← Volver a la ficha del textoThe Two
Traditions of
Meditation
in Ancient
India
Johannes Bronkhorst
TWO TRADITIONS OF MEDITATION
JOHANNES BRONKHORST
THE TWO TRADITIONS
OF MEDITATION
IN ANCIENT INDIA
Second edition: Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 1993. (Reprint: 2000.)
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Table of contents
Preface to the second edition
Acknowledgements to the first edition
Introduction
Part I: Two traditions of meditation
Ch. 1: The ascetic practices of the Bodhisattva
Ch. 2: Further Buddhist criticism of alternative practices
Part II: The main stream
Ch. 3: Early Jaina meditation
Ch. 4: Meditation as part of asceticism in early Hindu scriptures
Ch. 5: Theory and practice in the main stream
Ch. 6: The influence from Buddhist meditation
Part III: Buddhist meditation
Ch. 7: Influence on Buddhist meditation (I)
Ch. 8: Influence on Buddhist meditation (II)
Ch. 9: The origin of Buddhist meditation
Ch. 10: Pratyekabuddhas, the Sutta Nipata, and the early Saiigha
Conclusion
Ch. 11: The position and character of early Buddhist meditation
Abbreviations
Primary Sources
Modern Authors
Index
Preface to the second edition
The Two Traditions oT Meditation in Ancient India has been out of print
for a while. Reactions to the first edition have been varied, ranging from
positive to critical. It is clear that these reactions are determined, at least
to a large extent, by the positions of the scholars concerned with regard
to the question of what can be expected from research into earliest
Buddhism. The brief discussion that follows of some of the criticisms
that have been expressed against the first edition, is therefore more than
just a defence of this book; it is meant to be a contribution to a more
general discussion regarding the aspirations and possibilities of
scholarship in this particular field of study.
Lambert Schmithausen has recently (1990) distinguished three
positions held by scholars of Buddhism with regal’d to the question
whether and to what extent the early Buddhist texts can be regarded as
faithfully preserving the doctrine of the Buddha himself at least in
essence. They might be presented as follows : (i) stress on the
fundamental homogeneity and substantial authenticity of at least a
considerable part of the Nikayic materials; (ii) scepticism with regal’d to
the possibility of retrieving the doctrine of earliest Buddhism; (iii)
cautious optimism in this respect. This book takes position (iii). This
position is to be preferred to (ii) for purely methodological reasons : only
those who seek may find, even if no success is guaranteed.1
The danger of position (i) is that it may raise a hypothesis into a
principle. And once the homogeneity of the early Buddhist texts is taken
as point of departure rather than as a hypothesis to be tested against the
evidence, one is in the same situation as the Christian church, which
managed to obstruct progress in Biblical studies for many centuries,
precisely because it insisted on the fundamental homogeneity of its
scripture.2 This parallelism becomes almost complete, once the further
k Position (ii) is essentially adopted in the review by S. Collins (1987). For a
discussion of some of the points raised there, see my review of T. E. Vetter's The
Ideas and Meditative Practices of Early Buddhism in the Indo-Iranian Journal 36
(1993), 63-68.
I refer here to Gusdorf, 1988.
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requirement is added that the early Buddhist texts have to be interpreted
in the light of the later tradition.3
It would be unfair to those who uphold position (i) to put too much
emphasis on the parallelism with the unfortunate history of Biblical
studies. We must assume that they look upon their position as, in their
eyes, the best hypothesis available, which they are ready to abandon at
any time, if only good enough evidence were forthcoming. The present
book concentrates on contradictions and inconsistencies. Upholders of
position (i) - such as R. Gombrich (1990) - argue that some lack of
homogeneity is only to be expected in the early Buddhist texts, even on
the assumption that all of them go back to the Buddha himself. No far-
reaching conclusions should therefore be drawn from ‘inconsistencies’
and ‘contradictions’, especially not where these latter occur in
descriptions of such notoriously elusive ‘things’ as meditational states.
Similar problems about ‘contradictions’ are voiced by D. S. Ruegg (1989
: 9 n.9) who, while specifically referring to the first edition of the present
book, complains that the “treatment of the relevant material is not
infrequently based on unexplicated or unexamined (and anything but
self-evident) presuppositions about ‘contradictions’ in the tradition”.
It seems that the main arguments of this book have escaped
Gombrich and Ruegg. They may escape other readers too. For this
reason these main arguments will be once more presented in this Preface,
but in an abbreviated and differently arranged form. This new
presentation will, I hope, show that the criticisms mentioned above are
not applicable to this book. Details and references will be found in the
main body of the book.
The point of departure is the undeniable fact that even the oldest
Buddhist texts we have do not date back, in their present form, to the
period of the Buddha. Linguistic considerations alone suffice to show
that “all Buddhist texts, as they are read today, are not only heavily
influenced by linguistic developments known to be much later than early
days of Buddhism, but also reformulated perhaps, and certainly recast
from one language into another before they reached their present
linguistic shape” (Hinuber, 1991: 184). There is therefore no guarantee
3. As is proposed by R. Gombrich (1988 : 21; cp. 1990 : 11-12).
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whatsoever that all these texts represent the teachings of the Buddha, and
it is at least conceivable that some of their contents are non- authentic.
How can we imagine non-authentic views and practices to have
found their way into the canonical collections, primarily the collections
of Sutras? This is not difficult. It is at least conceivable that in the
process of collecting some texts or passages were included that contained
elements that derived, ultimately, not from the teaching of the Buddha,
but from other religious groups and ideals current at the time.
The preceding remarks concern conceivable events; no evidence has
yet been presented that they actually took place. Suppose they did take
place. How could we ever discover the non-authentic elements in the
Buddhist texts? In general this would be difficult or even impossible.
Elements that were not part of the teaching of the Buddha but were not
rejected either, might find their way in - after or even before the death of
the Buddha - without anyone ever noticing, least of all the modern
scholar. Perhaps the only hope ever to identify non-authentic elements in
the Buddhist texts is constituted by the special cases where elements
which are recorded to have been rejected by the Buddha, yet found their
way into the texts, and, moreover, are clearly identifiable as belonging to
one or more movements other than Buddhism.
This gives us what might turn out to be an objective criterion for
identifying foreign intrusions into the Buddhist texts : An element that is
(i) rejected at some places in the Buddhist texts, (ii) accepted at others,
and (iii) known to fit at least some non-Buddhist religious movements of
the time, such an element is very likely to be a non-authentic intrusion
into the Buddhist texts. As we have to work with only limited evidence, I
would not know what better criterion there could be in the circumstances.
Unfortunately, the importance of this criterion seems to have escaped all
of my critics.
Of course, having a criterion in theory is one thing, applying it to the
texts, quite another. This book tries to apply this criterion to the one
aspect of Buddhism - perhaps the only one - where it seems to work: that
of meditation. Much of the book is dedicated to the presentation of the
meditational and ascetic practices and related ideas found in early
Jainism and other non-Buddhist religious movements of early India.
Since no one has criticized this presentation, whereas several scholars
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have expressed doubts with regard to the ‘inconsistencies’ and
‘contradictions’ in the Buddhist texts (see above), I shall concentrate on
the latter. I shall briefly discuss some examples, all of them taken from
the main body of the book:
1. The Mahaparinirvana Sutra, in its various recensions, records a
discussion of the Buddha with someone called Putkasa (in Sanskrit) or
Pukkusa (in Pali). The Buddha here boasts that once, in a violent
thunderstorm when lightning killed two fanners and four oxen nearby
him, he did not notice it. It is known that abilities of this kind were
sought after by certain non-Buddhists. Another Buddhist Sutra (the
Indriyabhavana Sutta of the Pali canon and its parallel in Chinese
translation), on the other hand, ridicules such ‘cultivation of the senses’
which leads to their non-functioning; the Buddha is here reported to say
that if this is cultivation of the senses, the blind and deaf would be
cultivators of the senses.
The passages here mentioned may not logically contradict each
other, yet they come about as close to that as one could hope for in this
type of texts: on one occasion the Buddha disapproves of the practice
that aims at the complete suppression of all sense-activities, on another
he boasts about his attainments in this direction. This situation calls for a
solution. One solution would be to think that the Buddha changed his
mind about this practice. A more plausible explanation is that a practice
that was respected among non-Buddhists came to be ascribed to the
Buddha, either before or after his death. This latter explanation implies
that the practice concerned is not authentically Buddhist.
2. A Sutra of the Majjhima Nikaya (the Culadukkhakkhandha Sutta ) as
well as its parallels in Chinese translation describe and criticize the
Jainas as practising ‘annihilation of former actions by asceticism’ and
‘non-performing of new actions’. This can be accepted as an accurate
description of the practices of the Jainas. But several other Sutras of the
Buddhist canon put almost the same words in the mouth of the Buddha,
who here approves of these practices (see note 8 to chapter 2, below).
Did the Buddha first hold one opinion, then to change his mind ? Or did
he not know how to describe his experiences ? Obviously it is far more
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plausible that, again, practices that were widely accepted outside the
Buddhist fold, but not inside it, found their way in.
The argument here summarized is again presented, in a but slightly
different form, by no one else than Ruegg, apparently without realizing
it, in the very same book in which he dismisses my arguments. This
situation is extraordinary enough to warrant quoting the passage
concerned at length (Ruegg, 1989: 142-143):
Now, in some old Buddhist canonical texts also there are in fact
found certain references to the idea that liberation from 111
( duhkha ) results from, and consists in, the non-production of any
future karman at all and from the ending, often through austerities
( tapas ), of any existing bad karman. This idea is there usually
ascribed to the Nigantha Nataputta (Nirgrantha Jnatrputra), in
other words to Mahavlra and the Jainas. We also read that
immobility of body and renunciation of speech bring Ease
( sukha ). Moreover, in a couple of Buddhist canonical texts the
idea that no new karman at all should be generated, and that any
existing karman should be ended, has even been connected with
the Buddha himself in a sermon he once addressed to a Nirgrantha
and in another one he addressed to Vappa, a disciple of the
Nirgranthas.
The connection of such a teaching with the Buddha himself seems
nevertheless to be rare. When it does occur, it is evidently to be
explained by the fact that his auditor was a Nirgrantha and that the
teaching was thus intended as an introductory salvific device, a
circumstance that would lend support to Kamalasila’s statement
denying that such relinquishement of all activity was the
Buddha’s own teaching. In the majority of other places where it
has been mentioned in the Pali canon, this doctrine has in fact
been severely criticized. It is patently inconsistent with such basic
principles of Buddhist doctrine as the four correct efforts
( sammappadhana / samyakprahana ) . . .
It is not a little surprising to see how Ruegg, who rejects my
arguments, arrives here at my conclusions, using my arguments and
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basing himself on the inconsistencies whose very existence he had
attributed to my ill-founded presuppositions. In the situation it is no
doubt kindest to Professor Ruegg to assume that he dismissed my book
without having read it.
3. The Vitakkasanthana Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya and its parallels in
Chinese translation recommend the practising monk to ‘restrain his
thought with his mind, to coerce and torment it’. Exactly the same words
are used elsewhere in the Pali canon (in the Mahasaccaka Sutta,
Bodhirajakumam Sutta and Sangarava Sutta) in order to describe the
futile attempts of the Buddha before his enlightenment to reach liberation
after the manner of the Jainas. Once again it is hard to see a better
explanation than that these Jaina practices had come to be accepted by at
least some Buddhists.
It would be unrealistic to expect that all ‘contradictions’ in the
Buddhist canon are quite as explicit as the ones mentioned above. This
does not however mean that they are any less real. Consider the
following:
4. Four states of meditation are often enumerated in the Buddhist Sutras
in varying contexts, but almost always together. They are: 1) the Stage of
Infinity of Space; 2) the Stage of Infinity of Perception; 3) the Stage of
Nothingness; 4) the Stage of neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation. The texts
say little by way of explanation of these stages, but the names make clear
that they together form a list of graded exercises aimed at the cessation
of all ideations. This aim conforms very well with the aims we have to
ascribe to the early Jainas and those of similar convictions. Moreover,
the Jaina scriptures describe ‘reflection on infinity’ as one of the
accompaniments of ‘pure meditation’. These stages arc denounced
elsewhere in the Buddhist canon, be it indirectly: The Buddha is said to
have had two teachers before his enlightenment: Arada Kalama and
Udraka the son of Rama. From the former he learned the Stage of
Nothingness, from the latter the Stage of neither Ideation nor Non-
Ideation. However, the Buddha left these teachers, because he came to
believe that these Stages would not lead him to his goal.
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Here the question seems justified: do these stages lead to the goal or
do they not ? Various answers can be imagined, such as, “they do to
some extent, but not all the way”, “the Buddha had second thoughts
about the usefulness of these stages”, etc. But I insist that there is a
problem here that demands an answer, and not just a manifestation of my
“unexplicated or unexamined (and anything but self-evident)
presuppositions about ‘contradictions’ in the tradition”, as Ruegg would
have it. Criticism of this kind, which refuses to study arguments, is not
only counter-productive, it constitutes one of the greatest enemies of
scholarship which, as Gombrich rightly points out, should at least try to
progress by argument. Returning to the Stage of Nothingness and the
Stage of neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation, it will hardly be necessary to
add that in my opinion they comply with the criterion of foreign intrusion
into the Buddhist texts formulated above.
The conclusion that the above four meditational Stages were not
accepted in earliest Buddhism finds support in an altogether unexpected
quarter; for a detailed presentation of the argument I must refer the
reader to BSOAS 48, 1985, pp. 305 f.4 Among the early (Abhidharmic)
matrkas, one seems to have been considered particularly important. It
occurs a number of times in the early texts, but not always in exactly the
same form; to an original enumeration of merely mental characteristics,
meditational states came to be added. But initially the meditational states
thus added did not contain the four Stages discussed above, even though
these Stages, collectively known as ‘the Formless States’, are very
prominent in the Buddhist scriptures as we have them. The most
plausible explanation is again that the Formless States were not accepted
during the earliest period of Buddhism.
5. The Buddhist texts are not of one mind concerning the time when
liberation is reached. A great number of passages emphatically states that
liberation is reached in this life, i.e., well before death. This is hardly
surprising, for the Buddha himself is agreed to have passed many years
teaching after his moment of liberation. Yet other passages speak about
This article has been criticized by R. M. L. Gethin (1992: 281). Be it noted that this
criticism -whatever its worth - does not affect the argument here presented.
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liberation as taking place at death. As in all the preceding cases, there is
here a contradiction in the texts. Various solutions are conceivable, such
as “the Buddha didn’t know”, “he expressed himself variously”, “he
changed his mind”, “some are liberated at death, others in life”, etc.
Indeed, anyone with some imagination can add to this list of possibilities
almost indefinitely. However, we know that among many non-Buddhists
liberation took place at death, and that many Buddhist texts emphatically
hold the opposite opinion. It is no doubt superfluous to add that an
intrusion of foreign ideas seems to me most plausible here, too.
These examples should suffice to induce critics, at last, to read this
book, rather than presenting their a priori reasons for thinking that the
effort made in it cannot possibly lead anywhere. Scholarship should and
indeed can only progress by argument, and this implies also: trying to
understand someone else’s arguments. Those who are not willing or able
to do this, would have done better to ignore the book,5 rather than
pronounce facile judgments about it.
The first edition of this book was published in 1986, by Franz
Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH, Stuttgart. The preparation of this
second edition has permitted me to correct a number of, usually minor,
mistakes, and make other improvements. For ease of comparison, the
page numbers of the first edition are indicated in the margin in the
present edition. The help provided by Yves Ramseier in the preparation
of this edition is here gratefully acknowledged.
This is done in some recent surveys of Buddhism, such as Harvey, 1990; and
Klimkeit, 1990.
Acknowledgements to the first edition
This book was written with the financial assistance of the Netherlands
Organisation for the Advancement of Pure Research (ZWO). This
organisation also enabled me to visit India in order to work with various
Jainas, laymen and monks. From among these I like to thank in particular
Prof. N. Tatia and Muni Jambuvijayaji for their help. In Europe I
received help and encouragement from many friends and colleagues.
Here I can mention but a few: Professors L. Schmithausen and T. E.
Vetter, and Dr. H. Tieken. I like to thank Prof. A. Wezler for his support
and enthusiasm in getting this book published in Germany, when ZWO
refused to finance its publication.
Introduction
The main aim of the present study is to find out what early Buddhist
meditation was by ascertaining what it was not. The results are therefore
largely negative, but not any less interesting.
The fact is that everyone who wishes to form an opinion on early
Buddhism has to choose from a bewildering mass of often contradictory
statements in the Buddhist canon. This choice is in danger of being
arbitrary, for little is known about the relative chronology of the different
parts of the canon. There can be no doubt that the canon - including the
older parts, the Sutra- and Vinaya-Pitaka - was composed over a long
period of time. Only by assuming this can we make sense of its often
glaring contradictions. But which parts are the oldest ?
In the following pages I shall try to answer this question in so far as
it concerns Buddhist meditation by a method which, to my knowledge,
has never yet been employed. At a number of places the Buddhist canon
criticizes alternative practices which are claimed by others to lead to the
highest good. These alternative practices can be identified in the early
scriptures of Jainism and Hinduism. The idea behind this method is that
those alternative practices, even when they are described and approved
of in other parts of the Buddhist canon, cannot be considered to be
2
authentic to Buddhism; they must be looked upon as later borrowings
from outside. Traces of earliest Buddhism therefore must be sought
among the practices which are opposed to those alternative ones.
Does this deny the possibility that early Buddhism shared certain
features with the other religious movements that existed in India in its
time ? Clearly not! We do not wish to exclude features from early
Buddhism simply because they are present elsewhere. We wish to
exclude such features only if other, contrasting or even contradictory,
features exist in the early Buddhist scriptures which are explicitly
preferred to the former ones in those scriptures.
Why should features which arc peculiar to Buddhism have greater
likelihood to belong to early Buddhism than features which also occur
elsewhere ? This is partly a matter of definition. By ‘early Buddhism’ we
mean the beginning of the tradition peculiar to Buddhism. The question
will remain whether all these peculiar features came more or less at the
same time and can therefore be ascribed to a single founder of this
tradition, i.e., to the historical Buddha. All we can say is that the
Buddhist tradition clearly points to such a person. Moreover, it is known
that religious traditions tend to be conservative. They may inadvertently
borrow elements from outside; they may also develop and undergo
modifications. They will not as a rule introduce complete novelties. This
privilege is reserved for the founder of such a tradition.
The execution of the above program will enable us to reach a better
understanding of early Buddhist meditation. It also allows us to obtain
more insight into the alternative, non-Buddhist, practices, especially of
the early period. The circumstance that the two traditions intermingled at
a rather early date had hidden from previous investigators the ideas
underlying the non-Buddhist practices. It also obscured the influence
which these ideas had on virtually all systems of Hindu philosophy.
A few words must be said about methodology. This book presents a
theory about what early Buddhism - or rather, certain aspects of it - was
and what it was not. That is to say, this book does not merely reproduce
the texts on which it is based, and is not simply the result of ‘just reading
the texts’ (if such a thing is at all possible; cf. Bronkhorst, 1986 :
Introduction). In a way it contains more than what can be found in the
texts. In return, it explains contradictions and other features of the texts
3
which would otherwise remain obscure. There is no way to prove that the
theory presented in this book is right. But this does not by itself detract
from its value. A great deal, if not all, we know about the world is of
such a theoretical nature.
Such a starting point has consequences for those who wish to
disagree with my theory. It will not just be enough to say that it has not
been proved. It may be more worthwhile to try and show that the theory
does not fit certain facts. Criticism of this kind, though not without value,
will at best bring us back to the situation where the contradictions in the
Buddhist canon are, again, unexplained. Really constructive criticism of
my theory will present an even better theory.
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Part I: Two traditions of meditation.
I. The ascetic practices of the Bodhisattva
1.1. At three places6 in the Majjhima Nikaya of the Pali Buddhist canon
an episode is found in which the Buddha describes how he, before his
enlightenment, tried out two methods which he then discovered did not
lead to the desired end. The two methods are ‘meditation without breath’
and ‘reduced intake of food’. The episode reads7 in the Mahasaccaka
Sulla:*
6. Mahasaccaka Sutta, MN I. 242-46, Nalanda ed. vol. I, p. 301-05; Bodhirajakumara
Sutta, MN 11.93, Nalanda ed. vol. II, p. 326-31; Sangarava Sutta, MN 11.212,
Nalanda ed. vol. II, p. 490-94.
'7. References to other parts of the Pali canon where identical or closely similar
passages occur are given to the left of the passages concerned.
(p. 242, 1. 23:) Ins sit mayham aggivessana etad ahosi: yan nunaham dantehi dantam
adhaya jivhaya talum ahacca cetasa cittam abhinigganheyyam abhinipplleyyam
abhisantapeyyan ti/sokho aham aggivessana dantehi dantam adhaya jivhaya tilum
ahacca cetasa cittam abhinigganhami abhinippllemi abhisantapemi / tassa mayham
aggivessana dantehi dantam adhaya jivhaya talum ahacca cetasa cittam
abhinigganhato abhinippilayato abhisantapayato kacchehi seda muccanti /seyyatha
pi aggivessana balava puriso dubbalataram purisam sise va gahetva khandhe va
gahetva abhinigganheyya abhiniplleyya abhisantapeyya, evam era kho me
aggivessana dantehi dantam adhaya jivhaya talum ahacca cetasa cittam
abhinigganhato abhinippilayato abhisantapayato kacchehi seda muccanti /
araddham kho pana me aggivessana viriyam hoti asalllnam, upatthita sad
asammuttha, saraddho ca pana me kayo hoti appatippasaddho ten era
dukkhappadhanena padhanabhitunnassa sato / evarupa pi kho me aggivessana
uppanna dukkha vedana cittam na pariyadaya titthati /
(p. 243, 1. 4:) tassa mayham aggivessana etad ahosi: yan nunaham appanakam
jhanam jhayeyyan d /so kho aham aggivessana mukhato ca nasato ca assasapassase
uparundhim / tassa mayham aggivessana mukhato ca nasato ca assasapassasesu
uparuddhesu kannasotehi vatanam nikkhamantanam adhimatto saddo hoti /
seyyatha pi nama kammaragaggariya dhamamanaya adhimatto saddo hoti, evam
era kho me aggivessana mukhato ca nasato ca assasapassasesu / uparuddhesu
kannasotehi vatanam nikkhamantanam adhimatto saddo hoti araddham kho pana
me aggivessana viriyam hoti asalllnam, upatthita sad asammuttha, saraddho ca
pana me kayo hoti appadppassaddho ten’eva dukkhappadhanena
padhanabhitunnassa sato / evarupa pi kho me aggivessana uppanna dukkha vedana
cittam na pariyadaya titthati /
(p. 243, 1. 18:) tassa mayham aggivessana etad ahosi: yan nunaham appanakam
yeva jhanam jhayeyyan d / so kho aham aggivessana mukhato ca nasato ca kannato
ca assasapassase uparundhim / tassa mayham aggivessana mukhato ca nasato ca
kannato ca assasapassasesu uparuddhesu adhimatta vata muddhanam uhanand /
seyyatha pi aggivessana balava puriso tinhena sikharena muddhanam
abhimantheyya , evam era kho me aggivessana mukhato ca nasato ca kannato ca
5
assasapassasesu uparuddhesu adhimatta vata muddhanam uhananti / araddham kho
paname aggivessana viriyam ... na pariyadaya titthati/
(p. 243, 1. 32:) tassa mayham aggivessana etad ahosi: yan nunaham „ appanakam
yeva jhanam jhayeyyan ti / so kho aham aggivessana mukhato ca nasato ca kannato
ca assasapassase uparundhim / tassa mayham aggivessana mukhato ca nasato ca
kannato ca assasapassasesu uparuddhesu adhimatta sise sisavedana honti /seyyatha
pi aggivessana ha lava puriso dalhena varattakhandena sise slsavetham dadeyya,
evam eva kho me aggivessana mukhato ca nasato ca kannato ca assasapassasesu
uparuddhesu adhimatta sise sisavedana honti / araddham kho pana me aggivessana
viriyam ... na pariyadaya titthati/
(p. 244, 1. 9:) tassa mayham aggivessana etad ahosi: yan nunaham „ appanakam yeva
jhanam jhayeyyan ti /so kho aham aggivessana mukhato ca nasato ca kannato ca
assasapassase uparundhim / tassa mayham aggivessana mukhato ca nasato ca
kannato ca assasapassasesu uparuddhesu adhimatta vata kucchim parikantanti /
seyyatha pi aggivessana dakkho goghatako va goghatakantevasl va tinhena
govikantanena kucchim parikanteyya, evam eva kho me aggivessana adhimatta
vata kucchim parikantanti / araddham kho pana me aggivessana viriyam ... na
pariyadaya titthati /
(p.244, 1. 23) tassa mayham aggivessana etad ahosi: yan nunaham appanakam yeva
jhanam jhayeyyan ti /so kho aham aggivessana mukhato ca nasato ca kannato ca
assasapassase uparundhim / tassa mayham aggivessana mukhato ca nasato ca
kannato ca assasapassasesu uparuddhesu adhimatta kayasmim daho hoti / seyyatha
pi aggivessana dve baiavanto purisa dubbalataram purisam nanabahasu gahetva
angarakasuya santapeyyum samparitapeyyum. evam eva kho me aggivessana
mukhato ca nasato ca kannato ca assasapassasesu uparuddhesu adhimatta
kayasmim daho hoti / araddham kho pana me aggivessana viriyam ... na pariyadaya
titthati /
(p. 244, 1. 37:) api ’ssu mam aggivessana devata disva evam ahamsu: kalakato
samano gotamo ti /ekacca devata evam ahamsu: na kalakato samano gotamo, api
ca kalam karotlti /ekacca devata evam ahamsu: na kalakato samano gotamo na pi
kalam karoti, araham samano gotamo, viharo tv eva so arahato evarupo hotlti/
(p. 245, 1. 6:) tassa mayham aggivessana etad ahosi: yan nunaham sabbaso
iharupacchedaya patipajjeyyan ti / atha kho mam aggivessana devata
upasahkamitva etad avocum: ma kho tv am marisa sabbaso aharupacchedaya
patipajji, sace kho tvam marisa sabbaso aharupacchedaya patipajjissasi tassa te
mayam dibbam ojam lomakupehi ajjhoharissama, taya tvam yapessaslti / tassa
mayham aggivessana etad ahosi: ahah c eva kho pana sabbaso ajaddhukam
patijaneyyam ima ca me devata dibbam ojam lomakupehi ajjhohareyyum taya
caham yapeyyam, tarn mama assa musa ti / so kho aham aggivessana ta devata
paccacikkhami, halan ti vadami /
(p. 245, 1. 17:) tassa mayham aggivessana etad ahosi: yan nunaham thokam thokam
dharam ahareyyam pasatam pasatam, yadi va muggayusam yadi va kulatthayusam
yadi va kalayayusam yadi va harenukayusan ti /so kho aham aggivessana thokam
thokam aharam aharesim pasatam pasatam, yadi va muggayusam yadi va
kulatthayusam yadi va kalayayusam yadi va harenukayusam / tassa mayham
aggivessana thokam thokam aharam aharayato pasatam pasatam, yadi va
muggayusam yadi va kulatthayusam yadi va kalayayusam yadi va harenukayusam,
adhimattakasimanam patto kayo hoti / seyyatha pi nama asltikapabbani va
kalapabbani va evam eva 'ssu me angapaccahgani bhavanti tay ev appaharataya,
seyyatha pi nama otthapadam evam eva ’ssu me anisadam hoti
tay ev appaharataya, seyyatha pi nama vattanavall evam eva 'ssu me pitthikantako
unnatavanato hoti tay ev appaharataya, seyyatha pi nama jarasalaya gopanasiyo
oluggavilugga bhavanti evam eva ’ssu me phasuliyo oluggavilugga bhavanti
tay ev’ appaharataya, seyyatha pi nama gambhlre udapane udakataraka
6
(p. 242, 1. 23:) Then, Aggivessana, I thought : ‘Let me, closing my
teeth, pressing my palate with my tongue, restrain my thought with
my mind, let me coerce and torment it’. Then indeed, Aggivessana,
closing my teeth and pressing my palate with my tongue, I
restrained my thought with my mind, coerced and tormented it.
While I, Aggivessana, closing my teeth and pressing my palate
with my tongue, restrained my thought with my mind, coerced and
tormented it, sweat came from my armpits. Just as when,
Aggivessana, a strong man, taking a weaker man by his head or
taking him by his shoulder, may restrain, coerce and torment him,
just so indeed, Aggivessana, while I, closing my teeth and pressing
my palate with my tongue, restrained my thought with my mind,
coerced and tormented it, sweat come from my armpits. But,
Aggivessana, my energy was aroused, not shrinking, my
mindfulness was alert, not distracted, but9 my body was impetuous,
not calmed, while I was harassed by that painful exertion. Even
gambhlragata okkhayika dissanti evam eva ’ ssu me akkhikupesu akkhitaraka
gambhlragata okkhayika dissanti tay ev' appaharataya, seyyatha pi nama tittakalabu
amakacchinno vatatapena samputito hoti sammilato evam eva ’ssu me slsaccha vi
samputita hoti sammilata tay ev' appaharataya / so kho aham aggivessana
udaracchavim parimasissaml ' ti pitthikantakam yeva pariganhami, pitthikantakam
parimasissaml 'ti udaracchavim yeva pariganhami / yava ’ ssu me aggivessana
udaracchavi pitthikantakam allina hoti tay ev' appaharataya / so kho aham
aggivessana vaccam va muttam va karissamlti tattheva avakujjo papatami
tay ev' appaharataya /so kho aham aggivessana imam eva kayam assasento panina
gattani anomajjami / tassa mayham aggivessana panina gattani anomajjato
putimuiani lomani kayasma papatanti tay ev appaharataya /
(p. 246, 1. 12:) api ’ssu mam aggivessana manussa disva evam ahamsu: kalo
samano gotamo ti / ekacce manussa evam ahamsu: na kalo samano gotamo, samo
samano gotamo ti / ekacce manussa evam ahamsu: na kalo samano gotamo na pi
samo. manguracchavi samano gotamo ti /yava ssu me aggivessana tava parisuddho
chavivanno pariyodato upahato hoti tay ev' appaharataya /
(p. 246, 1. 20:) tassa mayham aggivessana etad ahosi: ye kho keci atitam addhanam
samana va brahmana va opakkamika dukkha tippa katuka vedana vedayimsu,
etavaparamam nayito bhiyyo; ye pi hi keci anagatam addhanam samana va
brahmana va opakkamika dukkha tippa katuka vedana vedayissanti, etavaparamam
nayito bhiyyo; ye pi hi keci etarahi samana va brahmana va opakkamika dukkha
tippa katuka vedana vediyanti, etavaparamam nayito bhiyyo / na kho panaham
imaya katukaya dukkarakarikaya adhigacchami uttarim manussadhamma
alamariyahanadassanavisesam. siya nu kho anno maggo bodhayati /
9. MN 1.21, 1 17, 186 have: “my energy was aroused, not shrinking, my mindfulness
was alert, not distracted, my body was calmed, not impetuous, ...”. This justifies the
translation ‘but’ for ca.
7
such a painful experience, Aggivessana, when it happened to me,
did not completely take hold of my mind.
(p. 243, 1. 4:) Then, Aggivessana, I thought: ‘Let me perform
meditation without breath’. Then indeed, Aggivessana, I stopped
breathing out and breathing in, both through the mouth and through
the nose. When, Aggivessana, my breathing out and breathing in
had been stopped, both through the mouth and through the nose,
there came about the extremely strong noise of winds which went
out through my cars. Just as when an extremely strong noise comes
about when the bellows of a smith are blown, just so indeed,
Aggivessana, there came about the extremely strong noise of winds
which went out through the ears, when my breathing out and
breathing in had been stopped both through the mouth and through
the nose. But, Aggivessana, my energy was aroused, not shrinking,
my mindfulness was alert, not distracted, but my body was
impetuous, not calmed, while I was harassed by that painful
exertion. Even such a painful experience, Aggivessana, when it
happened to me, did not completely take hold of my thought.
(p. 243 1. 18): Then, Aggivessana, I thought: ‘Let me perform
meditation fully without breath’. Then indeed, Aggivessana, I
stopped breathing out and breathing in through mouth, nose and
ears. When, Aggivessana, my breathing out and breathing in had
been stopped through mouth, nose and ears, extremely strong
winds shook up my head. Just as when, Aggivessana, a strong man
may destroy a head with the sharp edge of a sword, just so indeed,
Aggivessana, extremely strong winds shook up my head, when
breathing out and breathing in had been stopped through mouth,
nose and ears. But, Aggivessana, my energy ... did not completely
take hold of my mind.
(p. 243, 1. 32:) Then, Aggivessana, I thought: ‘Let me perform
meditation fully without breath’. Then indeed, Aggivessana, I
stopped breathing out and breathing in through mouth, nose and
ears. When, Aggivessana, my breathing out and breathing in had
been stopped through mouth, nose and ears, there came about
extremely strong headaches in my head. Just as when,
Aggivessana, a strong man may place a turban on a head with a
8
strong strip of leather, just so indeed, Aggivessana, there came
about extremely strong headaches in my head when breathing out
and breathing in had been stopped through mouth, nose and ears.
But, Aggivessana, my energy did not completely take hold of my
mind.
(p. 244, 1. 9:) Then, Aggivessana, I thought: ‘Let me perform
meditation fully without breath’. Then indeed, Aggivessana, I
stopped breathing out and breathing in through mouth, nose and
ears. When, Aggivessana, my breathing out and breathing in had
been stopped through mouth, nose and ears, extremely strong
winds cut my belly all around. Just as when, Aggivessana, a skilled
butcher or apprentice of a butcher may cut a belly all
around with a sharp butcher’s knife, just so indeed, Aggivessana,
extremely strong winds cut my belly all around. But, Aggivessana,
my energy ... did not completely take hold of my mind.
(p. 244, 1. 23:) Then, Aggivessana, I thought: ‘Let me perform
meditation fully without breath’. Then indeed, Aggivessana, I
stopped breathing out and breathing in through mouth, nose and
ears. When, Aggivessana, my breathing out and breathing in had
been stopped through mouth, nose and cars, there came about an
extremely strong heat in my body. Just as when, Aggivessana, two
strong men, taking a weaker man by both his arms, may burn and
roast him on a pit of burning coal, just so indeed, Aggivessana,
there came about an extremely strong heat in my body when my
breathing out and breathing in had been stopped through mouth,
nose and ears. But, Aggivessana, my energy ... did not completely
take hold of my mind.
(p. 244, 1. 37:) The gods moreover, Aggivessana, seeing me spoke
thus: ‘The recluse Gotama is dead’. Some gods spoke thus: ‘the
recluse Gotama is not dead, but he is dying’. Other gods spoke
thus: ‘The recluse Gotama is not dead, nor is he dying, the recluse
Gotama is an arahant, that condition is exactly the one of an
arahant ’ .
(p. 245, 1. 6): Then, Aggivessana, I thought: ‘Let me completely
abstain from taking food’. Then indeed, Aggivessana, the gods,
9
approaching me, said this: ‘Don’t
you, Sir, completely abstain from taking food. If indeed, Sir, you
will completely abstain from taking food, then we shall feed you
divine nutritive essence through the pores of your skin, and thereby
you will stay alive’. Then, Aggivessana, I thought: ‘If I promised
to completely abstain from taking food, these gods would feed me
divine nutritive essence through the pores of my skin, and thereby I
would stay alive; thus I would [speak] untruth’. Then indeed,
Aggivessana, I rejected those gods, and said ‘enough’.
(p. 245, 1. 17:) Then, Aggivessana, I thought: ‘Let me take food
little by little, drop by drop, soup of kidney-beans, or soup of
vetch, or soup of chick-peas, or soup of peas’. Then, Aggivessana,
while I took food little by little, drop by drop, soup of kidney-
beans, or soup of vetch, or soup of chick-peas, or soup of peas, my
body became extremely thin. Just like the joints of the asltika or the
joints of the kala, my limbs, great and small, became just
so on account of taking so little food. Just like the foot of a camel,
my behind became just so on account of taking so little food. Just
like a line of balls, my backbone became similarly bent up and bent
down, on account of taking so little food. Just as the supporting
beams in an old shed are breaking off and falling to pieces, just so
my ribs were breaking off and falling to pieces on account of
taking so little food. Just as in a deep well the glitter of water is
seen, deep and low-lying, just so the glitter of my eyes was seen,
deep and low-lying in the sockets, on account of taking so little
food. Just as a bitter gourd, cut off while still unripe, becomes
shrivelled and withered on account of wind and heat, just so the
skin of my head became shrivelled and withered on account of
taking so little food. Then indeed, Aggivessana, [thinking:] ‘I shall
touch the skin of my belly’, I got hold of my backbone, [thinking:]
‘I shall touch my backbone’, I got hold of the skin of my belly,
since, Aggivessana, the skin of my belly had become stuck to my
backbone on account of taking so little food. Then indeed,
Aggivessana, [thinking:] ‘I shall defecate or urinate’, I fell down,
head forward, at that very place, on account of taking so little food.
