.
These, then, are the conditions of the soul that are
stipulated for these people. As for the conditions of the body,
why they are those very conditions that were stipulated for
the guardians with a view to the good and improvement of
the physique. He is fit to rule over this city in whom these
conditions have been combined from the outset of his being
and who, in addition, chanced to grow up in the kind of
governance that he [sc., Plato] describes later on. On
account of all this, the existence of people such as these is
infrequent; and that is the cause of the difficulty [attending]
this city’s existence. Someone might say: If the existence of
this city can only come about if people such as these happen
to exist, and their existing with these qualities [is contingent
on] their having grown up in this city, why then there is no
way in which this city can come into being. What we were
laying down ‘in speech? and had then thought to be
possible is [now seen to be] impossible. The answer is that
62.16 eloquent] Averroes has made this a leading theme in his
Decisive Treatise. Plato’s several enumerations of the qualities necessary
in a philosopher or guardian or tyrant make no mention of eloquence.
(Compare Republic 485a-487a, as well as 374¢-376c, and Laws yoge-
710c.) But this does appear in Farabi’s enumeration in Virtuous
City, 59.21, 59.5-6 (Dieterici tr., pp. 95, 94)- See also Farabi, Attainment,
44-6-13 (MPP, pp. 79 f.); and Maimonides, Guide, 1 34 (41a) (Pines tr,
p. 78). The importance of rhetoric in the political science of the Salasi fa
is discussed briefly by Leo Strauss in “Quelques remarques sur la science
politique de Maimonide et de Fardbi,” Revue des Etudes Fuives, 100
(1936): 37, additional note to p. 26, n. 3.
go
63.
10
The Second Treatise : 75
it is possible for "individuals' to grow up with these natural
qualities that we have attributed to them—developing,
moreover, so as to choose the general common nomos that
not a single nation can help choosing; { and besides, their
particular Law would not be far from the human Laws;
[if these conditions are fulfilled] wisdom would have been
completed in their time. This is as matters are in this time
of ours and in our Law. If it should happen that the likes of
these come to rule for an infinite time, it is possible for this
city to come into being. When it became clear to him
through argument that this city’s existence necessitates that
those ruling over it be wise, he turned to investigate the
cause on account of which these cities, presently existing,
do not receive any advantage from philosophers and the
wise. He said that this is for two causes. [2] One is because
these cities neither heed the bidding of the wise who are
truly wise nor look to them [for anything). He said, by way
62.29-63.1 See 57.29 (“general nomos”), 47.27-28, and 26.16
(“human Laws”), above. Consider Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 5. 7.
1134b18-1135a5. Farabi concludes his summary of Book VII of Plato’s
Laws with these words; “Then he set out, after that, to explain that
Traditions are of two classes: a class that pertains to the Law of cach
one of the legislators according to their need in their times and the
states of their cities; and [the second] Traditions that do not change and
do not alter, and they are natural. He spoke profusely in this con-
nection, and introduced for that examples relating to kindred, ingrat-
itude for favors, and the like” (Plato’s Laws, 36.15-18). The general
common nomos is something like a natural standard, a set of rules
common to all times and places, without which any kind of lasting
human association would be impossible. It does not aim high. Under
certain special circumstances, under the guidance of qualified leaders,
it is possible for men to go beyond this. They will then come close to the
human Laws, The latter, however, can only be approximated and never
made universal; they are the laws by which philosophers govern
themselves. See Pines, pp. 70 f.; the lengthy analysis in Leo Strauss,
Persecution and the Art of Writing (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1952),
Pp. 95-141; and International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, s.v. “Nat-
ural Law.”
483
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 76
of giving a simile: [The relation of] the wise to the citizens
of these cities is like that of a pilot, expert in the science of
navigation, who can find no one to learn it or to make use
of navigation. The sailors assert that navigation is not some-
thing that can be taught; nor is it an art entitling its master
to become ruler over the sailors. Rather, if someone says to
them that this art can be taught, they ‘will despise him’
and shun him. "Later on? someone who holds this opinion
of navigation comes to be pilot of the ship, either by coercing
the sailors or by something else through which one comes to
power. If the ship is ruled by people such as those, will they
The Second Treatise 7
in these cities from [pursuing] philosophy. The case here is
like the case of many of the sick whose disease is aggravated
by excellent food. Similarly, if the proper place and nutri-
ment are not found for them, the seeds of the best plants
will turn into the very worst of the bad kinds. Such is the
case with these virtuous natures when they grow up in these
cities and are badly educated. Hence the causes of the great
evils in these cities are none other than these ‘individuals’.
For the sluggish nature cannot be aroused to perform some-
thing great; similarly, the "mean-'spirited ; while the intem-
perate is even further from this. From this class of humans
then not turn away from the leader who is truly a leader 10 originate the sophists who rule over cities, blaming the
and sometimes [even] despise him? Just so is the situation of beautiful things such as wisdom and the rest, and praising
' the wise in these cities among their citizens. For their rank t- the base things and in general all the political evils laid
d 20 among them is that of physicians among the sick—[the ar down in cities. Their thought and their rulership over the
a: latter] not considering medicine to be the art of healing and cities: this indeed is the greatest of the causes for the loss of
t hence not holding the physicians in esteem. If the physicians wisdom and the extinguishing of its light. In investigating
4 tell them ‘that? they can be healed, they stone them [to such individuals as these, let it not be hidden from you that
i. | death]. Hence the work of the medical art will not be they constitute the larger portion [of the virtuous natures]
Ps perfected unless the sick are fully bound to and do submit to in these cities. If, nonetheless, one of these natures in these [~
| a the physicians. For whoever is ill undoubtedly needs to go cities is saved, and you said that it is God who singled him 492°
; 25 to the physicians’ doors, ‘as he says’. Such is the situation |_ out through His 'eternal' providence, you would have made |_
of the wise among the citizens. This, then, is one cause why 15 @ correct statement. As for those given over to philosophy
citizens today receive no advantage from the wise who are without these qualities having been completed in them, why
truly wise. [6] The second cause is the defectiveness of most the case with them is also evident. Not only does one receive
of those giving themselves to wisdom, if they lack [even] one no advantage from them in cities, but they are also the most
of those qualities that we said were conditions of the wise harmful of things for wisdom. That is because for the most
i. one who is truly wise. It is rare that there is one in whom [— part they incline one way—toward the desires and toward
5 these qualities exist to perfection; and even when he is to be *%* base actions in general, like violence and oppression. For
4 go found it is with difficulty "that this knowledge—i.e.,’ phi-
losophy—is perfected in him. Those virtuous qualities are,
64. of all things, what most hinder | many of those growing up
64.7-8 mean-spirited] Literally: the small-souled.
64.16-22 On philosophizing by those who are not ready for it, see
Ibn Tufayl, Hayy, p. 155 (MPP, p. 161); and Averroes, Decisive Treatise,
5-19-22, 17.15-20, 18.7-10 (MPP, pp. 168, 178). Much of Farabi’s
discussion of the “weeds” in virtuous cities is apposite here (Political
Regime, 104.7-107.19 [MPP, pp. 53-56).
63.19-24. See also Averroes, Decisive Treatise, 22.21-23.1 (MPP,
p. 182),
20
25
65.
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 78
they have no virtue in and of themselves that would restrain
them from these actions; nor will they speak truly in the
tales with which they frighten the citizens "while bringing
about these things" [sc., violence and the like]. They will be
a disgrace to wisdom and a cause of much harm to which-
ever of them is fit for it, as is the case in this time of ours. If
it happens that a true philosopher grows up in these cities,
he is in the position of a man who has come among perilous
animals. He is not obliged to do harm along with them, but
neither is he sure in himself that those animals will not
oppose him. Hence he turns to isolation and lives the life of
a solitary. The best perfection is missing in him, for that can
be attained by him only in this city that we have described
in speech.
It has become evident from this statement what the na-
ture of the philosopher is, and because of what we adjudge
the name “philosopher” [to someone], and that there is no
way of saving the cities unless | people such as these rule
over them. With this the cause why it is difficult for this city
to come into being has become evident, and [also] how it
happens that this nature [sc., the philosophic nature] is
accidentally harmful. It is now fitting that we return to the
manner of educating this particular kind—namely the
ruling kind—in this city. There is no way of understanding
the correctness in their education and upbringing unless it
is known what end this kind of humans strive for in their
governance. We hold it to be indispensable that we know
this first. [Only] then is it possible for us to speak of the
64.23-26 Avempace, Governance, 11.9-14, 78.6-12 (MPP, pp. 128,
4132); Ibn Tufayl, Hayy, pp. 153 £. (MPP, pp. 160 f.); Maimonides,
Guide, IL 36 (79b) (Pines tr., p. 372).
64.28 In the ensuing discussion (64.28-74.12), Averroes moves away
from an exposition that relies in any obvious way on Plato’s text. The
“corresponding passage in the Republic is 497b-511€, where among other
things the discussion is of the ideas and the divided line.
15
20
The Second Treatise 79
details of that in which they are to be educated. For he who
does not know the end necessarily cannot know what leads
to it. Although this investigation would be "more™ appro-
priate in the first part of this science, I deer it appropriate
that I mention some of it here.
We say: Since man is one of the natural beings there
necessarily must be some end for the sake of which he
exists. For every natural being has an end, as has been
explained in physics—all the more so man, who is the most
noble of them. Since the city is necessary for man’s existence,
he can attain this end only inasmuch as he is part of a city.
It is evident that this end, inasmuch as it pertains to one
being, is necessarily one. [This will be] either [a] in kind—so
that it belongs to each and every one of the people, as far as
number is concerned, this being what we see of the end,
which whether sufficiently or insufficiently, is one in num-
ber; or [4] in relationship—i.e., if many perfections are for
the sake of one perfection and some of them for the sake of
others—for this is one in that the many things by it are
[made] one. If man is not of more than one kind, and if the
human perfections are manifold in this aspect of existence,
and if it were possible that all of them be attained by all
people, why it is evident that every one of the people would
exist only for his own sake. Accordingly, it would be neces-
sary that there would be only one rank of humans in a city.
Perhaps this is impossible. If the attainment of all or most
of them [sc., the human perfections] is possible for only some
people, while nature limits the others to something different
than the fulfillment of the perfections, it is evident that the
65.13-14 Medigo (apparently reading medini rather than ha-medinah)
translates: But because man, from the necessity of his being, is political,
that end comes to him inasmuch as he is part of a city.
65.23-26 Farabi, Political Regime, 74.3-75-3, 78.1-79.9, 83.11-84.9
(MPP, pp. 35 f., 39)-
25
go
66.
10
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 80
second kind of humans are lorded over and the first kind
lord it. For their relationship to each other is identical with
the relationship of those very perfections "in! the individual
soul—i.e., that some of them are for the sake of others. The
things that humans may possibly consider as the end are
undoubtedly infinite, but of this we ourselves will only
specify what is generally accepted in this time of ours.
We say: [a] [Some] humans ‘assert’ that the end of man
is nothing more than preserving and protecting their bodies
and preserving their senses. Their association is solely a
Tnecessity-'association, and their end that they ‘aim’ at is
a “necessary” end. [6] Others assert that it is not appropriate
for man | to be limited in his existence to what is necessary;
rather, he has an end that has something better in it than
existence at the level of the necessary. This is in accord with
what is the case with many of the natural beings. For an
animal is given sight for the sake of what is preferable, not
on account of necessity—contrary to the case regarding the
sense of touch, for it is impossible for an animal to exist
without this sense. The people who hold this opinion con-
cerning the end of man are divided into parts: [1] [some]
humans ‘hold’ that it is wealth; [2] [other] people hold
that it is honor; [3] [still] others assert that it is pleasure.
Those who hold that it is pleasure are divided into two
parts: [a’] [some] humans assert that it is the delight of the
senses (they are closer to unexamined opinion); and [6’]
others think that it is the delight of the intelligible. [4]
Others assert that the end of man is only that he lord it
over others and rule them, while acquiring all the goods of
pleasure, wealth, honor, and whatever else they assert to be
[desirable]. [5] What the Laws existing in this time of ours
65.29-31 For the necessity-association or the indispensable associ-
ation, see Farabi, Political Regime, 88.4-139 (MPP, pp. 42 f.); and
Virtuous City, 62.4-6 (Dieterici tr., p. 98).
15
The Second Treatise or
assert concerning this matter is [that the end of man is
doing] what God (may He be exalted!) wills, but that the
only "way! of knowing this matter of what it is God wills of
them is prophecy. And this [sc., what God wills], if you
reflect on the Laws, is divided into abstract knowledge
alone—such as what our Law commands concerning knowl-
edge of God (may He be exalted !)—and action— such as
what it forewarns concerning the [moral] qualities. Its
intention regarding this purpose [sc., action] is identical
with the intention of philosophy in genus and purpose.
That is why humans assert that these Laws only follow
ancient wisdom. It is evident that, in the opinion of all
these, the good, the bad, the useful, the harmful, the
beautiful, and the base are something existing by nature,
- not by convention. For whatever leads to the end is good
20
25
and beautiful, and whatever hinders one from it is bad and
base, This is clear from these Laws and particularly this
Law of ours. Many of those of our region hold "this opinion.
concerning this Law of ours’,
As for the people of our nation? known as Mutakallimin,
their Legal inquiry led them to [the position] that what
God wills has no definite nature and merely turns on what
the will—i.e., the will of God (may He be exalted !)—-lays
down for it. According to this, there is nothing beautiful or
base other than by fiat. Furthermore, there is no end of man
other than by fiat. What brought them to this was their
thinking of defending the attributes with which God (may
He be exalted!) is described in the Law, to the effect that
66.15 commands] MS 4 adds: us.
66.21 The reference is to the Mut‘tazilites, who hold that the Law
prescribes what is according to nature or reason.
66.22 our nation] MS A: our faith.
66.23 Legal inquiry] L.e., theorizing from the standpoint of the Law.
See Averroes, Decisive Treatise, 1.7 (MPP, p. 165).
go
67.
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 82
He is capable of doing whatever He wills, and that it is
possible for the [divine] will to extend to all things, including
particulars as well. Hence all things are possible. What
happened to them happens often in Legal inquiry. That is,
God (may He be exalted!) is first described by [certain]
attributes. Then one seeks to make what exists agree [with
the teaching] without "upsetting? whatever of those attri-
butes has been laid down. But these [people] are distressed
in [trying] to discover the explanation of this question if
these things that they consider clearly evident in the Law
are as they believe. As a result this leads them | to an
opinion close to sophistry, very far from the nature of man,
and far from being the content of a Law. These, then, are
the opinions of the multitude concerning the end of man,
which is his happiness. The realization of their absurdity is
readily grasped. As for the opinions of the philosophers, we
shall mention them when we come to investigate that where-
in they differ since their controversy is ‘only’ over the
rational part of the soul. We return to the subject under
consideration and investigate the end that is truly the end
after accepting what ought to be accepted from the physicist
concerning this, for thereby we perceive the proper measure
of what can be seen of this through this science.
We say that he who possesses this science joins with the
66.28 particulars as well} Other MSS: It extends only to partic-
ulars.
67.1 Averroes, Decisive Treatise, 2319-24-13, 25.18-19 (MPP,
pp. 183 f., 185); Maimonides, Guide, I 71 (g5ab, 97b), 73; tenth premise
(112b-114b) (Pines tr., pp. 178 £., 182, 206-209). See 30.26-29, above.
67.4 The opinions of the philosophers are here distinguished from
all of the foregoing-—i.e., not only from the views of the dialectical
theologians, but from alt of the opinions catalogued since 65.29. From
this standpoint, all of the foregoing opinions are “generally accepted,
endoxa, “opinions of the multitude.” iat
67.8 For the themes of the following excursus (continuing to 74.12),
see Aristotle Physics 2. 1-2. 1g2b-194b, 8. 198b—rgga, 3. 1. 200b-201b;
De Anima 2. 1-4. 412a-415b, 3. 5. 4304, 9-11. 4328-4348; Nicomachean
The Second Treatise 83
physicist in inquiry concerning this object of search. For
10 physics considers this end in so far as it is a perféction for
the body and compares it with the other perfections if there
be more than one perfection for it. As for the human per-
fections, nothing ‘of them’ exists by nature save the dis-
positions alone or the beginnings leading to their [sc., the
perfections’] attainment. There is no sure sufficiency in
nature that these completions will reach us in their per-
fection; rather, they reach [us] only through will and
15 skillfulness. He who possesses this science also considers it
from this aspect—i.e., from the aspect that its efficient cause
is choice and will. This being so, I say that it has already
been made clear in physics that man is composed of soul
and body; and that the rank of the body relative to the soul
is that of matter, and the rank of the soul relative to it is
that of form; and that matter is for the sake of form, and the
form is for the sake of the actions or the passions resulting
from it [sc., the form]. This being so, man’s perfection and
end are to be found in the actions that necessarily result
20 from it [sc., the soul]. But it has been explained there that
the actions pertaining to man are [of two kinds]: Either [a]
they are common to ‘him’ and to other natural beings, be
they simple or compound ([these] common [actions] neces-
sarily resulting from common forms) ; or [4} they are specifi-
cally his (these necessarily resulting from a specific form or
forms). It was explained there that the thing that man has
in common with the simple bodies is the faculty of incli-
25 nation. The inclination resulting from this faculty in this
form is not a soul, nor do the actions resulting from it belong
to the soul. As for what man has in common with the
compound bodies, why it was explained there that it neces-
Ethics 1. 1. 1094a, 7. 1097a—-1098a, 13. 110za—1 toga, 3. 2. TUtb-1112a,
6. 1-2. 113gab, 10. 6-7. 1176a-1178a. “Physics,” as used here, refers
broadly to natural science.
30
68,
10
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 84°
sarily is a soul. These bodies are of two kinds: plants and
animals. The plants have in common with him the nutritive,
vegetative, and generative soul. As for the animals, they
have in common with him the faculties of sensation and
locomotion. As for the appetitive [faculties], they have them
in common with him in certain respects and are set apart
from him in other respects. | As for what distinguishes man,
it was made evident there that it is necessarily the "rational
faculty, and that this has two parts—practical reason and
scientific reason. It was also made evident there that the
rank of these common forms relative to the specific forms is
that of matter relative to form; and that man is what he is
only on account of his specific form since this is the way with
every being. For it is through its specific form that it is what
it is, and from it result the actions that are specific to it. This
having been laid down, the good and bad in a thing exist in
only one class of its actions. An example of this is that a
melody’s good [quality] only comes from striking a chord
and its bad [quality] from this very action. [In the same
way] the good and bad of a man’s action are necessarily to
be found only in the action specific "to him’. This being so,
a man’s end and happiness [are attained] only if those of his
actions that are specific to him are realized by him in the
utmost goodness and excellence. That is why it is said in the
definition of happiness that it is an activity of the rational
soul that is in accord with what is required by virtue. And
since the parts of the rational soul—in accord with what has
been explained there—are more than one, the virtues are of
more than one kind and the "human’ perfections are of
more than one perfection. For it has been explained there
that it has two parts, practical reason and scientific reason.
Some perfections, accordingly, are theoretical and others
practical. But since the appetitive part is one of the parts of
the soul, it comes about that man is aroused by what inquiry
20
25
go
69.
The Second Treatise 85
requires of him and is connected with it. In this respect, too,
it [sc., the appetitive part] is related to reason. There are,
then, three perfections: theoretical virtues, moral virtues,
and practical ‘arts’. But the practical ‘arts! are of two
kinds. One kind, in order to realize its actions in matter,
needs nothing more than knowledge of the general rules of
the art. The [other] kind additionally needs for the existence
of its actions cogitation and thought about the general rules
with which it is associated. For since this [takes place] with
each and every individual affected by the art and according
to the time, place, "and the rest’ connected with it, this
part of reason necessarily differs from the other part, and
its perfection is not [the other’s] perfection. The perfections,
then, are four: theoretical virtues, practical ‘arts', cogita-
tive virtues, and moral virtues. It is already seen from this
argument that the humari perfections are more than one.
But as we have said, if they are perfections of only one being,
then of necessity some of them must be for the sake of others;
[and this] regardless of whether their existence is possible in
all individual men or it is only possible for some [of these
perfections to be found] in some and leaving aside the fact
that it is evident that they are not possible in all individual
humans. Each [particular] kind of them is only possible in
[some particular] class of people, except '—by God!— for
some of the moral virtues, which are common [to all], like
moderation. "Hence! it is obligatory that these classes of
people be arranged in accord with the order of these kinds
of moral virtues, | the meaner of them being for the sake of
the more excellent, since the character of their order in a
particular individual will be the same as their order in many
individuals. This conforms with what the necessity of asso-
ciation brings about in human existence: [namely those]
68.18 three perfections] See 22.9-11, above.
68.27 See 65.23-26, above.
10
15
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Averroes on Plato’s Republic 86
who excel in all the virtues. For if there were in every
individual the possibility of attaining all these virtues—each
and every one of them necessarily attaining them—each
would be serving and served, lord and lorded over. Nature
would have done something in vain since they all would
have the disposition to be lords. This is impossible since of
necessity a lord must have someone there who is lorded over.
