Leer — Nature Man and God In Islam — Anónimo

NATURE, MAN AND GOD IN MEDIBVAL ISLAM pe UAB TREY Sl eR Ute ere a Pt a To tae ALT TET, doo PSR R iy e=4 MAHMUD ISFAHAN?’s commentary LSM VY 8541 OL RE Lee Ba Saale ch a Le Bs 2 LEE EAD 4 SDWIN &. CALVERLEY anv JAMES W. POLLOCK a) Rae a ad il = o e — . 7 o "S633" NATURE, MAN AND GOD IN MEDIEVAL ISLAM ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY THEOLOGY AND SCIENCE Texts and Studies EDITED BY H. DAIBER and D. PINGREE VOLUME XLV NATURE, MAN AND GOD IN MEDIEVAL ISLAM ‘ABD ALLAH BAYDAWI’s text Tawali ‘ al-Anwar min Matali ‘ al-Anzar ALONG WITH MAHMUD ISFAHANI’s commentary Matali ‘ al-Anzar, Sharh Tawali ‘ al-Anwar EDITED AND TRANSLATED BY EDWIN E. CALVERLEY anp JAMES W. POLLOCK VOLUME ONE BRILL LEIDEN - BOSTON - KOLN 2002 This book is printed on acid-free paper Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Baydawi, ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Umar, d. 1286? [Tawali‘ al-anwar min matali‘ al-anzar. English] Nature, man and God in medieval Islam : ‘Abd Allah Baydawi’s text, Tawali‘ al-anwar min matali‘ al-anzar, along with Mahmud Isfahani’s commentary, Matali‘ al-anzar, sharh Tawali‘ al-anwar / edited and translated by Edwin E. Calverley, and James W. Pollock. p- cm. — (Islamic philosophy, theology and science, ISSN 0169-8729 ; v. 45) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 9004121021 (set : alk. paper) 1. Islam—Doctrines. 2. Philosophy, Islamic. I. Isfahani, Mahmud ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman, 1275 or 6-1348 or 9. Matali‘ al-anzar. English. II. Calverley, Edwin Elliott, 1882-1971. III. Pollock, James W. (James Wilson), 1922- IV. Title. V. Series. BP166 .B29513 2001 297.2—dc2]1 2001035904 Die Deutsche Bibliothek — CIP-Einheitsaufnahme Nature, man and God in medieval Islam / ed. and transl. by Edwin E. Calverley and James W. Pollock. — Leiden ; Boston ; Kéln : Brill, 2001 (Islamic philosophy, theology and science ; Vol. 45) ISBN 90-04—12102-1 ISSN 0169-8729 ISBN 90 04 12381 4 (vol. 1) ISBN 90 04 12382 2 (vol. 2) ISBN 90 04 12102 1 (set) © Copyright 2002 by Koninklyke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization te photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Brill provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910 Danvers MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS CONTENTS OF VOLUME ONE Acknowledements- <sciiiuyesecodespsiiiacenczsestecenivsrsceessednosnstdeoetons XV Translators’ Introduction .......cceeceeeeeseeeeeseeeseeeeeseeeerseeeneeeeeees xvi A note on the translation, its edition and revision ........ xvi A note on ‘Abd Allah Baydawi [d. 1316?] oe XXV1 A note on Mahmud Isfahani [1276-1348] oe XXXVIil THE TRANSLATION Foreword to the Commentary by Mahmud Isfahani _........ 3 Foreword to the Subject Text by ‘Abd Allah Baydawi_ .... 9 Isfahani’s Commentary to Baydawi’s ‘Text begins .............. 10 AUTHORS’ INTRODUCTION STUDIES IN LOGICAL REASONING Chapter |: Principles of epistemology «0.0... .cceeceeeneeneeee 28 1. The two phases of knowing: an alternation Between <a cand Di. sfidialinoss acsahontnietinan isa crennrialans 28 a. Concept formation regarding what is being PERCEIVED: Ge lites eaarenettont apnea etic rateanemiaats 28 b. Judgmental assent or dissent to features of the concept being formed - :c..chssieatenss caseenteets cabantianaaeamneaae 28 c. Each phase either by intuition or by rational acquisition of knowledge 0.0.0... ceseeeeseeeeeeeneeneeeene 28 2. Logical reasoning, the means of such acquisition .......... 42 Chapter 2: Explanatory statements 000.0... eee eeeee 48 1. Conditions that govern a definition... cee eects 48 2. Glasses of defimitions 2... cece eeeesseeceeeeeeeeeeeneeseeeeeneeees 60 TRAZ1 S$) ODJECH ONS 55. sts cal cabnescsadsnawenigaewsstcscanaecst essa tuamententnians 64 Bayar S26 16: Rage \cesuciopircuactecseiaeQaidiorsiatiasieenabeats 68 3. Realities definable and definitive oo. ccceeseseeeeees 78 vi CONTENTS OF VOLUME ONE Chapter 3: Argumentation. .cc..tccctesssetacieetace dis desteevateocau ooticutes 82 I. Kinds of argumentation oo... ceeeeeeeeseceeceecensenerseeeeenerereenes 82 Analogical deduction o.....escceceesceesseecesseeesseeeeseneeseeenarenseeseees 82 Investigative induction oo... ceeeesecesseessceeeeteceeceeeesececeteeeaeeeeees 82 Illustrative analogical deduction .....ec cee eeseseeeeeeee rete 82 2. Analogical deduction in the syllogism and its types. .......... 88 The hypothetical exceptive syllogism ote eee eeereee 94 The categorical connective syllogism and the FOU TIUINES: siden ccsbevastescatecosatyntentpvisaece ata aunsomatine 98 Figures 1, 2, 3, 4; Summary of figures and moods _...... 100 3. The premised materials of argumentation o....... eee 123 Argumentation structured on rationality—proof, Petrone, Fallacy ccsie<scse0v yess voycouavat vophst an dl soeat'vedtaxpsusaseasneaseenas 123 Argumentation structured on authoritative tradition .......... 133 Chapter 4: The distinguishing properties of sound Vocal PCASOMIN ice katie eon staaesdpebuwwencass sancpslendecaeee pa ceecsoaars eosiane 137 1. Sound logical reasoning yields knowledge .......cccceeee 137 Objéctions-of the: Buddhists: jai): cardintacairiiaacuian coin 139 Objections of the geometricians wee cee teeseteeteeenseneeeee 147 Corollaries to the yield of knowledge ou... .ccccceeeeeeeeeees 151 2. Sound logical reasoning is sufficient for knowledge OE GG... 2524 obvious cg esbuceail pin toa scbnadinastenuveinayeenaes atecnmnano nase 158 3. Sound logical reasoning is obligatory for knowledge OL CSO Sas rtitnds i sbseiviedovtorsanile Suatacurale cine sch eantanavespratymeavaies 161 BOOK ONE REALITIES POSSIBLE Section I: Universals Chapter I: Classification of things known oo... eee ener 171 1. According to the Asha‘irah and the Muttazilah ................ 171 2. According to the Philosophers and the Mutakallimun ...... 176 Chapter 2: Existence and nonexistence oo... eeecseeeeeseeeserereeses 180 1. The conception of existence is INtuitiVe oo... ee ereeeeeee 180 2. Existence is a commonality among all existents 1.0.00... 187 A proof from negation oo... eee eeseeseeseteeeeeeeseeseneeeaeees 189 3. Existence is an addition to the quiddities 0... 191] GONTENTS OF VOLUME ONE vii Ashfari’s variant argument 20... cece cere eereeeeeeseesereeeeereenes 196 Special case of the necessary existent 00.0.0... eee eeeereeeee 198 The philosophers’ variant argument ..........ccceessceeereeteeees 209 A COPOMARY:. abe sas caet sevens ctbsa Seazie hoes Betasees aces sicbeta vagaksdeotisaseoceies 21) 4, The nonexistent is not a certainty externally «0... 213 Argument of the Mu‘tazilah on the non-existent... 217 5. The attribute-state is to be excluded wees 221 Chapter So Cnddity:. <piudeste Galan vecsashinssdapaeccnans see aueiiss 229 1 Op the quidaitysitsele 1.05 ae cauce acing caw edeehans 229 2. Classes of quiddity oo... cee eeesceeessceeecseeteeeeesseeessesesaeeeeeeees 234 Corollary regarding the simple quiddity ......0.... eee 239 Corollary regarding the composite quiddity with distinguishable parts .......ccescscecscsetsceeeseeeececceseeeeetaneseeseees 24] Corollary regarding the composite quiddity with INCERPEMEH ANNE Party .i.igimainouiarqeieauiumnianen 242 3s AMC BACMANON |. atelsciedssavesstsixcertense crits es vocaauemonenonersansncnseaeuscdon 243 Whether individuation is existential 0... ccs reese 247 The philosophers’ corollary .......c.cceeeeeseeseesseeeeseeeseneeeseaees 250 Chapter 4: Necessity and possibility, eternity and TET POTALRY, _sicoxidvnsaiscnudadcasipuccutes oovanstonse hovauanaspiuensenseencannnasSeyees 255 1. These subjects are intellectual entities having no EXUGITAL GXISCENICE cccsiseeketsccisucuieentesseib vate leads eviomaatiials 255 2. The distinguishing properties of necessity 0... eceseeeeeees 261 3. The distinguishing properties of possibility ....... eee 266 The possibility makes a possible reality have need TOL AE AUISE: -acas cinema chaseucitceiean tentes tess vassal aad Mat aael eae 266 Neither state of a possible reality has priority ........ 0. 281 A possible reality’s existence depends upon an CHECHIVE CAUSE « -...céscseciocsesisestantencedeveusexsaunavavaveduosundsstvvrencacts 283 A possible reality needs its effective cause as long BS TE ERINTS acdc snes care ante eag caalte ted ote as chil eaoneeeiapaaonnd 284 AS, TStOLMMIty® « ocsasseee casveuactoneuns dade uesdeondsacesiesscyceiuecebaparstasatenntye souterits 287 5x Vemporality: ccccccccc.ecccssvesetcaeeeccdeed siuweetsteethasqeven ceccesubaectsdaceeneess 290 Chapter 5: Singularity and plurality oo... eee eereeee 300 1. On the real nature of singularity and plurality .................. 300 Singularity is not the opposite of plurality in essence _...... 304 2. Classes of singularities 0... eesseeceseeseesecessetseesesenentesenees 307 vill CONTENTS OF VOLUME ONE So Glasses OF PMitalty® x .auecacmiedeslevicel nid ted tannins Objections regarding the black/white contrast... Dome: COLON ALIES: « ssccncanaucsianseaecidesxisevsiaiasescecten eas agers vegeta Chapter 6:.Gause and effect. -s.iccahcaiad entiicncttiewlnniapinags L WCTASSES: OR CANISC esas scaiiesstoede whetesaenerasd Vaveseastertneienae era ae 2. Multiple causes and effects oo. ee ee cess eseeeseeeeeaceeeeeeeneenes 3. The difference between the cause’s effective part and its limiting CONCIHION ..... ee eeeeeeeeseeeestaceeeseeeteceecseseusetaesseees 4. Whether one thing can be both receiver and agent of causation simultaneously ........ cscs eee seeesecseeseeeeeeeseeeeseeeeees Section 2: Accidents Chapter Te Greneral topies” ccc.scvat sss cash yaks sate ernaicunstetertndats tees 1. The various kinds of accidental qualities ......... csc 2. The impossibility of accidents transiting between SUDSELALES's.-osaduivest sax onsunhesiiasvidssdaodhkgudd Seauzevaunaow de phieloedwaleucnes 3. Whether an accident can subsist in another ACCIGENE ® scx4s . Sonseshtanesaarehigewwvsriseeersdsoteridooeetlisbucnaastnetadnatagaeuns 4. Whether accidents have permanent continuance ............. 5. The impossibility of one accident subsisting in two SuLStPates: At OME si: veniah tates tech epoisnaep tase ubendooee saad ebadeonnsekoneddetne Chapter’ 2: SOMA EIEY< scaiiecicccusnacsshancanselaneacecrten aieianssanseteekelencens Te GRASSES OE AMIE © aecshschsats ott ntaesaticiedctss aabseatenystnnelautasebeasleas 2. Quantity in its essence and as an accident... 3. On the nonexistential nature of quantities ..... eee 4 Tim Curattom’ se.se.c0..cescusetesines casas sence sceeekgevensbuosady deabedi ovtsete lee The external existence of time duration: arguments ABAMISE <.sisctesten tchesheesdasselissvesiecsasssesnhrilacstue; csheesegesetescesstensbive The external existence of time duration: arguments for .... Theories on the nature of time duration ........ cee SE ACE AME VOIG, icctidenssdaueistspacrtuanvehsinaunnrelmbie a aeameaasitess Theones:- of plate. ~saasidiscssinccesoeivtsnmaielannaiodeecaencunist Chapter *3: "Quality: iividan nsiieine cha tsesdene leiiesgaiens tees L. “Sénsate: qualities: ss .si.tis..scuedeapetetesvcelasiaeatesrases cedeidevenediests Classés: of sensate qualities :...cssc,cccssscsbeatdesecteqnausasstnudsensesss CONTENTS OF VOLUME ONE ‘PLOUGH: SENSATIONS. Selah sfcestedieess sks cettotebseel De atic datel cave dahaa deeeete 2 ‘Lemiperatube: Heat: 4i.xncincaebanwinaen ears E EMPEPAUUTES COIL’. “.c.cdssctuvesiedsots Grybes ens edereguuntauieuminias Huimidity: tan siesetsteu deen aden het aeteead WN SIGE aesseca vcac sacs’ sgltacnas dae nassactune oe gseeetoenaanaae ma tataeat ad Eexture: taut nedivntedi awake eni niisiien dees MVASION “SENSATIONS: 325s: : leases cescevs stoi yg satacvbacbu lay denddcenepeegerdecdsecsss Color strength s..2:04 achieving ee a a ae Nature-OF Heht: <cssjaiecatattadwi cela elhcstialaimaatameieoviae FLCAaTIny SENSATIONS =. 4 ussrinrsistessislsss ans vsversuasduncsssteaoweaieessteanes SFASte BEMSAMOMS, 242bscncaitscteerietsuetaeneaantauiareneeaentedseacine Simiell ‘sensatlOnis= pcepcssteesacteceeeeesseeshedbeds cdeoresdasssee dot eawtaserneeoosanes 2. Psychic ‘qivalities: «22c.i.cs.if.steelcscesrectsevseaesaenscedeedecdicdsenetedgnovace The living nature [or, life and its absence] «0.0... eee Perceptioncand knowledge: 2.02. scc..:.-5_ jennie ticenseiaueanestaccaeaensats Corollaries to: the: mental fO11 » segessideisideatacssicsastoavendtet The rational soul’s four stages of intellectual MEVElOpINENt: “suri, sesivntie ah ariel eat sonia acniudeatieets The power of autonomous action and the willing BIALUBEY sveyeliisiessdeavsuptatixentstamietslactznned ia yostenaacte ous seeahiwhaseie Pleasure and pain are self-evident concepts .........c cee Health and illness and related emotions .........c cesses 3. Qualities specific to quantities 0... eee eee tees eeeeteesernee 4, Qualities of predisposition ....... cee seseeeseeseeceeteeeeteseesseeeesenes Chapter 4: Accidents of relaton s.ccceseccssccscsesacsestuanseabsnccoviesdens l. Whether they appear in external existence ........0...... 2. The case of ‘place-where? o...ececcecccsessesseseseseeseeseeeeeeaneneonnes Gradual motion-change in quantity, quality, position and: place-where si c.isissseseaniceecosstseasaa dinsdasstearasiee General factors necessarily involved in gradual MOMON=CHANGE: secedetissvceasecrsaseossneebuasestedadiedececsscchessssniacewstoas Types of force required to make gradual MOtonsChange: NECEssAary — wesc vascsei vlan ieaenssceovensiantarscetanet Whether quiescence occurs when straight-line Mohon Chanpes’ CirectiGh: <saviiss cass intiayndenannsciyies 3. The case of the adjunctive relationship 0.0... eee On pniority in the adjunctive relationship... x CONTENTS OF VOLUME ONE Section 3: Substances Ghapter sl Bodies: sccssssssessavetenes ations tuestecesuntyerasqasdeetas ccusetentestaeee 1. Definition of a “body? oo... eee eeeesceseenceseessereeesetseeseteneeneees 2. Leading doctrinal theories on the parts of a body ............ The Mutakallimun argument that a body is a composite of indivisible atoms... ces csceeeeeeeeeetseeeereee The philosophers’ arguments against the composition Of bodies from atOMs oe. sseeseeeereceersecenecaeereeeeeraees The philosophers say a body is a continuity in itself and ‘divisible without lint 5.05: .cieaiesciasuteniivnteaiaaivaiaheos Corollaries to the philosophers’ doctrine of a body. .......... 3. ‘Classes of bodies: 222.2: 0.ccsiescssesst ccsced caisecn bid aesets Gaeacheneeseidaens Simple bodied celestial spheres .........cceecsseseseeeeeeeeteeeeeeseees Corollaries to the existence of the spheres: their PENCT CA TAUNTS * Sastiepihenty es aihadece eines nna inep eure renee es Corollaries to the existence of the spheres: motion ine CUlar TORAON. ° bch taihenictaniovagururaiiiae aise Simple bodied celestial orbs are fixed in the spheres ........ Simple bodied elements: fire, air, earth, water ..........000. Composite bodies are made from the elements _ ................ 4. Bodies as temporal phenomena | ..........ccceeceeeeeeteeeeeeeeee Theories of the philosophers on cosmogony. ..........:.:000 Arguments for the temporal nature of bodies ............000. Bodies would have been quiescent if they had been: present ini past Eternity: csi. sissnctscsauasverndiaiaderasys Bodies are possible realities and are caused... eee Bodies are inseparable from temporal phenomena ........ Arguments against the temporal nature of bodies _............ 5. Bodies as’ limited entities: csc ivatvsssssssectatneseanstsenesvesioriscassasnese Chapter 2: Incorporeal substantial beings 0.0... sees 1. Classes of incorporeal substantia] beings ........ccceeeeeee 2. The intellects of the celestial system... secs teeeeeeees Intellects of the celestial system transcend the limitations Gf Matter .cvalcana aoctsaialvaadiiteadiucrs . The souls of the celestial system 2.0... eee eee seeeeneeetees 4. The incorporeal nature of human ‘rational souls’ ............ oo CONTENTS OF VOLUME ONE Reason provides evidence of the rational soul’s THEOLPOVE AL MANEC: S55 echcccssuihcs soatseiie seaki pentane avietetnasoanahs The rational soul’s knowledge about God is not divisible as matter oo... csesccscessceceeccsterseseaseereseeresseeentes Rational souls can perceive contraries simultaneGusly” \ sd -0idns candida manana Rational souls conceived as material bodies could not: think: fréely~-...ceseecheacseti tei bee biel cited eautes: Rational souls can comprehend intelligibles without HORE cette ad pstncatycetpamadt mvsiostteyeeraleattnthulnn starring Rational souls conceived as material bodies could HOt: Perceive wniversals” oii. iss nseaiseadiees stviswncasesaareeisede Tradition provides evidence of the rational soul’s THCOMPOLE Al! BAITS. sarstiscdpedouersu tian yavoksitianscinsernosetage tees . The temporal nature of rational souls .... eel eee . The rational soul’s linkage to the body and ROVERDATICE WItlINi AE, 3 uacicse, cewcsaebdesOnicaayaccnsd cio venadeoskibaecateties Powers of external perception .......ceeeeessseceseesceeeeeeseeeeeatees DLBIAL < weacdvseteectopsgescnacabtacdanabradh eeevewcudyspentuasavardaeaiperincbdaaeuaas Powers of internal perception 20... ccsccesecsseseesseseeeeseeseeneess CTOOFGIATION, sncscctitsaiesasysusvatsnnacedessdeedtonsteamanmaacabeehages TPH APINIAWIGH, (gc srestias cccnssnraidin dard aaa trsetalanttonniitnesidesiurtianoeds ESTIMATION sxiactiotesctaanees doatasdhotiorcanisuxcesticaeeeseta seed vehineds Me MO ry “si certseecascescascbarsesteyacsid Hoevedigel soshivacetid ldeatents vevaninece BRO CURR sis ceteris atea Sdzau taveac sso vas va deasnacoanlass lane el ancantoduds Powers of body motion-change that are voluntary ANC CLE CHIVES: <. duces css dstasetsvecarsae tudeadaesretieseastente dei reereDateacess Powers of body motion-change that are naturally AUCOMOMUIG ys ssp cassccasesttascssicaeeiscoviossciaedoigesdecgbaseasaosessastedionans . The permanent survival of the rational soul after HG DOU SCAU: ec esi ceiail: ten caliaet ancolc tia. co usenet x1 CONTENTS OF VOLUME TWO BOOK TWO REALITIES DIVINE Section 1: The essence of God Chapter 1: Comprehensive knowledge about God... 1. Invalidation of circular and infinite series arguments ........ 2. Proof for the existence of the Necessary Existent ........... 3. Experiential knowledge of God’s essence .....ccccseeeeeeees Chapter 2: Qualities not properly attributable to God. .......... 1. Exclusion of resemblance between God’s reality and BUY OUNEM DEUE > -sssatesesines dnsscssdimndyeninsdesaaeatecaainivecatarteniateedinaed 2. Exclusion of corporeality and regionality ........ ccc The argument of the corporealists .......ccccesesseeseeeeeeeeesees 3. Exclusion of union and incarnate indwelling ..........0..00. 4. Exclusion of temporal phenomena from subsistence Ms OC ast sashes aah atuedsahisstecescssdedstesutydesdegosediedestoustceveacrdsaadoinasts 5. Exclusion of sensate qualities ..........ccccsseesseeerseetseeseessesessees Chapter 3: Doctrine of the divine singularity ........0..0..ce 1. Arguments of the Muslim philosophers and of the Mutakallimun oo. cceessseesecsccnsenseneesessesesenecsseseessesssensenseens Section 2: The attributes of God Chapter 1: Established attributes, the basis of God’s acts 1. God’s omnipotence in autonomous ACctiON ou... cece Divine omnipotence related to some problems of logic .... God’s omnipotence in autonomous action is over all possible: realities sus cecentrad en unriemnanaiinmledaouses 2. God 'SeVEr-present OMNISCIENCE +s. ss .astenisdiois dane sordssoniene An argument at Variance oo... eee eee eeeeeterneceeetaeeeeeneeesees Corollary 1: God comprehends all intelligibles .........000... Corollary 2: God’s ‘knowledge’ and ‘power’ are entities distinct from Himself 0... cece sseceeseeeseceserseeeerenesrees CONTENTS OF VOLUME TWO xiii Se GG 's: living Mature ies. iy. s0 seen eysasegs ete baa deeded eae wees adios 867 A GOS Wall,” teracacee Megcpusaviceuehbs oceans ded sadincap nce ae acalaa chins 868 God’s will is not a temporal phenomenon _ ............cccee 875 Chapter 2: Other attributes, not the basis of God’s acts .... 879 i, God's Hearne ANd: SORE iso, Se derc bigs saratoe eva eiteemiavectedd 879 2: Grod’S/SDECCN” .hcsctot ceeetyess cela yecdeieed Seveua eeddsn er tected dis ecw pees 884 God’s spoken word is truthful ..... ccc cceseesesscenecseeeeeeeeseees 886 3. God’s immortality oe cececesessceseseceeeeenereeeeseeeeeessenssenereees 887 4. Other qualities that al-Ash‘ari named attributes .........0.... 890 Sy God's produchOn OL DEM: sicisecesesseccssdsessccessaysaicsevacsanpedesten? 892 6. God’s beatific visibility to believers in the hereafter ........ 896 Muttazilah arguments at variance oo... eeeeseseeteeeeteeeeeees 906 Section 3: The acts of God and the acts of mankind [by topics} 1. Oi the: aets- or mankind \..eceisetitcaictitaceenvoviageu areas 915 Muttazilah doctrine, “Autonomy” in human acts ............ 921 Asha‘irah doctrine, “Compulsion” in human acts ............ 929 2. God is the agency that wills moral phenomena in All CTE ACUPES® snusicises 2 csti Oe uddeaetatavie tiled tenianddo atic biaauelcunciis 931 3. On predicating the good and the heinous ...............000 94d 4. God is under no obligation whatsoever .........::ceeeeeees 945 5. God’s acts are not based on hidden purposes © ..............++ 948 6. Obligations imposed are God’s notice to humankind Of ja final Jif evaluation’ vont.acbseccersnssendsaasainitomosensectanieavis’ 952 BOOK THREE REALITIES PROPHETIC Section 1; Prophethood [by topics] 1. Mankind’s need for the Prophet ........ccceccceeseeeeeeseseeee 959 2. The possibility of miracles [in psychology and religion] ..... 968 3. The prophethood of the Prophet Muhammad. ................ 984 Refutation of the Brahmans’ doctrine on the intellect ..... 995 Refutation of the Jews’ doctrine on the Mosaic Law ...... 1000 4. The blamelessness of the prophets .....cccceseeeseseeeeeeees 1003 Blamelessness is a psychic possession preventing AH INE RUE 2c Pca chan sea cia apd donde dewa ss cnc bea esi csagwriceb starts tals 1014 5. The prophets are superior to the angels... eee 1017 XIV CONTENTS OF VOLUME TWO 6. The signs of divine favor [given to saints and PEGPICIS|| es laseaatnjebacetesmececiarsecustntasaue veneotead snap eieca cian smammeeiauae 1023 Section 2: The resurrection assembly and the recompense [by topics] 1. Restoration of the vanished nonexistent eee 1027 2. The Resurrection Assembly of human bodies ................ 1036 Whether the body’s atomic particles actually will be annihilated then restored oo... ce eeceesceseeteceececeenseteeeeeees 1042 S,. Phe Garden: and thie: Fire. east eesassiotsscanascangearasivene 1043 The Garden and the Fire are created entities .............. 1048 4a. The Mut‘tazilah on reward and punishment ................. 1052 4b. The Asha‘irah on reward and punishment. ..........00.0. 1064 5. Pardon and intercession for those guilty of the dreadful great Sins oo... seeeceeseeeeececeeeeeeetseeeneneenseesenseeers 1073 6. Certainty of earned torment in the grave... eee 1078 7. Other traditional doctrines oe... eee eeeeeeeeeetceeereeeeeeees 1080 8. The terms ‘faith’ and ‘evidential practice’ in the PENIPIOUS COME: +5. dcpekcetensth ih avesdeseheabeastaisndssiarateataaysiaecielde 1081 Section 3: The supreme leadership of the Muslim community [by topics] 1. On the obligation to appoint a supreme leader ............ 1089 The Sunni Asha‘irah argument of human traditional responsibility ).s03.0siechesscoceceezteestinecsdescasetuvecudtiasevenctaess 1089 The Imamiyah argument of the divine benevolence .... 1093 2.) Dheatibutes ofan Timah. sccstsinsiascactievcedsaserautinctesanasinand 1095 Blamelessness not a prerequisite .......s cece seeeseeeeeeeeeeees 1098 3. Criteria to be met in appointing an Imam ...........0.0.. 1101 4a. The rightful Imam after the Prophet: Abu Bakr in Sunn doctrine’. hase sahsaiesiih asta ealiian Mescuteeltaaetes 1104 4b. The rightful Imam after the Prophet: ‘Ali in Shi‘ah OCI E®. sssntascsvinschcvesencaidiaysvinuan ersvis ntaotedibea Dedadheapn wesdek award 1112 5. ‘The excellence of the Companions oo... ceeeeseeeeeeees 1133 Table of Romanization o...... eect ees eeeceeceeeesesteeceeesetenenaeens 1137 CSIOSSAINE ° partcthanchenth couintetinds uiehameisatasy assailed naeerine 1139 Illustrations to Book 1, Section 30 ove cecccecsessccesseenseenees 1149 Bibliography: i..20ssasin ni aisaeciialiieds iia eailanatincad oi 1157 DAG ER ces iesseeoes hen Sete tat hate saboct tek ia oad Lieven srvetet tele Beles 1163 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS To the kind Creator, who befriends All who hear and affirm, and so receive, And to Edwin and Eleanor Calverley who wrote and prayed, And to Elmer and Eva Douglas who spoke and entrusted, And to Rachel Pollock who encouraged with faith and yeoman help, “We stand among those returning gratitude to you.” We bear in mind also and always the happy milieu of librarian and teaching friends at Indiana University, Bloomington. One of these at the outset intoned, while tapping mentally on the very present idea of a word processor, “Without such as this, that book project is not possible!” Others there assisted in making working photocopies of the two source printed editions and in printing for the same use enlargments of four of the manuscripts on microfilm purchased from the Princeton University Library collections. And other librarians have served this cause in greater or lesser ways. Hearty thanks likewise to Professor James C. Spalding of the University of Iowa School of Religion, who initially read portions and gave supportive advice, and to cousins Max and Dorothy Davidson for their kindly guidance on editorial format and style, and to brother John CG. Pollock for timely corrective adjustment of syntactical per- spective. Indeed, all who speak to this translation will have aimed to its improvement. Many other souls are there too, In widening rounds of interest— Of circles nominal, about the globe, in all time beyond— “Fa-nahnu lakum min al-shakirin”, In translation, above. James W. Pollock This page intentionally left blank TRANSLATORS’ INTRODUCTION A NOTE ON THE TRANSLATION, ITS EDITION AND REVISION Edwin Elliott Calverley (1882-1971) prepared in draft a complete English translation of the double-book summary of Islamic natural and revealed theology comprising Mahmud al-Isfahani’s commentary entitled Matal‘ al-anzar, sharh Tawah‘ al-anwar, together with its sub- ject text, ‘Abd Allah al-Baydawi’s Tawali‘ al-anwar min matali‘ al-anzar. The two works were published together in multicopy editions by printing presses, first by lithography in Istanbul in 1305/1887, des- ignated ‘L’ herein, then by typesetting in Cairo in 1323/1902, des- ignated “TI” herein. In these two printed editions each division al-Baydawi made in his concise text was followed by the presenta- tion of Isfahani’s commentary on that division. The editors of T based their work on L, while checking the text with available man- uscripts. They corrected most of L’s scribal errors but added some typographical errors in the process. Calverley purchased an excellent manuscript copy of the Isfahani commentary from Istanbul through an agent he had commissioned, and he designated this personally owned manuscript “MS 875” in his draft, from the Hijri date of its completion, a.n. 875/a.p. 1470. Due to the editor’s use of another MS also dated 875, Calverley’s manuscript is herein designated simply the ‘MS’. With L and T the ‘MS’ has been closely relied on as a translation source. It may be read in the Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington. Calverley wrote a summary of his work and a description of his purchased manuscript in an article published in the Muskm World in 1963,' where he expressed the hope of his work’s early readiness for publication. From dates in Calverley’s materials his work on this double-text extended from about the middle 1930s (“5 August 1937” on translation ms p. 168) up into the early 1960’s (“24—4—63” on L p. 88). He wrote, “End of Translation, 20 September 1962 EEC”, ' “Al-Baydawi’s Matali‘ al-Anzar, a Systematic Theology of Islam”, Muslim World 53 (1963) [293]-297. xvii INTRODUCTION on his translation p. 2462, with date and initials on L p. 487, but as noted his work of revision was obviously a continuing concern. Calverley retired from his teaching post in Arabic and Islamic Studies and editing the Muslim World at Hartford in 1952, and Dr. Kenneth Cragg was named his successor. In 1956 Dr. Elmer H. Douglas (1903-1990) followed Cragg in the teaching role, and later in the journal’s editorship. Then in 1965 Douglas took a three-year leave from Hartford to accept a call to teach in Trinity Theological College in Singapore. On leaving Hartford in 1965 Douglas paid a farewell call on Professor Calverley who was living at Avery Homes, a retirement care facility. On that occasion Calverley requested him to finish preparing the Baydawi/Isfahani translation for publication. Douglas accepted this task, and thereupon took home with him the transla- tion and its apparatus. In 1968, after returning to the States, Douglas formally retired from Hartford Seminary, then took up the Calverley translation project as well as his own research and production of translations and studies of Arabic authors, although realizing that his sight had begun to fail. In 1975 Professor Douglas invited James W. Pollock, who had been a student of both Calverley and Douglas at Hartford, to take over the work on Calverley’s translation draft. He affirmed very clearly to Pollock that his friend Calverley had placed no limiting conditions whatsoever on the handling of the unfinished literary prod- uct or on its apparatus. The same understanding has governed also in the transfer of this privilege and responsibility from Douglas to Pollock. The literary materials received in 1975 from Professor Douglas included: 1) Calverley’s copy of L, the Istanbul lithograph of 1305/1887 that includes both Baydawi’s Tawal‘ al-Anwar and Isfahani’s com- mentary upon it; 2) Calverley’s manuscript of the Isfahani commentary alone (dated Rabi‘ I, 875/1470), to be known herein as the ‘MS’; 3) Some 107 pages [about 20-25 by Calverley, and about 80 by Douglas] of typed transcription of the handwritten translation draft; and 4) Calverley’s handwritten translation draft (in easily legible script mostly in pencil), totalling 2462 pages of loose-leaf 9" x 6" paper. When these pages of the translation draft were collated, one leaf INTRODUCTION XIX (= 2 p.) was noted as missing, so it was retranslated. All together they filled 16 ring-binder loose-leaf notebooks.” With Pollock as editor, the translation project, requiring copying into typescript, a general editing and close revision, moved steadily from 1975 but did not gain momentum until there were larger blocks of time available in a 1986 sabbatical leave and after retirement from library employment on August 31, 1987. The partial table of contents printed in L and T was translated, filled out completely, and correlated closely with the content of the divisions according to Baydawi’s intent and Isfahani’s explanations. It serves as an overview of the subject matter that Baydawi had mentally outlined with clarity and logic. One is informed by this concise outline rather than mystified, as one may be with the books of Baydawi’s close compeers, as in the three-volume Teheran 1980's edition of Ibn Sina’s Jsharat with the commentaries by Nasir al-Din Tusi and Qutb al-Din Razi, the Cairo a.H. 1332 reprint edition of Fakhr al-Din Razi’s Muhassal with Tusi’s Talkhis, and the Cairo 1983 edition of ‘Adud al-Din Iji’s Mawagif: Pagings for these titles cited in our footnotes are from these editions. In preparation for the major task, these and other source mate- rials were purchased, plus a fairly complete library of the available literature on the main fields covered, the Encyclopaedia of Islam new edition being on a most useful and valuable personal subscription. Working photocopies of both L and T on durable new paper were made and bound. From the Princeton University Library, microfilm copies were purchased of three MSS of Baydawi’s Tawali‘ al-anwar min matal‘ al-anzar alone: Garrett 283B (dated 718 a.4./1318-19 a.p.), 2 The microfilm copies of manuscripts mentioned in Calverley’s 1963 Muslim World article were not present among these translation materials, nor was Dr. Calverley’s copy of “I”, the Cairo typeset edition of 1323/1902 based on ‘L’, pre- sent among the materials received. This latter book was later found and cataloged when Pollock as Indiana’s Near East Librarian came across it in a Collection of Arabica formerly owned by Dr. Calverley. This special collection came into the temporary custody of Indiana University Library in 1981 and remained there to about 1990. Concordia Seminary in St. Louis, which had purchased Dr. Calverley’s entire library, had placed his Arabic books with Indiana for servicing and circulation among an active clientele in Arabic Studies. Due to the cost to both institutions for preservation measures, Indiana University decided to terminate the arrangement and so returned the Arabica collection to Concordia. xX INTRODUCTION Garrett 989Hb (dated Dhu al-Hijah 874/1470) and Garrett-Yahuda 3081 (dated by R. Mach “before 850 H.”/1446). Also from the same library, copies were purchased of two MSS of Isfahani’s commen- tary, Matali‘ al-anzar sharh Tawali‘ al-anwar: Garrett-Yahuda 4486 (dated 864/1459-60) and Garrett 989Ha (dated Safar 875/1470). Calverley’s handwritten translation contained repeated notices to himself of required reworking that he had hoped to provide, while revised passages were often present alongside earlier drafts, and fre- quent alternate wordings for terms, phrases and clauses remained throughout. Furthermore, as a consequence, the constant and nor- mal exact repetition of statements in scholastic dialogue usually was Jost to view in the draft. Calverley had begun typing a copy of his handwritten work, but near the beginning of the introduction an oversight was made where a single sequential page numbering for two different drafts was entered on the typed pages. It became clear to the editor, therefore, that a close and complete revision of the whole translation draft was necessary. This has been done with care, with affectionate personal and professional respect for our forebear, and with constant reliance upon his massive accom- plishment. This editorial liberty was taken with an awareness of both its present privilege and in turn the book’s future critical review, knowing that the latter would be intended for improvement in the art and effort of translation, so that the book in hand could be held as a ‘fair copy’ and valuable, while in English. The intended readership of this translation This translation’s intended readership begins among the ranks of medievalist and Islamist scholars. Within this specialized readership the Editor hopes for and is relying primarily on a judgmental bal- ance scale on which, as a result of these scholars’ professional assays, the pointer is tending toward approval. Preliminary critiques have indicated basic factors that should characterize a translation to make it useful. Our ‘reach’ has been for these factors, and as they have come within our ‘grasp’ they have been incorporated here. In addition, and beyond this difference between specialist and non- specialist readers, by presenting the work in English, we are seeking to interest everyone who wants to study the structure of Islam in INTRODUCTION XX1 itself along with its relationships with other civilizations. This wider readership extends to all students, leaders and followers, both in the religious faiths and in secular thinking as well, within the global com- munity that is more familiar with the use of English than it is with Arabic. Naturally, the expectations and informational needs of such a readership are wide and varied. The translation of this classical Arabic summary of Islamic philosophical theology is provided to help meet every reader’s preliminary wish to know and understand, and we hope it will not preempt anyone’s impulse to exercise further scholarly initiative. Furthermore, to afford a panoramic measure of the subject field, this translation aims only to follow the authors at a suitably distant elevation, giving readers a liberating intermediacy between an editor’s effort to produce an outer space mental view of complete information totality—always Baydawi warns against such absurd impossibilities—and a reader’s terrestrial pedestrian experi- ence of laborious gleaning of knowledge. Although some scholars already have pronounced the era of Baydawi’s philosophical and reli- gious thought to be moribund, there are others who recognize it as a plateau, an intellectual staging area, and the threshold to agile and creative new phases. In Professor Calverley’s article cited above regarding this transla- tion, he had pointed out how useful Baydawi’s Qur’an commentary was to Muslim and non-Muslim scholars alike in their study of Islam. He reasoned that since Baydawi’s commentary was important for interpretation and learning, then the same author’s summation of the Islamic theology underlying his commentary would also have a continuing importance. The extent of its significance has yet to be estimated and realized. Furthermore, Dr. Calverley chose Nature, Man and God in Medieval Islam as the English title for this translation in order to relate it both to ongoing studies and to Nature, Man and God, the Gifford Lectures by Bishop William Temple, a memorable presentation published in 1934. Two University of al-Azhar dissertations on Baydawi were pub- lished in the early 1980’s, as cited in full in Baydawi’s biographical sketch just following here. In addition, Professor Muhammad al- Zuhayli of the University of Damascus published his book, al-Qadi al-Baydawi, in 1988. All three of these modern writers are active in the field of Islamic law, in which Baydawi had served in his pro- fessional capacity as judge. Professor Zuhayli states [p. 156]: xxii INTRODUCTION [Baydawi’s Tawal‘ al-anwar| is superior for the excellence of its topi- cal arrangement and interior subdivisions, its precision of expression, its focus on demonstrated proofs, and its comprehensive use of the technical terms of theological statement. The setting in which Baydawi and Isfahani worked The historical and intellectual setting in which the two authors worked must be clear to every reader’s awareness as we proceed in this translation. The hope is that interested students will note and appre- ciate the intellectual landscape of our authors’ worldview as they state what they mean with emotional perseverance and convinced judgment. Here we should note the aptness of their book titles for this purpose. Baydawi’s name for his concise text as it may be trans- lated, “Rays of dawnlight outstreaming from far horizons of logical reasoning’, is more than a short-lived floral centerpiece of words. Indeed, it con- notes both the physical presence of the mountainous terrain of his native Iran and the palpable intellectual milieu of the great minds who personify the high peaks and far horizons of logical reasoning. Then Isfahani’s title inverts Baydawi’s wording and gives a different perspective in which the connotations are likewise immediately per- ceptible, also as translated, “High vistas of logical reasoning, a commen- tary on ‘Rays of dawnlight outstreaming.’”* Through these titles Baydawi and his Commentator together make the plain statement of their admiration and respect for the work of those other scholars, con- temporary and past, from whom came these “Rays of dawnlight out- streaming.” From Aristotle to Ash‘ari and Jubba’i, to Ibn Sina, Ghazali and Fakhr al-Din Razi, Baydawi gathered their ‘dawnlight rays’ of careful thinking and systematically focussed them into a clear and coherent picture, very much worth the observation. A time chart is presented herewith showing the relative dates of Baydawi and Isfahani together with dates for other great scholars looming up in this panorama. 3 A third writer closely related to these two is ‘Adud al-Din [ji, who like Mahmud Isfahani was a student of a student of Baydawi. The translated title of his summary work is “The main route stations in an exploration of the science of theological statement” {= al-Mawaqif fi ‘ttn al-kalam|. The memories of mountains and roads around their home towns of Bayda’, Isfahan and Jj helped in mentally formulating their book titles. Isfahani as an ex-patriot in Egypt well remembered the ‘high vistas’. INTRODUCTION Xxiil A TIME CHART RELATING SELECTED MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHERS AND THEOLOGIANS C.E. 800 Kindi, ca.? 801-66; Ash‘ari, Abu al-Hasan, 873/4?