Then indeed, Aggivessana, soothing this my body I rubbed over
10
my
limbs with my hand. While I, Aggivessana, rubbed over my limbs
with my hand, the hairs, having fetid roots, fell down from my
body on account of taking so little food.
(p. 246, 1. 12:) People moreover, Aggivessana, seeing me spoke
thus: ‘The recluse Gotama is black’. Some people spoke thus: ‘The
recluse Gotama is not black, the recluse Gotama is brown’. Other
people spoke thus: ‘The recluse Gotama is not black, nor is he
brown, the recluse Gotama has a fair10 skin ( tnanguraccha vi) ’ . So
much, Aggivessana, the colour of my skin, [though] fully clean and
fully pure, had become destroyed on account of taking so little
food.
(p. 246, 1. 20:) Then, Aggivessana, I thought: ‘The recluses or
Brahmins of the past who experienced painful, sharp, severe
sensations [which were] due to [self- inflicted] torture,11
[experienced] this much at the most, not more than this. Also the
recluses or Brahmins of the future who will experience painful,
sharp, severe sensations [which will be] due to [self-inflicted]
torture, [will experience] this much at the most, not more than this.
Also the recluses or Brahmins of the present who experience
painful, sharp, severe sensations [which are | due to [self-inflicted]
torture, [experience] this much at the most, not more than this. But
indeed I do not attain,
through these severe and difficult practices, excellence in
knowledge and insight which is truly noble and transcends the
human condition. Could there be another road toward
enlightenment ?’
This episode contains two features which suggest that non-Buddhist,
most probably Jaina, practices are described :
I®. See below, point (iv).
11. opakkamika. The parallel passages in the Mahavastu (II, p. 130) and Lalitavistara
(p. 263) have atmopakramika; see also Mahavastu II, p. 121-23, Lalitavistara
p. 246-48.
11
(i) After the “meditation fully without breath”, some gods think that
Gotama is dead, others that he is dying, others again observe that “that
condition is exactly the one of an arahant". Obviously Gotama’ s
condition is not “exactly the one of an arahant ” in the Buddhist sense of
this word. Here the term arahant is reserved12 for those who have
followed to the end the road to salvation taught by the Buddha, as also
for the Buddha himself after his enlightenment. The practices described
in the present passage arc without value for the attainment of (Buddhist)
salvation, and to be discarded by Buddhist arahants. However, this same
term (or its equivalent, in Sanskrit arhant, in Ardha-Magadhi araha,
arihamta ) was also used by the Jainas, and perhaps the Ajlvikas (see
Basham, 1951: 56, 140), to designate those who have reached the highest
stage possible while still embodied as human beings.13 Both the Jainas
and the Ajlvikas are known for their inclination towards asceticism, so
that we must conclude that the gods used the word arahant in the sense
current among these religious wanderers.
(ii) The reduced intake of food is preceded by the intention to
completely abstain from taking food. The reduced intake of food, with all
its horrors, is therefore no more than a second choice. The story loses
much of its force by the fact that the exalted initial intention comes to
nothing. Why then was it added?14 The question resolves itself once we
assume that our episode is directed against the Jainas, among whom the
A few possible exceptions occur in the Patika Sutta (nr. 24) of the DIgha Nikaya (III.
7, 10. 11), where the term is used - by Sunakkhadatta, who has left the Buddhist
order - in connection with certain ascetics. It is hard to decide if the term is used
here, for once , in its literal sense (‘deserving, respectable ’), or if it is used to
indicate the foolishness of Sunakkhadatta, who indeed is repeatedly called
moghapurisa ‘foolish man' in that Sutra. T.W. and C.A.F. Rhys Davids’ (1921: 3-
6) contention that in the Patika Sutta as well as in our Mahasaccaka Sutta the term
is used in its supposedly pre-Buddhistic sense (“we may take it that ... the word ...
had come to be popularly applied, not only to priests and kings, but also to
ascetics’’) is unacceptable, the more so since this part of the Mahasaccaka Sutta
cannot be very early; see below, § 1.4. Some more places where arahant may be
used in its literal sense have been noted by Franke (1913: 300-301). See further
Horner, 1936: 77-95.
13 Also the Vratyas used the term; see Weber, 1876: 85.
14 It is not present in the parallel passage in the Mahasihanada Sutta of the Majjhima
Nikaya (1.80).
12
most respected way of dying is by voluntary starvation.15
The following feature points in the same direction:
(iii) The phrase “painful, sharp, severe sensations [which are] due to
[self-inflicted] torture” (opakkamika dukkha tippa katuka vedana)
occurs, apai't from this episode, in two and only two other contexts in the
Pali canon, both times in connection with Jainas (Nigantha; see below):
in the Devadaha Sutta (nr. 101 of the Majjhima Nikaya, vol. II, p. 218-
19) and in the Culadukkhakkhandha Sutta (nr. 14 of the Majjhima
Nikaya, vol. I, p. 92).
Perhaps we may add:
(iv) The reduced intake of food is said to evoke three kinds of
reactions from onlookers. Some say that Gotama is black, others that he
is brown, others again that he has a fair skin ( mahguracchavi ). The exact
significance of mahguracchavi is not known. It occurs always16 (DN I.
193; 242; MN I. 429; II. 33; and here) in the company of kala, “black”,
saina “brown”. The three terms seem intended to cover among them the
whole range of colours a human being can have: in three of the five cases
they enumerate the varieties of complexion that an unknown beautiful
girl can have, so that “having a fair skin” seems to be a reasonable
translation. In the circumstances, only the first two terms are appropriate.
15 Cf. Schubring, 1935: 182-83; Kamptz, 1929; and ch. Ill below. Perhaps we may look
at the following as a confirmation that our episode is directed against the Jainas :
the gods assure Gotama that they will keep him alive in a way which is familiar
from the Jaina scriptures. They want to feed Gotama divine nutritive essence
through the pores of his skin (lomakupesu). Feeding of this kind (lom' ahara) is
known from the (late) Pannavana Sutta (ch. 28, § 1859-61). “Here we learn that
infernal beings, celestial beings and one-sensed beings undertake feeding through
skin (1859-60). The two-sensed up to the five-sensed human beings undertake the
feeding through skin as well as mouth (1861).” ( Pannavana , part 2, Intr. p. 396-97).
Cf. Sutrakrtanganiryuktip. 228-29, gathas 17 If.
16 That is to say, in the Pali canon. Prof. K.R. Norman informs me that manguracchavi
occurs with kala and odata at Vism 184 and Sp 238, and observes that it
“presumably represents a colour (half-way) between black and white”, perhaps
‘(dark) brown’. Norman further suggests a connection with mangula / mangull,
which seems to be used only in a bad sense.
It seems however dubious to attach too much worth to the opinions of the
commentators, who may often, like us, have tried to make sense of the material
before them and may occasionally have failed to draw the correct conclusions.
Moreover, mangura may be connected with mankura, which has been preserved by
the Sanskrit lexicographers in the sense 'mirror’; this suggests ‘shining’ for
mangura.
13
The third one may have been added17 under the influence of and in order
to ridicule the belief which survived among the Digambaras, that
Mahavlra shone like a crystal (Jaini, 1979:35; cf., e.g., Ravisena’s
Padmapurana 11.92 (vol. I, p. 18)). [This idea is not totally foreign to the
ancient Buddhist scriptures. Sn 548 describes the Buddha as ‘golden
coloured’ ( suvannavanna ), Sn 550 as ‘shining like the sun’ ( adicco va
virocasi ), Sn 551 as ‘whose skin resembles gold’
(. kancanasannibhattaca ); see also Th 818f. See however ch. X below.]
However, it is not impossible that the disagreement among the
onlookers does not concern the present colour of Gotama, but rather his
original colour which had now become unrecognizable.18
1.2. The episode on meditation without breath and reduced intake of
food occurs in the Ekottara Agama preserved in Chinese, as well. It reads
(T.125, p. 670cl8-671b4):19
(670cl8:) Then I thought: ‘Why should I still eat ? I can
completely abstain from taking food’. Because this thought arose
in me, the gods came to me and said: ‘Do not now stop eating. If
you’ll stop eating, we’ll prolong and preserve your life with the
pure force of nectar’. Then again I thought: ‘What reason is there
now to stop eating, [since] it will instigate the gods to give me
nectar. I would deceive [others and myself]’. At that time I
thought: ‘Now I can eat a residue of sesamum and rice’. Then I
ate per day one [seed of] sesamum and one [grain of] rice. My
body became deteriorated and weak, and my bones were joined
together. A sore grew on top of my head, so that the skin [of my
head] fell down of its own, piece after piece, and my head
resembled a broken bottle-gourd. [The sore] did not leave my
17 It is hard to believe that manguracchavi was added by the redactors of the Pali canon
in their efforts to unify the texts, since the Mahavastu (II, p. 126-30) and the
Lalitavistara (p. 255) use the corresponding term madguracchavi in the same
context.
18 This was pointed out to me by Prof. Schmithausen in a written communication.
19 Prof. E. Zurcher was kind enough to lend assistance in reading this passage. The
responsibility for the translation remains however mine.
14
head intact.20 At that time I was like this : a sore grew on top of
my head, so that the skin [of my head] fell down of its own, piece
after piece, all because I did not eat. And just like stars which are
seen [reflected] in deep water, so were my eyes at that time, all
because I did not eat. My body resembled an old cart which
breaks down. It was entirely destroyed and could not support and
obey me. And my two buttocks were like the foot of a camel.
When I put my hand on my belly, I got hold of the bones of my
spine; and when I placed my hand on my spine, I got hold of the
skin of my belly. My body was emaciated and weak, all because I
did not eat. At that time, when I ate one [seed of] sesamum and
one [grain of] rice and considered it my food, I did not in the end
derive any benefit [from it]. And I did not attain to the most
honourable dharma. When I wished to defecate or urinate, then I
fell over on the earth and could not myself stand up and sit down.
(671a7: ) Gods, seeing me, thought this, saying: ‘This recluse
(; sramana ) Gautama, he has come to extinction’. But there were
some gods who said: ‘This recluse, his life has not yet ended,
[but] today his life will certainly end’. Other gods again said:
‘This recluse is not at the end of his life. This recluse is really an
aril at. The dharma of a sage [called] arhat contains this painful
practice’. At that time I still was conscious and knew the factors
that came to me from outside.
(67 lal2:) Then again I thought: ‘Now I can enter into meditation
without breath’. I then entered into meditation without breath, and
counted my exhalations and inhalations. Counting my exhalations
and inhalations, I noticed that there was air coming out from my
ears. The sound of [this] wind resembled the roll of thunder.
(67 lal5:) Then again I thought: ‘Now I close my mouth and
block my ears, [so that] my breath [can] not escape’. When my
breath [could] not escape, the air inside came out from my hands
and feet. Truly, I did not let my breath go out through my ears,
nose and mouth. The inner sound [resulting from this] resembled
the roar of thunder. Yet my consciousness revolved [through all
20
Unclear.
15
this] along with my body.17
(67 lal9:) Then again I thought: ‘I ought to enter into meditation
without breath once more’. I then completely blocked all
apertures [of my body]. Having blocked all exhalations and
inhalations, I then suffered pain in my forehead. As if a man,
taking hold [of me], pierced my head with a drill, so did I have
extremely painful headaches. At that time, like before, I retained
consciousness.
(671a23:) Then again I thought: ‘Now again I can sit down and
meditate [such that] my breath cannot go out or in’. Then I
blocked my exhalations and inhalations. Thereupon all my breaths
gathered together in my belly. The breaths which then whirled
around had extremely few points of support.21 Just as when a
skilled butcher slaughters a cow with a knife, so did I suffer
extremely severe pains. And as when two strong men together
hold one weak man and toast him before a fire, [so that] he suffers
extreme pains which he cannot bear, so did I [suffer such pains].
These severe pains cannot be wholly described. Yet I retained
consciousness.
(671a29:) On that day, while I sat in meditation, my body did not
have a human colour. At that occasion there were people who,
seeing me, said: ‘The colour of this recluse is extremely black’.
There were other people who, seeing me, said: ‘The colour of this
recluse resembles green’.
(671b3:) Monks ( bhiksu ), you should know that in the six years
that I did these painful practices I did not attain to the most
honourable dharma.
The episode from the Ekottai'a Agama and the one from the Majjhima
Nikaya clearly come from a common source. It seems a priori likely that
the former is a later version, for the Ekottai'a Agama is said to have been
profoundly influenced by Mahayana, and to contain an “abundance of
composite Sutras, artificially forged together by placing one after the
other Sutras or portions of Sutras borrowed from other canonical texts”
21
Unclear.
16
(cf. Lamotte,1967: 106; Bareau, 1963: 9). Some facts support this.
The episode in the Ekottara Agama reverses meditation without
breath and reduced intake of food. Reduced intake of food comes here
first, and this has given rise to an absurdity. At the beginning of his
reduced intake of food the future Buddha decides not to undertake a
complete fast, because the gods would keep him alive, would not let him
die. But at the end of the reduced intake of food the gods are made to
think that Gautama has died, or is about to die, without their having done
a thing to prevent this. This inconsistency is absent from the Pali version
where these thoughts on the part of the gods occur after Gautama’s
meditation without breath. We may assume that the story got muddled up
in the course of the longer tradition which underlay the version in the
Ekottara Agama.
The statement at the end of the episode in the Ekottara Agama that
these painful practices were performed for six years is another indication
that this is a later stage in the development of the story. The Pali canon
does not, to my knowledge, indicate anywhere how long the future
Buddha tried alternative methods. In the later literature,22 however, it is
often said that it lasted six years.
The Ekottara Agama version of our episode preserves, in spite of its
lateness, the two main indications that it originally dealt with non-
Buddhist, probably Jaina, practices:
(i) The gods call Gautama an arhat
(ii) The future Buddha intends to fast to death but abandons this idea.
The third indication which we might expect, viz., something
corresponding to mahguracchavi, is not found in the Ekottara Agama.
One thing is lacking in the Ekottai'a Agama. The Pali version
introduces the description of meditation without breath with an account
of the Bodhisattva’s attempt to “restrain my thought with my mind, [to]
coerce and torment it”. This is the only part of the whole episode which
can properly be called a description of meditation. It is absent from the
22 E.g., Asvaghosa's Buddhacarita 12.95; Lalitavistara p. 250, 256, 257, 259, 260, 264,
265; Mahavastu II, p. 241 . It is also mentioned in the introduction to the Jatakas (Ja
1.67), which is late. For a comparative study of all these and other versions of our
story, see Dutoit, 1905.
17
Chinese version.
The explanation of this absence lies no doubt in the circumstance
that the practice to “restrain one’s thought with one’s mind, to coerce and
torment it” - here criticized - was taken over by the Buddhists themselves
at an early date. This is most clearly shown by the fact that almost the
same words which are used in the autobiographical account of the
Buddha to ridicule this practice, are used elsewhere in the Majjhima
Nikaya (I. 120-21; similarly MAc p. 582c7-10) to recommend that same
practice. Even the accompanying simile is there. This explains
sufficiently the omission in the Ekottara Agama.
1.3. The Ekottara Agama gives no real context to the autobiographical
account which contains our episode. Only an introduction accompanies
it, which reads (p. 670c2-3): “Thus it has been heard. At one time the
Buddha was in a grove outside the city of Vaisali. Then the world-
honoured one spoke to the monks: ‘Formerly, when I had not yet attained
enlightenment,23 ...’.” Following this comes the autobiographical account
which contains our episode and which reaches up to the end of this unit.
The Majjhima Nikaya gives the episode in three different contexts,
one of which is of particular interest to us. The Mahasaccaka Sutta may
well contain the original context of the episode; at the very least it shows
that early in the Buddhist tradition there was a clear awareness that our
episode served the purpose of criticizing others, i.e., Jainas, for which a
suitable context was created. The following points go to show this:
(i) The Mahasaccaka Sutta mainly describes a conversation between the
Buddha and Saccaka Niganthaputta, alias Aggivessana. The Niganthas of
the Pali canon are - as has been shown by Jacobi (1895: xivf.) - the
Jainas. Saccaka is called ‘Niganthaputta’, i.e., ‘son of a Nigantha’, which
indicates that he was a Jaina.24
(ii) Saccaka points out that there are two extremes into which certain
recluses and Brahmins fall. Some are devoted to the cultivation of the
body, at the expense of the cultivation of the mind. Others are devoted to
23 Lit. ‘the way of a Buddha’.
24 On the pleonastic use of -putta / putra. see Alsdorf, 1969: 18 (375) n. 9, and esp.
Alsdorf, 1951: 357-60 (587-90).
18
the cultivation of the mind, at the expense of the cultivation of the body.
Both suffer the horrible consequences of this omission because they fail
respectively to cultivate the mind or the body. Saccaka specifies that the
disciples of the Buddha are devoted to the cultivation of the mind, at the
expense of the cultivation of the body. Those who are devoted to the
cultivation of the body, at the expense of the cultivation of the mind, are,
apparently, Nanda Vaccha, Kisa Sankicca, and Makkhali Gosala. These
three persons are mentioned at the beginning of a passage which gives an
enumeration of ascetic practices. These practices fit very well with what
we know about the Jainas (Jacobi, 1895: xxxi), yet neither Nigantha
Nataputta, i.e. Mahavlra, nor his followers are here mentioned. The
reason seems clear: Saccaka, himself a Jaina, cannot ascribe to the Jainas
the extreme of only cultivating the body at the expense of cultivating the
mind. The tenor of Saccaka’s exposition indicates that others such as
Nanda Vaccha, Kisa Sankicca, and Makkhali Gosala - all of whom are
normally associated with the Ajivikas (Basham, 1951: 27-30) - are guilty
of this extreme, while the Jainas give mind and body their proper share.
It is certainly significant that this same enumeration of ascetic practices
occurs often in the Pali canon (see Franke, 1913: 135n.l), but never in
connection with these three persons!25 Note that according to the
composer of this part of the Mahasaccaka Sutta the episode of meditation
without breath and reduced intake of food is not directed against the
Ajivikas. (MN I. 237-39, esp. p. 238, 1. 12-28).
Perhaps the following point should be added:
(iii) Towards the end of the Sutra (MN I. 249-50) Saccaka directs a final
criticism at the Buddha. The Buddha, he points out, sleeps sometimes by
day. This criticism makes sense against the background of the Jaina rule
that monks should abstain from sleeping by day (Jaini, 1979: 251; cf.
Ayar. 106 (1.3. 1.1): sutta amunl munino saya jagaramti “The unwise
sleep, the sages always wake” (tr. Jacobi, 1884: 28); Suy. 585 (1.14.6);
25 Jacobi (1895: xxxi-xxxii), not taking into account the context, mistakenly thinks that
this passage is “most easily ... accounted for by our assuming that the original
Niganthas ... were not the section of the church, which submitted to the more rigid
rules of Mahavlra, but those followers of Parsva, who, without forming a hostile
party, yet continued ... to retain within the united church some particular usages of
the old one.”
19
Pujyapada’s Sarvarthasiddhi 9.19; Hemacandra’s Yogasastra with the
own commentary (vol. II, p. 726); etc.).26
The other two Sutras of the Majjhima Nikaya provide no context
worth the name. The autobiographical account containing our episode is
given in the Bodh irajak uniara Sutta in reply to the faulty observation that
“happiness should not be reached through happiness, happiness should
be reached through hardship” (see however note 5 to ch. II). Here the
features which point to specific non-Buddhistic, probably Jaina, practices
remain unexplained. In the Sangarava Sutta the autobiographical account
follows the Buddha’s statement that he has achieved perfection of
wisdom in this world ( ditthadhammabhinnavosanaparamippatta ) by
having recognized the dhamma himself (MN 11.211). This is hardly a
fitting context for our episode.
However, in all the three Sutras our episode is part of the same
autobiographical account, portions of which do not appear to make sense
in the Mahasaccaka Sutta. One of those portions seems to fit much better
in the Sangarava Sutta. This is the story of the Bodhisattva’s training
under Alara Kalama and Uddaka the son of Rama, which he then
discarded as useless. This story has nothing to do with the point which
the Buddha wants to make to Saccaka. It is, on the other hand, a suitable
introduction to the message which the Buddha wants to get across in the
Sangarava Sutta, viz., that he reached his goal all alone.27 One gets the
impression that the long autobiographical account which is repeated in
three contexts, contains some portions which at an earlier time occurred
separately in those different contexts.
Be this as it may, the autobiographical account in the Mahasaccaka
Sutta contains some further portions which do not make sense in the
conversations with Saccaka, and which may therefore be later additions.
They are the following:
(i) Immediately after the account of the training under Alara Kalama and
Uddaka the son of Rama, the Buddha describes how three similes
occurred to him which, briefly stated, showed him that no progress
would be possible as long as desire for the objects of the senses were not
26 The idea is also found in Brahmanical sources, e.g. ApDhS 1.2.24.
27 This story occurs again in the Ariyapariyesana Sutta (MN I. 163-67).
20
abandoned (MN I. 240-42). This description serves no purpose in the
reply to Saccaka.
(ii) At the end of the Mahasaccaka Sutta (MN I. 250-51) Saccaka
contrasts the composed behaviour of Gotama with the evasive reactions
of the six heretics, which include, as ever, Nigaiitha Nataputta. Since
there is no mention in the text that Saccaka was converted to Buddhism,
he was still a follower of Nigantha Nataputta. This episode is therefore
inexplicable in this context.
If we remove the portions indicated above from the Mahasaccaka
Sutta, we are left with what may be called the ‘Original Mahasaccaka
Sutra’. It is very likely that it once had an existence of its own, while
additions were made to it later. From the beginning this Original
Mahasaccaka Sutra must have contained the episode on meditation
without breath and reduced intake of food. This episode itself may or
may not have existed before the composition of the Original
Mahasaccaka Sutra.
1.4. Something can be said about the date of composition of the episode
on meditation without breath and reduced intake of food. It must have
been well before the final redaction of the Pali canon, because, as we
have seen, the Original Mahasaccaka Sutra suffered a number of
additions. The Pali canon was written down in the first century B.C.28
Our episode must be much earlier than this.
One feature of our episode allows us to tentatively push this date
back considerably. The Bodhisattva, we know, abandoned his intention
to fast to death. The author of the episode really did not have much
choice here, for if he had let the Bodhisattva die as a result of these
hardships, the latter could not have reached enlightenment in the same
life. Embarrassment could however have been avoided by placing the
episode in an earlier existence of the Bodhisattva. In that case the
28 Dates vary from between 35 and 32 B.C. (Lamotte, 1958: 404-05) to about 89-77
B.C. (Bechert, 1974: 131).
21
Bodhisattva could finish his fast to death completely. Why was this not
done?
Stories about previous existences of the Buddha are a late feature of
the canonical literature. Very few of them occur in the collections of
Sutras ( Kutadanta Sutta: DN I. 134-43, cf. DAc p. 98b-100b;
Mahasudassana Sutta : DN II. 169-98, cf. DAc p. 21b-24b, MAc p. 515b-
518b; Mahagovinda Sutta : DN II. 220-51, cf. DAc p. 30b-34a;
Makhadeva Sutta : MN II. 74-82, cf. MAc p. 511c-515a, EAc p. 806c-
810a; Ghatlkara Sutta : MN II. 46-49, 54, cf. MAc p. 499a-503a; see
Winternitz, 1920: 9 If.; Bareau, 1980: 5). A whole collection of such
stories (the Jatakas) came to be accepted in the Pali canon. We may
assume that this happened before the time that these Jatakas (Liiders,
1941: 1 3 6f . ; but cf. Lamotte, 1958: 444-45) were depicted at Buddhist
monuments, especially in Bharhut. These sculptures may be dated
between 150 and 100 B.C. (Barua, 1934: 29-37; Rowland, 1967: 88). It
seems that we must date our episode long before this time, i.e., in the
third century B.C. at the latest (cf. Bareau, 1980: 5-6). 29
This conclusion seems supported by the fact that many Jatakas
contain verses in the new Arya metre (Alsdorf, 1967: 23-51) and must
therefore perhaps be dated before the supposed migration of Pali to
Ceylon, in the middle or second half of the third century B.C. (Alsdorf,
1965: 70; 1967: 5). This last consideration is however weakened by the
possibility that the early Pali works which originated after this date may
also have been composed on the mainland, not in Ceylon; cf.
Frauwallner, 1971: 105-06. 30
With regard to the above conclusion some caution must be
exercised. It is likely that some kind of tradition regarding the pre-
enlightenment hardships of the Buddha existed prior to the composition
of our episode (see below). This may have prevented the transposition of
29 A possible objection would be that the Bodhisattva is said to abandon a full fast
merely to indicate that he would be kept alive by receiving divine food through his
pores. This point of view does not however seem to do full justice to our episode.
30 It is not likely that our episode was part of the original Skandhaka which Frauwallner
(1956b: 67) dates a century after the death of the Buddha. Mukherjee (1966: 130-
32) argues convincingly that the original Skandhaka may not have contained any
biographical material regarding the period preceding the enlightenment of the
Buddha.
22
this episode to an earlier life of the Bodhisattva even at a time that stories
about such earlier lives started playing a role.
The episode on meditation without breath and reduced intake of
food does not belong to the earliest layer of Buddhist literature. There is
reason to believe that its composer made use of already existing passages
(‘pericopes’), which may have been more or less freely floating.
The Pali account of meditation fully without breath contains four
comparisons:
(i) “Just as when a strong man may destroy a head with the sharp edge of
a sword, just so indeed extremely strong winds shook up my head”
(ii) “Just as when a strong man may place a turban on a head with a
strong strip of leather, just so indeed there came about extremely strong
headaches in my head”31
(iii) “Just as when a skilled butcher or apprentice of a butcher may cut a
belly all around with a sharp butcher’s knife, just so indeed extremely
strong winds cut my belly all around”
(iv) “Just as when two strong men, taking a weaker man by both his
arms, may burn and roast him on a pit of burning coal, just so indeed
there came about an extremely strong heat in my body.”
These comparisons also occur in the Ekottaragama version, even though
there (i) and (ii) have been condensed into one:
(i)-(ii) “As if a man, taking hold of me, pierced my head with a drill, so
did I have extremely painful headaches”
(iii) “Just as when a skilled butcher slaughters a cow with a knife, so did
I suffer extremely severe pains”
(iv) “And as when two strong men together hold one weak man and
toast him above a fire, so that he suffers extreme pains which he cannot
bear, so did I suffer such pains.”
31 Jha (1979: 276) observes: “The traditional scholars from South India very often say:
kimartham sirovestana-pranayamah ?” What could be the connection ?
23
These four32 comparisons must have occurred in the original version of
our episode.
But the same comparisons occur in the exact words elsewhere in the
Pali canon and always in connection with a sick person: MN II. 193; SN
IV. 56; AN III. 379-80. There can be no doubt that the comparisons fit a
sick person much better than one engaged in meditation fully without
breath. The important role allotted to wind in Indian medical treatises is
well-known.33 Further, it is difficult to see why meditation without breath
should bring about the extreme heat of the fourth comparison, which
appears to describe fever, which is connected with bile (pitta) and not
wind (see note 28). It is however clear how the four comparisons could
come to be transferred from a sick person to one engaged in meditation
fully without breath; the first and the third mention wind, and winds are
not allowed to leave the body in this kind of meditation.
Another apparently borrowed part in the episode is the description
of the horrible effects of the future Buddha’s reduced intake of food,
which occurs in both the Pali and the Chinese versions. It occurs again in
the Mahaslhanada Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya (nr. 12, MN 1.80) and,
in a somewhat different form, in the Shcn mao hsi shu ching (originally
Romaharsanlya Sutra , cf. Levi, 1932: 158n5; T. 757, p. 598a 25f.).34 In
both these Sutras it is part of an account of the extreme ascetic practices
which the Bodhisattva tried out. These practices include much besides
fasting, but no meditation with or without breath. Since it is hard to see
in what other context this part could originally have existed, we may
assume that some sort of tradition regarding the pre-enlightenment
hardships of the Buddha existed prior to the composition of our
32 Four, not three. The Pali version must be closer to the original because two of its
comparisons make a mention of winds, which the whole passage really is about.
The mention of winds cannot be an adjustment apres coup, for the four
comparisons were taken from another context. See below.
33 According to Agnivesa's Caraka Samhita, Sutrasthana 20.11 (p. 113), headache
( siroruc ) and belly-ache ( udaravestah; the commentator Cakrapanidatta explains:
udarasyavestanam ivodaravestah ) are caused by wind ( vata ). This corresponds to
comparisons (i)-(iii). Heat ( daha ), on the other hand, is caused by bile (pitta); see
Sutrasthana 20.14 (p. 114).
34 The Romaharsanlya Sutra in its Chinese version is clearly influenced by our episode.
It includes the remarks by onlookers regarding Gautama’s black or brown colour
(p. 598b24) and is aware of the feeding of ojas through the pores (p. 599a24).
24
episode.35 The portion on meditation in our episode may not have been
part of this tradition (it occurs nowhere except in our episode), and
appears to have been composed for this episode.
1.5. The most interesting result of the above observations is that,
probably in the third century B.C., a Buddhist gave a description of a
non-Buddhist, probably Jaina, method of cultivating the mind, called
‘meditation’ (jhana / dhyana). Stripped from obvious exaggerations and
repetitions it presents this picture : Among the non-Buddhists (Jainas),
meditation was a forceful effort to restrain the mind and bring it to a
standstill. Along with it, but perhaps only in a more advanced stage of
meditation, breathing is stopped.
This form of non-Buddhist meditation is contrasted with Buddhist
meditation in the Mahasaccaka Sutta, and probably also in the Original
Mahasaccaka Sutra which may have constituted the original context of
our episode. The Bodhisattva is said to recall the First Dhyana in a
passage which appears to contain very old elements (Horsch, 1964;
Bareau, 1963: 47-48, 52-53). It reads (MN I. 246-47; cf. T. 1428, p.
78 la4-l l):36
Then, Aggivessana, I thought: ‘I remember, indeed, that [once],
during the work of my father the Sakka, while sitting in the cool
shade of the rose-apple tree, separated from desires, separated
from bad things (cl ham m a), I reached the First Dhyana, which is
accompanied by thought and reflection, born from separation,
consists of joy and bliss, and remained [there]. Could this perhaps
be the road toward enlightenment?’ Then, Aggivessana, following
this memory I had this knowledge: ‘This is really the road toward
35 This tradition, too, may have been strongly influenced by Jaina and similar practices.
See Bollee, 1971; Verclas, 1978: 156-60.
36 tassa mayham aggivessana etad ahosi: abhijanami kho panaham pitu sakkassa
kammante sltaya jambucchayaya nisinno vivicc eva kamehi vivicca akusalehi
dhammehi savitakkam savicaram vivekajam pltisukham pathamam jhanam
upasampajja viharita, siya nu kho eso maggo bodhaya ti / tassa mayham
aggivessana satanusari vihhanam ahosi: eso va maggo bodhaya ti / tassa mayham
aggivessana etad ahosi: kin nu kho aham tassa sukhassa bhayami yan tarn sukham
ahhatr 'eva kamehi ahhatra akusalehi dhammehi 'ti /tassa mayham aggivessana
etad ahosi: na kho aham tassa sukhassa bhayami yan tarn sukham ah~hatr 'eva
kamehi ahhatra akusalehi dhammehi ' ti /
25
enlightenment’. Then, Aggivessana, I thought: ‘Indeed, I do not
fear that bliss, a bliss which is apart from desires, apart from bad
psychic states’.
One cannot fail to be struck by the relaxed and friendly atmosphere
which emanates from this passage, and which contrasts with the violent
spirit ascribed to Jaina meditation.
In the opinion of the author of the Original Mahasaccaka Sutra
Buddhist meditation consists of the so-called Four Dhyanas. This is
shown by the fact that the autobiographical account in the Mahasaccaka
Sutta concludes with a description of the final enlightenment of the
Buddha which follows his ascent through the Four Dhyanas. They are
described as follows (MN I. 247) :37
Then indeed, Aggivessana, having taken ample food, and having
recovered strength, being separated from desires, separated from
bad things, I reached the First Dhyana, which is accompanied by
thought and reflection, born from separation, and consists of joy
and bliss, and resided [there]. Even such a blissful experience,
Aggivessana, when it happened to me, did not completely take
hold of my mind. As a result of appeasing thought and reflection I
reached the Second Dhyana, which is an inner tranquillization, a
unification of the mind, free from thought and reflection,
consisting of joy and bliss that is bom from concentration
(. samadhija ), and resided [there]. Even such a blissful experience,
Aggivessana, when it happened to me, did not completely take
hold of my mind.
so kho aharn aggivessana olarikam aharam aharetva balam gahetva vivicc’eva
kamehi vivicca akusalehi dhammehi savitakkam savicaram vivekajam pitisukham
pathamam jhanam upasampajja vihasim /evarupa pi kho me aggivessana uppanna
sukha vedana cittam na pariyadaya dtthati / vitakkavicaranam vupasama ajjhattam
sampasadanam cetaso ekodibhavam avitakkam avicaram samadhijam pitisukham
dutiyam jhanam upasampajja vihasim / evarupa pi kho me aggivessana uppanna
sukha vedana cittam na pariyadaya dtthati / pldya ca viraga upekhako ca vihasim
sato ca sampajano, sukhah ca kayena padsamvedesim yan tarn ariya acikkhand :
upekhako sadma sukhaviharlti tadyam jhanam upasampajja vihasim / evarupa pi
kho me aggivessana uppanna sukha vedana cittam na pariyadaya dtthati / sukhassa
ca pahana dukkhassa ca pahana pubbeva somanassadomanassanam atthagama
adukkham asukham upekhasadparisuddhim catuttham jhanam upasampajja vihasim
/ evarupa pi kho me aggivessana uppanna sukha vedana cittam na pariyadaya
dtthati /
26
As a result of detachment from joy, I remained indifferent,
attentive and mindful. I experienced with my body the bliss which
the noble ones describe [in these terms]: ‘indifferent, with
attentiveness, residing in bliss’; thus I reached the Third Dhyana
and resided [there]. Even such a blissful experience, Aggivessana,
when it happened to me did not completely take hold of my mind.
As a result of abandoning bliss, and abandoning pain, as a result
of the earlier disappearance of cheerfulness and dejection, I
reached the Fourth Dhyana, which is free from pain and bliss, the
complete purity of equanimity and attentiveness, and resided
[there]. Even38 such a blissful experience, Aggivessana, when it
happened to me, did not completely take hold of my mind.
When we compare what we learned about non-Buddhist meditation with
this description of the Buddhist Four Dhyanas (which is standard, and
recurs numerous times in the Buddhist canon; see Schmithausen, 1981:
203-04), we notice many differences. The one that is emphasized by the
author of the Original Mahasaccaka Sutra is that Buddhist meditation39 is
a pleasant experience,40 accompanied by joy ( piti ) and bliss ( sukha ), or
bliss alone, in all but its highest stages, whereas non-Buddhist meditation
is not described as pleasurable.
38 This sentence is here rather absurd, and shows the unifying, but non-understanding
hand of a redactor.