If it were possible for these perfections to be combined in
one man, this would be considered difficult if not miracu-
lous. The usual situation is that each and every kind of
human ‘is disposed’ toward some particular one of these
perfections. This is clear from investigation of individual
humans. It has been explained what the human perfections
and the virtues of the soul are; and it has been made clear
as well that some of them are required for the sake of others,
so that there will be a virtue among them for whose sake all
these [other] virtues are, while it will not be for the sake of
anything else, being rather the thing sought for itself and
the rest being sought for it. This is man’s ultimate perfection
and ultimate happiness. Hence it is fitting that we investi-
gate it.
We say: It appears from the case of the practical arts that
they were originally established only because of necessity
due to "the deficiency’ that is incidental to man’s existence.
His existence would not be possible without them, just as
the existence of many of the animals would not be possible
but for their peculiarities and natural habits, such as the
hexagonal cell of the bee and the weaving of the spider. As
for the theoretical part, it appears in physics from its
character that its existence in man is not because of necessity
but rather for the sake of what is preferable. Whatever
exists for the sake of what is preferable is more choiceworthy
than whatever exists because of necessity. Hence this part
of reason—i.e., the practical—exists necessarily for the sake
25
go
70.
The Second Treatise &7
of the theoretical. This conforms with what can be seen of
its character. For it is evident that these arts only exist
initially for the sake of their products, and their products
for the sake of justice. Now by virtue of his acquiring these
arts, a man is necessarily lorded over and subject, and
Tsomeone else’ is the lord. The ford will be lord by a dis-
position in him by [virtue of] which he is better than the one
being lorded over. This being so, this disposition is nothing
other than the part of reason called theoretical. For the
manner in which this part of reason lords it over the "other!
part—i.e., the practical—in the particular sou! is identical
with the manner in which one who is disposed to receive
the theoretical sciences lords it [over anyone] whose natural
disposition is sufficient for [only] the practical arts. Hence
the likes of these serve "by nature’ | and are lorded over
by nature’. For the relationship of one of these two parts
of the soul to the other part is “necessarily” this relationship
—i.e., the relation of the lord to the one being lorded over.
It is possible to question this by saying: These practical arts
have been laid down, all leading up to one ruling art—
namely the art of governing cities. It also has been made
clear that the theoretical sciences are necessary for this art’s
existence. ‘This being so, the theoretical sciences’ are only
preparations with a view to action, Through them [sc., the
theoretical sciences) a man benefits others. There is no
difference between them [sc., the theoretical sciences] and
the other, practical arts other than that [the practical arts]
serve them in attaining their [sc., the theoretical sciences’]
intention, And they [sc., the practical arts] grant them lord-
ship in that they {sc., the theoretical sciences} prepare them
[sc., the practical arts] with a view to their [sc., the
theoretical sciences’] purpose. [Thus the theoretical sciences
are] in the position of the other ruling arts with respect to
10 the arts that grant them lordship—such as the ruling art of
15
20
a5
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 88 |
agriculture with respect to the particular agricultural {arts]
beneath it. Accordingly, the theoretical sciences and the
practical arts belong to one genus and differ only in in-
feriority and excellence. This is the opinion asserted perhaps
by many of the pretenders to philosophy of this time of ours
from among those who direct.[their] inquiry to those things
—(their inquiry] being based on unexamined opinion with-
out their considering them according to the natural order
and the study [done by rules of] art.
We say: That concerning which the theoretical sciences
speculate, and particularly physics and metaphysics, are
not practical things; nor has the will any effect upon their
existence. This is self-evident to one who is trained in
sciences such as these. This being so, and the subjects of
these sciences being such that their being is not up to us, it
is clear that they are not disposed toward action [by their]
primary disposition and essentially. Through them a man
does not—as the primary intention— serve others. Rather
their existence in man is with respect to what is preferable,
for it would be absurd if their existence in man were null
and in vain. This can be seen better from what we are
about to say. It has already been made clear in first phi-
losophy that being is of two kinds: sensible and intelligible.
Intelligible being is the principle of sensible existence in
that it is its end, form, and efficient cause. Its [sc., the
sensible’s] existence in the intelligibles of the theoretical
sciences belongs to the class of intelligible ‘existence’. The
purpose of man, inasmuch as he is a natural being, is that
he ascend to that existence as much as it is in his nature to
ascend. This being so, the relation of this "human" intelli-
gible existence ‘to the other things existing in man, be they
soul or body, is the relation of intelligible existence’, simply,
70.23 Aristotle Metaphysics 7. 10. 1036a2-12, 8. 6. 1045433-36.
40.29 .e., in that it is its end, form, and efficient cause.
7h
The Second Treatise &9
jo to sensible existence. Similarly, in so far as it is acquired by
the will, its relation to the other volitional things is the very
same relation, | This being presupposed, its lordship over
the volitional things consists in the primacy of intelligible
existence over ‘sensible? existence, and in its giving the
volitional beings their principles on which their existence
depends—this by way of the intelligible existence giving the
5 sensible existence what it depends on. It has already been
made clear that this is not by way of the intelligible’s serving
the sensible; rather it [sc., the sensible] is something that
follows on it [sc., the intelligible] and is necessitated by it.
This being so, the theoretical sciences are indeed useful for
action and necessary for action in the way in which it is
said of intelligible existence that it is necessary for sensible
existence, The primacy of this part over the other parts of
the city resembles the primacy of intelligible existence over
10 sensible existence. It may be seen from this treatise that the
practical arts—be they faculties, or ruling or ministerial
arts—exist only because of the theoretical sciences. People
have asserted "an opinion’ concerning the existence of these
practical arts that—upon my life!—is just the opposite of
what these assert concerning the theoretical sciences. For
they say that the intelligibles of these arts are not—accord-
ing to the primary intention—for the sake of their products,
but [rather] that their sole purpose is good and excellent
15 discernment; and that the actions and products resulting
from them are something incidental. [This would be of] the
order of what appears in the case of the movements of the
heavenly bodies. Accordingly, the practical arts are the
virtues [simply]. Even more is this thought of those practical
71.5-6 Ina way the higher may serve the lower, but in fact it is not
service. The sensible is posterior to the intelligible.
71.9 over sensible existence] MS 4 adds: or over existence simply.
71.17-18 See 68.19-21, above, for the two kinds of practical arts.
20
25
72
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 90°
arts that make use of reasoning. As for these positive quali-
ties resulting from these arts, it is thought by those who
‘concentrate’ on a single art that that art encompasses
knowledge of all things, as "we see’ the physicians ‘think-
ing’ of their art. But the truth is that the intelligibles of
these Tarts’ were established at first only with a view to
activity; if one perceives anything by them, it is by accident.
If, therefore, the perceiving is put down as the end of the
art, it [sc., the art] would belong to another genus. The term
[“art’] applied to them would be said homonymously, just
as happens to the term “music,” which is defined sometimes
as the practical art and sometimes as the theoretical one.
As for the cogitative virtues, it is evident from their case
too that they are for the sake of the theoretical intelligibles.
For the existence of these virtues is mostly—"or’ the exist-
ence of the noblest of them [is universally]—for the sake of
the arts; and the arts, as has been explained in this treatise,
are for the sake of the theoretical intelligibles. For -it is
evident that these cogitative virtues are divided as the arts
are divided. Just as there is an art “unqualifiedly’ ruling
over all the arts—namely the art of governing cities—so is
there a ruling cogitative faculty—namely the faculty by
which the actions of this [ruling] art are materialized. |
As for the moral virtues, it appears from their case too
that they are for the sake of the theoretical intelligibles.
And this is for several reasons: One of them, as has already
been made clear in physics, is that appetite and desire are
of two kinds: one stems from the imagination, and the other
stems from cogitation and thought. The appetite that stems
from the imagination is of necessity not specific to man,
being rather connected with the animal as animal. As for
the appetite that stems from cogitation and thought, why it
41.25 The theme of this brief paragraph is developed at length in
Farabi, Attainment, 20.3-29.7 (MPP, pp. 64-69).
15
20
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The Second Treatise or
is specific to man; and the existence of appetite of this
character is connected with man. The moral virtues are
nothing other than that this part of us is aroused toward
that which cogitation judges ought to come into being, to
the extent that it judges and at the time that it judges. It is
evident that this activity belongs to nothing other than the
theoretical part of the soul. This being-so, it is "only7 this
part that acquires virtue from the cogitative part. .The
cogitative part, then, is more truly elevated; it is "more
noble and more choiceworthy. Also many of the animals
have a share in this [moral] part—such as the modesty to be
found in the lion—but it is human only by virtue of thought
and cogitation, and whatever is the cause of something’s
being of a certain character possesses that character to a
higher degree. It can also be seen now from the case of these
virtues that through thena man serves others. For example,
justice exists only because of [reciprocal] dealings, modera-
tion because of pleasures that hinder noble actions, courage
because of harmful things, and liberality because of wealth.
But as for theoretical science, why it is clear’ from its
character that a man is not disposed toward it that he might
serve others. Moreover, these virtues are more apt to be
hylic than the theoretical sciences and more apt to be in
need of the body for their continued existence—and not
only of the body, but also of instruments and external
things. Thus liberality has need of wealth so that, by means
of it, it might perform acts of liberality; similarly the just
performs acts of justice through them [sc., instruments];
and the courageous has need of strength and help. But as
72.13-14 The example of the lion is given by Avempace, Governance,
55-14 (Asin tr., p. 93).
72.21 hylic} I.e., material or grounded in matter.
72.24. Liberality thus needs wealth in two respects—as something
to be overcome (72.18-19), and as an indispensable means.
73:
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 92
for the theoretical sciences, they are of all things the
strongest, the most free of matter, to the point that they are
thought to be in a manner everlasting. It has already been
made clear elsewhere that the more strongly separated
something is from hyle, the more noble it is. But this kind
of perfection—i.e.', the moral, is laid down [in relation to]
= go theoretical perfection as a preparatory rank, without which
the attainment of the end is impossible. Hence this perfec-
tion is thought to be the ultimate end because of its proxim-
ity to the ultimate end. It appears from this, then, that the
human perfections are of four classes and that they are all
for the sake of theoretical perfection. |
As to whether the moral virtues are for the sake of the
practical arts or vice versa, or whether both cases exist
together—i.e., that some arts are for the sake of the virtues
and some virtues for the sake of the arts—why there is
room in this for “penetrating” investigation, But it is clear
that the ruling moral virtue of all these virtues must neces-
5 sarily be joined to the ruling cogitative faculty. If the ruling
virtue’s relation to the ruling cogitative faculty is as the
relation of the cogitative faculty to the ruling art, why then
it necessarily is for the sake of the ruling art. Just so is the
case with those arts to which no kind of this virtue belongs.
10 For in accord with this relation, it—1.e., the practical arts—
is only laid down as a preparatory rank. "Though" their
[sc., the moral virtues’] acquisition is necessary for it [sc.,
the art], it is only so that the activity of the art may be more
perfect and more praiseworthy. This is self-evident. But
however the case may be here, both of them together are
for the sake of the theoretical part. What we have said
concerning the analogies between these human perfections
15 is an agreed-upon thing among the Peripatetics. But as this
93.5-7 See 70.3-4 and 71.30-32, above.
20
25
30
4
The Second Treatise 93
theoretical part does not exist in us from the outset in its
ultimate perfection and in actuality, its existence in us is
only potential. It has been made clear in physics that every-
thing that has potentiality in its existence or has potentiality
mixed in its existence [can attain] its ultimate perfection
only when it exists as complete actuality with no potentiality
at all mixed with it. It is for us to bring into being and to
perfect the perfection and actuality that are of this character
—i.e., it comes to pass through choice and will since there
is no sufficiency in nature to bring it about. What then is
this perfection that it is incumbent upon us to pursue and
which is the end that we would realize in ourselves? Is it the
theoretical sciences, or another rank and another creation
more noble than the theoretical sciences? If it is other than
the theoretical sciences, is it something found in us or some-
thing that ‘in its substance is outside ourselves?”
We say: As for him who assumes that the theoretical
sciences are everlasting and that they exist in us in actuality
and that the humors have only submerged them since youth,
why in this manner they are as if they stood still in potential
existence. Either they are separate forms, as Plato assumes,
or it is the Active Intellect or an intellect other than that
and beneath it in rank, It is evident that [if this is assumed]
human perfection is not itself acquired through the will
since it exists in its essence prior to the will. [Yet] will is
connected with its definition inasmuch as it "has a connec-
tion’ with the definition of the ultimate perfections. In this
respect it is taken as a "premise! for the definition of the
end. | If it be said that this is only something acquired by
us by will—i.e., when we acquire of the other ultimate
73-25-31 Farabi, Political Regime, 71.10-72.14, 79.9-t1 (MPP, pp.
33 f., 36). See also Averroes’ summary of Aristotle’s De Anima (Talkhis
kitab al-nafs, ed. Ahmad Fu’ad al-Ahwani [Cairo, 1950], 66.9-10,
72-13-73-7).
A 5
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 94
perfections whatever is in our nature to acquire—that
perfection [nonetheless] would [still] reach us through that”
relationship by [virtue of] whose connection to us we are
what we are. For it is known that if this acquisition is
related to the will, it is only related in ways other than the
former ways since will is not connected with that by which
we realize ourselves. Rather, will is connected with the
existence of the relationship "by which’ the Active Intellect
achieves our perfection. As for him who asserts that the
theoretical sciences are not everlasting but that they are
the ultimate perfection, why human perfection according
to him would be what the will itself acquires. As for him
who holds that ‘the theoretical” sciences are not everlasting
and that the ultimate perfection is having a conception of
the separate intelligences, why it is evident that perfection
according to him [would consist of] two kinds: a first and
a final [perfection]. The first is what he himself acquires;
the second is what he acquires through conjunction [with
the Active Intellect]. This needs to be investigated in [the
study of the soul in] physics, We return to what we were
about and ‘go into each point’ of what Plato said about
the way of educating this class of people.
We say that Plato compares the relation of this kind of
people, as regards their knowledge, to the rest of the mul-
titude, He says that the multitude resemble humans who
have lived in a cave since childhood, never having left it.
They turn to look carefully at what is in the cave without
turning their faces to the mouth of the cave. At the cave’s
mouth there are images of the other kinds of beings, and
at their backs ‘a fire’, so that they see nothing of those
images other than their shadow on the hollow of the cave.
74.11 Aristotle Physics 7. 3. 247b1 ff.
74.16-18 Missing here are the references in Plato 514a-515b to
prison, prisoners, and chains.
S14
SIS
20
25
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The Second Treatise 95
This being their situation, these grasp nothing of the knowl-
edge of things other than the shadow of "an image of beings
falling on the hollow of that cave. They think that true
beings are nothing more than those ‘shadows". As for the
wise, why they are those who go out to the cave’s mouth,
into the sparkling light, and see things as they truly are in
the sunlight. Just as a man who suddenly goes forth from
a cave into the sunlight finds that his eyes are grown dim
and that it is impossible for him to look at something, so is
it impossible for this class of humans—i.e., those who are
disposed to knowledge—that we rush them to inquiry in
the sciences since they find it hard to abstract the intelligible
and to look at it. The cunning device adopted with them is
to lead them upward gradually step by step so as to look at
things, first by means of the light of the stars and the moon,
to the point that they-are able to look at them in the
presence of the sun. Just so ought the !atter to be led upward
gradually step by step, and we direct them [at first] to what
is easiest for them to learn. {| When he investigated which
science it is that they “ought to’ begin [their] study with, it
became clear to him that it was arithmetic. This is because
from the outset they, with the guardians’ children, had been
growing up on music and gymnastic. Now it is clear that
74-23 cave’s mouth] Other MSS: go out from that cave.
74.24 Plato 515¢-516a speaks of the released prisoners being com-
pelled to stand up and face the mouth of the cave and, despite their
protests, being forcibly dragged into sunlight. Avempace too uses this
simile in an excerpt preserved in Shemtob Falqéra, Moreh ha-moreh
(Pressburg, 1837; reprint ed., Jerusalem, 5721/1961), 132.12-23 (com-
mentary to Maimonides, Guide, III 51) and discussed in Leo Strauss,
Philosophie und Gesetz (Betlin: Schocken Verlag, 1935), p. 116. Lawrence
V. Berman, “Ibn Bajjah and Maimonides” (Ph.D. diss., Hebrew University,
1959), p.5, n.4, corrects the scribal crror by which authorship was atiributed
lo Farabi.
75.1 In the ensuing discussion (75.1-77.13), Averroes again moves
away from Plato’s text. At a few points he alights, so to speak, on the
Republic, omitting 516c-521b (what it behooves the philosopher to do
in the Platonic city as contrasted with “these cities”) and 431d-537a
(dialectic).
5t6ab
10
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Averroes on Plato’s Republic 96
' the intention in gymnastic is toward the body. But as for
music, why the statements by which they transmitted this
to them are stories, and a story does not grant this faculty—
ie., that by which a man can take in the intelligibles of the
theoretical sciences. This being so, this science ought neces-
sarily to be of the class of the theoretical sciences and be
the Teasiest? of the mathematical studies. Of this description
are the four mathematical sciences—arithmetic, geometry,
astronomy, and music—except that it [sc., arithmetic] excels
in this respect—i.e., ease of study—owing to ‘its greater?
freedom from matter. Arithmetic is then the easiest of them
and that most “common” to all things. It is then followed by
geometry, then astronomy, then music. It is clear from the
character of these sciences that the initial need of the wise
for mathematical sciences is mainly ‘training’, for most of
their intelligibles [sc., of the mathematical sciences] do not
exist as nature intends [natural beings to exist]. Hence there
is to be found among them that which has no end. In
general, their intelligibles are defective intelligibles since
they are not conceived of in their particular objects but in
what imitates them. Hence Plato divides the intelligibles
‘of’ things into two parts. One of them he calls ‘direct’;
these are the intelligibles of things that truly are. And the
second [he calls thought]; these are the intelligibles of the
appearances of existing things—and they are the mathemat-
ical sciences. For he asserts that the case with the intelligibles
is like the case with the sensibles. Just as with the sensibles
"there are’ sensibles that are perceived through their es-
sences and sensibles that are perceived through their
75-7 this science] I.e., the introductory science by which the cave
dwellers are gradually led to see in the light of day.
75.14 as nature intends] Farabi, Attainment, 10.2-5 (Mahdi tr.,
P. 19).
75-18 thought] MSS: knowledge. The reference is to Plato’s dianoia.
25
76.
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The Second Treatise 97
appearances (just as what is perceived of many of the
sensibles is their ‘reflection? in a mirror), so is the case
with the intelligibles. Since, as we have said, the insights
of the mathematical sciences are infinite and their subjects
also of an unknown [manner of] being, only he who pos-
sesses First Philosophy investigates them. Plato asserts of
them that they are not of the rank of the other theoretical
sciences as regards human perfection. Hence he says of them
that they are sciences whose beginnings are unknown and
whose ends are unknown; and [only] what is between the
beginnings and the ends is known. This being so, the
mathematical sciences are not intended initially and essen-
tially for human perfection, as is the case with physics and
metaphysics. Although they differ in this respect—and
particularly in what these two sciences take from them
[sc., the mathematical sciences] by way of principles for
the investigation of the end (as when ‘the! divine science
[sc., metaphysics] accepts the number of movements from
astronomy)—this difference is not only with respect to their
kinds, but also exists with respect to the parts of the partic-
ular science. | It is evident that the greater part of the
advantage in them and of what is intended in them at the
outset is only the training and preparation of the intellect
for the study of those two ultimate sciences. We ourselves
are unable to say that what is intended in these sciences—
i.e., the mathematical sciences—is only” action. [And this]
notwithstanding that some of their students do ‘somewhat!
[engage in action]—as many of the multitude think con-
cerning geometry and harmonics. For the things into which
they inquire are common to natural matters and artificial
matters. For example, when it is found that an equilateral
triangle must necessarily have its three sides come out of
the two centers of two equal circles and its two sides resting
76.5 common] L.e., in the sense of being in a border zone.
10
15
20
25
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Averroes on Plato’s Republic 98
on the base meet at the point where the two circles intersect,
it is nothing peculiar to a triangle existing in wood or copper
or in artificial things generally. It comprises [both] natural
and artificial things. Furthermore, the individual objects
presupposed by these sciences are to be found only in matter.
If the inquiry of these sciences were into that in which they
[sc., geometrical figures] exist, it would investigate their
four causes—i.e., the matter, the form, the efficient cause,
and the end. But it is evident from their case that they
investigate the formal cause alone. Hence, they [sc., mathe-
maticians] need individual objects which are included in
these sciences; while engaged in their work, [they need]
knowledge supplementary to what is known by them from
these [sc., mathematical sciences]. If someone wishes to
construct an equilateral triangle out of wood, it is not
enough "for him” [to know] what Euclid said in the begin-
ning of his book on the construction of the equilateral
triangle, without joining to this the craft of carpentry. This
is entirely self-evident to one trained in these sciences. All
this being as we have characterized it, the object in teaching
this kind of humans the mathematical sciences is initially
and essentially for the sake of training; though there also is
joined to this, as Plato says, knowledge of the necessary
practices with which they practice them. Inasmuch as they
are guardians, they ‘also’ have need of the knowledge of
number and measurements for the array of people in battles,
proper "maneuvers, and the measurements for pitching
camps. Similarly, knowledge of the seasons and months is
also necessary, not only for navigators and those travelling
in deserts, but also for generals. Practical music is necessary
for them in that they are the ones who institute it in the
city. This, then, is what Plato mentions that they begin by
studying. He asserts this thought only because the art of
76.25 maneuvers] Literally: permutations.