-935/6; Jubba’i, Abu ‘Ali Muhammad, d. 915/6; Jubba’i, Abu Hashim ‘Abd al-Salam, d. 933; Ka‘bi al-Balkhi, Abu al-Qasim, d. 931 or 2; Maturidi, Abu Mansur, d. 944 900 Farabi, 875-950; Sijistani, 912?-985; Yahya ibn ‘Adi, d. 974; Baqillani, 940-1013; Qadi ‘Abd al-Jabbar, d. 1025; Isfarayini, Abu Ishaq, d. 1027; Ibn Sina, Abu ‘Ali (Avicenna), 980-1037; Abu al-Husayn al-Basri, d. 1044 1000 Ibn Hazm, 994-1064; Juwayni, Imam al-Haramayn, Abu al-Ma‘ali, d. 1085; Anselm, 1033-1109; Abelard, 1079-1109; Ghazali, Abu Hamid Muham- mad, 1058-1111 1100 Nasafi, Abu Hafs ‘Umar, d. 1142; Shahrastani, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al- Karim 1086?-1153; Ibn Rushd, (Averroes) 1126-1198; Ibn Maymun, (Maimonides) 1135-1204; Shihab al-Din Yahya Suhrawardi, 1154-1191; Fakhr al-Din Razi, 1150-1210 1200 Tusi, Nasir al-Din, 1201-1274; Thomas Aquinas, 1225-1274; Ibn Kam- muna, d. 1284 or 85; Shams al-Din Muhammad Shahrazuri, 13th c.; Ibn al-‘Ibri, (Bar Hebraeus) 1225 or 6-1286; BAYDAWI, ‘Abd Allah, ca. 1225??-1316?; Ibn al-‘Assal, Abu Ishaq Ibrahim, d. 1260?; Hilli, Hasan ibn Yusuf Ibn al-Mutahhar, 1250-1325 1300 ISFAHANI, Mahmud, 1276-1348; [ji, ‘Adud al-Din, 1281-1355; Taftazani, Sa‘d al-Din Mas‘ud, 1322-1390; Ibn Khaldun, ‘Abd al-Rahman, 1332-1382 Jurjani, ‘Ali ibn Muhammad, al-Sayyid al-Sharif, 1339-1413 Baydawi frequently referred to the authors of the scholarly works that were his sources using their honorary titles or nicknames by which they were familiarly known. The first such title encountered without a full name given with it is the “Shaykh” [‘Venerable Teacher’] in his book “al-Jsharat’? [at L 14], which, as here, when given with his book title clearly means Ibn Sina. But more com- monly used for Ibn Sina are the titles “Imam” [‘Leader in Islam’] and “Hakim” [‘Physician-Philosopher’], the latter being distinctively his. The titles Imam and Shaykh are commonly and widely used of various individuals. Indeed, “Shaykh” more frequently refers to Ash‘an, the founding scholar of the orthodox Sunni school of thought, and “Imam” more frequently refers to Fakhr al-Din Razi, the aggressive Sunni spokesman for the generation just before Baydawi’s career, while “Ustadh”, [‘Professor,’] is applied only a few times to Abu Ishaq al-Isfarayini. The editors of the Cairo typeset edition (at T 14) identified Razi as the person intended by Baydawi’s short reference, “The Imam”, but L (at L 30) and two manuscripts, the MS and XXIV INTRODUCTION MS Garrett 989Ha, both completed in 875/1470, did not notice the need to add this identification. Again, at (L 63) “The Imam” is sufficient for identification as Razi’s book title al-Muhassal accompa- nies and clarifies the reference. One notices the contrast in Isfahani’s commentary. For the benefit of the Mamluk King Nasir Muhammad, Isfahani, much more often than Baydawi, has identified formally the authors who were quoted or were the objects of his criticisms. It seems very evident that both our authors expected their listeners and readers to be studying the great writers concurrently with their lecture courses, and therefore not to be in constant need of orientation. But such expectations often were beyond medieval students, just as they are beyond most mod- ern learners. The excellent manuscript of Isfahani’s commentary that was owned by Professor Calverley is peppered with tiny glosses of coded author information that were added from 1470 onwards by successive determined owners who were either advanced graduate students or active as teachers. Fakhr al-Din Razi and Ibn Sina appear to be the most influential scholars in Baydawi’s thought. As is the custom among academic lecturers in any given field of knowledge, our author had assimilated the teachings of his great forebears, quoting longer or shorter word strings or restating them as the best current understanding of the topic in hand. Razi’s Compendium (= Muhassal) was most helpful to Baydawi with its survey and sifting of the leading thinkers both “ancient and modern.” Regarding Ibn Sina, perhaps we may char- acterize this gifted doctor of medicine and of philosophy as having verbal hyperfluency—with occasionally the smallest trace of a ‘benev- olent unconcern’—that continues to push many another scholar to the limits of their ken for logical meaning control! These two influential writers, Ibn Sina (d. 1037) and F.D. Razi (d. 1210), well represent the two parallel and mostly distinct currents of intellectual activity flowing in the Islamic community’s common stream of consciousness. These were [naql] the traditional ‘religious’ current and [‘aql] the rational ‘philosophical’ current. Coming down to Baydawi’s time were other scholars with Razi in the traditional current, including the two Jubba’i’s, Qadi ‘Abd al-Jabbar and Abu al-Qasim Ka‘bi al-Balkhi, Ash‘ari, Bagillani, Imam al-Haramayn al- Juwayni, Ghazali, Nasafi, Shahrastani, Abhari and Tusi. Along with Ibn Sina in the rational current are the philosophers following Aristotle, Kindi, Farabi, and Ibn Rushd. INTRODUCTION XXV Since the Islamic community’s common stream of consciousness supported the flow of both these currents, it should not be surpris- ing that scholars in each current would be to some degree borrow- ing concepts and arguments from scholars in the other current. Each of these ‘mostly distinct’ thought currents had its spokesmen who vigorously struggled to advance the legitimacy and supremacy of their own way of thinking. Great books were wnitten, such as Ghazali’s Tahafut al-Falasifah, (= The Annihilation of Philosophy), and great debates were held. The thought of Ghazali, the champion of ‘tradition’, was full of ‘rational’ terms and arguments. And Ghazali’s effort called forth a worthy rebuttal from Ibn Rushd (who was called Averroes north of the Mediterranean), who wrote Tahafut al-Tahafut (= The Annihilation of [Ghazali’s] “Annthilation”). Baydawi was a strong sup- porter of the ‘Kalam’ movement in traditional theology which actively reached out and incorporated many terms and arguments from phi- losophy. The struggles and interplay of ideas between the ‘tradional’ and the ‘rational’ currents began among the early Mu‘tazilah and continued for many decades broken only by what appear to be infor- mal ‘historical rest periods’. Truly, the Islamic community’s stream of consciousness, like that of other religious communities, has been at times a flow of ‘seething rapids’ and ‘white water’. And at times the contrasting moods of ‘white water rapids’ versus ‘calm tranquil- lity’ are both to be found within the career and writings of an indi- vidual scholar. On the translation of arabic theological and philosophical terminology Our general intention with this English translation is to provide an important Muslim classical summary statement of Islam which may illumine a wider understanding of this civilization and its religious foundation. We have striven in sympathy to bring over the mind and expressions of the authors. In dealing with the writers’ fertile Arabic language, to use a good earth metaphor, we have ‘plowed and disked’ the material into the English form of our day. The foot- notes deal with greater or lesser questions that arise in the field of study, as the many glosses by the medieval book owners demon- strate. However, as translators we have declined to dissertate. Now in a nautical metaphor, we found that to chart and encompass all the intellectual deeps and sweeps of this history and its culture would Xxvl INTRODUCTION require sailing and remaining far far beyond the value-added fea- ture of the plain English we intend. Specifically, we have attempted to match English to Arabic terms in their context, the choice here balancing between 1) the correla- tion with contemporary plain meanings, and 2) the following of tra- ditional scholarship, with notes explaining their relative values. We cannot rely strictly on past scholarly tradition in matching English with the Arabic. Over time there comes a failure in the necessary creative tension between a reader’s subjective conception of a term and the objective application of it. ‘Therefore, some older valid expres- sions have been redesigned and struck into English, and are here offered as new bearers of meaning. Our hope is that many students will discover in this translation more aspects of history and theology that invite their own research and recording. Wherein the question in choosing a source book for comparative studies in religion may concern merely varying tastes in values, students can at least agree with the saying, “De gustibus non est disputandum.” But wherein an excellent description of a classic human religious posture provides needed material for analyt- ical reflection and intuitive composition,—in a scholarly community of mutually active good will,—then all devotees of knowledge and friendly meeting will do well when we shall think again together. A BriocrapuicaAL Note on ‘App ALLAH IBN ‘UMarR AL-BAYDAWI ‘Abd Allah al-Baydawi was born near Shiraz, Iran, in the village of Bayda’. No date of his birth can be found, but it was before the family moved into Shiraz upon his father’s appointment as chief qadi there. This appointment came sometime during the 34 year period, 1226-1260, when Abu Bakr ibn Sa‘d ibn Zangi governed in Shiraz as Atabeg of Fars province. ‘hus, Baydawi was probably born in the first half of the 7th/13th century; less vaguely, but arbitrarily, we will say that he was born ‘ca. 1225?’ He would have lived through the major upheaval of Islamic civilization when Hulagu and the Mon- gol armies overthrew Baghdad and killed the caliph in 1258, then went on to establish the Ilkhan [or, Mongol “Viceroy”] kingdom in Persia with Tabriz as its capital. Depending on when he died, Baydawi could have lived as a citizen under the rule of up to eight of the different Ilkhans, from Hulagu [1256-1265] to Uljaytu [1304-1317]. INTRODUCTION XXVH The establishment of the Ilkhan rule in Persia after the Mongols’ violent entry into southwest Asia made the populace there extremely apprehensive of what might happen next. It is natural that people of all classes in Persian society would have studied closely the actions and judgments of each Ilkhan ruler for anything that might affect the welfare of their cities and institutions, as well as of themselves, their families, and their neighbors. It was known that Hulagu’s favorite wife and many of his soldiers came from Christian communities that the Nestorians had estab- lished in Asia, and although the Ilkhan himself was not a Christian, he indeed showed favor to this group in society. On the other hand, his son the next ruler, Abagqa [1265-1282], was openly a Buddhist and supported that faith, while one of his wives was a Christian. At one time the Shi‘i community had been in favor, and although Takudar Khan [1282-1284] had been a Muslim and called himself Ahmad, no faith was set up as the state policy until 1295 when Ghazan Khan took the name Mahmud and embraced Islam in the Sunni form. Berthold Spuler relates how this IIkhanid policy of religious tol- eration was considered a “necessary expedient of internal adminis- tration.”* Externally, the Ilkhans together with the states and the church of European Christendom became very much interested in developing a mutual relationship, but commerce and communica- tion by land between them were hindered by the strong Muslim Mamluk state in Egypt and Syria. Although these changes in religious loyalties and the consequent favoritism of the Ilkhan rulers for certain groups did have unsettling effects on the total populace of their empire, nevertheless, their polit- ical and military strength in defense of the empire, and their concern for its internal peace and prosperity together provided the opportu- nity for flourishing growth in the arts, literature, religious studies, and the sciences. Scholars offering different subject specialties and representing various religious and philosophical worldviews moved * The Muslim World, a Historical Survey, Part IT The Mongol Period/by Berthold Spuler; translated from the German by F.R.C. Bagley. Leiden, EJ. Brill, 1960, p. 31 in the chapter “The Ilkhans in Persia”, pp. 25-42, with maps between pages 68 and 69. See also Spuler’s contribution of the historical part to the article, “I[khans”, in the En-I-2. XXV1 INTRODUCTION to Tabriz and Shiraz as leading cities in this now relatively peace- ful land. Learning, teaching, and writing opportunities were plenti- ful and were used to advantage. It is reasonable to surmise that a continuing need was felt among leading members of the majority Muslim population for an up-to- date intellectual defense and summary presentation of the Islamic worldview, the foundation of their civilization. It became ‘Abd Allah al-Baydawi’s concern to provide the arguments and system of ideas that would serve this purpose. His great-grandfather ‘Ali had been a respected local imam in Bayda’, his grandfather Muhammad had been chief qadi in Shiraz, and his own father ‘Umar followed in the steps of the grandfather in the same high post-—a lineage of accomplishment, honor, and prestige. This household of ‘ulama’ was one of learning and legal precision. The family’s traditional role was in public service and it was active at the level of the basic religious foundation of society. Two dissertations on Baydawi’s life and work were published at the beginning of the 1980’s by students at the University of Al-Azhar in Cairo. One, by Jalal al-Din ‘Abd al-Rahman,° was a study of Baydawi’s career in jurisprudence and its lasting influence in Islamic society, while the other, by ‘Ali Muhyi al-Din ‘Ali al-Qarah Daghi,° is complementary to the first, being a study and critical edition of one of Baydawi’s book on jurisprudence. Regarding the life and times of Baydawi, Qarah Daghi observes that our author was saved the necessity of traveling abroad to obtain advanced education, first by the library and teaching availability of his father, and second by the vaniety of talented specialists in the ranks of the scholars who had moved out of war-ravaged territories and gathered in Shiraz.’ That he made attentive use of these advantages is attested by his reputa- tion in which he surpassed his peers in knowledge of the various religious sciences and became known for his learning beyond his own province. > Entitled, a/-Qadi Nasir al-Din al-Baydawi wa-Atharuhu fi Usul al-Figh, [Cairo]: Dar al-Kitab al-Jami‘i, 1981. ® Entitled, al-Ghayal al-Quswa fi Dirayat al-Fatwa/ta lif Qadi al-Qudat ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Umar al-Baydawi. [A study, critical edition, and annotation] by ‘Ali Muhyi al- Din ‘Ali al-Qarah Daghi. Al-Dammam, Saudi Arabia: Dar al-Islah, [1982]. ? “Ali al-Qarah Daghi, op. cit., pp. 58-59. INTRODUCTION XXIX The events in Baydawi’s life that can be aligned with dates of fair certainty are few. The date of his birth had not been reported, and for his death so many conflicting dates have been recorded that its date also is regarded as uncertain. A number of medieval biogra- phers, led by Khalil ibn Aybak al-Safadi [d. 764/1363], place it at 685/1286, and this date is still accepted by many as probably cor- rect.® Evidence for it, however, seems blurred and inconclusive. Other writers name dates a few years later. Hamd Allah Mustawfi Qazvini [fl. 1330-1340] wrote in his Tankh-i Guzidah [p. 706] that Baydawi died in 716/1316-17. As a summary of the different dates men- tioned two are in the 680’s Hijri, three are in the 690’s, and two are in the first two decades of the 700’s Hijri. Baydawi had com- posed a world history that included events down to 674/1275, but the terminal date in this history comes well before the earliest date suggested for his death. From information that has been assembled in the two disserta- tions mentioned, and in the biographical notices in the two editions of the Encyclopaedia of Islam, and especially in the illuminating study of the question by Josef van Ess,°? a tentative outline is suggested herewith for our author’s life taking it up to 716/1316. The friendship of the Atabeg of Fars province for the Baydawi family ended with that governor’s death in 658/1260. ‘Abd Allah Baydawi’s father, “Umar, continued serving the province as chief judge, Qadi al-Qudat, or, with the new title and rank of a Senior Judge of the Empire, ‘Qadi al-Mamalik’, to which the late Atabeg had named him. ® Examples are the mention by H.T. Norris, “Shu‘ubiyya in Arabic literature”, ‘Abbasid Belles-Letires [p. 37], and John Burton, “Quranic exegesis”, in Religion, Learning and Science in the ‘Abbasid Period [p. 52]. These two titles comprise the second and third volumes of the series, Cambridge History of Arabic Literature, both volumes being published in 1990. * “Tas Todesdatum des Baidawi”, in Welt des Orients, v. 9 (1978), pp. 261-270. William Montgomery Watt follows van Ess, saying of Baydawi, “His death prob- ably occurred in 1308 or 1316, though earlier dates are mentioned.” [Watt, Jslamic Philosophy and Theology, an Extended Survey, [2nd ed.], Edinburgh University Press, 1985, p. 137,] Van Ess listed these two dates as most probable, giving his preference to the evi- dence for the second. He says that there is factual evidence regarding Baydawi from the two to three decades following the traditionally accepted date of his death (685/1286] and this requires an entirely new study of his life [p. 269]. XxX INTRODUCTION When ‘Umar al-Baydawi died in 673/1274—5, we will assume that his son ‘Abd Allah applied for and was granted the appointment, possibly doing so in person on a special trip to Tabriz, and so came into office as chief judge in Shiraz. Some years earlier, when ‘Abd Allah Baydawi had begun his career in public office, he had received successive appointments as qadi in a series of small towns in the Shiraz district, surely including his home village. Baydawi’s professional expectation had been of a long career in office, like his father and grandfather before him. Having studied all his life, he knew very well not only his specialty subject of jurisprudence but all the other religious sciences that were the foundation of Islamic civilization. In the years of his early career, we surmise that he may have grown impatient for the wider public service and recognition that he expected. Individual judicial cases of people innocently or will- fully entangling themselves in the details of the public law no doubt could have worn down his patience to the point where he began to act and speak outwardly as he may have thought and wrote in pri- vate, that is, concisely, precisely, and quite short on toleration of those whose reasoning powers were slower. When he served as a personal tutor of young minds he could be the sole arbiter and authority of their progress. But as a judge of his fellow citizens before the public and religious law, that “he approached . . . with reverence and reserve”,'® it seems that his severely correct temperament and the judgments he rendered began building up resentment among the financially and politically leading citizens of the province until this resentment reached a degree that became explosive. He was only a few short years into his career at Shiraz when abruptly he was removed from office, about the year 677/1278-79. His ouster from office proved such a family and personal embarrassment that he removed himself from Shiraz and traveled to Tabriz, the capital of the Ilkhan empire comprising Fars and other provinces. Meanwhile, it appears that there was another family of the ‘ulama’ elite who rivaled the village “Baydawis” and wanted leadership in the province’s capital city. It may be speculated that on Baydawi’s exit from the scene, a young man named Fakhr al-Din Isma‘il al- Shirazi," fifteen years of age and reputed to be a prodigious scholar, '0 Jalal al-Din ‘Abd al-Rahman, op. cit., p. 145. '! Jalal al-Din ‘Abd al-Rahman [op. cit., p. 181] gives a full form of the name, INTRODUCTION XXX1 had immediately been put forward from the midst of this family as candidate for the chief judgeship of Shiraz. The boy was quickly accepted by the governor of Fars, who no doubt saw the fledgling jurist as being more docile, patient, and gentle in dispensing public justice to his elders. A date for this eventful change in the careers of the two rival judges has been reached by calculations from Fakhr al-Din Isma‘il’s death date of 756/1355, less his age of 94 at death, which give his birthdate as 662/1263-64; then by adding 15 years, his age at induc- tion to office, the year 677/1278-79 is produced for this his first installation as chief judge of Shiraz. After completing his move to Tabriz and having settled into his lodgings, ‘Abd Allah Baydawi one day decided to attend that city’s chief ‘school’ or lecture hall. Professor Edwin Calverley retells from Taj al-Din ‘Abd al-Wahhab al-Subki’s Tabagat al-Shafi‘iyah al-Kubra [vol. 5, p. 59]!° what happened. He entered a school there and took one of the back seats because no one there knew him. The instructor put to those present a question which he said none of those present could solve or repeat. Then Baydawi started to answer. The instructor said, “I will not listen until I know that you understand the question”. Al-Baydawi said, “You may choose whether I should repeat the question word for word, or give the sense of it”. The teacher was surprised and said, “Repeat the ques- tion word for word”. Then Baydawi repeated it and then gave the solution, and showed that the teacher had not stated the problem accu- rately. Then he confronted the instructor with a similar problem and requested him to solve it, but the instructor begged to be excused. The wazir [of the empire] happened to be present and called Baydawi to his side, and when he found out who he was, he had Baydawi restored to his position in Shiraz. In widening circles among scholars of the East this incident was told and recorded about Baydawi, the brilliant but impatient and severely correct jurist theologian, who had been ousted from office by a local governor but then restored to it by the highest authority of the empire. using both Fakhr al-Din al-Shirazi and Majd al-Din al-Shirazi al-Bali [the latter name from a village in Shiraz district]. Van Ess [op. cit., p. 269] reports the boy’s name as “Magdaddin al-Fali.” EE. Calverley: “Al-Baydawi’s Matali‘ al-anzar, a systematic theology of Islam”, in Mushm World v. 53 (1963), p. 294. XXX INTRODUCTION When the imperial court in Tabriz restored Baydawi as Qadi al- Qudat of Shiraz, in about the year 680/1281,'° the judicial situa- tion as it had been under him earlier lamentably began to repeat itself. Assuredly this time, Tabriz would have been fully informed of the hardship for the people and leaders of Fars through enduring ‘the severity’ of this chief justice. Baydawi’s brilliance of mind was not questioned, but the rendering of his judgments had grated too sorely, and thus, his judicial career in Shiraz was brought to a full stop in 681/1282, only six months after his reinstatement. And again Baydawi left the familiar city and traveled the miles north to the capital, Tabriz, an arena where he said he was deter- mined to spend his time peacefully in ascetic living, religious medi- tation, teaching and writing. This trip in 681/1282 marks Baydawi’s permanent move to Tabriz.'* And without delay, in Shiraz the youth- ful Fakhr al-Din Isma‘il “al-Shirazi” was reinstalled as chief justice, and from then history records that he held office for seventy-five years. The whole discouraging professional experience in Shiraz would have taken place during the reign of the son of Hulagu, Ikhan Abagqa, during the years 663-680/ 1265-1282. And at the time of Baydawi’s final trip to Tabriz, the new IIkhan, Ahmad Takudar, would have just begun his reign, the dates of which are 680-83/1282-84,'>' In his al-Azhar University dissertation, Jalal al-Din ‘Abd al-Rahman '3 Van Ess reports 680/1281 as the date calculated for Baydawi’s restoration to the judgeship fop. cit., p. 265, n. 71]. ‘* This date of 681/1282 as part of the calculation is reported by Jalal al-Din ‘Abd al-Rahman [op. cit., pp. 142-43], and by ‘Ali al-Oarah Daghi [op. cit., p. 59, note 3]. J. i Ess [op. cit., p. 265, note 71] uses the same calculation but carries it only to Baydawi’s reinstatement in 680/1281. 8 A Middle East Studies Handbook, by Jere L. Bacharach. Seattle, Univ. of Washington Press, 1989, p. 41. 6 There is a story that on reaching Tabriz, Baydawi had sought out a sufi shaykh, one Muhammad al-Kitkhata’i [spelling is uncertain] [=? kedkhuda] who was a confidant of khan Ahmad Takudar. He is reported to have asked the shaykh to intercede for him in requesting the emperor’s intervention in restoring him yet again to the chief judgeship of Shiraz. On the occasion of the shaykh’s regular Friday night meeting with the Ilkhan the request was relayed in such a manner as to show the applicant’s foolhardiness in persisting in this quest for high office. The shaykh told the Ilkhan that the man “wanted a small piece the size of a carpet from one of the quarters of Hell [Jahannam]”, that is, he wanted “the judgeship over Fars province.” The Ilkhan immediately agreed to the request, and was ready INTRODUCTION XXX states that none of the writers who mentioned Baydawi’s life had reported any intellectual or publishing activity from his Shiraz years other than the fact that he had served as the chief judge there, and that it was only after his final move to Tabriz that he came to have a reputation as a writer.'’ This observation bears weight in our out- line of Baydawi’s life. Baydawi is most famous for his commentary on the Qur’an, Anwar al-Tanzil wa-Asrar al-Ta wil. It is a thoroughgoing revision of Zamakh- shari’s commentary, al-Kashshaf ‘an Haga’iq al-Tanzil, done in order to replace that author’s Mu‘tazilite interpretations and to provide a more widely useful orthodox commentary with fuller annotations. Baydawi dedicated it to Ilkhan Arghun whose reign was 683~-90/ 1284-91, probably completing it during that reign. Such a reference work would have tremendous value to the Ikhan in governing and understanding a populace with a majority of Muslims. It would pro- vide opportunities for its author to give private lessons to members of the court as well as lectures for the general public. It was the foundation of his scholarly reputation and so would have been the textbook for his teaching. Without any doubt he was keeping busy as his career in Tabriz got underway. Other outstanding works of Baydawi, in addition to the Anwar al- Tanzil, include Minhaj al-Wusul ila ‘Ilm al-Usul and a commentary to go with it, and al-Ghayah al-Quswa fi Dirayat al-Fatwa [?? = Mukhtasar al-Wasit], both the preceding titles being on Islamic law, then Misbah al-Arwah, as well as the compendium here translated to English, Tawali al-Anwar min Matali‘ al-Anzar, both the preceding being on Islamic scholastic theology, and Nizam al-Tavarikh, on world history.'® to issue the order. When the shaykh reported to Baydawi just what he had told the Ikhan, Baydawi was taken aback and seems to have been truly shocked into an objective comprehension of his real foolhardiness in continuing to apply for the office. He then withdrew his appeal, and remained with the shaykh in order to learn the way of mysticism. This story is retold with slight variations in both the dissertations from al-Azhar University, and is attributed to the Rawzat al-Jannat by Muhammad Baqir al- Khvansari [1811-95], but it is fitted into the theory of the early date of Baydawi’s death, 685/1286. Jalal al-Din ‘Abd al-Rahman [op. cit., p. 180] cites the mention in the Kashf al-Zunun of Katib Celebi [= Hajji Khalfah] and Khvansari’s Rawzat al- Jannat to the effect that Baydawi wrote his commentary on the Qur’an while work- ing with Shaykh al-Kitkhata’i. ‘7 Jalal al-Din ‘Abd al-Rahman, op. cit., pp. 157-158. 18 James Robson, article “al-Baydawi, ‘Abd Allah ibn “Umar”, in En-I-2, v. 1. XXXIV INTRODUCTION In addition, he wrote a number of commentaries on the works of other writers in grammar, logic, and theology. Both Jalal al-Din ‘Abd al-Rahman and ‘Ali al-Qarah Daghi men- tion the names of pupils who studied with Baydawi. ‘Abd al-Rahman names two:'? Fakhr al-Din al-Jarbardi [= al-Chahar Barti] [664— 746/1265-6— 1345-6], and Zayn al-Din al-Habaki [= al-Hanaki], who was later the teacher of ‘Adud al-Din al-Iji, famous for his authorship of al-Mawagqif fi ‘Im al-Kalam. Qarah Daghi lists those two plus two others, namely, Kamal al-Din al-Maraghi [b. 643/1245-46], and ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn Ahmad al-Isbahani, father and teacher of Mahmud ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Isfahani, the author of the com- mentary on Baydawi’s Tawali al-Anwar that is translated here together with its subject text. Qarah Daghi mentions that doubtless there were more:”” It should be noted that if the early date fi.e., 685/1286] for Baydawi’s death should be posited, and if his final trip to Tabriz should be set at 681/1282, then the space of four years allowable would seem to render it unlikely that he could have produced so many book titles, or earned the scholarly reputation that he had, or given adequate time for teaching of advanced students. And there is another factor bearing on the passage of time in this scholar’s life in Tabriz, namely, the fact that the normal duration of the course of study for each of his pupils may with fair certainty be reckoned in years, rather than in ‘quarters’, ‘semesters’, or months. An indication of Baydawi’s gradual improvement in fortune is given by the discovery of a series of letters written by the wazir under Ghazan Khan and Uljaytu Khan [reigning respectively, 694— 703/1295-1304 and 703-716/1304--1316], namely, the historian Rashid al-Din Tabib, to his son, Amir ‘Ali, who was the Ikhans’ governor in Baghdad. These letters are believed to have been writ- ten about 703/1303 or perhaps as late as 712/1312-13, during or just after a war between the Ilkhanids and the Mamluks in Syria. In one of the letters Rashid al-Din gives a list of citizens honored by the Ilkhan, among whom is mentioned Baydawi as bearing the title “Qadi” [he alone in the list being so titled] and as having received an imperial gift that included 2000 dinars, a sable fur, and 'S Op. cit., pp. 185-188. 2 Op. cit., pp. 65-68. INTRODUCTION XXKV a mount and saddle.”! It is possible that Baydawi was not only hon- ored as ‘qadi’ by tradition, but that he was also recognized by the Ilkhan’s court in a new role of chief qadi of the Shafi‘ite school of Islamic law.” The tranquillity of the Ikhan empire was so only in a relative sense. Ghazan Khan had become a Sunnite Muslim as a formal step of religious loyalty. Various reforms in his administration were begun, and the construction of public buildings increased. However, the inconclusive war against the Mamluks and the threat of more war coming from a major division of the Mongols in the north forced the Ilkhan to build up his empire’s defenses. Although the Ilkhan gave the Shi‘ite minority advantages and money for their institu- tions and building projects they were still dissatisfied with his reli- gious stance. In about 705/1305 a leading Shi‘ite scholar moved to Tabriz, namely, Jamal al-Din al-Hasan ibn Yusuf Ibn al-Mutahhar al- Hilli, known as ““Allamah Hilli” [648-726/1250-1325]. In the pub- lic discussions and debates on matters of Islamic faith and on the dispute between Shi‘ites and Sunnites as to who should have been the rightful leader of Islam after the Prophet Muhammad, Ibn al- Mutahhar al-Hili soon became active as a Shi‘ite spokesman, while ‘Abdallah al-Baydawi was an outstanding scholar and speaker for the Sunnite majority. Both were highly intelligent and both keenly appreciated these opportunities for presenting their positive reasons and mutual objections and for constructing arguments and counter- arguments that could stand in the minds of attentive hearers. ‘Allamah Hill abridged Nasir al-Din Tusi’s handbook on Islamic religious practice, Misbah al-Mutahayid and organized it into ten chap- ters. Then he supplied his own composition which he called, a/-Bab al-Hadi ‘Ashar, [The Eleventh Chapter], containing the teaching about God and His attributes, then Prophecy, the Chosen Leader [Imam] 2| —D.0. Morgan, in his article, “Rashid al-Din Tabib”, [En-I-2, v. 8, p. 443] states that this collection of letters is “generally regarded as a spurious compilation, perhaps of the Timurid period.” J. van Ess, op. cit., pp. 266-267, mentions the doubts of other scholars as to the reliability of these letters, but accepts a coun- terargument against the doubts and is favorably inclined himself as to their histor- ical value. ” Cf. E. Tyan’s article “Kadi”, En-I-2 v. 4, pp. 373-374, esp. p. 374. 3 "Translated from Arabic and published by Willliam M. Miller, London: Royal Asiatic Society, Luzac Distr., 1928 (reprint 1958). XXXVI INTRODUCTION of the nation, and the Hereafter. We note that the ‘Allamah begins by speaking about the obligation [wajib] that is divinely placed on believers in Islam to know and obey God, the Necessary Existent [wajib al-wujtd], and other foundational teachings of Islam. Ghazan Khan’s hopes for reorganizing his empire ended when he died at the age of 31 in 703/1304. His brother Uljaytu succeeded him, intending to continue his brother’s plans. He had become a Sunnite Muslim along with his brother, and sometime during the first years of his reign he had tightened his control of the Sunnite community by combining two of their schools of Islamic law into one for administrative purposes. However, in 710/1310 he was won over to the Shi‘ite cause’ when Ibn al-Mutahhar al-Hilli issued a fatwa in his favor that abolished a troublesome divorce.” This major shift in the ruler’s religious loyalty changed the bal- ance of power in the Islamic community, and gradually put Sunnites on the defensive. For the next several years, tensions increased within the Persian populace and especially between the two large Islamic divisions. Baydawi deeply sensed the immediate and long term impli- cations of this change. With reference to the succession of Islamic leadership after the Prophet Muhammad, he was convinced that the Shi'ite position contravened the facts of history. This basic deviance in the conception of historical fact he felt was also a denial of much that Sunnite Islam stood for. With an educated and cultured spokesman like Ibn al-Mutahhar al-Hili, he would have been pleased and stim- ulated to continue discussion and debate over these matters. But the politico/religious atmosphere was radically changed, and the future seemed headed for an unthinkable tragedy. Shi‘ite citizens had been increasing in numbers in Persia, and now they were favored over the Sunnites on every occasion. Uljaytu was even persuaded to engrave on his coins the Shi‘ite slogan, ““‘Ali is the viceroy of God.” Bertold Spuler relates further in his survey of this history that Uljaytu persecuted the Sunnites so severely that “civil strife seemed bound to break out.” During this tense period Uljaytu died in 717/1317, and his death was attributed to poisoning. Shortly afterwards in 718/1318 under B. Spuler, The Muslim World, a Historical Survey, Part 2, The Mongol Period, pp. 38-39. Leiden: EJ. Brill, 1960. 5 Jalal al-Din ‘Abd al-Rahman, op. cit., p. 183. 26 B. Spuler, op. cit., p. 39. INTRODUCTION XXXVI the next khan, Abu Sa‘id son of Uljaytu, the historian Rashid al- Din Tabib, one of the two co-wazirs of the empire who had been struggling for supremacy at the second echelon of government, was accused by his opponent, Wazir Taj al-Din ‘Ali, of having poisoned Ikhan Uljaytu. And because his co-wazir accuser was temporarily too strong, no adequate defense could be made, so Rashid al-Din and his son Ibrahim were executed and their family property seized by the government. But history records a sort of vindication some years later when Ghiyath al-Din, another son of Rashid al-Tin Tabib, was made wazir, the empire being still under [khan Abu Sa‘id.”’ In the years after 710/1310 when Shi‘ism had begun to modify the internal actions and attitudes of the government toward its non- Shi‘ite citizens, for Baydawi there was no longer any satisfaction in public activity. As a Sunnite speaker attempting to address a changed and predominantly hostile public atmosphere, doubtless he would no longer have received the customary courteous and fair hearing by the crowd of listeners in the religious debates and discussions. His formerly attentive students excused themselves and disappeared from his company. Calumny in private gossip easily could have been splashed over his reputation. Thus, his early determination to live an ascetic life of meditation and study would have prevailed in his daily plans. It was clearly bet- ter for him to keep “a low profile” and avoid trouble as much as possible. This principle he observed well until he was overtaken by death in 716/1316, the date given by Hamd Allah Mustawfi al- Qazvini [d. after 740/1339—-40] as recorded in his Ta’rikh-i Guzida.”® As Baydawi’s name for long had not been heard either in gossip or in news reports, it has seemed to historians ever since that time that his last days are faded in the distance. This is a lapse of his- toriography, as no consideration has been given by any biographer nor has speculation been made regarding the relevant general fact of an aged and discouraged person’s deteriorating physical and men- tal powers and how this fact would bear upon the continuance of regular daily communication between the outside world and such an 7 D.O. Morgan, in his article, “Rashid al-Din Tabib” [En-I-2, v. 8, p. 443]. * Quoting Bertold Spuler regarding this history, “[It] (completed 730/1330)... con- tains a quantity of useful information about the author’s times which is not to be found elsewhere, so that it is indispensable as a source for the later Ilkhan period...” B. Spuler, article “Hamd Allah . . . al-Mustawfi al-Kazwini” in En-I-2, v. 3, p. 122. XXXVIli INTRODUCTION individual. So to Baydawi, as to everyone, gradually there did come the time of a parting along the unseen abscission line between body and intelligent soul. In this case of Qadi ‘Abd Allah Baydawi, as in many a noteworthy case, memories of his words and copies of his writings continue to reward study and to stimulate comprehension, both in scholars’ cells and in high offices of government. A BroGrRaPHIcAL Nore on Maumup [spn ‘Asp AL-RAHMAN AL-ISFAHANI Shams al-Din Mahmud ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Isfahani, author of this translated commentary on Baydawi’s Tawali‘ al-Anwar, was born in 674/1276 in Isfahan.