39 By this I mean, of course, the Four Dhyanas.
40 Note that SN 1.1 claims that Nirvan'a is reached without effort; cf. Karunaratne, 1976.
TWO TRADITIONS OF MEDITATION
II. Further Buddhist criticism of alternative practices.
2.1. More information about the Jainas that is of interest to us can be
gathered from various places in the Buddhist canon. Of particular interest
is MN I. 92-95 (cf. T. 55, p. 850c-851a; MAc p. 587bl3f.; EAc
p. 744a27f.) where the Buddha is in conversation with the Sakka named
Mahanama:41
At one time, Mahanama, I resided in Raj ag aha on the mountain
Gijjhakuta. At that time there were many Niganthas on the black
rock on the slope of [the mountain] Isigili, standing erect,42
refusing to sit down, and they experienced painful, sharp, severe
41 ekam idaham mahanama samayam rajagahe viharami gijjhakute pabbate / tena kho
pana samayena sambahula nigantha isigilipasse kaiasilayam ubbhatthaka honti
asanapatikkhitta, opakkamika dukkha tippa katuka vedana vediyanti / atha kho
'ham mahanama sayanhasamayam patisallana vutthito yena isigilipassam kalasila
yena te nigantha ten ' upas ahkamim, upasahkamitva te niganthe etad avocam : kin
nu tumhe avuso nigantha ubbhatthaka asanapatikkhitta opakkamika dukkha tippa
katuka vedana vediyatha ti ? evam vutte mahanama te nigantha mam etad avocum :
nigantho avuso nathaputto sabbahhu sabbadassavi aparisesam hanadassanam
patijanati : carato ca me titthato ca suttassa ca jagarassa ca satatam samitam
hanadassanam paccupatthitan ti /so evam aha: atthi kho vo nigantha pubbe papam
kammam katam, tarn imaya katukaya dukkarakarikaya nijjaretha; yarn pan’ettha
etarahi kayena samvuta vac ay a samvuta manasa samvuta tarn ayatim papassa
kammassa akaranam; id purananatn kammanam tapasa byandbhava, na variant
kammanam akarana ayatim anavassavo , ayatim anavassava kammakkhayo,
kammakkhaya dukkhakkhayo, dukkhakkhaya vedanakkhayo , vedanakkhaya
sabbam dukkham nijjinnam bhavissatl’d / tan ca pan’amhakam ruccad c’eva
khamad ca, tena c'amha attamana’d / ... na kho avuso gotama sukhena sukham
adhigantabbam, dukkhena kho sukham adhigantabbam / sukhena ca avuso gotama
sukham adhigantabbam abhavissa, raja magadho seniyo bimbisaro sukham
adhigaccheyya, raja magadho seniyo bimbisaro sukhaviharitaro ayasmata
gotamenad / ... api ca aham eva tattha padpucchitabbo : ko nu kho ayasmantanam
sukhaviharitaro, raja va magadho seniyo bimbisaro ayasma va gotamo ti / ... tena
h ' avuso nigantha tumhe va tattha padpucchissami, yatha vo khameyya tatha nam
byakareyyatha / tarn kim mahhath ’avuso nigantha: pahod raja magadho seniyo
bimbisaro anihjamano kayena abhasamano vacant satta (cha ... pahca ... cattari ...
tini ... dve ... ekam) ratdndivani (ratdndivam) ekantasukhapadsamvedi viharitun ti /
no h'idam avuso / aham kho avuso nigantha pahomi anihjamano kayena
abhasamano vacant ekam (dve ... tini ... cattari ... pahca ... cha ... satta) ratdndivam
(ratdndivani) ekantasukhapadsamvedi viharitum /tarn kim mahhath ’avuso nigantha
: evam sante ko sukhaviharitaro, raja va magadho seniyo bimbisaro aham va’ti /
evam sante ayasma va gotamo sukhaviharitaro rahha magadhena seniyena
bimbisarena’d /
42. T. 55 (p. 850c4) has ‘standing on their knees', EAc (p. 744bl) ‘squatting on the
heels’.
2
sensations [which were] due to [self-inflicted] torture.43 Then,
Mahanama, having arisen in the evening from my retirement, I
went to the black rock on the slope of [the mountain] Isigili where
those Niganthas were; having gone there I said to those
Niganthas: ‘Why, deal' Niganthas, are you standing erect, refusing
to sit down, and do you experience painful, sharp, severe
sensations [which are] due to [self-inflicted] torture?’ When this
was said, Mahanama, those Niganthas said to me: ‘Friend,
Nigantha Nathaputta, who knows all and sees all, claims complete
knowledge and insight [saying:] “Always and continuously
knowledge and insight are present to me, whether I walk, stand
still, sleep or be awake.” He (i.e., Nigantha Nathaputta) says:
“Formerly, Niganthas, you performed sinful activities; you must
exhaust that [sinful activity] by means of this severe and difficult
practice. Being here and now restrained in body, speech and
mind, amounts to not performing sinful activity in the future.
Thus, as a result of the annihilation of former actions by
asceticism, and of the non-performing of new actions, there is no
further effect in the future; as a result of no further effect in the
future there is destruction of actions; as a result of the destruction
of actions there is destruction of suffering; as a result of the
destruction of suffering there is destruction of sensation; as a
result of the destruction of sensation all suffering will be
exhausted.” And this [word of Nigantha Nathaputta] pleases us
and is approved of by us, and therefore we are delighted. ...
Happiness, dear Gotama, should not be reached through
happiness,44 happiness should be reached through hardship.45 If
happiness should be reached through happiness, dear Gotama,
king Seniya Bimbisara of Magadha would reach happiness
43. See note 6 to ch. I, above.
44. The Jaina text Suyagada 230 (1. 3.4. 6) criticizes some who say that happiness is
reached through happiness ( iham ege u bhasamti satam satena vijjatT). Sllanka
(p. 64) identifies these as ‘Buddhists etc (sakyadayah).
45. The Ekottara Agama completely reverses the situation and makes the Buddha say
that happiness can only be reached through hardship, not through happiness (EAc
p. 744b9-10, 20-21). This must be due to outside influence; see § 1.2 above.
3
[hereafter, because] king Seniya Bimbisara of Magadha lives in
greater happiness than the venerable Gotama.’ [The Buddha
replies:]
‘With respect to this I should be asked: “Who of the [two]
venerable ones lives in greater happiness, King Seniya Bimbisara
of Magadha or the venerable Gotama?” ... Therefore, dear
Niganthas, I shall ask you [a question] which you may answer as
seems right to you. What do you think, dear Niganthas, is king
Seniya Bimbisara of Magadha able to experience unalloyed
happiness for seven (six ... five ... four ... three ... two ... one)
nights and days [at a stretch] without moving his body and
without saying a word?’ ‘No, friend.’ ‘But I, dear Niganthas, am
able to experience unalloyed happiness46 for one (two ... three ...
four ... five ... six ... seven) night and day [at a stretch] without
moving my body and without saying a word. What do you think,
deal' Niganthas, who lives in view of this in greater happiness,
king Seniya Bimbisara of Magadha or I ?’ ‘In view of this the
venerable Gotama lives in greater happiness than king Seniya
Bimbisara of Magadha’.
We observe that here again the painful practices of the Jainas are
contrasted with the happiness of the Buddhists. Unfortunately the
contrast is not validly illustrated, because the Buddha himself - who has
already reached the goal - is said to be happy, and those who have not
yet reached the goal but are practising in the right way are not mentioned.
Nevertheless, this passage contains one more piece of information
about the Jainas as viewed by the Buddhists. The Jainas, we read, were
“standing erect,47 refusing to sit down”. We may look upon this as an
expression of their desire for ‘non-performing of new actions’ and
‘annihilation of former actions by asceticism’ 48
46. eAc p. 744bl4-15 seems to miss the point and makes the Buddha boast of being
able “to sit cross-legged for seven days and nights without stirring the body”, not
mentioning happiness.
47. Or ‘standing on their knees’ and ‘squatting on their heels’ in the Chinese parallels.
48. These words are again ascribed to Nigantha Nathaputta and his followers at AN I.
220-21; MN 11.214; cf. SAC p. 147c8f.; MAc p. 442c2f.
4
The emphasis on bodily practices among the Jainas is explicitly
mentioned in the Upali Sutta/Sutra (MN no. 56, 1.37 If.; MAc no. 133,
p. 628a f.). The Nigantha Dighatapassi tells the Buddha that of the three
kinds of bad activities - of body, speech, and mind - bodily activities are
the worst. The Buddha, on the other hand, is of the opinion that mental
bad activities are the worst.
2.2. The Indriyabhavana Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya ( III. 298f.;
cf. SAC p. 78a22f.) criticizes such ‘cultivation of the senses’ (indriya-
bhavana) as leads to their non-functioning. Uttara explains, at the request
of the Buddha, that his teacher Parasariya teaches such cultivation of the
senses that “one sees no form with the eye, hears no sound with the car”
(MN III.298: ...cakkhuna rupam na passati, sotena saddam na sunati ).
The Buddha responds that then the blind and deaf will have cultivated
the senses ( bhavitindriya ), because they do not see with the eye, nor hear
with the ear. The Buddha then explains to Ananda that the best
cultivation of the senses ( anuttara indriyabhavana) consists in equanimity
( upekkha) with respect to what is experienced through the senses.
2.3. The main conclusions to be drawn from the material presented in
chapters I and II are as follows. Certain non-Buddhist ascetics, in
particular the Jainas, performed practices which are described as ‘non-
performing of new actions’ and ‘annihilation of former actions by
asceticism’. The ‘non-performing of new actions’ implied apparently
It is noteworthy that almost the same words are placed in the mouth of the
Buddha at AN 1.221, 11.197-98 (cf. MAc p. 434b23; SAC p.l47c27): so navan ca
kammam na karoti, puranam kammam phussa phussa vyanlikaroli: the effects of
activities are now said to wear out with death (AN II. 198-99; MAc p. 434c5f.). At
Ud 21, similarly, we are confronted with a monk “in a cross-legged position, with
body erect, mindful and conscious, and bearing without a murmur, acute, piercing
and terrible pains, the result of deeds done in the past” ( pallankam abhujitva ujurn
kayam panidhaya puranakammavipakajam dukkham tippam kharam katukam
vedanam adhivasento sato sampajano avihannamana, tr. Strong, 1902: 27). At AN
V.292, 294, 297, 298 (cf. MAc p. 437b26f.) the Buddha is made to declare “that of
intentional deeds done and accumulated there can be no wiping out without
experiencing the result thereof, and that too whenever arising, either in this same
visible state or in some other state hereafter” (naham bhikkhave sancetanikanam
kammanam katanam upacitanam appatisamviditva vyantibhavam vadami, tan ca
kho ditthe va dhamme upapajjam va apare va pariyaye; tr. Woodward, 1936: 189,
191). in all these cases we can be sure of outside influence on Buddhism. See
ch. VII, below.
5
such feats of motionlessness as standing erect without ever sitting or
lying down. The accompanying feelings of displeasure are probably what
is meant by ‘annihilation of former actions by asceticism’.
These practices on the part of the Jainas and other non-Buddhist
religious ascetics were, in the view of the Buddhists, accompanied by
others, of equally negative intent. One of these is the abstention from all
food, until its inevitable result, death. Another one is described as
‘meditation without breath’. The meditation-part of this practice
consisted in a complete restraint of all mental processes. Along with this
went an attempt to stop breathing.
One more practice was described and assigned to non-Buddhists.
Here the attempt is made to halt the functioning of the senses in such a
way that “one sees no form with the eye, hears no sound with the car”.
The common denominator in all these practices is easily discerned.
All of them aim at non-activity of a part, or of the whole, of the aspirant.
Given the fact that many of the religious movements in the time of the
Buddha and later strove to discard the evil consequences of activity
(. karman ), this goal should not surprise us.
It is perhaps more surprising that the early Buddhists are against all
these practices. In some cases they contrast the non-Buddhist practices
aiming at non-activity with what are, in their opinion, the practices to be
performed in their stead. Rather than fasting, restraining the mind and
stopping the breath, one should perform the Four Dhyanas. And rather
than aiming at the non-functioning of the senses, one should remain
equanimous in the face of the experiences they offer.
6
Part II: The main stream.
III. Early Jaina meditation.
3.1. Probably the earliest surviving detailed description of the
road leading to liberation in the Jaina scriptures is Ayaramga (Ayar.)
1.8(7). 7. 2-8 / 228-53:49
49. jassa nam bhikkhussa evarn bhavati ‘se gilami ca khalu aharn imammi samae
imam sarlragam anupuvvenam parivahittae' se anupuvvenam aharam samvattejja,
anupuvvenam aharam samvattetta kasae patanue kicca samahiyacce
phalagavayatthl utthaya bhikkhu abhinivvudacce ... tanaim jaejja, tanaim jaetta se
ttam ayae egamtam avakkamejja. egamtam avakkametta ... tanaim samtharejja,
[tanaim samtharetta] ettha vi samae kay am ca jogam ca tiyam ca paccakkhaejja / ...
//228//
anupuvvena vimohaim jaim dhlra samasajja /
vasumamto matimamto savvam nacca anelisam I 12291 1
duviham pi viitta (so Schubring; Jambuvijaya reads viditta) nam buddha
dhammassa paraga /
anupuvvle samkhae arambha ya tiuttati //230//
kasae payanue kicca appaharo titikkhae /
aha bhikkhu gilae jja aharasseva am tiyam / 7 23 1//
jlviyam nabhikamkhejja maranam no vi patthae /
duhato vi na sajjejja jivite marane faM//232//
majjhattho nijjarapehl samahim anupalae /
amto bahim viyosajja ajjhattham suddham esae //233//
jam kimcuvakkamam jane aukhemassa appano/
tasseva amtaraddhae khippam sikkhejja pamdite //234//
game aduva ranne thamdilam padilehiya /
appapanam tu vinnaya tanaim samthare muni 1/235/1
anaharo tuvattejja puttho tattha hiyasae /
nativelam uvacare manussehim vi putthavam //236//
samsappaga ya je panaje ya uddha-m-ahecara /
bhumjamte mamsasoniyam na chane na pamajjae H22>1 II
pana deham vihimsamti thanato na vi ubbhame /
asavehim vivittehim tippamano ' dhiyasae //238//
gamthehim vivittehim ayukalassa parae /
paggahitataragam cetam daviyassa viyanato // 239 / 1
ay am se avare dhamme nayaputtena sahite /
ayavajjam padiyaram vijahejja tidha tidha / 1 240 / '/
hariesu na nivajjejja thamdilam munia sae /
viyosajja anaharo puttho tattha ' dhiyasae //241//
imdiehim gilayamto samiyam sahare muni I
tahavi se agarahe acale je samahie H 242//
abhikkame padikkame samkucae pasarae /
kayasaharanatthae ettham va vi acetane //243//
parikkame parikilamte aduva citthe ahayate /
thanena parikilamte nislejja ya amtaso //244//
aslne 'nelisam maranam imdiyani samlrate /
7
When50 a monk thinks: ‘I am indeed tired of carrying around this
body in these circumstances’, he should gradually reduce his
food; having gradually reduced his food and diminished his
passions, his body being prepared, standing like a plank, his body
pacified, ... he should ask for grass; having asked for grass and
received it, he should go away to a lonely place; having gone
away to a lonely place ... he should spread the grass; and having
spread the grass, at that occasion, he should reject body, activity,
and movement ... (228).
The51 firm ones, having reached the [ways of] liberation, powerful
and wise,52 knowing all that is excellent, (229)
Having conquered the twofold (birth and death?), the awakened
ones have gone to the other shore of the doctrine. And one rids
oneself of activity when he has thought [about this] in due order.
(230)
kolavasam samasajja vitaham padur esae //245//
jato vajjam samuppajje na tattha avalambae /
Into ukkase appanam savve phase ' dhiyasae //246//
ayam catatare (v.l. cayatatare) siya je evatn anupalae /
savvagayanirodhe vi thanato na vi ubbhame 1/247/ /
ayam se uttame dhamme puvvatthanassa paggahe /
aciram padilehitta vihare citthamu (so Schubring; Jambuvijaya reads cittha)
mahane // 248//
acittam tu samasajja thavae tattha appagam/
vosire savvaso kayam na me dehe pans aha //249//
javajjlvam parlsaha uvasagga ya id samkhaya /
samvude dehabhedae id panne ' dhiyasae //250//
bhiduresu na rajjejja kamesu bahutaresu vi /
icchalobham na sevejja dhuvavannam sapehiya 1/25 1//
sasaehim nimamtejja divvamayam na saddahe /
tarn padibujjha mahane savvam numam vihuniya (so Schubring, Jambuvijaya reads
vidhunita) 1/252/1
savvatthehim amucchie ayukalassa parae /
titikkham paramam nacca vimohannataram hitam 1/253/1
50 The meaning of the passage is not always clear. The translation often follows
Schubring, 1926 : 111-15, and also owes much to the advice of Dr. H. Tieken. The
suggestions of N. Balbir ( Bulletin d' etudes indiennes 4, 1986, p.23*) have been
gratefully incorporated.
51 The remainder of this passage consists of verses which have been added to explain
“body, activity and movement”. See Schubring, 1926: 113 n.3.
52 Schubring takes vasumanto maimanto to be nom. sing., but there is nothing against it
being nom. plural (Pischel, 1900: § 396, pp. 324-25). On vasuma(t) < Skt.
*vasamat , see Norman, 1976:49.
8
(1) Having diminished his passions he bears with little food. In
case the monk gets ill in the presence of food, (231)
He should not long for life, nor strive after death; he should not be
attached to either, life or death. (232)
Impartial, intent on the destruction of activity ( nijjara) he should
preserve his concentration. Renouncing internally as well as
externally he strives after a pure heart. (233)
Whatever means he may know to secure his life [for another
while, let the wise one quickly avail of that for an intervening
period.53 (234)
Having looked for a place in a village or in the wilderness,54 and
knowing it to be with little life, the monk should spread out the
grass. (235)
He should lie without food; when affected [by discomfort] in that
[position] he should bear it. He should not go beyond the
boundary [which he has set himself], even when he has been
affected55 by things human. (236)
He should not hurt nor rub away living creatures which creep on
the ground, or fly high or low, and eat his flesh and blood. (237)
Creatures injure his body, yet he should not walk from his place.
Being pained by all kinds of outside influences, he should bear [it
all], (238)
going to the other shore of his span of life, [free] from all kinds of
knots. This is well-accepted by the self-controlled and
understanding person. (239)
(2) The following is another practice taught by the son of Ncaya
(= Mahavira). One should abandon movement in the threefold
three ways, except for [keeping] himself [alive], (240)
53 Sllanka (p. 194) and Schubring (1926: 1 14 n. 1) point out that this extension of life is
meant to make the monk ready for the death he has chosen.
54 On the opposition between ‘village’ (grama) and ‘wilderness’ ( aranya ) in Vedic
literature, see Sprockhoff, 1981: 32-43.
55 putthavam\ cf. Pischel, 1900: § 396.
9
He should not sit down on green plants, but lie on the bare ground
after inspecting it; renouncing, taking no food, he should bear
[discomfort] when affected [by it] in that [position], (241)
While feeling aversion to his senses, the monk may take [as much
food] as is appropriate.56
Nevertheless, he is blameless who is motionless and concentrated.
(242)
He may step forward and backward, contract and stretch [his
limbs], in order to keep body [and soul] together; or, alternatively,
he [may become] unconscious in that same position. (243)
He may walk around when tired, or [remain] standing as before.
When tired of standing he may finally sit down. (244)
While sitting he directs his senses to the excellent death [which he
is going to die]. In case he stumbles upon a termite hill [for
support], he should search for something different. (245)
He does not lean on something from which something avoidable
could originate. He should pull himself up from there and bear all
that affects him. (246)
(3) This one is [even] more intent (, ayatatare ) [on reaching the
goal] who keeps to the following. While controlling all his limbs,
let him not move away from his place. (247)
This is the best practice, better than the preceding. Having
cleansed [the place] for a short time, the Brahmin should remain
there standing. (248)
Having reached a place free from living beings, he should place
himself there. He should renounce his body; thinking ‘there are no
afflictions in my body, afflictions and troubles [last] as long as
life’, he should bear them, being restrained, realizing that they
lead to the destruction of the body. (249-50)
He should not be attached to desires for transitory things, even
when [they become] more numerous. He should not nourish
wishes and greed, since he is looking for the unchanging
character. (251)
56 samiyam = samyak. See Schubring, 1910 : 105.
10
[A god] may offer him eternal things,57 [but] he should not trust
this divine trick. Brahmin, recognize this, shaking off all that is
inferior. (252)
Not stupefied by all things he reaches the other shore of his span
of life. Knowing that endurance is highest, each of the [three
ways] of liberation is good. (253).
Here we find a description of a voluntary starvation to death,
accompanied by an as complete as possible restraint with regard to all
activity and movement. It is the culmination of a life of training and
preparation.58
The emphasis on restraint of activity and movement should not
surprise us. We read repeatedly in the Ayar. that suffering is the result of
activity ( arambha , kamma): “knowing that all this suffering is born from
activity” (1.3. 1.3 / 108 and 1.4.3.1/140; arambhajam dukkham inam ti
nacca); “no action is found in him who has abandoned activity, the
condition [for rebirth] originates on account of activity, (1.3. 1.4 / 110;
akammassa vavaharo na vijjati, kammuna uvadhi jayati).
The most obvious remedy against such a situation is to abstain from
activity: “therefore he who does not act has ceased [from activity]; he
who has ceased from that is called ‘homeless’” (1.1.5.1/40; tam je no
karae esovarate, etthovarae esa anagaiv tti pavuccati)-, “free from activity
he knows and sees, he does not long for [anything] because of his
insight; he is called ‘homeless’” (1.2. 2.1 / 71; esa akamme janati pasati,
padilehae navakamkhati, esa anagaiv tti pavuccati)-, “But he is wise and
awakened [who] has ceased from activity. ... Looking at those among the
mortals in this world who are free from activity, having seen the result
connected with activity, he who really knows turns away from that
[activity]” (1.4. 4. 3 / 145; se hu pannanamamte buddhe arambhovarae ...
Prof. Tatia draws my attention to Yogasutra 3.51 and the Bhasya thereon, where the
gods are made to say to the yogin, among other things: “Have entrance to this high-
place which is unfading and ageless and deathless and dear to the gods.”
( pratipadyatam idam aksayam ajaram amarasthanam devanam priyam: tr. Woods,
1914:286.)
In these respects the above description contrasts with the later canonical descriptions
of voluntary death contained in the Painnayas. This has been pointed out by Caillat
(1977).
11
nikkammadarpsl iha macciehim kammuna saphalam datthuna59 tato
nijjati vcdavl): etc.
All this gives us a clear and intelligible picture of the way to
liberation in early Jainism. Activity being the source of all unhappiness,60
the attempt is made to put a stop to activity.61 This is done in a most
radical way. The monk abstains from food and prepares for death in a
position which is as motionless as possible.
The passage translated above does not say a word about meditation
( jhana / Skt. dhyana). This does not mean that nothing is said about the
mental attitude of the monk. The monk is supposed to have diminished
his passions, he should not long for life or death, must preserve his
concentration and strive after a pure heart, etc. It is easy to guess that in
the mental realm as in the bodily, cessation of activity is sought, but no
detailed information is given in the Ayaramga.
3.2. For such information we turn to a slightly younger text, the
Uttarajjhayana, chapter 29. This chapter deals with the effects of a
number of practices. Some of these are comparable with what we learned
in the preceding section, others throw additional light on it.
Comparable with our earlier findings are the following statements:
“What does the soul produce by renouncing activity? By renouncing
activity it produces a state without activity. By being without activity the
soul does not bind new karman and destroys the karman that was bound
before”. (29.37 / 1139; jogapaccakkhanenam ... jive kam janayai?
jogapaccakkhanenam ajogattam janayai I ajoglnam jive navam kammam
na bamdhai, puvvabaddham nijjarei ) “By renouncing food it stops the
many hundreds of existences (which it would otherwise be doomed to
live)” (29.40 / 1142; bhattapaccakkhanenam anegaim bhavasayaim
nirumbhai). “By the possession of right conduct [the soul] produces the
59 This v.l. datthuna seems to make more sense than datthum , which Schubring (1926:
89 n. 4) takes as “grammatisch ungenau fur pasai od. dergl."
60 Injury to living beings seems to be the intermediate link between activity and the
resulting unhappiness. This explains the always repeated emphasis in the Jaina
scriptures on abstention from injury.
61 This is perhaps most concisely expressed at Suy. 1.15.7 / 613: “For him who does
not act there is no new karmail' ( akuvvato navam natthi kammam). Old karman. be
it noted, is cut off by asceticism (Uttar. 29.27 / 1 129) as well as by non-activity
(Uttar. 29.37 / 1 129; see below).
12
state [of motionlessness] of the king of mountains. Having reached the
state [of motionlessness] of the king of mountains, the homeless [monk]
destroys the four parts of kairnan which [even] a kevalin possesses. After
that [the soul] becomes perfected, awakened, freed, completely
emancipated, and puts an end to all suffering” (29.61/1163; caritta-
sampannayae nam seleslbhavam janayai / selesim padivanne anagare
cattari kevalikammamse khavei / tao paccha sijjhai bujjhai mucca'i
parinivvai savvadukkhanam amtam karci /.) These passages confirm our
idea that liberation is effected by bringing all activity to a standstill.
The culmination of this process is described in Uttar. 29.72 / 1174:62
Then having preserved his life [long enough], the remainder of
life being less than the time of a muhurta, he stops [all] activities
and enters pure meditation ( sukkajjhana ) in which only subtle
activity remains and from which one does not fall back; he first
stops the activity of his mind, then of his speech and body, then
he puts a stop to breathing out and breathing in. During the time
needed to pronounce hardly five short syllables the homeless
[monk], being in pure meditation in which [all] activity has been
cut off and from which there is no return, simultaneously destroys
the four parts of karman [which remain]: pertaining to experience,
span of life, name and lineage.
Here we meet with the term ‘pure meditation’ ( sukkajjhana / Skt.
sukladhyana ). It is clear from the text that in this stage of pure meditation
little or no activity remains. Initially only subtle activity remains, later all
activity is cut off. The text adds, almost superfluously, that the monk
stops the activities of his mind, speech and body, and even stops
breathing. All this is exactly what we had expected on the basis of the
supposition that early Jainism strives to obtain complete inactivity. This
inactivity includes, we now know for certain, cessation of the mental
processes. Let us however note that meditation, i.e. the attempt to stop
62 ahauyam palaitta amtomuhuttaddhavasesaue joganiroham karemane suhumakiriyam
appadivai sukkajjhanam jhayamane tappadhamayae manajogam nirumbhai,
vaijogam nirumbhai', kayajogam nirumbhai, anapanuniroham karei,
Isipamcahrassakkharuccaranaddhae ya nam anagare samucchinnakiriyam aniyattim
sukkajjhanam jhiyayamane veyanijjam auyam namam goyam ca ee cattari
kammamse jugavam khavei.
13
the mental processes, constitutes here no more than one relatively minor
aspect of the road to liberation.
3.3. A more detailed description of ‘pure meditation’ is found in the no
doubt later Thanamga Sutta (Than.) which, like the Ahguttara Nikaya of
the Pali canon, classifies and orders subject matters on the basis of the
number of their subdivisions. At Than. 4.1.69-72 / 247 we read:63
Pure meditation is of four kinds and has four manifestations: 1. in
which there is consideration of multiplicity and changes of object;
2. in which there is consideration of oneness and no change of
object; 3. in which activity has become subtle and from which
there is no return; 4. in which [all] activity has been cut off and
from which one does not fall back. These are the four
characteristics of pure meditation: absence of agitation, absence
of delusion, discriminating insight, renunciation. These are the
four supports of pure meditation: forbearance, freedom, softness,
straightness. These are the four reflections of pure meditation:
reflection on infinity, reflection on change, reflection on what is
inauspicious, reflection on sin.
The third and fourth kind of pure meditation are here described as in
the passage from the Uttarajjhayana (29.72 / 1174) studied above. The
only difference is that the words “from which one does not fall back”
(appadivatl/ -vai) and “from which there is no return” ( aniyattl) have
changed place. There is therefore no reason to doubt that the Thanamga
Sutta follows in this point an older tradition.
In order to find out whether the other kinds of pure meditation also
existed in early Jainism, we shall compare the above description with
some passages from Ayar. I, certainly one of the oldest texts of the Jaina
canon. The few occurrences of ‘meditation’ (jhana), ‘meditate’ ( jhati )
63 sukke jhane caiivvihe caiippaoare pannatte, tamjaha - puhattavitakke saviyarl ( 1),
egattavitakke aviyari (2), suhumakirie aniyattl (3), samucchinnakirie appadivatl
(4) / sukkassa nam jhanassa cattari lakkhana pannatta, tamjaha - avvahe asammohe
vivege viussagge / sukkassa nam jhanassa cattari alambana pannatta. tamjaha -
khamti mutti maddave ajjave / sukkassa nam jhanassa cattari anuppehao pannattao.
tamjaha - anamtavattiyanuppeha vipparinamanuppeha asubhanuppeha
avayanuppeha /
14
etc. in Ayar. I are all of them found in the ninth (in some editions eighth)
chapter which describes the vicissitudes of Mahavlra and may be a later
addition. Of this Great Hero it is said that “he meditates with care and
concentration, exerting himself day and night” (1.9. 2. 4 / 280; raimdivam
pi jayamane appamatte samahite jhati). Meditation is here said to be
possible for long stretches of time, not, e.g., merely for a muhurta as
maintained by the later tradition.
Ayar. 1.9.4.14 / 320 reads: “Further, the Great Hero meditates on
what is above, below, beside, while remaining in his position,
motionless, observing his concentration, without desires.”64 This
indicates that meditation can have an object in the outside world. This
fits the second kind of pure meditation described in the Uttarajjhayana.
In this form of meditation there is “consideration of oneness and no
change of object”. A single object, we may assume, is made the focus of
attention and this causes the mind to come to a standstill. The first kind
of pure meditation must then be an introductory stage to the second kind.
We see that the four kinds of pure meditation can be looked upon as
stages on the road to complete motionlessness and physical death. At the
first stage the mind still moves from one object to another. At the second
stage it stops doing so and comes to a standstill. At the third and fourth
stages motionlessness of the body comes about in addition to motionless-
ness of the mind. When complete motionlessness of body and mind has
been reached, physical death takes place.
It is characteristic for the emphasis on the body in early Jainism that
even in the above description of pure meditation two of the four kinds of
pure meditation are described in physical rather than mental terms. The
third and fourth kind of pure meditation are characterized by little or no
activity of the body, in addition to that of the mind. Only this
interpretation, so it seems, makes satisfactory sense, and agrees with the
earlier passages which we discussed.
3.4. The description of pure meditation in the Thanamga Sutta does not
stand alone. Pure meditation is presented as one (the last) of four types of
64
avi jhati se mahavire asanatthe akukkue jhanam / uddham adhe ya tiriyam ca
pehamane samahim apadinne /
15
dhyana, viz. arta (AMg. alia: afflicted), raudra (rodda; wrathful),
dharmya (dhamma; pious), and sukla ( sukka ; pure). The first three are
described as follows (Than. 4.1.61-68 / 247):65
Afflicted dhyana is of four kinds: 1. [one] is joined with what is
not liked and also accompanied by the thought of separation
therefrom; 2. [one] is joined with what is liked and also
accompanied by the thought of non-separation therefrom; 3. [one]
is joined with disease and also accompanied by the thought of
separation therefrom; 4. [one] is joined with the experience of
agreeable pleasures and also accompanied by the thought of non-
separation therefrom. These are the four characteristics of
afflicted dhyana: crying, grief, weeping, lamentation.
Wrathful dhyana is of four kinds: connected with injury,
connected with robbery, connected with theft, connected with the
protection [of worldly goods]. These are the four characteristics of
wrathful dhyana: [one] has abundant hatred, much hatred, hatred
due to ignorance, hatred until the end which is death.
Pious dhyana is of four kinds and has four manifestations:
examination of the commandments [of the Jinas], examination of
sins, examination of the results [of actions], examination of the
forms [of the constituents of the world]. These are the four
characteristics of pious dhyana: liking for the commandments [of
the Jinas],66 liking for the natural state, liking for the scriptures,
liking for pervasive study [of the scriptures]. These are the four
65 atte jhane caiivvihe pannatte, tamjaha amanunnasampaogasampaiitte tassa
vippaogasatisamannagate yavi bhavati (1), manunnasampaogasampaiitte tassa
avippaogasadsamannagate yavi bhavati (2), atamkasampaogasampaiitte tassa
vippaogasatisamannagate yavi bhavati (3), parijusitakamabhogasampaoga-
sampaiitte tassa avippaogasadsamannagate yavi bhavati (4) / attassa nam ; jhanassa
cattari lakkhana pannatta, tamjaha kamdanata sotanata dppanata paridevanata /
rodde jhane caiivvihe pannatte, tamjaha himsanubamdhi mosanubamdhi
tenanubamdhi sarakkhananubamdhi / roddassa nam „ jhanassa cattari lakkhana
pannatta, tamjaha - osannadose bahudose annanadose amaranamtadose /dhamme
jhane caiivvihe caiippadoyare pannatte, tamjaha anavijate avayavijate vivagavijate
samthanavijate / dhammassa nam jhanassa cattari lakkhana pannatta, tamjaha -
anarui nisaggarui suttarui ogadharui / dhammassa nam jhanassa cattari alambana
pannatta, tamjaha - vayana padipucchana pariyattana anuppeha / dhammassa nam
jhanassa cattari anuppehao pannattao, tamjaha - eganuppeha aniccanuppeha
asarananuppeha samsaranuppeha /
66 Or: “liking for knowledge” (Alsdorf, 1966: 203-04 ((51)-(52))).
16
supports of pious dhyana: recitation, questioning, repetition,
reflection. These are the four reflections of pious dhyana:
reflection on being alone, reflection on transitoriness, reflection
on there being no refuge, reflection on birth and rebirth of living
beings.
It is clear that in this passage dhyana refers to a pondering over, a
thinking about certain things, and not to the process of stopping the mind
which we have designated ‘meditation’. Yet the term dhyana covers both
‘pondering’ and ‘meditation’. This is the reason that a classificatory text
like the Thanamga can distinguish four types of dhyana: afflicted,
wrathful, pious, and pure.67 Only the last type - sukla dhyana - is of
interest for our study of early Jaina meditation.
However, these four types of dhyana came to be looked upon as four
types of meditation, and this led to peculiar results. The Viyahapannatti
Sutta (25.7.217 / 580) and the Uvavaiya Sutta (§ 30) distinguish six kinds
of inner asceticism. The fifth is meditation (dhyana). What is this
meditation? That is explained at Viy. 25.7.237-49 / 600-12 and Uvav. §
30 V', both of which are virtually identical with Than. 4.1.61-72 / 247
studied above; both therefore describe all four types of dhyana. This is a
plain absurdity. Afflicted and wrathful dhyana at any rate cannot
possibly be considered forms of asceticism.
Interestingly, the confusion about dhyana also found expression in
an altogether different manner. The Av assay a Sutta contains a sutra
(4.23.4) where the confessing monk is made to repent for “the four
dhyanas: afflicted dhyana, wrathful dhyana, pious dhyana, pure dhyana ”
( padikkamami caiihim jhanehim - attenam jhanenam, ruddenam
jhanenam, dhammenam jhanenam, sukkenam jhanenam ).68
The idea of four types of dhyana may have been derived from a verse in the
Uttarajjhayana (30.35/1 21 1): attaroddani vajjetta jhaejja susamahie / dhamma-
sukkaim jhanaim jhanam tarn tu buha vae // It is not clear from this sloka whether
there is a distinction between dhamma jhana and sukka jhana. Perhaps pure
meditation (sukka jhana) is ‘in accordance with the doctrine’ (dhamma). It is
certainly clear that afflicted and wrathful dhyana are to be avoided.
68 The ekottarika- pattern of Av. 4 (Bruhn, 1981:23) excludes the possibility that this
sutra originally enumerated fewer (or more) than four dhyanas.
17
All this makes sufficiently clear that the four types of dhyana
distinguished in the later texts of the Jaina canon are of no value for the
study of meditation in early Jainism.
3.5. Some more information about early Jaina meditation is gained from
Uttarajjhayana 29:
“By making the mind onepointed [the soul] brings about the
destruction of thought” (29.25 / 1127; egaggamanasannivesanayae nam
cittaniroham karei). “By renouncing existence [the soul] brings about
[the state] from which there is no return. And the homeless [monk] who
has reached [the state] from which there is no return destroys the four
parts of karman which [even] a kevalin possesses, viz. pertaining to
experience, span of life, name, and lineage. After that [the soul] becomes
perfected, awakened, freed, completely emancipated, and puts an end to
all suffering.” (29.41 / 1143; sabbhavapaccakkhanenam aniyattim
janayai / aniyattipadivanne ya anagaiv cattari kevalikammamse khavei,
tarn jaha - veyanijjam auyam namam goyam / tao paccha sijjha'i bujjha'i
muccai parinivvai savvadukkhanam amtam karei /.)