77-
15
The Second Treatise 99
logic was nonexistent in his time. But as it “now” exists, it is
proper that they begin their study with the art of logic;
after that | going on "to arithmetic, then’ to geometry, then
to astronomy, then to music, then to optics, then to me-
chanics, then to physics, then to metaphysics. However, the
ancients were divided over whether it was obligatory to
begin with the art of logic or with the art of mathematics.
Some asserted that logic was instituted only so as to strength-
en the intellect and preserve it from error—the necessity
for this arising out of the profound sciences, like physics
and metaphysics. As for the mathematical sciences, there is
no need in them for logic owing to their easiness and their
little entanglement with matter. Even if this were as they
say. and logic were not necessary for the learning of the
mathematical sciences, their learning—if it came after
knowledge of it [sc., logic]}—would undoubtedly be better.
And since we seek only the best in the study [to be done by]
this kind of humans, it is fitting that they begin with the
art of logic.
As for the nomos that it behooves them to accept during
[this period of] study, why Plato—as was said before—
asserts of these that they are to be brought up on music,
When they reach sixteen or seventeen—and this is also after
they have rejected those dispositions [the rejection of which]
we have made a condition for ther—they train in horse-
manship until they reach twenty. On reaching this, they go
on to the learning of philosophy, according to this [afore-
mentioned] order. Plato does not assert that they begin the
study of science prior to those years because their thought
is not yet settled nor have they perfected their "cogitation’.
Also, once the [contribution of] imitation to those stories on
which they grew up has been made clear to them, they
77-1-3 Compare 75.9, 11-12, above.
537
s539be
20
25
78.
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 100
cannot be relied on not to ridicule them and proceed to
refute them before the multitude and to shatter them "with!
objections. This is because their position, as Plato says, in
relation to the stories and speeches on which they were
raised is the position of one who grows up with whom he
takes to be his father and mother, coming to know when he
has grown strong and bestirred himself that he is a foundling
to the two of them and that his father and mother are others.
Do ‘you’ not see that that earlier esteem of them would
pass away from his soul to the point that it sometimes would
lead him to mock them both? Similar is the case with this
kind of humans if they lay their hands on the sciences prior
to that age. This is because, in their zeal and ‘sharpness’,
they will tear at the stories "with argument” just as a puppy
tears at the garment of whoever is close by. You will make
this clear [to yourself] for this happens frequently to the
pretenders to philosophy of these cities. This is the most
harmful of things in regard to them. | Thereafter they do
not cease reading science until they reach thirty’ and have
completed all its parts. When they reach thirty-five, they
are charged with the governance of the army; this is for
about fifteen years. When they are fifty years old they are
then fit for rulership in this city and to rule over it. When
they are too weak to do this on account of age, they return—
as Plato says—to the Isles of the Blessed. "By the “Isles of
the Blessed” he means, according to what I think’, the
inquiry concerning the form [idea] of the good in whose
existence he believed. If there is someone who believes that
there is a good for man that exists for itself, he will believe
78.1 thirty) Following Plato 539a and two MSS; other MSS: thirty-
five.
78.2 According to Plato 539e the guardians have to be forced to go
down again into the cave and compelled to take charge in the affairs
of war.
S4oab
be
10
15
25
The Second Treatise ror
that the exercise of the other virtues hinders him from
speculation on this. That is why, according to what I think,
Plato asserts that at the end of their lives they isolate [them-
selves] for speculation "upon! that good.
He said: It is fitting for the citizens in general to mark off
certain days for them on which they recall their [sc., the
rulers’} virtues; they bring offerings on {those days], offer
sacrifices, and in general wax in praise of them in the
manner that country folk do this. (The same is the case
with the upbringing of women who are disposed by nature
to lordship. We ‘ourselves’ have already said that the
woman shares in common with the man all the work of the
citizens.) Plato asserts that their governance of the city is
fitting and proper if from them ‘this! city is provided with
more than one man [to serve in their stead].
When he finished this he resumed mentioning the manner
by which to realize the possibility of the existence of this
city in the best possible way. He had already said in what
preceded that the emergence of this city is possible "only if
it happens’ that someone of this description among the wise
is the son of a king or that rulership "over these’ cities is
fitting for him in other respects, such as excellence, numer-
ous relatives, honor, strength, and the rest. If this happens,
then the manner of the emergence of this city is this: He
[sc., the qualified ruler] attends to those in his city who are
more than ten years old or thereabouts; they expel them
and send them to the villages; they take their children and
bring them up in those disciplines and qualities that we
have described. In this way the emergence of this city will
be quickest, easiest, and best. You ought "to know’ that
78.15 one man] or: one individual.
78.22 they] The shift in this sentence from the singular to the plural
subject corresponds to what is left open in Plato 540d: when the true
philosophers, either one or more, come to power in a city... .
rc
540b~-
S40c
54ra
79:
to
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 102,
this manner mentioned by Plato is the best for its emergence.
Its emergence is possible in a manner other than this, but
[only] over a long time. This is when virtuous kings come to
[rule] these cities in a succession—one after another and for
a long time-—not ceasing to incline these cities gradually
until the situation in them, by the end of time, comes to be
the good governance. | Their [sc., these cities’] inclining will
be of two kinds at once—i.e., in their actions and their
deeds, and [in] their beliefs. This will be more or ‘less!
easy, depending on the nomoi existing at any given time
and on their [sc., the nomoi’s] proximity to or distance from
this city. In general, in this time their inclining to virtuous
deeds is more likely than their inclining to good beliefs. You
can prove this from these cities. In general, one who has
mastered the [several] parts of science and [understood] the
manner of creating inclinations in them [sc., the cities] will
have no difficulty in asserting that they are no better than
the beliefs. The cities that are virtuous in deeds alone are
those called aristocratic. It has been recounted that this
city-—i.e., the aristocratic—existed among the ancient
Persians. ‘These, then, are all the things Plato asserts con-
cerning the emergence of the virtuous city, its order, and
the laying down of its nomoi. We have explained this with
the utmost brevity possible for us. What yet remains for him
79-1-8 Ina parallel passage in his paraphrase of Aristotle’s Rhetoric,
Averroes divides excellent dominion into (a) kingship, wherein both
opinions and actions accord with what the theoretical sciences prescribe;
and (5) the rule of the good, wherein only actions are virtuous. “This
[latter governance] is known as the imdmiyya; it is said to have existed
among the early Persians, according to Abi Nasr [al-Farabi]’s account”
(Averroes, Rhetoric, 137-7-138.4) (Mahdi). See also Avempace, Govern-
ance, 11.4-5 (MPP, p. 128). The sharp distinction between beliefs and
deeds drawn here by Averroes further emphasizes the contrast between
the virtuous city and “these cities.” ‘In this time” virtuous deeds are
easier to come by than virtuous beliefs.
79.7, 8 aristocratic] ha-mekaheneth = imamiyya (Mahdi).
15
20
The Second Treatise 103
of this part [of political science] is only what he says con-
cerning the other unmixed, erring cities, how they may be
recognized, how this city may turn into them, and how they
turn into one another, As for the statement concerning the
manner in which these cities emerge, and setting up an
order for them whereby they may easily and in the best way
attain the utmost folly, which they leave for an inheritance:
why it seems that knowledge of this is not necessary for one
who possesses this science, just as it suffices for the physician
to know enough about "poisons! so as to recognize their
natures and know that it is proper to guard against them,
without troubling to learn the manner in which they are
made and compounded. So is it here with the philosopher
as regards these other cities—i.e., the erring cities. It suffices
him to recognize them and to know the evils that are
brought from them into the virtuous city. Hence what Plato
intended with this was to make known the manner in which
the virtuous city turns into them and they turn into one
another, and the comparison and contrast between them,
as well as what befalls them. We will cut off "this! treatise
here and begin the third treatise of this part [of political
science].
79:11, 26 unmixed] MSS: ‘simple.
79-11, 18 erring cities] These cities are characterized as erring or
mistaken by Glaucon in 544a. “Erring cities” is also a technical term
as used by Farabi in Political Regime, 87.5, 104.3-6 (MPP, pp. 41 f., 53).
In Farabi’s usage (followed by Averroes), the nonvirtuous cities to be
discussed in the third treatise are all “ignorant cities.” See 52.22-23 and
note to 45.11, above.
do.
The Third Treatise
Having completed the discussion in this part of this kind
{of governance], namely the discussion of the governance of
a5, the virtuous cities, he turned to what remained for him of
this science, namely the discussion of nonvirtuous govern-
ances. He makes known only their unmixed kinds, and how
some turn into others, and the resemblance between them
and the virtuous governance and between one another. He
makes known which governance is most opposite ‘to the
virtuous governance; and makes known | which may be set
down as being between these two governances—i.e., the
virtuous [and that] which is most opposite’ to it—being of
the rank of intermediaries between the extremes; and how
these intermediaries are arranged with respect to the ex-
tremes, as is the case with the other opposites that have more
than one intermediary between them and still are distinct.
5 An example of this is the color white. Black is its opposite.
Between the one and the other there are intermediaries;
these, however, are arranged—i.e., some are ‘closer’ to
white and some are closer to black. It is evident that if this
is also the case with governance, the transformation of the
two extremes that are as opposite to each other as can be
will consist in their first turning into the intermediaries,
79-24-25 In admitting a plurality of virtuous cities, Averroes tacitly
rejects the notion of a single universal society based on the one true
religious Law. See 97.13, below, and 57.6 and note to 31.24-25, above.
For Farabi, too, there can be more than one virtuous city (Political
Regime, 102.3, 104.7 [MPP, pp. 51, 53]; Plato, 20.12 [Mahdi tr., p. 65];
Virtuous City, 70.9 [Dieterici tr., p. 111).
104
to
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The Third Treatise 105
and at that also according to the arrangement of the
intermediaries. That is, they first turn into the closest of
the intermediaries, then into that which follows ii, later into
the one that follows it, "until? it turns into the extreme that
is most opposite [to it]. We shall explain this when we reach
Plato’s words concerning this, Similarly we shall compare
the people who rule over each and every one of these
governances, in respect of themselves and of the pleasures
accruing to them from each and every governance and
Teach and every guidance’.
This, then, is the sum of the necessary statements that
this part of Plato’s statements comprehends. We ourselves
shall explain each and every thing that he says in it.
We say that Plato asserts that the unmixed governances
under which cities come into being are, in general, of five
kinds. The first kind is the virtuous governance, the dis-
cussion of which has preceded. The second is the primacy
of honor. The third is the primacy of the few, namely
rulership based on wealth; this is also known as the primacy
of the vile. The fourth is the primacy of the assembly of the
‘multitude’. The fifth is the primacy of the tyrant. If you
divide the virtuous primacy into the primacy of the king
and the primacy of the good, then the primacies are six
[in number]. If someone takes charge of this governance in
whom five conditions are combined—namely wisdom, per-
fect understanding, good persuasion, good imagination, and
capability for war with no bodily impediment to his prac-
80.17 unmixed] MSS: simple.
80.21 primacy of the good] See 52.24-26, above.
80.23 conditions are combined] The following account (to 81.5)
closely parallels Farabi’s discussion of the “first chief” and his surrogates
in Aphorisms, 66.3-67.10 (Dunlop tr., pp. 50 f.). See also Virtuous City,
60.11-61.6, g-11 (Dieterici tr., pp. 96 ££), for the discussion of the
conditions for the “second chief.”
80.24, 29 war] ha-shgaydeah—watchfulness, assiduity. This translation
go
81.
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 106
ticing martial acts—why he is the king simply and his
governance is the truly royal governance. But if “these?
qualities are only to be found separately in a group—so
that one contributes to the end [of the city] through his
wisdom, and the second [contributes] what leads to the end
through his understanding, and the third has good persua-
sion in speech, and the fourth has good imagination, and
the fifth has capability for war—and they together help
bring about and preserve this governance, why these are
called select rulers and their rule is called the elevated and
choice rule. | It also may happen that the ruler of this city
is one who has not attained this rank—i.e., the rank of
king—but is expert in the nomoi that the first one [sc., the
founder] legislated and has good [powers of] conjecture by
which to extrapolate from them what the first one did not
make clear for each and every decree and for each and
every judgment. Of this class of knowledge is that knowl-
edge called by us the art of jurisprudence. Besides this he is
to have a capability for war. This one is called a king [who
rules] according to the laws. It may happen that these two
are not found in a single individual, the warrior being other
than the judge. The two of them must [then] necessarily
share in lordship, as was the case with many of the Muslim
kings. We hold that there is here yet another’ kind of
governance. That is the governance of the pleasure-seeker;
assumes along with Rosenthal that the Hebrew translator mistook the
meaning of jihad.
81.4 jurisprudence] The knowledge that is possessed by the second-
rank ruler is figh. Averroes makes explicit what is implicit in the parallel
passage in Farabi’s Aphorisms. See also Farabi, Enumeration, 107.5-14
(MPP, p. 27), for the relative standing of jurisprudence; and Plato
Statesman 301a-b,
81.6-7_ Compare Farabi, Virtuous City, 61.7-9 (Dieterici tr., p. 97)»
where Farabi attributes wisdom to the one ruler and the remaining
qualities to the co-ruler. Averroes’ joint rulers appear to be below that
rank.
10
20
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The Third Treatise 107
that is the governance the end of whose citizens is pleasure
alone. If you join to this governance the necessity-govern-
ance, then the kinds of governance are eight. As for the
virtuous governance, the discussion of it has been completed.
As for the timocratic governance and the timocratic cities,
they are the cities that help their citizens to draw near to
honor and to attain it. Honor, in truth, is only between man
and man, when he thinks there is some perfection in the
other and subordinates his soul to him. There is here yet
another kind of honor performed without subordinating the
soul of the honorer to the honored. But here the honor is
balanced with another honor or money or advantage. This
honor consists only in equality, or else they are strict and
particular about equality as much as is possible—i.e., the
honor of the market-place.
As for the first kind-of honor, it does not consist in
providing an abundance of things for which honor is obliga-
tory. This kind of honor is that which is more fitting for
timocratic cities to aim at. Hence ranks are arranged in
them so that they resemble the virtuous city in this respect.
The difference between the two of them is that the honors
in the virtuous city are only something incidental to the
virtues and the fitting things that are truly fitting things, not
that the honor is intended for itself; rather it is a shadow
associated with the virtue. As for the timocratic cities, why
in them honor is intended for itself. It also is arranged by
them in accord with what is suitable—according to what
unexamined opinion holds to be suitable. These are among
the fitting things according to them: wealth, pedigree, what-
ever brings about the causes of pleasure, dice-playing, and
attaining most of the necessities; [also] since a man is able,
81.13 Averroes’ account of timocracy, which continues to 82.20,
closely resembles Farabi’s in Political Regime, 89.14-94.4. (MPP, pp. 43-
46). See also Virtuous City, 62.10-14 (Dieterici tr., p. 99).
3°
82.
10
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Averroes on Plato’s Republic 108
through his wealth, to supply himself with all his needs, that
he be useful to others with respect to these things. It seems
that the things that ought to be most deserving of honor are
the love of violence and domination and that a man forever
be lord, not be lorded over, and be served, not serve. For
these | are already thought to be the primary virtue neces-
sarily leading to honor. And these are recognized among
humans as the great-souled, and especially when there is
joined to these the capability ‘for’ victory and, in general,
for doing harm and for helping. The capability consists of
the improvement of the faculties of body and soul and of
the external means. Individuals of this description are those
who are lords in cities such as these. Their rank in honor
accords with their rank in these fitting things. Whoever is
not enabled by the honor from them to be a total lord, has
a partial lordship—lording’it over in one respect and being
lorded over in another, Hence it is told of al-Mansur Ibn
Abi ‘Amir that he used to go out to assemblages and
weddings and used to say: “Let whoever holds himself to be
prince of the faithful command me ‘to humble myself!
before them. By my soul! I shall be honored by them, for he
does not honor the soul who does not humble and abase it.”
In this governance they take precious garments for kings,
such as cloaks of byssus and purple, and seat [them] upon
golden thrones. For all these, according to unexamined
opinion, are [signs of] perfections and knowledge. The most
fitting of these for lordship is he through whom all these
desired things are assembled together and who is able to
allot them equitably among them and to preserve them.
This is the justice that exists in this city. It seems that this
city is the choicest’ of the nonvirtuous cities. This is because
it aims at the virtues that are virtues according to un-
examined opinion and [at what], according to unexamined
opinion, are beautiful actions. Hence the likes of these seek
20
25
83.
The Third Treatise ? 10g
out actions by which a good memory may be left of them so
that they might be honored in their life and in their death.
This kind of association is the timocratic association. It is
rarely found in a simple nation; hence the existence of such
a city as this is difficult. But you yourself know that this
kind of governance ‘was! frequently found among us.
As for the governance of the vile, they are rulers whose
citizens care for wealth, riches, and the acquisition of this
in excess of need, not for the sake of receiving’ through
avarice anything for themselves other than them [sc., wealth
and riches]. Property is of two kinds: property by nature,
and property by convention. Natural property is what is
sought to supply the lack that befalls a man when he exists
without it. These are food, clothing, places wherein a man
may dwell or make room for himself by owning them, tools
that serve for these things, and materials out of which these
things [are made]. As for the property that is by convention,
that is dinars and dirhams and what | stands in their place.
These do not supply a natural lack in man and hence will
not be [found] in ali cities. It is only’ the need for the
"provision of? a medium [of exchange] that leads to them
in all activities in cities. Hence dinars and dirhams are an
appropriate sign for any money whatever if it happens to be
supplied by one who knows the conventional [equivalents].
It is a sign’ of the proper [purchasing] power and the
initial appraisal of all things and a measure for them. This
is why it is thought to be identical with wealth and the most
82.22 Averroes’ account, which continues to 83.15, elaborates upon
Farabi’s discussion of the vile city in Political Regime, 88.14-89.6 (MPP,
Pp. 43). See also Virtuous City, 62.6-8 (Dieterici tr., p. 98).
83.2 all cities] See 43.13-31, above.
83.2-3 medium of exchange] wdlam ha-sarekh ha-mébhi? éléyhem
bemedinoth bekhal ha-ma‘asim <v)ésel higa’ath ha-emsa‘t. Perhaps, following
other MSS: leads to them in acquisitive [or: democratic] cities.
83.4 supplied] MSS: loved.
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 410
fitting of things to be accumulated and acquired. That is
because it is potentially all things valuable, besides being
easily transferable. The ruler of these [people] is the
wealthiest and most powerful among them. If, joined to
this, he has the capability of governing them well in that he
acquires wealth for them and preserves it for them always,
why then he is suitable for being the lord over this city.
Wealth is obtained first from all the necessary things, such
as agriculture, grazing, and hunting; later on, from trading,
hiring, and the rest. This is the association based on wealth
and the purpose that this association has in view. This
lordship is known as the lordship of the few because in their
seeking to acquire "property it necessarily follows that
they will be few and that the majority in this city be the
poor, as will appear later on.
As for the democratic association, it is the association in
which everyone in it is unrestrained. He does what his heart
desires and moves toward whichever of the pleasing things
his soul leads him. Hence there will emerge in this city the
totality of things that exist separately in those [other] cities.
So there will be among them people who are lovers of honor,
and humans who love the possession of property, and
humans who love tyranny. Nor is it farfetched that there be
among them one who has the virtues and is moved by them.
Hence all the arts and ‘dispositions’ emerge in this city,
and it is so disposed that from it may emerge the virtuous
city and every one of the other cities. It seems that there is
no lordship here other than by the will of those who accept
being lorded over on account of the primary laws. For it is
83.8-12 Compare the parallel passage in Farabi, Political Regime,
89.4-6 (MPP, p. 43). “Necessary things” corresponds to Farabi’s
“‘methods employed to obtain the bare necessities.” Averroes here omits
the fourth in Farabi’s enumeration: robbery.
83.16 On democracy see Farabi, Political Regime, 99.7-101.5 (MPP,
pp. 50 f.); and Virtuous City, 62.16-18 (Dieterici tr., p. 99).
The Third Treatise faa
also thought concerning this city that it is not fitting that
all things be permitted every man in it, for thereby it would
come to their killing and ‘robbing” one another, since this
too is one of the desires fixed in the nature of many humans.
Hence there is no doubt that the primary laws are observed
by people, namely [those regulating] the sites chosen by the
citizens on their first coming to that city and also the food
found | there. After that there are the secondary laws
concerning commerce, and similarly also tertiary laws con-
cerning [moral] dispositions and what resembles them, It is
evident that in this city the household is the primary
intention and the city is only for its sake. Hence it is entirely
domestic, contrary to what is the case with’ the virtuous
city. Every man, if he so wills, may have all goods in
private. If so, most of these cities existing today are demo-
cratic, and the individual who truly lords it over them is the
one who has the capability of so governing that every man
attains his desire and preserves it. This city is the one of
which most of the multitude hold that it is the city to be
admired, for every man asserts on the basis of unexamined
opinion that he deserves to be free. It seems that this city
is the first among the cities that grow out of the necessity-
cities; for once humans attain the necessary, they are
aroused toward their desires, and this city [sc., the demo-
cratic city, then] necessarily comes into being. The associ-
ation in these cities is necessarily only accidentally an
association since ‘they do not aim at? a single end in their
association, and the lordship in them is lordship ‘only’ by
84.3-4 Avempace, Governance, 6.2-6 (MPP, pp. 124 f.).