** His home was one where scholarship in general religious studies was honored and pursued by his father, ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn Ahmad al-Isfahani. Mahmud aptly and heartily fol- lowed this example of motivation. A brief outline of the life of Isfahani, Baydawi’s commentator, is supplied by Ibn Hajar al-‘Asqalani [773-852/1372-1449], writing in his biographical dictionary of nota- bles who died in the 8th/14th century, a/-Durar al-Kaminah fi A‘yan al-M? ah al-Thaminah, entry #4752. We shall follow this outline and suggest a partially filled in picture of his life and contribution, where possible correlating this with the time-frame of Baydawi’s career. Mahmud?’s father, ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn Ahmad Isfahani, was one of the four students of Baydawi whose names have been gathered from various sources.” No date for his course of study with Baydawi has been found, but we shall take it to have been sometime during what we assume would be his most productive years at Tabriz, between 681/1282 and on up to 710/1310, when the Ilkhan Persian empire officially became a Shi‘ite state. Let us add to our assump- tions the fact that ‘Abd al-Rahman would have moved his family to Tabriz while he studied there. That more distant capital city, plus Baydawi’s rising fame somewhat later than 681/1282, would have had more attraction as a study center than Shiraz would have had earlier than 681/1282, even though the latter was closer to their *9 In Arabic the city’s name has been traditionally spelled with a “b” instead of an “f”, but in Persian it is “f”. This carries over into the usages with personal names. *® Qarah Daghi, ‘Ali Muhyi al-Din, op. cit., pp. 65-68. See also the list in the biographical note on Baydawi, p. xxxiv above. INTRODUCTION XXX1X home in Isfahan, since Baydawi earlier would have been less known as a scholar. Mahmud would have been 7 years of age in 681/1282, and 36 years of age in 710/1310. Ibn Hajar says only that he “worked” in his home town [i.e., either as apprentice in a skilled trade, or as a ‘pre-professional’ student], becoming skilled and advancing in the various “arts and sciences”, and that he studied under his father and another shaykh, one Jamal al-Din ibn Abi al-Raja’. When ‘Abd al-Rahman moved his family to Tabriz and began his course of study under Baydawi, it may be that Mahmud was still living with his parents while bringing in wages from his work. To speculate, if Mahmud accompanied his parents, he might reasonably have been near the age of twenty, reaching this age in 694/1294—5. By that time Baydawi’s career at Tabriz could have reached its high- est level, his fame attracting students from cities in every direction. The situation then would have been ideal for Mahmud to attend along with his father, and thus earn for himself a ‘subject teaching license’ [yazah]. This practice by students of bringing a child or youthful son along to hear the lectures and thus gain academic credit is known to have become a “routine” phenomenon in Islamic edu- cation by the time Ibn Hajar al-‘Asqalani was writing in the mid- 8th/ 14th century.” Of course, this is only speculation regarding Mahmud, as one would expect him at least to mention such an experience in his writ- ings, and if later he had become proficient as a scholar, then his biographical notice in Ibn Hajar’s al-Durar al-Kaminah would have mentioned it also. But the lack of any such mention does not demon- strate in itself that he did not sit in his father’s shadow at Baydawi’s lectures. At any rate, therefore, whether as a direct or indirect hearer of the famous scholar, Mahmud is no more than ‘once removed’ from him. Especially since his father was the mtermediary, Mahmud’s insight into Baydawi’s mind and work was deeply appreciative of that teacher. To digress briefly, the same ‘once removed’ degree of separation from Baydawi the teacher holds also in the case of ‘Adud al-Din ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn Ahmad al-Iji, his intermediary being his tutor 31 Jonathan Berkey, The Transmission of Knowledge in Medieval Cairo, a Soctal History of Islamic Education. Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 32. xl INTRODUCTION shaykh, one Zayn al-Din al-Hanaki [or, al-Habaki]. However, al-Iji’s summary work on Islamic theology, al-Mawagif fi ‘Ilm al-Kalam, is nei- ther presented or known as a commentary on Baydawi’s book of natural and revealed theology, but rather as an original work. It is evident that medieval Islamic scholars observed some of the same general patterns in the organization of their topics. We have made a brief study of the organization of Jji’s book along with a com- parison of it to the Baydawi text with its Isfahani commentary.” When his family eventually returned to Isfahan, Mahmud would have begun his teaching career which would build up gradually as he matured through his own reading and learning. His pupils prob- ably included both primary and secondary students, as classes and as individuals, and from among them he could choose those who were more advanced. His was an orthodox Sunnite Muslim family, and when Ilkhanid Persia became a Shi‘ite state in 710/1310 under Ikhan Uljaytu [703-17/1304—-17}, Mahmud Isfahani would have felt the same dis- couraging effect upon his scholarly enthusiasm at the age of 36 that Baydawi was feeling very keenly as an elderly man. In addition to the religious situation, the [khan Abu Sa‘id [717-36/1317-35] seemed both weak and untrustworthy. He had allowed the famous wazir- ® There is a close similarity in organization between Isfahani’s commentary taken together with Baydawi’s Tawel® al-Anwar and Iji’s Mawagif: Please note the two tables of contents: Baydawi has six main divisions, using standard ‘book’ terms for the divisions. Iji has six main divisions, using a geographical metaphor of ‘Stations on a Route of Exploration in Theological Knowledge’. BAYDAWI VI {1.] Introduction: Studies Ist Station: Basic items of knowledge in logical reasoning. and learning. BOOK 1: Realities Possible: {2.] Section 1: Universals 2nd Station: “Matters of general reference” (3.] Section 2: Accidents 3rd Station: Accidents Ch. 1, General Obser. Pt. 1: General Ch. 2, Quantity Obser. Pt. 2: Quantity Ch. 3, Quality Obser. Pt. 3: Quality {4.] Section 3: Substances 4th Station: Substances [5.| BOOK 2: Realities Divine 5th Station. Things divine (Dogmatic theology) (Dogmatic theology) [6.| BOOK 3: Realities Prophetic 6th Station: Matters of tradition (Prophecy, Imamate, (Prophecy, Imamate, Practical theology, Practical theology, Last Day) Last Day) INTRODUCTION xli historian, Rashid al-Din Tabib, and his eldest son to be executed because of a rival’s spite in 718/1318, but later he had raised the dead wazir’s younger son, Ghiyath al-Din, to the same post his father had held, perhaps as some kind of an apology to the family. The next mention of Mahmud Isfahani in Ibn Hajar al-‘Asqalani’s brief obituary notice of him is that he went on the pilgrimage to Makka at the end of 724/1324. He was then 50 years of age. Thus, we realize that fourteen years under increasing Shi‘ite control over the country’s internal civilization is a long time for him to have endured the change from being in a majority Sunnite position to being of a second-class minority. The following month, at the turn of the year 725/1325, it is apparent that he did not return to Isfahan, but instead, he traveled to Jerusalem, as Ibn Hajar mentions. His pilgrimage to Makka and his visit to Jerusalem as the next most holy place of Islam helped to restore his religious perspective and revived his confidence in his profession. Being a Sunnite Muslim, he felt an inward guidance to emigrate permanently from the Shi‘ite Ikhanid region that was his home to the territory of the Mamluk empire comprising Egypt, Palestine and Syria. This empire was a strong Sunnite state, so he was soon headed for Damascus, arriving there in Safar, the second month of the new year, his age being 51. In the city at various lecture halls, and especially in the great Umayyad Mosque, wherever public discussion groups met regularly, there Mahmud al-Isfahani made himself at home, participating with all his old enthusiasm for things intellectual and religious. Ibn Hajar al-‘Asqalani picks up a semi-legendary moment in Mahmud’s hie, when he quotes a sharply observant old Shaykh Ibn Taymiyah [66 1-728/ 1263-1328], the Hanbalite judge and theologian, as scold- ing a talkative group at a public discussion, “Be quiet now all of you, so that we can hear what this noble fellow has to say. No one like him has ever come here”. [al-Durar al-Kaminah, 1966, p. 95.] Thus it was for seven happy years Mahmud spent his days and evenings at the Umayyad Mosque intently poring over his reading or patiently helping groups of students with their difficult reading assignments. When it was his turn to lead a public discussion peo- ple would be left full of praise for him. One day in late spring, in the month Rabi‘ II of the year 732/1332, Mahmud being 58 years old, an important letter of invitation to membership came to him by post from the Cairo office of Shaykh xii INTRODUCTION Majd al-Din al-Aqsara’i, supervising shaykh of the famous Nasiriyah khanqah in Siryaqus, then a northern residential suburb of Cairo. Built and fostered by the reigning Mamluk king, al-Malik al-Nasir Muhammad, this khangah [or, khanaqah] was an outstanding exam- ple of the retreat and study centers in Cairo, originally for Sufis and later accepting religious academics, that provided a room, meals, worship and study facilities and a common library, plus regular schol- arships or stipends for budding or established scholars. The khan- qahs brought honor and prestige upon their builders, their supervising shaykhs, and all who resided within.” Then, in short order, Mahmud ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman Isfahani gave his hearty and obedient response to the sender of this letter by trav- eling to Cairo, alighting from his mount at the khanqah, and by taking up his lodgings there [fa-nazala ‘indahu]. And there he was graciously welcomed by Shaykh Majd al-Din al-Aqsara’i and soon introduced to the residential fellows and the leading patrons of the khangah in a general convocation, this without doubt becoming a ‘lecture series’ by general acclaim [wa-‘umila lahu sama‘]. The chief fostering patron of the Siryaqus khangah was the king, al-Malik al-Nasir Muhammad ibn Qalawun, now a mature leader in his third and finally secured reign [709-41/1309—40], having been installed and removed twice before [693-94, and 698-708], fortunately without injury.** He was ten years younger than Isfahani, and there is no doubt that this monarch warmly agreed with the supervising shaykh in appreciating the newly arrived scholar’s gifts. Listening to Mahmud Isfahani’s expositions of the Qur’an and to his discussions of the teachings and semi-philosophical debates of the Mutakallimun, the king felt his own need for a better comprehen- sion of the religious foundation of Islamic civilization. Isfahani spoke often of a great Sunnite teacher, ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Umar Baydawi, who had lived in recent years in the Ilkhanid empire when it had been a Sunnite land. Al-Malik al-Nasir Muhammad even could have possessed a copy of Baydawi’s theological summary, Tawali al-Anwar min Matals‘ al-Anzar. But then, it was steep and heavy reading, even 33 See Jonathan Berkey, op. cit., pp. 56-60, “Sufi Convents as Centers of Education”, and J. Chabbi’s article “Khankah” in En-I-2, v. 4, pp. 1025-26, for gradual changes in the function of the khanqahs. 3 See Peter M. Holt’s article, “Al-Nasir”, 1. Al-Nasir Muhammad ibn Qalawun, 684~-741/1285-1341, in En-I-2, v. 7, pp. 991-992. INTRODUCTION xiii for well educated royalty. As had the earlier Ilkhans, this Mamluk king sensed that behind the difficult sentences there was a religious scholar of forthright logical clarity and positive, serious judgment, with strength of conviction and knowledge, qualities the IIkhans and their counterparts, the Mamluks, wanted to see in their legal con- sultants. Al-Nasir Muhammad saw these qualities in Mahmud Isfahani, but in a more fluent and genial style than in Baydawi. Therefore, al-Nasir Muhammad proposed to Isfahani, and indeed, commissioned him to write out a full commentary on Baydawi’s Tawali‘ al-Anwar. This would be as a service both to him as king, and to all readers of religious and scholarly purpose. A sizeable reward in cash, property, office, or all of these, was always under- stood as part of a commission, and this also depended on the king’s satisfaction with the end product. Residence at the Siryaqus khanqah of course provided all the con- tinuing needs of a scholar. Therefore, Isfahani set to work on the commentary that was commissioned probably sometime not long after becoming acquainted with al-Malik al-Nasir Muhammad in 732/1332. The king was then in the final third of his last reign, being destined to live nine more years until 741/1340. These two dates may then be set as the extreme limits for the possible begin- ning and ending of Isfahani’s work on this book. Others of the leading Mamluk princes also had found Isfahani to be an appealing and convincing teacher. Few if any of them came from native Egyptian families, so their social class had no difficulty in accepting a foreign scholar’s contribution.” Prince Qawsun al- Saqi, who had the high office of royal ‘cupbearer’,*® and kept this title, “‘al-Saqi”, adding it to his personal name, was able to convince Shaykh Mahmud Isfahani to accept the honor of being named the supervising shaykh of a new khanqah that the prince was building. The deal offered to Isfahani would have included a higher stipend and more comfortable lodgings as the supervising shaykh, a first- class hbrary of manuscript titles to be commissioned from the best scribes, plus the all-important freedom of setting his own schedule of hours for individual work and for public discussion. He did not * Carl Petry, The Cailian Elite of Cairo in the Later Middle Ages, Princeton University Press, 1981, Ch. 2, “Geographic origins of the civilian elite”, esp. pp. 61-68, 77-81. %° P.M. Holt, op. cit., p. 992. xliv INTRODUCTION refuse this fine offer, but continued without interruption in his own royally commissioned task. Before he emigrated to Egypt Mahmud Isfahani had produced his own works or commentaries on the works of other writers in the fields of literary criticism, poetics, dialectical theology, and logic. In Cairo his written production ultimately included a commentary on Ibn al-Sa‘ati’s literary work al-Badi, commentaries on two works of Baydawi, the Tawah‘ al-Anwar and the Minha al-Wusul, and his Tafsir, an interpretation of the Qur’an. Colleagues and friends told of their amazed observations of him while at work, whether in Isfahan, Damascus or Cairo. Ibn Hajar al-‘Asqalani relates one vignette, that he avoided eating very much in the evening, for that would make him need to drink liquids, and that would make him need to find a piece of vacant land whereon to relieve himself, and therefore precious writing time would be lost to him. Friends remembered how firm his handwriting was and how quickly his pen flew along. And it seemed that any time some inter- ruption came into the workings of his mind when he was involved either in conceptual thought or in problems of knowledge it was like an affliction to him. Ibn Hajar goes on to quote the historian Khalil ibn Aybak al-Safadi [d. 1362] as saying, “I saw him [in Cairo] when he was writing his commentary [[tafsir] on the Qur’an], he was working directly from his mind and memory without any review [of his source materials]; and people have found [this work] to be greatly useful.” Isfahani’s move away from the Siryaqus khanqah, called the Nasinyah after the king who built it, to another where he, Isfahani, was the supervising shaykh and chief scholarly ornament, was only a small irritation to the king. Likewise, Prince Qawsun’s success in luring Shaykh Isfahani away from his first lodgings to newer ones with a grander title amounted to nothing more than the prince’s usual activity in a court full of others like him constantly jostling and scheming for advancement in prestige, an activity that corre- sponded to the bustling hubbub in a busy market place, nothing to cause worry. When Shaykh Isfahani finally announced that he had completed his commentary on Baydawi’s Tawali al-Anwar min Matali‘ al-Anzar, royal and religious and scholarly personages all welcomed and praised the work. Readings were scheduled, manuscript copies were com- missioned, and the king presented the author a friendly and gener- INTRODUCTION xlv ous reward for the long task now completed. Of the place of Baydawi’s Tawal* al-Anwar in the later esteem of Muslims, Jalal al-Din ‘Abd al-Rahman, in his University of al-Azhar dissertation on Baydawi*’ quotes Taj al-Din ‘Abd al-Wahhab al-Subki [d. 1370], who wrote in his biography of Shafi notables, Tabagat al-Shafityah al-Kubra, “[Baydawi’s Tawali‘ al-Anwar| is the most outstanding compendium that has ever been written in the science of [Islamic] theological statement.” Furthermore, Jalal al-Din ‘Abd al-Rahman goes on to say that of all the commentaries on Baydawi’s Tawali‘ al-Anwar the most helpful and useful one is that by the great Doctor, Shaykh Shams al-Din [Mahmud ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman] al-Isfahani.* For Mahmud Isfahani from then on no major changes were reported in his location, his reputation, or his work. He continued to debate and to discuss interesting philosophical and religious prob- lems with other scholars and with the public, and he continued to teach his students and to write, although he had considerably slowed up in the latter activity. His friend the king died in 741/1340, and was succeeded by no less than seven short-lived reigns in the eight years following. Ibn Hajar al-‘Asqalani says that Isfahani died in Dhu al-Qa‘dah 749/1348, this being in the Second Pandemic of the bubonic plague.*® At the age of 75 years, his successful career in scholarship as both teacher and writer was brought to an end. One may imagine that he found eminent satisfaction in his life among colleagues, friends and students. And without doubt, he remains an outstanding citizen of his world and an interesting person with whom to study and reflect. 7 al-Qadi Nasir al-Din al-Baydawi wa-Atharuhu fi Usul al-Figh, p. 201. %8 ‘Abd al-Rahman, op. cit., p. 205. * Tbn Hajar al-‘Asqalani, al-Durar al-Kaminah, 1966, p. 95. See also “Fleas: the Lethal Leapers”, by Nicole Duplaix, National Geographic Magazine, May, 1988, pp. 675 fF. This page intentionally left blank THE TRANSLATION This page intentionally left blank IsFAHANT’s FoREwoRD To His COMMENTARY, Matali‘ al-Anzar, Sharh L 2, T 2, MS 3b In the Name of God, the Merciful Lord of Mercy, [we do this}.! Praise be to God, For He it is alone Who singularly lives in the obligation of His presence and the perpetuity of His abiding,’ Who stands alone in prevention of His nonexistence and the impossibility of His passing. Demonstrating His existing presence is the created earth and soaring heavens; Witnessing to His singular incomparability is the banishment of corruption from earth and sky. He surpasses far any matching to likes or peers. He is holy, high beyond temporal origination or analytical division, beyond compounding or partition. Comprehended by His knowledge is the careful creeping of a black ant on massive rock in glooms of the dark. ' This invocation, the “basmala” [bi-ism Allah al-Rahman al-Rahim], is given here as preface to the entire double book that follows [i.e., both text and com- mentary], not being repeated at the beginning of Baydawi’s text. In it we follow Kenneth Cragg’s translation. [We add the bracketed phrase as being implicit in whatever context the basmala is used.] ® Isfahani’s incipit: [al-Hamdu lil-Lah al-ladhi tawahhada bi-wujib al-wujiid wa- dawam al-baqa’]. These lines of preamble clearly echo Baydawi’s previously writ- ten incipit and preamble. Regarding the phrase, [wajib al-wujud] or, [wujub al-wujiid], or abbreviated to [al-wajib], a shift in connotation is apparent between the aspect of ‘egocentric’ philosophical reasoning and the aspect of ‘theocentric’ religious atten- tion, In the zone of philosophical reasoning, the Prime Mover is ultimately declared to be the ‘Necessary Existent’, or, ‘the Necessarily Existent One’, ie., that Being who is necessary to sustain the existence of the philosopher and his universe. Thus, God may be considered as having necessary existence; but any notion of the eternal God as ‘being under obligation’ is expressly rejected by Baydawi and his colleagues. However, moving into the zone of religious attention and expression, the presence of the Transcendent One is intuitively and immediately recognized as the source of an obligation within which all other existents stand in relation to the One. The two aspects of this necessity/obligation are always present. Note ‘Allamah Hilli’s comparable teaching mentioned in Baydawi’s biographical note [p. xxxvi]. 4 AUTHORS’ FOREWORDS God has introduced every thing by His autonomous power,’ [power] eternal and refraining from ceasing: Unto Him [all things have their] return, By Him [all things have their] beginning.’ He has made arrangement for all things that are by His particularizing command, That follows His primeval decision.° Fallen down short of perceiving® His essence’ are the meditations of great sages, Wandering lost in the great wilderness of His divinity are the logical reasonings® of wise scholars. + The ‘power of autonomous action and causation’, a concept well reformulated by R.M. Frank in his Beings and Their Attributes. * See the articles “al-Ma‘ad”, by R. Arnaldez and “al-Ibda‘”, by L. Gardet, in the En-I-2. The latter article carefully distinguishes between [ibda’] and [ibda‘]. ° [... .bt-gadariht alladhi huwa tali sabiq al-gada’]. These two decisions of God are linked together implicitly if not in clear statement. Their order of sequence is presented here. ® [idrak] is used for both sensate and beyond sensate perception in Arabic, and thus we believe it reasonably may be translated as perception in both cases. The term apprehension has come to introduce a distortingly large connotative compo- nent of fear into the act of perception, in our judgment. 7 [dhat] essence. Fazlur Rahman points out, “In Muslim philosophy this term [dhat] is used in several senses: 1) thing, 2) self, 3) substance; 4) essence: ... the essential or constitutive qualities of a thing as a member of a species, .. . contrasted with its accidental attributes. In this sense it is the equivalent of [mahiyah}.” “Both these meanings of {dhat] as essence and substance, however, are combined and often confused ... by Aristotle and his followers.” [From F. Rahman’s article “[dhat]” in En-I-2.] We shall follow the usual translations of (dhat] and [mahiyah] which are by the terms “essence” and “quiddity”, respectively. The meanings overlap and thus will continue to generate confusion, especially for students beginning in philosophy. A brief review of the terms for each of these two concepts will show the close over- lap in their meanings and the distinctive emphasis of each, even though our definitions are simplified: [dhat] is an essence itself in real existence; and [mahiyah] is an essence in the abstract as constituted in its whatness by its ingredients. This dis- tinction may help to avoid some difficulties. As terminology that we hope would be clarifying we propose the future use of “real-essence” for [dhat], and “guid-essence” for [mahiyah]. 8 [anzar] plural of [nazar]. As a noun we identify it with the ‘speculative thought’ carefully done and well tested that is necessary to be accepted as certainty beyond mere theory. The predominant and near total use of this term in our translation will be as ‘logical reasoning’. Baydawi presents sound logical reasoning as the most careful and most useful kind of intellectual activity. More often than by a full syllogism, logical reasoning AUTHORS’ FOREWORDS 3 Benediction and peace be on creation’s best, Muhammad, Whom He sent out to all peoples of a world created, Whom He chose for quelling error and for lifting up a standard to guide one’s way, To whom He promised the place of interceding on the Day of Showing and Recompense; And also on his Family, righteous and serene, And on his Companions, all noble and pious. Now as to the subject matter that follows: Masters of the intellect agree together, and the wardens of tradi- tion give their assent, in that the worthiest matter to which mass ardor may strive, and the greatest thing for which nobility in mankind may compete is systematic knowledge, for it is animation to the heart, that L 3. chief of our members, and it is soundness to the intellect, that most powerful of all things. For this reason God Most High commended systematic knowl- edge and its human community in many places in the Noble Qur’an. God Most High has said: “Those who advance systematic knowledge God will advance by several ranks;” [Qur’an 58:11] and “Is the balance equal [between] those who do have knowledge and those who do not have knowledge?” [Q 39:9] and “God has confirmed that there is no deity at all except Himself, while angels and the friends of knowledge do maintain justice.” [QO 3:18] The greatest and highest kinds of knowledge, the most perfect and beneficial among the areas of experiential knowledge, are the divine sciences of [our] revelation and the particularities of [our] religion, MS 4a since by them there is ordered well-being for all who wor- ship, and there is awarded the bounty of salvation at the Restoration.’ Fruits of many intellects in their varieties are there in harvest, precious accepts the perceived data of both intuition and reason, and constantly is checking and adjusting back and forth, alternating between a) the clarifying ‘process of con- ceiving’ meanings and reality [al-tasawwur], and b) the ‘assenting judgment’ to each step in the improving focus of a conception of some entity [al-tasdiq]. * [al-ma‘ad], another term for the Day of Resurrection. It is God’s prerogative to restore all things for close review and recompense. 6 AUTHORS’ FOREWORDS and rare things of every kind are there to captivate. He who is adorned with these thereby wins the uplifted arrow prize; whoever withdraws from these [divine sciences] will [indeed] join the vast assembly on Resurrection Day, but, as unseeing. [In this category of the divine sciences there is one that has no peer at all], the systematic knowledge of the fundamental principles of [our] religion [that is specifically, the ‘science of theological state- ment’].!! This is the grandest of them all in subject, noblest of them in elements and corollaries, firmest of them in foundational supports and most obvious of them in proof. As both an edifice about the pillars of the religious law and as a foundation for them, as chief and foremost among landmarks of our religion, and as opener of the curtains of divinity, and giver of access to the secrets of lord- ship, [this systematic knowledge] serves to divide between the cho- sen righteous and the abandoned wicked, and to differentiate the obedient, a populace whose destiny is divine forgiveness T 3 and good pleasure, from the disobedient, a populace whose destiny is error and terror. Writing on this subject, outstanding authors of all times and excel- lent scholars in all eras and periods have produced noble volumes and polished compendiums, they have striven to delineate ultimate concepts, state fundamental truths, disclose unique treasures and record useful lessons. On behalf of us all, may God reward them abundantly. However, the book [entitled] Rays of Dawnlight Outstreaming!*—a very learned work by that wise and careful leader, chief of cadis and © [faza bi-al-qidh al-mu‘alla’] i.e., wins the priority in allotments, preeminence in counsel; derived from the ancient Arabian game [maysir] where the winner gets the seventh of the divining arrows. [Hans Wehr, Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic.] "In view of the need for a more lucid conception the following is now sug- gested as a translation for [‘ilm al-kalam]: ‘the science of theological statement’. It will be used sometimes, as here, as a specific alternate for “the systematic knowl- edge of the fundamental principles of our religion.” See the note ahead coming under point 5 of Baydawi’s discussion of the functions of this science. Full title: [Tawali‘ al-anwar min matali‘ al-anzar], the second half of Baydawi’s title being taken as the first half of the commentary’s title. The suggested transla- tion for the two titles illustrates their difference in perspective that hinges on the word [matali‘]: Baydawi—Rays of Dawnlight Outstreaming from FAR HORIZONS of Logical Reasoning. Isfahani—HIGH VISTAS of Logical Reasoning, a Commentary on “Rays of Dawnlight Outstreaming.” AUTHORS’ FOREWORDS 7 civil governors, an exemplary investigator, model of precision and finest [scholar] of modern times, Imam to Islam and all Muslims, ‘Abd Allah al-Baydawi, God make his spirit venerable and his tomb radiant—|this title] stands out from among these [other books] for its inclusion of the finest products of reason and the choicest selec- tions of tradition. It has reviewed our religion’s sources,'* distilled its major sections, summarized its governing laws, verified its logical demonstrations, untangled its problems and clarified its enigmas. And, as [the author] himself says, along with its being concise and easy to remember, it embraces concepts that come from many disciplines, although they stand close together in many of their aspects, its foundation princi- ples and main topics are well marked and its natural [subject] group- ings and transitions are well arranged. In light of this, a person whom I would not withstand L4 and with whom I can only agree has requested me to write out for him a commentary MS 4b that would not only delineate [the book’s] ultimate meanings, state its fundamental truths, disclose its unique treasures and record its useful lessons, but also would present sys- tematically its general concepts, perfect the articulation points within them, open up its problem areas and explicate its enigmas. So I undertook to fulfill the requirements he set me, and I have loosened up the author’s tightly locked ambiguities of expression and have endeavored both to make clear what he means to say and to par- ticularize his [general] formulations. I have named this [book of mine], Fiigh Vistas of Logical Reasoning, a Commentary Upon “Rays of Dawnlight Outstreaming.”'* Moreover, I have inscribed it in the name of one who is plainly free of the unattractive traces of bad habits and is fully endowed in winsome qualities of a fine character, one who is a flowing spring of generosity and good deeds endorsed by the support of the merciful Lord, a person in whom are centered qualities suiting the most noble and exalted, lordly and princely, great, splendid and masterful. This man is actively guardian of the borders and coastlines, divinely aided and victorious, Chief of the Reserve Forces and Commander of the Armed Forces, Chief Cupbearer MS gl: Le., [our] religion’s sources. “ [Matali‘ al-Anzar, Sharh Tawali‘ al-Anwar.] 8 AUTHORS’ FOREWORDS among royal conquerors;!° may God celebrate’® strength in the strug- gle for God and in hard work. He has established justice and benevolence, and he protects the people of religion and faith. He is our Sultan Most Great—who holds by the neck all foreign kings, being [himself] King over all kings of the Arabs and the non-Arab East, a fair minded master, a hard working guardian of our borders and coasts, triumphant over enemies and made victorious by heaven, a conqueror in the world and in our religion, Sultan of Islam and all Muslims, reviver of jus- tice in all worlds, a guarantor of equity for the oppressed versus wrongdoers, a preceptor of faith for the pious, a negotiator of agree- ment among believers—Abu al-Ma‘ali Muhammad,” the son of our Lord and Sultan Most Great, al-Malik al-Mansur Sayf al-Din Abu al-Fath Qalawun."* May God extend this man’s sovereignty over the people of the [Islamic] community for a protecting shade. May God expand their community by the blade of his sword and by the charm of his per- 8 [qawsiin al-saqi al-maliki al-nasirt] L4 gl: His expression, “Qawsun al-saqi”, is one of the honorary titles given to successful princes. [An anonymous quote.] Charlies Rieu, stated in his Supplement to the Catalogue of Arabtec Manuscripts in the British Museum, item # 186, on Isfahani’s Matai‘ al-Anzar. “The work is dedicated, not as stated by Haj. Khal. iv., p. 168 (or, v. 2, p. 1116), to Malik al-Nasir B. Kala’un, but to that Sultan’s favourite Amir and Sipahsalar, Kausun al-Saki, who was raised by him to the rank of Viceroy, Na’ib al-Saltanah . ..”. However, we believe that Rieu’s reading of Isfahani’s text in Matah* al-Anzar at this point is not correct. The glossed comment on the title, “Qawsun al-saqi”, (as quoted above) does not support a change of dedication of his book from Sultan al- Nasir Muhammad, as his chief patron, to the Amir Qawsun, who also made him- self Isfahani’s patron. More-over, it is hard to think that Haji Khalfah would have so interpreted Isfahani’s Arabic eulogy of the Sultan. 16 The MS alone reads, “May God strengthen...” [shadda Allah ...]. L, T, and MS Garrett 989Ha read [shayyada Allah. . .]. '7 Known as al-Nasir Muhammad, he was Sultan of Egypt and Syria during three periods: 1293-1294, 1299-1309, and 1310-1341. Ibn Hajar al-‘Asqalani writes in his af-Durar al-Kaminah [biography item #4752] that Mahmud al-Isfahani came to Cairo from Damascus in “the year 32”, presumably 732/1332, during the third period of al-Nasir Muhammad’s rule, and in the 56th year of Isfahani’s life. Ibn Hajar also reports that Isfahani was honored by the Amir Qawsun who built a khanqah for him and installed him as its shaykh. Perhaps this was near the mosque Qawsun built, as shown in the map and list of monuments with J. Jomier’s article “Kahira”, in En-I-2. Qawsun was the sultan’s son-in-law and leader of the suc- cessful one of two power factions active in the last years of al-Nasir Muhammad’s reign. [cf. P.M. Holt, art. “Mamluk” in En-I-2.] Isfahani’s commission to write this commentary would have been given sometime during those nine years, 1332-1341. '8 al-Mansir Qalawin ruled as Sultan of Egypt and Syria from 1279 to 1290. AUTHORS’ FOREWORDS 9 sonality for a safeguard and vicarious [divine] regency. May He make ready a place for the establishment of his noble residence among the abodes of the stars, one to be completely adorned with all hap- piness. May God portion out desperation’? and generous treatment among [the king’s] enemies and his friends [respectively]—as long as “the night blots out and the day shines forth” [Qur’an 92: 1—2]— as recompense for some of [the king’s] favors and hospitality and for a token”? of his goodness and grace. The request humbly brought now is that out of the abundant excellence of his [royal] nature [the king] will give [this written work of mine] a favorable reception in his magnanimity and generosity. MS 5a Baypawr’s Foreword To His Concise Text, Tawali‘ al-Anwar min Matali‘ al-Anzar L4, T 3 Baydawi said: Praise be to Him Whose existence and continuance are a necessary confirmation, And Whose nonexistence and passing away are thus self-pre- vented.”! Demonstrating His existing presence are the earth, His alone, and the sky, His alone; Witnessing to His incomparable singularity is the careful foundation of the universe, and its vast superstructure. He is the Omniscient One whose knowledge comprehends every- thing that lies beyond limits of the finite in number and measure. He is the Omnipotent One whose power of autonomous action does not cease upon reaching a desired goal: 'S Reading [ya’s} with the MS, although L and T appear to read [ba’s]. MS Garrett 989Ha is unpointed here, while the next noun is indeterminate. 20 The MS here provides another preposition “for” [li-], while L and T do not. The MS Garrett 989Ha indicates the tanwin [shay’in]. *! Baydawi’s incipit: [al-Hamdu li-man wajaba wujiiduhu wa-baqa@’uhu, wa-imtana‘a ‘adamuhu wa-fana’uhu]. 10 AUTHORS’ FOREWORDS Unto Him [all such has] its return, By Him [all such has] its beginning. He gives order to everything in heaven and earth by the sequence of His particularizing command Upon the customary rule of His decision primeval. How majestic L5_ is His power, how blessed are His names! Magnificent are His qualities, and universal His benefits! Wandering and lost in the great wilderness of His divinity are the reflections and opinions of [man’s] intellect; Hoping for but affording no perception of Him are the highways of [human] thought and all its byways. I praise Him, yet praise of Him is beyond measuring. I thank Him, yet thankfulness is also His gift. I pray for blessing on His Messenger, whose zeal and toil made supreme the guidance [of God], and whose courage and ability quelled error [in mankind]: May God send blessing upon him and his family, as long as the bright full moon sends back its soft beams. Isfahani says: L5, T 3, MS 5a [Here] in [Baydawi’s] preamble” are included most of the essential topics in the principles of our religion. Among these is our author’s assured confirmation of the Divine Maker and His attributes, and his admiring exclamations at God’s beautiful grandeur as he makes mention of God’s necessary existence and His permanent continu- ance, of the impossibility of His nonexistence and passing away, of His absolute singularity and His knowledge,’’ of His power of autonomous action and sovereign control, of His primeval decision and particularizing command, of His restoration and inauguration [of all things], and of [His instituting] a prophethood that [in itself] is God’s ability to herald a new order. Now, [the term] ‘praise’ is both for eulogizing and for proclaim- ing divine favor in kindness and other good things; as one says, “I praised this man for his gracious deeds, and I praised him for his good qualities and his courage”. * Tsfahani’s commentary upon Baydawi’s text begins here, following it section by section. 3 The scribe of L has omitted this term. AUTHORS’ FOREWORDS 11 God, being the Real and True One, Glorious and Most High, a. is that One who is described in attributes of majesty, a Master whose qualities are all perfection, and therefore b. He is the One worthy of praise and veneration. Moreover, c. to characterize the Most High in terms of His necessary exist- ence [and hence every creature’s obligation to Him] is [to make] the fundamental statement testifying that He is indeed characterized by attributes of divinity. Therefore, d. praise [of the divine] belongs specifically to that Essence Who is characterized by the necessity of [His] existence; and that neces- sary existence has concomitants 1. the necessity of [His] permanent continuance as well as 2. the impossibility of [His] nonexistence and passing away. In the author’s preamble here, the third [proposition] is considered as related to the first, and the last as related to the second, so he com- plemented the first proposition with the second, and complemented those two with the third and fourth. Then [Baydawi] pointed out something that demonstrates the Most High’s existence by the method of the Mutakallimun,”* [namely,] by the evidence T 4 for His existence in His works, the most evi- dent of His works demonstrating His existence being the earth and the heavens. God Most High said: “Indeed, if you should ask them, ‘Who created the heavens and the earth?’ . .. most surely they will say, God.’” [Qur’an 29:61] Also He said: “Can there be any doubt about God, Creator of the heav- ens and the earth?” [Q 14:10] [Baydawi’s statement,] “Witnessing to His incomparable singular- ity is the careful foundation of the universe and its vast superstruc- ture”, logically requires [in turn] the denial that there is a plurality of gods, for that would be a situation necessarily resulting in the dis- integration of both the heavens and the earth. God said, “If there should be in either of them [i.e., heavens or earth] deities other than God, then both [heavens and earth] would be destroyed.” [O 21:22] [As a grammatical note here,] the term, “careful foundation” [rasf] with the quiescent letter L 6 “[sad]” is a verbal noun, as one + MS gl: This being to reason from the result [al-ma‘lal] to the cause [al-‘illah]. The “Mutakallimun” are those who practice ‘the science of theological statement’. 12 AUTHORS’ FOREWORDS says, “The work of setting [rasaftu] the stones into the building I performed carefully to give it firm stability [arsufuha rasfan] by putting each one of them together tightly.” Then [Baydawi] made it plain that God is ‘omniscient’ by way of His ‘knowledge’, not ‘omniscient’ by way of His ‘essence’. a. His knowledge is a unity, and comprehends everything know- able that lies beyond the limit of counting or measuring. MS 5b b. Indeed, His knowledge is a unity that is linked to each and every universal and particular, both those that can be sensed and those that can be conceived. God said: “He has knowledge of all things”, [Q 6:101; etc.