“By watchfulness of the mind the soul brings about onepointed
[thought]. When thought is onepointed and the mind is watched the soul
becomes devoted to control.” (29.53 / 1155; managuttayae nam jive
egaggam janayai / egaggacitte nam jive managutte samjamarahae
bhavaij. )
“By holding the mind together69 [the soul] brings about onepointed-
ness. Having brought about onepointedness it brings about modifications
of knowledge. Having brought about modifications of knowledge it
purifies right belief and destroys wrong belief. ... By holding speech
together [the soul] purifies the modifications of belief which are mixed
with speech. Having purified the modifications of belief which are mixed
with speech [the soul] easily reaches enlightenment, and is no longer
such that it reaches enlightenment with difficulty. ... By holding the body
together [the soul] purifies the modifications of conduct. Having purified
the modifications of conduct it purifies the conduct which is in accord
with the word [of the tnlhankaras \ . Having purified the conduct which is
69 samaharanaya = Skt. samadharanata ?
18
in accord with the word [of the tirthahkai'as, the soul] destroys the four
parts of karman which [even] a kevalin possesses. After that [the soul]
becomes perfected, awakened, freed, completely emancipated, and puts
an end to all suffering.” (29.56-58 / 1158-60; manasamaharanayae nam
egaggam janayai / egaggam janaitta nanapajjave janayai / nanapajjave
janaitta sammattam visohei, micchattam ca nijjarei / ... vaisamaharanayae
nam vaisaharanadamsanapajjave visohei / vaisaharanadamsanapajjave
visohitta sulabhabohiyattam nivvattei, dullabhabohiyattam nijjarei / ...
kayasamaharanayae nam carittapajjave visohei / carittapajjave visohitta
ahakkhayacarittam visohei / ahakkhayacarittam visohetta cattari
kevalikammamse khavei / tao paccha sijjhai bujjhai muccai parinivvai
savvadukkhanam amtam karei /.) “By subjugating the organ of healing
[the soul] brings about the subjugation of its likes and dislikes for
pleasant and unpleasant sounds, it does not bind the karman which
results therefrom, and destroys [the karman ] which has been bound
before. ... By subjugating the organ of sight [the soul] brings about the
subjugation of its likes and dislikes for pleasant and unpleasant colours,
it does not bind the karman which results therefrom, and destroys [the
karman] which has been bound before. With regard to the organ of
smelling it is the same, as also with the organ of taste, and the organ of
touch.” (29.62-66 / 1164-68; soimdiyaniggahenam manunnamanunnesu
saddesu ragadosaniggaham janayai, tappaccaiyam kammam na bamdhai,
puvvabaddham ca nijjarei / ... cakkhimdiyaniggahenam
manunnamanunnesu ruvesu ragadosaniggaham janayai, tappaccaiyam
kammam na bamdhai, puvvabaddham ca nijjarei / ghanimdie evam ceva
/ jibbhimdie vi / phasimdie vi /.)
3.6. We can summarize the results of the above as follows. Early Jaina
meditation was only one aspect of a more general attempt to stop all
activities of body and mind, including even breathing. In order to bring
about this mental state a number of means were employed. Reflections
on infinity, on change, on what is inauspicious, and on sin were probably
preparatory. More immediate precursors of meditation proper, we may
assume, were certain mental states, viz. forbearance, freedom, softness,
and straightness. Other supportive practices were onepointedness of the
mind, watchfulness of the mind, holding the mind together, and
19
subjugation of the sense-organs. Meditation itself was characterized by
absence of agitation, absence of delusion, discriminating insight, and
renunciation.
Meditation was said to have four kinds of manifestations, which
must be understood to be four steps on the ladder to perfection. They are
described thus: 1. in which there is consideration of multiplicity and
change of object; 2. in which there is consideration of oneness and no
change of object; 3. in which activity has become subtle and from which
there is no return; 4. in which [all] activity has been cut off and from
which one does not fall back.
The fourfold division of meditation into afflicted, wrathful, pious
and pure, is not reliable. Undoubtedly this division was made by early
systematisers and must initially have been meant to be a division of
dhyana, which word means both ‘thought’ and ‘meditation’. Later
theoreticians mistakenly took it to be a division of meditation only, and
this did not fail to influence the later history of Jaina meditation.
20
IV. Meditation as part of asceticism in early Hindu
scriptures.
4.1. The main idea of the road to liberation in early Jainism is also
expressed in Bhagavad Gita (BhG) 18.3 :70 “Some wise men say that
[all] activity is to be abandoned as evil.”
More details are given at Mahabharata (MBh) 1.86.14-16:71
But the muni who behaves like a muni by abandoning desires,
renouncing activity, and conquering his senses, he reaches
perfection in the world (14). Who should not honour him who has
clean teeth, whose nails are cut, who is always bathed and
adorned, is not bound and performs [only] pure actions ?72 (15)
Emaciated by austerities, patient, his flesh, bones and blood
wasted away, when the muni becomes free from the pairs (of
opposites, such as heat and cold), then he really behaves like a
muni. Then, having conquered this world, he gains the other
world (16).
Briefly stated: “Such a muni reaches perfection which is the most
important [thing there is], by living in the forest, his food and movements
being restrained.”73
Motionlessness of body and mind is emphasized at MBh 12.294.13-
18:74
70. tvajyam dosavad ity eke karma prahur manlsinah.
7 1 . yas tu kaman parityajya tyaktakarma jitendriyah /
atistheta munir maunarn sa loke siddhim apnuyat // 1 4//
dhautadantam krttanakham sada snatam alamkrtam /
asitam sitakarmastham kas tarn narcitum arhati / '/ 15 / '/
tapasa karsitah ksamah kslnamamsasthisonitah /
yada bhavati nirdvandvo munir maunarn samasthitah /
atha lokam imam jitva lokam vijayate par am // 1 6//
72. sitakarmastham. This expression is not fully clear. Nllakantha’s explanation (his
text reads sitakarmanam) does not help much: sitakarmanam himsayuktam
dharmam api tyajantam (p. 1 70, on 1.91.15).
73. MBh 1.86.4: tadrh munih siddhim upaiti mukhyam vasann aranye niyatahara-
cestah I I
74. vimuktah sarvasangebhyo laghvaharo jitendriyah /
purvaratre pare caiva dharayeta mano ' ' tmani //1 3//
21
Freed from all attachments, taking little food, having conquered
the senses , he should fix his mind on his self in the first and last
part of the night (13). Having made his senses firm with his mind,
oh lord of Mithila, and having made his mind ( manas ) firm with
his intellect ( buddhi ), he is motionless like a stone (14). He
should be without trembling like a pillar, and motionless like a
mountain; the wise who know to follow the precepts then call him
‘one engaged in Yoga’ ( yukta ) (15). He neither hears nor smells
nor tastes nor sees; he notices no touch, nor does [his] mind form
conceptions (16). Like a piece of wood, he does not desire
anything, nor does he notice [anything]. When he has reached the
Original Nature ( prakrti ), then sages call him ‘engaged in Yoga’
(yukta) (17). And he looks like a lamp shining in a place without
wind; not flickering and motionless it will not move upward or
sideward (18).
The Katha Upanisad (KU) is probably the earliest Upanisad which
gives some detailed information about meditation. The concluding verse
(6.18) declares that ‘the whole method of Yoga’ ( yogavidhim krtsnam)
has been presented. The most informative verses are KU 6.10-1 1:75
When the five organs of knowledge stand still together with the
mind (manas), and the intellect (buddhi) does not stir, that they
call the highest course (10). This they consider as Yoga, a firm
fixing of the senses. Then one becomes careful, for Yoga is the
origin and the end (11).
sthinkrtyendriyagramam manasa mithilesvara /
mano buddhya sthiram krtva pasana iva niscalah //1 4//
sthanuvac capy akampah syad girivac capi niscalah /
budha vidhividhanajhas tada yuktam pracaksate //i 5//
na srnoti na caghrad na rasyati na pasyati /
na ca sparsam vijanad na samkalpayate manah //1 6//
na cabhimanyate kirncin na ca budhyad kasthavat/
tada prakrtim apannam yuktam ahur manlsinah //1 7//
nivate cayatha dlpyan dlpas tadvatsa drsyate /
niringas cacalas cordhvam na tiryag gaiiw apnuyat // 1 8//
75. yada pahcavatisthante jhanani manasa saha /
buddhis ca na vicestati tam ahuh paramain gadm // 1 0//
tam yogam id manyante sthiram indriyadharanam /
apramattas tada bhavad yogo hi prabhavapyayau //1 1//
22
KU 3.6 has the same tenor:76
But he who has discernment, with an ever controlled ( yukta )
mind ( manas ), his senses are subdued, like the good horses of a
charioteer.
The following description in the Svetasvatara Upanisad (2.8-9)
gives also the bodily practices their due:77
Holding the body straight, three parts of it stretched up, causing
the senses to enter into the heart by means of the mind, the wise
one should cross over all the frightening streams with the help of
the raft which is Brahman (8). Having here suppressed his breaths
and having brought his movements under control ( yuktacesta),
when his breath has been diminished, he should take breath
through his nose. Being careful, the wise one should restrain
(dharayeta) his mind like that chariot yoked with vicious horses
(9).
The Maitrayanlya Upanisad (MU 6.18)78 speaks of a six-membered
Yoga, consisting of restraint of the breath, withdrawal of the senses,
meditation, fixing the mind, insight ( tarka ),79 concentration. All these
terms, with the single exception of tarka, are known from the other early
passages on meditation which we have studied. The explanation of
‘fixing the mind’ ( dharana) is interesting (MU 6.20):80
76. yas tu vijhanavan bhavati yuktena manasa sadal
tasyendriyani vasyani sadasva iva saratheh //
77. trir unnatam sthapya samam sarlram hrdindriyani manasa samnivesya /
brahmodupena pratareta vidvan srotamsi sarvani bhayavahani // 8 / /
pranan prapldyeha sa yuktacestah kslne prane nasikayocchvaslta /
dustasvayuktam iva vaham enatn vidvan mano dharayetapramattah //9/I
78 pranayamah pratyaharo dhyanam dharana tarkah samadhih sadanga ity ucyate yogah.
79. The use of tarka here is surprising. The only meaning which seems to fit both here
and at MU 6.20 (see below) is ‘insight’. A similar meaning is assigned to this term
in Abhinavagupta’s Tantraloka (III. 13-15, 34, 40); see Pandey, 1963: 535; Pensa,
1973:11-13.
89. athanyatrapy uktam - atah parasya dharana / talurasanagranipidanad vanmanah-
prananirodhanad brahma tarkena pasyati /. The readings atah and talurasanagra-
nipldanad (so Limaye-Vadekar, 1958: 343) seem to make more sense than atha and
talurasanagre nipidanad (so Van Buitenen, 1962: 112).
23
And elsewhere also it has been said: After this, the fixing of it
(i.e., of the mind). As a result of pressing the tip of the tongue
against the palate and suppressing speech, mind and breath, one
sees Brahman through insight (?; tarka)u.
The tip of the tongue is here said to be pressed against the palate.
The same is said at Visnusmrti 91 A and Trisikhibrahmana Upanisad 93
and 146. But this is exactly what the early Buddhist critic ridiculed the
Jainas for in the Original Mahasaccaka Sutra (above, § 1.1). A point of
difference is that the Visnusmrti (97.1) and the Trisikhibrahmana
Upanisad (92 and 146) add that the teeth do not touch each other,
whereas the Original Mahasaccaka Sutra said they do. Here, however,
the Maha Upanisad (5.75) and the Muktika Upanisad (2.42) agree with
the account in the Original Mahasaccaka Sutra, by talking about
‘grinding the teeth’ ( dantair dantan vicurnya). We see that the
description of meditation in the Original Mahasaccaka Sutra corresponds
with these texts in this respect.
Details of meditation are found in a few verses given at MU 6. 34
(Van Buitenen, 1962: 105):82
When [someone], having made his mind ( manas ) completely
motionless, without dissolution or distraction, goes to a state
without mind, that is the highest place (7). The mind has to
remain suppressed until it is destroyed in the heart. This is
knowledge, this is liberation; the rest, on the other hand, is
bookish proliferation83 (8). The bliss, purified by concentration,
which arises when the spotless mind ( cetas ) has been made to
enter into the self, cannot be described with words. It is in that
state ( tada) itself experienced by the inner organ (9).
^ 1 . See note 1 0 above.
82. layavikseparahitam manah krtva suniscalam /
yada yaty amanobhavam tada tat paramam padam I 111 I
tavan mano niroddhavyam hrdi yavat ksayam gatam /
etaj jnanatn ca moksas ca sesas tu granihavistarah //8//
samadhinirdhautam amalasya cetaso, nivesitasyatmani yat sukham bhavet/
na sakyate varnayitum gira tada, svayam tad antahkaranena grhyate //9//
83. So Van Buitenen, 1962: 133.
24
It is remarkable that here bliss is said to accompany meditation which is
clearly of the type also met with in early Jainism. The author of the
Original Mahasaccaka Sutra had denied experiences of bliss to Jaina
meditation and reserved them for Buddhist meditation. Is the mention of
bliss here due to influence from Buddhist meditation? It is possible, for
influence from Buddhism in the Maitrayaniya Upanisad seems likely
(Horsch, 1966: 197-203; Pande, 1974: 575-76). It is however strange that
not more features of Buddhist meditation arc found in this Upanisad.
4.2. Restraint of breath has been referred to a few times in the passages
discussed in § 3.1. It recurs more emphatically in certain others. BhG 4.
29 speaks of those “who having stopped the movements of breathing in
(prana) and breathing out ( apana ) are devoted to pranayama ” (prana-
panagati ruddhva pranayamaparayanah ). This suggests that the term
pranayama can refer to a complete cessation of breathing. This agrees
with the definition of pranayama in Yoga Sutra (YS) 2.49 as “cutting off
the movement of breathing out and breathing in” (svasaprasvasayor gati-
vicchedah).
The following passage brings restraint of breath in connection with
fixing the mind (MBh 12.304.8-10):84
But they say in accordance with the teaching of the sacred books
that the highest Yoga- activity among [the different forms of]
Yoga is of two kinds: with properties ( saguna ) and without
properties ( nirguna ) (8). [These two are] fixing the mind and
restraint of breath (pranayama), oh king; restraint of breath is
with properties, fixing the mind85 is without properties (9). Where
[a Yogin] would be seen leaving his breaths free, oh best among
84. dvigunam yogakrtyam tu yoganam prahur uttamam /
sagunam nirgunam caiva yathasastranidarsanam //8//
dharana caiva manasah pranayamas ca parthiva /
pranayamo hi saguno nirgunam dharanam (v.l. dharayen ) manah I 191 I
yatra drsyeta muhcan vai pranan maithilasattama /
vatadhikyam bhavaty eva tasmad dhi na samacaret // 1 0//
85. The reading dharanam manah is hard to construe grammatically; the v.l. dharayen
manah is better, but not completely satisfactory. Perhaps however we may accept a
construction action noun + accusative as permissible for epic Sanskrit, as it is for
Pali (Hiniiber, 1968: 54-55).
25
the people of Mithila, there is certainly an excess of air ( vata );
therefore one should not act [in such a manner] (10).
The passage is obscure, but seems to consider pranayama less than and
probably preparatory to fixing the mind. Verse 10 seems to indicate the
need for pranayama; otherwise there would be an excess of air. This
indicates that apparently pranayama remains a necessity also in the state
‘without properties’, i.e., fixing the mind. It certainly shows that here too
pranayama concerns the breath, not, or not only, the senses.86
The following passage comes closer to the idea that saints stop their
breathing moments before death (MBh 1 2. 207. 25 ):87
Having reached equilibrium of the gunas, performing [only] such
actions as concern sustaining the body, and pushing at the time of
death the breaths into the artery of the heart ( manovaha) with
merely the mind, one is liberated.
The same may be intended at MBh 13.154.2, where in describing
the death of Bhlsma it is said:88
The breaths of that great soul, forced together, went up.
4.3. Fasting to death was practised by Yayati (MBh 1.81.10-16):89
King Yayati the son of Nahusa anointed his younger son Puru king
and then gladly departed for the forest (10). Having sent his sons
86. This is maintained by Edgerton (1924: 41 n. 46).
87. gnnanam samyam agamya manasaiva manovaham (v.l. manovaham) /
dehakarma (v.l. dehakarma) nudan pranan antakale vimucyate //
88. tasyordhvam agaman pranah samniruddha mahatmanah.
89. yayatir nahuso raja purum putrarp kanlyasam /
raj ye 'bhisicya muditah pravavraja vanam tada // 1 0//
antesu sa viniksipya putran yadupurogaman /
phalam iilas ano raja vane samnyavasac ciram III 1//
samsitatma jitakrodhas tarpayan pitrdevatah /
agnlms ca vidhivaj juhvan vanaprasthavidhanatah // 1 2//
atithln pujayain asa vanyena havisa vibhuh/
silonchavrtdm asthaya sesannakrtabhojanah //13//
piirnam varsasahasram sa evamvrttir abhun nrpah /
abbhaksah saradas trimsad asin niyatavanmanah // 1 4//
tatas ca vayubhakso ' hliut samvatsaram atandritah /
pancagnimadhye ca tapas tepe samvatsaram nrpah 1/15/1
ekapadasthitas cash sanmasan anilasanah /
punyaklrtis tatah svargam jagamfa] ...
26
Yadu etc. to the borders [of the kingdom], the king lived for a long
time in the forest, eating [only] fruits and roots (11). Firmly resolved,
having conquered anger, satisfying manes and gods, and duly pouring
oblations into the fires, [all] in accordance with the rules of forest-
dwellers (12), the mighty one honoured guests with oblations
obtained from the forest. Adopting the mode of life by way of
gleaning, eating remains of food (13),90 the king accepted this mode
of life for a full thousand years. Eating [only] water for thirty
autumns, he kept his speech and mind under restraint (14). Then he
ate [only] wind for a year, free from lassitude. And the king
performed asceticism in the midst of five fires for a year (15). And he
stood on one foot for six months, eating [only] air. Then, having a
reputation of virtue, he went to heaven, ....
Fasting; to death is prescribed, after a preparatory course of
asceticism, at Yajnavalkyasmrti II.3. 50-55 :91
He should spend the time with fasts regulated by the moon, or he
should continually be engaged in painful exercises. Or, alterna-
tively, he should eat when a fortnight has passed, or when a
month, or a day, has passed (50). Being pure he should sleep on
the earth at night, the day he should spend [standing] on the tip of
his toes, or standing, sitting, or walking about, or again by
practising Yoga (51). He should perform asceticism in the midst
of five fires in summer, lying on the bare ground during the rains,
and wearing wet clothes in winter, or he should perform
90 On the meaning and implication of this term ( sesannakrtabhojana ) see Wezler, 1978,
esp. p. 87-88.
9 1 candrayanair nayet kalam krcchrair va vartayet sada /
pakse gate vapy as my at mase vahani va gate // 50//
sucir bhumau svaped ratrau divasam prapadair nayet /
sthanasanaviharair va yogabhyasena vapunah //5 1//
grlsme paheagnimadhyastho varsasu sthandilesayah /
ardravasas ca hemante saktya vapi tapas caret/ /52 //
yah kantakair vitudati candanair yas ca limpati /
akruddho 'paritustas ca samastasya ca tasya ca// 53//
agnln vapy atmasat krtva vrksavasl mitasanah /
vanaprasthagrhesv eva yatrartham bhaiksam acaret //54//
gramad ahrtya vagrasan astau bhunjlta vagyatah/
vayvasanah pragudlclm gacched va varsmasamksayat //55//
27
asceticism according to his power (52). If someone pricks him
with thorns, or anoints him with sandal, he is neither angry nor
satisfied with all and with that man (53). Or having placed the
fires upon himself, living under a tree, taking limited food, he
should go for alms in order to prolong his life,92 only in the
houses of forest-dwellers (54). Or, taking eight mouthfuls from a
village, he should eat it, his speech remaining restrained. Or,
eating [only] wind he should go to the north-east, until the
destruction of his body ( 55).
It deserves notice that the final fast is here not accompanied by motion-
lessness.93
Death through fasting and restraint of breath is described at
Apastamblya Dharma Sutra 2.9.23. 1-2:94
Or, if he desires [to perform] more restraint, he should collect
things (i.e., food) every day, morning and evening, in a vessel (1).
After that he should wander, surviving on roots, fruits, leaves, or
grass; in the end he should live on what happens [to come to him],
then on water, [then] air, [then] ether. Each next undertaking
brings greater reward (2).
4.4. It is clear that all the important features of early Jaina meditation are
found in the early Hindu scriptures. Here too meditation is only one
aspect of a more general process in which all bodily and mental activities
are stopped. Fasting to death and stopping the breath, both of which we
had come to know as characteristic accompaniments of early Jaina
meditation, are also present in the Hindu scriptures. The same is true of
bodily motionlessness, which is compared with the state of a stone, of a
pillar, of a mountain.
92 I understand, following Wezler in a private communication, yatra° as ellipsis for
dehayatra0.
93 This and the preceding case have affiliations with ‘Vedic asceticism’; see my The
Two Sources of Indian Asceticism (Bronkhorst, 1993).
94 bhuyamsam va niyamam icchann anvaham eva patrena say am pratar artham aharet
//l// tato miilaih phalaih parnais trnair iti vartayams cared antatah pravrttani tato ' po
vayum akasam ity abhinisrayet tesam uttara uttarah samyogah phalato visistah //2//.
28
As in early Jainism, meditation itself aims at the motionlessness of
the mind. Here as well the sense organs are conquered. As a result the
adept is said not to hear, smell, etc.
There can be no doubt that the early Jaina and Hindu scriptures
describe forms of meditation which belong to the same tradition.
Therefore we shall speak of main stream meditation. It cannot be denied
that this kind of meditation, and more in particular its accompaniments,
have been described remarkably well, although not fully, by the author of
the Original Mahasaccaka Sutra and elsewhere in the Buddhist canon.
29
V. Theory and practice in the main stream.
5.1. The idea that liberation from the effects of activity is obtained
by abstaining from activity may have been criticized from the earliest
period. We find it in the Bhagavad Gita 3.4-6:95
A man does not reach the state free from activity by not
performing actions; and he does not attain perfection by merely
abandoning [activity] (4). For no one ever remains without
activity even for a moment, because everyone, being powerless, is
made to perform activity by the gunas which are born from
Original Nature ( prakrti) (5). He who sits, restraining his organs
of action [but] thinking with his mind of the objects of the senses,
he is said to be deluded and of improper demeanour (6). But he,
Arjuna, who performs discipline of action ( karmayoga ) with his
organs of action, restraining his senses with his mind, unattached,
he excels (7).
The same criticism is expressed in BhG 18.11: “For it is not possible for
an embodied being to abandon completely all actions” ( na hi dehabhrta
sakyam tyaktum k arm any asesatah ).
Criticism of this kind has to answer the question whether liberation
can be attained in another way, and if yes, which way. The answer which
is given is surprisingly simple. Liberation from the results of one’s
actions is possible because in reality no actions are ever performed. They
are not performed because man’s inner self, his soul, is completely
different from his body and never acts.96 The Bhagavad Gita (3.27) puts
9^. na karmanam anarambhan naiskarmyam puruso 'smite /
na ca samnyasanad eva siddhim samadhigacchati I I At I
na hi kas citksanam apijatu tisthaty akarmakrt/
karyate hy avasah karma sarvah prakrtijair gunaih // 5//
karmendriyani samyamya ya aste manasa smaran /
indriyarthan vimudhatma mithyacarah sa ucyate // 6//
yas tv indriyani manasa niyamyarabhate 'rjuna /
karmendriyaih karmayogam asaktah sa visisyate HI II
96. This idea is already known to Suyagadamga 13-14 (1.1.1.13-14); see Bollee,
1977: 15 and 66f. In Buddhist literature the idea is primarily connected with Purana
Kassapa (Basham, 1951: 13), but sometime with others, such as Samjayin
30
it like this:97
Actions are, all of them, undertaken by the gunas of Original
Nature ( prakrti ). He who is deluded by egoism thinks ‘I am the
doer’.
It is sufficient to know that in reality one never performs any actions:98
But he, oh long-armed one, who knows the truth about the
category guna and the category action, knowing that the gunas
move about among the gunas, he does not get attached (28).
Those who are confused by the gunas of Original Nature ( prakrti)
get attached to the gunas and their actions. He who knows all
should not disturb those dull [people] who do not know all.
It is clear that in this way an altogether different road to liberation is
introduced. The Bhagavad Gita (3.3) calls it jnanayoga ‘discipline of
knowledge’ and mentions it together with the ‘discipline of action’
(karmayoga) which enjoins disinterested activity:99
In this world a two-fold foundation (of religious salvation) has
been expounded by Me of old : by the discipline of knowledge of
the followers of Sankhya, and by the discipline of action of the
followers of Yoga. (tr. Edgerton, 1924: 1).
This ‘discipline of knowledge’ is, of course, the samkhya100 which
is so often referred to in the Mahabharata, as has been shown by
Edgerton in an important article (1924). But there are also passages in
the Upanisads which show that the knowledge that the soul is
Vairatlputra (Vogel, 1970: 25f.). The idea is perhaps also present in MN III. 19 and
SN III. 103, where the question is asked (and rejected) what self is affected by
actions which have not been performed by a self, since the five skandhas are not the
self; see however Schmithausen, 1986: 228-29 n. 122.
97. prakrteh kriyamanani gunaih karmani sarvasah /
ahamkara vimudhatma kartaham iti manyate I I
98. BhG 3. 28-29: tattvavit tu mahabaho gunakarmavibhagayoh /
guna gunesu vartanta iti matva na sajjate //28//
prakrter gunas ammudhah sajjante gunakarmasu /
tan akrtsnavido mandan krtsnavin na vicalayet //29//
99. Joke ' smin dvividha nistha pura prokta mayanagha /
jnanayogena samkhyanam karmayogena yoginam //
100. Different from the Samkhya system of philosophy.
31
unchangeable and unaffected by actions was thought to bring about
liberation. The soul is described at Brhadaranyaka Upanisad (BAU)
4.4.22:101
That Soul (atmari) is not this, it is not that (. neti , neti). It is
unseizable, for it cannot be seized. It is indestructible, for it
cannot be destroyed. It is unattached, for it does not attach itself.
It is unbound. It does not tremble. It is not injured. Him (i.e., that
Soul) these two do not overcome - neither the thought ‘hence I did
wrong’, nor the thought ‘hence I did right’. Verily, he overcomes
them both. What has been done and what has not been done do
not affect him. (cf. Hume, 1931: 143)
The result of knowing the soul is presented in BAU 3.8.10-1 1 : 102
10. Verily, O Gargi, if one performs sacrifices and worship and
undergoes austerity in this world for many thousands of years, but
without knowing that Imperishable, limited indeed is that [work]
of his. Verily, O Gargi, he who departs from this world without
knowing that Imperishable is pitiable. But, O Gargi, he who
departs from this world knowing that Imperishable is a Brahmin.
11. Verily, O Gargi, that Imperishable is the unseen Seer, the
unheard Hearer, the unthought Thinker, the ununderstood
Understander. Other than It there is naught that sees. Other than It
there is naught that hears. Other than It there is naught that thinks.
Other than It there is naught that understands. ... (tr. Hume, 1931:
119)
Since knowledge of the soul is something which is attained while being
alive, the idea of liberation in this life could arise. It is described in BAU
101. sa esa neti nety atma / agrhyo na hi grhyate / asiryo na hi slryate / asahgo na hi
sajyate / asito na vyathate / na risyati / etam u haivaite na tarata id / atah papam
akaravam id / atah kalyanam akaravam id / ubhe u haivaisa ete tarad / nainam
krtakrte tapatah //
102. yo va etad aksaram gargy aviditva ’smiml loke juhoti yajate tapas tapyate bahuni
varsasahasrany antavad evasya tad bhavati / yo va etad aksaram gargy aviditva
’ smal lokat praid, sa krpanah / atha ya etad aksaram gargi viditva ' smal lokat praid,
sa brahmanah // 1 0//
tad va etad aksaram gargy adrstam drastr asrutam srotr amatam mantr avijhatam
vijhatr/ nanyad ato 'sd drastr I nanyad ato ’sd srotr I nanyad ato 'sd mantr I nanyad
ato'sd vijhatr / ... //1 1//
32
4.4.6:103
He who is without desire, who is freed from desire, whose desire
is satisfied, whose desire is the Soul - his breaths do not depart.
Being very Brahma, he goes to Brahma, (tr. Hume, 1931: 141)
We may observe that this trend of thought exerted a lasting influence on
later philosophical systems, most notably on the Samkhya and Vedanta
systems. In both these systems the soul is conceived as motionless and
no party to the activity of body and mind.104
5.2. If the knowledge that one’s real self is by its very nature free
from activity is sufficient for being freed from the results of actions, one
would think that no place is left for austerities and meditation. There can
be no doubt that indeed knowledge fully replaced these alternative
methods in the opinion of some. But others preferred a combination of
knowledge and ascetic and meditative practices. Reasons for doing so are
given at Apastamblya Dharma Sutra 2.9.21. 13-16:105
13. Abandoning truth and falsehood, pleasure and pain, the
Vedas, this world and the next, he shall seek the soul.
14. (Some say that) in a enlightened one there is obtainment of
peace.
15. (But) that (opinion) is opposed to the Sastras.
16. (For) if there were obtainment of peace in an enlightened one,
then he ought not to feel pain even in this (world), (cf. Biihler,
1879: 153)
That is to say, in addition to knowledge of the soul something more
103. yo ' tamo niskama aptakama atmakamo na tasya prana utkramanti / brahmaiva
san brahmapyeti /. Sprockhoff (1962) sees in passages like this ‘vage Ansatze’ to
the concept of jlvanmukti.
104 The soul is in these systems as a rule considered to be omnipresent. The exception
is Ramanuja, whose soul has the size of an atom; see Hohenberger, 1960: 67-68.
105. satyanrte sukhaduhkhe vedan imam lokam amum ca parityajyatmanam anvicchet
1113/1 buddhe ksemaprapanam // 1 4// tac chastrair vipratisiddham //1 5// buddhe cet
ksemaprapanam ihaiva na duhkham upalebheta // 1 6//
33
is required. This something is here106 the ascetic mode of life described
in the following Sutras (2.9.21.18 - 23.2).
A different justification for combining the way of knowledge and
the practice of bodily and mental restraint is given in the Katha Up.
(2.24):107
Not one who does not abstain from bad acts, nor one who has not
come to peace, nor one who is not concentrated, nor one whose
mind has not come to peace, shall reach this [Self] by means of
knowledge.
In this passage ascetic practices are a precondition for the
acquisition of knowledge. Similarly, BAU 4.4.22 first gives a description
of the soul and then states that austerities are performed in order to gain
knowledge of it:108
Verily, he is the great, unborn soul, who is this [person] consisting
of knowledge among the senses. He lies in the space within the
heart, the ruler of all, the lord of all, the king of all. He does not
become greater by good actions nor inferior by bad actions. He is
the lord of all, the overlord of beings, the protector of beings. He
is the separating dam for keeping these worlds apart.
Such a one the Brahmins desire to know by repetition of the
Vedas, by sacrifices, by offerings, by austerities, by fasting. On
knowing him, in truth, one becomes an ascetic (muni), (cf. Hume,
1931: 143)
The two ways are also combined, e.g. in MBh 12.212. 14- 19: 109
106 \ye shall leave out of consideration other ways, such as karmayoga in the
Bhagavad Gita: they are not directly relevant to the present discussion. See also
note 16 below.
107. navirato duscaritan nasanto nasamahitah /
nasantamanaso va 'pi prajnanenainam apnuyat//
108. sa va esa mahan aja atma yo 'yam vijnanamayah pranesu / ya eso 'ntarhrdaya
akasas tasmin chete / sarvasya vasi / sarvasyesanah / sarvasyadhipadh / sa na
sadhuna karmana bhuyan / no evasadhuna kaniyan / esa sarvesvarah / esa
bhutadhipatih / esa bhutapalah / esa setur vidharana esam lokanam asambhedaya /
tam etam vedanuvacanena brahmana vividisand yajnena danena tapasa 'nasakena /
etam eva viditva munir bhavad /
109. imam gunasamaharam atmabhavena pasyatah /
34
He who looks upon this collection of gunas as being the soul, due
to wrong points of view, his suffering is infinite [and] does not
cease (14). But when [suffering] for you (fe) [= by you] is seen as
not the soul, not as I, nor as mine, on what basis does [then] the
stream of suffering continue ? (15) Hear in this connection the
supreme teaching of renunciation called ‘Right Mind’, which
when declared shall result in liberation for you (16). For mere
renunciation (without knowledge of the soul) of all actions, also
of the ones prescribed [by the Veda], is considered as an affliction
of the wrongly educated which always brings suffering (17).
When objects are renounced ( dravyatyage ), however, [sacrificial]
activities [are involved]; when property is renounced, also vows
[are involved]; when happiness is renounced, this is the exertion
of asceticism; when all is renounced, this is perfection (18). This
one and only way of renunciation of all (viz. the one called ‘Right
Mind’) is taught as leading to freedom from suffering; any other
way leads to misery (19).
5.3. A consequence of the fact that practice leads to liberation only in
combination with the knowledge of the immovable nature of the soul, is
that practice does no longer have to be predominantly bodily.110 Where
practice is expected to bring about this knowledge, the mental part is
bound to gain prominence. This means that now meditation can become
the main means of liberation, at the expense of physical austerities. It can
virtually by itself lead to knowledge of the true nature of the self. The
following passage, which describes Yoga- activity ( yogakrtya ) according
asamyagdarsanair duhkham anantam nopasamyati //14//
anatmeti ca yad drstam tenaham na mamety api /
vartate kimadhisthana prasakta duhkhasamtatih //1 5//
Ultra samyanmano nama tyagasastram anuttamam /
snui yat tava moksaya bhasyamanam bhavisyati // 1 6//
tyaga eva hi sarvesam uktanam (v. 1. yuktanam) api karmanam 1 1
nityam mithyavinltanam kleso duhkhavaho matah //1 7//
dravyatyage tu karmani bhogatyage vratany api /
sukhatyage tapoyogah sarvatyage samapana // 1 8//
tasya margo ’ yam advaidhah sarvatyagasya darsitah /
viprahanaya duhkhasya durgatirhy anyatha bhavet / / 19 / '/
HO. This opens the way for practices like the karmayoga of the Bhagavad Gita,
devotion to God, etc.
to verse 2, illustrates this (MBh 12.232. 10- 1 8):1 * 1 1 1
Meditation, study, liberality, truth, modesty, sincerity,
forbearance, purification, purity of food, and restraining the
senses (10); by these [means] the fire increases and removes sin.
To him [who practises these means] all things arc obtained and
knowledge comes about (11). Acting the same way toward all
beings, with [things] obtained or not obtained, having shaken off
sin, full of fire, taking little food, having conquered the senses,
having brought desire and anger under control, he should wish to
bring [himself] to the place of Brahman (12). Having brought
about one-pointedness of his mind and senses, concentrated, he
should fix his mind with his self in the first and last parts of the
night (13). If one sense leaks of this man possessed of five senses,
then his insight flows away, like water from the bottom of a bag
(14). But he should first take hold of his mind, just as a killer of
fish [first takes hold of] small fish; then the knower of Yoga
[should take hold of] his ear, then his eye, tongue and nose (15).
Then, holding these together, the ascetic should place them in his
mind; removing in the same way his volitions, he should fix his
mind in his self (16). Bringing the five [senses] together with his
knowledge, the ascetic should place them in his mind; and when
these [five senses] with the mind as sixth stay in the self, and
1 . dhyanam adhyayanam danam satyam hrir arjavam ksama /
saucam aharasamsuddhir indriyanam ca nigrahah // 1 0//
etair vivardhate tejah papmanam capakarsati /
sidhyand casya sarvartha vijhanam ca pravartate //1 1//
samah sarvesu bhutesu labdhalabdhena vartayan/
dhutapapma tu tejasvl laghvaharo jitendriyah /
kamakrodhau vase krtva ninised brahmanah padam //1 2//
manasas cendriyanam ca krtvaikagryam samahitah /
pragratrapararatresu dharayen mana atmanalll'ill
jantoh pancendriyasyasya yad ekam chidram indriyam /
tato ' sy a sravad prajna drteh pad ad ivodakam //1 4//
manas tu purvam adadyat kumlnan iva matsyaha/
tatah srotram tatas caksur jihvam ghranmn ca yogavit //1 5//
tata etani samyamya manasi sthapayed yatih /
tathaivapohya samkalpan mano hy atmani dharayet //1 6//
panca jnanena samdhaya manasi sthapayed yatih /
yadaitany avadsthante manahsasthani catmani /
prasldand ca samsthaya tada brahma prakasate H\1U
vidhuma iva diptarcir aditya iva dlpdman /
vaidyuto ’gnir ivakase pasyaty atmanam atmana /
36
come to rest staying together, then Brahman shines forth (17).