84.10 the necessity-cities] or: the indispensable cities. See Farabi,
Political Regime, 88.4-13 (MPP, pp. 42 f.); and Virtuous City, 62.4-6
(Dieterici tr., p. 98). See 86.24-27, below.
84.12 do not aim at] MS A; since it is impossible [to have].
84.12-15 See note to 52.25-26, above.
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85.
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 112
chance. The associations of many of the Muslim kings today
are only associations that are entirely domestic. All that
remains in them of the nomos is the nomos that preserves
the primary laws for them, It is evident that all property in
this city is domestic. Hence they “sometimes! need to bring
forth "from the household” some of the acquired surplus in
it and transfer it to whichever of them fights. Herein
originate tributes and imposts. Men are of two classes: a
class designated the multitude, and a class designated the
mighty—as was the case with the people in ‘Persia’ and as
is the case in many of these cities of ours. Among these the
multitude are plundered by the mighty, and the mighty go
so far in seizing their property that this occasionally leads
them to tyranny, just as this comes about in this time of ours
and in this city of ours. For the most part, love of property
grows upon the multitude only when the primary nomoi
among them are acquisitive. When every one fights for the
city, he is not obliged to draw off any of his wealth for
fighting. This will occur only’ as long as humans hold fast
to that which was laid down for them—the nomos of the
citizens of the necessity-cities—and especially if their liveli-
hoods depend on hunting or robbery. But when different
desires arise in them and grow to extremes, it is impossible
for them as a whole to fight and their kings need to impose
"taxes! upon them. If, along with this, it should happen that
these rulers do not equitably divide the property seized
from them | and lord it over them, why this is the hardest of
things for the multitude. They will then try to shake off
the rulers, and the lord will try to tyrannize over them.
Hence this city is most opposite to the tyrannical city. What
84.13 by chance] Farabi, Political Regime, 101.9-10 (MPP, p. 51):
for here no one has a better claim than anyone else to a position of
authority,
84.19 mighty] tagifim. See note to 41.17, above.
84.20 Persia] Plato Laws 3. 697c-698a.
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The Third Treatise 113
initially was designated as civic property in this nation is by
now truly domestic—i.e., for the sake of the households of
the lords among them. Hence the aristocratic part among
them is by now entirely tyrannical. This, then, is the
situation of the democratic city and the matters related to it.
As for the truly tyrannical cities, they are the cities
through the association and efforts of whose citizens the
completion of a single aim is intended, namely the aim of
the tyrant to attain the end he has set for himself. This may
be only the desire for tyrannizing, or the desire for honor,
or the desire for wealth, or ‘the desire for? pleasure, or the
combination of them. It is evident that the likes of these
[things] are not sought for any end for which they are
intended other than serving the tyrant and giving
expression to his will. Hence they resemble slaves; indeed
they are truly slaves. This association is the most opposite
to the virtuous association "because in the virtuous asso-
ciation it is intended only that every one of the citizens
receive as much of happiness as it is in his nature to be
raised to. Hence the intention of the virtuous royal arts! is
only the advantage of the civic body, just as is the case with
the other arts. An example of this is the art of medicine: its
intention is the healing of the sick, not the attainment of
85.5 aristocratic] kohant = imami. See note to 79.1-8, above.
85.7 tyrannical cities] or: despotic cities. See Farabi, Political Regime,
94-5-99.6 (MPP, pp. 46-50); and Virtuous City, 62.14-16 (Dieterici tr.,
P. 99).
85.12-14 Farabi defines political science as the knowledge of the
things by which the citizens may thus attain happiness (Attainment,
16.4-5 [MPP, p. 61]). That Averroes should then go on, as he does in
the next sentence, to speak of virtuous royal arts is not surprising in the
light of Plato Statesman 25ga~b, 305¢-e, and Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics
1, 2. 1094a26-bro, :
85.15 civic body] The reference is to those people who participate
in the affairs of the city, political humans, as distinguished from gods
and subpolitical beings.
85.15-18 Plato 342d-e, 346e.
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86.
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 114
the physician’s private intention. Similarly, the navigator’s
intention is the saving of the ship’s crew, not the saving of
himself alone—as is the case with the tyrant’s intention. For
he aims at his own private intention. He does not grant them
any advancement, but "only? grants them necessary things
to the extent that they serve him utterly, as is done with
slaves. It is evident that this city is of the utmost injustice
since not one of the practical arts has as its intention solely
the completion of the intention of the arts. This is self-
evident. The governance of the household of the citizens of
this city and the other arts and crafts existing in it aim
solely at the perfection of a single intention and solely at
the life of a single household, without anyone having an
intention of his own. So also with the virtuous city: the
households and other kinds of people in it also only aim, in
their intention, "at? the good of one [kind] of people, namely
the lords, who in this respect resemble the tyrannical city.
But the difference between them is this: notwithstanding
that the other kinds of people in each of these two {cities]
aim only at, the completion of a single intention alone, in
the virtuous city this is only so that every one of its kinds
may have an intention sought by it for itself, in that this is
its happiness. | When it is added that this intention is for
the sake of those who are kings over them, then the inten-
tions of the citizens are for the sake of their [sc., the lords’]
intentions. Hence each one of the two kinds—i.e., that of
the lord and that of the multitude—helps its fellow in the
virtuous city attain happiness. That is, the multitude serve
the lords in that whereby the intention of wisdom is fulfilled
in them [sc., the lords]; and the lords serve the multitude in
that which brings them to their happiness—if such as this
can be called service. It would be more proper that it be
be called governance or guidance. Such is not the case in
the tyrannical city, for in it and as regards the multitude,
The Third Treatise qWd5
the lords seek no intention other than their private intention.
Therein is the similarity between aristocratic cities and
tyrannical cities. The aristocratic parts existing in these
to cities often’ turn into tyrannical ones, and give the lie to
the aristocratic intention—as is the case with the aristocratic
parts found in cities existing in this time of ours. The tyrant
necessarily has helpers among them, and consequently
tyrannizes over the citizens. It may, however, happen that
these helpers and mighty ones are not accorded advance-
ment by tyrannical lordship; this city is tyrannical in its
entirety. It may indeed happen that they have some
15 superiority from tyrannical lordship, their varying [status]
in this lordship corresponding to the extremity of their
tyranny and their violence. This kind of tyranny exists
most frequently, particularly at the beginning of a tyranny.
This city tyrannizes over its kind—I mean that the mighty
in it, together with the king, tyrannize over the multitude.
Indeed, it may happen that the citizens as a whole help to
tyrannize the other nations, not to tyrannize one another.
Their rank would then correspond to their rank in capa-
ao bility for tyrannizing and in the soundness of their plans
for saving and preserving them[selves]. Their first lord will
be whichever of them is most advanced in these things.
These, then, are the tyrannical cities and their kinds.
As for the cities based on pleasure, they are the ones
whose citizens, through their association, aim at the attain-
ment of sensual pleasure such as cating, drinking, copu-
86.8-10 aristocratic] kohanf = imami. See note to 499.1-B, above. See
also Averroes’ discussion (63.27-64.22) of the deleterious effects of these
cities upon virtuous natures and the political consequences of the
deterioration of those todividullt
\. rying} or: manifold.
p62 a “base city.” See Political Regime, 89.7-13, 102.12-
103.13 (MPP, pp. 43, 52 £.)3 and Virtuous City, 62.8-10 (Dieterici tr.,
pp. 98 £).
25
go
87.
10
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 116
lation, and the others. Similarly the necessity-cities are
those whose citizens, through their association, aim at the
attainment of the necessary things. That through which they
attain the necessary things are either agriculture or hunting
or robbery. Agriculture is of them all [the most] natural to
man for the attainment of the necessary. This much of a
notion of these cities as is here [presented] will suffice
according to the intention of this science in its primary
purpose. These governances are varied and many in accord
with the varying states of the soul. Hence they must neces-
sarily "point? to the states of the soul; and the cause of their
being of this number is nothing other than that [this is} the
number of the states of the soul. | The spirited part is that
which loves honor; when it goes too far it becomes tyran-
nical. As for the love of pleasure and wealth, this necessarily
belongs to the desiring part. As for the democratic city and
the cause of its coming into being, why it is the variety in
the states of the soul and the appetite that is fixed in the
nature of each and every man with regard to each and
every one of these states. If the parts of the soul are severed
from one another and the baser of them is not for the sake
of the nobler—as many humans may possibly assert—then
the human association is the association of the free. Simi-
larly, if the parts of the soul are for the sake of the spirited
part, then the human association is the timocratic or
tyrannical association. Hence, too, if the desiring soul is the
leading one, then it is the association based on wealth or the
hedonistic one. As for the virtuous association, it has already
been made clear in physics and in this science "as well that
the case is quite the opposite of all this and’ that the
lordship over the parts of the soul belongs only to the
86.24-27 See 83,10-12 and note to 84.10, above.
87.11 rational part} Plato 586; Aristotle Micomachean Ethics 10. 7.
11'77a12-18,
The Third Treatise m7
rational part. Hence the virtuous city is the city over which
this part rules.
This having been made clear concerning the ends of these
Cities, it is fitting that we proceed to each and every thing
that Plato says about the transformation of these cities into
15 One another and the comparison between them. He first
begins by comparing these cities in pairs, thereafter com-
paring the two people who rule over the two of them.
Finally he compares them all together, since the case is
clearer in governances than it is in states [of the soul]. Just
as justice is clearer in a city than it is in the "particular!
soul, so it appears to be with wrongdoing. We resume and
zo we say: Although this city—i.e., the virtuous one—once it
exists, “does not easily? perish, it undoubtedly does perish
necessarily since everything that comes into being perishes,
as has been explained ‘in physics and becomes clear through
investigation. As to whence corruption enters into it, why
it is clear that it enters into it from the class that rules over
it when there arise in it [sc., the ruling class] confusion,
corruption, and the mixture of the golden and silver
[classes]. So that when the lords in this city do not attend
25 to the selection of like [individuals] for copulation in the
manner that he said, there are born to them children who
do not resemble them’. If these are not transferred from
the class of guardians but remain guardians, the bad ones
among them will constantly shun those things on which
they have been raised and despise music and choose gym-
nastic, [thereby] strengthening the spirited part in them and
the desiring part. When this kind of humans arises in the
class of lords and is mixed with the virtuous kind, then each
one of them pulls his fellow to what resembles him. The
go bronze and iron kind will be zealous to acquire and possess
87.21 physics) Aristotle Physics 5. 2. 226a6-8.
87.30 Or: to acquire property and be master over them.
546
547
88.
15
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 18
property, while the other kind will be zealous for those
primary virtues. | If the pulling between them is prolonged,
they settle on something intermediate between the virtuous
governance and the governance in which property is accu-
mulated. They [sc., the bronze and iron kinds who are now
part of the guardian class] take possession of land, houses,
and chattels for themselves in particular. They give the
[gold and silver] guardians as much of this as is needed to
sustain them, turning them by this act from free friends
into slaves who are lorded over because of their [sc., the
bronze and iron rulers’} might in war and their love of
training and honor. It is evident that this governance is like
something in the middle between the governance based on
wealth, namely the lordship of the few, and the virtuous
lordship. For in the respect in which this class among them
that fights for them does not wish anything of the acquisi-
tion of property or of the other arts, it resembles the
virtuous city. But in the respect that the lords in it are not
those virtuous ones whom we have defined—those tending
toward lordship being rather those who are spirited and
have a capability for victory—it is likewise not virtuous.
Hence this governance is a mixture of good and bad. Now
this lordship is the first lordship that Plato ‘asserts! the
virtuous city is transformed into because preference for
honor, violence, and love of lording-it-over prevail over the
souls of the virtuous more than the other desires. That is
why those who are skilled in debate say that [what begins
as] the lordship of friends ends up as the love of honor.
Furthermore, this is the first thing to be chosen after
wisdom, according to unexamined opinion, since honor is
a shadow that accompanies it. It is, as it were, the closest
thing into which the virtuous are transformed. It is not
88.14-15 One sees dimly here a play on words in the original: what
begins as the lordship of lovers ends up as the love of lordship.
548¢
The Third Treatise 119
often that there are to be found those who are free of it
{sc., love of honor] because of prolonged [association] with
it and love of being remembered. If one’s love of honor goes
to the point of tyrannizing, then he withdraws himself from
such cities as these, which have the virtuous kind of lordship,
20 no less [surely] than if the bad class accept the lordship of
a tyrant or if one of this description grows up among them.
This, then, is what Plato asserts concerning the initial
transformation of the virtuous governance. He holds simi-
larly concerning the transformation of the individual who
resembles the virtuous governance, namely the philosopher,
into the individual who resembles the timocratic associ-
ation, namely he whose happiness consists in honor.
He said and characterized this individual—he means the
one whose happiness consists in honor—as being an indi-
25 vidual who prefers gymmastic, loves hunting, rejects music,
loves lordship and tyranny, and does not base his claim to
lordship on what he says or suggests but rather on his
strength in war.
He said: He who is of this character will undoubtedly
despise money as long as he is a youth, but as he grows
older there is born ‘in him’ with the passing days a love
of money. ‘This is because’ his nature is not a complete
nature. In the end, he participates in the money-lover’s
nature since he already has been abandoned by the best
go guardian to the extent that he removes himself from
89.
listening to the musical arguments. If the soul bends | to
them [sc., the musical arguments] from its beginning, it
persists all its life in preferring virtue. This, then, is the
character of the individual whose happiness consists in
honor. But how does this individual grow out of the virtu-
ous one? This will be when this young fellow happens to be
the son of a virtuous individual who grew up in a city
5 without a good governance. He [sc., the father] flees from
Seno e es
10
20
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 120°
the honors and lordships established therein and from
whoever in general conducts it at some level. He removes
himself from all things, as happens to the virtuous who
come forth in nonvirtuous cities. This being so, and this
being the situation of the father of this young fellow, the
first thing that happens to him is that he hears from his
mother that she is discontented with her husband—i.e., his
parent—because ‘he is not one of the lords; because of this
she lacks standing among its citizens; moreover, she has a
hard life because’ he also does not wish to accumulate
wealth or to seek it. Hence she repeatedly tells her son,
“You have a father who has not the nature of a man and is
very lax,” and the rest of what women customarily censure
men with. The same holds for the servant of this young
fellow and his friend and in general whoever gives heed to
his bidding from among the inhabitants of his household.
When [one of the latter] sees the parent of this one set upon
by ‘someone’ who oppresses him or hits him, he commands
[that individual’s} son (while he is yet a young fellow) to
take revenge on whoever oppressed his father and inflict
twice as much of the oppression upon him [when he grows
up]; and in general, in all his actions, to be more like a
man ‘in his appearance and in’ his courage than his parent.
This being so, there is ‘further? joined to him in this city
the opinion of its citizens calling one who minds his own
business a fool and a madman and a defective and a
simpleton, while those who attend to those who are not of
their way of life and meddle into what are not their affairs
are honored and praised and called mighty. In such a lad,
the virtuous nature that his father nurtured in him, namely
the cogitative soul, draws him on together with the desiring
and spirited nature that ‘these’ [people] do not cease
89.15 Following Plato 549e.
550ab
25
go
go.
The Third Treatise i 20
nurturing in him. From this he turns to something inter-
mediate between excess Jove of the desires and love of
virtue. He thrusts the lordship in himself to the middle part,
namely love of honor, since this part of the soul, as we have
said repeatedly, is of all the parts that which is closest to the
part leading to virtue. He necessarily turns into an indi-
vidual who loves honor ‘and acts haughtily’. ‘This, then,
is the character of the youth who is among those whose
happiness consists in honor, and the character of his trans-
formation from the virtuous nature. He resembles the
character of the timocratic city and its transformation from
the virtuous city. You may understand what Plato says
concerning the transformation of the virtuous governance
into the timocratic governance and of the virtuous indi-
vidual into the timocratic individual from the case of the
governance of the Arabs. in early times, for they used to
imitate the virtuous governance. Then they were trans-
formed into timocrats in the days of Mu‘awiya. So seems
to be the case in the governance now existing in these
islands.
After this he investigates which governance this timo-
cratic city might possibly be transformed into | and into
which of the other people who rule over cities this timocratic
individual ‘might possibly’ be transformed. He says that
this governance—i.e., the timocratic—is for the most part
89.28-31 Averrocs points to two latter-day cases that come close to
illustrating Plato’s account of the transformation of the virtuous gov-
ernance. The first concerns the regime of the Arabs under Muhammad
and his immediate successors, the first four caliphs (632-661), here
described as an “imitation” of the virtuous governance, In the accession
of the caliph Mu‘awiya in 661 and the establishment of the Umayyad
dynasty, Averroes sees a transformation of the imitation. The second
case refers to the Almohad dynasty, under whose rule of Morocco and
Andalus Averroes lived the greater part of his life. See 92.4-8, below.
89.32 Paragraphing supplied.
90.4 See 82.22-89.15, above.
L
Averroes on Plato's Republic 122° The Third Treatise 123
transformed into the lordship of the few. This lordship, as employ many mighty ones. [6] If they themselves are the
5 we have said, is lordship of the rich; the poor have no share 25 fighters or some few of them, then when they wage war they
whatever in lordship among them. The transformation of will flee. You can make this clear from the case of most
the timocratic into this governance occurs only because, caseful nations when poor scene make war with them. Of
over time, they come to see the utility in dinars and dirhams necessity there must be an error in this lordship of the sort
q and prefer the useful to the beautiful. They withdraw from he did not leave off censuring in what preceded, [namely]
: virtue by another evil stage within the timocratic city "and that one is occupied with many things, such as farming and
accord dinars and dirhams a shameful honor. It is possible |_ accumulating wealth. ; mee ; . ie
to observe that which Plato speaks of when we investigate He said: The generation of this kind of lords in this 55
10 the timocratic cities! and how they are transformed. This 30 governance is the greatest of the evils that come upon them.
lordship is a vile, despicable, and contemptible lordship; it That is because they never cease turning the governance
is of little stability, perishing through some little thing that toward whatever is advantageous for thern, particularly in
comes upon it from without or within. The first error in it [~ the acquisition of wealth. Undoubtedly it will be one of the
is that they do not award lordship to him who has the 5% 91. nomoi laid down in this city y that it is not proper that
capacity to maintain it. Rather they only look out that he aristocrats rule over them or theirs, and that every man may
be sufficiently wealthy alone. In this they are in the position give away all his wealth, and nomoi similar to these. This
of one who chooses that the pilot of the ship be whoever 5 being so, the poor in this city increase of necessity just as
among the ship’s company is most avaricious; and they do increase the drones born in a beehive who eat but do not
15 aa se d the captain who is truly a captain ‘regarding the gather honey. Just as the drones are the greatest disease for
ae ats ‘a, on account of his being poor?. Whoever - ° the beehive, so is the case in this city. This being so, where
; does this has already undoubtedly prepared the ship for there are poor in the city so are there necessarily robbers,
] destruction. So is the case with the city. Further, this city plunderers, and bad people. Hence such cities as these have
a is not a single city, but rather two cities—the city of the 10 in them many kinds of evil. This, then, is the wrongdoing _
poor and the city of the rich. For if they accumulate and the error that beset this city. For the most part, the
4 property and are niggardly with it, they will remain non- timocratic city is devoid of this; hence that city is closer to
: ao poor. An evil affecting this city is that they are [rendered] the virtuous city, and the distance of this [sc., the oligarchic
q utterly incapable for war because the situation compels city] from it 1s proportionate to the error that befalls it.
them to [adopt] one of two [courses]. [4] They may employ After having made clear how the timocratic city is trans-
many fighters, but this’ is impossible for them because ot g90.30-91.2 Averroes’ addition to, or substitution for, Plato 552a-b.
; fear of them, (Hence he says of their lordship that it is he ERA ap ie of yey ey Pier anion add: a te aoe
| . i i and pricks in the eyes of the rich, who are few in number. Such plagues
: lordetup of the somal ee: paierse Pagal as these in this city resemble the drones. .. . (The phrase “horns ‘aad
i property, so in Pp paengiee a eyes” combines expressions found in Num, 33:55 and
90.15 ship] MSS: city. 91.13 Paragraphing supplied.
15
20
25
go
92.
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 1240
formed into this city, and how many kinds of error befall
it, and what kind of governance it has, it is proper that we
also consider the individual who resembles it, in which city
he is and out of what he is transformed. We say: When the
one for whom happiness consists in honor has a son and
successor, it may possibly happen later on that he “grows
poor’ and that everything that he owned passes away.
Moreover, he is drawn toward some one of the lordships,
such as governance of the army and the like, and there are
lawsuits against him owing to people who ‘bring him up!
to judgment and render him contemptible. When some-
thing like this or resembling it happens to him, dying will
be more bearable for him than the poverty that has beset
him. Love of honor is expelled from the soul of whoever
prefers the acquisition of wealth, and for this he sends forth
all the desires, Such is the transformation of the timocratic
individual into the oligarchic one. He undoubtedly resem-
bles the governance based on wealth, just as the individual
whom we characterized as being one whose happiness
consists-in honor also resembles that [timocratic] govern-
ance. This individual undoubtedly is avaricious and
niggardly; he finds it sufficient that civic desires are [limited
to] the necessary things, but he does not do this out of any
virtue in him. He only abandons these desires for another
desire that is greater in him, namely the love of wealth.