} and “Not a leaf falls but He knows of it; nor is there a seed in the darknesses of the soil, nor any place of moisture or of dryness but it is written down in a Book of Plain Record [1.e., the Qur’an]”, [0 6:59] and “God is One from whom nothing may be hidden, whether on earth or in heaven”, [Q 3:5] and “Though you may announce something publicly, God knows what is in secret and what is still more hidden.” [Q 20:7] Next [Baydawi] set forth the fact that God is omnipotent by way of a power of autonomous action a. that is necessary through His own essence, b. that is continuous through His own continuance, and c. that is linked to all the possible realities. The [power] that specifies some of these possible realities to become real temporal phe- nomena at certain moments of time acts through the linkage of His divine will to each one. Thus, His power of autonomous action does not cease upon achieving His desired goal, for it is properly His right to restore again some goal to be desired by His will, just as it is forever His right to begin [working for] it. God Most High said: “As We introduced the first created thing, so We shall restore it.” [Q 21:104]? *° The ‘beginning’ and the ‘restoration’ usually refers a) to the original creation of something and its restoration in the Resurrection. Or, it may refer b) to a shorter term goal, that when it is achieved, the ‘power’ of God is not frustrated by hav- ing nothing more to work toward, and thus another goal is set and there is a begin- ning again which is a restoration in the sense of ‘recommencement’ in the place of the work completed. See the article “Ma‘ad” in En-I-2 by R. Arnaldez. AUTHORS’ FOREWORDS 13 Then [Baydawi] explained that God Most High makes arrange- ment for everything that is created from the heavens to the earth by His ‘particularizing command’ [qadar], which in turn follows along the customary rule of His ‘primeval decision’ (qada’]. God said: “Everything that We have created has been through a particular- izing command”, [Q 54:49], “There is not one thing of which We do not have a storehouse full, and We will not deliver it [to mankind] except by our well known particularizing command.” [Q 15:21] So, His ‘primeval decision’ is an expression for the orderly exist- ence of all created beings within the Book of Plain Record and the Safely Preserved Tablet,® all of them having been brought together and totalled up in readiness for an original creation. And His ‘particu- larizing command’ is an expression for their existence as having been placed down within the individual ‘quiddities’’ after they have obtained their various contingent factors that specifically differentiate them one by one. The ‘customary practice’ [i.e., by which His par- ticularizing command follows His primeval decision] is the ‘custom- ary way’, as it is said that a certain person has persisted in one ‘customary way’. How glorious is His power of autonomous action, omnipotent over all things, and not ceasing upon the achievement of His desired goal! How blessed are His names; that is, let His names be exalted and magnified over any descriptions of created beings! God said: “Blessed is the name of your Lord, unto Whom be glory and honor.” [Q 55:78] How great is His favor that He has showered upon us both out- wardly and inwardly; How universal are His benefits that include all created beings. God said: “He has showered His favors upon you, both outwardly and inwardly”, [Q 31:20] and “If you should count up every favor of God, you could not reach their total.” [Q 14:34; Q 16:18] [Now, note Baydawi’s expression], “wandering and lost”, that is “bewildered in the vast wilderness L 7 of His divinity are the reflections of [man’s] intellect”, that is, observance of God by one’s mental vision, and by critical opinions about Him. *® See the article, “Lawh”, in En-I-2, v. 5:698, by A.J. Wensinck and C.E. Bosworth. ®” fal-a‘yan] the identified quiddities [sometimes thought of as ‘the ideas’], after 14 AUTHORS’ FOREWORDS Observance in the intellect by mental vision, when something nec- essarily cannot be perceived directly, is only a process of defining and describing. But the Creator Almighty has no commonality with anything else at all, whether in the category of genus or species, so He may not be separated distinctly from anything else through the category of either specific difference or accidental quality; rather, He is separately distinct in His essence. Therefore, there is no delimit- ing definition for His essence, since neither genus nor difference apply to Him. And because He is separately distinct in His essence from anything else, He has no obvious concomitant” the concep- tion of which would convey the intellect to His reality. Nor is there a descriptive definition of Him that would convey [the intellect] to the observance of Him. For that reason, the reflections of the intel- lect have gone wandering and lost; that is, observance of Him [fails], from which conception of [Him as] a mental object would benefit, and also critical opinions about Him [fail] from which judgmental assent about Him would benefit. [This is so] because judgmental assent in logic results only from a syllogistic inference from 1) the cause to the effect, or from 2) the effect to the cause. Now, the first [alternative] would be impossible in His case, for He is the First Cause, the Existential Cause of all created things, from Whom, not about Whom, testimony is requested. The second [alternative] sometimes does not produce certainty, so the intellect becomes confused. God has said, “We will show them Our signs both in remote regions and within themselves, so that it may be clear to them that this is the truth. Or are you not satisfied that your Lord is a trustworthy witness in everything?” [Q 41:53] [About this uncertainty Baydawi said], “Violently shaking”, that is, with a complete and incomprehensible blockage, “are the high- ways of [human] thinking and its methods”, that is, the directions it takes. they have received their identifying qualities. They may be thought of existing men- tally only, or extramentally in external reality. °8 Isfahani’s apparent self-contradiction may be resolved as follows: that God may be abstractly indicated as the Necessary and Obligating Presence [wajib al-wujud], and that this affirmation has the obvious concomitants of ‘necessity of continuance’ and the ‘impossibility of nonexistence and passing away’ is an abstract fact. This abstract fact is separately distinct from the religious fact that in His essence God does not have any obvious concomitants. AUTHORS’ FOREWORDS 15 You should understand that ‘thinking’, as will be plain when the topic comes up, is the movement of the [‘reasoning] soul’ among the intelligibles,* beginning from a “desired premise’ and ending at it as the ‘conclusion desired’? This [movement of thought] resem- bles*! spatial movement that requires an open stretch of some dis- tance in which movement may take place, and that [intellectual] open stretch is called the ‘syllogistic way’, or method. Since the movement begins from [the desired premise] and the movement ends with [the desired conclusion], and as each of them is called [in logic a propositional] marker point,” [Baydawi] there- fore likened those intelligibles to the highways in which spatial move- ment takes place, and he likened the desired premise from which the [thought] movement began and the [desired conclusion] at which it ended to marker points, so he called these two** by those names.* After [Baydawi] had made it plain that praise belongs to a Being who would be characterized by attributes of grandeur and would be a giver of favors to others, and that God Most High is He, that One who is characterized by attributes of grandeur and who is the Lord of favors, he began to praise [God] and said: “I praise Him, yet praise of Him is beyond measuring.” Here he was emulating the example of the Master of messengers, God’s blessings be upon him, wherein the Prophet had said: “I cannot measure praise due unto You in the same measure that You have brought it upon Yourself.” [Baydawi] also said, “I thank Him, yet thankfulness is also MS 6b His to give.” [This is] because the acts of human beings are cre- ated and belong to God, thanksgiving being among the acts of human beings. L8_ Indeed, [thanksgiving] consists in a eulogy upon one’s tongue, action taken with all one’s might, and conviction within one’s °° For a preliminary concept of the ‘reasoning soul’ we have Baydawi’s term ‘soul’, that functions like an ‘intellect’, the intellect being the distinguishing com- ponent of the human soul. And sometimes it will be called simply ‘the intellect’. °° Both are the [matlub]. *L reads: [li-shibh]; T: [tushbih] apparently with “movement” as verb subject; the MS: [yushbih] apparently with “thought” as verb subject, and a gloss: “the predicate of [anna]”. ® [jihah]. * MS gl: Le., the ‘intelligibles’ [al-ma‘qilat] and the ‘desired marker point’ [whether premise or conclusion] [al-matlib]. * MS gl: Le., the ‘highways’ [al-turug] and the ‘marker point’ [al-jihah]. * (14 uhsi thana’an ‘alayka anta ka-ma athnayta ‘ala’ nafsika]: a hadith indexed in Wensinck’s Mu§jam Alfaz al-Hadith al Nabawt as being in most or all of the major hadith collections. Found in Sahih Muslim, Salah #222. 16 AUTHORS’ FOREWORDS heart.*® Taken all together, T5 [thanksgiving] is to devote one’s soul, one’s body members, and one’s powers, both outwardly and inwardly, ‘to that for which they were created’,*”” and thus ‘thanks- giving’ is the gift of God. Then, since all happiness, whether heavenly or earthly, whether temporal or eternal, is something that comes to us through the Messenger, God said [i.e., to him], “We have sent you strictly as an act of mercy to the world’s inhab- itants.” [QO 21:107] God has commanded us to ask blessing upon him, saying, “Indeed, God and His angels ask blessings upon the Prophet; O you who believe, ask blessings for him and greet him abundantly with ‘peace.’” [Q 33:56] So [Baydawi] began to pray for blessings to be upon him, and said, “I pray a blessing to be upon His Messenger who* has made supreme the guidance [of God] ...” such that it has reached to the eastern parts of the earth and to the western. [Notes on Baydawi’s syntax here.] The term, ‘toil’, [‘ana’] is spelled with an ‘a’ and is the verbal noun of [‘aniya], spelled with an ‘7’, and in the imperfect tense with an ‘a’, as [ya‘na’]. He quelled error, that is, his courage, or, his strength conquered [it], and ‘his ability’ [ghana’uhu], spelled with an ‘a’ is ‘his advantage’. ‘Shining out’ [diya’] means ‘brightness’. One says, “The light of the fire made a brightness”, [da’at] with either [daw’an] or [diya’an], and the word [ada’at] is like it. It sometimes occurs as transitive [muta‘addiyan]; one may say, “The fire brightened it.” The word [ada’a] here is transitive, its active agency being its shining out [diyauhu], and the pronoun [hu] attached to it refers to the Messenger [as antecedent]. The ‘bright full moon’ is its object in the accusative case. But it can 3° Near his commentary’s beginning Isfahani places this statement in triadic form based on the rhyming of [lisin—arkan—janan], here focussed on the concept of praise as thanksgiving. Near the ending of his commentary, in Book 3, Section 2, Topic 8, Isfahani changes this same triad to focus on the concept of “faith.” As such it is discussed in the article, “Iman.—I. Elements and conditions of the act of faith”, by Louis Gardet in the En-I-2, v. 3, pp. 1170b-1171a. 7 The foregoing clause echoes the second part of a quotation used by the Prophet, but not attributed to him as its originator; in full it is: “Everyone is easily amenable to that for which he was created.” Baydawi uses this quotation in his argument in Book 3, Section 2, Topic 4b. As a hadith it is listed in Sunan Abu Daud, Kitab al- Sunnah, #4709. 38 The MS adds here the clause, .. . “Whose zeal and toil’, as in Baydawi’s text, but Isfahani abridges the passage, and it is omitted by L and T and MS Garrett 989Ha. AUTHORS’ FOREWORDS 17 also be intransitive (laziman], and in that case “the bright full moon” would be the active agency of [ada’a], [diya’uhu] being in apposi- tion to it. Baydawi said: L8, T5 To proceed further: a. the greatest of all our sciences in subject matter, the firmest of them in principles and corollaries, the strongest of them in evidence and proof, and the clearest of them in argument and method, is that Science [of Theological Statement] which is the 1. Guardian in making manifest the sublime mysteries of divinity hidden by the curtains of [divine] omnipotence; the 2. Observer of everything present in the sovereign domain as well as everything unseen in the divine kingdom; the 3. Distinguisher between those chosen to bear a message and to guide and those disposed by nature for error and evil; the 4. Unveiler of the states of the blessed and the miserable in their final abode on the Day of Justice and Decision; and the 5. Solid Platform for the Religious Law’s [pillar] bases; and it is [the Law’s] foundation, as well as being the chief and headmost of the distinguishing signs of our religion.” * The two immediately preceding adjectives, superlatives formed on weak-lam verb roots [aqwa’—ajla’], are examples of problems faced by the Iranian author as well as by the Ottoman scribes and editors of this work in Arabic spelling. L: [aqwiha—ajlaha]; T (edited in Cairo): [aqwaha—ajlaha]; MS Garrett 283B: [aqwiha (?}—ajlaha); MS Garrett 989Hb: [aqwiha—ajliha]. Isfahani’s text in L is [aqwiha] while in T it is [aqwaha], but he chooses [awdahuha] as a synonym of [ajlaha] and that precludes misreading the latter as [ajallaha], perhaps a more common term in laudatory texts. © Baydawi first defines the [‘ilm al-kalam] by this list of its functions, and his commentator Isfahani starts out by giving a generic definition for it that serves to designate the larger body of knowledge from which the [‘ilm al-kalam] branched out. Modern scholarship also wrestles in translation for a definition of this newly growing ‘branch of religious knowledge’. Professor Louis Gardet has written on this matter in the En-I-2. In his article titled “Kalam”, he distinguishes our topic from other usages by defining [‘ilm al-kalam]} as “defensive apologetics”, or “the science of discourse (on God).” In his article titled “‘Ilm al-kalam”, he begins by saying “The term is usually translated, as an approximate rendering, ‘theology.’” Then he quotes two authori- ties. The philosopher Farabi said, that it was “a science which enables a man to procure the victory of the dogmas and actions laid down by the Legislator of the 18 AUTHORS’ FOREWORDS Isfahani says: L 8, T 5, MS 6b a. Our author’s intent is to point out the fact that the noblest of all branches of knowledge is the [body of] systematic knowledge of the fundamental principles of our religion {that is, ‘the science of theological statement’], in order to motivate students to desire and seek it. Now,—wherein the greatness and nobility of any science rest upon the greatness and nobility of its subject matter, and L9 upon the firmness of its principles, namely, its universal foundations, as the fact that the Most High is a free agent, and its corollaries, namely, questions that branch out from the universal foundations, such as the commissioning of prophetic messengers and the resurrection of human bodies, and upon the strength of its evidence and proof and the clarity of its argumentation and method,—then, to that extent every science will have had its subject matter become greater and nobler, its principles and corollaries firmer, its evidence and proof stronger, and its argumentation and method clearer. Indeed, that science [of theological statement] will be greater and nobler, this being the greatest of all our sciences in subject matter, firmest of them in principles and corollaries, strongest of them in evidence and proof, and clearest of them in argumentation MS 7a and method; this is the science called [the ‘science of] theological statement’. 1. [Baydawi describes this ‘science of theological statement’ first] as “the Guardian” in presenting clearly and publicly the attrib- utes of the Most High’s essence, [a task that is done] through [study- ing] the attributes of [God’s] acts. [Baydawi’s use of the term] ‘to religion, and to refute all opinions contradicting them.” Further, from ]ji’s Mawagif: “Kalam is the science which is concerned with firmly establishing religious beliefs by adducing proofs and with banishing doubts” (p. 7 in our edition). After this Gardet gives a full history of the development of this science, first among the Muttazilah in defending Islam against Mazdaean and Christian apologists, then later among the Asha‘irah who were more in the mainstream of Islamic thinking and practice. The Mut‘tazilah fell out of favor and “Mu‘tazilism was in turn condemned and most of its productions [in religious literature] were destroyed.” “The discov- ery of these works [e.g., ‘Abd al-Jabbar’s Mughni] in the Yemen is another proof that under the challenge of the 5th/11th century reaction {against them] the influence of the school continued to be felt in non-Sunni milieus” (En-I-2 v. 3: p. 1144a). Gardet lists (v. 3, p. 1145a) among the “later Mutakallimun” of the Asha‘irah school Ghazali, Shahrastani, Fakhr al-Din Razi (“one of the most orginal thinkers of this school”), then skips to Isfahani, ]ji, Jurjani and Dawani. Perhaps Baydawi was skipped here because he is considered to be more of a jurist than a Mutakallim. We believe that the translation, ‘the science of theological statement’, will serve as a useful and correct interpretation. AUTHORS’ FOREWORDS 19 manifest’ means ‘to present clearly and publicly’, the ‘sublime mys- teries of divinity’ are the attributes of [God’s] essence, ‘the divinity’ being [God’s] essence, and the ‘curtains of divine omnipotence’ are the attributes of the [divine] acts; thus, the attributes of [God’s] essence are behind the cover of the attributes of [His divine] acts. 2. [Baydawi’s] expression, “the Observer”, is a second descrip- tive for that science [of theological statement, in its natural com- prehension] of the observable aspects of the world, namely, everything perceptible to the senses, as well as the unrevealed aspects of the divine kingdom, namely, the intelligibles that are absent to the phys- ical senses. For indeed, among the realities possible that [have become] existents there are those that are perceived by physical sense, being called the ‘observable evidence’, the ‘sovereign domain’ and ‘the cre- ation’; and there are those that are perceived not by physical sense but rather by the intellect, these being called ‘the unseen’, the ‘divine kingdom’, and the ‘governing authority’. God has referred to both these categories when He said, “He is well aware of the unseen and what can be observed”, {QO 6:73] “Do not all creation and all governing authority belong to Him?” [Q 7:54] “Blessed be He in whose hand is the sovereign domain”, [QO 67:1] and, “Praise be to Him in whose hand is the divine rule over all things.” [Q. 36:83] 3. [Baydawi’s] expression, “the Distinguisher’, is a third descrip- tive of that science [of theological statement]; that is, [it is] the agency distinguishing between those chosen to bear a divine mes- sage and to guide and those disposed by nature for error and ruin, namely, those created with a disposition for these things. ‘Ruin’ means ‘destruction’, and is the verbal noun of “perished.” 4, [Baydawi’s] expression, “the Unveiler”, is a fourth descrip- tive of that science [of theological statement]; that is, [it is] the Unveiler of the states of those in bliss or in misery in the Hereafter, these being their [respective places] of final abode on the Day of Justice and Decision. 5. [Baydawi’s] expression, “the Solid Platform for the [pillar] bases of the Religious Law” is a fifth descriptive [of the science of theological statement]. It follows in orderly fashion upon what has preceded, namely, that the [pillar] bases of the Religious Law and the distinguishing signs of our religion are founded upon the Book 20 AUTHORS’ FOREWORDS and the Prophet’s Custom, and the [process of ] inference drawn from both of these depends upon the fact of having established that God L 10 is One Who speaks, Who sends messengers, and Who gives revelations to them. These matters are known only from the ‘science of theological statement’. Therefore, [this science of theological state- ment] is the Solid Platform for the [pillar] bases of the Religious Law and is its foundation, as well as being the chief and headmost of the distinguishing signs of our religion. Thus, the distinguishing signs of our religion are ‘in need’ of the science of theological state- ment, while the ‘theological statement’ is not ‘in need’ of them. The science characterized by these attributes is the greatest of all our sciences in its subject matter, firmest*’ of them in principles and corollaries, strongest of them in evidence and proof, MS 7b and clearest of them in argumentation and method, only because its sub- ject matter is the essence of God Most High, and the essence of all created things. [It is so] because in this way it investigates the attrib- utes of God and the various conditions of all created things wherein these factors will lead to conviction in what should be believed. Let no one say that it is inadmissible to make the essence of God a subject [for study] in the science of theological statement, because the subject of every science is something that is granted [as a pre- supposition] in that science, either being clearly evident in itself or made evident in some other science. Furthermore, the essence of God is neither something clearly evident in itself, because it is a matter of logical reasoning, nor is it made evident in some other science, because the rest of T’ 6 the sciences of the religious law seek help in this matter through ‘theological statement’. As a par- ticular example, the certainty that there is a Creator is not due to what people say, namely, that His essence is ‘made clear through philosophy’ and is ‘granted as a presupposition in theology’, because that would not be sound reasoning. How could it be admissible that the [main] subject in the highest of the religious sciences would be made clear within some other science foreign to the sciences of the religious law? Rather, since what would be made clear by proof is the ‘existence’ of an essence,” this [‘existence’] being something ‘addi- tional’ to the essence [itself], that is, to [its] existence in absolute *! L mistakenly reads, [aqwiha] instead of [aqwamuha]. * The MS alone parenthetically inserts here: (not the essence of Him the Most High). AUTHORS’ FOREWORDS 21 terms, it would be therefore one of the states of the essence. Now, an investigation—of the states of a [given] subject of a certain sci- ence—that would be carried on within [that same] science, would not exclude the [given subject’s] essence from becoming the subject [of investigation]. Thus, if it should be objected that the certainty of a [given] sub- ject’s ‘existence’ would not be established within the [same] science, but rather in some other [science], and if its ‘existence’ should not be evident [within its own science], and if its ‘existence in relation to [its own] essence’ should not be evident [within its own science}, so that it would need to be demonstrated, then the answer [to the objection] would be that if the investigation should be about the ‘states’, these being [a subject] other than the ‘existence’, then the existence of this subject would be granted and it would be made clear in some other science. But if the investigation should be about the ‘existence’ [of the main subject in the science], then that would not be made clear in some other science, but rather, within that [same] science. In that case [the ‘existence’ of the subject] would be one of the problems of [that certain] science. This is provided that [the disputants’] statement—that the existence of the subject would be made clear nevertheless, in another science,—is not to be taken in its absolute sense. Rather, what is meant by [their statement] is that the subject [of this science, i.e., ‘theological statement’], being more specific than the subject of some other science, would have its existence made clear in the other science only if it should not be clear [in its own science of ‘theological statement’]. So, it is apparent that the greatest of the sciences in subject mat- ter L 11 is [the science of] theological statement. Also, with regard to the fact that the science of theological statement is the firmest of the sciences in its principles and corollaries, compared to the [other] sciences of our religion, that is true because it is a knowledge of conviction, while in the rest of them it is conjectural [knowledge]. Compared to the topics in divinity in the system of MS 8a the Physician-Philosopher [Ibn Sina], [the science of theological state- ment] rests upon: a) divine inspiration which provides the truth of conviction, and b) divine aid that is both *L: [musnad]; T, MS and MS Garrett 989Ha: [mustanad]. 22 AUTHORS’ FOREWORDS 1) required for completeness of what is knowable, and is 2) free from the defect of fallible estimation; and all that is in contrast to the topics in divinity in the system of the Physician- Philosopher. His [system] is based upon the intellect to which the fallible estimation raises objections. Thus, if the fundamental princi- ples should be such, then the subsidiary corollaries would be likewise. With regard to [the science of theological statement] being the strongest of [the religious sciences] in evidence and proof, this is true because its evidence provides a decisive demonstration, and it is clearest in argumentation and method because it is the method of the prophets. [This science of theological statement] is the Straight Path, the Path of God, “to Whom belongs all that is in the heav- ens and on the earth.” [Q 2:255, 284, etc.] Baydawi said: Lil, T6 This [then is the preamble]. Our book employs the wisest intellec- tual maxims and the finest traditional selections in the ongoing task of examining [our theology’s] fundamental principles and bringing out its distinguishing factors, in summarizing its laws and verifying its demonstrations, in resolving its problems and clarifying its enig- mas. Even together with its brevity of expression and resulting ease of memorization, it includes topical ideas having many branches whose boundary sides are close together, and these are uniformly identifiable in their fundamental concepts and introductory steps, and soundly correct in their sublimities and their passages of transition.“ I named it: Rays of Dawnlight Outstreaming from Far Horizons of Logical Reasoning. And from God, to Him be praise, I ask that He will safeguard me from anything worthless and guide me on a steady path, that He will forgive my sins on Judgment Day and bring me to the highest heavens, “together with the prophets and people of truth, the martyrs and people of virtue.” [Qur’an 4:69] 4 [musawwamat al-mabadi wa-al-matali‘ muqawwamat al-‘awali wa-al-maqati‘]. Baydawi appears to favor an architectural metaphor: foundation, entry stairway, upper areas, lines of definition. Isfahani reverses the order of the first two nouns, perhaps favoring a topographical metaphor: introductory climbing approach, spread out platform foundation, sublimity of conceptual subject, passages intersecting with history. AUTHORS’ FOREWORDS 23 Isfahani says: Lil, T 6, MS 8a [Baydawi’s expression, ‘this, then’ means} ‘this has been the pre- amble’, or, ‘accept this [as introduction].’ His expression, ‘wisest intel- lectual maxims’ [‘aqa’il], being the plural of [‘aqilah], means ‘the best’; it is the precious part of any thing, that is, it includes the choicest intellectual statements and the best traditional studies—as one says, “The choicest of his companions came to me”, that is, the best of them—while continuing to examine its principles and deduce its distinguishing factors. So indeed, the principles mentioned in it are reviewed, and the distinguishing factors noted in it are extracted [and listed for study]. As the term, ‘to review’, means ‘to trim’, the meaning is that its fundamental principles are reviewed and trimmed of all that is extra- neous. Its distinguishing factors have been clearly formulated and extracted to rest upon the bases of the faith, and the religious laws have been summarized, that is, clarified and explained, ‘summariz- ing’ meaning ‘clarify’ and ‘explain’. The word, ‘difficult’ [also] means ‘ambiguous’. One may say, L 12 “The matter became difficult”, that is, ambiguous. One may say, “The affair became problematic”, that is, hard and incompre- hensible, and “a problematic matter does not lead straight ahead.” Also, “clarification” means ‘explanation’, as one says, “I clarified it”, that is, “I explained it.” The ‘many divisions’, [i.e., especially of peoples], [shu‘tb] being the plural of [sha‘b] with an ‘a’ after the ‘[shin]’, are what have been divided into many branches, or tribes among the Arabs.* The term, “sides”, [junib] being the plural of ‘side’ [janb], [as in] ‘their boundary sides are close together’, that is, they are near to each other. The expression, ‘uniformly identifiable’ [literally, ‘designated by a mark’ [musawwamah], means something known [by its mark]. A statement of the Most High [refers to angels], “having a uniform insignia” [musawwimin], [Q 3:125] that is, marks by which they are readily known. Also, the word of the Most High is, “stamped clay bricks”, [OQ 51:33] that is, they have the seal imprints [of manufacture] * Baydawi and Isfahani both use only one set of the nouns from the root [sh-‘-b], namely, [sha‘b—shu‘tb], now commonly meaning ‘people’. However, the context indicates that their meaning fits another set, namely [shu‘bah—shu‘ab], meaning branch or division. 24 AUTHORS’ FOREWORDS stamped on them. And the term, ‘made correct’? [muqawwamah], means, ‘properly correct’. One says, “I made the thing to be cor- rect [qawwamtu], so it is sound [qawim]”, that is, properly correct [mustaqim]. Our author meant by the phrase, “the introductory steps and fun- damental concepts”, the topics on ‘logical reasoning and its princi- ples’ and on the ‘realities possible’, and by the phrase, “the sublimities and their passages of transition”, he meant the topics on ‘realities divine’ and ‘realities prophetic’ and on the ‘supreme leadership’, which are obvious. Baydawi said: L 12, T6 The content of the volume is arranged in an introduction and three interior books. Isfahani says: L 12, T 6, MS 8b Since the chief reason for composing this volume has been to estab- lish firmly both the fact of the Creator and His attributes and of the Prophethood with its linked topics, all by using intellectual demon- strations set up from premises drawn from [all] the realities possi- ble by logical reasoning about them, our author arranged the volume into an introduction and three interior books. The Introduction is on Studies in Logical Reasoning, Book 1 on Realities Possible, Book 2 on Realities Divine, and Book 3 on Realities Prophetic, with their related matters.” * Through the course of these lectures, readers can note the influence of great authorities of the past on Baydawi. The Jubba’i family among the Muttazilah and al-Ash‘ari among the Asha‘irah Sunnis are prominent among his esteemed guides. His thought was informed by the work of Ibn Sina in philosophy and science and Fakhr al-Din Razi in historical theology. G.C. Anawati’s survey of Razi’s Muhassal in the En-I-2 (under Fakhr al-Din Razi) reveals how Baydawi has made his contri- bution in form and content generally following Razi. This is in line with the nor- mal custom for medieval speakers and writers to build what they have to say on the work of earlier authorities. But we believe that in a comparison with Razi the Tawali al-Anwar min Matali‘ al-Anzar of Baydawi is a better model in the outlining and statement of topics and arguments. Baydawi’s permanently useful work in this regard is fully appreciated by scholars in both medieval and modern times, as we have documented in the Preface. AUTHORS’ INTRODUCTION STUDIES IN LOGICAL REASONING This page intentionally left blank Baydawi said: L 12, T6 THE INTRODUCTION: STUDIES IN LOGICAL REASONING.' Isfahani says: MS 8b THE INTRODUCTION: STUDIES IN LOGICAL REASONING An introduction is intended to support the topical material follow- ing. Since the topics of the three interior books are based on mat- ters that are linked together by logical reasoning, our author has set forth his studies in logical reasoning as the introduction T 7 to the three books. And since logical reasoning is the process of arrang- ing facts that are known—-whether these be [preliminary] concep- tions or [notions] accepted by consensus—in a way that leads to learning something that is not already known, studies [in the process of alternating] ‘intellectual conception’ and ‘judgmental assent’ have come to be the beginning steps for ‘logical reasoning’. If these organized factors lead to an intellectual conception, they are called a ‘definition’ or an ‘explanatory statement’, and if they lead to an assenting judgment they are called a ‘convincing argument’ or an ‘inferential proof’? demonstration. Therefore, since logical rea- soning comprises these two factors |[1.e., intellectual conception and judgmental assent], it has [important] distinguishing properties. ' Aristotle, Ibn Sina, and Fakhr al-Din Muhammad Razi, in their historical sequence, all make a study of logic and epistemology the general and introductory basis for consideration of other particular sciences. Writing for the generation just prior to Baydawi, Razi began his book, Muhassal Afkar al-Mutagaddimin wa-al-Muta akh- Khirin ... (Compendium of thought ancient and modern) [Cairo, Reprint of 1323 A.H. ed., pp. 16-50], with three ‘pre-suppositions’ [muqaddimat]: 1. the pair, ‘{intellectual] conception’ and ‘judgmental statement’ [tasawwur/tasdiq], are primary features of knowing, which, following Ibn Sina, Razi treated as linked but not as functioning together in an alternating process responding to the data of perception; 2. ‘the dis- tinguishing properties of logical reasoning’ [ahkam al-nazar], which Baydawi put at the end of his introduction; 3. inferential proof [al-dalil]. 28 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER I In his Introduction the author set out four Chapters: 1. Principles of [Epistemology], L 13 2. Explanatory Statements, 3. Argumen- tation, 4. Distinguishing Properties of Logical Reasoning. Baydawi said: L 13, T7 CHAPTER 1: PRINCIPLES OF EPISTEMOLOGY 1. The two phases of knowing: an alternation between a. and 6. a. Concept formation—regarding what 1s being perceived b. Judgmental assent—or dissent to features of the concept being formed c. Each phase either by intuition or by rational acquisition of knowledge (a.) Understand that thinking about something by itself, without passing any judgment on it whether of denial or assertion, is called [‘intellectual] conception’. (b.) But with a judgment passed on it either way, [this act of thinking] is called ‘judgmental assent’ [or dissent, to the concept being formed]. (c.) Each of these [phases of knowing] is divisible into 1. intuitional [knowing], that does not depend upon logical reasoning and thinking in order to take place, as forming a concept of existence or nonexistence, and judging that denial and affirmation may not be held together [in consideration as both true] nor removed together [from consideration as both untrue],’ and 2. acquisitional [knowing], that does have need [for reason- ing and thinking], as forming a concept of angels and of demons, and acquiring knowledge of the temporal origination of the world and of the eternity of the Creator. Now, if MS 9a _ these intellectual conceptions and judgmental assents should be altogether inherently necessary [as intuitions] or [if they should be] by acquisition, then we would not lose anything nor would we gain anything {in the way of knowledge], because knowledge by logical reasoning is acquired only from other things ane 209 ? The scribe of L inadvertently wrote a “lam” where a “ta f-‘-n]. was meant: [y-r-l- PRINCIPLES OF EPISTEMOLOGY 29 that were previously known. If these [conceptions and judgments] should be altogether by acquisition, then the implication would be that each one would be resting upon something else, either on sub- ject-substrates having limitations or on those not having limitations, and this would imply either a circular argument or an infinite series, these both being impossible. Isfahani says: L 13, T 7, MS 9a CHAPTER 1: PRINCIPLES OF EPISTEMOLOGY l. The two phases of knowing: an alternation between a. and b. a. ormation of a concept regarding what 1s being percewed b. Fudgmental assent or dissent to features of the concept of being formed c. Each phase either by intuition or by rational acquisition of knowledge (a.) Understand that ‘thinking’ about a thing constitutes the per- ception of it [as being] abstracted from the extraneous qualities and material properties that its quiddity does not require, by reason of its being a quiddity.? This [‘thinking’] is one species of perception. ‘Perception’ provides a representation‘ of the real nature of the thing® to the percipient.® That [species of perception in the reasoning soul] that is observing [this real nature of the thing] itself is the func- tioning instrument by which [the thing’s real nature] is perceived.’ > MS gl: Isfahani’s expression, “by reason of its being a quiddity” [fan mahi- yatihi], admissibly means “from” with the meaning of a causative preposition [“by reason of its being a quiddity”]. This would be like the phrase in the statement of the Most High, “He does not speak from caprice”, [Q 53:3] that is, ‘by reason of? His caprice. * MS and L 13. gl: This is not a true definition of ‘perception’, being so far from such that it would be received as a circular definition, because the under- standing of the percipient depends upon his own understanding. Rather, this is an interpretation and a distinguishing of its meaning from among all other intelligible meanings, to define it as the thing called by this name, and not something else. [From Ibn al-Mutahhar al-Hilli’s glosses on Nasir al-Din Tusi’s Tard]. > MS gl: Le., its nature as imprinted upon it [al-intiqash]. ®° MS gl: This being the [reasoning] soul. [N.b.: the intellect is the dominant part of the reasoning soul.] ? fyushahiduha ma bihi yudrak] The MS and T: [yudrak]; L: [tudrak]. 30 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER I And this [functioning instrument operates] on four levels: 1. sensa- tion, 2. imagination, 3. estimation, and 4. thinking.’ 1. ‘Sensation’ is perception of the thing as being enclosed by accidental qualities and material properties along with the presence of matter,’ and a special relationship'’ between [the matter] and the percipient. 2. ‘Imagination’ is perception of [the thing] as enclosed by accidental qualities and material properties, but there is no stipula- tion of the presence of matter and its special relationship [to the percipient]. 3. ‘Estimation’ is perception of a particular meaning"! linked to what has been sensed. 4. Some scholars make ‘perception’ specifically mean ‘sensa- tion’, but then clearly it would be distinct from ‘thinking.’ And ‘know- ing’ [or, ‘cognition’]!? sometimes is taken to mean ‘perception’ in its first sense;'? so then, each one—sensation, imagination, estimation, and thinking—would be [a species of] ‘knowing’. (b.) Further, some scholars restrict ‘knowledge’ [i.e., as accumula- tion] to being a mental entity.'* In that case, [‘knowledge’] clearly would be distinct from ‘perception’ having the meaning ‘sensation’, and in absolute terms it would be more specific than ‘perception’ in the first meaning [of ‘sensation’]. Now, by every interpretation, ‘think- ing’ is more specific than ‘knowledge’ in absolute terms. But some- times L 14 [the term] ‘knowledge’ is applied to mean a ‘judgmental statement’, while sometimes it is applied to mean a ‘judgmental state- ment of conviction’.’° 8 [ihsds], [takhayyul], [tawahhum], [ta‘aqqul]. ° MS gl: That is, [its own] identity, namely, external existence. '° MS gl: [I.e.], of comparison or possession and of nearness or distance. 1! MS gl: As the ‘hostility of Zayd’ or the ‘friendship of ‘Amr’. 2 [Slm]—H. Wehr’s A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic gives “knowledge” and synonyms and reads the word as a sort of ‘intellectual accumulation’, as the first group of definitions. The second group of definitions read it as a ‘process’: cogni- tion, intellection, perception, knowledge. Indeed, ‘knowing’ has been omitted from this list in error. 'S MS gl: Namely, representing the real nature of a thing to the percipient. 't MS gl: Le., something that is not an obvious physical sensation. 'S MS gl: Le., a belief that is convinced and certain and that correctly applies to the actual facts. PRINCIPLES OF EPISTEMOLOGY 31 Ibn Sina’s theory of knowing Then the Shaykh [i.e., “al-Shaykh al-Ra’is” Abu ‘Ali Ibn Sina], in his book, al-Jsharat, had divided [‘knowing’, as meaning ‘perception’] in the first sense!