Like a shining flame without smoke, like the bright sun, like the
fire of lightning in the sky, he sees the self with the self.
5.4. A further theoretical adjustment to the situation where both
knowledge and practice are required in order to find liberation, may be
witnessed in the Nyaya-Vaisesika system of philosophy. Here, to be sure,
the soul is conceived as acting and undergoing the fruits of its actions.
But a closer inspection brings to light that this should not be accepted at
its face value, but in a technical sense which modifies the situation
considerably.112
The soul, in Vaisesika ontology, is an omnipresent and eternal
substance (dravya); this implies that the soul is motionless. It is
conceived as acting because it can have effort ( prayatna ) as a quality
( guna ); this quality is required in order to bring about activity of the
body. Effort itself is the result of two other qualities of the soul, desire
( iccha) and repulsion ( dvesa ). The activity of the body gives rise to yet
two more qualities of the soul, virtue ( dharma ) and sin ( adharma ). Virtue
and sin are responsible for rebirth and samsara.
All these qualities inhere in the soul and cannot exist without it. The
soul, on the other hand, can very well exist without them. Indeed,
liberation is conceived of as freedom from the special qualities that
inhere in it. The complete list of these qualities is as follows: knowledge
( buddhi ), happiness ( sukha ), pain ( duhkha ), desire (iccha), repulsion
(dvesa), effort (pratyatna), virtue (dharma), sin (adharma), subliminal
impression ( samskara ).113 None of these survive in the liberated state.
We see that the theoretical constructs of the Vaisesikas, and following
them the Naiyayikas, force them to look at the liberated state as one
H- Since the ontology of Nyaya-Vaisesika derives from Vaisesika, we shall confine
ourselves to Vaisesika texts, primarily Kanada’s Vaisesika Sutra and
Prasastapada’s Padarthadharmasahgraha.
An analysis of the road to liberation in Paksilasvamin’s Nyaya Bhasya is given by
Oberhammer (1984: 1-65), who however seems to misunderstand the nature of
liberation adhered to by Paksilasvamin.
H3 Dharma , adharma and samskara are not enumerated among the qualities in
Kanada's Vaisesika Sutra (VS 1.1.5) and were not yet considered such in the
Vaisesika known to the Jaina author Jinabhadra (c. 6th century; see Halbfass, 1980:
285n.55).
37
without knowledge and happiness; a fact for which they have been often
ridiculed.114
The order in the list of special qualities of the soul is not arbitrary.
Knowledge of an object precedes the experience of happiness or pain
connected with it; this in its turn gives rise to desire and repulsion
respectively; then follows effort in order to obtain or avoid that object; as
a result virtue and sin come into being, as well as subliminal impressions.
The sequence also shows how liberation can be obtained. Right
knowledge of the categories of reality, including the soul, prevents desire
and repulsion from coming about. As a result no new virtue and sin arise.
Life goes on until the old virtue and sin have produced experiences
and consequently disappeared. Liberation is reached at the moment
of death. Prasastapada’s Padarthadharmasangraha (p.261-62) describes
this process as follows:115
When someone - as a consequence of knowledge and of the
activity resulting therefrom, viz., [activity] without intended fruit
- is born in a virtuous family and desires to know means to get rid
of suffering, goes to a teacher and acquires true knowledge about
the six categories [of Vaisesika], then he becomes free from
passion because his wrong knowledge ceases. Because there is
then no passion nor repulsion, virtue and sin which are born from
those do not come into existence; and [the virtue and sin] which
have been accumulated before disappear after producing
experiences. When he has thus brought about contentment and
H4 Already Paksilasvamin (Vatsyayana) notes as one example of wrong ideas in his
Nyaya Bhasya on sutra 1.1.2 (p. 11-12): “Emancipation (i.e., liberation) is dreadful.
It consists, as a matter of fact, in the cessation of all effects. Since emancipation is
separation from everything, much that is good is lost in it. How could therefore a
wise man find pleasure in this state of emancipation, in which all happiness has
been cut off and which is without consciousness?” (apavargo bhismah / sa khalv
ayam sarvakaryoparamah sarvaviprayoge 'pavarge bahii ca bhadrakam lupyata id
katham buddhiman sarvasukhocchedam acaitanyam amum apavargam rocayed
id/) Some later Naiyayikas preferred to look upon liberation as blissful (Mishra,
1936:384-87).
11^ jnanapurvakat tu krtad asankalpitaphalad visuddhe kule jatasya duhkha-
vigamopayajijriasor acaryam upasangamyotpannasatpadarthatattvajnanasyajnana-
nivrttau viraktasya ragadvesabhavat tajjayor dharmadharmayor anutpattau
purvasancitayos copabhogan nirodhe santos as ukharn sanraparicchedam cotpadya
ragadinivrttau nivrtdlaksanah kevalo dharmah paramarthadarsanajam sukharn krtva
nivartate / tada nirbijasyatmanah sariradinivrttih / punah sanradyanutpattau
dagdhendhananalavad upasamo moksa id //
38
happiness, as well as separation from the body, and passion etc.
have ceased, only virtue characterized by inactivity remains. [This
too,] after producing the happiness born from insight in the
highest truth, ceases. Then the body etc. disappear of [this] soul
which is free from seeds [for rebirth]. The tranquillity [which
arises] since no body etc. come again into existence, and which
resembles a fire whose fuel has been burnt, is liberation.
We see that the soul of the Vaisesikas has something in common
with the soul of the Samkhyas. Both are in their deepest essence
unconnected with what goes on in the world. But unlike the Samkhyas,
the Vaisesikas admit that the soul can get into connection with the world,
and into a close connection at that; the soul is connected with its qualities
by the relation of inherence ( samavaya ), which is the closest relation that
exists in this system of philosophy.
Yet, in its deepest essence the soul remains free from activity and its
fruits. This is underlined by the circumstance that the soul is conceived
as omnipresent. The soul, even though actor, remains in this way free
from action. This is, as far as I can see, the only reasonable explanation of
the otherwise rather queer attribute of omnipresence of the soul. This
explanation gains in strength if it is true that the oldest VaiBesika
considered the soul as having the size of the body, as Frauwallner (1956a:
62) surmises.116
116 Frauwallner’s (1956a: 95-97) attempt to explain the omnipresence of the soul on
the basis of adrsta , a quality of the soul which is supposed to exert its influence
almost everywhere, does not convince. The Vaisesika Sutra speaks already of the
omnipresence of the soul (VS 7.1.29), but contains no indication that adrsta
(mentioned in sutras 5.1.15; 2.2; 4; 8; 14; 19; 6.2.2.; 15; in all but two cases in the
compound adrstakarita) was considered a quality of the soul (cf. Halbfass, 1980:
285f.). Indeed, adrsta is not enumerated among the qualities (cf. note 19 above).
Moreover, Nyaya Sutra 3.2.69 uses the word adrsta - in the compound adrstakarita,
so common in the Vaisesika Sutra - in a sense which contrasts with karman (67);
here it is no quality of the soul, nor even the same as dharma and adharma .
Frauwallner' s reason for believing that early Vaisesika considered the soul as
having the size of the body is that this idea was present and survived among the
Jainas. The early connection between the two systems seems supported by the Jaina
tradition that the Vaisesika Sutra was composed by a Jaina schismatic from the
Uluka lineage (Leumann, 1885a: 121; Mehta and Chandra, 1970-72: 646 (s.v.
Rohagutta), 664 (s.v. Vaisesiya)). Vaisesika Sutra 5.2.18 has been presented as
evidence that the soul of early Vaisesika was deemed to have limited size. See
Wezler, 1982: 653-55. A closer study of this sutra, to be published in the
39
It is clear from the above passage from the Padarthadharmasahgraha
that knowledge is but the beginning of the process leading to liberation.
It is succeeded by some kind of practice of the type with which we are
now familiar. This is confirmed by the Vaisesika Sutra,111 which
describes Yoga as a state where the mind ( manas ) resides only in the soul
and therefore not in the senses, resulting in the absence of happiness and
pain (5.2.17); liberation is attained when this contact of mind and soul is
also no longer there (5.2.20). We recognize what is elsewhere called
pratyahara ‘withdrawal of the senses’. Again, liberation is the absence of
contact of the soul with virtue and sin (6.2.19); the means thereto are,
among other things, fasting, chastity, dwelling in a forest (6.2.2).
5.5. The ‘pure’ forms of asceticism lived on, as in Hatha Yoga,118 beside
the currents which emphasized meditation and knowledge of the soul.
Where they had to confront these other currents, terms pertaining to
meditation often were reinterpreted in such a manner that they came to
refer to bodily practices. Elsewhere the mental practices were postponed
until after the mastery of the - by now numerous and complex - bodily
practices, i.e., postponed to a stage which few people would reach.
Reinterpretation of terms pertaining to meditation is witnessed in
Sivananda Sarasvati’s Yogacintamani. There we read that “restraint of
breath itself, in accordance with the degree of practice, is called by the
names pratyahara, dharana, dhyana and samadhr (p. 28: pranayama
evabhyasakramena pratyaharadharanadhyanasamadhisabdenocyate ). Of
the same tenor, but more specific, is Skanda Purana 4.41.94-95:119
Proceedings of the Bhartrhari Conference held in Pune 1992 ( Asiatische Studien /
Etudes Asiatiques 1993), has convinced me that it constitutes no such evidence.
The omnipresence of the soul is explained by Vyomasiva by arguing “that only
on such a hypothesis can we explain the yogi’s ability to inhabit many bodies
simultaneously” (Potter, 1977: 98).
Other reasons why Brahmanical philosophies - unlike Jainism - introduced the idea of
an omnipresent soul are given by Jaini ( 1980: 220 ).
1 1 1 Wezler (1982) argues that the sutras on Yoga and liberation were later added,
perhaps after Prasastapada (p. 665). This does not however affect my argument.
On the ancient roots of Hatha Yoga, see Nowotny, 1976: 5-10.
1 1 9 pranayamadvisatkena pratyahara udahrtah /
pratyaharair dvadasabhir dharana pariklrtita //94//
bhaved Isvarasamgatyai dhyanaip dvadasadharanam /
dhyanadvadasakenaiva samadhir abhidhlyate I 1951 I
These verses occur in slightly different form in Goraksa’s Goraksasataka ( 1 14-15).
40
By twelve restraints of breath ( pranayama ) pratyahara is named.
By twelve pratyaharas dharana is known (94). Dhyana consists of
twelve dharanas and may lead to union with God. By twelve
dhyanas samadhi is mentioned (95).
We recognize in the terms pratyahara (‘withdrawal of the senses’),
dharana (‘fixing the mind’), dhyana (‘meditation’), and samadhi
(‘concentration’) the last four limbs of the eightfold Yoga described in
YS 2.29 (cf. also MU 6.18 discussed above, §4.1). We see that mental
states are reinterpreted to be, or to be the result of, physical restrictions.
Postponement of meditation is seen in, e.g., Svatmarama’s Hatha
Yoga Pradipika (HYPr). We are told in verse 1.2 that Hatha Yoga, which
emphasizes bodily practices,120 is only taught by way of preparation for
Raja Yoga:121 “Bowing to the respected teacher and patron, Yogin
Svatmarama teaches the knowledge of Hatha [Yoga] merely for the sake
of Raja Yoga.” And again (HYPr 4.103):122 “All the means of Hatha
[Yoga] and Laya [Yoga] are for the attainment of Raja Yoga.” Raja
Yoga is the name of the unified mind (4.77); 123 it is the state without
mind, samadhi (4.3-4). But a precondition for Raja Yoga is mastery over
Kevala-kumbhaka (2.74-75):124 “Who is powerful through Kevala-
kumbha[ka] because he [can] hold his breath as long as he likes, he
obtains even the state of Raja Yoga, there is no doubt about it.” Holding
one’s breath as long as one likes is obviously beyond the reach of most
(cf. Bernard, 1950: 57-58).
Hatha Yoga belongs to the tradition of asceticism which we are
investigating. The following verses (HYPr 4.106-09, 112) show this
beyond doubt 9 25
1 20 The Gheranda Samhita ( 1 .2) calls it ghatasthayoga ‘bodily Y oga' .
121 pranamya srigurum natham svatmaramena yogina/
kevalam rajayogaya hathavidyopadisyate //
1 22 sarve hathalayopaya rajayogasya siddhaye /
122 eklbhiitam tada cittam rajayogabhidhanakam /
124 saktah kevalakumbhena yathestam vayudharanat //
rajayogapadam capi labhate natra samsayah /
1 25 sankhadundubhinadam ca na srnoti kadacana /
kasthavaj jayate deha unmanyavasthaya dhruvam //106//
sarvavasthavinirmuktah sarvacintavivarjitah /
mrtavat tisthate yogi s a mukto natra samsayah //1 07//
khadyate na ca kalena badhyate na ca karmana/
41
By virtue of the state without mind (unmanl avastha)126 the body
becomes certainly like a piece of wood; it does not at any time
hear the sounds of a conch- shell and of a large drum (106). Being
free from all states and devoid of all thought, the Yogin is like a
dead person; he is liberated, there is no doubt about it (107). The
Yogin engaged in samadhi is not devoured by death and is not
harassed by karman, nor is he subdued by anyone (108). The
Yogin engaged in samadhi is not aware of smell, taste, form,
touch, and sound, nor of himself or another (109). ... He is
certainly liberated who is healthy, as if sleeping while awake, and
without breathing out and breathing in (112).
HYPr 4.31-32 amount to much the same:127
Absorption (lay a), in which breathing out and breathing in are
destroyed and the grasping of objects has disappeared, in which
there is no movement [of the body] nor modification [of the
mind], is victorious in the Yogins (31). Some [state of] absorption
comes about in which all conceptions are cut off and there are no
movements whatever; it can only be experienced by oneself and is
beyond words (32).
We find here most of the features which have characterized main stream
meditation from early times: motionlessness of body and mind, cessation
of breathing, non-functioning of the sense-organs.
It is interesting to quote in conclusion the final verse128 of Svatma-
rama’s Hatha Yoga Pradipika (4.114), because it evinces a sceptical
attitude toward the claim that knowledge alone may lead to the goal:129
sadhyate na sa kenapi yogi yuktah samadhina I 1 1 08//
na gandham na rasam ruparn na ca sparsam na nihsvanam /
natmanam \ na param vetti yogi yuktah samadhina //1 09//...
svastho jagradavasthayam suptavad yo ' vatisthate /
nihsvasocchvasahlnas ca niscitarn mukta era sah//112//
126 xhiS is the same as Raja Yoga according to verses 4.3-4 (p. 125).
1 27 pranastasvasanisvasah pradhvastavisayagrahah /
niscesto nirvikaras ca layo jayati yoginam //3 l/l
ucchinnasarvasamkalpo nihsesasesacesdtah /
svavagamyo layah ko 'pi jay ate vagagocarah //. 32 //
128 In the Lonavla edition this is not the final verse. A whole (fifth) chapter follows
which is found in some Mss., as explained on pp. (5) - (7) of the Introduction.
129 yavan naiva pravisad caran maruto madhyamarge
42
As long as the breath, moving about, does not enter into the
middle road; as long as the semen does not become steady as a
result of binding the vital air; as long as in meditation reality does
not become like the natural state;36 so long the knowledge that
[some] talk of is deceitful and false chattering.
yavad bind urna bhavati drdhah pranavataprabandhat /
yavad dhyane sahajasadrsam jayate naiva tattvam
tavaj jhanam vadati tad idam dambhamithyapralapah //
36. This line is not very clear. The English translation in the Adyar Library edition, by
Srinivasa Iyangar and revised by Radha Bumier and A. A. Ramanathan, reads (p.
83-84): “as long as the mind does not, in meditation, reflect the natural state [of the
object contemplated upon, i.e. Brahman]”. This translation depends on
Brahmananda’s commentary Jyotsna (p. 182): yavat tattvam cittam dhyane
dhyeyacintane sahajasadrsam svabhavikadhyeyakaravrttipravahavan naiva jayate
naiva bhavati. The Lonavla edition contains the translation (p. 176): “So long as ...
the Supreme Reality does not appear as if it were its (the mind’s) Sahaja (native)
state.”
43
VI. The influence from Buddhist meditation.
6.1. It seems that main stream meditation remained unaffected by
Buddhist meditation for a long time. Only in the case of the Maitrayaniya
Upanisad did we have to consider the possibility that there was some
influence from the side of Buddhist meditation (above, § 4.1). And even
in this case it concerned a rather minor point, not one pertaining to the
actual technique of meditation, nor to its immediate aim. We may
assume that main stream meditation owed its strong position primarily to
two factors. The first one is that, apparently, it had far wider currency
than Buddhist meditation. This is indicated by its presence in both Jaina
and Hindu scriptures. The second factor explains to some extent the first
one. The idea that the misery resulting from activity must be combated
by inactivity is so clear and simple that its immediate appeal must have
been greater than that of the rather abstruse methods propagated in
Buddhist meditation.
Yet some influence from the side of Buddhist meditation is
discernible. It is first noticeable in a passage of the Mahabharata, but
here the influence remains confined to terminology. Strong influence can
be shown in the Yoga Sutra. The important position acquired by this text
explains that the Buddhist element in Hindu meditation came to stay.
We turn to the texts.
6.2. MBh 12.188.1-2, 5-10, 12-13, 15, 20-22 reads:130
130. Iiun tn vaksyami te partha dhyanayogam caturvidhum /
yam jhatva sasvatlm siddhim gacchand paramarsayah //l//
yatha svamisthitam dhyanam tatha kurvanti yoginah /
maharsayo jnanatrpta nirvanagatamanasah //2//
tatra svadhyayasamslistam ekagram dharayen manah /
pindlkrtyendriyagramam aslnah kasthavan munih // 5//
sabdam na vindec chrotrena spars am tvaca na vedayet/
rupam na caksusa vidyaj jihvaya na rasams tatlia // 6//
ghreyany api ca sarvani jahyad dhyanena yogavit/
pancavargapramathlni necchec caitani vlryavan HI II
tato manasi samsajya pancavargam vicaksanah /
samadadhyan mano bhrantam indriyaih saha pancabhih //8//
visamcari niralambam pancadvaram calacalam/
purve dhyanapathe dhlrah samadadhyan mano ' ntaram 1/9 //
44
See, oh king, I tell you the fourfold Yoga of meditation, knowing
which the supreme seers reach eternal perfection (1). Yogins, great
seers satiated with knowledge whose minds are set on nirvana,
perform meditation that is well-practised (2). ... A sage, sitting
like a piece of wood, bundling his senses together, should fix his
mind [so that it becomes] one-pointed and held together as a result
of recitation, on that [own nature (?)] (5). He should not notice
sound with his ear, nor should he feel touch with his skin; he
should not perceive colour with his eye, nor tastes with his tongue
(6). And the knower of Yoga should also abandon, by means of
meditation, all odours; being energetic, he should not desire these
things which trouble the five senses (7). Then, being wise and
joining together his five senses in his mind, he should concentrate
his wandering mind together with the five senses (8). Being
resolute, he should concentrate his interior mind, which is moving
here and there, having no point of support, with five gates,
unsteady, in the first course of meditation (9). When he bundles
together his senses and his mind, this is the first course of
meditation described by me (10). ... Like a drop of water on a leaf,
moving here and there, going in all directions, just so is that mind
of his on the road of meditation (12); being brought together
(samdhita) for some moment on the road of meditation, it stands
indriyani manas caiva yada pindlkaroty ayam /
esa dhyanapathah purvo maya samanuvarnitah // 1 0//
jalabindur yatha lolah parnasthah sarvatas calah /
evam evasya tac cittam bhavati dhyanavartmani // 12//
samahitam ksanam kimcid dhyanavartmani tisthati /
punar vayupatham bhrantam mano bhavati vayuvat //1 3 //
vicaras ca vitarkas ca vivekas copajayate /
muneh samadadhanasya prathamam dhyanam aditah //1 5 //
svayam era manas caiva pahcavargas ca bharata/
purvam dhyanapatham prapya nityayogena samyati //20 //
na tat purusakarena na ca daivena kenacit/
sukham esyati tat tasya yad evam samyatatmanah //21 //
sukhena tena samyukto ramsyate dhyanakarmani /
gacchanti yogino hy evam nirvanam tan niramayam I 122 1 I
This passage occurs with few changes in the Brhan-Naradlya Purana 44. 83-105.
The differences are described on p. 2119 of the Poona ed. of MBh 12.
45
still, but again the mind roams about on the path of the wind, like
the wind (13). ... When the sage concentrates on the first
meditation from the beginning, vicara, vitaika and viveka come to
him (15). ... He himself, oh descendant of Bharata, as well as his
mind and five senses, comes to rest when he has reached the first
course of meditation by the incessant practice of Yoga (20). That
bliss of him whose self is thus controlled, will not be attained by
means of any kind of human effort or fate (21). Endowed with
that bliss he will delight in the activity of meditation. In this way
Yogins attain to that nirvana which is free from disease (22).
This passage speaks of a ‘fourfold dhyanayoga' (v.l), and of a ‘first
Dhyana’ ( purva dhyanapatha, vv. 9, 10, 20; prathama dhyana, v. 15) in
which vicara, vitarka and viveka are present, as well as bliss (v. 21-22).
Yogins performing this kind of meditation reach nirvana (vv. 2, 22.) All
this sounds like pure Buddhism (cf. § 1,5 above) and cannot be due to
coincidence.131
But there are differences as well. It appears that the Four Dhyanas are
really a foreign element in the Yoga of the Epic, which could only be
made to fit clumsily. Note that only the First Dhyana of the ‘fourfold
dhyanayoga ’ is mentioned - repeatedly - in the text, never the remaining
three. The reason may well be that these later Dhyanas, especially the
Third and Fourth, were an embarrassment for the author of this section
because they go beyond his aim in discarding such desirable (see v. 21-
22) states as joy ( prlti) and bliss ( sukha ). The immediate aim in this
section of the Mahabharata - as elsewhere in the Epic - is control of the
mind and the senses. This resembles the Second Dhyana, where vitarka
and vicara come to rest. Our section of the Epic appeal’s to be content
with even less. The First Dhyana is sufficient for its purposes because
vitarka and vicara are apparently looked upon as special faculties on the
First Dhyana, not as mere thought remaining from ordinary
131 So Bedekar, 1963a; Pande, 1974: 534; Heiler, 1922: 46-47; Keith, 1923: 144;
Oldenberg, 1915: 324; Barnes, 1976: 189 f. Nothing supports the contention that
here the four stages of meditation are intended which figure in MBh 12.46.2-4, as
maintained in the Critical Notes to the Poona ed. (p. 2161). In those stages no
mention is made of vicara, viveka and nirvana.
46
consciousness.132
Our passage contains clear indications that it belongs to the main,
i.e., non-Buddhistic, tradition of meditation. The meditator sits Tike a
piece of wood’ (v. 5), tries to put his sense organs out of use (v. 6-7),
wants to stop his mind (v. 20). The terminology of Buddhist meditation
has been used, but its influence stopped at that.
6.3. Influence from Buddhist meditation, i.e., from the form Buddhist
meditation acquired under the influence of main stream meditation (see
ch. VII below), is noticeable in the first chapter of the Yoga Sutra
(YS).133 This will be shown by bringing to light a contradiction between
the sutras.
Sutra 1.2 defines: yogas cittavrttinirodhah “Yoga is the suppression
of the activities of the mind”. This agrees with all we have come to know
about main stream meditation in Jaina and Hindu scriptures. Sutra 1.3
explains that then the self abides in its own form. This too tallies with
main stream meditation and the accompanying speculations about the
nature of the soul (above, chapter V). Subsequent sutras (1.5-11) specify
what are the activities of the mind. YS 1.12 indicates that the desired
suppression comes about as a result of practice ( abhyasa ) and
passionlessness ( vairagya ). These two terms are explained in sutras 1.13-
16. There can be no doubt that sutras 1.2-16 belong together and give a
short description of main stream meditation.
Sutras 1.17-20 then continue:
YS 1.17: vitarkavicaranandasiriitarupanugainat samprajnatah : “Because
it is accompanied by the form of deliberation, reflexion, happiness and
the feeling ‘I am’ [there is concentration ( samadhi ) which is]
samprajhata .”
YS 1.18: viramapratyayabhyasapurvah samskaraseso ’ nyah :“The other
[ asamprajhata form of concentration (samadhi)] is preceded by practice
132 Note that also the Yoga Sutra (1.44) appears to give vicara a special sense, viz. of
having subtle things as objects. Something similar is said in Vasubandhu’s
Abhidharmakosa and Abhidharmakosabhasya (II. 33) and in earlier Abhidharma
works.
133 Cf. already Senart, 1900, and esp. La Vallee Poussin, 1937a.
47
on the notion of cessation, [and is such that only] subliminal impressions
(; samskara ) remain in it.”
YS 1.19: bhavapratyayo videhaprakrtilayanam : “In the case of the
bodiless and the prakihlayas, it depends on their state.”
YS 1.20: sraddhaviryasmrtisamadhiprajhapurvaka itaresam: “It is
preceded by trust, energy, mindfulness ( smrti ), concentration ( samadhi )
and insight ( prajha) in the case of others.”
We note, to begin with, that sutra 1.17 is not complete. The author
of the Yoga Bhasya supplies samadhi, a word which has not been used in
the preceding sixteen sutras. The incompleteness of sutra 1.17 suggests
that this sutra together with the ones following it was taken from a
different context. It is known that the Yoga sutras were collected
together, most probably by the author of the Yoga Bhasya (Bronkhorst,
1985a: § 1). The author of the Yoga Bhasya gives evidence at a few
places that he knew the original meaning and context of the sutras, and
this allows us to accept tentatively his proposal to supply samadhih in
sutra 1.17. It is true that sutra 1.20 now comes to convey the peculiar
sense that asamprajhata samadhi is preceded by samadhi, but this may be
due to the technical meaning assigned to asamprajhata samadhi.
When we compare these four sutras with the definition of Yoga
given in sutra 1.2, it becomes clear that samprajhata samadhi cannot be
considered the highest form of Yoga. Certainly deliberation ( vitarka ) and
reflexion ( vicara ), and perhaps also happiness ( ananda ) and the feeling ‘I
am’ ( asmita ), must be looked upon as activities of the mind, even if it
may be difficult to say how these must be brought in agreement with the
five kinds of activity enumerated in sutra 1.6. The case is different with
asamprajhata samadhi. Here only subliminal impressions ( samskara )
remain, which cannot be looked upon as activities of the mind. Therefore
asamprajhata samadhi must be considered the completion of Yoga, the
total suppression of all activity of the mind.
However, such an interpretation gives rise to difficulties. For it
would mean that the bodiless - i.e., gods according to the Yoga Bhasya -
and those called prakrtilaya - those whose minds have been temporarily
dissolved into primary matter - have reached the highest aim of Yoga,
48
which seems an unlikely supposition. What is worse, sutra 1.18
emphatically asserts that in asamprajnata samadhi subliminal
impressions ( samskara ) remain, strongly suggesting that another state
exists in which even these subliminal impressions are no longer present.
It is confirmed by the last sutra of the first chapter, which I shall
give in its immediate context, that such a further state exists. Sutra 1.46
speaks about a concentration with seed ( sabijah samadhih) and sutra 1.47
about an inner tranquillity ( adhyatmaprasada ). Sutras 1.48-51 then
continue:
YS 1.48: rtambhara tatra prajha : “There there is truthbearing insight.”
YS 1.49: srutanumanaprajhabhyam anyavisaya visesai'thatvat : “It has
other objects than the insight from the scriptures and the insight from
inference, because it concerns particulars.”
YS 1.50: tajjah samskaro ’ nyasamskarapratibandhl : “From that [insight]
arises a subliminal impression which obstructs the other subliminal
impressions.”
YS 1.51: tasyapi nirodhe sarvanirodhan nirbijah samadhih : “When that
[subliminal impression] too is destroyed,134 because all [subliminal
impressions] have been destroyed, there is concentration without seed.”
It seems clear that the definition of Yoga given in the first chapter of
the Yoga Sutra does not fit the descriptions contained in that same
chapter. The definition speaks merely of the suppression of mental
activity, whereas the descriptions go far beyond this: they speak about a
state also beyond happiness and the feeling ‘I am’, where even the
subliminal impressions are destroyed.
The author of the Yoga Bhasya does not do much to solve the
disagreement. On sutra 1.18 he simply identifies asamprajnata samadhi
with nirbija samadhi (‘concentration without seed’). And on sutra 1.46 he
justifies the expression sabija samadhi ‘concentration with seed’ by
stating that “outer objects are the seed”. It is clear that in this way nirbija
samadhi ‘concentration without seeds/outer objects’ acquires a sense
134 nirodha carries both the meanings ‘suppression' and ‘destruction'. My choice of
translation here and in YS 1.2 embodies a certain amount of interpretation.
49
close to asamprajnata samadhi . But the Yoga Bhasya does not explain
how asamprajnata samadhi can retain the subliminal impressions where
nirblja samadhi does not.
The Yoga Bhasya gets into more trouble while explaining sutra
1.19. Obviously it does not want to grant the highest Yogic state - which
it calls kaivalya ‘isolation’ - to the gods and the praki'tilayas, free of
charge, so to say. It ‘solves’ the problem by adding iva ‘as if’ in the
explanation: it is as if the gods and praki'tilayas experience isolation.
The clumsy procedure of the Yoga Bhasya further convinces us that
two kinds of Yoga are being referred to in the first chapter of the Yoga
Sutra. 135
The other kind of Yoga described in the first chapter of the Yoga
Sutra shows far-reaching agreement with Buddhist meditation. YS 1.17
says that deliberation ( vitarka ), reflection ( vicara ), happiness ( ananda )
and the feeling ‘I am’ ( asmita) are present in samprajhata (samadhi).
Deliberation (vitarka) and reflection (vicara) are also present in the [70]
First Dhyana of the Buddhists (above, § 1.5). Joy (prlti) is present in the
First and Second Dhyana, bliss (sukha) in the First, Second and Third;
this corresponds to happiness (ananda). Only the feeling ‘I am’ has
nothing corresponding to it in the early Buddhist texts.136
Asamprajnata samadhi (?) may be compared with the five states
which came to be added after the Four Dhyanas in the Buddhist
scriptures, and which are characterized by a weakening and ultimately
disappearance of samjha ‘ideation’. The dependence on Buddhist ideas is
confirmed by the fact that in YS 1.20 asamprajnata samadhi (if it is that)
is said to be preceded by trust (sraddha), energy (virya), mindfulness
(smrti), concentration (samadhi), and insight (prajha). The last two of
this list, samadhi and prajha, are also the last two of the Buddhist triad
si la, samadhi, prajha, which is often presented in the canon as the
Frauwallner (1953: 437f.), too, distinguishes two kinds of Yoga in the Yoga Sutra,
but considers the first chapter as describing hut one of them.
136 Unless we consider it equivalent to mindfulness (smrti) and circumspection
(samprajanya), as Heiler, 1922: 46 does. Note that the Buddhist texts speak
occasionally of liberation as a result of, among other things, the destruction of all
dispositions to egoism, selfishness and pride (sabbaahankaramamankaramananu-
sayanam khaya); see MN 1.486.
50
teaching of the Buddha in a nutshell (Eimer, 1976: 34f.; § 8.4.3, below).
It is even more noticeable that all these five terms - s raddha, vlrya, smrti,
samadhi, prajna, or rather their Pali equivalents - occur in the Pali
version of the account of the Bodhisattva’s training under Alara Kalama
and Uddaka the son of Rama. Gotama proclaims to be the equal of his
teachers in these five respects. (MN 1.164-66; repeated 1.240, 11.212.
Note that the Chinese parallels merely mention sraddha, vlrya and
prajna; MAc p. 776M4-17, cl3-15; T 1428 p. 780M1-13, c4-5; cf.
Bareau, 1963: 13-26). The terms occur also elsewhere in the canon (e.g.
MN 1.479), and frequently in the Abhidharma works.
YS 1.18 and 1.48-51 (when combined) tell us that asamprajhata
samadhi is not the final end. The subliminal impressions ( samskara )
which remain are to be destroyed with the help of insight ( prajna). If we
read asrava for samskara , this is pure Buddhism.137 In addition to this, it
can hardly be coincidence that the ‘truthbearing insight’ is said to follow
an inner tranquillity ( adhyatmaprasada ); the Buddhist texts speak about
an inner tranquillization ( adhyatmasamprasadana ).
6.4. Traces of the influence from Buddhist meditation are visible in other
works. Yogakundall Upanisad 1-2 reads:138
There are two causes for [the activity of] the mind: subconscious
impression ( vasana) and air. Of these two when one is destroyed,
both get destroyed (1). Of these two, a man should always
conquer air first. [The means thereto are:] moderate eating,
[practising] postures, and setting the Sakti in motion as the third
(2).
The words vasana (‘subconscious impression’) and samskara (‘sub-
132 The Buddhist texts also speak about the destruction of samskaras, e .g. in Sn 731;
cf. DN 11.36, MN 1.167, SN 1.136, Vin 1.5. See also the argument concerning the
mental nature of samkhara in Franke, 1913: 307-18; and Schneider, 1980: 100-01.
Cf. Schumann, 1957; Johansson, 1979: 41-56.
138 hetudvayam hi cittasya vasana ca samlranah /
tayor vinasta ekasmims tad dvav api vinasyatah //l//
tayor adau samirasya jayam kuryan narah sada /
mitaharas casanam ca sakticalas trtlyakah //2/ /
The first of these two verses occurs almost identically (tu for hi) in Svatmarama's
Hathayogapradipika (4.22).
51
liminal impression’) are virtual synonyms, in the Yoga Bhasya
(Koelman, 1970: 154) and elsewhere.139 Therefore the above verses refer
to the destruction of subliminal impressions, like certain sutras of the
Yoga Sutra (above, § 5.3). Similarly, the verses must be considered to
have undergone influence from Buddhist meditation.
Note however, that the element ‘destruction of subconscious
impressions’ is grafted upon techniques which clearly belong to main
stream meditation. The destruction of subconscious impressions is said to
result from the destruction of breath, one of the most characteristic
accompaniments of main stream meditation. The Upanisad nowhere
returns to the question of the destruction of the subconscious
impressions, whereas much room is dedicated to breath control. We must
conclude that in the Yogakundall Upanisad the influence from Buddhist
meditation is slight, and may even be merely terminological.
Buddhist meditation is more strongly represented in the Muktika
Upanisad (MuktU).140 Verse 2.27 contains a statement very similar- to the
one above:141
The tree which is the mind has two seeds: the movement of breath
and subconscious impression. When one of these two is
destroyed, both arc quickly destroyed.
The remainder of this Upanisad talks much about the destruction of
the subconscious impressions, more than about the control of breath.
Destruction of the subconscious impressions is said to be equal to
liberation (MuktU 2.68). The subconscious impressions are of two kinds:
pure and impure (MuktU 2.61); all are abandoned in the end (MuktU
2.68-71); etc. Yet abandonment of the vasanas is said to be the same as
suppression of the movement of breath (MuktU 2.45: vasanasampari-
139 E g. in Vidyaranya’s JIvanmuktiviveka; see Sprockhoff, 1964: 226-27.
140 The Muktika Upanisad is late and may date from the 15th century A.D.
(Sprockhoff, 1976: 260-64, 286).
141 dve bije cittavrksasya pranaspandanavasane /
ekasmims ca tayoh kslne ksipram dve api nasyatah I I
This verse occurs almost identically in the Yogavasistha according to the commentary
Jyotsna on HYPr 4.22, p. 143.
52
tyagah pranaspandanirodhanam) . Moreover, the aim is to free the soul
from attributes which do not really belong to it, such as ‘being the actor’:
“Properties of the mind, such as being the actor, being the enjoyer, bliss
and suffering, are fetters of the soul ( purusa ) because they are afflictions
( klesa ) by nature; their destruction is liberation while being alive
( jlvanmukti )” (MuktU 2.1: purusasya kai'trtvabhoktrtvasukhaduhkhadi-
laksanas cittadharmah klesarupatvad bandho bhavati / tannirodhanam
jivanmuktih /). This shows that this Upanisad belongs to the main
tradition of meditation, in spite of the influence from Buddhist
meditation.