Hence, if the likes of these are denied others’ property "but!
do not refrain from unnecessary desires, there will be rapid
ruin and destruction, as we have said, on account of the
niggardliness in them. In general, the transformation of the
timocratic individual into the hedonistic individual is some-
thing evident, whether he takes his pleasure in wealth or
the other remaining pleasures. So seems | to be the case with
91.22 oligarchic] Literally: moneyed.
91.28 them] MSS: him.
ss3
10
The Third Treatise 25
the timocratic city and the hedonistic city; this is because
the ‘city’ based on wealth and the hedonistic one are of a
single class. We often sce kings being corrupted ‘to’ the
likes of these. An example in this time is the kingdom of
people known as the Almoravids. At first they imitated the
governance based on the nomos; this was under the first
one of them. "Then they changed under his son into the
timocratic, though there also was mixed in him the love of
wealth’, Then it changed under his grandson into the
hedonistic with all the kinds of things of the hedonists; and
it perished in his days. This was because the governance
that opposed it at that time resembled the governance based
on the nomos. This, then, is the statement on the change
of the timocratic individual into the oligarchic individual.
The difference between their two ranks is clear, for the
oligarchic is baser than the timocratic. So is the case with
the city of them both. Now we ought to consider into which
city this city can possibly be changed out of itself.
We say that he says that it changes into the democratic
city. Similarly, he also explains further that the oligarchic
individual changes into the individual resembling this city.
g2.1-2 See 81.9-10, above.
92.4. Almoravids} Correcting the Hebrew mistranslation. The
Almoravids were the dynasty that preceded the Almohads (sec note to
8g.28-31, above).
g2.4-8 What began as an “imitation” of the governance based on
the nomos under the conqueror Yisuf Ibn Tashfin (1061-1107) was
twice transformed by the time his grandson reigned forty years later.
The latter’s overthrow was effected by ‘Abd al-Mu’min, the founder of
the Almohad dynasty, whose governance “‘at that time resembled” the
governance based on the nomos. In the absence of further evidence,
the governance based on the nomos cannot simply be equated with the
governance based on the Law. Averroes would have had no difficulty
whatever in expressing that if such had been his intention, The model
for the imitation or resemblance, the standard by which these regimes
are being judged, is not the Koran, but rather that which the Koran
itself incorporates and imitates. See note to 62.29-63.1, above.
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 126 The Third Treatise : 129
i 15 As for the mode by which the city based on wealth is The situation of this city is then like the ‘situation’ of a
Hs changed into this city, it is this: Since lordship in the city
of the few is assured only by the possession of property
alone, their nomoi that they lay down necessarily [include]
a nomos that helps them in this intention. Hence the first
thing they Jay down as a principle of the nomos is that it be
permitted any one of the youths who so wishes to spend
whatever he wishes of his wealth on whatever desire he
wishes. For thereby it comes about that they [sc., the money-
20 grubbers] draw off all their wealth. This is why it is im-
possible for people in this lordship to combine with the
honoring of wealth and its acquisition, the laying-down of
nomoi regarding moderation, [even] when because of
necessity they have to propose them and especially at the
end when they lay down nomoi such as these. When they
forsake people and their desires, they forsake not a few to
go to poverty, but many—and these not only the un-
distinguished, but [also] those of nobility and courage.
25 When such as these come forth in this city and multiply in
it, they necessarily anger the avaricious and niggardly,
whom they envy and blame for being the cause that placed
them in poverty and contempt. Similarly, they lay down
many nomoi in this city.
He said: They make their souls idle and put them at ease
since they do not attend to things other than the accumu-
lation of wealth.
He said: When many people of this kind of poverty are
go associated together and there come forth among them such
drones ‘as are born’ in beehives, and they compare them-
selves with the rich in battles and in the other civic affairs
that are imposed upon them by the necessity of association,
they find themselves | mightier than they in everything.
And they despise them and assert that they became wealthy
shattered and sickly body. Just as a body of this character
falls ili from the slightest externa] cause, so is the case with
this city. If there is some city opposing it—and particularly
a democratic one—then such drones as these who come
forth, help them against them [sc., the rich] and agree to
plunder the rich and seize their wealth and drive them from
the city or enslave them. Just as it is also possible for a body
to take leave of its own being and change, so is it possible
that this city change from its being into the democratic city.
This comes about when the poor that are in it conspire
against the rich and ransack their property and kill them
or drive them from the city. You can explain this by
[referring to] the niggardliness and avarice [displayed]
toward the poor in these cities on [the part of] the rich.
When this is so and the Likes of these-—-the free-born poor—
rule over the city, every one of them does what is right in
his eyes. Lordship among them is held by some kind of
chance. Every kind of human is undoubtedly to be found
in this city, and no ‘one’ has any rank at all. Their nomos
is an equal nomos—i.e., there is no superior among them.
Hence this city—i.e., the democratic one—resembles a
many-colored woven garment. Just as this kind. of garment
is considered by women and youths to be good because of
the variety of its colors, so seems to be the thought about
this city according to unexamined opinion. But in truth it
is not so. Unless strengthened by virtue or honor, it perishes
rapidly, as is the case with democratic cities existing in this
time of ours and in that which preceded [it}. Out of this
city will come forth the virtuous city and the other kinds of
these cities because they exist in it potentially since all the
93-12-13 chance] I.e., lordship is not attained because of some
particular merit. See 84.13, above, and note thereto, See also Averroes,
only because of their [sc., the poor’s] shame and disgrace. Rhetoric, 136.11-12.
25
go
94.
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 128
states of the soul exist in "this city’. So it seems that the first
cities to grow up by nature are the necessity-cities; then the
democratic cities follow them; then every one of these cities
branches off from them. Hence, as Plato says, the wise ought
to attend to such cities as these [sc., the democratic ones]
and choose from among them the good kinds that accord
with the virtuous association “until’ they bring it forth.
This is analogous to a man who wishes to set up a store in
which he sells everything and who chooses from it that
which pleases him.
He said: Since in this city no one is compelled to under-
take any of the "useful" civic matters "such as’ wars, peace,
and the rest, it easily comes to ruin. Hence it is that we see
people such as these who deserve being put to death
dwelling among them as though [no one cared or saw,
stalking the land like a hero}.
He said: Moreover, they do not praise the things that we
ourselves were praising when we were attending to ‘the
virtuous city?, nor do they adhere to any of those actions. |
This, then, is the extent of the error in this city and its
remoteness from the virtuous city, even though it might be
thought of this governance, according to unexamined
opinion, that it is a hedonistic governance. This, then, is the
statement concerning the transformation of the city based
on wealth into the democratic one, and the extent of the
error that befalls it in comparison to the virtuous city and
the timocratic city.
We ought also to consider the individual resembling it
and out of what he changes. We say that the individual who
93-21-23 Averroes’ addition. ;
93-30 Following Plato 558a. MSS have instead a near-quotation
from Isa. 43:10: they are those before whom there was no God
formed.
g4.1-4. Averroes’ summary.
94.5 Paragraphing supplied.
ss7de
ss8
10
15
20
The Third Treatise 429
resembles this lordship also only changes from being a
citizen of the lordship of the few in the [same] manner as
this city changes from it [sc., the oligarchic city]. It may
happen that a son is born to that individual who is a citizen
of the lordship of the few, and, for want of education in the
lordship of the few and because of the increase of idlers that
come forth there, he does not leave off bending his son
toward his governance. [Meanwhile] those without bend
him [sc., the son] toward absolute freedom and aim at this
kind of desires, As-time passes he necessarily changes to
unqualified freedom in all his desires, not limiting [himself]
to the necessary desires with which his father would have
him be satisfied. Rather he will move to the unnecessary
desires. (By ‘“‘necessary desires” I mean those that are
constituted in us and which we need for life, such as the
desire for water and food with respect to this preserving the
humors of our bodies "by transmitting to our bodies’ a
replacement for that which pours out of "them’.) Now if
this youth turns to some such condition, he will from day
to day become more subjected to his desires that come into
his mind. At one time he drinks wine till he is drunk; at
another time he drinks water till his temperament cools; at
another time he takes gymnastic with those who engage in
gymnastic; at another time his conduct is like the conduct
of those who engage in philosophy; and at other times he is
slothful and too relaxed for any activity. In general, there
is neither order nor measure in his conduct. Yet this con-
duct is called sweet and free, though in truth it is the
remotest of things from human conduct. For inasmuch as
man has some single end, his activity necessarily only
[corresponds] to some single governance. This youth being
then of this disposition, he necessarily resembles the demo-
cratic city. We presuppose that this is so and that the
comparison between him and these people whom we have
s6r
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 130°
enumerated is like the comparison between the cities. We
ought to consider which city this city—i.e., the democratic
one—changes into and what is its potentiality, and into
which individual this individual turns, and what is his rank
and measure and happiness.
He said that the democratic cities mostly change into
tyranny and the tyrannical cities. The case of the change
of the democratic city into the tyrannical one is like the case
of the change of the lordship of the few into the democratic
lordship. The cause of this is of one class: for just as the
cause of the change of the lordship of the few into the
democratic lordship is nothing | other than excess in the end
that they aim at, namely the acquisition of wealth (for this
is the cause of so many democratic people coming forth in
that city, they being those whom we likened to drones
existing in beehives), so the cause of the change of demo-
cratic lordship into the tyrannical lordship is only excess in
quest of freedom and the limitless ‘increase’ of it. For
whatever is done in excess goes beyond its measure and is
changed into the opposite. This occurs not only in voluntary
things but also in natural things. The quest for excess in
‘freedom’ is the cause of there coming forth in it drones
Tresembling’ the drones that come forth in the lordship of
the few, save that here it [sc., the cause] is more extensive
and more frequent. That is because the lords in that city—
i.e., the city of the few—do not praise such as these who
come forth among them—i.e., idlers full of desires—but
rather destroy and fight them. Hence its change is to
something intermediate between the city based on wealth
and the tyrannical city, and this is the democratic city.
Such men as these as come forth among them are the
The Third Treatise 131
up in their households and dwellings and in all the classes
to be found among them to the point that fathers and sons,
masters and slaves, men and women, are placed on an equal
footing among them. And they nullify the law in order that
nothing have lordship over them. In general, nothing is
choiceworthy among them save absolute freedom and that
a man control whatever he wants as he wants. Of necessity,
then, the coming-forth of that bad class of drones will
increase among them just as "the production of humors!
increases in shattered bodies—'i.e.,1 phlegm, and the red
and the black [bile]—to the point that this city, with such
a class as this coming forth in it, turns necessarily into a
tyranny. Hence it is fitting that statesmen guard against the
coming-forth in cities of such a class as this even more than
the physician’s precautions against the production of bad
humors in bodies. When they detect that something of them
comes forth in cities, they [must] tear them out by their
roots and cast them out of the city just as the physician does
with the two biles and the phlegm. This is even more fitting
for the statesman. This class of humans—ie., those who
control everything that they desire—does not come into
being [alone] in this city. It is found, rather, that, as Plato
says, three classes of humans emerge in it. Their coming-
forth in it is the most helpful of things for its changing into
tyranny. As for the first class among them, that is the class
of drones whom we have characterized, those who abandon
[themselves] to all their desires. This class, as we have said,
are the honored and praised lords in this city. | There is also
a class that grows in this city that is abhorred in it, namely
that which loves money alone. The coming-forth of this
class in this city is as honey for these drones who eat it with
honored and praised ones whom they set up as lords for $29 great speed. As for the third class, they are the people who
15 them, and [these] rule over’ them. For it is the way of this
lordship that when freedom overflows in it they are stirred 95-23 statesmen] Plato 564c: legislator.
i
i
10
Lt)
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 132°
keep to their own affairs or have no affairs, [and] they are
not wealthy. The moneyed kind, however, is persecuted in
this city; and these two classes combine to plunder "and
rob them!’ of their property, except that the first class does
this by way of desire and licentiousness, while the second
does this only’ because of the advancement they intend
for themselves by means of [the others’] property. That
advancement corresponds to the extent that those who seize
lordship of the association in this city find it possible to
plunder these of their property and to divide it among the
populace.
He said: The propertied are necessarily wronged by
these; and there arise here contentions and acts of violence
and robberies. It is the way of the populace to turn over
"their affairs’ to the one who is greatest in that class—i.c.,
of the people who give rein to their desires—and they
sustain him and make him great. Such an individual as this
does not cease adding gradually to [this] change and to
excess in freedom to the point that they enslave the majority
of the citizens and become thorough tyrants. The beginning
of the transformation of this one who comes’ to tyrannical
lordship from democratic lordship is this: When he begins
this lordship he commits tyrannical acts to the point that
he finally turns into a thorough tyrant. For on finding the
populace at the outset submissive to him in harming
whomever he wishes to harm and punishing him with
something detestable, and in destroying whomever he
wishes to destroy, he thus does not cease “to bring! one kind
of people into tyranny over another kind. And this, as we
have said, is so that the [different] kinds existing in this city
96.4 and] Following Plato 565a; MSS: except that.
96.12 change and... freedom] The change consists in depriving
the propertied of their political and economic importance. The freedom
is not for the citizens generally, but for the leader himself and for his
fellow drones,
565
~
366
20
25
go
97.
The Third Treatise 133
be made evident, and particularly the moneyed kind, which
are the most hated of things in this city. He does not cease
doing this continuously until he becomes the enemy of most
of the citizens and hates them. Then, either they conspire
against him and kill him, or he rules over them and
tyrannizes them all and becomes a tyrant. (You yourself can
understand this clearly from this democratic lordship that
exists in our time for it often changes into tyranny. An
example of this is the lordship existing in this land of
ours—i.e., Cérdoba—after 500 [A.H. = 1106]. It was almost
completely democratic; then the situation turned after 540
[= 1145] into a tyranny.)
As to how his rise comes about through these actions, and
what his governance comes to in the end, and the extent
of what befalls the city through him by way of injury and
evil, and the misfortune that befalls him himself, why that
will be made clear through speech and investigation. Plato
says that it is characteristic of this individual that he subdue
all humans and arouse them to hold fast to the nomos so
that it might be thought that he is not tyrannizing, | and
that he intends the guidance and direction of the citizens
(with a view] to dividing property and goods among them,
and that he has no other intention than the care of the
association and the improvement of the city. When he has
made peace with the enemies without by setting things
right with some and 'overcoming” others, he turns to his
city where he continually stirs up wars among them. This
is so that he might control the property of its citizens and
seize it. For he holds that once he has plundered them of
their wealth they will be unable to shake him off, and they
will be preoccupied with themselves and with seeking their
daily bread, as happened to the people of our district-with
96.24-26 See 92.4-8, above.
567
10
15
20
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 134
the individual known as Ibn Ghaniya. If it also comes into
his mind to be frightened of people in the populace on
account of their having much wealth and substantial pos-
sessions and power, he cunningly devises their destruction
by turning them over to their enemies. Similarly, he "hates!
whatever human is of this description among his peers and
whom he has made into his henchmen. When ‘he! does
these actions, the greatest thing is [his] hatred of the
citizens. That is why he makes use of his energy to recognize
these—-i.e., men of might, courage, and greatness—among
them. He plots against them until he purges the city ‘of
them7. This purge is the opposite of the purge by which the
physicians purge bodies and the wise [purge] the virtuous
cities; for these extract the worst and cast it out, while this
one does the opposite. That is why the tyrant is obliged to
be in one of two conditions: either not to live, or to dwell
with evil and sinful people who hate him. This is one thing
in which, according to him, the tyrant takes delight.
Undoubtedly, as long as he engages in these actions and his
enmity toward his citizens grows, he will have need of more
numerous henchmen so that he may be more protected and
secure. This can only be provided for him if he engages evil
foreigners, to the exclusion of the citizens; he draws them
‘from every’ place ‘if? he gives them pay. These are his
trusted friends, and he destroys those predecessors who set
him up as ruler of the association. If the tyrant finds nothing
97-7 One ofa family that were prominent opponents of the Almohad
dynasty and leaders in the attempted restoration of Almoravid rule in
North Africa.
97-7-8 Plato 567a: if he suspects certain men of having free thoughts
and not putting up with his ruling.
97-15-16 Plato 567d: either dwell with the ordinary many, even
though hated by them, or cease to live.
97.21 Averroes passes over, for the moment, the digression in Plato
568a~c wherein the tragic poets are attacked for their praise of tyranny.
See 101.15-18, below.
s68de
25
30
98.
The Third Treatise 135
with which to feed this army and camp, the situation will
compel him~—should there be any wealth in the city in one
of the temples—to order that it be taken out. Similarly, he
conspires against the property of the association that set
him up as one of the democratic’ rulers. As this activity
of his against the association increases, they see that this
"is the opposite of what they intended” in handing over the
lordship to him, since they only intended by this that he
guard [them] from the rich and the gentlemen and other
citizens once he possessed dominion and power, so that they
might exist under his governance and the governance of his
servants, Hence the association of the distressed “then” seek
to drive him out of their city, and he is compelled to enslave
them and to take [their] arms from them. The condition of
the association with him is "like! what is said | in the
metaphor of the torch burning over coals in the fire, for the
association flees from some [sort of] servitude in handing
over the lordship to him and falls [thereby] into an [even]
harsher servitude. All these actions of the tyrants are
manifest in this time of ours not only through argument but
also through sense and evidence. We have spoken of the
manner in which the democratic city changes into the
tyrannical city, and what is the condition of the citizens in
a tyranny, and the extent of their distress,
Now we ought to consider ‘also’ the individual who
resembles this city, and how he changes from the individual
who is one of the democratic rulers, and whether his way
of life in grief and lack of happiness resembles the govern-
ance of the city that is being tyrannized. We say that since
97.25 MS A: they see that this is the way in which they went astray.
97-26-27 the gentlemen} Literally: the virtuous and the good,
98.1 I.e., that in seeking to avoid the discomfort of the torch’s
smoke, men have been exposed to the greater hazard of being burned
in the fire.
98.6 Paragraphing supplied.
569
570
yee rer
10
15
20
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 136
Plato defined this individual as being, according to him, the
individual filled with unnecessary desires, he began by first
making known what these desires are. ‘Then, after that, he
turns to describe the manner in which the tyrannical
individual is changed from an individual who exercises
democratic rule, and the extent of his grief and lack of
happiness, and [shows] that in this he resembles [the city]
that is being tyrannized. He said that the unnecessary
desires are those that are aroused and brought into motion
in sleep: i.e., the bestial part, when the cogitative part that
rules over this part is asleep. "For" it is the way of the bestial
‘part? during sleep, when released from the rule of the
cogitative part and from every ‘thought’, that it holds at
that moment "that nothing will frighten it off from seizing
what it desires when it awakens. When this part is brought
low by the nomoi [and] the better [desires], much of it is
nullified; and if some remnant of it remains, it is weak, But
if a man attends to this part [sc., the bestial part], his
condition in sleep does not resemble that of that first one.
Rather, this one’s cogitative part in sleep is just as it is in
waking so that he entertains no thought [hostile] to the
nomoi. Hence this resembles ‘the two’ [kinds of] people,
the bestial and the divine. When it became clear to him
what the unnecessary desires are, he turned to investigate
what this individual—i.e., the tyrant—changes out of, and
said: We have already said of the democratic individual,
whom we mentioned in the preceding, that he is a young
fellow who grew up with a disposition to choose none of the
unnecessary desires apart from the accumulation of wealth.
Since this young fellow grew up among people filled with
98.16 Following Plato 571b; MSS: by the better nomoi.
98.19 hostile] Following Plato 572b. The MSS read: near to the
nomoi, The MSS may reflect an earlier mistranslation of the Greck
prefix para as “near” or “beside,” which was taken over by Averroes.
S72
25
go
10
The Third Treatise 137
Tun'necessary desires, and his nature was better than their
nature, and his father was drawing him toward his way of
life and they toward its opposite, he turns into something
intermediary between those two kinds and takes fromm each
one of them what to his mind is equitable. His way of life is
neither the way of life of one who has no freedom nor the
way of life of one who transgresses the nomos, and he is
transformed from being one belonging to the lordship of the
few to turn into one of the populace.
He said: All this being as we have characterized it, let it
be presupposed now that when one of this description
reaches | old age, he has a son who has grown up with his
disposition. Also let it be presupposed that those things that
happened to his parent happened to him—i.ec., through
people whose way it is to draw ‘him' to that which has
[hostility] to the nomos—and that they lead him to utter
freedom. [Presuppose too] that his father, contrary to what
was the case with himself, has already attended in some way
to the birth of these desires [in the son], as also do his
servants and his relatives. He undoubtedly changes toward
excess in these desires more intently than did his. father
because he has no one drawing him toward the other
extreme and because he finds no people to force him and to
oppose him. Rather he finds people who act cunningly
toward him regarding whatever it is that he loves. This one
[love] they place over all the desires, and it rules over them.
They [sc., the desires] make it [sc., the love] into what
corresponds to one of the greatest drones in the hive. ‘For
when he encounters the unnecessary desires! such as
drunkenness from wines and incense and perfumed oils, and
in general all the delights [to be found] in [such] gatherings,
98.27 no freedom] Plato 572d: illiberal.
99-3 hostility] Following Plato 572¢; MSS: nearness. See note to
98.19, above.
573
Averroes on Piato’s Republic 138
they depart from him and are utterly removed from him.