® into a. plain ‘conception’, that is, free from any ‘judgmental assent’ [to it], and b. conception with ‘judgmental assent’ [to the correctness of the conception]. And [also] in his book al-Shif¢ he divided [‘knowing’] into ‘conception’ only, and ‘conception with judgmental assent’. [It would be] as when we say, “All whiteness is an accidental quality.” [Understood] in this way, (a.) the ‘conception’ informs you that in the mind there has been created MS 9b _ both the ‘form’ of a [particular] composition and what it is composed of, as its whiteness and its quality as an acci- dent, while (b.) the ‘judgmental assent’ consists in the fact that in the mind the relationship of this ‘form’ to the entities themselves takes its place, in that the one properly matches the other. Some of the scholars who divide ‘knowing’ into conception and judgmental assent [to the conception being formed] mean by ‘con- ception’ a simple perception, that is, perception in which judgment is not a property, and [they mean] by ‘judgmental assent’ a per- ception in which judgment is a property. Other scholars'? made ‘judgmental assent’ (or, a ‘judgmental statement’) an expression for the total of perception and judgment [together]. Baydawi’s general theory of knowing L 14:10 The author [Baydawi following Ibn Sina] has divided ‘thinking’ into two divisions: a. thinking about a thing when [thought] avoids any judgment about it, whether excluding some factor from [the thing] or affirming that factor of it, and '6 Gloss in MS Garrett 989Ha: This is according to [Isfahani’s}] statement “Knowing {al-‘ilm] is sometimes taken to mean ‘perception’ in its first sense.” '7 Glosses: 1. The MS: That is, a ‘conception that has been judged’. 2. L 14: This is the school of the ‘Imam’. [Presumably this is F.D. Razi, although the same title is also applied to Ibn Sina]. Razi’s Muhassal [pp. 19-20, Cairo reprint of the 1323 ed.] appears to corroborate this by relegating the conception of simple per- ception to a minor usage. 32 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER I b. thinking about a thing along with making a judgment as to one of these two alternatives. He called the first of these [divisions intellectual] ‘conception’ and the second ‘judgmental assent’. He spe- cified ‘thinking’, out of all the other species of perception, as being in two divisions only because matters that are known and the arrange- ment of which is done by thought and logical reasoning are ‘intel- ligibles’, and not matters of sensation, or imagination, or estimation. This is according to what you will be learning, that ‘thinking’ is the movement [of the reasoning soul] among the ‘intelligibles’. This division of ‘thinking’ into two divisions and naming one of them ‘intellectual conception’ and the other ‘judgmental assent’ does not imply that there would be no division of the other species of perception into two divisions and naming one of them ‘conception’ and the other ‘judgmental assent’, nor [does it imply] that one [divi- sion] of them would not be named ‘conception’ only or ‘plain con- ception’, and the other ‘conception with judgmental assent’, that is, ‘a judgment’. [Baydawi’s] expression, “by itself”, is a condition of the object entity [under which it is intellectually conceived]. Also, his expres- sion, “without passing any judgment upon [the object] whether of denial or assertion”,—that is, without a judgment for either one of these being a property [of the thought],—clearly explains his expres- sion, “by itself.” What is meant by this is that no [particular] judgment would be made a property of [the thought], not that a lack of judgment would be a property of it. ‘Judgment’ consists either [positively] in the ‘pro- jection’ [i.e., upon the conception] of a relationship of certainty or [negatively] in the ‘removal’ of it. The ‘projection’ is held to be either an imposition of necessity or an affirmation of certainty, and the ‘removal’ [is held to be] either a negation or a rejection. The ‘relationship L 15 of certainty’ may consist in a) the affirmation of one thing T’8 about another by way of identity, as the affirmation of being an accident is for whiteness in our statement, “Whiteness is an accident”; or, it is in b) the affirmation of one thing together with another by way of accompaniment, as is the certainty in our statement, “The sun has risen”, together with our statement, “The day has come”, when we say, “If the sun MS 10a_ has risen then the day has come”; or, it can be in c) the affirmation of a distinction between one thing and PRINCIPLES OF EPISTEMOLOGY 33 another by way of difference, as is the difference between our state- ment, “This number is even”, and our statement, “This number is odd”, after we say, “This number is either odd or even.”!® (a.) So, on this basis,'? thinking about a thing without any judg- ment being made as an accompanying property [of the thought], is called intellectual ‘conception’, (b.) while thinking about a thing with a judgment being made about it as an accompanying property [of the thought], is called ‘judgmental assent’ [l.e., assent to the conception being formed]. Between these two [mental actions] there is a real difference, in the sense that they may not be affirmed [together as both true], nor removed [together as both untrue] from the thinking process. There is no implication that a conception, that would be formed about each of these two terms,” would exit from [the category of] ‘intellectual conception’ and enter [that of] ‘judgmental assent’, because the conception formed about each of these two terms would be [simply] a thought about [that] term by itself; that is, no judg- ment would accompany [the thought], so it would be outside [the category of] ‘judgmental assent’ and still within [that of] ‘intellec- tual conception’. Nor is there any implication that a conception that would be formed about the ‘subject [of a sentence] together with its predicate’ would [therefore] become a ‘judgmental assent’, because this ‘intellectual conception’ of the subject?! would have no judgment accompanying it.” On Baydawi’s theory of knowing as intuition and acquisition L 15:12 [Baydawi’s] statement—that each of the pair, namely, ‘[intellectual] conception’ and ‘judgmental assent’, is divided into '8 These three ways of stating certainty may be otherwise described as statements that are: a) categorical proposition, b) conjunctive hypothetical, c) disjunctive hypo- thetical. 'S MS gl: That is, on the basis of [Baydawi’s] division of ‘thinking’. 20 T.e., the ‘conception’ and the ‘assent’ to it. 2! 'L alone of sources used inserts, “with its predicate” [ma‘a al-hukm]. ” L 15 gl: With reference to his expression, “would have no judgment accom- panying it. ..”: since there is no doubt that judgment does accompany all the three concepts [i-e., subject, predicate and their judgmental relationship [al-mahkam ‘alayhi—al-mahkiim bihi—al-nisbah al-hukmiyah], i.e., only when all the three are taken together], but it would not accompany merely one or two of them. [Coded Hashiyah; presumably from al-Sharif al-Jurjani’s glosses [Hashiyah] on Isfahani’s commentary.] 34 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER I 1. intuitional [knowing] that does not depend upon logical rea- soning and thought for its attainment, and 2. acquisitional [knowing] that does depend upon logical rea- soning and thought,—has the meaning that some portion of each of the pair would be intuitional [knowing] and some portion of each would be [rational] acquisitional [knowing]. (1.) An example of ‘intuitive [intellectual] conception’ would be the conception of existence and of nonexistence, while an example of ‘intuitive judgmental assent’ would be the judgment that denial and affirmation may not be joined together [in a statement as both true] nor may they be removed together [from a statement as both untrue]. (2.) An example of a ‘rationally acquired conception’ would be the conception of an angel or a demon, while an example of a ‘ra- tionally acquired judgmental assent’ would be knowledge of the tem- poral origination of the universe or of the eternity of the Creator. However, in the matter of defining intuitive judgmental assent as not depending upon logical reasoning and thought, an observation is required. For indeed, intuitive judgmental assent sometimes does depend for its attainment upon logical reasoning and thought, in that both of its terms,” or one of them, would be acquired knowl- edge. Therefore, it would be preferable to say regarding intuitive judgmental assent, that the conviction of the intellect is not depend- ent,—within the relationship that holds between its two terms [of subject and predicate] after a concept of them both has been formed,— upon logical reasoning and thought. In this sense, intuitional [know- ing] deals with observable facts of evidence, and these are the phenomena from which knowledge benefits. They come either from a) external L 16 sensation, these being called ‘sensate phe- nomena’, as our judgment that the sun is up, or b) from internal sensation, these being MS 10b_ called ‘impressionistic phenomena’,”* as our judgment that we are fearful and angry. Some scholars have interpreted intuitive judgmental assent [merely] as that which the intellect must have when it forms conceptions of its two terms [subject and predicate] without any other aid. The first 3 Both of its terms”: i.e., the subject and predicate of a proposition that is being composed. 4 [mahsusat] ... [qadaya i‘tibariyah]. PRINCIPLES OF EPISTEMOLOGY 35 term [ie., the subject]” is called ‘inherently necessary’. So by this interpretation, intuitional [knowing] would be more specific [i.e., in its reference] than ‘necessity’ in an absolute sense [would be], while by the interpretation that was mentioned earlier”® it would be synony- mous with [necessity in an absolute sense]. In this division?’ intuitive judgmental assent must mean something synonymous with inherent necessity,”* otherwise, the judgmental assent would not be confined within [the categories of] the intuitional and the acquisitional.”?° Now, since many investigating scholars had treated ‘judgmental assent’ as [if it were merely] ‘judgment [in general]’, while [Baydawi] was treating ‘judgmental assent’ in his division [of the phases of knowing] as ‘thinking [conceptually] about something together with a judgment passed upon [the conception being formed]’ either in denial or affirmation, he gave an example of ‘intuitive judgmental assent’, namely, [one’s] judgment that denial and affirmation could not be joined together [in one statement as both true], nor could they be removed together from [a statement as both untrue]. And he did this in order to draw attention to the fact that ‘judgmental assent’ [i.e. following a statement of conception] was [being handled sim- ply as] ‘judgment’ [in general], among one group of scholars.*! Further, in his division [of the phases of knowing], [Baydawi] set forth [this] ‘judgmental assent’ as®* ‘thinking about something ‘ogether 2 MS gl: Le., the attainment of which does not depend on logical reasoning and thought. 26 MS gl (on a partially damaged page): This is where the conviction of the intel- lect, within the relationship that holds between its two terms [subject and predi- cate] after a conception of them both has been formed, does not depend upon logical reasoning and thought. 27 'L 16 gl: Le., the author’s division of judgmental assent into the intuitional and the acquisitional. ° L 16 gl: This being the kind the attainment of which does not depend on log- ical reasoning and thought. * L 16 gi: [Isfahani’s} statement that it would not be confined is because judgmen- tal assent that is inherently necessary would be, in that case, in another category. * In the MS (f. 10b:5) an error by the scribe writing on the repaired page omits the correct words [wa-lamma kana], while inserting extraneous matter. *| In his book, the Mukassal (pp. 20-40, Cairo reprint of 1332 ed.), F.D, Razi discusses ‘judgmental assent’ [tasdiq]. But he writes of judgment in general, rather than the particular judgment responding to the need to verify the current stage of the ‘intellectual conception’ that is in the process of formation. The two-phase know- ing process [tasawwur/tasdiq] is an ongoing alternation between the two phases in handling the data of perception. *” The MS inserts here [by mistake, as it appears correctly a few lines below], “as a way of expressing” [Sbarah ‘an}. In MS Garrett 989Ha the same phrase was inserted here but later was scratched out. 36 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER I with a judgment passed—of one of the two [alternatives, i.e., denial or affirmation]—upon [the thought so far conceived]. And he did this in order to draw attention to the fact that in his judgment it was preferable to set forth ‘judgmental assent’ as a term for ‘think- ing [conceptually] about something together with a judgment passed upon [the concept in its process of formation].’ Isfahani’s theory of knowledge L 16:12) T 8:25 All we [Isfahani] have said is that only a portion of each of these two phases [of knowing], namely, conception and judgmental assent, is intuitional and a portion of each of them is acquisitional. This is because, if it were not so, then the acts of conception and of judg- mental assent either a. would be all inherently necessary [as an intuition], or b. they would be all rationally acquired, and each of these alter- natives is impossible. (a.) We say this of the first option, because if all of the concepts and judgmental assents should be inherently necessary [by intuition], then we would not have lost anything [i.e. of knowledge] from either one; that is, all of them would come about for us without [our giv- ing them] any logical reasoning or thought. But the conclusion is false, because a great many conceptions and judgmental assents do not come about for us without logical reasoning and thought. (b.) And we say it also of the second option, because if all con- ceptions and judgmental assents should be by rational acquisition, then we would not have obtained any of them [by acquisition]. But this conclusion is [also] false, because sometimes there are many intellectual conceptions and judgmental assents that we do acquire. An explanation of the logic here is that matters of logical reasoning are acquired only from other and previously held items of knowledge. So, if all intellectual conceptions and judgmental assents should be by acquisition then the implication would be that all of them would be relying upon something else, either in subject-substrates MS Ila limited in extent, and then a circular argument would be implicit from the inherent necessity that whatever was acquired then would return to its supporting base, L 17 or in subject-substrates unlim- ited in extent, and then an infinite series argument would be implicit. And both circular and infinite series arguments imply that it would be impossible for us to acquire by rational means any [knowledge] PRINCIPLES OF EPISTEMOLOGY 37 at all, either from intellectual conceptions or from judgmental assents. A circular argument would so imply because in that case, our acquiring some particular thing (a) [by reasoning] would depend on [our acquiring] some other thing (b) [by reasoning], [and] that [in turn] would depend on [our already having] the first thing (a); thus, our rational acquisition of any [particular] thing would depend upon four rational acquisition of] that very thing. This is because thing (a)—being dependent upon thing (b) that [in turn] is dependent upon the [original] thing (a)—would itself be depending upon that [same original] thing (a); and something [not known] that depends upon itself [i.e., for rational disclosure] would be impossible to acquire by reasoning. An infinite series argument also would so imply [i.e., the impos- sibility of acquiring knowledge] because in that case, a. our acquisition of any [knowledge] either by intellectual con- ceptions or judgmental assents would depend on our having acquired within our intellect something having no limits, T9 and such an acquisition within the intellect of something having no limits would be an impossibility b. because it is impossible for the mind to encompass within its comprehension something that has no limits; and anything depen- dent upon an impossibility would be an impossibility. Therefore, our obtaining [by rational acquisition] any [knowledge], either by way of intellectual conceptions or by judgmental assents, would be an impossibility. 1. An objection had been made* against ‘intellectual concep- tions’ [as a phase of knowing] as follows: a) If what is meant would be the conception of an entity ‘in its reality, then we [the objector] would prefer that all [knowl- edge] be ‘acquired rationally’. Any implication that the argument would be circular or an infinite series in that case would be ruled out, since it would be admissible that the conception of an entity ‘in its reality’ would be concluded with the acquisition of the con- ception ‘in some aspect.’ It could not be said of this that the aspect MS gh: [Le., by] Shams al-Din al-Samarqandi [i-e., Abu al-Layth Nasr ibn Muhammad al-Samarqandi, called Imam al-Huda, d. between 373/983-4 and 393/1002-3}. Joseph Schacht’s article in En-I-2 (“Abu’l Layth al-Samarkandi”) men- tons him as a Hanafi scholar and lists his known books. 38 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER I jitself] would have [some of the entity’s] reality, as [the aspect] would be one of [the entity’s] accidents and the accident would have its own reality. The assumption would be that ‘conception of the [entity’s] reality’ would be [something] acquired, and this would imply a circular or infinite series argument. Our position [as objec- tors] is that the circular or infinite series argument would be implied only if acquisition of the ‘conception of an entity in its reality™* should depend upon the conception of the reality of whoever defined it.> But this would be ruled out since it would be admissible that the ‘conception of the entity in its reality’ would be acquired from the ‘conception of another entity in some aspect.’ b) But if what is meant is the conception of the thing ‘in some aspect,’ then we [the objector] would prefer that all [knowl- edge] be ‘inherently necessary’ [and thus intuitively known], since everything to which the intellect turns would be a conception ‘in some aspect.’ 2. There could be another objection raised** that the intended meaning of ‘conception’ would be either a) something more general than ‘in its reality’ or ‘in some aspect,’ or that the meaning would be b) something mixed in that part would be ‘in some aspect’ and part ‘in its reality.’ (a)-a. The answer to this [second objector’s] first alternative (a) would be that the ‘general’ would be in the same category as the ‘specific,’ and we have shown the falsity of that argument; and (b)-a. the answer to his second alternative would be that then we [i.e., presumably Isfahani] would prefer that all [knowledge] be ‘inherently necessary’ [as intuitive]. l.~a. Now, the answer [to Abu al-Layth al-Samarqandi’s rea- sons for objection given above] is that by ‘all the conceptions’ we mean everything that has been judgmentally assented to as being a more general conception than ‘in its reality’ or ‘in some aspect,’ in such a way as to include every MS 11b_ individual case of a con- ception L 18 ‘in some aspect’ and every individual case of a con- ception ‘in its reality’, And no inference making this out to be false can be drawn from the fact that each of these two divisions {i.e., 3 MS gl: As a human being, for instance. % MS el: This being ‘a rational animate being.’ 3° MS el: As if in reply to the main objection here. PRINCIPLES OF EPISTEMOLOGY 39 ‘in some aspect’ and ‘in its reality] has been invalidated when taken by itself apart from the other. Thus, if everything [known] in this sense*’ should be inherently necessary [as intuition], then all the indi- vidual cases of conception—including every individual case of con- ception ‘in some aspect’ and every individual case of conception ‘in its reality—would be inherently necessary [as intuition], so not one bit of knowledge would be lost from any of them. And if everything [known] in this [same] sense should be by [rational] acquisition, then either a circular or an infinite series argument would be implicit. 3. And again an objection has been raised to this [latter point] as well,*® that on the assumption that all [knowledge] would be by rational acquisition then the [very] reasons mentioned as invalidat- ing this division [of knowledge] would be by rational acquisition, so it would not be possible to argue that this division was invalid. This is because then every reason set forth to invalidate this division would be [itself knowledge] by rational acquisition and thus would be ruled out, and then there would be need for another [reason], and implic- itly the reasoning would be circular or in an infinite series, so the argument would never be completed. 3.-a. The answer [to this objection] is that the reasons men- tioned as invalidating this division [of knowledge] are [already] known to be in the same circumstance, so if they are already known, and the assumption being that everything [known] is by rational acqui- sition, then [the reasoning of] the argument would be complete and safeguarded from impossibility. Otherwise, the rejection of this assump- tion would be implied, because it would require the contrary of what [already] exists in the same circumstance.” 4. So then, if an objection should be raised* not granting that if [some fact] should not be something already known then the imph- cation would be that this assumption [i.e., that all knowledge is by acquisition] would be denied. *” MS gl: Le., in the sense of being ‘more general.’ 8 The MS and MS Garrett 989Ha insert here “to this point” [‘alayhi]. L 18 gl: This objection is directed only to ‘acquisition’, not to ‘intuition’, and seems to be applied to ‘judgmental assent’. 3° MS gl: And everything that requires the contrary of what is evident in the same circumstance is to be denied, so this assumption would be denied; and so the goal of the logic is established, namely, to deny that everything [known] would be by acquisition. * Reading with T, which adds “So if...” [fa-in qila]. 40 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER I 4—a.1 [Baydawi’s] statement [answering such an objection] is [that the assumption would be denied] “because it requires the con- trary of what is in the same circumstance.” But our [Isfahani’s] posi- tion does not grant that [the assumption] would require the contrary of what is in the same circumstance. That would be required only if an exclusion of known evidence should be a concomitant of this assumption, but that would be ruled out. 4—a.2 The answer [that is proper for this possible objection] is that these reasons are known to be in the same circumstance. Thus, if this assumption should be true and active in the same circumstance, then it would be true and active along with the fact [of the reasons] being known; because whatever would be true and active in the same circumstance would be true and active along with all the matters true and active in the same circumstance. Therefore, [the reasoning of] the argument would be completed and safeguarded from impossibility. If it should be otherwise, then it would imply [the correctness of] the goal of our logic, namely, the denial that everything [known] would be by [rational] acquisition in the same circumstance. 4.—a.3 It is possible to answer this objection from another aspect, this being the objector’s position that if everything [known] were by rational acquisition, then the reasons mentioned to invalidate [his position also] would be by rational acquisition, if by [his position] he meant that [the reasons] should be by rational acquisition in the same circumstance. This [meaning of the position] would be ruled out, because the assumption that everything [known] would be by rational acquisition does not imply that everything [known] would be by rational acquisition in the same circumstance, and thus the argument would be complete. And, even if [the objector] should mean by [his position] that [all things] would be [known] by ratio- nal acquisition MS 12a according to the assumption, then we would grant that, but the argument would depend on whether all these things were knowable in the same circumstance, not on their not being by rational acquisition according to this assumption. 5. An objector L19 might hold that it should not be granted that the infinite series argument would be impossible for this form [of the argument].*’ Your position [i-e., a disputant addressing Isfahani] “| MS gl: Le., the form [of statement] in which everything [known] would be by acquisition. PRINCIPLES OF EPISTEMOLOGY 41 is that it would imply that the mind should comprehend what is without limit; and that is the impossibility. Our [Isfahani’s] position is that if you [the disputant] mean by this that it implies the mind’s comprehension of what has no limit by way of an endless succession, then in that case the implication [i.e., of impossibility] is granted, but the impossibility of it is ruled out.” But if you mean by it that the mind’s comprehension of what has no limit would be all at once, then the impossibility of it is granted, but any such implication is ruled out. Indeed, all the things that have been learned earlier have been preparatory to those that follow.® There is no necessity for preparatory causes to continue together with their results, because a preparatory cause passes away when the caused result is present. Let no one say, “We can demonstrate by another means that it is impossible for the mind to encompass what has no limit.” This other means would be that the [knowledge arrived at as] the con- clusion would depend upon the movement of thought, and the movement of thought would not take place except within a time- duration. Thus, if the mind should encompass something having no limit, it would depend upon the termination of a limitless number * MS gl: Because, assuming that the soul is eternal, it is admissible that it would gain comprehension of matters that have no limits by following them up succes- sively through endless time durations in the past. *8 The MS alone of sources used reads, [al-muqaddimat al-lahiq]. However, this is one of the repaired and recopied sections of the MS. Leaves 1-24 of the MS suffered damage to the text portion at the inner margins. Al-Sayyid al-Sharif al-Jurjani, in his Ta‘ifat, defines “preparatory [arrangements]” {mu‘addat] as “a term for that upon which something depends.” It is a general category that in the present context would include premises in an argument, or the partial development of a general or particular science that would support later advances in knowledge. It would also be equipment prepared for specific activities. “ L 19 gl. 3. [Al-Sayyid al-Sharif al-Jurjani later repeated and enlarged upon this idea in his “Marginal Glosses” [Hashiyah] upon Isfahani’s Commentary]: The conclusion depends upon intelligible propositions derived [by rational acquisition], and these have no limit. Each one of these intelligible propositions, that are ratio- nally acquired and that proceed without limit comes about only through thinking [al-fikr]. Now, thinking is a movement that takes place only within a time-dura- tion; thus, each one of the intelligible propositions rationally acquired and pro- ceeding without limit would be within a time-duration. Therefore, the conclusion [of the process] would depend upon the termination of an endless number of time- durations, which would be impossible since the time-duration from the beginning of the soul’s existence is a limited factor. Now, if an objection should be raised—to the effect a) that the time-duration from the beginning of the soul’s existence would be limited by implication only if 42 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER I of time-durations, which would be impossible because the time-dura- tion from the beginning of the soul’s existence is a limited factor. In such a case our position would be that [that argument] would depend upon a clear explanation of the falsity of metempsychosis and of the soul’s temporal nature, and thus it would entail an expla- nation of something clearly comprehensible being based on [an expla- nation of] something difficult to comprehend. 5.-a. In refuting this division [of the argument], it is prefer- able to argue that, if ‘conceptions’ and ‘judgmental assents’ in their entirety T 10 should be by rational acquisition, then not one thing would have come to us from these two processes except by logical reasoning and thought. But this conclusion is false, for many things do come to us from ‘conceptions’ and ‘judgmental assents’ without logical reasoning and thinking. Baydawi said: L19, T 10 2. Logical reasoning: the means of the rational acquisition of knowledge Logical reasoning is the process of arranging* entities that are known in a way that leads to learning something that is not already known. If these entities so organized should be a) conducive to forming a [the soul] should be a temporal phenomenon, but b) that this implication would be ruled out because 1) of the admissibility that the soul could be eternal, and 2) that prior to this body it would have been linked to another body, and so on without end in the manner of metempsychosis,—then the reply would be that it has been established by demonstrated proof A) that the soul is a temporal phe- nomenon, and B) that metempsychosis is a falsehood. Our position [i.e., that of al-Sharif al-Jurjani] is that in that case to explain the impossibility of everything known being by acquisition would depend upon making it clear a) that the soul is a temporal phenomenon, and b) that metempsychosis is a falsehood. And these latter two points are difficult to comprehend, while to explain the impossibility of everything known being by acquisition is a clearly comprehen- sible point. Therefore, the implication is that to demonstrate the falsity of some- thing clear and obvious would require the use of something very difficult to comprehend. ® L 19 gl 5: This arrangement comprises [Aristotle’s] four causes. These are: the effective [cause] [al-fa‘l], the material [al-maddah], the formal [al-strah], and the final [al-ghayah]. Since the ‘arrangement’ indicates an ‘arranger’, that is the ‘effective’ [cause]; the known entities of which the arrangement is actually made are the ‘material’ [cause]; the arrangement itself is the ‘formal’ [cause]; and the process of seeking [isti‘lam] what is not known is the ‘final’ [or, ‘purposive’ cause]. PRINCIPLES OF EPISTEMOLOGY 43 ‘conception’, then they would be called a “definition” or a “state- ment of explanation”, and if they should be b) conducive to ‘judg- mental assent’ then they would be called an “argument” or a “proof demonstration.” Isfahani says: L 19, T 10, MS 12a 2. Logical reasoning: the means of the rational acquisition of knowledge a. After having stated that intuitional [knowing] has no need for logical reasoning and systematic thinking, Baydawi needed to define logical reasoning and thinking. The term ‘thinking’ is used with a number of meanings.” [Source is coded simply Sharh. This is likely to be Jurjani’s glosses on Isfahani’s commentary. A modern scholar notes: “For Aristotle, to know is to know by means of causes, and it is clear that the four Aristotelian causes are necessary elements in things, which must be known or understood if full understanding is to be reached, rather than causes in the modern sense.” Paul Edwards, Ed. in Chief. The The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (New York: Macmillan, 1967), s.v. “Aristotle” by G.B. Kerferd. In his Jsharat (Teheran, 1984; v. 1, pp. 8-17), Ibn Sina speaks of ‘logic’ [mantiq]: “What is meant by ‘logic’ is that a person has available an instrument for [men- tal] regulation the use of which will prevent going astray in one’s thinking. By ‘thinking’ here I mean what is available for people in general—-[here N.D. Tusi lists in his commentary on Ibn Sina the three kinds of thinking, as found incor- porated in Isfahani’s following commentary on this passage]—when there is a tran- sition from matters that are present in mind (whether as a ‘conception’ [tasawwur] or as a ‘judgment of verification’ [tasdiq], which itself may be by knowledge or by supposition or by convention and acceptance) to matters that are not present in [mind]. This transition never takes place without there being [both] a syllogistic arrangement of the information in hand and a syllogistic structure. That syllogism and its structure may be set up correctly or it may be set up incorrectly. Many times the incorrect way will resemble what is correct, or it may [only] seem to resemble what is correct. Logic then, is a [body of] knowledge in which one learns the various [methods of] transition from items [of knowledge] that are available in a person’s mind to [other] items [yet] to be obtained.” F.D. Razi, in his Muhassal (pages 40 and 49) treats ‘logical reasoning’ and ‘sys- tematic thinking’ under the heading ‘distinguishing properties of logical reasoning’, but uses identical definitions in the subheadings for each topic: (1) “Logical rea- soning [al-nazar]/(2) Systematic thinking [al-fikr}]}—is the arrangement of judgmental statements [tasdiqat] so as to arrive by them [yatawassal biha] at other judgmen- tal statements.” *® The commentary on Ibn Sina’s Jsharat wa-tanbihat that Nasir al-Din Tusi [1201-1274] wrote and called. Hall mushkilat al-Isharat is quoted nearly verbatim by 44 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER I 1. One [meaning] is that [thinking] is a movement of the [rea- soning] soul by means of the power*’ whose instrument® is the ante- nor convolution inside the brain,—whatever movement it may be—as long as that movement is among the intelligibles; but if it should be among the physical sensations, then it would be called ‘imagination’. This power is single, but with reference to the first [class, i.e., the intelligibles], it is called ‘thinking’, and with reference to the second [class, i.e., the physical sensations], it is called ‘imagination’. This [intellectual] movement takes place within the category of quality. So, just as the movement in [the category of] quality takes place among the physically sensate qualities, MS 12b_ it likewise takes place among the psychological [non-sensate] qualities of the [rea- soning] soul, in that a representation L 20 is made within the soul of the inward stores*’ item by item whenever attention is given to them. And there is no doubt that the [reasoning] soul specula- tively considers these entities when its attention is directed there. This movement [among ‘intelligibles’] constitutes ‘systematic think- ing’, while the speculative consideration constitutes ‘logical reason- ing’. Because of their mutual concomitance to each other, the name of the one is applied to the other, and they both serve in a syn- onymous function. 2. Sometimes the term ‘thinking’ is used in a second sense, more particular than that just mentioned, being a movement of the {rational soul among the intelligibles, a) beginning from the ‘conclusion’ [i.e., the logical goal], b) searching out and reviewing the quiddities” that are pre- sent among [the intelligibles}, c) and aiming [ahead] toward premises that will lead on to [the conclusion], until d) the [rational soul] finds the needed [quiddities], which it then e) arranges [into a syllogism], and thus Isfahani [1276-1348] as the first sentence in each of the three meanings that follow [v. 1, pp. 10-11 of the 1984 Teheran ed. of the fsharat with Tusi’s commentary. MS gl: Le., an executive power [al-quwah al-mutasarrifah]. *® MS gl: Le., whose substrate [mahall]. MS gl: Le., the intelligibles [ma‘qulat]. °° MS gl: [Le.,] of [nazar] and [fikr]. °! [ma‘ani] The ‘quiddities’, or, abstracted essences having an identified ‘what- ness’ and being present in the situation, may serve also as ‘causal factors’ in the purpose of the logical ‘thinking’ that is going on. PRINCIPLES OF EPISTEMOLOGY 45 f) returns from them back to the conclusion, [the logical goal]. ‘Systematic thinking’ in this [purposive syllogistic] sense is the for- mat upon which all the rationally acquired sciences are arranged.” The ‘speculative consideration’ of quiddities that are present when searched out for review in the way mentioned is called ‘logical rea- soning’. Moreover, sometimes one term is used for the other [i.e., ‘systematic thinking’ and ‘logical reasoning’]. Thus, it is as if™ [Baydawi] observed and pointed out™ the differentiation between the two meanings, and then joined them together. 3. Again, sometimes ‘thinking’ [in the sense of ‘systematic think- ing’] is applied [only] to the [intellectual] movement from the ‘con- clusion’ [as the logical goal] to the premises, but without including in [the movement] the return from [the premises] back to [the con- cluding goal]. Now, since the rationally acquired sciences are dependent upon ‘thinking’ in the second sense [above], and the syllogism as arranged in the special manner is an obvious concomitant of [this systematic thought], Baydawi descriptively defined [systematic thinking] in terms of [the syllogism]. The syllogism consists in setting up a plurality of entities in such a way that the name of one may be applied to [a group of] them, and between each of these things and each one of the others there is a relationship of precedence or subsequence in their placement ranking within the intellect.°° So, the syllogistic arrangement is more specialized than an [ordinary] composition, because in an ordinary composition this relative placement ranking would not be regarded. On Baydawi’s defimtion of logical reasoning By his term ‘entities’, Baydawi means two or more entities. His phrase ‘[entities] that are known’,—that is, ‘intellectually conceived’ * 'T, in error: [al-ma‘lim al-kasbiyah], L & the MS [al-‘ulim al-kasbiyah]. °° Reading with the MS, MS Garrett 989Ha and MS Garrett-Yahuda 4486: [ka- anna]. L and T read: [kana al-musannif]. *+ On a repaired and recopied page portion here the MS reads: [ashara], while L & T & MS Garrett 989Ha read [nazara]. 5° Regarding this definition of the syllogism, Jurjani’s Ta’rifat [Fluegel ed., Leipzig, 1845, reprinted, p. 57, |. 16-17,] provides a near verbatim quote, probably by Jurjani [1340-1413] from Isfahani [1275-1348], as the latter preceded; or, both writers may have quoted from some older source. 46 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER I or ‘judgmentally assented to’ as a judgment of conviction or other- wise,—[is used] in order to deal with the logical reasoning actually taking place [both] in conception formation and in the judgmental assent that includes conviction, formal belief, and supposition. His expression, “in a way that leads to learning something not already known”, is used to make the definition® apply specifically [both] to logical reasoning and to systematic thinking in the second sense [i.e., capable of arrangement in a syllogism]. This definition takes into consideration [Aristotle’s] four [kinds of] causes: mater- ial, formal, effectual, and final. In defining the four causes there is no intention to make the four causes themselves into definitions, for there would be no valid necessity MS 13a _ to apply a definition to something already defined when the causes would not be true of [what was already defined]. But rather, the intention is that the definition should be made [of things] predicable of the thing to be defined while taking these causes into consideration. So then, a definition would define a compound entity with regard to its exist- ence,” L 21 because an entity that is not compound cannot be conceived as having material and formal causes, and a nonexistent entity cannot be conceived as having effective and final causes. Therefore, the definition would be a descriptive one, because things predicated of the entity with respect to the causes would be predi- cated with regard to things that are external to the entity, and things predicated with regard to external matters would not concern the essence; thus the definition would be descriptive. [Baydawi’s] expression, “the process of arranging entities that are known”, is a specifying phrase that is derived from a ‘material’ [cause, as well as from those that are] ‘formal’ and ‘effective.’ Of these, one of them, the material [cause], is mentioned as being directly applic- able, while the other two would be [applicable] according to [their] engagement [i.e., in the matter].°® And again, [Baydawi’s] expression, “in a way that leads to learn- ing something that is not already known”, is a specifying phrase derived from a ‘final’ cause. % MS gl: Le., the definition of logical reasoning and systematic thought. 37 MS gl: Le., its existence in the mind fwujiduhu al-dhihni]. L 21 gl: His expression, “the other two would be [applicable] according to their engagement [i-e., in the matter]”: since every sort of arrangement must have an arranging agent, namely, an intelligent power, as a carpenter is to a bedstead [sarir]. PRINCIPLES OF EPISTEMOLOGY 47 [Continuing from Baydawi] “If these entities so organized should be a. conducive to forming a conception, then they would be called a ‘definition’ or an ‘explanatory statement’, and if they should be b. conducive to judgmental assent then they would be called an ‘argument’ or a ‘demonstration’.” The former [i-e., forming a con- ception] would be like [the definition] “a living being that speaks”, that would lead to forming a conception of ‘mankind’. The second [i.e., judgmental assent] would be like when we say, “The world is a possible entity, and everything that is a possible entity has a cause”, [a saying] that leads to a judgmental assent to [the correctness of] our saying, “the world has a cause”. The author [Baydawi] put ‘explanatory statement’ before the ‘argu- ment’ in the setting of his exposition—because of its natural prece- dence to the argument—in order to have it correspond with the natural order. Natural precedence [of A to B] is as when one entity- A is such that another entity-B°** depends upon A, but A has no effect upon B. For example, one precedes two, and indeed, ‘two’ depends upon there being a ‘one’, but the ‘one’ has no effect upon [the ‘two’]. The ‘explanatory statement’, in relation to ‘argument’, is similar because the ‘explanatory statement’ would be a little earlier than the ‘conception’, while the ‘argument’ would be a little earlier than the ‘judgmental assent’. Moreover, ‘intellectual conception’ precedes ‘judgmental assent’ naturally. This is because every T 11 judgmental assent depends upon (1-2) the conception of [judgmental assent’s] two terms and upon (3) the conception of the combination of the two, as it is inher- ently impossible to form a judgment while being ignorant of any one of these three [subordinate conceptions]. But these [subordinate preliminary] conceptions do not have any effectual causality upon the judgmental assent. ° The reading in L is not complete; T: [ghayr]; the MS and MS Garrett 989Ha: {ghayruhu]. * MS gl: Le., 1) conception of its subject and 2) conception of its predicate. Baydawi said: L 21, Tl CHAPTER 2: EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS 1. Conditions that govern a definition An ‘explanatory definition’ of some thing is [a statement]! the under- standing of which necessarily brings about an understanding of that thing. Thus, a knowledge of [the explanatory definition] would pre- cede the knowledge of [the thing] defined. Thus, a thing cannot be defined a. by way of [a definition] equal to it in clarity or obscurity,—~as has been said, “An even number is not an odd number’”;—nor [can it be defined] b. by way of itself;—as when [some disputant] says, “Movement L 22 is a transition”, or “Man is a human living being”;—nor [can it be defined] c. by way of [a definition] more obscure than itself. [This latter statement is true] equally whether 1. knowledge of the entity depends on [a definition removed] in only one degree,—as in the definition of the sun as “a star of the daytime”, and in the definition of the daytime as “the time period when the sun is up [in the sky]”;—-or whether 1 In the “Book of Definitions” [Kitab al-TaTifat] by ‘Ali ibn Muhammad, al-Sayyid al-Sharif, al-Jurjani [1339-1413] [Fluegel ed., reprint of Leipzig, 1845; Beirut, Maktabat Lubnan, 1978] are the following definitions: {mu‘arrif]: “That [statement] the conception of which necessarily brings about the acquisition in [one’s] understanding of a conception of the object entity, both in its core nature and in its distinctiveness from all else; thus the definition com- prises both ‘definition by less than absolute delimitation’ [al-hadd al-naqis] and ‘description.’” {ta‘rif]: “A term for a statement about an entity; and the understanding of this statement necessarily brings about an understanding of another entity [like the first].” In the former ‘definition’ [mu‘arrif] there is an emphasis more on the dynam- ics of knowledge formation and transfer as a ‘process’; while in the latter the ‘definition’ [ta‘rif} seems confined to being only a label that is read and under- stood. In this chapter we will try to be consistent in translating [mu‘arrif] as an ‘explanatory definition’, or as ‘definer’, or as ‘defining agency’. The term [ta‘rif] will be translated ‘definition’. EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS 49 2. [this knowledge would depend on a definition removed] in several degrees,—as when ‘two’ is defined as the “first even num- ber”, and then ‘even number’ is defined as “a number divisible into two equal parts,” and then ‘two equal parts’ is defined as “two things, neither of which is more than the other”, and then [finally] the definition of them both as “two”; or whether 3. {this knowledge] is not dependent at all,—as when ‘fire’ is defined as “a basic principle resembling the soul.” [In an explanatory definition] precedence should be given to a term that is more general because of its familiarity and its clarity. Further, unusual and metaphorical expressions as well as repetitions should be avoided,—as when someone might say, “A number is a plurality of units brought together”, or, “Man is a living being who is corporeal and speaks rationally.” [‘This would be true], unless, of course, either a) an inherent necessity should require [definition in this way], as when defining two mutually adjunctive entities,—for example, “A father is a living being from whose seed another individual of the same species is generated”,—wherein [necessary repetition] would be the case; or b) some other need [should require it], as when people say, “A flattened nose is a hollowed out nose”, that kind of ‘hollowing out’, being done only on the nose. Isfahani says: L 22, T 11, MS 13a CHAPTER 2: EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS In Chapter 2 Baydawi set forth three topics: MS 13b 1. The conditions that govern a definition; 2. The classes of definitions; 3. Realities definable and definitive. 1. Conditions that govern a definition a. An explanatory definition of some thing is a statement the un- derstanding of which necessarily brings about an understanding of that thing. The expression, ‘an understanding of that thing’, here is meant to be an understanding that is more general—than either the under- standing obtained from a delimiting definition or the understanding 50 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER 2 obtained from a descriptive definition,?—in order that this [single explanatory] definition should deal with both of these [particular kinds of understanding]. However, according to this explanation [of what constitutes a definition],’ the implication is that an object defined either by ‘delim- itation’ or by ‘description’ would [itself] serve as an ‘explanatory definition’ for both the ‘delimiting definition’ and the ‘descriptive definition’ [respectively]. This is because it would be valid to say-— of an object ‘defined by delimitation’ or ‘defined by description’— that an understanding of [each of] these aspects necessarily would bring about an understanding of what constitutes either a ‘delimit- ing definition’ or a ‘descriptive definition’, respectively. [This would be true], unless, of course, if by [the phrase] ‘nec- essarily would bring about’, there is meant the kind of ‘necessary influence’ that a cause has upon its effect, but not the reverse. However, ‘a requirement of logical necessity’ is something more gen- eral than ‘the necessary influence of a cause upon its effect’, as well as the reverse. And further, a ‘generality’ does not have the logical capacity to give demonstrative proof for a ‘particularity’. It has been said that an ‘explanatory definition’ of some thing would be a statement the understanding of which would be the log- ical cause for the understanding of that thing. But this [definition] is regarded as sound only by one who admits the legitimacy of definition by a single factor, while for anyone who would not admit the legitimacy of definition by a single factor this definition would > Delimiting def. [al-ta‘rif al-haddi]/descriptive def. [al-ta‘rif al-rasmi]. 3 L 22, gl 4: No one should say that ‘understanding an object defined by delim- itation’ does not exist until after ‘understanding the delimiting definition [itself]’, as otherwise, the object would not be an ‘object defined by delimitation’; so in that case the ‘understanding of the delimited object’ would not bring about the ‘under- standing of the delimiting definition’ because ‘[the understanding of the delimited object]? would be known already before ‘[the understanding of the delimiting definition]’. Our position is that for ‘entity-a’ to require logically the existence of ‘entity-b’ it is not necessary that [‘the understanding of entity-a’] should exist prior to [‘the understanding of entity-b’], but rather it is admissible that [‘the understanding of entity-a’] should be dependent upon [‘the understanding of entity-b’]. For exam- ple, the ‘understanding of a whole entity’ is dependent upon ‘[the understanding of] every one of its parts’; and thus, ‘the understanding of [the former whole entity]’ logically requires ‘the understanding of the latter entity’s every part’. [From a Commentary [sharh], presumably that of al-Sharif al-Jurjani upon ‘Adud al-Din Jji’s al-Mawaqif fi tlm al-kalam.] * L gh As when we say that ‘man’ is ‘a laughing being’ [al-insan al-dahik]. EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS 51 not be valid’ L 23 because it lacks any common and regular usage. However, it would be valid indeed for [defining] a specific concomitant property, some thing clear and simple, the understanding of which would be a logical cause for understanding an entity hav- ing that property. The truth of the matter is that a definition would not be valid by way of a single factor, because an entity the conception of which is being sought by logical reasoning must be conceived by any means whatsoever; otherwise, the search for it would be impossible. So there would have to be some [preliminary] conception that would be use- ful in forming a ‘goal concept’. But that ‘goal concept’? would be something other than the [preliminary] ‘conception by any means whatsoever’. However, the [preliminary] ‘conception by any means whatsoever’ has a role leading into the ‘goal concept’. Therefore, a [mental] realization of both these conceptions is necessary in for- mulating the goal concept. So the goal concept actually would not be formulated by using a single factor, because the agency actually formulating the goal concept would be a composite. Therefore, an explanatory definition of some thing is an explana- tory statement the conceptual understanding of which provides what is useful in formulating a conception of the thing [itself]. And so from [this explanatory definition] there is deduced the evidence [for the goal concept of the thing]. 1. An objection has been raised that, if the [1st] ‘definer’ should need a [2nd] definer, then the argument would be an infinite series. But this conclusion would be false. An explanation of the inherent logic here is that if the [lst] definer should have need for a [2nd] definer, then this [2nd] definer of the [1st] definer would [in turn] need another [3rd] definer, and the argument would be an infinite series. Furthermore, if the [1st] definer should have a [2nd] definer, then implicitly the [two of them] would be equals, as a stipulated condition for [being] a ‘definer’ is that [the ‘definer’] should be the equal of what is ‘defined’. But in fact, the [2nd] is [really] more specific than [the Ist], as [the 2nd] would be a ‘specific definer’ by the inherent logical necessity of its being the [2nd] definer of a [Ist] ° Reading with the MS, MS Garrett 989Ha and MS Garrett-Yahuda 4486: [man lam yujawwiz...fa-la yasihh hadha al-ta‘rif]. The scribe of L has plainly over- written [yasihh] to read [yujawwiz], and this changed reading was followed by the editors of T. 52 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER 2 definer. So there would be no MS 14a _ validity in a definition by its means. 1a. The answer to the first [objection]® is that the [2nd] definer of the [Ist] definer would be classified as subordinate to the ‘absolute [1st] definer’, as being a [2nd] definer, and [this 2nd definer] would be differentiated from all other definers by its adjunction to the ‘absolute [lst] definer’. So, if we should understand the absolute nature of the [Ist] definer, then necessarily there would be an under- standing of its [2nd] definer, as being a [2nd] definer. Furthermore, {the 2nd definer’s] adjunction to the [lst] definer would be a well known fact wherever there was an understanding of the two adjoined terms; thus, in its totality [the 2nd definer] would become well known, so [the 2nd definer] would have no need for another [i-e., a 3rd] definer. 2. [A second] objection has been raised that this [reply] requires consideration, because the totality;—a composite of the [Ist] definer together with its adjunction [the 2nd definer],—would be a definer by way of two parts, the [lst] definer and the [2nd definer] adjunc- tion. But the fact that the two parts [Ist and 2nd definers] would be well known in a potential sense would not imply that they both as a totality would not have need for another [3rd] definer. 2.-al. The real answer [here] is that this infinite series argu- ment would be an infinite series in matters of mental consideration, and it would cease with the cessation of the intellect’s consideration [of it]. Sometimes the intellect will consider the [2nd] definer of a [1st] definer from the standpoint of its being a [2nd] definer, and from this standpoint an understanding is gained of the [Ist] definer.’ And according to this consideration there would be no need for a [3rd] definer, [so the argument would come to an end]. But some- times the intellect will turn its attention to itself and observe itself L 24 for what it is, and it will have need for a definer. But the intellect will not keep this aspect [of itself] under consideration con- tinuously, so the infinite series ceases with the cessation of the intel- lect’s consideration T 12 of this aspect. 2.-a2. But the [formal] answer to the second objection is that it would be admissible for an entity, with regard to its own essence, 5 MS gl: Le., regarding the infinite series. 7 MS gl: That is, the definer [Ist] in an absolute sense. EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS 53 to be equivalent to another entity, and with regard to any one of its own accidental qualities, to be more specific than [the other entity]. The [2nd] definer of a [lst] definer would be a case like that, for in consideration of its own essence [the 2nd] would be equal to the [lst] definer,® while in consideration of its being a specific definer,’ [the 2nd] would be more specific than [the Ist is]. That is to say, it is in consideration of the fact that [the 2nd] is a ‘definer’, that it is [therefore] equivalent to a definer; [its equiva- lency] is not in consideration of the fact that [the 2nd definer] is more specific than [the first is]. Now, an understanding of the ‘definer’ of some thing must precede an understanding of the thing that is ‘defined’, because knowledge of the ‘definer’ is a cause of knowledge of the ‘defined’ thing, and a cause precedes the caused effect. And if knowledge of the ‘definer’ precedes knowledge of the ‘defined’ thing, then the former must be much clearer than the latter. b. [Thus, definitions are governed by the following conditions, as given by Baydawi.] 1. It is not valid to give an ‘explanatory definition’ of some thing in terms that would be no better than equal to it, whether in clarity or obscurity. That is, whatever would be presented as a ‘definer’ the case would be such that, if [the ‘definer’] should be understood, then the ‘defined’ [entity] would be understood, but if [the ‘definer’] should be something unknown, then [the ‘defined’] would be unknown. An example of this is when someone says, “An even number is not an odd number”, for an ‘odd number’ is equal to ‘even number’ in [degree of] clarity and obscurity. 2. Nor is it valid to give a definition of a thing by way of itself. Otherwise, the implication would be that knowledge of itself would precede MS 14b_ knowledge of itself, and that would imply that a thing would precede itself. [This is true] equally whether the ‘de- finer’ is presented as only the same as the ‘defined’, as when dispu- tants may say that ‘motion-change’, that is, locational [movement], is ‘to be in transition’, or whether [the ‘definer’] is presented as the same as the ‘defined’ plus something more, as when people say, “Man is a human living being.” The former is an example of [definition by way of] an accidental quality [‘to be in transition’], while the latter is an example of [definition by way of] the substance. ® MS gl: Le., the absolute definition. ° MS gl: Le., the definer of a definer. 54 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER 2 3. Nor is it valid to give a definition of a thing by way of what is more obscure than [the thing itself], equally whether the greater obscurity is or is not dependent upon the ‘defined’ thing [itself]. a) If [the greater obscurity] should depend upon [the defined thing] and be [distant] in only one degree, then [the definition] would be an obvious circular argument; but if [the greater obscu- rity should depend upon the defined thing] and be [distant] in more than one degree, then [the definition] would be an obscure circular argument. If the dependency upon the defined thing should be [dis- tant] in one degree, then it would be like a definition of the sun as ‘the daytime star’, followed by a definition of the ‘daytime’ as ‘the time period when the sun is visible above the horizon’. b) But if the dependency [upon the defined thing] should be [distant] in more than one degree, then it would be like the definition of ‘two’ as ‘the first even number’, followed by a definition of the ‘even number’ as ‘a number divisible into two equal parts’, followed by a definition of the ‘two equal parts’ as ‘two entities nei- ther one of which exceeds the other’, followed by a definition of the ‘two entities’ as ‘two’. c) A definition by way of something more obscure [than the ‘defined’] but having no dependence upon the thing ‘defined’ L 25 would be as when someone might say, “Fire is a basic element resem- bling the soul”, the soul being more obscure to the intellect than fire.’ But knowledge of the soul does not depend upon a knowledge of fire." c. [A defining factor having] more of a general nature should take precedence in the formulation of a definition. This is because of its familiarity and clarity, since the conditions required of a more gen- eral term and its exceptions’? are fewer than the conditions required of a more specific term and its exceptions.'’ Everything that is a '0 MS 14b glosses: 1. Because fire is perceived by the senses, while the soul is not. 2. An aspect of resemblance between them is that they are both continually in motion, but fire is in locational [makaniyah] motion while the soul is in intellec- tual [fikriyah] motion. And it has been said that the resemblance is in the subtle fineness [latafah] [that they have in common], and this is based on the notion that the soul is a body subtle in fineness. " L 25 gl: Because it [the soul] is something abstract [min al-mujarradat], while fire is sensate [min al-mahsiisat], and knowledge of it is easily acquired. 2 MS gl: Le., trees, stones and plants. MS gl: Le., horses, sheep and cattle. EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS 55 condition or an exception for what is more general [also] would be a condition or an exception for what is more specific, but the reverse is not true. Further, there is no doubt that an entity having few con- ditions and exceptions would be more frequently in the intellect, and thus it would be clearer and more familiar to the intellect. And what is clearer to the intellect should take precedence because the learner would perceive it first, and then would move on to what is more specific. 1. An objection has been raised that a more general term should precede in complete delimiting definitions only because what is more general in them is the genus, and that logically indicates something that is indefinite and unattainable in its individuality.’ But this [individuality] is obtained by [a defining factor] that is more particular, this being the ‘individual difference’. If the genus should not take precedence, then ‘the formative part’ [or, ‘the defining fac- tor] in the delimiting definition would be defective, and it would not be complete and inclusive of all of its parts. But in any other than a complete delimiting definition, it is preferable to give precedence to what is better understood,’ although this is not obligatory. lal. However, this requires consideration, for all of the essen- tial parts in a complete ‘delimiting definition’ amount to no more than the proximate genus and the proximate difference, and this interpretation [of the matter] is verified equally whether the genus is made to precede MS 15a_ the difference or it is made to come after. And the precedence of the genus over the difference would not constitute the ‘formative part’ [or, ‘defining factor’] of a com- plete delimiting definition in [external] reality. That is because the precedence of the genus over the difference is an adjunctive rela- tionship made accidental to the genus as compared to the difference, and an ‘adjunctive relationship’ made accidental to one thing'® in comparison to something else'? would come after them both, and would be dependent upon them both. Thus, it would not support ‘The MS and MS Garrett 989Ha read, “in itself” [bi-nafsihi], which might possibly be taken to mean, “by its own causation.” L and T read, “in its individ- uality” [bi-‘aynihi], more clearly providing the intended sense. '5 MS 14b gl: [I.e.], this being the more general; and it is only called the “bet- ter understood” because it is more often present in the intellect. 'S MS gl: [Le.J, genus. "7 MS gl: [I-e.], difference. 56 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER 2 the quiddity of either the genus or the difference, nor would it sup- port their existence either as a single mental totality, or their exist- ence separately. Therefore, it would not be a ‘formative part’ for, ‘defining factor’] for a complete delimiting definition. Let no [opposing disputant] say [to us] that what [we] have stated means that the precedence of the genus over the difference would not be a ‘formative part’ [or, ‘defining factor’] of the genus and of the difference. Nor is there any implication that it would not be a ‘formative part’ of a complete delimiting definition. For it is admis- sible that a complete delimiting definition would have matter that would be the genus and the difference, and [would have] form that would be the precedence of the genus over the difference. 1.-a2. That is because we would answer [the opponent] that the ‘complete delimiting definition’ is an expression for ‘all the essen- tial parts’ [i.e., substantial and formative] of the entity being defined, and that this definition corresponds to the object; so whatever would not be a part of the real nature of the entity thus delimited would not be a part of its complete delimiting definition, while whatever is part of the complete delimiting definition would be a part of the entity delimited. The precedence of the genus over the difference is not part of the entity defined, so it would not be part of the com- plete delimiting definition; otherwise, it would be part of the entity delimited. L 26 The term ‘formative part’ is applied to the prece- dence of the genus over the difference in a metaphorical sense, and the necessity of making the genus precede the difference does not imply that [the genus] would be a formative part of it,’ because it is admissible that [the genus] would be a required condition. And likewise, neither the necessity to make the genus precede the difference in regard to the inference it makes, nor the necessity to make the difference precede the genus in regard to the occurrence [of the genus]'? makes any requirement that the precedence of the genus over the difference in the first of these two considerations or the precedence of the difference over the genus in the second of them should be a ‘formative part’ of the quiddity that has its sub- sistence in them both. '8 The MS omits “of it.” ‘9 MS gl: Because the individual difference makes [yuhassil] the genus stand forth. EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS 57 The truth is that the general term should precede the particular term in [all] explanatory definitions, equally whether the general term is a genus” or an accidental quality,?! and equally whether the particular term is an individual difference” or a property.”* [This is] because the particular term T 13 provides the [factor of] distinc- tion, and the distinction is not attained until after there has been participation [i.e., in a commonality of meaning], for there would have to be a consideration of the commonality [of meaning]** first, in order to form a conception of the [factor of] distinction. d. Moreover, in formulating definitions one should avoid l. terms that are unusual, MS 15b _ that is, those words whose use is not well known or that vary [in meaning] from population to population, and that are matched by ordinary words, and 2. terms that are used metaphorically, that is, terms used in senses that are not conventional, because of some connotation between them, since these terms need examination and clarification, so the need for one explanatory statement would require [in turn] another explanatory statement. Further, in formulating explanatory definitions one should avoid the [kind of] repetition for which there is no inher- ent necessity or need, equally whether the repetition would be 3. the delimiting definition itself, as if someone should say, “Number is a plurality formed of units gathered together”, when “formed of units gathered together” is the ‘plurality’ itself; or whether {the repetition] is [only] 4. one of the parts of the delimiting definition, as “Man is a living, corporeal and rationally speaking being.” In the delimiting definition of a ‘living being’ there is understood the notion of ‘body’, as when [the ‘living being’] is said to be “a body with a sensate [reasoning] soul and moving of its own will.” For then the [term] ‘body’ is repeated, this being one of the parts of the delimiting definition of ‘man’. Regarding repetition that is on account of some inherent necessity, that is the kind [of repetition] that, if it should not in fact take place, then the definition would not remain true. [This is], for example, 20 21 22 23 24 MS gl: As a rationally speaking living being. MS gl: As a walking, rationally speaking being. MS gl: As a rationally speaking being [al-natiq]. MS gl: As a laughing being. As in the consideration of synonyms. 58 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER 2 repetition that takes place in the definition of two mutually adjunc- tive words that are indeed together both in one’s thinking and in external] existence, as ‘fatherhood’ and ‘sonship’. Indeed, it cannot be affirmed that one of them certainly exists unless there is [that] certainty for the other; likewise, neither one can be thought of” unless thought is given to the other [also]. Therefore, each of them must be defined by setting forth the cause that requires them to be in a mutually adjunctive relationship so that they would both occur together within the intellect. The expla- nation [in the definition] would be directed specifically to that one of the two whose definition is desired. Therefore, a repetition of the cause must in fact take place, so that L 27 the explanation would be directed necessarily and specifically to that one of them that is intended for definition. For example, it might be said,”° “A ‘father’ is a living being from whose seed is generated another living being of the same species, [i.e., the ‘fatherhood’ being] from the standpoint that there is gen- erated from his seed another living being of the same kind.” Thus, the first?’ living being is the essence [of the father] that is the sub- ject-substrate seat for the adjunctive relationship of fatherhood [i.e., as an accidental quality]. The other living being, who is of the same kind, is the essence of the son that is the subject-substrate seat for the adjunctive relationship of sonship {as an accidental quality]. Now, both [i.e., of these terms, ‘father’ and ‘son’, at first] have been taken as being free of any adjunctive relationship. But the gen- eration of the second from the seed of the first constitutes the cause of their being in a mutually adjunctive relationship; and [the clause], ‘from the standpoint that there is generated from his seed’, is the inherently necessary repetition of that cause. The cause is mentioned again because of the linkage of the adjunctive relationship to the [first] living being, who in turn is the subject-substrate seat for the adjunctive relationship of fatherhood” [i.e., as an accidental quality]. °° MS gi: [Le.], by itself. Here L uses [yu‘aqqal], while the MS uses [yata‘aqqal], the latter matching [ta‘aqqul] in the 5th form. °° MS gl: [I-e.], in defining ‘a father’. 2? The MS omits “first.” 8 L, the MS and MS Garrett 989Ha read, ‘subject-substrate for the fatherhood’ [ma‘rid al-ubiiwah]. The editors of T clarified this point by corollating it with the preceding usage, “subject-substrate for the adjunctive relationship of fatherhood” [ma‘rad idafat al-ubtiwah]. EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS 59 [The cause] is repeated here so that the explanation would be made specifically” MS 16a for [the adjunctive relationship of father- hood], for indeed, a father is adjunctively related to a son only from this standpoint.” So, if [the specifying cause] should not be repeated [in the definition] then the definition would not be true, because then the delimiting definition might be validly applicable [also] to the son, as then the son would be [defined] the same [as the father];*! and so the delimit- ing definition® would not be steady and unvarying, and thus it would not be true. But if [the specifying cause] should be repeated, then the delim- iting definition would not be validly applicable [also] to the son. And even though the son should be ‘a living being from whose seed there is generated another living being of his own kind’, still he would not be a ‘son’ from this particular standpoint; but rather, he would have being only from the standpoint that there would be generated from his seed another individual of his own kind. Therefore, the delimit- ing definition would be true because of the repetition of one of its parts, while it would not be true without [that repetition]. Regarding repetition that is on account of some need, that is the kind of repetition which, if it should not in fact take place, then the definition would be true but it would not be complete. Many of the logicians set forth the definition of a composite in terms of an essence and its essential accident from this viewpoint. [It would be] as when they might say, “A flattened nose is a nose that has been hollowed out”, where that kind of ‘hollowing out’ is done only on the nose. Thus, ‘nose’ and ‘hollowed out’ are a repetition,® and this repeti- tion is permissible only because there is a need for it. Indeed, [even] if there should be no repetition in the explanatory definition, it would be true,—for it would be admissible to say in defining a flattened nose, that it is ‘something with a hollowing out that is specific to the nose’, and the definition would be true,—but it would not be 2° L: [li-yakhuss]; MS 15b:19: [li-takhuss]; T: [li-takhsis]. 3° MS gl: Le., from the standpoint that there would be generated from his seed another living being of the same kind. 3! MS gl: Le., there would be generated from his seed another living being of the same kind. 2 L omits here, ‘the delimiting definition’ [al-hadd]. 33 L: [tikraran]; T and the MS: [mukarraran]. 60 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER 2 complete. This is because the question is about the flattened nose, and whoever replies would need this repetition so that the reply would fit the question, so if there should be no repetition then [the reply] would not be complete. 2. An objection has been raised that there is no difference between ‘need’ and ‘inherent necessity’, since what is asked for in both cases, a) if it should be only the subject-substrate [for an accidental quality], then there would be neither ‘need’ nor ‘inherent necessity’ for the repetition, while b) if it should be the subject-substrate together with an acci- dental quality, then the repetition would be ‘inherently necessary’ in ‘the location where it was needed’. Otherwise, the definition would be defective. 2.-a. The answer [to this objection] is that between these two there is indeed a separating difference, because an ‘inherently nec- essary’ repetition is such that, if there should be no repetition, then the ‘definition’ would not remain ‘valid’, while repetition ‘in the loca- tion of need’ is such that, if there should be no repetition, then the definition would not be ‘complete’. The truth is that [for] this par- ticular kind of the composites, this [kind] being a composite of the essence and its essential accident, there is L 28 an ‘inherent neces- sity’ for repetition in giving a definition of it, in view of the fact that an inquirer’s question would be about the [whole] composite. Therefore, the essence [of it] must be mentioned one time in order to give a definition of [that factor], and [mentioned] another time in order to give a definition of its essential accident. But in the same situation [the repetition] might not be inherently necessary, because if the question should be about its essential accident by itself, there would be MS 16b_ no ‘need’ for the repetition. But whoever would reply would have need for the repetition so that his reply would fit the question. Baydawi said: L 28, T 13 2. Classes of definitions An explanatory definition of some thing certainly will be equivalent to [the thing] both in general and in particular, so as to include the totality of [the thing’s] individual parts and distinguish this [totality] EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS 61 from any others. Thus, [an explanatory definition] inevitably would be either a. [from] within [the totality of parts], or b. external to [the totality of parts], or [would be] c. a composite of these two [alternatives]. (a.) In the first case, it would be either 1. [from within] the totality of [the thing’s] parts, T 14 _ this being a ‘complete delimiting definition’, or it would not be [from within the totality of parts], this being an ‘incomplete delimiting definition’. (b.) [Likewise] in the second case [also being external to the total- ity of parts], it would be an ‘incomplete descriptwe definition’. (c.) In the third case, 1. if the ‘differentiating factor’ [i.e., of the ‘explanatory definition’] should be from within [the entity defined], then [the explanatory definition] also would be called an ‘incomplete delimiting definition’; while, 2. if it should be the reverse [ie., if the differentiating factor should not be from within the entity defined], as when [the explana- tory definition] would be a composite of the genus and the prop- erty, then [the explanatory definition] would be called a ‘complete descriptive definition’. Isfahani says: L 28, T 14, MS 16b 2. Classes of definitions An explanatory definition of something must be equivalent to [the thing] in general and in particular, that is, in truth. a. This [statement is true] in the sense that the thing defined must truly conform to everything that the explanatory definition affirms of it, this being both the ‘factor of continuity’ and the ‘factor of prohibition’.** % MS gl: This is a concomitance in the certainty of presence [thubit]; that is, whenever [mata’] the explanatory definition exists then the defined entity exists. The gloss is also in L with a minor change. % L gh: [al-man]: The meaning of ‘prohibition’ is that the explanatory definition is such that no factor from the entity defined may enter it; and this is concomi- tant to our statement, “the entity defined must truly conform .. .” 62 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER 2 b. And [the statement is true also] in the reverse of this sense, that is, the explanatory definition must truly affirm everything that the thing defined truly conforms to, this being both the ‘factor of inclusion’® and the ‘factor of reflexive action’.*” [The reason for this is that] if [the explanatory definition] should not be equivalent to [the thing defined] in actual fact, then [the explanatory definition] would be either 1. clearly different from [the thing defined], or 2. more particular than it from some aspect or other,* 3. more particular than it in an absolute sense, or 4. more general than it in an absolute sense. But all of these conclusions are false. That the first and second [(1.), (2.) conclusions are false] is obvious, because the conception of the defining agency necessarily should bring about the conception of the thing defined; but something clearly different [from it] or something more particular would not do that. The third [(3.) conclusion is false], because something more par- ticular in an absolute sense would not include all the individual parts of the thing defined, and thus would be less frequently [in the mind], and what exists less frequently would be more obscure, and what is more obscure would not be useful in an explanatory definition. The fourth [(4.) conclusion is false], because [the definer being] more general in an absolute sense would not clearly distinguish the quid- dity of the thing defined from others, since [the definer as more gen- eral] would make a commonality between [the quiddity of the defined] and the others, and what makes a commonality between two enti- ties would not clearly distinguish either one of them from the other. Further, the conception of something more general in an absolute sense would not necessarily bring about [in the mind] the concep- tion of something more particular. Indeed, the concepts of a ‘living being’ and of a ‘walking being’ do not necessarily bring about the concept of ‘man’. 3 or 6 MS gl: [al-jam‘]: This is that the explanatory definition will include every indi- vidual part of the defined entity. 