The notion of vasana and its destruction appears here and there in
other late Upanisads as well, but not usually in the predominant position
it has in the Muktika Upanisad. Examples are: Nadabindu Up. 49c-d =
Yogasikha Up. 6.71a-b; Annapurna Up. 4.79; Maha Up. 2.45; 5.78;
etc.142 Nothing like the Four Dhyanas of the Buddhists recurs in any of
these Upanisads, as far as I know.
142
Cf. Sprockhoff, 1963: 200-201.
53
Part III: Buddhist meditation.
VII. Influence on Buddhist meditation (I).
7.1. We have seen that the main stream of ancient Indian meditation
largely lived a life of its own, showing developments both theoretical and
practical which could be explained without reference to Buddhism.
Buddhist influence came late and remained marginal. The question is
whether Buddhist meditation also remained unaffected by main stream
meditation.
A priori this seems unlikely. Buddhist meditation had to live in
surroundings where apparently the other form of meditation held
undisputed sway. Moreover, the other form of meditation was so simple
and perspicacious in its aim that Buddhist meditation could not compete
with it in appeal.
There is another fact which supports this a priori supposition. The
Buddhist scriptures, as we have seen, show that much attention was paid
to other modes of meditation, or rather asceticism. We studied the most
important passages in chapter I, above.143 The Jaina canon, on the other
hand, says very little about Buddhism, and nothing whatever about
Buddhist meditation (Bollee, 1974: 27-28; cf. Jacobi, 1880: 161).
Therefore Buddhism is more likely to have adopted parts of the
meditation current among the Jainas and elsewhere than vice versa. The
fact that Buddhism appears to have been ‘a comparatively minor factor
in the religious life of India before Asoka’ lends further support to this
supposition; see Basham, 1982: 139-41 .
A concrete instance of influence from mainstream asceticism on
Buddhism is provided by the five demands of Devadatta to the Buddha
(Mukherjee, 1966: 75-81). Three of them occur in a stereotyped
description of heretics in the Buddhist canon. This has been discussed by
Bollee ( 1971, esp. pp. 71, 76, 81, 83) and will not be repeated here. This
case is particularly interesting because the five demands are in Buddhism
not accepted as compulsory, but as optional. Four of them recur in the
143. See further Bollee, 1971; Bhaskar, 1972; Jacobi, 1895: xv-xx; Tatia, date
unknown.
54
list of thirteen dhutangas enumerated in the canon (Vin V. 131, 193) and
in the post-canonical Milindapanha (ch. 6) and Visuddhimagga (ch. 2). 144
Another instance occurs in the Mahaparinirvana Sutra , in the
discussion with Putkasa / Pukkusa, the different versions of which have
been compared by Bareau (1970: 282-95). Putkasa tells that Arada
Kalama at one occasion did not hear the sound of five hundred - in one
version fifty - carts passing by, even though awake and conscious.145
This ability, we know, is ascribed to practitioners of main stream
meditation, along with the ability not to see, smell, taste and feel. The
Buddhist texts ridicule it, as we have seen (§ 2.2, above). Here however
the Buddha is said to surpass Arada Kalama in this respect. He tells
Putkasa that once, in a violent thunderstorm when lightning killed two
farmers and four oxen near- him, he did not notice a thing. We see that a
story of probably non-Buddhist origin (so Bareau) was accepted by the
Buddhists. This could not fail to influence the way Buddhist meditation
came to be looked upon subsequently.
One more instance of borrowing from main stream meditation was
pointed out in § 1.2, above. We saw that at one place in the Majjhima
Nikaya ( Vitakkasanthana Sutta, nr 20; MN 1.120-21) monks are advised
to do what is shown to be incorrect elsewhere (MN 1.242; and therefore
in the Original Mahasaccaka Sutra). It refers to the kind of meditation
which consists of “closing the teeth, pressing his palate with the tongue,
restraining thought with the mind, coercing and tormenting it”, in short,
main stream meditation.
Further cases were pointed out in notes 5 and 8 to ch. II. ‘Non-
performing of new actions’ and ‘annihilation of former actions’ - two
characteristics of Jaina meditation criticized at some places - were found
to be accepted at other places of the Buddhist canon.146
144. On the dhutangas, see Bapat, 1937; 1964: Introduction; and Dantinne 1991: esp.
p. 25f. The tendency to accept painful practices is also apparent in the Ekottara
Agama where it makes the Buddha say that happiness can only be reached through
hardship; elsewhere this point of view is ascribed to the Jainas; see note 5 to
chapter II above.
145. Something closely similar is told about the grammarian Sakatayana in Patanjali’s
Vyakarana-Mahabhasya on P. 3.2.115, vol. II, p. 120, 1. 20-23.
146. It is possible that the (first) stanza uttered by Anuruddha after the death of the
Buddha (Bareau, 1971: 163-64), which stresses the latter’s cessation of breathing,
likewise betrays influence from main stream meditation.
55
7.2. The above cases could relatively easily be shown to be due to
outside influence. Each of them rests on at least two canonical passages
which flatly contradict each other, while one agrees closely with what we
know about main stream meditation and its accompaniments. We shall
now turn to a few cases which are less immediately obvious. The idea
remains the same: we shall propose outside influence where by this
means contradictions in the Buddhist canon can be explained and where
at the same time the origin of this influence can be indicated.
7.2.1. A number of meditational states are mentioned in the Buddhist
canon. These, as a rule, occur in lists. We first look at the eight
Liberations ( vimoksa / vimokkha).ul They are the following:148
1) Having visible shape, one sees visible shapes
2) Having no ideation of visible shape in oneself, one sees visible
shapes outside [oneself]
3) One becomes intent on what is beautiful
4) By completely going beyond ideations of visible shape and the
coming to an end of ideations of aversion, by not fixing one’s
mind on different149 ideations, [thinking] ‘space is infinite’, he
reaches the Stage of Infinity of Space ( akasanantyayatana /
akasanancayatana ) and remains there
5) Having completely gone beyond the Stage of Infinity of Space,
[thinking] ‘knowledge is infinite’, one reaches the Stage of
Infinity of Perception ( vijnananantyayatana /
vinnanancayatana ) and remains there
6) Having completely gone beyond the Stage of Infinity of
Perception [thinking] ‘there is nothing’ one reaches the Stage of
147 See e.g. Sang VIII.9; Daso VIII.7; DN 11.70-71, 111-12; DAc p. 62M9-25; MN
11.12-13; AN IV. 306, 349; Lamotte, 1970: 1281-83. MN III.222 calls them attha
disa ‘the eight directions’; cf . MAc p . 694a2-b9. According to Mahavibhasall (T.
1545, p. 399b20 f.; tr. La Vallee Poussin, 1937c: 12) heterodox teachers teach four
liberations, viz. the four stages akasanantyayatana until naivasamjnanasam-
jnayatana.
I translate the Pali version. Small variations occur in the other versions which are
of no relevance for the present study.
l4^. See note 14 below.
56
Nothingness ( akincanyayatana / akincannayatana) and remains
there
7) Having completely gone beyond the Stage of Nothingness, one
reaches the Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation
( naivasamjnanasamjnayatana / nevasannanasannayatana) and
remains there
8) Having completely gone beyond the Stage of Neither Ideation
nor Non-Ideation, one reaches the Cessation of Ideations and
Feelings ( samjnavedayitanirodha / sannavedayitanirodha ) and
remains there.
Even though it is difficult to understand fully what exactly is meant
by this passage, one can easily see that it is a list of graded exercises by
which the practitioner gradually puts an end to all ideations. In the Stage
of Nothingness the most ethereal of ideations alone remain, described as
“there is nothing”. In the following two states even this ideation
disappears.
It is not clear why two states follow the Stage of Nothingness. One
might think that ideations are not yet completely absent in the Stage of
Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation, however unlikely that may be.150 But
even on this assumption the presence of feeling ( vedayita ) in the final
Cessation of Ideations and Feelings must give rise to suspicion, since the
whole list seems aimed at the dissolution of ideations and leaves no place
for feelings. This suggests that the state of Cessation of Ideations and
Feelings is an addition to the list. Other passages from the Buddhist
canon confirm this.
1^0. if we understand the term naivasamjnanasamjnayatana literally, there are no
ideations in this ‘Stage of Neither Ideations nor Non-Ideations’. This interpretation
is supported by DN 11.69, according to which beings without ideations occupy that
stage (see note 15 below). DN 1.184, moreover, speaks of the ideation
accompanying the Stage of Nothingness as ‘the topmost of ideations’ ( sannagga ),
after which follows the cessation of all ideations. See further Franke, 1917: 70.
Note that the later dogmatists had different opinions on this issue, the Theravadins
holding that there are ideations in the Stage of Neither Ideations nor Non-Ideations,
their opponents that there are none ( Kathavatthu III. 12). These opponents are
identified as Andhakas in the Kathavatthuppakarana-Atthakatha (p. 72). See also
Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakosabhasya 8.4 (La Vallee Poussin, 1923-31: ch. viii, p.
143-44).
57
The Culasuhhata Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya (nr. 121; III. 104-09)
gives a list of states in which more and more is experienced as empty
( sunna ). The list can be briefly given as follows:
1) He fixes his mind on the exclusive151 ideation of forest ( aranna -
sahham paticca manasikaroti ekattam)152
2) He fixes his mind on the exclusive ideation of earth
( pathavisahha )
3) He fixes his mind on the exclusive ideation of the Stage of
Infinity of Space ( akasanahcayatanasahha)
4) He fixes his mind on the exclusive ideation of the Stage of
Infinity of Perception ( vihhanahcayatanasahha)
5) He fixes his mind on the exclusive ideation of the Stage of
N othingness ( akihcahhayatanasahha
6) He fixes his mind on the exclusive ideation of the Stage of
Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation ( nc vasannanasannayatana-
sahha)
7) He fixes his mind on the exclusive mental concentration
beyond [any ideation of] characteristics (or mental images)153
( animitta cetosamadhi).
The numbers 3)-6) of this list correspond to the numbers 4)-7) of the
list of the eight Liberations. What precedes and follows differ.
It is again possible to distinguish a list of graded exercises in which
consciousness, by a process of ever increasing abstractions, is deprived
of all content. The two introductory states fit well with this. But the last
state, the animitta cetosamadhi, appears superfluous. Rather, in this list
an unconvincing trick has been used which is apparently intended to
provide a place for this animitta cetosamadhi. In all but the last states the
mind is fixed on the exclusive ideation of something. In the final state the
mind is fixed on the animitta cetosamadhi and now apparently goes
151. See note 14 below.
152 The Pali text adds Utssa arannasannaya cittarn pakkhandati pasldad santitthad /
adhimuccad, and the same appropriately adjusted to each of the following
sentences. But the Chinese (MAc p. 736c f.) and Tibetan (not accessible to me)
parallels omit this (Schmithausen, 1981: 234 n. 124).
155. So Schmithausen, 1981:235.
58
beyond all forms of ideation. In the preceding state the mind is said to be
fixed on “the exclusive ideation of the Stage of Neither Ideation nor
Non-Ideation”. This is absurd. Ideation is ascribed to a state which has
no ideation. Perhaps we witness here an attempt to justify the final state,
animitta cetosamadhi.
It seems dubious that animitta cetosamadhi is identical with samjha-
vedayitanirodha (‘Cessation of ideations and Feelings’).154 Schmithausen
(1981: 236 n. 133) gives one reference (SN 40.1-9) where the two terms
seem to have been interchanged, as well as a few references (DN II. 100,
AN 6.60 (III.397)) where the two denote different things. We note that,
at any rate, the terms arc different.
The two lists discussed thus far share in common a unit of four
meditational states, which may be looked upon as their ‘hard core’: 1. the
Stage of Infinity of Space ( akasanantyayatana ); 2. the Stage of Infinity of
Perception ( vijhananantyayatana ); 3. the Stage of Nothingness
(akihcanyayatana); 4. the Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation
( naivasam jhanasam jhayatana) . This ‘hard core’ occurs by itself in the
Buddhist canon under the name ‘the four arupas / ai'upyas’’ (DN III. 224;
Sang IV. 8; DAc p. 50c25f.).
One might expect that this list of four meditational states has to be
reduced still further to account for the seven Places of Perception
( vijhanasthiti / vihhanatthiti ) : 155
1) There are beings with different156 bodies and different
ideations, such as men, some gods and some inhabitants of hell
2) There are beings with different bodies and uniform157 ideations,
such as the Brahmakayika gods who came first into existence
3) There are beings with uniform bodies and different ideations,
such as the Abhasvara gods
4) There are beings with uniform bodies and uniform ideations,
154 For a different opinion, see Vetter, 1988:67 n.8.
155. See e.g. DN III.253; DAc p. 52a23 - 29; AN IV.39; Daso VII.7. 1 translate the Pali
version, ignoring the small deviations which occur in other versions.
156. I translate nanatta ( Skt . nanatman ) and ekatta ( Skt . ekatman ) as proposed by
Schmithausen (1981: 233-34, n. 122), even though the Sanskrit version has nanatva
and ekatva.
157. MN 1.169-70; MV 1.7; MAc p. 777a-b; T. 1428, p. 787b.
59
such as the Subhakinha gods
5) There are beings which, by going completely beyond ideations
of form, and the coming to an end of ideations of aversion, by
not fixing their mind on different ideations, [thinking] ‘space is
infinite’, reach the Stage of Infinity of Space ( akasanantya -
yatana )
6) There are beings which, having completely gone beyond this
Stage of Infinity of Space, [thinking] ‘perception is infinite’,
reach the Stage of Infinity of Perception ( vijhananantyayatana )
7) There are beings which, having completely gone beyond the
Stage of Infinity of Perception, [thinking] ‘there is nothing’,
reach the Stage of Nothingness ( akihcanyayatana ).
Here the Stage of Infinity of Space, the Stage of Infinity of Perception
and the Stage of Nothingness, occur together without the fourth, the
Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation
(nai vasam jnanasam jhayatana ) .
There is, however, an obvious reason why the Stage of Neither
Ideation nor Non-Ideation is left out. This list enumerates Places of
Perception. But perception ( vijnana ) is always accompanied by ideation
( samjna ), which is absent in the Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-
Ideation. This last stage, therefore, falls into another, higher category.
The Buddhist canon also gives a list of nine Residences of Beings
(sattvavasa / sattavasa] e.g., Daso IX. 3; Sang IX. 2; DN III.263) which is
the seven Places of Perception plus two items. Between 4) and 5) is
added the Residence of Beings of those without ideations and feelings
( asannino appatisamvedino, in the Pali version), or of those without
ideations and discriminating ideations ( asamjnino ’ pratisamjninas, in the
Sanskrit version); and the Residence of Beings of those who have
reached the Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation ( naivasam -
jnanasamjnayatana ) is added at the end.
It appears from the above that the Stage of Nothingness
( akincanyayatana ) and the Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation
(naivasamjnanasamjnayatana) are the two final states of a row of graded
exercises. By a process of increasing abstraction, in which the initial
60
stages seem to be variable, the aspirant works himself up to a state where
there is ‘neither ideation nor non-ideation’. In the later stages of this
process the mind is successively fixed on the notions “space is infinite”,
“perception is infinite” and “there is nothing”. The Stage of Nothingness
is the final state in which some kind of notion remains before the jump is
made into (complete or almost complete) notionlessness, the real goal.
There is some independent evidence that the Stage of Nothingness
and the Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation were at one time aims
in themselves.
The Buddha is said to have had two teachers before his enlighten-
ment: Arada (P. Alara) Kalama and Udraka (P. Uddaka) the son of
Rama. From the former the Bodhisattva learned the Stage of
Nothingness, from the latter the Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-
Ideation. No credence can be given to this story, for the following
reasons, presented by Bareau (1963: 20-21). 158
The episode of the Bodhisattva’ s training under Arada Kalama and
Udraka the son of Rama is found in three versions in the older parts of
the canon: in the Majjhima Nikaya of the Theravadins (thrice: in the
Ariyapariyesana Sutta, nr. 26, MN 1.163-67; Mahasaccaka Sutta, nr. 36,
MN 1.240, Nalanda ed. I, p. 294-98; Sangarava Sutta, nr. 100, MN
11.212, Nalanda ed. II, p. 484-87); in the Madhyamagama of the
Sarvastivadins (MAc p. 776b5-777a4); in the Vinaya of the Dharma-
guptakas (T. 1428, p. 780b7-cl9). The names of Arada Kalama and
Udraka the son of Rama occur again in the scriptures of these schools,
where they relate how the Buddha, after his enlightenment, wonders to
whom he will preach his doctrine first. He thinks of Arada Kalama and
Udraka the son of Rama, but learns that both have died recently. No
word is said about the Buddha’s relationship to these two people, nor
indeed do we hear what these men had been or done. This would be hard
to explain if the training of the Bodhisattva under them had been related
at that time a few pages earlier as it is now. One suspects that the names
1^8. [Discussions with Ghiorgo Zafiropulo - whose book De la quete a 1' annonce de
l'eveil is expected to come out soon (Innsbrucker Beitrage zur Kulturwissenschaft,
1993) - have now (1992) convinced me that Bareau’s reasons may not be
compelling. This does not, however, affect - or if it does, it strengthens - the
following arguments.]
61
of these two men originally occurred only where the Buddha thinks of
possible persons with whom to start his missionary activity. In order to
give some content to these mysterious names, the account of the
Bodhisattva’s training under teachers with these names was added. This
supposition finds support in the fact that the Vinaya of the Mahisasakas
relates the Buddha’s doubt about whom to preach to first (T. 1421, p.
104all-21; Bareau, 1963: 145-46) and mentions in this context the
names of Arada Kalama and Udraka the son of Rama, but does not refer
to the Bodhisattva’s training under these two even though this Vinaya
mentions a number of things about the Bodhisattva prior to his
enlightenment (T. 1421, p. lOlalO- 102cl4; tr. in Bareau, 1962). 159
If this story does not reflect the historical truth, why was it
invented? Part of the reason has been given above: the occurrence of the
two names ‘Arada Kalama’ and ‘Udraka the son of Rama’ required an
explanation which could be given in this manner. But clearly this does
not explain why the story took exactly this shape. In its actual form the
story serves the additional purpose of denouncing the Stage of
Nothingness and the Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation.
Let us note that in two of the three versions of this story (of the
Theravadins and of the Sarvastivadins) the Bodhisattva complains that
these two stages do not lead to what he is looking for, an impossibility if,
in the opinion of its author, they represented two steps which preceded
the final steps of the way to enlightenment. If on the other hand, the
criticism had been against, for instance, the eight Liberations ( vimoksa ) -
which have one more stage after the two stages mentioned in this story,
viz. the Cessation of Ideations and Feelings, samjnavedayitantiodha - the
Bodhisattva should have been depicted as also practising this final stage
and finding it worthless. Consequently it is only reasonable to assume
that the account of the training under Arada Kalama and Udraka the son
of Rama contains an implicit criticism of those who considered the Stage
of Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation the final aim of a course of training,
immediately preceded presumably by the Stage of Nothingness.
The above observations have made it probable that in the early days
159 Note further that the Mahaparinirvana Sutra mentions a Putkasa / Pukkusa who is
supposed to be a follower of Arada Kalama and visits the Buddha not long before
the latter's death. See Bareau, 1970: 282-95, esp. p. 284; and § 7.1 above.
62
of Buddhism the following list of meditational states existed (which may
have been the end of a longer list of which the initial items were not
strongly fixed):
a) the Stage of Infinity of Space ( akasanantyayatana );
b) the Stage of Infinity of Perception ( vijhananantyayatana );
c) the Stage of Nothingness ( akihcanyayatana );
d) the Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation ( naivasam -
jnanasam jhayatana) .
We know that this short list appears as a part of longer lists in the
Buddhist canon and was therefore accepted in Buddhist circles.
Interestingly enough, the evidence discussed above points to a time when
this list was not accepted by at least some Buddhists.
The list agrees well with what we know of main stream meditation.
There the aim is to stop mental activity. This can be compared with the
Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation studied above. It is striking
that the Jaina scriptures describe reflection on infinity ( anamtavattiya ,
Skt. anantavartita or -vrttita) as one of the reflections ( anuppeha , Skt.
anupreksa) underlying pure ( sukka , Skt. sukla), i.e. the highest
meditation (above, § 3.3). This corresponds with the Stage of Infinity of
Space and the Stage of Infinity of Knowledge. A further point of
resemblance is the fact that these four states of meditation, unlike the
Four Dhyanas of Buddhism, are never described as pleasurable or
blissful160 (as already remarked by Schmidt (1953: 65)).
We hypothesize that the meditational states under discussion at
present entered Buddhism from Jainistic or related circles.
7.2.2. How could these meditational practices find entrance into
Buddhism? Where could they find a place side by side with the Four
Dhyanas ?
The Four Dhyanas can be briefly characterized as follows (cf. § 1.5
above):
160 The only exception occurs in the Culasannata Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya.
However, the Chinese and Tibetan parallels leave out the sentences concerned. See
note 10 above.
63
- In the First Dhyana there is deliberation ( vitarka), thought ( vicara), joy
( priti ) and bliss ( sukha ).
- In the Second Dhyana deliberation and thought come to rest. Inner
tranquillization (, adhyatmasamprasadana ), unification of the mind
0 cetaso ekotlbhava), concentration (samadhi), joy and bliss are present.
- In the Third Dhyana one is no longer attached to joy. Equanimity
( upeksa ), mindfulness ( smrti ), circumspection ( samprajanya ) and bliss
arc present.
- In the Fourth Dhyana bliss and misery ( duhkha ) are abandoned, as well
as cheerfulness ( saumanasya ) and dejectedness ( daurmanasya ).
Equanimity and mindfulness remain.
Clearly the Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation can be
compared with the Second Dhyana, where deliberation and thought come
to rest. Both states represent some kind of cessation of ordinary mental
functioning. There is some evidence that an assimilation of this type was
actually made at some time.
A Buddhist Sutra (SN IV.297-300; SAC p. 152b28 - 153a2) relates a
discussion between Nigantha Nataputta, i.e. the Jina, and the householder
Citra / Citta. Citra is asked if he believes the recluse Gautama who says
that there is a concentration free from deliberation and thought ( avitakko
avicaro samadhi), that there is cessation of deliberation and thought
( vitakkavicaranam nirodho). Initially Citra gives an ambiguous answer,
but then turns out not to believe, but to know these things from his own
experience which he obtained while practising the Four Dhyanas (Pali) /
the first two of the Four Dhyanas (Chinese). In this passage the leader of
the Jainas is depicted as considering impossible the very aim of Jaina
meditation. What is more, the Jaina road of meditation up to the
cessation of all mental activity seems here to be identified with the first
two of the Four Dhyanas of the Buddhists. Note that the word nirodha
‘cessation’ which is common in the main tradition of meditation, is used
in the context of the Second Dhyana, where normally ‘coming to rest’
( vyupasama / vupasama ) is used.
Main stream meditation does not end with a mere cessation of all
mental activity. In its highest stages there is a complete cessation of all
64
activity whatever, particularly of breathing. If the cessation of mental
activity was identified with the Second Dhyana, one might expect that
cessation of breathing in particular was assigned to a later Dhyana,
preferably the Fourth one. This is confirmed by the list of Successive
Cessations ( anupubbanirodha ; DN III.266; 290; AN IV. 409). It reads:
- For one who has reached the First Dhyana the ideation of objects of
sense ( kama ) has ceased;
- for one who has reached the Second Dhyana deliberation and thought
( vitakkavicara ) have ceased;
- for one who has reached the Third Dhyana joy ( phi) has ceased;
- for one who has reached the Fourth Dhyana breathing out and breathing
in (assasapassasa) have ceased,
- for one who has reached the Stage of Infinity of Space the ideation of
form has ceased;
- for one who has reached the Stage of Infinity of Perception the ideation
of the Stage of Infinity of Space has ceased;
- for one who has reached the Stage of Nothingness the ideation of the
Stage of Infinity of Perception has ceased;
- for one who has reached the Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation
the ideation of the Stage of Nothingness has ceased;
- for one who has reached the Cessation of Ideations and Feelings
ideations and feelings have ceased.
We note the fourth item of this list, where the same terms are used as at
MN 1.242, where Jaina meditation is described (above, chapter I).
If it is true that the early Buddhists (or some of them) made attempts
to assimilate the four stages under discussion to the Four Dhyanas, it
cannot have escaped their attention that in the Second Dhyana, where
vitarka and vicara come to rest, joy ( prlti ) and bliss ( sukha ) remain
together with other feelings which do not disappear until the Third and
Fourth Dhyanas. This would imply that after the Stage of Neither
Ideation nor Non-Ideation another stage would be required where not
only ideations ( samjha) but also feelings ( vedayita ) have stopped. Such a
stage exists in the Cessation of Ideations and Feelings
( samjhavedayitanirodha ) frequently met with in the texts.
65
The above assimilation of the four states and what follows them to
the Four Dhyanas is clearly not very satisfactory. The differences
between the four states and the Four Dhyanas are too great to allow of
such an easy assimilation. No wonder that this assimilation was not
accepted in the larger part of the Buddhist canon. The alternative, if one
of the two groups was not to be discarded, was to place them one after
the other. In the nine Successive States ( anupurvavihara /
anupubbavihai'a)m we find the following order : first the Four Dhyanas,
then the Stage of Infinity of Space, the Stage of Infinity of Knowledge,
the Stage of Nothingness, the Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-
Ideation, and finally the Cessation of Ideations and Feelings.
The list obtained was justified with the help of the nine Successive
Cessations (see above): in each next stage something more is stopped.
The Potthapada Sutta of the DIgha Nikaya (nr. 9) contains a slightly
different justification: the list162 is presented as bringing about the
successive cessation of several forms of ideation (DN 1.182-84):
- In the First Dhyana there is cessation of the ideation of objects of sense.
- In the Second Dhyana there is cessation of the subtle and true ideation
of the joy and bliss born from seclusion ( vivekajapldsukhasukhuma -
saccasaniia ).
- In the Third Dhyana there is cessation of the subtle and true ideation of
the joy and bliss born from concentration
(samadhijapitisukhasukhumasaccasanna).
- In the Fourth Dhyana there is cessation of the subtle and true ideation
of indifference and bliss ( upekkhasukhasukhumasaccasanna ).
- In the Stage of Infinity of Space there is cessation of the ideation of
form (rupasanna).
- In the Stage of Infinity of Perception there is cessation of the subtle and
true ideation of the Stage of Infinity of Space ( akasanancayatana -
sukhumasaccasanna ) .
161. See e.g. Daso IX. 8; Lamotte, 1970: 1308.
162, Properly speaking, a slightly different list. The final Cessation of Ideations and
Feelings is lacking here, and the Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation is
designated differently. See the next note.
66
- In the Stage of Nothingness there is cessation of the subtle and true
ideation of the Stage of Infinity of Perception ( vihhananahcayatana -
sukhumasaccasanna) .
- In the next and final state, simply described as Cessation ( nirodha ),
there is cessation of all ideations.163
The Successive States became quite prominent in the Buddhist
canon and are often said to lead to the vanishing of the Intoxicants
(asrava / asava), i.e., final liberation (e.g., SN 16.9-11; AN 9.34; 35; MN
1.159-60; 174-75; 11.42-45; MAc p. 701bl2).
7.2.3. If it is true that the four states - from the Stage of Infinity of Space
until the Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation - were borrowed
from main stream meditation in one form or another, we must assume
that originally this list of graded exercises represented a road to
liberation quite different from the authentic Buddhist one. Moreover,
these states must then have been part of a scheme where liberation was
not attained until the death of the body. Our idea that these states were
borrowed from outside is therefore confirmed by the fact that several
Buddhist schools were indeed of the opinion that an alternative road to
liberation led through the Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation;
arhant-ship is here obtained at the end of one’s final existence. These
schools are the Vibhajyavadins, Mahisasakas, Theravadins164 and the
authors of the Sariputrabhidharmasastra 165 (Bareau, 1957: 248; 1955:
175, 184, 198, 262).
7.2.4. The above arguments make it likely that the four states discussed
came into Buddhism from outside. The following, somewhat speculative
considerations may support this.
Space ( akasa ) and perception ( vijnana ) are the last two in the list of
163 This stage corresponds to the Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation rather
than to the Cessation of Ideations and Feelings, for, unlike the latter of these two, it
does not stop feelings. There is at any rate nothing in the text to indicate this.
164 Bareau gives no reference for the Theravadins. Cf. Pp 13: yassa puggalassa
apubbam acarimam asavapariyadanah ca hod jivitapariyadanah ca, ay am vuccad
puggalo samasm “The person in whose case no sooner does the termination of
sinful tendencies take place than the life terminates. Such a person is said to be one
who is ‘equal-headed'. ”(tr. Law, 1924: 20).
165. Mahasamghikas ? See Lamotte, 1958: 208 n.24.
67
six dhatus, the earlier ones being earth, water, fire and wind (see, e.g.,
SN 11.248) . This makes it tempting to think that these earlier dhatus
could be added before the above four meditational states. Indeed, in AN
V.324 and elsewhere166 we find the following list of items which can, but
should not be used as objects of meditation: (1) earth, (2) water, (3) fire,
(4) wind,167 (5) Stage of Infinity of Space, (6) Stage of Infinity of
Perception, (7) Stage of Nothingness, (8) Stage of Neither Ideation nor
Non-Ideation, (9) this world, (10) the world beyond, (11) whatever is
seen, heard, thought, known, obtained, searched, pondered over by the
mind.
If we leave out of consideration the last three items of this list, we
arrive at something similar to what is described in a passage of the
Moksadharmaparvan, viz. MBh 12.288.113-15. There we find a
successive fixation of the mind ( dhai'ana) on earth, ether, water, fire,
ahamkara, buddhi, and avyaktam (cf. Bedekar, 1963b: 25-27;
Frauwallner, 1953: 142-43; Hopkins, 1901: 351-52; Barnes, 1976: 66).
Frauwallner (1953: 143) observed, no doubt correctly, that it was
considered that the Yogin who practised these successive fixations was
able to go through the process of creation in reverse order.169 It remains
none the less possible that both these lists - the one of the Mahabharata
and the one of the Ahguttara Nikaya - derive from a common ancestor.
Their divergent developments may have been determined by ontological
and other considerations.
7.3. This may be the place to say a few words about the four Brahmic
States ( brahmavihara ). As far as I know, the practice of these mental
states is nowhere criticized in the Buddhist canon. Nor are these states
166. AN V.7-8; 318-20; 321-22; 353-58.
167. Note that these four (six in the case of MAC) elements are enumerated as objects
of meditation in the Smrtyupasthana Sutra (MN 1.57-58; DN 11.294; MAc p. 583b
17-23; EAc p. 568a23-bl). Schmithausen (1976: 252-53, n. 25) suggests that the
four elements in this context are not original and derive from passages like MN
1.185 f. and 421 f., where they occur in an analysis of rupa.
168 The text announces seven fixations but appears to give eight. Are we to exclude
buddhi, which has the suffix -tas that is so hard to explain in this context, or should
we look upon avyakta as belonging to another category ?
169 Recall Eliade’s (1967: 107) remark that the Yogin aimed at the state which
preceded creation, primordial unity.
68
immediately recognizable as belonging to main stream meditation.
Indeed, it appeal’s that they are not found in the old Hindu and Jaina
scriptures.170 Yet certain passages in the Buddhist canon show that they
were known to and practised by non-Buddhists.
The Samyutta Nikaya (SN V. 115f) and the Samyukta Agama (SAC
p. 197 bl5f.) contain the story of Buddhist monks who are embarrassed
by heretical wanderers. These heretics claim that the teaching of the
Buddha does not differ from their own : both teach the four Brahmic
States.171 In response to this allegation the Buddha is presented as saying
that his followers practise the Brahmic States until their highest
perfection, leading to purity in the case of benevolence (maitii / P.
metta), to the Stage of Infinity of Space ( akasanantyayatana / P.
akasanancayatana ) for compassion ( karuna ), the Stage of Infinity of
Perception (vijnaiianantyayatana / P. vinnanancayatana) for joy ( mudita ),
the Stage of Nothingness ( akincanyayatana / P. akincannayatana) for
indifference ( upeksa ).172 All this merely confirms the main point: the
Brahmic States were practised by non-Buddhists.
The Pathamametta Sutta of the Anguttara Nikaya (AN II. 128f.)
does not even try to show the difference between Buddhists and non-
Buddhists in their practice of the Brahmic States. The only difference lies
in the result. Both Buddhists and non-Buddhists attain to the state of
certain gods as a result of these practices, and remain there for a long but
finite period of time. After that the non-Buddhists go to hell, or become
animals, or ghosts. The Buddhists, on the other hand, reach Nirvana
while in that divine state. We may conclude that at least for some time
the Brahmic States were practised identically by Buddhists and certain
non-Buddhists.
Some Sutras indicate that their authors considered the Brahmic
States older than and inferior to the practices taught by the Buddha. The
Makhadeva Sutta (MN 11.74-83; MAc p. 511c-515b; EAc p. 806c-810b)
170. They are referred to in Umasvati’s Tattvarthadhigama Sutra 7.6 (Jacobi, 1906:
523) but not in the Jaina canon (Schubring, 1935: 191).
171. The term brahmavihara is not used here, but the four practices are described.
177. The Pali text also brings in the Constituents of Enlightenment (sambojjhanga).
These are absent from the Chinese.
69
relates how king Makhadeva173 and his successors abandon the world as
soon as they get grey hair, and practise the Brahmic States.174 The
Buddha explains that he himself was Makhadeva in an earlier birth, but
that Makhadeva’ s practices brought him not to the end, whereas the
practices now taught by the Buddha lead to liberation (MAc p. 515a23)
and Nirvana (MN 11.82; EAc p. 810bl2).
The Pali version of the Mahagovinda Sutta (DN 11.220-52) indicates
the same thing. Mahagovinda practises the four Brahmic States and
reaches the world of Brahman. The Buddha explains that he himself was
Mahagovinda, but that his practice was not satisfactory. Only the Noble
Eightfold Path ( ariya atthahgika magga ) leads to enlightenment and
Nirvana (pp. 250-51). The fact that the Brahmic States are not clearly
included in the Chinese (DAc p. 30b-34b; T 8, p. 207c-210b) and
Sanskrit (Mv III. 197-224) versions of this story, makes it probable that
they were inserted at a relatively late date, perhaps under the influence of
the Makhadeva Sutta.
The assimilation of the Brahmic States to three of the four Stages
discussed in § 7.2 may give us a clue regarding the origin of these
practices. In both the Brahmic States and the four Stages we find a heavy
emphasis on infinity. In the four Brahmic States the world is pervaded by
the mind which is suffused with benevolence, compassion, joy and
equanimity respectively. It seems reasonable to assume a historical
connection with the reflection on infinity of the Jainas (see § 7.2.1 and
§ 3.3, above).
7.4. We see that there is much reason to think that the influence from
main stream meditation on Buddhist meditation was already widespread
in canonical times. That this was solely due to the relatively small
number of active Buddhists as compared with the much larger number of
those who practised main stream meditation seems unlikely. Another
factor must have been at work. Already early in the history of Buddhism
there was uncertainty about the details of the practice taught by the
The Chinese ( ) presupposes rather ‘Mahadeva’.
174 The Chinese versions have which also translates brahmacarya. However,
the specifications given in the Ekottara Agama (p. 808b 15- 16; cl 1-12; 809a21;
8 1 Oal 3- 1 4) leave no room for doubt.
70
Buddha. This explains why the Buddhist canon contains so many
contradictions, some of which we have studied above. It also explains
why very early disagreement arose about the nature of an arhant (see
Bareau, 1957; La Vallee Poussin, 1937b). This uncertainty opened the
door to foreign elements which could take the place of original but little
understood elements. In this way outside influence could touch the very
heart of the teaching of the Buddha. In this light we shall study some
other questions.
Before we turn to these questions, let us see what remains that can
be considered authentic Buddhist meditation in view of the conclusions
of the present chapter. The Four Dhyanas and the subsequent destruction
of the intoxicants survive the present analysis easily. I know of no
indications that they too must be looked upon as due to outside influence.
Moreover, they occur very frequently in the canonical scriptures and
already made the impression on other investigators of belonging to the
oldest layers of the tradition.175
Closely connected with the Four Dhyanas is the practice of
‘mindfulness’ ( smrti / sati). Mindfulness is mentioned in the description
of the Four Dhyanas, but is also independently described in the canon. It
is possible that, originally, mindfulness merely concerned the body
(Schmithausen, 1976: 253). It may have been borrowed from outside
movements, because it appears to be known to Jainism (Schmithausen,
1976: 254). But this is no reason to doubt its role in original Buddhism,
for mindfulness is nowhere criticized in the Buddhist canon, nor does it
conflict with other practices accepted by the Buddhists.