These drones are to be seen among them [sc., the unnec-
essary desires], and they hinder him to the point that his
mind is unbalanced and his excitement is intensified. Then
the demons seize him; and his confusion is intensified, and
he is beside himself "if there remains in him? some remnant
of [his earlier] life after all that has befallen him’ on
15 account of these desires. As this is the situation of the
tyrant—i.e., the situation of one who takes no notice,
neither little nor much, of the noblest of his parts, namely
reason—the situation of the tyrant resembles the situation
of the deranged and of the drunk, and his intellect resembles
his; and hence his status and position are similar to those of
the deranged and the drunk. Hence, unbalanced ones such
as these wish not merely for dominion over people, but over
angels too if this were only possible for them. This, then, is
zo the character of the tyrannical individual and the manner
by which he changes from the individual who is a democrat-
ic ruler. He only comes to such a condition as this after all
these things have befallen him [owing to his] nature and
way of life. When he completed this, he undertook to
consider the manner of this one’s life and lordship. And he
said: This individual has gatherings based on the pleasures,
among which are bazaars, baths, and promenades, and in
general whatever causes love to dwell and arouses [erotic]
desire, which [in turn] overpowers him and guides the parts
a5 of his soul just as the captain guides the ship. As this is the
situation of this individual, other desires will not cease being
aroused alongside these desires, just as "the shoot’ sprouts
gg.11 they depart] The referent is ambiguous. Averroes seems to be
referring to any vestiges of moderation in the young feliow.
99-19 angels} Plato 573c: gods. 2
99.27 Averroes’ elaboration. Plato 573d speaks of desires sprouting
up beside the soul.
30
100.
10
The Third Treatise 139
Tat the side’ of the tree. He will have need of great ex-
penditures; and if he has wealth, he spends it immediately.
Thus he soon has need of [further] expenditures, and
thereafter there arises for him the need to borrow from
others. Along with all this, his desire forces him to what is
beyond his capability, and particularly the erotic and
amatory desire, which are the guides of the rest of his
desires, | In general, he does not leave off the subject of his
desires, as Plato says, like one who indulges himself in
raising pigeons. Hence, only one of two things is possible
for him: either he draws toward himself whatever he wishes
from whatever place, or he feels pain as a woman feels pain
during her menstrual period or as an invalid in pain. If his
parents have something [left], he does not find what they
gave him to be sufficient, and he asks it of them. If they
refuse, he takes it from them, either by deception or by
theft or by force. If they still hinder him in this, he attends
to tyrannizing over them or killing thern, as we see this
happening to many humans in these cities. This, then, is the
situation of one to whom a tyrannical child is born, who
finally comes to tyrannize his parent. His desires further
lead him to plunder houses of assembly and temples and
wayfarers. In general, those desires do not cease, but go on
increasing ‘in him” forever; they are intensified by the
dominion of [erotic] desire and love to the point that he
feels troubled. When he is relieved of the good opinions!
held by him from the period of his youth—at which time
his parent was raising him and he {sc., the son] was one of
the democrats—it reaches the point that his waking be-
comes, as Plato says, like his condition when asleep, He
100.1-2 Averroes’ elaboration. Plato 579¢ speaks of a crowded nestful
of intense desires raising a clamor,
100.12-13 democrats} or: he was one of the democratic rulers. Plato
574: there was a democratic regime in him.
574
i
i
i
q
20
25
101.
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 146
denies himself nothing, and nothing frightens him. When
the likes of these drones multiply in democratic cities, they
recognize that they [are a multitude]. They, with the help
also of the foolish populace, take the mightiest and strongest
of them in tyranny and deliver the lordship to him; and he
tyrannizes over them. Just as he formerly ruined father and
mother, so does he now ruin 'the city? of his father and
forefather. If these drones are few in the city and if the
virtuous among them [sc., the citizens] rebuke them, then
the mightiest of them take to leaving the city and stand on
the roads robbing men of their lives and wealth.
He said: It is the way with the tyrant’s might that he does
not mark any of the citizens with love or affection that is
genuine or mutual. All this being as we have characterized
it, why then the governance of the tyrant is the governance
of utmost injustice since it is most contrary to that which
we previously defined to be the right one. It is this that is
of the utmost evil and ruination, just as what preceded
concerning the king is of the utmost goodness and excel-
lence. Since the situation as among cities is like the situation
as among individuals, there is, therefore, no one more happy
than the virtuous king and no one more wretched than the
tyrant. This comparison between each one of them—i.e.,
the comparison of city to city and individual to individual—
is, however, clearer in [the case of] the city. This being so,
if we ourselves accept that the relation of city to city is [the
same as] the relation of individual to individual, then this
comparison between the two of them—i.e., between the
two people—becomes clear. | Hence the accidents and
properties characteristic of this city ought to be reflected
upon, and we must judge the tyrant in the light of them.
It is clear that this city is in extreme slavery and very far
removed from freedom. Similarly, the soul of the tyrant is
100.15 Following Plato 575¢ to fill a lacuna in the Hebrew text.
576
L
ST7C-
$77e
15
20
The Third Treatise 4i
filled with slavery and devoid of freedom; for the base part
rules over it, while the parts that are of utmost fitness are
enslaved. When a city is enslaved, either it does not bring
about what it wishes or else brings about only little of it;
hence they are full of sighing, sorrow, and mourning. As for
those filled with tyranny, it is also clear from their situation
that they are impoverished. Similarly, the tyrannical soul
is impoverished, not sated.
He said: And just as this city is in utmost fear, so is the
tyrant. And just as there is not to be found in any city more
mourning and weeping than in this city, so is the case with
the tyrant’s soul, which is filled with persistent desires and
unfulfilled loves. This, then, is what Plato said in com-
paring these cities and these people. But since he found this
comparison, which we have described, between the virtuous
city and the tyrannical one clearer than that between the
two people ruling over them, he wished to make the case
of the tyrant manifest through a clear example. [He does]
all this on account of the renown of ‘tyrannical" lordship in
his time, and the poems in praise of them, and their
assertion that it is the lordship of the free. I have seen many
among the poets and those who grow up in these cities who
prefer this lordship. They hold that it is the ultimate end
and that there is excellence in the tyrannical soul, and they
hold fast to [this] lordship. He resumed and said that it is
clear that the relation of the tyrant to those over whom he
tyrannizes is the relation of the master to the slave. If we
presuppose that there is a rich individual who has many
slaves and who does them no good at all, this can only be
because the nonslave citizens among the people of his
homeland are twice the number of the slaves. Now if we
101.15-18 Averroes picks up the theme of Plato 568a—c, which he
passed over at 97.21.
101.16 grow up] Other MSS: many of the poets who grow up.
—
578a
L.
s7ade
25
102,
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 142
presuppose that such an individual as this, and his children,
wives, and property, are in a certain region of the earth
where there is none other than slaves with him and where,
in general, he is in a situation in which it would be im-
possible for someone without freedom to help him, why then
owing to his slaves he necessarily reaches [a state] of great
fear’ for his wives, property, children, and himself. The
situation compels him to deliver up his slaves or [at least]
some of them. Although there is no obligation ‘to do this’,
he accumulates many things for them and withholds them
from himself so as to bind them [to him]. He will be in one
of two conditions: either great strength accrues to him, or
he comes to lose any importance. If, moreover, God were
to place people ‘around him’ who hold that there is no
necessity that one have lordship over another, would not
the heart of this individual grow faint and would he not be
among them ‘as though he were’ under detention? { This
is necessarily the situation of the tyrant: he is detained
among a class such as this, filled with hunger and fear.
Moreover, he has great hunger ‘within’ himself and cannot
rule himself. Hence he cannot go wherever he wishes nor
look at whatever he wishes, but rather ‘only? lives the life
of a woman. One of the worst dispositions of such an
individual is that he is unable to restrain and overcome
himself, yet he attempts to lead other people at some level.
It is as ifa man who is sick in all his bodily dispositions, as
much as he reckons on curing what [ails] him, leaves off
curing his body and [instead] improves his property as far
as is possible for him and takes to healing [other] people’s
bodies in accord with his notions. On account of ail this,
the tyrant is the most enslaved of people and has no device
101,24 great fear] Following Plato 578e, one MS, and Mantinus;
other MSS: great calamity.
102.9-10 Or: no device for the longing of his desires.
579
10
15
20
The Third Treatise 143
by which to put an end to his desires, but rather-is forever
in continual sorrow and mourning. The soul of one who is
of this description is an impoverished soul; hence he is
envious, violent, and friendless. These states having existed
in him prior to his lordship, they are even more necessary
after [he assumes] the lordship. Without any doubt, he is of
necessity troubled and unlucky, for he who rides chance and
accident often comes to lose any importance. All this, as we
have said "more than once’, is clear and may be discerned
through argument as well as through the sense[s]. From the
sum of this argument have been made evident the order
fof succession] of these cities, the happiness and misfortune
in them, the order of those ruling over them, and that the
happiest of them is the king just as the most unfortunate of
them is the tyrant. This, then, is what Plato holds con-
cerning the change of these cities and of the people in them
one into another.
One might object and say that if the case is as he thought,
namely that there is among these cities "what! resembles
"two opposites—the two being’ the virtuous city and the
tyrannical one—and that there is among them what re-
sembles an intermediary between the extremes, then it does
not necessarily follow that the change of cities proceeds
according to [this] order. This exists only in natural things,
for it is the way with nature to bring about opposites via
intermediaries. As for these things, they are completely
102.11 friendless} Plato 580a: envious, faithless, unjust, friendless,
impious, and a host and nurse for all vice; and, thanks to all this,
unlucky in the extreme.
102.13 unlucky} The following clause is Averroes’ addition, as is the
subsequent sentence.
102.15 argument] or: from the contents of this treatise. Averroes
omits Plato’s repetition of the five types of cities and men.
102.19 Paragraphing supplied.
=
580a-
580c
25
go
103.
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 144
voluntary. And [since] all these natures—i.c., the natures
we have described—are to be found in all these cities, it is
possible for any city among them to change into any other,
We say that what Plato said ‘undoubtedly’ is not necessary,
but Fit ist [this way] as a rule. The cause of this is that the
governance that is laid down has an effect by transferring
certain states [of the soul] to whoever grow up in it, even if
these are opposite to what is fixed in the nature of those who
are being disposed toward those states. It is possible thereby
for the majority of people to excel in the human virtues.
This is only rarely impossible. This has already been made
clear in the first part of this science, for it was stated there
that the way of attaining the practical virtues is habitude,
just as the way of attaining the theoretical sciences is study. |
This being so, man’s transformation from one state to
another is consequent upon the transformation of the laws
and ‘is arranged according to their order’. Since the nomdi,
and especially in the virtuous city, are not suddenly trans-
formed-—and this too is because of the habits and excellent
states to which they accustom its members and with which
they grow up—but rather are only transformed gradually
and to what is proximate [to them, it follows that] the
transformation in habits and dispositions necessarily changes
according to that order, to the point that when the laws are
utterly corrupted, the states [of the soul] existing there will
be utterly base. You can make this clear from what—after
forty years—has come about among us in the habits and
102.23 voluntary] See discussion of voluntary intelligibles and the
deliberative faculty in Farabi, Attainment, 17.17-28.4 (MPP, pp. 62-68).
102.26 as a rule} The earlier discussion of the transformation of
regimes was cast in terms of possibilities and likelihoods, rather than
inexorable necessities. See 89.32-90.4, 92-12, 93.6-8, 93-18-21, above.
102.28 It is possible thereby] I.c., by transferring certain states of
the soul to the inhabitants (given the virtuous city or excellent laws).
102.30-gt Aristotle Wicomachean Ethics 2. 1. 1 togar4—b25. : .
103.8-12 “Forty years" appears to refer to the period beginning with
Io
15
20
25
The Third Treatise 145
states of those possessing lordship and status. Because the
timocratic governance under which they grew up has been
undone, they have come by these base things that they now
have. Only he among them who is virtuous according to the
Legal prescriptions remains in an excellent state. This is
rare among them. When Plato completed this he wished
also to compare the pleasures occurring to each one of these
because this belongs to the completion of the comparison
between them, With this he completes his discourse con-
cerning the necessary parts of this science, and this is what
we ourselves had in mind to explain. :
"He began and he said:’ Since the states of the soul are
comprised within three classes, so too are the kinds of cities.
The first kind is that which loves wisdom; the second is that
which loves mastery—if in moderation, then it is honor
[-loving], and if in excess it is victory[-loving]; and the
third, the appetitive one, is "that which’ loves gain. The
kinds of pleasures are necessarily [also] three, [one] for each
of these, since it is clear from the character of the pleasures
that they are an appendant shadow. :
Plato began by using a dialectical argument to explain
which of these pleasures is most worthy of choice. For "he
said’ that every one of the adherents of these three pleasures
is found to choose only the pleasure incidental to his way
of life. Thereafter he laid down a well-known topic from
among those mentioned in "Book II of the! Topics, namely
the Book of Dialectic. He said that what the man of wisdom
and knowledge chooses is most worthy of choice. And he
reinforced this topic by saying that the man of wisdom ‘and
knowledge! is he who has two instruments by him:-whereby
the establishment of the present (i.e., Almohad) rule ca, 1146. The
decay in that-regime has already been alluded to by Averroes in 89.31
and 92.7-8, above.
103.17, 18 moderation, excess] Averraes’ additions.
582
104.
15
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 146
things are arranged in order, namely experience and reason-
ing. Totheman of wisdom alone does it befall that he arranges
these three pleasures in order through experience and
reasoning. As for experience, that is because he has tasted
those pleasures from the time of his youth; but these others
do not | taste at all the delight of wisdom. As for the man of
wisdom being the one for whom it is possible to proceed
throughargument and reasoning, why this is self-evident. For
we see that the multitude remember the pleasures ‘only’ at
the time when their opposites are joined to them, ‘so that?
when they are ill they say that health is the most pleasant
of things, "and in time of poverty they say that wealth is the
most pleasant of things’. But things pleasant do not require,
as such, being preceded by an opposite. An example of this
is vision, and so on. Indeed, the noblest of pleasures are
those that are other than of this character and hence exist
more fully. Plato elaborated upon this intention—i.e., the
ignorance of whoever would be the equal of the wise in
judging the pleasures, and the capability of the wise to do
this. Yet with all this, the argument does not rise to being
demonstrative; so we leave it and take up what he says of
this later on, which does appear to be demonstrative for
he made use therein of another argument, and this is it.
He said: Just as hunger and thirst are an emptying of the
body and an emptiness that befalls it, so are ignorance and
absence of knowledge an emptying of the soul and an
emptiness for it. This being so, there are two people who
are filled—i.e., he who takes food and he who acquires
knowledge. But the true fullness is only through the thing
that has the noblest existence, namely that which [partici-
pates] most in being and most in truth. Things only! excel
104.4-5 Averrocs adds the example of poverty and wealth. See
Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1. 4. 1095224 f.
104.6 vision] Plato 584b: the pleasures of smells in particular.
s83cd
s85
20
25
go
105.
The Third Treatise 147
in this matter according to their proximity to, or remoteness
from, the eternal things, which truly exist and endure
permanently. This being so, the thing whereby the souls are
filled [participates] more in truth than the thing that fills
the body since the soul is closer to the eternal things than
is the body, especially if the apprehension of their form is
an eternal apprehension. Now if, in general, fullness in what
one apprehends is pleasant, whatever "he apprehends of
what! is essentially nobler and [participates] more in truth
and is more enduring, is necessarily a more choiceworthy
pleasure. Such is the case of the pleasure of the intellect
relative to the other pleasures. For "those! pleasures perish
rapidly because opposites are mixed in with them, while
the pleasure of the intellect has no opposite. Thus either it
is eternal, or it perishes owing to a change that comes over
it. And this argument—upon my life!—is a demonstrative
argument.
Furthermore, he also said: As for most of the pleasures of
the intellect, they become better as the intellect performs
them. Whatever is the cause of something’s being in the best
condition is itself more choiceworthy, This being so, it is
the judge who attains all the pleasures to the greatest extent
possible. And this—upon my life!—is the truth, except for
the statement wherein ‘he said’ that whatever is the cause
of something’s being of the best character is itself better.
That is [merely] a generally accepted argument, although
he does not explain it. { Galen, in his ignorance of logical
methods, thinks that these are all demonstrative arguments.
But of these arguments comparing these pleasures, the only
demonstrative argument is that argument alone which
precedes this one.
104.23-28 Plato Philebus 52b, 55a, 59¢, 64d-6ya.
104.28 Or: it {sc., the intellect] is the judge who understands all the
pleasures in the best possible way.
10
15
Averroes on Plato’s Republic 148
This, then—may God preserve your honor and prolong
your days!—is the sum of the scientific arguments necessary
for this part of [political] science as are contained in these
arguments attributable to Plato. We have explained them
as briefly as we possibly could on account of the troubles of
the time. This was only attainable for us because of your
helping us to understand them and because of the boon of
your ‘sharing? in all that we have longed for of these
sciences and your helping us toward them with the most
complete kind of help. You are the cause not only of this
good being bestowed upon, and transferring to us, but also
of whatever human goods we have acquired, which God
(may He be exalted!) has bestowed upon us for your sake.
May God preserve your honor!
What the tenth treatise encompasses is not necessary for
this science. For at its beginning he explains that the art
of poetry has neither the purpose nor the knowledge from
which true knowledge comes about. This matter has already
been completely explained elsewhere. Then he mentions
thereafter a rhetorical or dialectical argument by which he
explains that the soul "does not? die. Then there is a story
after that in which he describes the bliss and delight that
await the souls of the happy and the just, and what awaits
the souls of the tormented. We have "made it known more
than once? that these stories are of no account, for the
virtues that come about from them are not true virtues. If
one calls them virtues, it is [only] homonymously. They
belong to the remote imitations. This has already preceded
105.4 Rosenthal, p. 300, tentatively identifies the addressee as the
Almohad ruler, Aba Ya‘qab Yisuf (reigned 1163-1184). Teicher
(p. 193), conjectures that the addressee is, rather, Abii Ya‘qib’s son
and successor, Abii Yasuf Ya‘qab al-Mangar (reigned 1184-1198/99).
The date of this work’s composition is not known.
105.11 Paragraphing supplied.
105.16-17 not true virtues] Consider 31.7-25, above.
The Third Treatise 149
in [the discussion of] the genus of imitations. It is this that
has brought us to an untruth such as this. It is not something
go necessary to a man’s becoming virtuous, nor will it be better
and easier for a man to become virtuous through it. For we
see here many people who, in adhering to their nomoi and
their Laws, albeit devoid of these stories, are not less well off
than those possessing [these] stories. In general, there is in
these stories that over which the ancients had already
disputed; and Plato was troubled thereby. "What they!
25 [sc., these stories] are is clear from "his discourse’ at the
beginning of this book. As for the first treatise of this book,
they are entirely dialectical arguments; there is no demon-
stration in them other than by accident. Similarly with the
opening of the second; hence we do not explain anything
of what is in it. May God help you with that which you are
presently undertaking; and, in His will and holiness, may
He remove the obstacles.
The treatise is completed, and with its completion the
explanation is completed. Praise be to God!
105.25 And with this Averroes excuses himself from giving an ac-
count of Plato’s theory of the immortality of the soul. Farabi, too, ends
his summary of Plato’s Laws with Book IX.
105.28-29 Paragraphing supplied. Teicher ascribes these lines to a
copyist.
Appendixes
|
|
APPENDIX I
Translator’s Colophon
Averroes’ explanation of thescientific arguments foundin Plato’s
Republic is completed; this is the beginning of the second part of
political science. Its translation was completed on 22 Kislev 5081
(after the Creation) [= 24 November 1320] in the city of Uzés.
I, Samuel ben Judah ben Meshullam ben Isaac ben Solomon,
Barbevaire, of Marseilles, translated it.1 When I was translating it
there had not come into my hands Averroes’ explanation of the
philosopher Aristotle’s Ethics, which is the first part of this voli-
tional science, but only the Philosopher’s statements themselves. I
was unable to translate them owing to their profundity and their
difficulty. I applied myself to this and strove mightily until there
came into my hands the explanation of that part by the afore-
mentioned scholar, Averroes, [written] in distinct, clear language
as is his fine way in all of his explanations. I aroused myself to
translate it; and God, honored in His mercifulness, approved of
my doing so as a good thing so that the translation of the ex-
planations of the whole of political science was completed. Then
I went over the whole of my translation of this science and
1 There is an account of Samuel ben Judah’s life and works by Lawrence
V. Berman, in Alexander Altmann (ed.), Jewish Medieval and Renaissance
Studies, Philip W. Lown Institute of Advanced Judaic Studies, Brandeis
University, Studies and Texts, vol. 4 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1967), pp. 289-303. Berman’s translations of these two colophons appear on
Pp. 307-311 and p. grt, n. 36. In translating I follow the Hebrew text of
Samuel’s colophon as published in E. I. J. Rosenthal (ed, and trans.), Averroes’
Commentary on Plato’s “Republic” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956,
1966, 1969), pp. 106-107; by permission of Cambridge University Press. The
copyist’s colophon is that of MS 4.