7 LL gt: [al-in‘ikas]: This is a concomitance in exclusion; whenever a defined entity would be excluded the explanatory definition would be excluded. %L and T: [akhass min wajh]; MS: [akhass minhu min wajh]; MS Garrett 989Ha: {akhass minhu bi-wajh]. EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS 63 Now, if you have understood that much, we will proceed and say that an explanatory definition L 29 may be divided into four classes: a. a complete delimiting definition, b. an incomplete delimiting definition, c. a complete descriptive definition, and d. an incomplete descriptive definition. The reason why [the division] is comprised within these four classes is that the explanatory definition, being other® than the thing defined but factually equivalent to it, inevitably would be either 1. [from] within the entity defined, or 2. external to it, or 3. a composite of these two. (1.) In the first case, that is, where the explanatory definition is [from] within the thing defined, a) either the explanatory definition will comprise the total- ity of the parts of the thing defined, this being a ‘complete delimit- ing definition’, as ‘rational living being’ is in giving an definition of ‘man’; or, b) the explanatory definition will not comprise the totality of the parts of the thing defined, this being an ‘incomplete delimit- ing definition’, as ‘the body of a growing and rationally speaking being’, or ‘a body that speaks rationally’, or ‘a substance that speaks rationally’ would be in defining ‘man’. (2.) In the second case, the explanatory definition will be exter- nal to the thing defined, this being an ‘incomplete descriptive definition’, as ‘a being that walks erectly MS 17a would be in a definition of ‘man’. (3.) In the third case, that is, where the explanatory definition will be a composite of factors both internal and external to [the thing defined], and a) if the ‘differentiating factor’ [i.e., from within the whole definition] should be internal to the thing defined, that is, if [the ‘differentiating factor’] should be a proximate ‘individual difference’, then [the whole definition] also would be called an ‘incomplete de- limiting definition’, as ‘a being that walks and talks rationally’ is in % MS gl: Le., as a matter of common understanding. 64 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER 2 a definition of ‘man’. However, if the case should be the reverse, that is, b) if the “differentiating factor’ should be extemal [to the thing defined], [and] 1) if the other, internal factor should be the proximate genus, as ‘a living being that laughs’ is in a definition of ‘man’, then this [whole definition] would be a ‘complete descriptive definition’, but 2) if the other, internal factor should not be the proxi- mate genus, then this [whole definition] would be an ‘incomplete descriptive definition’ also, as ‘a growing body that laughs,’ or ‘a laughing body’, or ‘a laughing substance’ is in a definition of ‘man’. The apparent sense of our author’s statement would require that an external ‘differentiating factor’,—together with whatever genus, proximate or remote,—should be called a ‘complete descriptive definition’, in which case it would be admissible for a ‘complete descriptive definition’ to be more than one [variety]. However, accord- ing to what we have stated,*’ a ‘complete descriptive definition’ may be only one [variety], just as a ‘complete delimiting definition’ may be only one [variety], while ‘incomplete delimiting definitions’ and ‘incomplete descriptive definitions’ can be in several varieties. Baydawi said: L 29, T 14 Fakhr al-Din Razi’s objections To this [doctrine of the definition] an objection has been raised [by the Imam Razi as follows]:” a. The totality of the parts [of a thing] would constitute the thing itself. And one part would provide an explanatory definition of the totality only if it would give an explanatory definition of some one of its parts. That [defined] part then would be either * MS gl: As a composite of a remote genus [i-e., a ‘being that walks’] and a proximate individual difference [i.e., ‘speaks rationally’]. | Reading with T: [qarrarna]. MS Garrett 989Ha reads: [qarrarnahu]. L and the MS read: [qurrira], with a MS gl: “[Le.], in the commentary.” ® Baydawi’s clearer and more succinct treatment has reversed the sequence of the two points in Razi’s objection. Cf. Razi’s Muhassal pp. 16-18, of the repagi- nated reprint of the Cairo 1323 a.u. edition. EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS 65 1. itself [ie., the defining part], and thus implicitly it would constitute the definition of a thing by itself, or [the defined part] would be 2. one external to [the defining part]. However, an external [defining factor] would provide an explana- tory definition [of the object] only if [the external factor’s] specific applicability to [the object] should be understood, and that would depend upon an ‘understanding’ of [the object being defined] and upon an understanding of whatever else there is among [all other] matters without end, which would be an impossibility. b. If the desired goal [in making a definition] should be some- thing of which there would be an awareness [already], then its attain- ment [i.e., as something not known] would not [again] be possible; while if it should not be something of which there would be some awareness already, L 30 then it would be impossible to [begin a] search for it. Isfahani says: L 30, T 14, MS l7a Fakhr al-Din Razi’s objections The Imam [Fakhr al-Din] al-Razi* raised objection [on the doc- trine of | the definition** on two aspects. a. [The first aspect on which Imam Razi raised his objection] is that definition of a [particular] thing is impossible. This is because definition of [the thing] by means of itself would be impossible; in that case then,® definition would be either 1. by means of a factor internal [i.e., to the thing being de- fined], or 2. by means of a factor external [to it], or 3. [by means of] a composite of the two [factors]. (1.) In the first case above [i-e., definition by means of an inter- nal factor], the factor internal [to the thing to be defined] would be either 8 L, MS and MS Garrett 989Ha: ‘al-Imam’; T: ‘al-Imam al-Razi’. “ MS gl: Le., on the admissibility [jawaz] of an explanatory definition. * This clause in full is included in L, T, MS Garrett 989Ha and MS Garrett Yahuda 4486. In the MS, however, after having been written in the following portion was crossed out. 66 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER 2 a) all of its [necessary] parts, or b) [only] one of them,*’ each of these alternatives being invalid. (a) As for [the first alternative here with the definition hav- ing] all the parts, [the definition would be impossible,] because hav- ing the totality of the parts would constitute the thing itself, and a definition of a thing by the totality of its parts would be a definition of the thing by means of itself, which is impossible. (b) As for [the second alternative here with the definition having only] one of the parts, [the definition would be impossible] because that part would give an explanatory definition of the total- ity only if it gave an explanatory definition of one of its parts. This is because, if it did not give an explanatory definition of one of the parts, then [the case would be] either that none of the parts had any need of definition, or that [the part to be defined] already had been given an explanatory definition by some other than the part stipulated as providing the explanatory definition for the [original] entity. Now, if all parts of the entity [to be defined] should be known already, then its quiddity would be known [already]; and so that [stipulated] part [really] would not provide the explanatory definition for it, but this would be contrary to the assumption [i.e., that a definition is needed]. Thus, it is established that a part would provide an explanatory definition of a thing only if it would give an explanatory definition of one of its parts. Thus, that part providing the explanatory definition would be either the part [itself] that is being given the explanatory definition, and this would imply definition of a thing by itself;** or, [it would be] something external to the thing [being defined], which would imply definition by external means, but definition by exter- nal means is impossible. (2.) [In the second case above, (as well as in the paragraph just ended), definition by means of an external factor is impossible]: because T 15 an external [factor] would provide an explanatory definition of a thing only if [the external factor’s] specific applica- bility [to the thing] should be explained. Indeed, any characteristic MS 17b that would not be specifically applicable to the thing [being © MS gl: As a ‘living being that speaks rationally’. *7 MS gl: As a ‘body that speaks rationally’ or a ‘substance that speaks rationally’. * T inserts, ‘this being impossible’. EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS 67 defined]*® would not be valid in its definition. Thus, if [the external factor’s] specific applicability to [the thing being defined] should not be explained, then possibly its specific applicability to [the thing] would be nonexistent, and thus would not provide an understand- ing of [the thing]. Now, having a specific applicability means that the characteristic would be affirmed of that [particular] thing and be excluded from anything else. Thus, an understanding [of an external descriptive fac- tor’s] specific applicability [to an entity being defined] depends upon an understanding of the thing [being defined] plus an understand- ing of whatever else there is of all other matters without limit. This is so, since it is impossible to understand the specific applicability [of an entity’s defining factor], while being ignorant of both the entity itself and of whatever else there is. Thus, an understanding of [the defining factor’s specific applicability] is dependent upon both an understanding of the thing [being defined], plus an understanding of whatever else there is of all other matters without limit, and that is an impossibility. Indeed, [formulating an explanatory definition of a particular thing] from ‘an understanding of that thing’ implicitly would constitute a circular argument. This is so because, in such a case: a) an understanding of the thing [to be defined] depends upon an explanatory definition of [the thing] made by a defining factor external to it. And b) a definition of [the thing] by way of a defining factor external to it depends upon an understanding of the [external defining factor’s] specific applicability to the thing. And c) an understanding of the [external defining factor’s] specific applicability to the entity [being defined] depends upon ‘an understand- ing of the thing’ [itself]. Thus, it is implicitly a circular argument. Moreover, [formulating an explanatory definition of a particular thing] from an understanding of ‘whatever else there is [other than that thing] among all matters without hmit’, implies that the mind would comprehend what is without limit, since whatever else is [other than that thing] would be without limit. (3.) [In the third case above, i.e., an explanatory definition by] a composite of factors both internal and external would be [actually * MS gl: As ‘a walking being’. 68 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER 2 a definition] by external means. This is so because a [definition] composed of both internal and external factors would represent nei- ther the thing itself, nor its internal nature. If it should be other- wise, then the external factor would be within, because the external part L 31 would be [only] a part of what is composed from it and from the internal [part], and the part of a part would consti- tute a part [of the whole]. Let no one say that [a definition] composed of both internal and external factors would not be [a definition] by external means unless implicitly the internal factor would be [really] external. This is because we hold that the entry of a composite [definition] within the inte- rior of something would necessarily cause the entry of every part of the composite within [the entity], but the exit of the composite from [within] the entity would not necessarily cause every part of [the composite definition] to exit from it. Thus, invalidation of a definition by means of an external factor implies invalidation of a definition by means of a composite of inter- nal and external factors. b. The second [aspect on which Razi raised objection] is that if the sought for conception of an entity should be something of which there was some awareness” [already], then it would be impossible to obtain it [again as if new], because of the impossibility of [newly] obtaining something already obtained. But if it should not be some- thing of which there was some awareness already, then a search for it would be impossible, because of the impossibility for anyone to begin a search for something of which no one was aware. Baydawi said: L3l, T15 Baydawi’s reply to Razi’s objections a.—al. The answer to [Razi’s] first objection is that a part natu- rally precedes the whole, and for [partial] entities, every one of which is antecedent to [a complete] entity, it is impossible to be the [com- plete] thing itself, or to be its defining factor. Moreover, an explanatory definition of an entity is not under oblig- ation to provide a definition of any of [the entity’s] parts, basically ° MS gt: Ie., known [ma‘lum]. EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS 69 because it is admissible that none of them would have need for it. The definition of a described entity depends upon the description that provides the explanatory description being such that from a conception of [this description] a conception of the described object can be inferred that exactly fits it. However, that [inference] depends upon the [former conception’s] specific applicability to and at the same time its inclusiveness of [the latter conception], not [merely] upon there being knowledge of these two factors.*’ This argument is weak, however, since neither one [i.e., the ‘specific applicability’ or the ‘inclusiveness’, taken individually] as a prereq- uisite would require that they both be a prerequisite together as a complete total, in order to point out the distinguishing features [1.e., of the object defined by description]. If all the parts [of something], even [the part having] formative [power] [i-e., the defining factor], should be known, then the quid- dity [of the thing] would be known, while, if the case should be otherwise, it would be useless to provide a delimiting definition. If the conception of the [definition from an external aspect] nec- essarily should bring about the conception of [the object being described], and further, if [this definition from an external aspect] should be an [already] formed conception, then the [conception that would be brought about also] would be an [already] formed con- ception, and there would be no need for an explanatory definition [of it]. But if [the definition from an external aspect] should not be an [already] formed conception, then an explanatory definition by its means would be impossible. a.—a2. However, [in summary, a proper] answer is that the var- ious parts [of something to be defined] would be individually known, and [the formulation of] a ‘delimiting definition’ would consist in bringing them together as a total group so that in the mind there would occur a form corresponding to the entity that has been defined by delimitation. The case would be the same with regard to a ‘descriptive defimtion’ if [the defining factor] should be a composite, but if [its defining factor] should be a single term, then it would provide no useful information. | L’s unclear orthography of [bi-him4] is taken by T to be [bi-ha], but it is clearer in MS Garrett 283B and MS Garrett 989Hb. 70 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER 2 b.-a. To [Razi’s] second objection the answer is that in search- ing for an entity of which there is an awareness of some of its aspects there would be no impossibility. Isfahani says: L 31, T 15, MS 17b Baydawi’s reply to Razi’s objections a.-al. The answer to [Razi’s] first objection is that an explana- tory definition [of something] would be valid when using both inter- nal and external factors [of the thing]. 1. Regarding definition by way of internal factors, when it would be a matter of considering all of the parts, we do not grant that the totality of the parts of a thing would be [the same as] the thing itself, such that it would imply that a definition by means of all of the parts would be a definition L 32 by way of the thing itself. Indeed, a part naturally would be antecedent to the whole; and no single one of the [partial] things that would be antecedent to the [whole] thing, of which it is a part, can itself constitute that [whole] thing, such that it would imply that definition [of the whole] by means of all of its parts would constitute a definition by means of the thing itself. MS 18a And definition by means of an internal factor, if it should be a matter of considering only one of the parts, would be valid. [Razi’s] statement is: “A part will provide an explanatory definition of the entity only when it has defined one of [the entity’s] parts.” Our position is that we do not grant this. Indeed, an explanatory definition of something is not required to define one of its parts at all, basically because it is admissible that none of the parts would have need for a part to define them. [Razi’s] statement is: “If all of the parts [of the thing] should be known, then the quiddity would be known, and thus a part would not provide the explanatory definition for it.’ Our position is that we do not grant that if the totality of the parts should be known then the quiddity would be known. The ‘whole’ is something other than the ‘totality’ of its parts. For it would be admissible that the totality of the parts would be known but that the whole would not be known. Thus, the whole would need to be defined, and the part would provide the definition of it. EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS 71 2. Regarding definition by means of an external factor, we do not grant that it would be invalid. [Razi’s] statement is: “An external factor provides an explanatory definition of [an entity] only if [that factor] clearly defines its specific applicability to [the entity].” Our position is that we do not grant that. [Razi’s] statement is: “Since any description that would not speci- fically apply to the entity would not be useful in defining it.” Our position is that we grant this. [Razi’s] statement is: “If [the external factor’s] specific applica- bility to [the entity] should not be known, then possibly its specific applicability to [the entity] is nonexistent and thus would not pro- vide any understanding of it.” Our position is that we do not grant that if [the external factor’s] specific applicability to [the entity] should not be known then pos- sibly its specific applicability to [the entity would be nonexistent. Indeed, it is admissible that [the factor] would be specifically applic- able to [the entity], while at the same time its specific applicability would not be known; so then there would be no possibility for it to lack specific applicability to [the entity], and in that case it would provide T 16 a useful understanding of the entity.’ Truly, the useful understanding provided by an external characteristic about the described object depends upon the characteristic’s explanatory definition being of such accuracy that from a conception of [that definition] there would be inferred a conception of the described object exactly as it is. But then this nevertheless depends upon the external char- acteristic being specifically applicable to the described object and inclusive of it at the same time. For if [the characteristic] should not specifically apply to [the described object], then it would have a commonality both with the described object and with everything else. Thus, [the characteristic] would be more general than [the described object], and from the conception of something general no inference can be made to the conception of something particular. Moreover, ° The MS f. 18a:11 repeats [ma‘rifat-hu] to read, “...and in that case [the external characteristic’s] understanding would provide a useful understanding of [the entity]”. A marginal gloss in the MS here reads: “The hypothesis is established, namely, the validity and possibility of definition by way of an external defining factor, as asserted by the objector to its impossibility.” 72 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER 2 if [the characteristic] should not be [also] inclusive, then it would be more particular [than the described object], and something more particular would be more obscure, and thus would not be useful in forming a definition. But the useful understanding provided by an external character- istic about the described object does not depend upon knowing its specific applicability and its inclusiveness. Indeed, what is useful in forming a conception is the understanding of the specifically applic- able and inclusive characteristic [itself], not an understanding of the specific applicability of the external characteristic to the described object. So it is admissible L 33 that between the specifically applic- able and inclusive characteristic and the described object there would be an obvious concomitance such that the mind would make the transition from a conception of [the characteristic] to the concep- tion of the described object, MS 18b even though the [charac- teristic’s] specific applicability and inclusiveness should be unknown [previously]. Now, even if it should be granted that a definition by external means would depend on an understanding of the specific applica- bility of the external characteristic to the described object, never- theless we do not grant that this implies a circular argument and an understanding of what is without limit. [Razi’s] statement is: “An understanding of the specific applica- bility [of an external characteristic to a described object] depends on an understanding of the described object, as well as an under- standing of whatever else there is of all [relevant] matters without limit.” Our [Isfahani’s] position is that knowing the specific applic- ability [of an external characteristic to the described object] depends upon knowing the described object, from one or another aspect, and depends upon knowing everything else there is of [relevant] things without limit, from a total aspect. Therefore, there is no implication of a circular argument or of a [required] comprehension [of every- thing else without limit]. [Baydawi] has stated that this reply [to Razi] is a weak argument. The fact that every individual part naturally would precede [in an explanatory definition of an entity] does not imply that they all pre- cede as comprising a whole and a totality in order to point out the difference there is between the totality of parts and the thing itself. Indeed, it is admissible that every one of the parts naturally would precede, while the whole, being a whole and a totality, would not EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS 73 precede. In that case, the totality of parts would constitute the thing itself, so it would not be valid to construct a definition by means of the totality of parts, because of the impossibility of defining a thing by means of itself. Regarding [Baydawi’s] statement that an explanatory definition of an entity is not required to provide such a definition of any one of its parts because it is admissible that none of them would have any need for it, an objection could be raised that if all the parts, includ- ing even the ‘part having formative power’® [i.e., the ‘defining fac- tor’], should be known, then the quiddity [of the thing] would be known [already]. This is because if the quiddity should not be known already, when there is knowledge of all the parts and even of the formative part, then no delimiting definition would be useful in pro- viding an understanding of the defined entity. But it would be use- ful from your point of view [i.e., as supporters of the Baydawi-Isfahani argument]; and, if the quiddity [of an entity] should be known [already] when there is a knowledge of all its parts, then it would have no need for a [specific] part to define [the entity], and so the [specific] part would not provide an explanatory definition for it. a.-a2. In answer [to Razi] about a definition by external means [Baydawi] said: The definition of a described entity depends upon the description that provides the explanatory definition being such that from a conception of [this description] a conception of the described object can be inferred that exactly fits it. However, that [inference] depends upon the [for- mer conception’s] specific applicability to and at the same time its inclusiveness of [the latter conception], not [merely] upon there being knowledge of these two factors. Regarding this [statement] an observation could be made [by using his own words], “If the conception of the [definition] by external means necessarily should bring about the conception of [the described object], and if [this definition by external means] should be an [already] formed conception, then the [conception brought about also] would be an [already] formed conception, and there would be no need for a definition [of it]. But if [this definition by external means] should not be an [already] formed conception, then a definition by its means would be impossible.” 3 [al-juz’ al-suwary]. 74 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER 2 a.—a3. Then [Baydawi] said: “However, a [proper] answer is that formulating a definition L 34 _ by means of ‘all the parts’ is [only] a manner of expression. Indeed, the various parts [of an entity to be defined] would be individually known, and [the formulation of] a ‘delimiting definition’ would provide for bringing all the parts gath- ered together™ in such a way that there would occur in the mind a [recognized and] known image” corresponding MS 19a to the object defined by delimitation.” A verification of this is that ‘all the parts’ would constitute the quiddity itself. But ‘all the parts’ may be regarded in the mind in two ways: l. as a totality, in that ‘all the parts’ would occur as having a single existence*® [in the mind], and in this regard [as a totality] it would constitute the ‘object defined by delimitation’; and 2. as separate pieces, in that each part would occur [in the mind] as having an existence by itself,’ and in this regard [as sep- arate pieces] ‘all the parts’ would constitute ‘a delimiting definition’. Therefore,—from a definition of ‘all the parts’ taken as a totality, [and] from [a definition of] ‘all the parts’ taken as separates—no inference can be made that the entity would be defined by means of itself. A clarification of that [statement] is that to define the ‘quiddity’ [of an entity] by means of ‘all the parts’ has the meaning that the [individual] conceptions of ‘all the parts [taken as separates]’ would be of use in formulating a [single over all] conception of ‘all the parts [taken as a totality]’. Moreover, all the [individual] concep- tions of the parts [taken separately] would constitute something other than a [single] conception of all the parts [taken as a totality]. [This is] because “all the [separate] conceptions of the parts” is a man- ner of expressing “all the [separate] existences of the parts” within the mind, since the ‘conception’ of a thing is an expression for its ‘existence’ within the mind. Thus, the [separate] ‘conceptions’ of all the parts would be their [separate] ‘existences’ within the mind. And [so] the existences [separately] of the parts within the mind would * L and T: [mujtama‘ah]; the MS: [majmi‘ah]. 5° L and T read, ‘intelligible image’ [strah ma‘lumah], while the MS and MS Garrett 989Ha omit the adjective ‘intelligible’. 6 MS gl: Le., a single concept [would occur] in the mind. 7 MS gl: Le., a single concept. EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS 75 constitute something other than the existence [as a totality] of all the parts within the mind. [By this latter] I [Isfahani] mean the existence of the quiddity, whether in its essence,” or as a manner of expression.”® Indeed, the existences of the parts [separately] would consist of multiple existences [all] linked to the parts in such a way that for every [separate] part there would be an existence in the mind that is different from the existence of any other, whether in its essence or as a manner of expression. But the existence of all the parts [as a totality] would be a single existence linked to the totality. And there is no doubt that the mutually different existences [all] linked to the parts would constitute something other than the single exist- ence linked to their totality. Thus, the [multiple] concepts of ‘all the parts [separately]’ constitute something other than the [single] con- cept of ‘all the parts [as a totality]’. Therefore, it cannot be inferred that a definition by means of ‘all the parts’ would constitute a definition of an entity by means of ‘itself’. An objection could be raised that then inevitably— 1. either [the case would be that] every one of the parts would have its own existence separately within the mind, which would imply that T 17 the ‘genus’ and the ‘individual difference’ each would have an existence in the mind different from the other’s existence in the mind; so it would be impossible to predicate one [of them] of the other as being in agreement, and it would be impossible also to predicate them both of the sum resulting from the two of them” as being in agreement; and since the condition governing the definer L 35 is that it should be equal in truth to the defined entity, if [the definer] should not be predicated as being in agreement [with the defined entity] then being equal [with the defined entity] would be an impossibility, and thus, an explanatory definition by means of [the definer] would be impossible; 2. or, [the case would be that] the totality [of the parts] would be present within a single existence in the mind,®! MS 19b _ so this 58 MS gi: That is, if the parts should be really existing [haqiqiyah] parts, which would not be the case unless the quiddity should be really existing. *° MS gl: That is, if the parts should be ‘parts’ as a ‘manner of expression’ [i‘tibartyah], which would not be the case unless the quiddity should be such ‘as a manner of expression’. 6° MS gl: Such as man. *! L and T omit the line: “and this would imply that all the parts [together as 76 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER 2 case would imply that the explanatory definition of the entity would be by means of [the entity] itself: l.—a. The reply [to the first case of this objection] would be that the genus and the difference each have an existence differing the one from the other in the mind, and it would be impossible to predicate one of them of the other as being in agreement in this regard; and it would be impossible for ‘all the parts’ [as a totality] to be equal to the [one] quiddity in truth in this regard. But the condition governing the definer, that it should be equal in truth to the defined entity, is with regard to [the definition’s] quiddity,” but not with regard to its quiddity as being under the restriction of [external] existence. Now, although the genus and the difference each has an existence different from that of the other, and with regard to [each of them] being limited by this restriction [of external existence], neither one [of the two] may be predicated the one of the other. But with regard to the fact that each of them may sometimes be found to exist [exter- nally] with the other in a single existence,® one of the two may be predicated truthfully of the other. Further, on the assumption that the totality [of parts] would be [mentally] present in a single existence, this [fact] would not imply that an explanatory definition [formulated] by means of the parts present in the mind in a single existence would constitute the definition of something by means of itself. That is so, because a single exist- ence, with regard to its linkage in the mind with the quiddity of the genus would be a conception of the quiddity of the genus; and with regard to its linkage [in the mind] with the quiddity of the individ- ual difference [the single existence] would be a conception of the quiddity of the individual difference; and with regard to its linkage with the totality obtained from the [combination of] genus and difference it would be a conception of the quiddity [of the whole entity]. a totality] would be present [mawjiidan] in the mind in one existence.” The MS and MS Garrett 989Ha include the line. ® 'T inserts as clarification, [i.e.], “in view of its being [the quiddity]” [min hayth hiya hiya]. ®? Gloss in MS and L: [Regarding Isfahani’s] statement, “in a single existence”— that is, it would be external {existence] if the quiddity should be related to it in reality or in theory, or [it would be existence] in the mind if the quiddity [merely] should be ‘related to it’. [From al-Sharif al-Jurjani’s glosses on Isfahani’s commentary.] EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS 77 Thus, the ‘conceptions’ would be differentiated, even though in the mind the existence would be single. For the whole concept of the genus and the difference [as separates] would be different from the concept of the totality obtained from the [combination of] genus and difference, but the sum of the two concepts would be useful in formulating a [single] concept [of the total formation process] of the combination. Therefore, the definition of something by means of itself would not be implied. Likewise, with regard to a descriptive definition, if [the object being defined] should be a composite, then its single elements would be [separately] conceived, but a conception of its single elements would not imply that the thing defined by description would be con- ceived. Rather, [that] would depend upon them being brought together as a group in such a way that a form corresponding to the described thing would take shape in the mind. The case would be the same for an incomplete delimiting definition. But a single term [as the defining factor] would not provide any- thing [useful], because if [the defining factor] should be a concep- tion [already formed] then the object to be defined [also] would be a conception [already formed], and thus would have no need to be defined; but if [the defining factor] should not be a conception [already formed], then it would be impossible to formulate an explana- tory definition by means of it. 2.~a. To the second [case of the objection the reply would be] that to direct a search toward something that is perceived in one or another of its aspects would not be impossible. The thing for which the concept is sought L 36 would be known in one aspect and unknown in another aspect, and the direction of a search for some- thing having [these] two aspects would not be towards the known aspect nor the unknown aspect, so there would be no implication that the search would be to obtain what had been obtained already, nor that it would be a search for the [absolutely] unknown. * MS gl: Le., in that respect. [From al-Jurjani’s glosses on Isfahani’s commentary.] 78 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER 2 Baydawi said: L 36, T 17 3. Realities definable and definitive® Real entities are either simple or composite, and each of these either will have something else composed from it, or it will not. a. A simple entity from which nothing else will be composed would not be defined by delimitation, nor would a delimiting definition be formulated by means of it, as with ‘the Necessary [and Obligating] Existent One’. b. [A simple entity] from which something else will be composed would not be defined by delimitation, but a delimiting definition would be formulated by means of it, as is the case with ‘substance’. c. A composite from which nothing else will be composed would be defined by delimitation, but a delimiting definition may not be formulated by means of it, as is the case with ‘man’. d. [A composite] from which something else will be composed would be defined by delimitation, and a delimiting definition may be formulated by means of it, as is the case with ‘living being’. Thus, a delimiting definition would belong to a composite entity, and so likewise would a complete descriptive definition, while an incomplete descriptive definition would belong inclusively with both {simple and composite] entities. Isfahani says: L 36, T 17, MS 20a 3. Realities definable and definite Real entities® are either ‘simple’, that is, not having any subdivision by which they would be made up of two or more parts, or [they are] ‘composite’, that is, having a subdivision by which they would be made up of two and more parts. And for each of these two, the ® [ma yu‘arraf wa-yu‘arraf bihi]. 6° L and the MS [both products of Istanbul] read [al-haqayiq], while T [a prod- uct of Cairo] reads [al-haqa’iq]. Other manuscript copies used —~MS Garrett 989Ha [Isfahani’s commentary] & 989Hb [Baydawi’s text], MS Garrett 283B [Baydawi], and MS Garrett-Yahuda 4486 [Isfahani]——omit the distinguishing marks, so they can read either way. This is the practice throughout the manuscripts for this and similar word patterns. EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS 79 simple and the composite, either there will be something else com- posed from it, or there will not, so these [alternatives] make four classifications [as follows]. a. A simple entity from which nothing else will be composed would not be defined by delimitation, whether by a complete or an incom- plete delimiting definition, because neither the complete nor the incomplete delimiting definition would be possible, except in a case having a [subdivided] part, and a simple entity has no [subdivided] part. Moreover, nothing else would be defined by delimitation by the means of [that simple entity] as a necessary consequence of the fact that [that simple entity] would not be a part of anything else, as is the case with ‘the Necessary [and Obligating] Existent One’. Indeed, there is no [subdivided] part with Him, nor does He constitute a [subdivided] part of anything else; therefore, He would not be defined by delimitation, nor would a delimiting definition be formulated by means of Him. b. A simple entity from which ‘something else’ may be composed would not be defined by delimitation because it has no [subdivided] part [in itself]. But the ‘something else’ [than that simple entity] may be defined by delimitation by means of [that simple entity], because [in such a case, that simple entity] would constitute a part of [the other entity], as is the case with ‘substance’. Indeed, [‘sub- stance’] is a simple entity and it has no [subdivided] part [in itself], but something else may be composed of it because it is the genus for the [individual] substances.°’ Thus, it would not be defined by delimitation, but something else may be given a delimiting definition by means of it. c. A composite entity from which nothing else would be com- posed may be defined by delimitation because it has a [subdivided] part, and nothing else would be defined by delimitation by means of [this composite], as a necessary consequence of the fact that [this composite] would not constitute a [subdivided] part of anything else. This is the case with ‘man’, for [‘man’] is a composite of [the two factors] ‘a living being’ and ‘a rationally speaking being’. But nothing else would be composed from [‘man’], as a necessary consequence 57 MS gl: Le., as are intellect, soul, prime matter, form, body as a growing [liv- ing substance] [al-jism al-nami], and body as an absolute [i.e., an abstraction]. 80 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER 2 of the fact that ‘man’ constitutes a primary species.“ Thus, [‘man’] may be defined by delimitation, but nothing else may be defined by delimitation by means of [‘man’, as a term in the definition]. d. A [lst] composite entity from which something else may be composed would be defined by delimitation because it has a [sub- divided] part, and another [a 2nd composite] entity would be defined by delimitation by means of [the Ist composite] as a necessary con- sequence of the fact that [the lst composite] would be a part of [the 2nd composite]. {This would be the case] as with ‘a living being,’ for [‘a living being’] would be a composite of ‘a body’, and of ‘a growing being’, and of ‘a sensate being’, and entities other than [‘a living being’] would be composed of it, L 37 as is ‘man’. Thus, ‘a living being’ would be defined by delimitation, and a definition by delimitation may be formulated by means of it. Therefore [in summary], a delimiting definition belongs with a composite entity equally whether it is a complete or an incomplete delimiting definition. The case is likewise with a complete descrip- tive definition, as a necessary consequence of the fact that it would be a composite of a genus® and a specific property. However, an incomplete descriptive definition belongs inclusively with both sim- ple and composite entities. Everything that has an explanatory concomitant property and that [in itself] is not intuitively conceived’’ would be defined by descrip- tion; and everything that is an explanatory concomitant property of some entity that is not intuitively conceived would be the means used in formulating a descriptive definition of that entity.” 