17^. See Frauwallner, 1953: 162 f.; Pande, 1974: 529-34; Schmithausen, 1978: 101;
Griffiths, 1983: § 2; cf. Heiler, 1922: 45; Schmithausen, 1981: 218-19.
71
VIII. Influence on Buddhist meditation (II).
8.1. In the preceding chapter we discussed the influence of main stream
meditation on the techniques of Buddhist meditation. In the present
chapter we shall examine the extent to which main stream ideas
influenced the Buddhist conception of liberation and its commencement.
Recall that main stream asceticism led to liberation after death. Only
where ascetic practices were wholly or partly replaced by insight, could
the decisive transition take place in this life. Buddhism too promised
liberation in this life (as will be shown in § 8.2). This leads us to expect
two developments in Buddhism under outside influence: (i) liberation in
Buddhism will tend to be postponed to the time after death (§ 8.3);
(ii) liberating insight will tend to take an explicit form and a central
position (§ 8.4).
8.2. Numerous canonical passages confirm that Buddhism preached
liberation in this life, i.e., before death. The Buddha himself is said to
have reached liberation at his moment of enlightenment, attaining
Nirvana and accomplishing his task at that time (see Bareau, 1963: 72-
79). But with respect to others, or in general descriptions, the aim of the
religious life is also said to be attained, or attainable, in this life (drste
dharme / ditthe va dhamme ).176 A special case is constituted by the oft-
repeated formula: “Soon N. - having himself, in this very life, by means
of his intuition witnessed that highest end of the religious life for which
sons from good families completely go forth from their house to the state
of houselessness - reached [that end] and remained there, and
recognized: ‘Birth is destroyed, the religious life has been lived, what
had to be done has been done, there is no more of this state [of
existence]’.” (in Pali : ... na cirass ’ eva yass’ atthaya kulaputta sammad
cva agarasma anagariyam pabbajanti, tad anuttaram brahmacariya-
pariyosanam ditthe va dhamme say am abhihha sacchikatva upasampajja
vihasi ‘khlna jati, vusitam brahmacariyam, katam karanlyam, naparam
176. E.g. DN I.167f.; 11.71; MN 1.55, 71; SN II. 15, 46; AN 1.50; cf. DAC p. 34a24, p.
1 03c2 1 ; MAc p. 596a24; SAC p. 99a22, b7; EAc p. 81 lbl2; T. 1428, p. 788a4. See
also Kumoi, 1969: 209.
72
itthattaya ’ ti ’ abbhannasi. ) 1 77
The teaching of the Buddha is similarly characterized as ‘belonging
to this life’ ( samdrstika / sanditthika) and ‘inviting to come and see’
( ehipasyika / ehipassika ).178 The attribute akalika, which often occurs
along with the preceding two, appears to mean ‘not connected with
death’ (Bronkhorst, 1985b) and draws attention to the this-worldly
relevance of the message of the Buddha as well. Sometimes these or
similar attributes describe Nirvana,179 which is thus seen to be attainable
in this life. Both Nirvana and Arhant-ness ( arahatta ) are defined as
‘destruction of desire, destruction of hatred, destruction of delusion’
( ragakkhaya , dosakkhaya, mohakkhaya ) in SN IV. 25 1-52, which
indicates that the two are identical or, at any rate, related and therefore
(also) part of this world.
8.3. The tendency to postpone liberation until after death becomes visible
in those canonical passages which distinguish between Nirvana -
qualified in Sanskrit and Pali as ‘without a remainder of upadhi / upadf
(anupadhisesa / anupadisesa) - and the ‘highest and complete
enlightenment’ (anuttara samyaksambodhi / sammasambodhi ).180 The
former occurs at death, the latter in life.
The Nigrodhakappa Sutta of the Suttanipata (Sn 343-58) also
assigns Nirvana to the time after death. The prose introduction tells us
that Nigrodhakappa is aciraparinibbuta “recently entered into
Parinirvana”. The first verse states that he is dead ( kalam akasi). And Sn
354 (= Th 1274) asks: “Has he reached Nirvana or is he with a remainder
of upadi ? Let us hear if he was liberated.” ( nibbayi so adu sa-upadiseso,
yatha vimutto ahu tam sunoma).
Some passages, esp. in the Mahaparinirvana Sutra, speak about the
177. E.g. DN 1.177; 11.153; SN 1.140, 161; AN 11.249; III.70; Ud 23; Sn p. 16; p. 111-
12; cf. MN 1.172, 177; MPS p. 380-82; DAc p. 104cl2-14; p. 25b22-25; p. 39a2-9;
SAC p. 309al6-17; EAc p. 612b24-26.
178. E.g. DN 11.93, 217; MN 1.37, 265; SN 1.9, 220; AN 1.149, 207; Mv III. 200.
179. AN 1.158-59; IV.453-54; Ud 37.
180. E.g. DN 11.108-09; III.135; AN 11.120; IV.313; Ud 85; MPS p. 216-18; cf. DAc
p. 16a8-14; EAc p. 753c23-26; T. 7, p. 192al-5.
73
death of the Buddha as his ‘Parinirvana’.181 (It is understandable that the
opinion could arise that the term ‘Parinirvana’ referred to the state after
death of the Buddhist saint, ‘Nirvana’ to the state while he was alive.
This does not however appear to be correct. The canon also uses the term
‘Parinirvana’ with reference to living men.182 See Franke, 1913: 180n.;
Thomas, 1947; Nyanatiloka, 1976: 160-61 (s.v. parinibbana).)
The Dhammasangani (Dhs 1017-18) differentiates between Arhant-
ness ( uparitthimam arahattaphalam ) and Nirvana ( asahkhata dhatu ),
disagreeing with SN IV. 25 1-52 discussed above. See C.A.F. Rhys
Davids, 1900: 153-54, 342.
There is one canonical passage (It 38-39) where the conflict between
Nirvana in this life and Nirvana after death is resolved by distinguishing
two kinds of Nirvana: with and without a remainder of upadi (Skt.
upadhi; the terms used are sa-upadisesa and anupadisesa);183 the former
applies to Nirvana in this life, the latter to Nirvana after death. We saw
that the distinction between Nirvana without a remainder of upadi on the
one hand, and enlightenment on the other, is more common in the canon.
Introducing a ‘Nirvana with a remainder of upadi ’ was consequently a
rather obvious thing to do. We do not, however, have to know the exact
significance of upadi 1 84 in order to discover that the idea of a Nirvana
with a remainder of upadi does not agree with the use of the word
elsewhere in the canon. An oft-recurring formula describes the two fruits
of which certain advanced disciples will obtain either the one or the
other: “perfect knowledge in this life, or - in case there is a remainder of
upadi - the state of being a non-returner” ( ditthe va dhamme anna, sad va
upadisese anagamita ).185 Some other passages186 use both the terms
anupadisesa and sa-upadisesa with reference to living monks. In Sn 354
18 1. E.g. DN 1.204, 11.140; SN V. 260-62; AN IV. 310-11; Ud 63-64; Th 1045; MPS
p. 192; T. 5, p. 169a23; T. 6, p. 185bl5; T. 7, p. 199M6-19; MAc p. 515bl9.
182. E.g. DN III. 55, 97; MN 1.235; AN I. 204-05; 11.167; Sn 359; SAC p. 57c8.
1 8 - \ Note that the Chinese translations, where they translate these terms at all, often
skip the word upadi in it: sa-upadisesa corresponds to , anupadisesa
to . See e.g. DAc p. 16al3; MAc p. 584bl7, 20, 23; p. 752c2; EAc p. 753c25.
l8z( For opinions, see Welbon, 1968: 208-20; Bhattacharya, 1968.
185. DN II. 314-15; MN 1.62, 63, 481; SN V.129, 181, 285, 314; AN III. 81-82, 143; It
39, 40, 41; Sn 140, 148; cf. MAc p. 584bl6-24, p. 752cl-2.
186. AN IV. 75-78; 379-81.
74
(= Th 1274) the Buddha is questioned about the fate of Nigrodhakappa
who died: “Has he reached Nirvana or is he with a remainder of upadi ?”
(see above). We must conclude that the distinction between Nirvana with
and without a remainder of upadi, in spite of its later currency (see La
Vallee Poussin, 1925: 171-77, 179-80), was initially no more than an
attempt to find a middle course between the original idea of Nirvana in
this life and the later tendency to place Nirvana after death.
Another solution of the problem of the two Nirvanas also came to be
adopted. The highest stage of meditation - here nirodhasamapatti, or
samjnavedayitanirodha - is said to be similar to Nirvana, or touching it.
(See La Vallee Poussin, 1937b: 213 f.; Schmithausen, 1981: 241, 219
n.67.) This opened the possibility for a Nirvana which is really situated
after death but can be anticipated in life.
8.4. The early Buddhists believed in liberation in this life. They must
therefore have often been asked which is the insight by which one is
liberated. For the main stream of meditation could only acknowledge
liberation in life after one had acquired insight into the nature of the soul
(above, ch. V). The Buddhists could not answer by saying that the soul is
essentially not involved in action, as their opponents did. A firm tradition
maintained that the Buddha did not want to talk about the soul, or even
denied its existence.187 Instead they adopted what they considered most
essential to the Buddhist doctrine as liberating insight. We shall see that
(1) this liberating insight varied along with what was considered most
central to the teaching of the Buddha (§ 8.4.1); (2) insight and practice
vied with each other, just as they did in main stream meditation (§ 8.4.2);
(3) the Buddhist texts leave scope for the possibility that originally the
liberating insight was not described in any explicit form - they even
support this to some extent (§ 8.4.3). These three points go a long way to
show that the explicit descriptions of the content of liberating insight are
not original to Buddhism, and were added under the influence of main
It is possible that original Buddhism did not deny the existence of the soul
(Frauwallner, 1953: 217-53; Schmithausen, 1969: 160-61; Bhattacharya, 1973;
Perez-Remon, 1980; Vetter, 1983). One reason why it did not want to talk about it
may well be that conceptions of the soul were too closely connected with the
methods of liberation described in Part II, above.
75
stream meditation.
8.4.1. In order to show that liberating insight in Buddhism varied along
with what was considered central to the teaching of the Buddha, it is
enough to recall some articles by Lamotte (1977, 1980) and esp.
Schmithausen (1981). I quote Schmithausen (1981: 211-12):
The principle that Enlightenment and, analogously, Liberating
Insight188 are essentially characterized (and perhaps rendered
effective) by the fact that ... their content must consist of, or at
any rate contain, the most fundamental truth, can be observed to
have been valid also in later periods, for we find that such
concepts also were taken to be constitutive or essential to both as
are expressive of what was, later on, regarded to be the most
fundamental truth. E.g., in some obviously more or less later
descriptions of Enlightenment or Liberating Insight, the
Comprehension of the four Noble Truths is supplemented189 or
even supplanted190 by the Comprehension of Origination-in-
Dependence ( pratltyasamutpada) - in its two forms of anuloma
and pratiloma corresponding to samudaya- and nirodhasatya,
respectively191 -, a fact which is easily understood if we bear in
mind that, as an expression of the most fundamental
soteriologically relevant truth, pratltyasamutpada seems to have
gradually superseded the four Noble Truths. In most of the
Hlnayana schools, however, it was in its turn later superseded by
the doctrine of the non-existence of a substantial self or person
([ pudgala-]nairatmya) . Accordingly, it is not surprising to find
this new fundamental truth, too, becoming the major content of
Liberating Insight, which, e.g., according to one of three
I®®. Schmithausen uses “the term ‘Enlightenment’ with exclusive reference to the
(historical) Buddha, and the term ‘Liberating Insight’ either with special reference
to his Disciples ( sravaka ), or in a comprehensive sense including both Enlighten-
ment and the Liberating Insight of the Disciples” (1981: 199).
189 Schmithausen refers in a footnote to Waldschmidt, 1967: 410f.
190. Schmithausen refers to Nobel, 1955: 8 (translated p. 57-59) and texts like SN
12.65.
191. Schmithausen refers again to SN 12.65.
76
alternative explanations found in the Sariputrabhidharma,192
consists in a realization of all the four Noble Truths under the
aspect if ‘Lack of Self’.
Schmithausen (1981: 219 f.) further points at other forms which
liberating insight has in the Buddhist canon:193 “that the five Skandhas
are impermanent, disagreeable, and neither the Self nor belonging to
oneself’;194 “the contemplation of the arising and disappearance
(udayabbaya) of the five Skandhas”;195 “the realization of the Skandhas
as empty (rittaka), vain (tucchaka) and without any pith or substance
(asai-aka)” .196
8.4.2. The competing roles of insight and practice already in canonical
Buddhism have been pointed out by La Vallee Poussin in his article
“Musila et Narada” (1937b; cf. Schmithausen, 1981: 214 f.; Griffiths,
1981). Musila (in SN II. 115 f.) represents those who know and thereby
reach the goal. Narada is one of those who strive to reach the goal
through direct experience. The canon also shows that attempts were
made to remove the opposition between these two groups, e.g., in AN
III.355 f. La Vallee Poussin further shows that all three schools - of
knowledge, of direct experience, and of their combination - survive in
later times. These are the same schools which we met in main stream
meditation. La Vallee Poussin rightly identifies the group represented by
Musila with samkhya, the group of Narada with yoga, as defined in the
Bhagavad Gita. We must look upon this parallelism as due to influence
192. At T. 1548, p. 595a3ff. Schmithausen further draws attention to Pads 11.105:
katih'akarehi cattari saccani ekapativedhani ? catuh’akarehi ... : tathatthena,
anattatthena, ... ; Patis-a 594: anattatthena’ti: catunnam saccanam attavirahitatta ...
and explains that “in the latter passage, sacca has, of course, to be understood in a
collective sense as denoting the totality of those dharmas the nature of which is
Suffering, etc.”
193 por iater views see Schmithausen, 1981: 240f.
194. This is mentioned at Vin I. 13-14; MN I. 138-39; III. 19-20; 278-80; SN II. 124-
25; III. 21-24; 195-98; 223; etc.; cf. further MN I. 500; III. 286-87; SN II. 244-52;
etc. All these places have a formula in common which - as Schmithausen (1981:
219-20, n. 69) has rightly argued - contains traces to show that originally it
belonged in another context, in the stereotyped detailed description of the Path of
Liberation, as Schmithausen calls it.
195. AN II. 45.
196. SN III. 140-42.
77
from main stream meditation on Buddhism. The explanations of the idea
that liberation is obtained merely through insight given by La Vallee
Poussin - that insight without meditation makes liberation accessible to
more than just a few (1937b: 206) - and by Schmithausen - that there was
an awareness of the difference of situation between the Buddha’s
Enlightenment and the Disciple’s Liberating Insight, and that
psychological plausibility was sought (1981: 222) - may add to our
understanding, but only after we know that ideas of this type were
already exerting an influence from the side of main stream meditation.
Those who emphasized practice did so usually in connection with
the Cessation of [all] Ideations and Feelings (samjnavedayitantiodha /
sannavedayitanirodha). What is particularly interesting is that in certain
schools this state came to be looked upon as similar to Nirvana, an
anticipation in this life of Nirvana; Nirvana itself, and therefore
liberation, was postponed until after death, just as was the case in main
stream asceticism. See § 8.3, above.
8.4.3. In the stereotyped detailed description of the path of liberation
which often recurs in the Buddhist canon (see Schmithausen, 1981: 203
f.) liberating insight takes place in the Fourth Dhyana. It is described thus
(e.g. MN 1.23; cf. DN I. 83-84, 209; MN I. 183-84, 348; AN I. 165; II.
211; etc.):197
Then, when my mind was thus concentrated, pure, cleansed, free
from blemish, without stain, supple, ready, firm, immovable, I
directed my mind to the knowledge of the destruction of the
intoxicants. Then I recognized in accordance with reality ‘this is
suffering’, I recognized in accordance with reality ‘this is the
197 so evam samahite citte parisuddhe pariyodate anahgane vigatupakkilese
mudubhiite kammaniye thite anejjappatte asavanam khayahanaya cittam
abhininnamesim / so idam dukkhan ti yathabhutam abbhahhasim ayam
dukkhasamudayo ti yathabhutam abbhannasim, ayam dukkhanirodho ti
yathabhutam abbhannasim, ayam dukkhanirodhagamini patipada ti yathabhutam
abbhannasim / ime asava ti yathabhutam abbhahhasim, ayam asavasamudayo ti
yathabhutam abbhahhasim, ayam asavanirodho ti yathabhutam abbhahhasim, ayam
asavanirodhagaminl patipada ti yathabhutam abbhahhasim / tassa me evam janato
evam passato kamasava pi cittam vimuccittha, bhavasava pi cittam vimuccittha,
avijjasava pi cittam vimuccittha / vimuttasmim vimuttam iti hanam ahosi / khina
jati, vusitam brahmacariyam, katam karaniyam, naparam itthattaya ’ti abbhahhasim
/
78
origin of suffering’, I recognized in accordance with reality ‘this
is the cessation of suffering’, I recognized in accordance with
reality ‘this is the path leading to the cessation of suffering’. I
recognized in accordance with reality ‘these are the intoxicants
(. asava)' , I recognized in accordance with reality ‘this is the origin
of the intoxicants’, I recognized in accordance with reality ‘this is
the cessation of the intoxicants’, I recognized in accordance with
reality ‘this is the path leading to the cessation of the intoxicants’.
Then, when I knew and saw this, my mind was liberated from the
intoxicant of desire, and from the intoxicant of existence, and
from the intoxicant of ignorance. In [the mind thus] liberated the
knowledge arose that it was liberated. I recognized: ‘Birth is
destroyed, the religious life has been lived, what had to be done
has been done, there is no more of this state [of existence].’
In many passages this insight is preceded by two other insights, but those
must be later additions (see below, § 9.2.7). Consequently we can
concentrate on the present passage.
There can be no doubt that this passage does not represent the original
account of enlightenment (so also Schmithausen, 1981: 205). The
recognition of the intoxicants, their origin, cessation, and the path
leading to their cessation is obviously modelled on the pattern of the
recognition of suffering, its origin, cessation, and the path leading there.
It is tempting to follow Bareau (1963:87) in thinking that the recognition
of the intoxicants, their origin, etc., was added later to the text.198 This
would also solve problems relating to the origin of the intoxicants
(Schmithausen, 1981: 205-06). Yet we may share Schmithausen ’s (1981:
206) misgivings about dropping this part, for asava “seems to be a key
term of the whole passage”.
The truth seems to be that the part on the recognition of the
intoxicants, their origin, etc., is a bridge linking the recognition of the
Four Noble Truths (suffering, its origin, etc.) with the destruction of the
intoxicants. This bridge was necessary because destruction of the
intoxicants is mentioned just before and after the Four Noble Truths.
Some versions are without it; see Schmithausen, 1981: 205 n. 21.
79
This bridge - regardless of the question whether it was added by the
composer of this passage or later - therefore emphasizes the fact that the
Four Noble Truths just do not fit here. They do not fit because the
connection between their knowledge and the destruction of the
intoxicants is not clear.
But the Four Noble Truths do not fit in this context for another far
more serious reason. Recognition of the Four Noble Truths culminates in
knowledge of the path leading to the cessation of suffering. This is useful
knowledge for someone who is about to enter upon this path, but it is
long overdue for someone at the end of the road. Knowledge of the path
must and does precede a person commencing upon it. This also applies to
the Buddha himself. In the passage which we studied above (§ 1.5, MN I.
246-47) we were told that the Bodhisattva remembered how once in his
youth, he reached the First Dhyana and wondered if this could be the
road towai'ds enlightenment. The text then continues: “following this
memory I had this knowledge: ‘This is really the road towards
enlightenment’.” In other words, also the Bodhisattva knew the path he
was to traverse, and knowledge of the Four Noble Truths could not
thereafter bring him anything new.
We observed that knowledge of the Four Noble Truths must come at
the beginning of the path leading to ‘the cessation of suffering’. We find
this confirmed in many places in the Buddhist canon. The first sermon
which the Buddha is supposed to have preached deals with them in many
of its versions (Bareau, 1963: 172 f.; Feer, 1870; Waldschmidt, 1951:
96 f. (176 f.)). Here his listeners are obviously completely uninitiated in
the Buddhist doctrine. Elsewhere the Four Noble Truths are often
presented as the preaching of the Buddha in a nutshell, as in the
following passage (SN V.438; similarly DN 1.189; MN 1.431; SN 11.223;
DAc p.llla21-22; MAc p.805c2-3):199
What then, monks, have I taught ? ‘This is suffering’; thus,
monks, have I taught. ‘This is the origin of suffering’; thus have I
taught. ‘This is the cessation of suffering’; thus have I taught.
kin ca, bhikkhave, may a akkhatam ? ‘ idam dukkham ti, bhikkhave , may a
akkhatam, ‘ayam diikkhasamudayo ti maya akkhatam, ‘ayam dukkhanirodho ti
maya akkhatam, ‘ayam dukkhanirodhagamini patipada ti maya akkhatam /
199
80
‘This is the path leading to the cessation of suffering’; thus have I
taught.
Here too they constitute what an aspirant must know before he can
actually go the path and become liberated.
The Four Noble Truths are specified at a number of places.200 The
specification shows what we knew already, viz., that the Four Noble
Truths must be known before one can properly start out upon the path;
the reason is that the Four Noble Truths specified contain a description of
the path to be traversed. I translate the Pali version:201
- This moreover, monks, is indeed the Noble Truth of suffering. Birth is
suffering, union with what is not dear is suffering, separation from
what is dear is suffering, that one does not get what one desires is
suffering. In short, the five aggregates of grasping are suffering.
- This moreover, monks, is indeed the Noble Truth of the origin of
suffering. It is the thirst which leads to renewed existence, is
accompanied by enjoyment and passion, finding its delight here and
there, viz., thirst for sensual pleasure, thirst for existence, thirst for
non-existence.
- This moreover, monks, is indeed the Noble Truth of the cessation of
suffering. It is the complete detachment from and cessation of that
same thirst, its rejection, renunciation, the liberation from it, the
absence of attachment to it.
- This moreover, monks, is indeed the Noble Truth of the path leading to
200 Vin I. 10; SN V. 421-22; Mv III. 332; CPS p. 158-62; T. 1421, p. 104b29-c7; T.
1428, p. 788al6-29; cf. DN II. 305-14; MN I. 185-91; SN V. 425, 426; AN I. 176-
77; MAc p. 435c26-436a6, p. 464b27f.; T. 109, p. 503b21-c2.
2^1 i dam kho pana, bhikkhave, dukkham ariyasaccam / jati pi dukkha, jara pi dukkha,
vyadhi pi dukkha, maranam pi dukkham, appiyehi sampayogo dukkho, piyehi
vippayogo dukkho, yam p'iccham na labhati tarn pi dukkham / samkhittena,
pahciipadanakkhandhapi dukkha / idam kho pana, bhikkhave, dukkhasamudayam
ariyasaccam / ya’yam tanha ponobbhavika nandiragasahagata tatratatrabhinandinl,
seyyathl’dam: kamatanha, bhavatanha, vibhavatanha / idam kho pana.bhikkhave,
dukkhanirodham ariyasaccam / yo tassa yeva tanhaya asesaviraga nirodho, cago,
patinissaggo, mutti, analayo / idam kho pana, bhikkhave, dukkhanirodhagamini
patipada ariyasaccam / ayam eva ariyo atthangiko maggo, seyyathl'dam:
sammaditthi, sammasankappo, sammavaca, sammakammanto, sammaajlvo,
sammavayamo, sammasati, sammasamadhi /
On the irregular gender of -nirodham and -samudayam, see von Hiniiber, 1976: 39 n.
28.
81
the cessation of suffering. It is the Noble Eightfold Road, viz., right
view, right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right
exertion, right mindfulness, right concentration.
A number of versions of the account of the Buddha’s first sermon202
give evidence that the Buddhists themselves did not feel comfortable
about recognizing the Four Noble Truths as liberating insight. They put
into the mouth of the Buddha some remarks with respect to each of these,
to the extent that the Noble Truth of suffering had to be fully known by
him, then that it was actually fully known by him; the Noble Truth of the
origin of suffering had to be abandoned, then was indeed abandoned; the
Noble Truth of the cessation of suffering had to be seen with his own
eyes, then it had indeed been seen with his own eyes; the Noble Truth of
the path leading to the cessation of suffering had to be practised, then it
had actually been practised by him. It is likely that these remarks are
later additions to the text.203 But it can be seen that they change the
picture of the Buddha at his moment of enlightenment considerably. No
longer does he simply know suffering, its origin, its cessation, and the
path leading thereto. He now knows suffering, has abandoned the origin
of suffering, has seen with his own eyes the cessation of suffering, and
has completed practising the path leading to the cessation of suffering.
The ill-fitting ‘liberating insight’ has in this was become something quite
different from just an insight. The fact that the texts add that all this was
clearly realized by the Buddha does not alter this at all.
The different versions of the first sermon in Benares show another
peculiarity, to which Bareau (1963: 178-81) has drawn attention. The
versions which belong to Vinaya texts (Vin I. 10-11; Mv III.33 1 f.;
T. 1421, p. 104b28-cl7; T. 1428, p. 788al4-b23) and the versions which
have apparently been adjusted to or influenced by the Vinaya versions
(SN V. 421-23; CPS p. 142 f.; SAC P 103cl4f.; T. 109; T. 110) contain the
part dealing with the Four Noble Truths; the versions which belong to
Sutra texts (MN I. 171-73; MAc p 778a; EAc p 593b24f.) do not. This
seems to indicate that initially those Four Noble Truths were not part of
202 Vin I. 1 1; SN V. 422; CPS p. 146-48; T. 1421 p. 104c7-17; T. 1428 p. 788al6-bl4;
cf. SN V. 424-25, 436; Mv III. 332-33.
2*^3 Feer, 1870: 429-35; Schmithausen, 1981: 203.
82
the sermon in Benares, and consequently probably not as central to
Buddhism as they came to be. We may surmise that the concise
formulation of the teaching of the Buddha in the shape of the Four Noble
Truths had not yet come into being, not necessarily that the contents of
this teaching deviated from what they were meant to express.204 If then
the Four Noble Truths did not yet exist when the primitive version of
what came to be known as the Dharmacakrapravartana Sutra was
composed, we can be sure that in that time they were not considered as
constituting the insight which immediately preceded and brought about
liberation. Let us be clear about it that we are not sure that the Four
Noble Truths had not yet been formulated in earliest Buddhism. But the
indications in that direction which we possess go a long way toward
undermining the idea that these Four Noble Truths constituted liberating
insight in earliest Buddhism.
If then, in all probability, neither the Four Noble Truths nor any of
the other, later, specifications of liberating insight which we find in the
Buddhist scriptures played this role in earliest Buddhism, how could they
come to fill this place? One answer we know already: it is likely that the
Buddhists were often asked what their liberating insight was like because
they believed in liberation in this life. It may be, however, that another
factor aided this development. The Buddhist texts often speak about
‘insight’ ( prajna / panna) as something immediately preceding
liberation205 or characterize the teaching of the Buddha as especially
concerning slla (‘morality’), samadhi (‘concentration’) and prajna
(‘insight’), to which sometimes vimukti (‘liberation’) is added.206 This
may have made it plausible to the Buddhists themselves that the
Buddhist doctrine knew some ‘liberating insight’ as well which had to be
specified. The choice fell on the Four Noble Truths and on the other
contents which we have seen were subsequently given to this insight.
204 ]\f0te that Dhammapada 191 expresses the same truth in different words: dukkham
dLikkhasamuppadam, sukkhassa ca atikkamam / ariyam c'atthangikam maggam,
diikkhupasamagaminatn //. Cf. Feer, 1870: 418f.
205 see Schmithausen, 1981: 216, and note 33 below.
206 E.g. DN I. 206, II. 8 1 , 9 1 ; AN II. 1-2, III. 1 5- 1 6, IV. 1 05-06; It 5 1 ; Th 634; MPS p.
160, 228; DAc p. 12a20f„ p. 13a3-4; MAc p. 486c23f.; T. 6 p. 178b5-6; T. 1421 p.
135b7.
83
What I propose can be expressed more specifically. Perhaps the
passages which now contain a description of ‘liberating insight’ as
consisting in the Four Noble Truths etc., originally merely made a short
reference to prajna. Later tradition inserted the Four Noble Truths etc. in
the place of prajna wherever possible. Such a replacement was not
however possible in the contexts where liberation comes about while
there is Cessation of Ideations and Feelings (samjna- / sannavedayita-
nirodha).201 There is properly speaking no place for such an insight here
because there are no ideations (see Schmithausen, 1981: 216-17; La
Vallee Poussin, 1937 b: 220). The replacement was not made and the
older short reference to prajna - which originally belonged after the
description of the Four Dhyanas - survived only here.
This proposal, though hypothetical, explains the facts which
confront us in the extant canon. However, it raises another question. If
prajna was originally not intended to refer to the Four Noble Truths etc.,
what then was it ? And whatever it was, does not this term clearly point
to some kind of liberating insight ?
The answer to these questions must be that prajna referred to some
unspecified and unspecifiable kind of insight. The reason to think so is as
follows. If my reconstructions up to now are correct, prajna became
necessary at the stage where the aspirant had reached the Fourth Dhyana.
It is not in accordance with the line of approach adopted in this book to
try and specify what kind of psychic state this fourth Dhyana - or any of
the other Dhyanas - is. It will be agreed, to use very general terms, that it
must be a state of consciousness different from what we call normal.
After reaching the fourth Dhyana the next step consists in the
‘destruction of the intoxicants (asava/ asrava)' . I have little doubt that
this phrase ‘destruction of the intoxicants’ sounded almost as mysterious
to the early listeners to the Buddha’s words as it sounds to us, the reason
being that it apparently refers to an inner-psychic process, the conditions
for which are not fulfilled until the fourth Dhyana has been reached. This
means that the aspirant had to find his way to the most crucial and
207 Since Cessation of Ideations and Feelings appears to be a borrowed element in
Buddhism (ch. VII, above), its mention in descriptions of liberation must be looked
upon as a later adjustment of an earlier text. This explains the puzzling mention of
insight (prajna) in a state without ideations.
84
decisive steps of the process which he was undergoing while in a state of
changed consciousness! One does not need to refer to psychiatric
literature in order to know that many altered states of consciousness
rather have the tendency to make a person lose his way. All this makes it
plausible that the aspirant who had reached the fourth Dhyana could do
with, or rather could not do without, an insight into his psychic state and
its possibilities. This, I propose, is prajna .208
If this proposal is correct, it is not without consequences for the way
the Buddha must have taught his advanced disciples. General statements
- such as the Four Noble Truths etc. - would not be of help to them, but
rather personal advice, adjusted to the needs of each person. It is
therefore in direct support of the above proposal that the two main Sutras
which record the ‘first sermon’ of the Buddha without mentioning the
Four Noble Truths, continue in a way which leaves no doubt regarding
the personal nature of the Buddha’s instruction (MN I. 173; similarly
MAc 778a3-5; cf. Bareau, 1963: 183f.):209
I could indeed, monks, convince the monks belonging to the group
of live. Monks, I instructed two monks, [while] three monks went
for alms. What the three monks who had gone for alms brought
with them, we six lived on that. Monks, I instructed three monks,
[while] two monks went for alms. What the two monks who had
gone for alms brought with them, we six lived on that.210
I do not claim that this passage embodies a memory of an historical
event. It does, however, appear to preserve the idea of how the early
208 This seems confirmed by, or at any rate in agreement with, phrases like asavanam
khayo pannaya sacchikaranlyo (DN III. 230; AN II. 183; cf. DAC p. 5 1 al 2);
pannaya ca me / c’assa disva asava parikkhayam agamamsu / parikhlna honti (e.g.
MN I. 160, 175; AN IV. 448, 453; cf. MAc p. 582a29; p. 701bl2; see
Schmithausen, 1981: 216 n.55); pahhaparibhavitam cittam sammad eva asavehi
vimuccati (e.g. DN II. 81, 91; cf. MPS p.160, 228; DAc p. 12a21-23).
209 asakkhim kho aham bhikkhave pahcavaggiye bhikkhu sahhapetum / dve pi sudam
bhikkhave bhikkhu ovadami. tayo bhikkhu pindaya caranti / yam tayo bhikkhu
pindaya caritva aharanti tena chabbaggo yapema / tayo pi sudam bhikkhave
bhikkhu ovadami. dve bhikkhu pindaya caranti / yam dve bhikkhu pindaya caritva
aharanti tena chabbaggo yapema /
210 Note that according to the Nidanakatha (p. 82) four of the five monks are each
instructed individually, while the remaining four go for alms. See Waldschmidt,
1951:96 (176).
85
monks conceived what the Buddha’s instruction had been like.
It is no doubt significant that the versions of the ‘first sermon’ which
do mention the Four Noble Truths - the ones which occur in Vinaya texts
or are influenced by them - do not contain the above episode (CPS
p.142 f.; T. 1421, p. 104b-105a; SN V. 421-24) or preserve part of it in a
context which completely changes the meaning of it (Vin. 1.13; T. 1428,
p. 789a). The five monks, moreover, become enlightened while the
Buddha is still preaching. This shows that the accounts which include the
Four Noble Truths had a completely different conception of the process
of liberation than the one which includes the Four Dhyanas and the
subsequent destruction of the intoxicants. This too supports our thesis
that the Four Noble Truths were inserted later in the description of
liberation by way of the Four Dhyanas and the destruction of the
intoxicants. This modified description represents a hybrid of two views
of the matter: according to one view an insight into the Four Noble
Truths is sufficient for enlightenment; according to the other view
liberation is rather attained by way of the Four Dhyanas and the
destruction of the intoxicants. We cannot but be struck, once again, by
the parallelism with main stream meditation, where we also find insight
alone, practice alone, and the combination of both insight and practice as
different ways to reach the goal. It is reasonable therefore to suspect
influence from that side.
We can sum up the results of this section by stating that there is
good reason to think that the Four Noble Truths did not constitute
liberating insight in the earliest period of Buddhism. However, they were
apparently considered to do so before any of the other ‘liberating
insights’ which we find specified in the canon took their place. We must
conclude that if the earliest Buddhist tradition acknowledged the
existence of any liberating insight at all - and it possibly did - this insight
remained unspecified. One of the main reasons why it came to be
specified must have been that in main stream meditation liberation in life
was always accompanied by an explicit ‘liberating insight’.
86
IX. The origin of Buddhist meditation.
9.1. We have seen that Buddhist meditation formed a tradition different
from the meditation and ascetic practices found in Jainism and in many
Hindu scriptures. There is little reason to doubt that this main stream of
asceticism existed before the beginnings of Buddhism, i.e. before the
historical Buddha. It is a far more interesting question, however, whether
Buddhist meditation existed before the Buddha. This will be investigated
in the present chapter.
9.2. Nothing like Buddhist meditation is, understandably, referred to in
early Jaina literature. Vedic literature is for the most part silent about any
form of meditation. Not until the oldest Upanisads do we find any
references to it. The earliest sentence211 that is of interest to us is
Brhadaranyaka Upanisad (BAU) 4.4.23: tasmad evamvic chanto danta
uparatas titiksuh samahito 212 bhutvatmany evatmanam „ pasyati
“Therefore, knowing this, having become calm, subdued, quiet, patiently
enduring, concentrated, one sees the soul in oneself.”
It is most probable that this sentence refers to main stream
meditation. However, its brevity and consequent lack of information
leave this to some extent undecided. In order to invalidate the opinion
that perhaps this sentence refers to an earlier form of meditation of the
Buddhistic type, I shall try to show that this sentence is later than the
beginnings of Buddhism, i.e., later than the Buddha. I shall present a
number of arguments, of varying force, in support of this.213
2H Chandogya Upanisad 8.15 has ... atmani sarvendriyani sampratisthapy[a\ ...
“having concentrated his senses upon the soul”. This, if it refers to meditation at all,
then clearly to that of the main stream. Taittirlya Upanisad 2.4 identifies a number
of abstract things with the parts of a person. Here the phrase occurs: yoga atma.
This is most naturally translated: “exertion is the body”. There is no reason
whatever, contextual or otherwise, to think that yoga here refers to anything like
meditation. The word yoga is not attested in that sense until rather late; even the
entry yuja samadhau in Panini's Dhatupatha (IV. 68) was added after Patanjali
(Bronkhorst, 1983: § 1).