153
Appendix I "154
corrected the errors as best I could. The work of careful exami-
nation and improvement was completed on 26 Elul of that year
[= 20 September 1321]in the chateau at Beaucaire, [where I was]
confined and abandoned with more of our brethren, and shut up
in one of its fortifications called the Redoubt. It is not impossible,
but rather possible, even certain, that he who considers this
translation of mine of the two parts of this science will be in doubt
concerning some of its passages because of my poor translation
owing to my inadequate grasp of the Arabic language. But-——-by
the worship!—TI hereby expect and trust that those errors will be
excused for their paucity; they are not far off from what is
customarily [encountered] in the translation of other books
ascribable to one or another of the translators who came before
me. Perhaps hereafter, by decree of heaven, one of the select few
who are expert in both languages will be emboldened and
aroused with firm heart and fresh spirit to remove and clear out
my mistakes and errors so that the translation of this science be
perfected. I, out of my love for it and diligence in it, thought of
and imagined going even further by improving this translation
together with Christian scholars; and especially the first part of
it, for the statements of the Philosopher on that part are to be
found among them as well as interpretation of them by Abi Nasr
al-Farabi. By the Law and the testimony!? As I had imagined
[it], so would it have been, had not the cause alluded to, con-
cerning the long and harsh imprisonment that occurred to us at
this time, hindered me from [doing] this. If God prolongs my life
and brings me out—a prisoner from the dungeon, out of the
prison-house?—and offers me the briefest leisure, I will attempt
this. I will go further in inquiry and research, from the beginning
of the science to its end, in orderly fashion, until the translation
is brought to the most perfect state. Hence, until this is accom-
plished, let him who studies this science not blame me on coming
® Cf. Isa. 8:20.
3 Cf. Isa. 42:7.
Translator’s Colophon 155
to passages where there are mistakes and errors. For there is no
man who never fails,4 nor is there a craftsman who does not err
in his work on rare occasions. All the more, then, with practi-
tioners of the craft of translation, which is burdensome and
difficult work. For the craftsman in it needs to be expert in both
of the languages—i.e., that from which he translates and that
into which he translates—and be a scholar, not only of the
science or art that he is translating, but of all or most generally
known sciences as well, since all the sciences and arts are inter-
twined with one another, for the one is always being compared
to the others. The early translators who came before us had
already drawn attention to this or something like it in their
apologies for their translations. Notwithstanding the great per-
plexities, confusions, and injuries that have befallen our people
and that for a long time have come continuously one after
another—the latest [of these misfortunes} being the most calam-
itous—whatever of this art has come our way at the present time
is excellent. Let us praise God (may He be exalted!) and give
Him great thanks for having helped us in this. In general, I say:
You men of speculation, oh community of believers in the truth!
May His way be accomplished! Give credit to whomever it is
due! For to this very day, nothing at all of this science has been
translated or has come down to us, neither from the Philosopher
nor from others, except for whatever of this is to be found in the
Book of the Principles of the Beings’ by Abia Nasr al-Farabi, which
has fallen into the hands of many of the people of our nation.
This has only some of the second part of this science; there is
nothing in it of the first part. I myself was emboldened to begin
to show the honor of this science’s glorious majesty® and to bring
it forth in our language. Even if the good that exists in it is slight
owing to my shortcomings, here is the treatise as a start. Even if
4 Cf. I Kings 8:46 and I Chron. 6:36.
© The Political Regime.
° Cf. Esther 1:4.
Appendix I © 156
it is slight, it is potentially great.7 However that may be, sleepers,
awake from the deep sleep of slothfulness and the ignorance that
is devoid of any positive quality; [it is that] which leads and
brings down [the ignorant] into the nethermost pit [and] which
passes by and loses complete happiness.? Awake, ye who are
drunk with troubles; rejoice greatly.® Take hold of this fair
portion that God has allotted you. Hear, ye deaf, what these two
divine kings have spoken; look, ye blind, and see the light that
is bright in the skies.!° Surely seek counsel; who created all these
exalted wonders, elevated beyond all praise ? Look into the vision ;
behold, your reward is with you and your recompense before
you.#
The translator said: I had resolved to improve the translation
of this science together with Christian scholars but was unable to
do so owing to the force of the expulsions and imprisonments that
befell us from this people, which banishes us. We were a proverb
and a taunt among them; they made us like the dust in thresh-
ing.1® Yet I was scrupulous in inquiry concerning it; and wher-
ever I was in doubt I always consulted the book of the Philos-
opher and, as best I could, made what was crooked straight, This
is how I conducted myself with respect to the Ethics, but in the
case of the Republic I had no other book. Nonetheless, I am sure
that my errors in it are few and that he who looks into this after
me will make amends for me and judge me with an inclination in
my favor, as befits the sect of those who philosophize, seckers of
the true reality of knowledge in beings.1*
7 Steinschneider: “so scheint er gross im Verhiltnis zur Fahigkeit des
Autors” (Hebr. Ub., p. 223).
8 Cf. Prov. 19:15 and Ps. 55:24.
© Cf, Joel 1:5 and Isa, 61:10.
1° Cf, Isa. 42:18 and Job 37:21.
11 Cf. Dan. 9:23 and Isa. 40:10.
18 Cf, Jer. 24:9 and II Kings 13:7.
18 Or (emending amitiith to immith): seekers after the verification of knowl-
edge in existing things.
Copyist’s Colophon 157
This revision was completed in the month of Tammuz, 5082
[= June/July 1322]. Praised be the Creator who helped me, and
may He be exalted forever! Amen.
Blessed be He who giveth power to the faint; and to him that
hath no might He increaseth strength.14
Be strong!
Copyist’s Colophon
The name of the thinker who translated this book—i.e.,
Aristotle’s Ethics and the Platonic Republic—is Rabbi Samuel ben
Judah ben Meshullam ben Isaac ben Solomon of Marseilles. It
‘was he who translated it into the holy tongue and made many
apologies of various kinds for the confusion in translation at-
tending most of the Ethics and many parts of the Platonic Republic.
It appears that this young fellow was expert in the holy tongue,
but he was not perfected in forming a translation and [in]
knowledge of the language from which he was translating. The
honor due to him remains; and in any event we ought to praise
him and acknowledge his industriousness in striving to provide
us with a translation of this art, whether in respect of the good-
ness that is already in this book as it stands, or in respect of its
being an incitement to set right its deficiency and give a proper
shape to the whole of it (though the work involved is considerable).
In any event, since we in our misery are mingled with the nations,
we need to make use of their instruments whenever we happen to
have any undertaking in common with them—until there comes
He who purifies and refines silver, in His mercy raising a poor
and needy people out of the dust.
I, Moses ben Rabbi Isaac (may his soul be in Eden!) Rieti,
14 Cf. Isa. 40:29.
18 Cf. Mal. 3:3.
Appendix I 158
wrote [this copy of] this book, notwithstanding the deficiency in
its translation, while seventy years old in my mortal life, which
is the year 5217 [= 1457]. Not even this shall be wanting for my
children, along with the rest of the books that I wrote and caused
to be written and bought for them as I was free to do so, in
addition to what my father and teacher (peace be on him!)
wrote. May they find grace, good understanding in the eyes of
God and man!6
Selah!
416 Cf, Prov. 3:4 and 13:15.
APPENDIX II
Notes to the Hebrew Text
In publishing the Hebrew text, Rosenthal chose not to
produce a complete apparatus criticus, listing instead only those
variants that he judged to be significant. I have compared
his listing of variants onty with MS A. I have here added to that
list of variants by and large only in those cases where I follow
MS A and where the unlisted variant results in a difference that
is expressible in English. Such added readings are marked with
an asterisk.
Also listed here are emendations of the Hebrew text, whether
made by me or adopted by me from others, all of whom are
identified by surname. Of the latter class of emendations, twenty
appear in Rosenthal’s apparalus.
Excerpts and paraphrastic renderings of this text occur in
Joseph ben Shemtob’s Kebhod Elohim (Ferrara, 1555). (Norman
Golb drew my attention to the existence of such parallel passages
and kindly Ient me his copy of the work.) I note the following:
4a, 21-25 (Kebhod Elohim) = 65.9-14 (Rosenthal); 5a, 7-13,
15-18 = 67.8-15, 16-20; 5a, 25-5b, 10 = 67.20-68.11; 6a, 10-17,
22-24, 28-31 = 68.15+25, 69.12-14, 20-23; 6a, 32-6b, 1 =
73.25-28; 6b, 3-5 = 69.28-31; 6b, 6-7a, 3 = 72,1-32; 18b,
25-Iga, 1 = 104.12-28. The variants from our text are on the
whole slight.
22.18 human perfection] MS <A: beshlémiith ha-eniishi (sing.).*
28.17 love] Emending ha-sin’ah—hatred—to ha-ahabhah, following
Caspi, Medigo, and Mantinus.
159
Appendix IT
28.29
29.5
30.7
gut
31.6
* 160
compared] Emending dimyénd to damini (Rabin, cited in
Rosenthal).
turning] Transposing uyashibhit bazeh (Teicher).
divine acts] Reading ha-fe'uléth, with MS A and Farabi, rather
than ha-miskaloth.*
certain] Assuming an original yushagqu misread by the Hebrew
translator as pishiqu (Baneth, cited in Rosenthal).
closely} bedagiith (5 MSS). MS A: bedatoth-in religions (laws).
the righteous] Assuming an original salihiin or sulaka carried
over into Hebrew as ha-maslihim (Vajda, cited in Rosenthal).
looks] Emending vha-tmiirah—and transformation— to ovha-
tmiinah (Rosenthal).
looks] Emending betmiirah to betmiinah (Rosenthal).
illustrious] Emending sipiréy to sefiingy or safun (Mahdi). This
is in accord with Mantinus.
the beautiful] MS A: ha-tébh—the good.*
soft] Emending ha-rabim—many—to ha-rakhim (Rosenthal).
benefit] Emending vha-hanakah to vha-hanaah (Mahdi).
a defect] Suppressing gabhi‘a—chronic (Teicher).
come to grief] Emending MSS readings yyibhshar and uyikhshar
to upikhshal (Teicher).
most disciplined] Emending vha-miisar to vha-myisar (Teicher).
the dead] Emending ha-mitah—death—to ha-métim (Rabin,
cited in Rosenthal).
need] Emending derekh—way—to sorekh (Rosenthal).
with them] Emending méhem—from them—to ‘imam.
citizens] MS A: bataléy ha-medinah, rather than ba‘aléy ha-
medinoth.*
loot] Emending ha-klal to ha-shalal (Rosenthal).
for the body] Assuming an original min gibal mistranslated as
migodem—prior to (Berman).
become costly] Reading she-yigri, with MS A, rather than
she-yiqra.*
Lawgiver} Emending ba‘aléy to baal (Vajda, cited in Rosenthal).
over them] Reading ‘aléyhem, with MS A, rather than eléyhem.*
deserts) Emending al-barbari to ha-barari_ (Baneth, cited in
Rosenthal).
Notes to the Hebrew Text 161
53-28
54-22
55-21
of the animals] Suppressing the conjunction in ubeba‘aléy
hayyim (Teicher, cited in Rosenthal).
them] Reading /aken (fem.), with MS A, rather than ahem
(masc.).*
in fact] Emending be‘esmam to be‘esem (Teicher, cited in Rosen-
thal).
56.12-13 since] Assuming an original idk misread by the Hebrew
59.12
61.15
64.5
64.11
65.7
65.27
66.10
68.11
translator as wa-in and translated as af ‘al pi—even though.
and kiss him] Emending oyehargéhi—and kill him—to oyehabkéhi
(Teicher).
followed] Assuming an original ywtammu misread by the He-
brew translator as_yu’temanu—trusted (Kraus, cited in Rosen-
thal).
badly] Assuming an original s# misread by the Hebrew
translator as sawa’—just (Mahdi).
thought] Emending sibatham—their cause—to sbharatham
(Rosenthal). :
necessarily] hekhrak mah = dariratan ma, rather than darirata ma—
does not know the necessity in that which leads to it (Mahdi).
infinite] Adding Jilta (Strauss).
acquiring] Assuming an original yattakhidhu misread by the
Hebrew translator yattafidu—to unite (Mahdi).
required by virtue] Following the reading: lnefesh ha-medabereth
kfi asher thayybhéhii ha-ma‘alah, This variant or elaboration ap-
pears in the quotation of this passage by Joseph ben Shemtob,
Kebhod Elohim, p. 5b.
justice] Reading ha-shiviy, with MS A, rather than ha-shinily.*
necessarily] MS A: behekhrah.*
genus] Assuming an original jins misread by the Hebrew
translator as juz’—part (Mahdi).
theoretical perfection] The quotation in Joseph ben Shemtob's
Kebhod Elohim, p. 7a, continues: and that this is. man’s ultimate
perfection and his end.
unknown] Emending miitkaléy—known—to muiskaléy, following
Mantinus (Strauss).
generals] Assuming an original guwwdd (Rabin, cited in
Rosenthal). ©
Appendix I “162
78.6 he believed] Vocalizing a presumed ya‘tagidu instead of, r yu'tagadu
(Mahdi).
78.15 is provided with] MS A: hayah yamsi? méhem.* This is in accord
with Plato 540b.
78.22 expel them] Emending syapa méhem to uyds?im (Rosenthal).
80.29 specch] Assuming an original 6?°1-gawl misread by the Hebrew
translator as 6?/-/i/—in deed (Mahdi).
82.6 Whoever] Emending mimi to ami (Teicher, cited in Rosenthal).
84.12 Note. MS A: lo? yitakén.*
87.20 it] Suppressing the conjunction in ovshehi? (Rabin, cited in
Rosenthal).
88.3 in particular] Assuming sgulah is a translation of khassatan
(Pines).
89.8 he is not] Emending shehi?’—that he is—to sheéyné (Rabin, cited
in Rosenthal).
go.13 to him who has the capacity] MS A: Imi sheba séfeq.*
gi.5 just as increase] MS A: kmé sheyirbi.*
g2.11 with the city] Emending bemadrégath—the rank of—to bemedi-
nath (Strauss).
g2.28 since... things] MS A: ahar shehém lo? yashgihi bidbharim.*
93-12 held] Emending mithhazéq to miihazag.
95-28 in it] MS A; bah.*
96.27 comes to] Reading she’élav, with MS A, rather than she‘alav,.*
97-23 one of the... rulers] MS A: miba‘aléy ha-adonith.*
98.1 over] Reading ‘al, with MS A, rather than min.*
98.15 nothing] Emending shesham—that something is there—to
sheshiim.
98.23 who grew up] MS A: samah.*
100.2 for him] MS A: é.*
100.22-23 since... defined] MS A: abar shehi? betakhlith ha-hefekh Izeh
asher gadarnihi.*
101,26 obligation] Emending ta‘anah—claim—to ¢o‘an.
so as] Emending uyigshoram to lyigshoram.
103.3 are] Reading shehaya, with MS A, rather than shehi?.*
103.17 mastery} Assuming an original ghalaba misread by the Hebrew
translator as ghaya—end (Mahdi).
103.25 He said that] Suppressing ela’.
APPENDIX III
Short Titles and Editions Cited
This list is limited to Arabic and Hebrew texts and their
translations that are cited in abbreviated form in the footnotes.
Where there is a translation, it is listed immediately after the
original-language work. P indicates that the translation is not of
the entire work, but only of a part.
Avempace, Governance
Ibn Bajjah, Tadbir al-mutawahhid, El Régimen del Solitario, ed. and
Spanish trans, by Miguel Asin Palacios (Madrid-Granada: Escuelas
de Estudios Arabes, 1946).
The Governance of the Solitary, trans, Lawrence Berman, in MPP, pp.
122-133 (P).
Averroes, Decisive Treatise
Ibn Rushd, Kitab fast al-magal, ed. George F. Hourani (Leiden:
Brill, 1959). The page numbers: of the editio princeps of Marcus Joseph
Mueller, Philosophie und Theologie von Averroes (Munich, 1859), appear
in the margins of this edition.
The Decisive Treatise, trans. George F. Hourani, in MPP, pp. 163-185.
——, Exposition
Kitab al-kashf ‘an manghij al-adilla (“Exposition of the Methods of the
Proofs in the Dogmas of Religion’’}, in Marcus Joseph Mueller (ed.),
Philosophie und Theologie von Averroes, Monumenta Saecularia, I. Classe,
3 (Munich, 1859), pp. 27-127. (German trans. in Mueller’s book of
the same title [Munich, 1875], pp. 26-118.)
——, Incoherence
Tahafot at-tahafot (Incohérence de V Incohérence), ed. Maurice Bouyges,
163
Appendix IIT 164
Bibliotheca Arabica Scholasticorum, Série Arabe, vol. 3 (Beirut:
Imprimerie Catholique, 1930).
Averroes’ Tahafut al-tahafut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence), trans.
Simon Van den Bergh, Unesco Collection of Great Works, Arabic
Series, and E. J. W. Gibb Memorial Scries, n.s. 19 (2 vols.; London:
Luzac, 1954).
» Rhetoric
Tatkhis al-khatabah [Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Rhetoric], ed. Muhammad
Salim Salim (Cairo, 1967).
Avicenna, Metaphysics
Ibn Sina, al-Shif@’: al-Ilahiypat, ed. G. C. Anawati et al. (2 vols.;
Cairo, 1960).
Healing: Metaphysics X, trans. Michael E, Marmura, in MPP, pp.
g8-111 (P).
Farabi, Aphorisms
Al-Farabi’s Fusil Muntaza‘ah (Selected Aphorisms), ed. Fauzi M. Najjar
(Beirut, 1971).
The Fusiil al-Madani of al-Farabi (Aphorisms of the Statesman), ed. and
trans. D. M. Dunlop, University of Cambridge Oriental Publications,
no. 5 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961).
——, Attainment
Kitab tabsil al-sa‘@da, in Rasa’il (Hyderabad, 1345/1926).
The Attainment of Happiness, Part 1 of Alfarabi’s Philosophy of Plato and
Aristotle, trans. Muhsin Mahdi, rev. ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, Agora Paperback Editions, 1969).
The Attainment of Happiness, trans. Muhsin Mahdi, in MPP, pp. 52-
82 (P).
—— , Enumeration
Ths@ al-‘uliim, La statistique des sciences, ed. Osman Amine (ad ed.;
Cairo, 1948).
The Enumeration of the Sciences, trans. Fauzi M. Najjar, in MPP, pp.
22-90 (P).
Short Titles and Editions Cited 165
» Plato
Falsafat Aflatun, Alfarabius De Platonis Philosophia, ed. (with Latin
version) Franz Rosenthal and Richard Walzer, Corpus Platonicum
Medii Aevi, Plato Arabus, ser. 2, vol. 2 (London: Warburg Institute,
1943).
The Philosophy of Plato, Part 11 of Alfarabi’s Philosophy of Plato and
Aristotle, trans. Muhsin Mahdi, rev. ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, Agora Paperback Editions, 1969).
» Plato’s Laws
Tatkhis nawamis Aflatiin, Alfarabius Compendium Legum Platonis, ed. (with
Latin version) Francesco Gabrieli, Corpus Platonicum Medii Aevi,
Plato Arabus, ser. 2, vol. 3 (London: Warburg Institute, 1952),
, Political Regime
Kitab al-siyasa al-madaniyya, Al-Farabi’s The Political Regime, ed. Fauzi
M. Najjar (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1964). :
The Political Regime, trans. Fauzi M. Najjar, in MPP, pp. 31-57 (P).
——., Virtuous City
Risdla fi Gra ahl al-madina al-fadila, Alfarabi’s Abhandlung der Muster-
staat, ed. Friedrich Dieterici (Leiden: Brill, 1895; reprinted 1964).
Der Musterstaat von Alfarabi, German trans, by Friedrich Dieterici
(Leiden: Brill, 1g00).
Ibn Tufayl, Hayy
Ibn Tufayl, Hayy Jén Yagzan, Hayy ben Yagdhdn, Roman Philosophique
d’Ibn Thofail, ed. and French trans. by Léon Gauthier (2d. ed.;
Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1936).
Hayy the Son of Yagzan, trans. George N. Atiyeh, in MPP, pp. 134-
162 (P).
Maimonides, Astrology
“The Correspondence between the Rabbis of Southern France and
Maimonides about Astrology,” ed. Alexander Marx, Hebrew Union
College Annual, 3 (1926): 311-358. The text of Maimonides’ letter
appears on pp. 349-358.
Letter on Astrology, trans. Ralph Lerner, in MPP, pp. 227-236.
Appendix IIT 166
> Guide
Daldlat al-h@irin (Sefer Moreh nebhukhim), ed. S. Munk, rev. Issachar
Joel (Jerusalem: Junovitch, 5691/1931). The page numbers of the
editio princeps of S. Munk, Le Guide des Egarés (Paris, 1856-1866),
appear in the margins of this edition.
The Guide of the Perplexed, trans. Shlomo Pines (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1963).
» Yemen
Moses Maimonides’ Epistle to Yemen, ed. Abraham S, Halkin,
English trans. by Boaz Cohen, Louis M. and Minnie Epstein Serics,
vol. 1 (New York: American Academy for Jewish Research, 1952).
Glossary
A note of caution: a glossary is not a table of simple equivalents.
A term’s many associations and meanings in a given language
often are not carried over to another tongue.
Following each English term listed below are: (1) the manu-
script’s Hebrew term or terms being rendered thereby; (2) in
brackets, the Arabic term or terms Averroes presumably used;
and (3) where appropriate, and also in brackets, the correspond-
ing Greek term in the Republic.