212. Thus the Kanva version. The Madhyandina version has sraddhavittah".
213. i am of course looking forward to the definitive study announced by M.Witzel
(e.g. StII 13/14, 1987, p.407 n.96).
87
9.2.1. My first argument is based on Horsch, 1966: 39 If. I shall briefly
and in a somewhat modified way restate Horsch’s view.
Sutra 4.3.105 of Panini’s Astadhyayl reads: puranaproktesu
brahmanakalpesu [tena proktam 101, ninih 103] “In the case of
Brahmana and Kalpa works uttered by ancient [sages], [the taddhita
suffix] nini is [semantically equivalent to]214 tena proktam (‘uttered by
him’).” Katyayana restricts the scope of this sutra in his first and only
varttika on it (vol.II, p.326, 1.12-13): puranaproktesu brahmanakalpesu
yajhavalkyaddibhyah pratisedhas tulyakalatvat “A prohibition [of P.
4.3.105:] puranaproktesu brahmanakalpesu [must be stated] after
yajnavalkya etc., because [they are] of the same time.” Patanjali explains
(1. 14-16): puranaproktesu brahmanakalpesv ity atra yajhavalkyadibhyah
pratisedho vaktavyah / yajhavalkani brahmananl / saulabhanlti / kim
karanam / tulyakalatvat / etany api tulyakalanlti //. We learn from this
that, according to Patanjali, the Brahmana works uttered by Yajnavalkya,
rather than Yajnavalkya himself, are meant to be considered ‘of the same
time’ in this varttika.
The sense requires, in spite of Kaiyata, that the Brahmana works
uttered by Yajnavalkya are of the same time as Panini. We do not have to
take such a remark by Katyayana very literally. It is doubtful whether
Katyayana was well informed about Panini’s time, for tradition had not
even been able to preserve knowledge regarding certain essential features
of the Astadhyayl (see Kiparsky, 1980; Bronkhorst, 1980). We must
rather understand from this varttika that Katyayana was still aware of the
recent origin of the ‘Brahmana works uttered by Yajnavalkya’.
But Katyayana must also have been aware that these Brahmana
works were ascribed to an ancient sage, for otherwise this varttika would
serve no purpose in the context of P. 4.3.105 which is about ‘Brahmana
and Kalpa works uttered by ancient sages’. What Katyayana must have
had in view was a Brahmana work recently composed and ascribed to
Yajnavalkya, where in reality Yajnavalkya was an ancient sage who
could not have composed this work.
This description fits BAU 3-4 very well. Since Panini does not use
the term Upanisad in connection with Vedic literature, and divides Vedic
214 I translate as proposed by Wezler (1975: 5 etc.)
88
literature in mantra, brahmana and kalpa (cf. Thieme, 1935: 67f.), his use
of the word brahmana is wide and fit to cover the BAU. This is all the
more true since the BAU is, indeed, the last part of the Satapatha
Brahmana (SB 14.4-9). Moreover, the subsections of the BAU are called
brahmana in their colophons. The reason that BAU 3-4 must be meant by
Katyayana, rather than any other text, is that only here Yajnavalkya is
clearly the dominating person. Yajnavalkya is mentioned elsewhere,
primarily in SB 1-4 and 11-13, further Jaiminlya Brahmana 1.19, 23;
2.76; Sahkhayana Aranyaka 9.7 and 13.1, but nowhere as the sole
dominating figure. Moreover, the BAU is one of the youngest parts of
the SB.
Horsch (1966: 396) further shows that the compilatory nature of the
SB was still known to Patanjali215 and the Mahabhamta.216 This further
corroborates that BAU 3-4 is late.
The facts (i) that Panini does not make an exception for the
yajhavalkani brahmanani, (ii) that Katyayana indicates that he considers
these recent, and (iii) that Patanjali still knows the compilatory nature of
the SB, allow of the conclusion that BAU 3-4 is later than Panini and but
little earlier than Katyayana. Patanjali lived probably in the middle of the
second century B.C. (Cardona, 1976: 263-66). If we assume that
Katyayana wrote a century earlier, BAU 3-4 very well fits in the time
after the death of the Buddha, even if we accept this to have taken place
as late as 370 B.C. (Bechert, 1982).217
Patanjali - in a verse on P. 4.2.60 - appears to have known a work named
S„ astipatha, which may have contained sixty of the present one hundred Adhyayas
of the SB. Weber (1850b: 185n.) assumed that these are the sixty Adhyayas of the
first nine books of the SB. But Minard (1968) argues for the sixty Adhyayas
contained in books I-V (35) and XI-XIII (25) of the Madhyandina recension.
-16 Mahabharata 12.306.16 (where Yajnavalkya speaks) reads:
tu tub satapatham krtsnam sarahasyarn sasamgraham /
cakre saparisesam ca harsena paramena ha //
Here Yajnavalkya is said to have composed the whole of the SB. In BAU 6.5.3
(, adityanimani suklani yajumsi vajasaneyena yajhavalkyenakhyayante),
Yajnavalkya is said to have declared the sacrificial formulas of the Vajasaneyi
school. Patanjali’s yajhavalkani brahmanani may therefore cover all the later
portions of the SB, not just, but certainly including, BAU 3-4. See Weber, 1850a:
57n.; Goldstucker, 1861: 146f.
-17. The section on Panini's acquaintance with the Vedic Samhitas (§9.2.2.), which
followed in the first edition of this book, has now been superseded by Bronkhorst,
1991.
89
9.2.3. Further evidence regarding the late date of the BAU, and of the
later chapters of the SB as well, can be derived from a closer inspection
of the figure of Yajnavalkya.
Pronouncements of Yajnavalkya occur repeatedly in SB 1-4. There
is no reason to doubt that he was an authority on ritual, along with other
ritualists. He appears again in SB 11-13, but often in a legendary context:
a number of times he is depicted as debating with king Janaka of Videha.
Moreover, since these parts of the SB are younger than its beginning
(Eggeling, 1882: xxixf.; Weber, 1876: 130f.), we may assume that, at
this time, Yajnavalkya had become a legendary person.218 This is
confirmed by the fact that later again (in the BAU and the Mahabharata )
Yajnavalkya’ s fame had reached such proportions that he is said to have
declared the sacrificial formulas ( yajus ) and composed the SB (see note
6). This development is parallel to the one of Sakalya, who, really being
the maker of the Padapatha of the Rgveda, came to be considered the
person who had ‘seen’ the Veda (see below).
The parallel development of Yajnavalkya and Sakalya is of special
significance for the chronological problem we are investigating, as
follows. At SB 2.5. 1.2 Yajnavalkya’ s opinion is contrasted with that of
the rc, and therefore of the Rgvedins. A way of visualizing this disagree-
ment would be to describe a debate between Yajnavalkya and Sakalya.
And indeed, we find such a debate described twice over, at SB 11.6.3
and BAU 3.9.1-26. Both times the debate ends in the utter defeat and
consequent death of Sakalya.219 The important fact is that the
disagreement between the followers of Yajnavalkya and the Rgvedins
could not be visualized in this way until after Sakalya had become the
most important representative of the Rgveda, rather than merely the
representative of one of its versions and the maker of its Padapatha.
What we know about the development of the legend of Sakalya can
be summarized as follows : Panini’s Astadhyayi and Yaska’s Nirukta
know him as an early grammarian and as the maker of the Padapatha of
218. This is more extensively established in Horsch, 1966: 380f.
- 11!. The Rgvedins perhaps took revenge by not mentioning Yajnavalkya in their
Kausltaki Upanisad, in spite of mentioning Uddalaka Aruni and Svetaketu who
occur in the BAU (Esnoul, 1968: 280).
90
the Rgveda. In Patanjali’s Mahabhasya he has become the redactor of the
Rgveda Samhita (Bronkhorst, 1981: 142-43, 147), and apparently the
most important representative of the Rgveda. In the Anuvakanukramani
Sakalya is even said to have seen the Veda (Bronkhorst, 1982b: §4). The
legend of the debate between Yajnavalkya and Sakalya seems to fit best
at a time closer to Patanjali than to Panini, i.e., closer to 150 B.C. than to
350 B.C.220
9.2.4. We turn to a question which is directly related to our chronological
observations. The SB, including the BAU, is one of the late Vedic texts
which preserve Vedic accents. Both were composed in a time when
Vedic accents were still in use. Also the language described by Panini
contains Vedic accents as an integral part. If then the origin of Buddhism
is earlier than (portions of) the BAU, can it be that the earliest layers of
Buddhist literature contain indications that Vedic accent was still used ?
An affirmative answer to this question has been given by Levi
(1915, esp. p. 426-47), in a study where he shows, on the basis of Vinaya
texts of a variety of schools,221 that in an early period the tendency
existed to use Sanskrit with Vedic accent in the recitation of Buddhist
texts. Levi thinks that this accent could not have been transposed
mechanically from the sacred texts of the Veda onto the sacred texts of
Buddhism and concludes (1915: 447): “Les premier essais de litterature
canonique iraient done rejoindre l’epoque des derniers textes accentues
du canon vedique: le Brahmana, l’Aranyaka des Taittiriya et le Satapatha
Brahmana.”
Levi ai'gues his case on the basis of texts taken from the Vinaya
work Skandhaka. This allows us - with Frauwallner (1956b: 62-63) - to
be more precise about the period when Vedic accents were still in use.
The Skandhaka was composed, according to Frauwallner (1956b: 67),
shortly before or after the second council, which is at least 40 years after
--*4 This is the date which best seems to fit the evidence studied by Hiniiber, 1989:
34-35.
--1. The most important passages have again been discussed by Brough (1980), who
gives references to the Taisho edition for the Chinese passages (p. 37), and refutes
Norman's (1971: 329-31; cf. 1980: 61-63) alternative interpretation of a Pali
passage. Also see Lin Li-kouang, 1949: 216f; Demieville, 1929; Lamotte, 1958:
610f.;De Jong, 1982:215.
91
the demise of the Buddha (Bechert, 1982: 36). Parts of the BAU may
therefore be as late as this period. The fact that the bhasika accent used in
the SB is later than the accent system described by Panini (Kiparsky,
1982: 74) agrees well with the above results.
9.2.5. Perhaps conclusions can be drawn from the fact that BAU 2.1222
features a Ksatriya named ‘Ajatasatru’. Ajatasatru is approached by
Drptabalaki Gargya, who proposes to tell about Brahman. Ajatasatru
offers thousand (cows) in response, and compares himself to Janaka, the
former king of Videha. Apparently also Ajatasatru was a king. Our text
describes him as kasya, which can be taken to mean that he ruled over
Kasi.
The name223 Ajatasatru occurs nowhere in Vedic literature except
here in the BAU and in the parallel version in Kausltaki Upanisad 4. It is,
however, well-known from Buddhist literature. Ajatasatru (Pali
‘Ajatasattu’) is there described as the son of king Bimbisara, from whom
he seized the throne eight years before the death of the Buddha
(Malalasekera, 1937-38: 1: 31-35, s.v. Ajatasattu).
A serious difficulty is that the Buddhist texts depict Ajatasatru as
king of Magadha, not Kasi. He is not, to be sure, entirely without
connection with Kasi. He is said to have fought battles in Kasi against
king Prasenajit (Pasenadi) of Kosala and to have come in the possession
of a village in Kasi (Malalasekera, 1937-38: I: 33). Ajatasatru later
reputedly battled and defeated king Cetaka of Vaisali, who was joined,
among others, by the ganarajas of Kasi (Lamotte, 1958: 100-01).
The discussion between Gargya and Ajatasatru in the BAU (and in
the Kausltaki Up.) is clearly legendary. This means that if there ever was
a king Ajatasatru of Kasi, he must have lived a considerable time before
this discussion was laid down, long enough, perhaps, to make a
confusion between Kasi and Magadha possible. If, further, this
Ajatasatru is identical with the king who ruled over Magadha during the
Almost the same episode, with the same actors (Balaki for Drptabalaki), is found
at Kausltaki Upanisad 4 (= Sankhayana Aranyaka 6).
--3. The word ajatasatru ‘whose enemies are unborn, having no enemies’ occurs in
several Vedic Samhitas, but not as a name.
92
last years of the Buddha’s life,224 we can be sure that this part of the
BAU was composed a considerable time after the Buddha.
9.2.6. BAU 2.4 and BAU 4.5 give two versions of a discussion between
Yajnavalkya and one of his wives, Maitreyi. The former version appears
to be the older one. Hanefeld (1976: 71-115) has argued that two
independent texts underlie it, one (BAU 2. 4.5-6, 12 [na pretya ] - 14)
dealing with the atman, the other (BAU 2.4.7-12 [vinasyati]) dealing
with mahad bhutam. This latter concept has a universal-cosmic aspect, in
that mahad bhutam is said to be the origin of all literary texts (BAU
2.4.10). At the same time it has an individual aspect, viz. vijhana
‘discerning knowledge’: BAU 2.4.12 describes the mahad bhutam as a
mass of discerning knowledge (vijhanaghana) . The ‘Great Being’
(mahad bhutam ) apparently unites a universal-cosmic and an individual
aspect.
But classical Samkhya unites these two aspects in its mahan /
buddhi as well, whereas the Samkhya texts in the Mahabharata do not, or
hardly, do so (Frauwallner, 1925: 200f. (76f.)). Hanefeld (1976: 114-15)
raises the question as to whether or not the older Upanisads in their
present form must be dated much later than has generally been supposed.
9.2.7. We come to an important point. Buddhism presupposes a belief in
transmigration determined by one’s preceding (mental or physical)
behaviour or state.225 The BAU, on the other hand, presents such a belief
as something new. At BAU 3.2.13 Yajnavalkya takes Jaratkarava
Artabhaga apart to inform him, in secret, about karman. “What they said
was karma (action). What they praised was karma. Verily, one becomes
good by good action, bad by bad action.” (tr. Hume, 1931: 110). Similar
remarks occur at BAU 4.4.5. A more primitive idea seems to prevail at
BAU 6.2.16. Does this not show that the BAU represents an earlier phase
in the development of these ideas, and that it is consequently older than
--A This point of view was accepted by Hoernle (1907: 106) and, it seems, by Lassen
(Weber, 1850b: 213).
--A See Schmithausen (1986: 205), who points out that craving (trsna) etc., rather than
karman. is said to be responsible for suffering and rebirth in numerous canonical
texts.
93
the beginning of Buddhism ?
Not necessarily. The BAU originated in surroundings quite different
from those of early Buddhism. The former was part of an esoteric
movement confined to Brahmins who dwelt in villages; the latter centred
in the cities (cf. Horsch, 1966: 400). What is more, Jainism, as much as
Buddhism, presupposes a belief in transmigration determined by one’s
preceding behaviour or state (cf. Malvania, 198 1).226 But Jainism may
have existed, in the form preached by Parsva (Pkt. Pasa), as many as 250
ycai's before Mahavira (Schubring, 1935: 24f.), which is certainly earlier
than the BAU. Therefore it is not possible to see in the passages on
transmigration in the BAU evidence that this Upanisad preceded the
Buddha. Rather, they may have been attempts to sanctify a belief which
was anyhow irresistibly gaining adherents among the Brahmins.
There is some reason to think that the early Buddhists were
confronted with people who did not believe in transmigration of the kind
described:
The majority of versions of the long account of the enlightenment of
the Buddha describe three insights:227 memory of earlier lives;
knowledge of the births and deaths of beings; knowledge regarding the
destruction of the intoxicants. Only the third insight has an obvious
connection with liberation, which consists in the destruction of the
intoxicants. The first two insights make the impression of having been
added to the text which underlay these versions, and which was therefore
without these first two insights.
And indeed, one version of the long account of the Buddha’s
liberation survives in which only the knowledge regarding the
destruction of the intoxicants precedes final liberation: a Sutra of the
Sarvastivadins (MAc p. 589cl4-23). A closer study of all these parallel
versions - undertaken by Bareau (1963: 8 If.) - confirms that the long
--6. Jaini (1980: 225-29) thinks that certain ‘inconsistencies’ of the Jaina doctrine may
point to an earlier linear-evolutionary scheme similar to that of the Ajivikas, and
asks (p. 227-28): “Is it possible that, for the Jainas, the doctrine of karma represents
a relatively late (albeit prehistorical) accretion, a set of ideas imposed upon [that
linear-evolutionary scheme]?” Even if this is indeed the case, we must date this
‘accretion’ well before Mahavira.
227 . MN I. 22-23, 1 17, 247-49; EAc p. 666b22-c20; T. 1421, p. 102cl8-20; T. 1428 p.
781 b5-c 1 1 . These passages have been translated and discussed by Bareau (1963:
75f.), whom I mainly follow.
94
account of the Buddha’s liberation originally made no mention of his
earlier lives and of the knowledge of the births and deaths of beings.
Schmithausen (1981: 221-22, n. 75) comes to the same conclusion,
also basing himself on texts which describe the way to salvation for
others than the Buddha. The Madhyama Agama (T. 26), Schmithausen
observes, seems to have fewer accounts with memory of earlier lives and
knowledge of the births and deaths of beings, than without.
Schmithausen further points at the difference in tense in the description
of this memory and of the knowledge of the birth and death of beings
(present tense), and everywhere else in the account (aorists).
Why then were these first two insights added? The reason must be
sought in the circumstance that what the Buddha realized in his moment
of liberation cannot but be the most essential in Buddhism (see § 8.4,
above). The memory of earlier lives and the knowledge of the births and
deaths of beings may therefore have been added in order to press a point
which was considered essential to the teaching of the Buddha. There can
be no doubt that this point is the belief in transmigration determined by
one’s earlier behaviour or state.
The faculty to remember former lives is not, in most of Buddhist
literature, confined to Buddhist sages (Demieville, 1928). This seems to
indicate that soon belief in transmigration had become common to
Buddhists and all those they were confronted with. But in such a time the
addition of the memory of former lives and of the knowledge of the
births and deaths of beings to the account of the Buddha’s liberating
insight would be inexplicable. We must rather assume that this addition
took place when such a belief had not yet become common to all.228
Among those who were not yet fully convinced we may have to count
the Brahmins. These had to wait until new ‘old’ scriptures like the BAU
gave them free way to accept this belief.
In this connection it must be pointed out that the Buddhist canon
knows a few characters who deny transmigration and the moral efficacy
of acts. One is Payasi, appearing in the Payasi Sutta (DN II. 3 1 6f . ; cf.
228 . At least twice the Jaina canon mentions the memory of former lives, but not
together with the knowledge of the births and deaths of beings. It seems less
concerned with establishing the correctness of rebirth. See Samavaya 10.2, and
Tatia and Kumar, 1980: 37, 39.
95
DAc p. 42bf.). Then there are some of the six heretic teachers, in
particular Ajita Kesakambalin and Purana Kasyapa (Malalasekara, 1937-
38: I: 37; Basham, 1951: 10-26; Vogel, 1970: 20-21). It is, however,
unlikely, at least in the case of Payasi, that we must see in his opinion a
leftover from early times. Payasi’s opinion is described as very
exceptional, not held by anyone known to his opponent Kumara Kassapa.
Further, in the Jaina version of the story of Payasi - there Paesi - in the
Rayapasenaijja, the second Uvaiiga of the Jaina canon, this opinion is not
ascribed to Paesi; see Leumann, 1885b: 467-539.
9.2.8. A possible counterargument against some of the preceding
arguments will be that the language of the BAU still contains Vedic
features, and must therefore be older than classical Sanskrit, older also
than the grammar of classical Sanskrit which is Panini’s Astadhyayi.
This counterargument can be answered by pointing out that there is
reason to believe that Vedic and classical Sanskrit were used for some
time side by side. Since this point has been discussed elsewhere
(Bronkhorst, 1982c), I need not dwell upon it here.
9.3. The preceding observations have made it clear that no traces of a
pre-Buddhistic form of ‘Buddhist meditation’ survive in the non-
Buddhist literature of India. What do the Buddhist scriptures say in this
regard ?
9.3.1. We have become acquainted with a number of descriptions of non-
Buddhist religious practices in the Buddhist canon in the course of this
book. None of them ascribe to outsiders what we have come to regard as
authentic Buddhist meditation.
In this connection it deserves notice that the ideas in the canon
usually ascribed to the ‘six heretics’ contain nothing regarding
meditation (see Basham, 1951: 10-26; Vogel, 1970). 229
The Buddhist canon tells us that the Buddha learned the Stage of
Nothingness and the Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation from
229. The opinions ascribed to these heretics may have been put together on the basis of
different sources; see Basham, 1951: 25, 218-19; Norman, 1976a: 120-21.
96
two teachers, Arada Kalama and Udraka the son of Rama. Since the two
stages which they allegedly taught him are not part of authentic Buddhist
meditation (see ch. VII, above), we cannot draw any conclusions
regarding pre-Buddhistic ‘Buddhist meditation’ from this account.
9.3.2. If then the Buddhist scriptures contain no reliable information that
the Buddha got his meditational techniques from someone else, they
contain some very clear passages that claim that the Buddha discovered
these techniques himself.
First among these is the passage in which the Buddha to be
remembers how he reached the First Dhyana while still a child (§ 1.5,
above). On the basis of this memory he is then said to have discovered
the path leading to liberation.
Second come the passages where the Buddha is said to have made
his discoveries ‘among the things ( dharma ) which had not been heard of
before’.230 The phrase pubbe ananussutesu dhammesu cakkhum udapadi,
nanain udapadi, panda udapadi, vijja udapadi, aloko udapadi and its
equivalents in other languages occur in many different contexts.231 In the
‘first sermon’ it applies to the Four Noble Truths and consequently to the
path of liberation discovered by the Buddha. Since this appears to be the
oldest context to which the phrase applies, we must again conclude that
the path taught by the Buddha, including his method of meditation, was
considered a new discovery by his early followers.
9.4. We can sum up our findings regarding the origin of Buddhist
meditation as follows. None of the early scriptures of India, whether
Buddhist or non-Buddhist, contain any indication that the Buddhist form
of meditation existed prior to the beginnings of Buddhism. Some
passages in the Buddhist canon, on the other hand, describe the Buddha
as an innovator, also where the technique of meditation is concerned.
230 purvam ananusrutesu dharmesu / pubbe ananussutesu dhammesu. See CPS p. 1 44-
48; Mv III. 332-33; Vin 1.1 1; SN II. 10-11, 105; IV. 233-34; V. 178-79; 258, 422;
AN III. 9; cf. SAC p. 103c- 104a; T. 1428, p. 788 a-b. T. 1421, p. 104c7 etc.
interprets, no doubt incorrectly, ‘things ( dharma ) which had not before been heard
of by me'.
231. It is a ‘pericope'. For an explanation and application of this useful concept see
Griffiths, 1983.
97
There seems little reason to doubt that Buddhist meditation was
introduced by the founder of Buddhism, i.e., by the historical Buddha.
98
X. Pratyekabuddhas, the Sutta Nipata, and the early Sangha.
10.1. The previous chapter has made it clear that the early Buddhist
tradition supports the view that the method of salvation preached by the
Buddha was new and unknown before him. Unfortunately this point of
view was not retained in the Buddhist tradition. On the one hand the
historical Buddha came to be looked upon as one in a chain of Buddhas.
On the other hand, a second category of Buddhas came to be accepted -
the Pratyekabuddhas (P. Paccekabuddha) - who obtained enlightenment
without the help of a Buddha ( Sarny aksambuddha, P. Sammasambuddha,
contrasted with Pratyekabuddha), and did not preach the doctrine; they
were supposed to have lived in periods not covered by the preaching of a
Samyaksambuddha, i.e., before Sakyamuni.
The acceptance of Pratyekabuddhas conflicts with our assumptions
in a way which demands attention. The Pali canon, it is believed,
preserves utterances of Pratyekabuddhas in the Khaggavisana Sutta of
the Sutta Nipata. This belief has essentially been accepted in a recent
study by Wiltshire (1990), 232 who further argues that the Pratyekabuddha
tradition in Buddhism preserves the memory of the time before
Sakyamuni.
There is no doubt that the Khaggavisana Sutta is old. It is
commented upon in the canonical Culla Niddesa. At the same time, it
contains an unmistakable reference to the Fourth Dhyana in Sn 67. 233
Does this mean that the four Dhyanas were already known before
Sakyamuni ?
232. Wiltshire (1990:17) takes care to state that he regards the Gathas of the
Khaggavisana Sutta “as shedding light conceptually on [Pratyekabuddhas]’-.
233 vipitthikatvana sukham dukhan ca
pubbe va ca somanadomanassam
laddhan ' upekham samatham visuddham
eko care khaggavisanakappo
“Turning one's back on bliss and pain,
and earlier already on cheerfulness and dejection.
Obtaining pure indifference and calm,
one should walk alone like the horn of a rhinoceros.”
Compare this with the description of the Fourth Dhyana in § 1.5, above.
99
The answer to this question must be negative. There is no evidence
that the Khaggavisana Sutta is pre-Sakyamuni. Rather, this Sutra
contains a clear indication that it is later than ‘our’ Buddha: it refers to
him. Sn 54cd reads:234 “Observing the word of Adiccabandhu, one
should walk alone like the horn of a rhinoceros.” Adiccabandhu
‘kinsman of the Adicca family’ (Fausboll, 1881: 8) is “[a]n often-used
epithet of the Buddha” (Malalasekara, 1937-38: I: 245). In Sn 423 - to
take but one example - the Buddha specifies the family to which he
belonged as follows:235 “Adiccas by lineage, Sakiyas by birth; from that
family I have wandered forth, oh king, not longing for sensual
pleasures.” The Khaggavisana Sutta must therefore have been composed
after, or at the earliest during the preaching of the Buddha.
How then could it be thought of as being composed by Pratyeka-
buddhas ? The commentators obviously invented this explanation in
order to be able to keep the Sutta without having to draw the
consequences.236 We must conclude that here again we have no reason to
think that the Four Dhyanas existed before Sakyamuni.
10.2. Why were the later Buddhists hesitant to accept the Khaggavisana
Sutta as part of the post-Sakyamuni tradition ? The answer is not
difficult. The Khaggavisana Sutta celebrates the lonely wanderer. The
later Buddhist monk, on the other hand, was part of a community of
monks, and lived as a rule in a monastery. Solitary life was no longer
common.
But the Khaggavisana Sutta constitutes evidence that in the early
days of Buddhism monks did often live alone. Other parts of the canon
confirm this. The solitary life is often praised in the Sutta Nipata,
Dhammapada, Thera Gatha, and elsewhere.237 Life in monasteries seems
-34. adiccabandhussa vaco nisamma
eko care khaggavisanakappo.
235. adicca nama gottena, sakiya nama jatiya
tamha kula pabbajito ' mhi raja na kame abhipatthayam
236. Pj II. 1 04, Ap-a 181, Nidd II. 103.
237 Cf. Nakamura, 1979: 574-75. Przyluski (1926: 292) surmises that solitary
ascetics primarily joined Buddhism in western regions, whereas in the east groups
of monks travelled with a teacher. He derives support from the 12th Khandhaka of
the Cullavagga (Vin II. 299) where arannakas are found to be numerous in the west,
no mention of them being made in the east, at the time of the Second Council.
100
to be still rather uncommon in the time the Vinaya work called
Skandhaka was composed (Frauwallner, 1956b: 121), i.e., at least forty
years after the death of the Buddha (p. 117 above). This same work
prescribed that “the monk should ... live under trees” (Frauwallner,
1956b: 74). Life in monasteries probably developed out of the habit to
spend the rainy season at one place (Olivelle, 1974; Dutt, 1962: 53f.).
Before this took place, and perhaps also to some extent simultaneously
with it, followers of the Buddha led a wandering and often solitary life.
Works like the Sutta Nipata, Dhammapada and Thera Gatha derived
wholly or in part from these early wanderers. This is confirmed by the
fact that these works or parts of them are known to be among the oldest
portions of the Buddhist canon.238 The language of parts of the Sutta
Nipata is archaic (Fausboll, 1881: xi-xii). The Atthaka Vagga, Parayana
and Khaggavisana Sutta - all part of the Sutta Nipata - are commented
upon in the Niddesa, itself considered a canonical work. The
Arthavarglyani Sutrani (= Atthaka Vagga) are referred to in all the
versions corresponding to the original Skandhaka (Frauwallner, 1956b:
149; Levi, 1915: 401-17; Bapat, 1951: Intr. p. 1-2). Other early
enumerations often include Parayana, Satyadrsa ( Satyadrsta ), Munigatha,
Sailagatha, probably all of them corresponding to parts of the Sutta
Nipata; and Dharmapada, Thera ( Sthavira ) Gatha 239 (Lamotte, 1956:
258-61; 1957: 346-47).
10.3. If then the Sutta Nipata and other collections of verses arose in
circles where solitary wandering was held in high esteem, one might
expect that these works in particular are likely to show traces of outside
influence. Wanderers are more exposed to such influence than monks
who reside in monasteries among their likes.
Many of the verses in these works arc such that they would be
acceptable to Buddhists and non-Buddhists alike. They cannot help us to
find outside influence. Some verses of the Sutta Nipata however do show
such influence:
Bechert (1961: 43f.) argues for a long and complicated history of the origin of
the Thera and Then Gatha.
239 On the correspondence of Thera and Sthavira Gatha see Bechert, 1961: 10-12.
101
The Dvayatanupassana Sutta (Sn 724-65) enumerates a number of
items - many of them also occur in the Pratrtyasamutpada - which cause
suffering. Three of them are: arambha ‘effort’, ahara ‘food’, ihjita
‘movement’ (Sn 744-51). These three, like the other ones, have to be
suppressed in order to prevent further suffering. Suppression of effort,
food and movement sounds much like the asceticism we encountered in
Jainism and Hinduism; the use of arambha as a synonym of karman is
familiar from the Jaina texts we studied in chapter III, above. Asceticism
( tapas ) is often approvingly referred to (Sn 77; 267; 284; 292; 655).
Sleep is disapproved of (Sn 926).240
The presence of borrowed elements in the Sutta Nipata and other
collections of verses may be part of the reason why the canonicity of
these works - though old - remained uncertain (Lamotte, 1956; 1957).
240 Main stream asceticism includes restriction of breathing, as we know. This is
possibly meant in Sn 1090-91, where a question and answer regarding the one
without desire, thirst and doubt is translated as follows by Fausboll (1881:
202-03): “Is he without breathing or is he breathing ... ? ... He is without breathing,
he is not breathing ...” (nirasaso so uda asasano ... nirasaso so na so asasano ...).
This translation can be defended by deriving -asasa and asasana from a-svas.
However, most scholars take the sense of these verses differently, either by
accepting a v.l. (nirasayo; asamana) or by interpreting the words in another way
(see CPD s.v. -asasa. asasana).
Dixit (1978: 86-92) argues that “there are Suttanipata passages which throw
interesting light on certain technical concepts of Jainism, concepts which obviously
are not current among Buddhists” (p. 87). He concludes that “the presumption is
strengthened that the two traditions were particularly close kins in the beginning”
(p. 92). The Sutta Nipata does not share many lines with the oldest books of the
Jainas (Bollee, 1980).
102
Conclusion
XI. The position and character of early Buddhist meditation.
11.1. The results of this study can be briefly restated as follows : in the
ancient Indian religious movements other than Buddhism there was a
tradition of asceticism and meditation which can be described and
understood as direct and consistent answers to the belief that action leads
to misery and rebirth. In this tradition some attempted to abstain from
action, literally, while others tried to obtain an insight that their real self,
their soul, never partakes of any action anyhow. Combinations of these
two answers were also formed.
The Buddhist scriptures criticize this tradition repeatedly. Yet
practices and ideas connected with this tradition appear to have made
their way into the Buddhist community. Some of these practices and
ideas even came to occupy rather central positions in the Buddhist
tradition. Practices of this kind include the Eight Liberations, or at any
rate the last five steps of them, which also occur in other contexts in the
Buddhist canon; and the Brahmic States. Among the ideas which
influenced Buddhism, the gradual postponement of liberation to the time
after death, and the prominence of an explicit liberating insight must be
mentioned.
11.2. We have come as far as philology could take us, it seems. For a
further understanding of Buddhist meditation, philology will probably
not be of much help. An altogether different approach may be required to
proceed further. Such a different approach does not fall within the scope
of the present book. I may return to it in another study.
103
Abbreviations
AMg.
Ardha Magadhi
AN
Anguttara Nikaya (PTS ed.)
Ap-a
Apadana-atthakatha (PTS ed.)
ApDhS
Apastambiya Dharma Sutra
Av.
Avassaya Sutta
Ayar.
Ayaramga Sutta
bAu
Brhadaranyaka Upanisad
BhG
Bhagavad Gita
CPD
Critical Pali Dictionary
CPS
Catusparisatsutra
dAc
Dirghagama (T. 1)
Daso
Dasottara Sutra (= Mittal, 1957, and Schlingloff, 1962)
Dhs
Dhammasaiigani
DN
Digha Nikaya (PTS ed.)
eAc
Ekottara Agama (T. 125)
HYPr
Hatha Yoga Pradipika of Svatmarama
It
Itivuttaka (PTS ed.)
KU
Katha Upanisad
mAc
Madhyamagama (T. 26)
MBh
Mahabharata
MN
Majjhima Nikaya (PTS ed.)
MPS
Mahaparinirvanasutra (ed. Waldschmidt)
MU
Maitrayaniya Upanisad
MuktU
Muktika Upanisad
Mv
Mahavastu
NiddI
Maha-niddesa (PTS ed.)
104
Nidd II
Culla-niddesa (PTS ed.)
P.
Pali
Patis
Patisambhida-magga (PTS ed.)
Patis-a
Saddhammapakasini (Ct. on Patis), Bangkok 1922
Pj II
Sutta-nipata-atthakatha, Paramattha-jotika II (PTS ed.)
Pkt.
Prakrit
Pp
Puggala-pannatti (PTS ed.)
PTS
Pali Text Society
SAC
Samyuktagama (T. 99)
Sang
Sangiti Sutra (= Stache-Rosen, 1968)
SB
Satapatha-Brahmana (Madhyandina version)
SN
Samyutta Nikaya
Sn
Sutta-nipata (PTS ed.)
Sp
Samanta-pasadika, ct. on Vin (PTS ed.)
Suy.
Suyagadamga Sutta
T.
Taisho edition of the Tripitaka in Chinese
Th
Thera-gatha (PTS ed.)
Than.
Thanamga Sutta
Ud
Udana (PTS ed.)
Uttar.
Uttarajjhayana
Uvav.
Uvavaiya
Vin
Vinaya-pitaka I-V (PTS ed.)
Vism
Visuddhi-magga (PTS ed.)
Viy.
Viyahapannatti Sutta
VS
Vaisesika Sutra of Kanada
YS
Yoga Sutra
105
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125
Index
Ajivikas, 12, 20
Alara Kalama, 22, 83
Arada Kalama, 87, 93, 94, 138
akasanantyayatana, 88, 91, 92, 95, 101
akasanancayatana, 90, 99
akihcanhayatana, 90
akincanyayatana, 89, 91, 93, 95, 102
arupya , 91
abandoning [activity, 61
activity is to be abandoned as evil, 52
anupurvavihai'a, 98
anupubbanirodha, 97
anupubbavihara, 98
arahant, 8, 12, 13
arhant, 12, 100, 103, 106
ai'hat, 16, 18
arupa, 91
ascetic, 64, 65
ascetic practices, 20, 26
asceticism, 13, 32, 34, 35, 48, 58, 59, 66, 72, 73, 86, 105, 114, 126, 143,
144
at night, the day he should spend [standing] on the tip of his toes, or
standing, sitting, or walking about, or again by practising .i.Yoga, 58
Bharhut, 23
Bodhisattva, 18, 21, 23, 24, 26, 93, 94, 95, 116
Brhadaranyaka Upanisad, 126
brahmavihara, 101
Brahmic States, 102, 144
cessation of all mental activity, 97
Cessation of Ideations and Feelings, 98
clearly the dominating person. .i.Yajnavalkya, 128
Devadatta, 86
126
dhutangas, 87
Digambaras, 14
enlightenment, 12, 19, 23, 28, 49, 93, 94, 102, 105, 106, 107, 110, 114,
115, 116, 118, 123, 135, 140
fasting, 26, 36, 57, 59, 65, 71
First Dhyana, 26, 77, 78, 82, 96, 97, 99, 116, 138
Four Dhyanas, 28, 29, 36, 48, 77, 82, 8
The Two Traditions Of Meditation In Ancient India
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