Active intellect sékhel patel [‘agl fa“al}
Affective Aipa‘alithi [infi‘ali]
Appetite (see also Desire) hith‘orerith [shahwa] ([epithymia]
Argument (see also Speech and Statement) ma’amar [kalam; qawl]
[logos]
Aristocracy ro°shiyitth ha-tabhim; tigboreth ba‘al ha-ma‘alah [ridsa
imamiyya]
Art; Craft mal’akhak [sind‘a] [techné]
Bringer of nomos; Legislator maniah nimis [wadi* al-namis} [nomo-
thetés]
Chief ro°sh [ra’is} [archon]
Coercion mits [tkrah]
Cogitation mahshabhah [fikr] [logismos]
Compulsion hekhrah [qasr]
Courage amisith; gebhiirah [muriPa; igdam] [andreia]
Craftsman; Artisan sman [sani‘] [démtourgos}
Democracy medinah qehaliyyith; medinah qibisith; roshiyath qibus hamoniyy
[madina jimaiyya}
Demonstrative mofthi [burhdni]
167
Glossary
Desire (see also Appetite) ia’avah; teshiigah [shawq] [épithymia]
Dialectical nisiihi [ jadali}
Disease (see also Illnesses and Sickness) éli [marad]
Disposition tekhiinah; hakhanah [haya; isti‘dad] [ethos]
Domestic 6é(y)ti [manzili] [otkeios]
Elect few yehidim sguloth [khawass]
End of man takhlith eniishith; takhlith ha-adam [ghaya insaniyya)
Enlarged thought gedol ha-mahshabhah [kabir al-nafs] [megaloprepeta]
Equality shiviy [musdwat] [fsotés]
Erotic desire fésheg [‘ishqg] [erds]
Erring cities medindth tooth [mudun dalla]
Fable (with connotation of riddle or parable) fidah [laghz] [ainigma]
Final cause takhlith [ghaya]
Free; Free-born benéy farin [ahvar] [eleutherot}
Generally accepted opinions mefiirsamoth [mashhirat]
God ha-él [allah] [theos]
Governance hanhagah [tadbir]
Guidance hayysharah [irshad]
Habit ginyan [malaka]
Habitude minhag [minhaj]
Happiness haslahak [sa‘ada] [eudaimonia]
Hedonistic ta‘aniigi —[khissa]
Human beings; Humans benéy adam [nds] [anthropoi]
Human Laws ‘rath entishiyoth [shar@i* insaniyya]
Humors léyhoth [akhlat]
Ignorant cities medinath sekhaloth [mudun jahaliyya]
Illnesses (see also Disease and Sickness) falaim [amrad]
Imagination dimydn [khayal] [etkasta]
Imitation figiy [hikaya] [mimésis]
Immortality Aisha’ariith [baqa’]
Individual ish [shakhs}
Inquiry ‘iyyiin [nazar]
Intellect sékhel [‘agl] [nous]
Intelligible mitfkal_ [ma‘qil] [noéton]
Investigation fagirah [fahs; istiqs@a] [zétésis]
Judge shgfét; dayyan [qadi; hakim] [dikestés]
Jurisprudence mishpat [_figh]
Glossary
Justice shivily [‘adl] [dikaiosyné]
Law torah [shari‘a]
Lawgiver ba‘al ha-torah; maniah ha-torah [shari‘; wad‘ al-shari‘a]
Legal inquiry ‘iyyiin toriyy [nazar shar?)
Liberality nedibhiith [karam; jad] [eleutherta]
Lordship adniith [ghalaba]
Love (being well-disposed toward someone or something) ahabhah
[makabba}
Man (= male) ish [rajul; mar] [anér}
Man adam [insan]
Men; People anashim [qawm]
Moderation yir’ath hét (literally, sin-fearing) [gasd] [sdphrosyné]
Money (see also Property and Wealth) mamdn; ma‘oth [al-dirham wa
al-dinar} — [chrema]
Moral virtues ma‘aléth midothiyoth [ fad@il khulgiyya]
Multitude hamén [jumhiir] [hoi polloi; to pléthos}
Natural disposition yesirah [jabala] [éthos]
Necessity-cities medindth hekhrétiyoth (mudun darériyya]
Oligarchy medinah maméniyyith; sariath maméniyy; ro'shiyiith ha-anashim
ha-me‘atim; ro’shiyiith ha-pahiith; hanhagath ba‘aléy ha-pehithiith —[madinat
al-nadhala]
Opinion da‘ath [ra’y] [doxa]
Perfection shlémith [kamal]
Persuasive sipigi [igna‘t}
Pleasure ‘arébhiith; ta‘aniig [ladhdha] [hédoné]
Populace gahal [‘@mma] {démos]}
Practical ma‘asi [‘amalz]
Pretenders to philosophy mithpalsefim [tafalsuf]
Primacy ro°shiyiith [rasa] [arche]
Property meménoth [tharwa] [ousia]
Prophet abhi? [nabi]
Reason ékhel; midbar; dibir [‘agl] [nous; logos]
Reasoning hegésh [qiyas}
Rhetorical Aalasi [balaghi; khatabi]
Rulership sariith; r?shonitth [rasa] [arché]
Science fakhmah [lm] [epistéemé]
Scientific mada% [‘lmi]
Glossary ‘470
Self-control amitath ha-da‘ath (literally, true opinion) [dabt al-nafs}
[enkrateia] :
Sickness (see also Disease and Illnesses) mahalah (marad}
Solitary, a mith’ahed [mutawahhid]
Sophistic fhat‘a’? [mughaliti; mithim]
Soul nefesh [nafs] [psyché] :
Speech (see also Argument and Statement) ma>amar [kalam; qawl]
[logos]
Spiritedness ka‘as [ghadab] [thymos] :
Statement (see also Argument and Speech) ma’amar [kalam; qawl]
[logos]
Statesman ba‘al hanhagah [siyasi; sahib al-siyasa]
Story sipar [mathal] (mpthos]
Teaching limid [ta‘lim]
Theoretical ‘iyyiini [nazari]
Thought sebharah (fikra] [dianoia] — Me
Timocracy medinah ba‘alath ha-kabhod; medinah ha-kabhidiyyith; 10° shiyith
ha-kabhad; hanhagah ba‘alath ha-kabhéd; hanhagah ha-kebhidiyyith; qibits
baal ha-kabhad; qibiis ha-kebhodiyy (madinat al-karama)
Tyranny medinath ha-nisiiah; nisiah {madinat al-taghallub)
Unexamined opinion tehilath ha-da‘ath {badi? al-ra’y]
Vice pebithith [radhila] {kakia]
Virtue ma‘alah [fadilah] {areté]
Wealth (see also Money and Property) mamén [tharwa; yasar] [ploutos}
Wisdom fhakhmah [hikma] [sophia]
Index
N.B. The page numbers are those of the Hebrew text in
Rosenthal, which appear in the left-hand margins of the present
volume.
Abo Nasr [al-Farabi], 26, 2g
Accident, 21, 43, 45, 55, 65, 71, 84,
102, 105
Active Intellect, 73, 74
Adjudication, 37, 39
Almoravids, 92
Ancients, 77, 105
Andalus, 27
Angels, 31, 32, 47, 59 99
Animals, 22, 28, 57, 66, 67, 69, 72
fighting before offspring, 58
male and female in, 53, 54
perilous, 64
Appetite, 51, 72, 87; see also Soul,
appetitive part of
Arab(s), 89
king of, 44
poems of, 32-34
poets, 33
Arabic, 61
Arguments
affective, 25, 60
demonstrative, 25, 29, Go, 104, 105
dialectical, 21, 29, 103, 105
imitative, 29
persuasive, 25, 36, 61
poetical, 25, 29, 61
rhetorical, 25, 29, 105
scientific, 21, 105
Aristocracy, 52, 79, 80, 85, 86
Aristotle, 22, 24, 26, 46
Nicomachean Ethics, 22, 43
Politics, 22
Arithmetic, 75, 77
Art, engaging in more than one, 22,
27, 28, 33, 46, 50
Artisans, see Craftsmen
Arts, see Practical arts and Ruling
art(s)
Asclepius, sect of, 37
Ashm’day, 30
Astronomy, 75, 77
Belief (s), 39, 79
Cave, 74
Chief (s), 29, 32, 39-41, 50, 52, Gt
Choice, 21
Chronic illness, 37, 38
Cities, see Aristocracy, Democracy,
Erring cities, Hedonistic city, Ig-
norant cities, Necessity-association,
Oligarchy, Tyranny, Virtuous as-
sociation, Virtuous city, Virtuous
community, and Virtuous govern-
ance
City, parts of, 23, 24
City of Women, 53
Coercion (compulsion), 26, 27, 37,
39. 40, 45
Cogitative virtues (cogitation), 22,
Index
Cogitative virtues (cont.)
23, 25, 37) 38 5%, 52 61, 62, 68,
71-73) 77: 98
cogitative soul, 89
political cogitative faculty, 46
Commerce, 84
Community of women and children,
55-58 :
Copulation, 31, 34 35> 44 46, 47,
49, 86, 87
of guardians, 40, 52-57
between siblings, 56
Cérdoba, 96
Courage, 23-26, 31, 35) 49-52, 72, 89,
92, 97
to despise nondemonstrative argu-
ments, 62
political, 52
Craftsmen, 34, 40 49
illness of, 38
number of, 43-45
observed by children, 58
Dead, the, 29, 39
Defectives, incurable, 37, 38
Democracy, 80, 83-85, 87, 92-98, 100
Democratic man, 92, 94, 98-100
Demons, 30, 99
Demonstrative arguments, see Argu-
ments, demonstrative
Deserts
inhabitants of, 53
travelling in, 76
Desire(s), 49, 51, 5%, 62, 64, 72, 84,
85, 89, 91, 94-96, 98-100, 102
unnecessary, 94, 98, 99
see also Soul, desiring part of
Dialectical arguments, see Arguments,
dialectical
Disease, 22, 24, 32, 37 38; 47, 52 64
Divine Law, 26; see also Law(s)
Divine science, 21, 29, 753 see also
Metaphysics
Dog(s), 28, 36, 41, 54: 55
Egypt, 27
Elect few, the, 25, 60
Eloquence, 62, 80
End of man, 48, 53, 65-68, 73, 94
Enemies, external, 26, 28, 29, 41, 42
45: 93 97
Equality, 81, 93, 95
Equity, 51, 52
Erring cities, 79
Eternal life, 31
Euclid, 76
Fables, 34
good, 39
untrue, base, 29, 3% 33
see also Fictions and Story (stories)
Farabi, 26, 29
Fear(s), 31, 39 4%, 42) 49) 52 101,
102
Few, primacy of the, see Oligarchy
Fictions, 60; see also Fables and Story
(stories)
Free, the, 50, 84, 87, 93
Freedom, 33, 94-96, 98, 99, 101
Galen, 36, 46, 55, 56, 195
Geometry, 75-77
God, 21, 26, 30-32, 40, 41, 47, 55; 61,
64, 66, 68, 101, 105
Good, primacy of the, see Aristocracy
Good and evil, 30-32
Greeks, 27, 33, 46, 59
Guardians
ali related, 56, 57
behavior in war, 59, 60
copulations of, 40, 52-57
corrupted by property, 42
dwellings of, 41
education of, 31-36, 49, 76, 77
food of, 36, 37
nature of, 39
number of, 45, 46
like philosophical dogs, 28, 29
transformation of, 87, 88
Index
Gymnastic, 29, 36, 37, 46, 49) 51, 75:
87, 88, 94
differs from class to class, 60
for men and women, 54
Habit(s), 21, 24, 103
Happiness, 30, 31, 58, 68, 69, 85, 86,
88, 91, 98, 100, 102
Harmonics, 76
Hate (hatred), 28, 29, 42, 58
of falsehood, 61
Health, 22, 24, 31, 36, 52, 56, 104
Hedonistic city, 81, 86, 87, 92,°94
Hedonistic man, 91, 92
Honor, 66, 81-83, 85, 87-91, 93, 103
Honor, primacy of, see Timocracy
Human Laws, 26, 63; see also Law(s)
Human perfection(s), 22, 23, 25, 27,
65, 67-69, 73-75
Humility, 47
Humors, 52, 94 95
Ibn Ghaniya, 97
Ibn al-Taham, 33
Ignorant cities, 45, 52
Iilnesses, 37, 38; see also Disease
Imagination, 72, 80
Imam, 61
Imitation(s), 33, 77, 89, 92, 105
base, 30, 34
close, go
correct, go
not good, 31
remote, 30, [05
untrue, 30
Immortality, 31
Inclination, faculty of, 67
Injustice, 50, 52, 85, 100
Inquiry, 24, 52, 56, 60, 67, 68, 70, 74,
76, 78
Legal, 66
Instruments, musical, 35
Intellect, 23, 24, 76, 77, 99, 104
Intelligible(s), 30, 66, 70-72, 74, 75
Invalid, 32, 100
173
Investigation, 27, 53, 61, 65, G9, 73,
87, 96
Iraq, 27
Isles of the Blessed, 78
Jalaliqah, 27
Judge(s), 37-39, 81
Jurisprudence, 81
Justice, 24, 95, 47-52, 61, 62, 69, 72,
82, 87
political, 50
King(s), 92, 52, 78-81, 84, 92, 100,
102
natural conditions in, 61, 62, 80, 81
as philosopher, 60
Kurds, 27
Laughter, 32
Law(s), 26, 41, 44, 47, 48, 53) 54, 56,
63, 66, 105
general, 47
Lawgiver(s), 46, 60, 61
Legislator, see Nomos, bringer of
Liberality, 24, 72
Logic, 76, 77
Love, 28, 29, 36, 99, 100
filial, 56
of truth, 61, 62
Lying, 32
Man, see End of man, Human per-
fection(s), and Men
al-Mangir, 82
Mathematical sciences, 21, 75, 76
Mechanics, 77
Medicine, 21, 22, 24, 25, 3%; 37-39
47, 63, 85
lying as, 32
Melody (melodies), 29, 34; 35, 53, 68
Men
compared with women, 53, 54
prime years, 55
Metaphysics, 70, 75, 773 see also Di-
vine science
Index
Miracles (miraculous), 31, 69
Moderation, 23, 24) 31, 49-52, 68,
72; 92
Modesty, 72
Money, 26, 41-43, 58, 81, 83
love of, 88, 90, 96, 103
Moral virtue(s), 22, 23, 25, 26, 94,
39, 61, 68, 72, 73
Mu‘awiya, 89
Muhammad, see Lawgiver(s)
Multitude, the, 25, 32, 40, 50, 60, 67,
74; 76, 77, 80, 84-86, 104
Music, 29, 35-49, 46, 47, 49, 51-53,
60, 75) 77s 87; 88
practical, 35, 53, 71
theoretical, 71
Muslim kings, 81, 84
Mutakalliman, 30, 66
Natural disposition(s), 23, 27, 28, 39,
40, 47, 48, 50, 60, 61, 67, 69, 74, 85
Natural science, 21, 23
Nature, 21, 23, 52, 54, 65-67, 69, 70,
73s 75, 82, 102
Necessity, 22, 26, 66, 69, 90, 92
Necessity-association, 65, 81, 84, 86,
93
Nomos (nomoi), 46-48, 50, 77, 79, 84,
93, 96, 98, 99, 103, 105
on behavior in war, 59, 60
conventions of, 47
on forbidden degrees, 56
general, 47, 57
general common, 62
governance based on, 92
on love and desire, 36
partial, 47
practical, 47
concerning wealth, go-92
Nomos, bringer of, 32, 47, 81
Oligarchic man, 91, 92, 94, 98
Oligarchy, 80, 82, 83, 87, 88, 90-95
Opinion(s), 25, 27, 40, 46, 66, 67, 70,
71, 89, 100
174
false and correct, 39
generally accepted, 47
unexamined, 62, 66, 70, 81, 82, 84,
88, 93, 94
Optics, 77
Painters, 34
Perfections
noble, 23, 31, 72
practical, 68
theoretical, 27, 68
Peripatetics, 73
Persia(ns), 79, 84
king of, 44
Philosopher(s), 23, 29, 36, 48, 63, 67,
79
as king, 60
nature of, 28
position of, 64
women as, 53
Philosophy, 63, 64, 66, 75, 77, 94
first, 70
pretenders to, 70, 77
Physician(s), 21, 24, 25, 36-38, 63,
71, 795 85, 95) 97
Physics (physicist), 51, 65, 67, 70,
72-75» 172 87
Plants
compared with men, 67
women compared to, 54
Pleasure(s), 31, 32, 35 36, 39, 43» 57,
72, 81, 85-87, 99, 103-105
as end of man, 66
scourer of virtues, 49
Poet(s), 23, 33, 94, 101
Poctry, 29, 92-34, 101, 105
Political science, 23-25, 45, 57, 61,
65, 67, 79, 86, 87, 102, 103, 105
parts of, 21, 22
Poor, the, 40, 45, 90-93 95, 96
Possessions, see Property and Wealth
Practical arts, 22, 25-28, 48-50, 68-71,
73, 85
ranking of, 23
relation to theoretical sciences, 70
Index
Practical science, 21, 30, 61; see also
Political science
Prayers, 55, 59
Priests, women ruled out as, 53
Primary laws, 83, 84
Procreation, 46, 52-55
Property (possessions), 32, 33, 41-44,
83-85, 87, 88, go, 92, 96, 97, 101,
102
community of, 58
forbidden, 57
natural and conventional, 82
see also Wealth
Prophecy, 47, 66
Prophet(s), 32, 41, 61
Providence, 64
Rashness, 24
Reason, 49, 99, 103, 104
practical and scientific, 68
practical and theoretical, 69
see also Soul, rational part of
Reward and punishment, 31, 105
Rhythm(s), 35, 45
Rich, the, see Wealthy
Ruling art(s), 70, 71, 73; see also
Practical arts
Science, see Arithmetic, Astronomy,
Divine science, Geometry, Har-
monics, Logic, Mathematical
sciences, Mechanics, Metaphysics,
Natural science, Optics, Philosophy,
Physics, Political science, Practical
science, and Theoretical science(s)
Science(s), 31, 70, 74, 77, 78, 105
Secondary and tertiary laws, 84
Self-control, 31, 32, 35, 50, 51
Sensible(s), 30, 70, 71, 75
Sickness, see Disease
Socrates, 38
Solitary, the, 64
Sophists, 64
Sorrow, 39, 57, 101, 102
Soul
75
appetitive part of, 22, 23, 49, 62,
67, 68, 98, 109; see also Appetite
desiring part of, 52, 87, 893 see also
Desire(s)
parts of, 23, 24, 51, 72, 87, 8g, 1or
rational part of, 23, 67, 68, 87, 89;
see also Reason.
spirited part of, 23, 36, 51, 52, 87,
89
Spiritedness, 51; see also Soul, spirited
part of
Statesman, 95
Story (stories)
base, untrue, 30-32, 105,
fitting, 31
for guardians, 40, 41, 77
see also Fables and Fictions
Suffering, 31
Syria, 27
Teaching, 21, 25, 26, 29, 35, 60, 76
Temples, 30, 47, 59; 97) 100
Terrors, 39
Theoretical science(s), 21, 24, 25, 30,
48, Go, 61, 69-75, 102
Thought, 37, 62, 64, 72, 76
Timidity, 24, 49, 59
Timocracy, 80-82, 87-92, 94, 103
Timocratic man, 88-92
Tyranny, 80, 83-88, 94-98, 101, 102
Tyrant (tyrannical man), 41, 85, 88,
96-102
Vice(s), 24, 31, 52
Vicious, the, 34
Vile, primacy of the; see Oligarchy
Virtues, 25, 26, 31, 36-39, 42; 49, 5%
62, 81, 89, 91, 93
inculcation of, 24, 27, 29
practical, 102
ranking of, 23, 68-70, 72, 73
theoretical, 22, 39, 68
true, 36, 105
see also Cogitative virtues, Courage,
Humility, Justice, Liberality,
Index
Virtues (cont. )
Moderation, Modesty, Moral
virtue(s), Perfections, Practical
arts, and Wisdom
Virtuous, the, 34, 64, 80, 83, 87, 100
according to Law, 103
transformation of, 88, 89
Virtuous association, 85, 87, 99
Virtuous associations, 57
Virtuous city, 26, 45, 61, 79, 81, 83,
85-88, 93, 94, 10T-103
Virtuous cities, 26, 57, 79, 97
Virtuous community, 45
Virtuous communities, 46
Virtuous governance, 27, 52, 79, 80
transformation of, 87-89
War(s), 26, 31, 35, 36, 42, 80, 88, go,
93
art of, 26, 28, 53
children in, 58, 59
effect on copulation, 55
extirpative, 59, 60
just, 27
176
against wealthy cities, 44
women in, 54
Wealth, 66, 72, 80, 82, 83, 85, 87, 89,
97-101, 104
love of, go-92, 95
see also Property
Wealthy, the, 45, 50, 90, 92, 93, 96,
97
Weddings, 35, 55
of guardians repeated, 56
Weeping, 32
Will, 21, 70, 73, 74
Wisdom, 23-25, 27, 48, 50, 51, 63, 64,
66, 80, 86, 88, 103, 104
Wise, the, 29, 39, 48, 52, 60, 63, 97,
103, 104
Women, 32, 35, 61, 78, 89, 93, 100
City of, 53
imitations of, 34
nature of, 53
prime years of, 55
songs of, 32
vegetative lives of, 54
in war, 58
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