8 [naw‘an safilan]. ® 'T adds the term “proximate”, but other sources used do not. Reading with the MS, ‘intuitively conceived’ [badihi al-tasawwur]. The other sources used do not have the added term [al-tasawwur] in this first statement, but in the second parallel statement all sources do include it. ” A.-M. Goichon traces the semantic evolution of the word [hadd] as used in metaphysics and logic. Used of a concept, this word means ‘definition’, while in speaking of a proposition or of the syllogism, it means ‘term’. She states, “The whole Islamic theory of definition, and that of terms of rea- soning, follows Aristotle, sometimes reproducing what he says almost word for word.” Following this discussion, a bibliography lists a number of the Arabic books on logic. En-I-2, s.v. [hadd], by B. Carra de Vaux, J. Schacht, and A.-M. Goichon. EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS 81 An English translation of Ibn Sina’s Jsharat, Part 1, Logic, was published by Shams Inati (Toronto: PIMS, 1984). Preceding the translated text there is an ‘Analysis of the Text’ in which Inati has drawn upon Ibn Sina’s other writings on logic in order to complement what is given in the Jsharat. A partial summary of this analysis will sketch here Ibn Sina’s presentation: 1. Knowledge may be [intellectual] conception or [judgmental] assent. 2. Knowledge is in two forms: practical, dealing with peo- ple and society, and theoretical, dealing with the universe and its parts. 3. In order to increase human happiness via practical and theoretical knowledge, one should advance a) intellectual conception by way of ‘definitions’ in ‘explanatory statements’ and b) judgmental assent by way of ‘inferential proof’ [in argumentation]. Baydawi said: £37; 118 CHAPTER 3: ARGUMENTATION 1. Kinds of argumentation An ‘inferential proof demonstration’ consists of a process the knowl- edge of which [taken as a premise] by necessity produces knowledge of the ‘conclusion’s existence’. a. Analogical deduction Thus, an inferential proof demonstration may be made by means of a universal regarding a particular, or by means of either of two [universal] equivalents regarding the other, [the method in these two examples] being called ‘analogical deduction’. b. Investigative induction Or, [proof demonstration may be made] by the reverse of this [i.e., demonstration by means of a particular regarding a universal], this being called ‘complete [investigative] induction’ if it includes all of [the universal’s] particular examples, and ‘incomplete [investiga- tive] induction’ if it does not. c. Illustrative analogical deduction Or, [proof demonstration may be made] by means of one par- ticular regarding another particular, this being called ‘illustrative ana- logical deduction’, or [simply] ‘analogical deduction’, in the terminology of the jurisprudents.’ [In proof demonstration the first particular [term is called] the ‘major’ [or, ‘root’] term, and the second particular [term is called] the ‘minor’ for, ‘branch’] term. The term having commonality [between these two] is called the ‘middle’ [or, ‘connector’] term.’ Its causative influence is recognized sometimes by a ‘coordinate rota- ‘ |.—-[al-qiyas]; 2.—[al-istiqra”]; 3.—[al-tamthil] /[al-qiyas]. ? Major term = [asl] ‘root’; minor = [far ‘branch’; middle = [jami‘] ‘connec- tor’. These terms possibly developed among the early Mutakallimun or the jurispru- dents, and may have persisted in use in restricted topical areas. Later, the standard terms became fal-akbar] [al-asghar] and [al-awsat]. ARGUMENTATION 83 tion’, and sometimes by a thorough ‘examination and classification’, or by some other means.* We have investigated the subject [of proof demonstration] thor- oughly in [our book] Minha al-Wusul ila ‘Ilm al-Usul. Isfahani says: L 37, T 18, MS 20a CHAPTER 3: ARGUMENTATION When Baydawi had finished Chapter 2 on ‘explanatory statements’, he began Chapter 3 on ‘argumentation’. In it he set forth three top- ics) MS 20b 1. The kinds of argumentation, 2. Analogical deduction in the syl- logism and its types, 3. The materials of argumentation. 1. Kinds of argumentation ‘Argumentation’, [the Arabic term [al-hujaj]] being the plural of ‘argument’, is the most immediate means to achieving a judgmen- tal assent, [the terms] ‘argument’ and ‘inferential proof demonstra- tion’ being synonymous. Now, an ‘inferential proof demonstration’ is descriptively defined as a process the knowledge of which [taken as a premise] by necessity produces knowledge of the conclusion’s existence. By the ‘knowledge taken as a premise’ and the ‘knowledge [acquired] as a resulting conclusion” [Baydawi] is referring to [the process of] a ‘judgmental assent’ that comprises ‘theoretical opinion’, ‘formal belief? and ‘certain conviction’. By ‘necessity he means [here] something more general than ‘ordi- nary necessity’ or ‘intellectual necessity’,® equally whether [this unusual necessity] is readily apparent, that is, without an intermediary factor, or whether it is not readily apparent and has an intermediary factor. 3 Rotation [al-dawaran]; examination and classification [al-sabr wa-al-taqsim]. * Knowledge as premise [al-‘ilm al-malziim]; knowledge as conclusion [al-‘ilm al- lazim). ° Le., ‘inherent necessity’, or, ‘constraint’, usually indicated by the term [al- dariirah]. ® MS gl: [Ie., as it is used] among the philosophers. 84 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER 3 [Baydawi’s] statement, “the proved conclusion’s existence”, would not require the exclusion [from consideration] of a proof demon- stration leading to the conclusion that something was nonexistent, as the conclusion ‘that something was nonexistent’ would have exis- tence in the mind. [This is] because the ‘conclusion’ is a. that to which the ‘evidence’ of the proof demonstration is linked, and b. it is a composite proposition comprising the relationship between subject L 38 and predicate,’ and ¢. it is a more general [and basic assertion] than either ‘decisive affirmation’ or ‘negation’, and each of these would have existence in the mind. Thus, a ‘proof demonstration’ is a process the judgmental assent to which by necessity brings about a judgmental assent to the proved conclusion’s existence, [in a judgmental assent] more general [and basic] than if the proved conclusion had been [merely] a compos- ite of either negative or positive factors. And as this explanatory definition involved the proper usage of verbal expression, [Baydawi] did not hesitate to put it into words as the ‘proved conclusion’, for in definitions involving verbal usage one need not be afraid to use words that have similarities. Proof demonstration is of three kinds, and the basis for limiting the kinds to three is that proof demonstration is an adjunctive mat- ter calling for two factors: a. the first of the two being a factor the knowledge of which would be [admissible as] a premise, and b. the other a factor the knowledge of which would be [accepted as] a conclusion. The first factor (a) is that by means of which a proof demonstration is made [i.e., it would be the predicate of the major premise]. The second factor (b) is that about which something is demonstrated, [i.e., it would be subject of the minor premise]. The factor (a) by which proof demonstration is made may be either a universal or a particular, and it is likewise with the factor (b) about which a proof demonstration is made. If that by which demonstra- tion is made, (a) [i.e., the predicate of the major premise] and that about which something is demonstrated, (b) [1.e., the subject of the minor premise] should both be universals, then they must both be 7 Subject [al-mahkiim ‘alayhi]; predicate [al-mahkim bihi]. ARGUMENTATION 85 equal as true affirmations, so that the knowledge of one of them would necessarily imply the knowledge of the other. Now, if you have understood this, then we shall proceed with our topic, [i.e., the three kinds of argumentation]. a. Analogical deduction 1. By means of a universal factor one may demonstrate either a particular factor, as for example, one may demonstrate [a neces- sary inference] from the fact that possibility is a certainty for every- thing composite, this being a universal [statement], to the certainty of [possibility] for a body, this being a particular [statement]; thus, one can argue that as every body is a composite, and as every com- posite is a possible reality, therefore, every body would be a possi- ble reality. 2. Or, by means of a universal factor one may demonstrate another universal factor, that is, by means of one of two equivalent factors [one may demonstrate something] true of the other. For example, one may demonstrate [a necessary inference] from the fact that the ability to laugh is a certainty in ‘every being potentially capable of amazement’,—this [latter quality] being a universal fac- tor equivalent to ‘mankind’,—to its certainty in mankind,—which [in turn] is a universal factor equivalent to ‘every being potentially capable of amazement’; thus, one can argue that every human being MS 21a is potentially capable of amazement, and every being poten- tially capable of amazement is a being able to laugh, therefore, every human being is able to laugh. These two divisions {of proof demonstration] are both termed ana- logical deduction.® b. Investigative induction Or, [proof demonstration may function] in the reverse manner, that is, by means of the particular one may demonstrate a univer- sal factor. 1. [Proof demonstration] is called “complete [investigative] induc- tion’ if the demonstration [i.e., of the universal] is made by means of all the particular examples of the universal.? An example of this ® See the article, “Kiyas” in the En-I-2. * Al-Sayyid al-Sharif al-Jurjani, in his a/-Ta‘rifat, the Book of Definitions, differs from Isfahani and states that induction is based only on a majority of examples of the particular, not on all of them. If it should be made a complete enumeration of examples [i.e., perfect induction] it would be called ‘classified analogical deduc- tion’ [qiyasan muqassaman]. 86 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER 3 is when one may say that every body has its own position, since a body would be either simple or compound, and every example from these two [divisions] would have its own position. 2. [Proof demonstration] is called ‘incomplete [investigative] induction’ if the demonstration is not made by means of all the par- ticular examples [of the universal] but only by some of them. An example of this is when one may say that every living being moves its lower jaw when it chews, because men, birds and beasts do so. But an incomplete investigative induction would not provide the cer- tainty of conviction, because it is admissible that the case of the por- tion [of the specimens] not examined might be contrary to the case of the portion L 39 [of those] examined. For example, the croc- odile does not move its lower jaw, so therefore, a judgment by means of the universal would not be valid [in this division]. c. Illustrative analogical deduction Or, proof demonstration may be made by means of one particu- lar regarding another particular because of them both having a com- monality in a given characteristic. [For example,] one may draw an inference from the unlawfulness of [grape] juice/wine [with alcoholic content] to the unlawfulness of [date, raisin or other] juice/wine [presumably with lower alcoholic content],'° because they both have a commonality in being an intoxicant; thus, one may say that date wine is unlawful as is [ordinary] wine, since they both have a com- monality in being an intoxicant. [This kind of proof demonstration] is called ‘illustrative analogical deduction’ in the terminology of the Mutakallimun,'! while it is [simply] ‘analogical deduction’ in the ter- minology of the jurisprudents. 10 See the article, “khamr”, in En-I-2 (4:994—996), where [nabidh] is also treated. In his History of the Arabs, (6th ed., etc. London: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1958) p. 19, 337 and note, Philip Hitti pointed out that the term [khamr] was not confined originally to grape wine nor [nabidh] to date and raisin wine. The connotation of [khamr] seems to be the ‘permeation’ of alcoholic ferment, while the connotation of [nabidh] seems to be the ‘spoilage’ [by alcoholic ferment} of liquid food. The rate and extent of this permeation and spoilage gave the mea- sure of taste and mental effect, and consequently of religious approval or disap- proval of the drink’s use versus the non-religious appetite for it. As a practical distinction, [khamr] was an alcoholic beverage, grape wine, often of foreign import, while [nabidh] would be the still potable ‘home-made’ date or raisin juice. "A gloss in L, the MS and MS Garrett 989Ha adds: ‘in the terminology of the logicians [al-mantiqiyin]’, according to another ms. ARGUMENTATION 87 The first particular, grape wine in our example, is called the ‘major’ [or, ‘root’] term, and the second particular, date wine in our example, is called the ‘minor’ [or, ‘branch’] term, while the char- acteristic having commonality between these two, an ‘intoxicant’ in our example, is called the ‘middle’ [or, ‘connector’] term.'* The mid- dle term provides useful information only in the certainty that it is an effective cause in the judgment, that is, [the middle term] is the defining agency for the judgment]. 1. Sometimes [the middle term’s] effective causality is known by a ‘coordinate rotation’, that is, an arrangement whereby the effect fis dependent] upon the factor having the higher existential function whether in its presence or its absence; that is, the effect is present when this factor is present and absent when it is absent. Similarly, the unlawful status depends upon the intoxicant, whether it is pre- sent or absent. As being present, [unlawfulness] is in the juice when there is an intoxicating intensity present, and as being absent, [the unlawfulness is absent] when the juice is [merely] a liquid where no intoxicating intensity has developed, or where it has become vinegar. 2. At other times [the middle term’s effective causality is known] by a process of thorough ‘examination and classification’, [a process] that collects the characteristics in the major term and eliminates some of them in order that the remainder might be assigned to the causality. T 19 It is as one would say, [for example], that the reason grape wine is unlawful is either the fact that it is an intoxi- cant, or that it is grape juice, or that it is the sum of these, or some- thing else. But anything other than the fact that it is an intoxicant would not be a [sufficient] reason by our method'* that would serve to displace the reason [already] in the characteristic [comprising the middle term]. Therefore, the fact that [grape wine, the major term] is an intoxicant is determined as the causality [that effectively makes it unlawful]. 3. Or, [the middle term’s effective causality may be known] by some means other than ‘coordinate rotation’ or ‘thorough exam- ination’, [some means] that would indicate the [effective] causality “Major” (or, ‘root’) term = [asl]; ‘minor’ (or, ‘branch’} term = [far‘]; ‘middle’ (or, ‘connector’) term = [jami‘]. '3'L gl: inserts ‘aforementioned’ [al-madhkir]. Gloss in MS Garrett 989Ha: I.e., by proof demonstration [ay, bi-al-dalil]. 88 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER 3 of the characteristic [comprising the middle term]. Examples [of such] would be a pronouncement from an authoritative text, a con- sensus [among scholars], a [special] appropriateness [for usage], or the similarity [to an accepted usage]. Our author has dealt exhaustively with the subject of analogical deduction in his book, Minha al-Wusul tla Ilm al-Usul. Baydawi said: L 39, T 19 2. Analogical deduction in the syllogism and tts types Analogical deduction in the syllogism'* consists in a proposition-(a) composed of statements-(al, a2), such that, when these have been accepted as valid, there would necessarily unfold from [the first propo- sition-(a)] because of its essence another proposition-(b), and that-(b) would comprise either the resulting conclusion-(c) or its actual con- trary-(d). This [syllogism] is called either a ‘hypothetical exceptive [syllo- gism]’, or [if] it is not that then it is called a ‘categorical connec- tive [syllogism]’. Isfahani says: L 39, T 19, MS 2lb 2. Analogical deduction in the syllogism and its types One should understand that the particulars classified under a uni- versal are those that are distinguished either by their own identities, or by their attributes,’ or by both of these: the first being called ‘kinds’,'® the second ‘types’,'’’ and the third ‘classes’.'* L 40 Now, since the particulars of a definition—that is, the ‘delimiting definition’, both complete and incomplete, and the ‘descriptive 4 This clause, ‘analogical deduction in the syllogism’ will be abbreviated in the translation to the single word ‘syllogism’. ‘'S Own identities [dhatiyat]; attributes [‘aradiyat]. 16 MS gl: Like ‘man’ and ‘horse’. MS gl: Like ‘Greek’ and ‘Abyssinian’. In relation to the deduction in the syllogism we will opt for the term, ‘types’, for general usage, and ‘moods’, for the technical term used with the figures. [Ed.] ‘8 Kinds [anwa‘]; types [asnaf]; classes [aqsam]. ARGUMENTATION 89 definition’, both complete and incomplete—are distinguished in part by their own identities, as is the distinction between a complete delimiting definition and an incomplete delimiting definition, and in part by their accidental qualities, as is the distinction between a com- plete descriptive definition and an incomplete one, [Baydawi] called [these particulars of a definition] ‘classes’. And since distinguishing among the particulars of argumentation, namely, analogical deduction, investigative induction and illustrative analogical deduction,'* takes place by means of their own identities he called [these particulars of argumentation] ‘kinds’. And since distinguishing among the particular examples of ana- logical deduction,—-namely, the ‘hypothetical exceptive’, and the ‘cat- egorical connective’,”? the latter functioning on the basis of a syllogistic structure having first, second, third and fourth figures,—takes place by means of their accidental qualities, he called [these particular examples of deduction] ‘types’. The term ‘proposition’ applies to what is heard, that is, uttered, and to what is intellectually conceived,”! that is, the meaning that exists in the [reasoning] soul. The meaning here is the intellectual conception, because it is that which is required for the [logical goal as] conclusion, and the proposition that one hears may be called a syllogism by way of metaphor. In [Baydawi’s] expression, “[a proposition] composed of state- ments”, he meant two or more statements in order a) to include both the simple” and the compound syllogism,” and b) to produce from [the syllogism] a single proposition that would imply [an equiv- alent] contrary or a contradictory contrary of it.” '9 [qiyas], [istiqra’], [tamthil] / [qiyas]. 0 fal-istithna’t], [al-iqtirani]. 21 Proposition = [qawl]; uttered = [malfuz]; conceived = [ma‘qil]. 2 MS sgl: [The simple syllogism] is composed of two premises, as when we say that a) the world is changeable and b) everything changeable is a temporal phe- nomenon [hadith], so therefore, the world is a temporal phenomenon. 3 MS gl: [The compound syllogism] is like a syllogism with abridged conclu- sions [maqsur al-nata’yj], as when we say that the world is changeable and every- thing changeable is a temporal phenomenon and every temporal phenomenon has need for a maker, so therefore, the world has need for a Maker. ** MS gl: As when we say that every human is a living being [hayawan], it implies an equivalent contrary [‘aks mustawin]—some living beings are human— or the contradictory contrary [‘aks nagid]—everything that is not a living being is not a human. 90 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER 3 There is no deficiency in [a statement] such as when we say that ‘a certain man walks around at night so therefore he is a thief’, nor is there when we say that ‘if the sun has risen then the daytime is here’. Each of them is a single premise that requires another premise, and with that [other premise] it would then be a syllogism. But we do not grant that our statement that ‘a certain man walks around at night’ will by itself necessitate our [further] statement that ‘therefore he is a thief’; but rather, it together with our additional statement that ‘everyone who walks around at night is a thief? would then necessitate it. Nor do we grant that when we say that ‘if the sun has risen then the daytime is here’, that it is [merely] a single premise judgment. Just as the word, ‘if’, indicates the arrival [of day- time] so it also indicates the position of [an implied] premise, so that there are, in fact, two premise judgments, one of which indi- cates the arrival [of daytime] and the other the position of [the implied] premise. Regarding his expression, “when these are accepted as valid”: by this we?? do not mean in this same statement that they should be truthful, but rather, that they would be such [i.e., accepted as valid] even if their truth should only be assumed in order to form a syl- logism the premises of which would be false.° Also there is his statement, “there would necessarily unfold from it”, that is, from the first composite proposition would come factors providing for the existence of a composite structure fitted into MS 22a the syllogism. Thus, for that reason he did not say, “there would necessarily unfold from them” [i.e., the factors that become the premises], because the desired conclusion would not result from those statements unless they should come in that special [syllogistic] structure. His expression, “because of its essence”, means (a.) that the [syl- logistic] necessity [referred to] would not be due to the mediation of some extraneous premise, that is, [the logic] would not be nec- essary because of one of the two premises of the syllogism. Nor (b.) °° Reading with L, the MS, MS Garrett 989Ha, and MS Garrett-Yahuda 4486: “we do not mean” [la na‘ni]. T alone of sources used reads, “he does not mean” (la ya‘ni]. 26 MS gl: As when we say that every man is a rock and every rock is mineral; thus, even if these two premises should be false, nevertheless they are such that when they are in a valid form the inference from them would be that every man is mineral. ARGUMENTATION 91 would it be [necessary] due to the mediation of a premise that is potentially implied within one of those stated, that is, [a ‘hidden’ premise that would be] implied because of one of the two premises of the syllogism but whose two limiting terms would both be different from the limiting terms of the syllogism. a. Regarding the first [meaning derived from Baydawi’s reference], that is, syllogistic necessity as being due to the mediation of some extraneous premise, it would be as when we say, “A is equal to B and B is equal to C, and from this it is necessarily implied that A is equal to C.” However, [this ‘necessary implication’] is not because of the essence of this ‘structure’. If it should be otherwise, then this kind of ‘structure’ would always be productive, which it is not. This is because if, instead of ‘equivalence’, ‘clear distinction’ should be taken [as the category], or ‘halving’, or ‘doubling’, then it would not produce any ‘necessary implication’. Indeed, if we should say that A is distinct from B, and B is distinct from C, it would not imply that A would be distinct from C, because what may be dis- tinguished from another distinct entity would not itself by implica- tion be a distinct entity.”” Likewise, if we should say that A is the half of B, and B is the half of C, it would not imply that A would be the half of C, because the half of a half would not be a half. And likewise, if we should say that A is the double of B, and B is the double of C, it would not imply that A would be the double of C, because the double of a double would not be a double. Rather, the only ‘necessary implication’ from this syllogistic ‘struc- ture’ would be that A is equal to C by the mediation of our propo- sition that everything equal to B is equal to all that B equals. If this is joined to the first proposition then it produces [the statement that] A is equal to all that B equals, which means that all that B equals A is equal to. [The statement that] B is equal to C, means that C is equalled by B, so this is made the minor premise in our propo- sition that all that B equals A is equal to, and this produces C, [to which] A is equal, meaning that A is equal to C, and this is the conclusive goal of the logic. 27 MS gl: As if we should say that a man is distinct from a rock and a rock is distinct from a rational being, there is no implication from this that a man would be distinct from a rational being, also a horse is distinct from a man and a man is distinct from a neighing animal, but there is no implication from this that a horse would be distinct from a neighing animal, and there are many similar examples. 92 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER 3 Thus it is known that the syllogistic ‘structure’ mentioned gives the ‘necessary implication’ of our proposition, that “A is equal to C”, only through the mediation of our [other] statement that “all that is equal to B is equal to all that B equals.” And this is an extra- neous premise, not being a ‘necessary implication’ of either one of the two premises of the syllogism. So wherever this premise would not be true, the [syllogistic] com- posite structure would not produce [a ‘necessary implication’]. It would be as when we say that “A is half of B and B is half of C”, because it would not be truthful to say that all that is half of B would be the half of whatever B is the half of. T 20 And wherever this premise would be true, it would produce [a ‘necessary implication’] as it does in the syllogism of equivalence and the like. It would be as when we say that “A is the premise of B, and B is the premise of C, and this L 42 implies that A is the premise of C”, since it would be true that all that is a premise of B would be the premise MS 22b of all for which B is the premise. b. Regarding the second [meaning derived from Baydawi’s refer- ence], that is, syllogistic necessity as being due to the mediation of a premise potentially implied in one of those stated, it would be as when we might say, “The removal of part of the substance neces- sarily causes the removal of the substance,” but the removal of what- ever is not the substance does not necessarily cause the removal of the substance.” Now, ‘part of the substance’ implies ‘the substance’ by the medi- ation of [an implied premise, namely,] the ‘contradictory contrary of the second [premise]’,”” this being as when we might say, “Every- 28 MS gl: When we say that ‘Zayd is not white, and every Greek is white’, the implication is that ‘Zayd is not a Greek’ by the mediation of the contradictory con- trary of the second [proposition] [‘aks naqid al-thani} [also called a contradictory sub-contrary], namely, our proposition that whoever is not white is not Greek. L gl: Regarding the syllogistic necessity by the mediation of a premise potentially implied by one of those stated, I [i.e., al-Jurjani] say that this proposition [i.e., Isfahani’s example] in relation to the conclusion mentioned is not a syllogism. But when it is put together with our proposition, “What is not a part of the substance would be something that is not substance”, it forms a syllogism of the Second Figure, and it would be included in its definition. [From Jurjani’s glosses on Isfahani’s commentary. ] °°'MS gl: [‘aks naqid al-thani] Le., the second proposition, namely the major premise, this being his expression, “The removal of whatever is not substance would not necessarily cause the removal of the substance.” ARGUMENTATION 93 thing whose removal necessarily causes the removal of the substance is substance.” And this [mediating proposition] is set up as the major premise to our statement, “Removal of part of the substance neces- sarily causes the removal of the substance”, in order to produce the conclusive logical goal. But that [implied mediating] premise would be only on the con- dition that its two limiting terms should be different from the lim- iting terms of the syllogism [itself], lest the demonstration exercise should produce as result the ‘equivalent contrary’. In that case the limiting terms of the syllogism [itself] would not be different, in con- trast to the [difference in the] terms here,*® since the ‘contradictory contrary’ does change the terms of the syllogism [itself], in contrast to the ‘equivalent contrary’. c. Further [to the meanings in Baydawi’s reference], ‘the neces- sity deriving from [the syllogism’s] essence’ is something more gen- eral in meaning than either what is ‘obvious’ or what constitutes the ‘everything else’, so that both the ‘perfect syllogism’?! and the ‘every- thing else’ can be included within it. Baydawi’s expression, ‘another proposition’, means that it would be different from every aspect of the two premises. If it should be otherwise, then the necessary implication would be that each of the two premise judgments would be mutually distinct from each other, [each being] in their own syllogism, because [logical necessity] would govern each one of them.” Let no one say that consideration of this restriction” requires that the hypothetical exceptive syllogism, in which an identical premise would be an exception, should not be a syllogism—the case being like when we might say, “If A should be B, then CG would be D; but A is B, therefore C is D”,—since the conclusion statement is identical to one of the two premises. This is because our doctrine is that the ‘conclusion statement’ in the ‘hypothetical exceptive’ syllogism is [within] the ‘consequent’, [ie., the second and major premise]. One of the two premises is the °° MS gi: Le., the contradictory contrary. 31 MS gl: A perfect syllogism is like the First Figure, and those other than per- fect are like the other figures. * L gl: In accordance with our proposition, “All men are living beings and all stones are minerals”, for these both require their individual expressions as neces- sarily as does a valid universal require its particular. 33-MS gl: [Le.], that they be different. 94 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER 3 ‘necessary mediating conjunction’ between the ‘antecedent’ and the ‘consequent’, while the other premise has the position of antecedent, [i.e., the first, minor premise}.*° And there is no doubt that the con- clusion statement is different from each of them, for the conclusion is that ‘C is D’, and one of the two premises is ‘if A should be B, then C would be D’, and the other premise is ‘A is B’. To state again, the syllogism inevitably either a. will include the conclusion or its actual contrary: this [type] being called a ‘hypothetical exceptie syllogism’. [It is] as when we might say, “If the sun should have risen, then daytime would be here, but the sun has risen”, which produces [the logical result] “the daytime is here”, and this is in fact stated in the syllogism; and it is also as when we might say, “If the sun should have risen, then the daytime would be here, but the daytime is not here, so the sun has not risen”; thus, the conclusion would be as when we might say, “The sun has not risen”, L 43 this being the opposite of what is in fact stated in the syllogism. Or,” [the syllogism] b. will not include the conclusion statement or its actual contrary, this [type] being called the ‘categorical connective syllogism’, as when we might say, “The world is changeable, and everything changeable is a temporal phenomenon, MS 23a_ so, the world is a temporal phenomenon”; and our saying, “So, the world is a temporal phe- nomenon”, is the conclusion, but the syllogism actually does not include it or its contrary. Baydawi said: L 43, T 20 The hypothetical exceptive syllogism In the first [of these two types of syllogism, namely, the ‘hypothet- ical exceptive syllogism’ which does include the conclusion statement or its actual contrary], a. a valid proof demonstration inference may be made 1. from the presence of [true fact in] the premise to its pres- ence in the conclusion, or, 3 MS gl: “If A should be B.” 3° MS gl: This being, “But A is B.” 36 The scribe of the MS adds here, “if” [aw law lam yashtamil]. ARGUMENTATION 95 2. from the absence [of true fact in the premise] to its absence in the conclusion, or, 3. from the presence of [true fact in] one of two incompatible premises to its absence in the other [premise], or, 4. from the absence [of true fact in one [of two incompatible premises] to its presence [in] the other [premise]. b. [The hypothetical exceptive syllogism therefore] will include a [first] premise that governs either 1. by means of an ‘inherent necessity’ conjoined between the two [entities, premise and conclusion], this [type of premise] being called a ‘conditional conjunctive premise’;*’ or, 2. [the hypothetical exceptive syllogism will include a first pre- mise that governs] by means of an ‘inherent incompatibility’ [be- tween the premise and conclusion], this [type of premise] being called a ‘conditional disjunctive premise’.** [The conditional disjunctive pre- mise] is— a) ‘real truth’ if the two [i.e., premise and conclusion] are absolutely incompatible, [and it is] b) ‘impossible to match’ if the two of them are incompati- ble only in statements of true fact, and c) ‘impossible to isolate’*’ if the two are incompatible only in statements regarding a falsehood. c. In addition, there is another [second, premise] that will pro- vide a valid demonstration— 1. proving the position of the [first] premise, or, 2. proving [the position of] the incompatible [first premise] absolutely, or, 3. [proving the position of the incompatible first premise] in affirming true fact only, or, 4. negating the conclusion, or, 5. [negating the position of] the incompatible [first] premise absolutely, or, 6. [negating the position of the incompatible first premise] in [its] negation only. 7 An ‘inherent necessity’ [mulazamah]; a conditional conjunctive premise [shartiyah muttasilah]. 8 An ‘inherent incompatibility’ = [mu‘anadah] is contrasted with the ‘inherent necessity’ above; conditional disjunctive premise = [shartlyah munfasilah]. %° Impossible to match = [mAni‘at al-jam‘]; impossible to isolate = [mani‘at al- khuliw]. 96 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER 3 This [other second type of premise] is called a ‘fconditional] excep- tive premise’! Isfahani says: L 43, T 20, MS 23a The hypothetical exceptive syllogism In the first type [of syllogism], namely, the ‘hypothetical exceptive syllogism’, a. a valid proof demonstration inference may be made 1. from the presence [of true fact] in the premise to its pres- ence in the proved conclusion, as when we say, “If this should be a man, then it would be a living being, but indeed, it is a man, so therefore it is a living being.” Or, 2. from the absence [of true fact] in the conclusion to its absence in the premise, as it might be said of the aforementioned exam- ple, “But indeed, it is not a living being, so therefore it is not a man.” Or, 3. from the presence [of true fact] in one of two incompatible premises to its absence in the other. Or, 4. from the absence [of true fact] in one of two incompatible premises to its presence in the other, as when we might say, “Either this number is even or it is odd, but indeed, it is even, so it is not odd”; [or,] “but it is odd, so it is not even”; [or], “but it is not even, so it is odd”; [or,] “but it is not odd, so it is even.” b. Thus, on the foregoing basis, the ‘hypothetical exceptive syllo- gism’ will include a [first] premise that governs [either] 1. by means of an ‘inherent necessity’ conjoined between the premise and the conclusion, ([i.e.],—the presence [of true fact] in the premise implying its presence in the conclusion, and its absence in the conclusion [implying] its absence in the premise,—) this [type of premise] being called a ‘conditional conjunctwe premise’, and it is plainly conditioned by the fact that it is decisively affirmative, universal, and conjoined [with the conclusion] by an ‘inherent necessity’, ([i-e.],— “© [Conditional] exceptive premise = [shartiyah istithna’i]. *t A.-M. Goichon’s Lexigue de la Langue Philosophique d’Ibn Sina, No. 611:2 [Qiyas istithna’i], quotes from Ibn Sina: “The ‘hypothetical’ syllogism is composed of two premises, one of which is ‘conditional’, and the other being the positing or removal of one of their two parts; this [second] premise is called the exception [al-mus- tathnah] that is followed by the conclusion.” ® Inherent necessity’ (here it is) {luziimiyah], (while some lines above, clause a) it is) [mulazamah]. This is the ‘inherent necessity’ that functions within the syllogism. ARGUMENTATION 97 the presence [of true fact] in the premise implying its presence in the conclusion, and its absence in the conclusion implying its absence in the premise); or, 2. by means of an ‘inherent incompatibility’ between the two entities [premise and conclusion], ([i.e.],—the presence [of true fact] in one of these two implying its absence in the other, or its ab- sence in L 44 one of them implying its presence in the other,—) this [kind of] premise being called a ‘conditional disjunctive premise’, which a) is ‘real truth’ if the incompatibility |i-e., between premise and conclusion] is absolute, that is, in affirming a true fact and in negating a falsehood; that is, both [premise and conclusion] may not be affirmed at the same time and both may not be negated at the same time, as in the example that was given. b) [This type of premise] is ‘impossible to match’ if [the premise and conclusion] are incompatible only in a statement of a true fact, that is, they do not both [at once] state a true fact or both negate a falsehood; it is as when we might say, “Either this thing is a man, or it is a horse”, c) and is ‘impossible to isolate’ when the premise and con- clusion are incompatible only in a negation regarding a falsehood, that is, they are not both false and both true, as when we say, “Either this thing is not a man, or it is not a horse.” d) The ‘[conditional] disjunctive premise’ is plainly condi- tioned by the fact that it should be decisively affirmative, universal, and [disjoined from the conclusion by an] inherent incompatibility ([i-e.],the presence [of true fact] in one of the two parts implying its absence in the other, or its absence in one implying] its presence in the other—). c. In addition, the hypothetical exceptive syllogism will include another [second type of] premise that will provide a valid demon- stration— 1. proving the position of the [first] premise in the ‘[condi- tional] conjunctive [premise’ case], or, 2. proving the position of the incompatible [first] premise absolutely, that is, affirmatively and negatively in the ‘real truth’, [‘conditional disjunctive premise’ case] or, 3. [proving the position of the incompatible first premise] only in affirming true fact in the ‘impossible to match [premise’ case], or, 4. negating the conclusion in the ‘[conditional] conjunctive [pre- mise’ case], or, 98 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER 3 5. negating the [position of the] incompatible [first] premise absolutely, that is, affirmatively and negatively in the ‘real truth’ [‘conditional disjunctive premise’ case], or, 6. negating the [position of the] incompatible [first] premise only in its negation [of falsehood] in the ‘impossible to isolate [premise’ case]. This other [second type of] premise is called a ‘fconditional] excep- lwe premise’. Baydawi said: L 44, T 21 The categorical connective syllogism The second type of syllogism [namely, the categorical connective syl- logism] has four aspects [i.e., figures], because in it there must be an entity that will relate to both [major and minor] terms of the desired conclusion, this entity being called the middle term. The sub- ject in the conclusion [statement] is the minor term and the predi- cate is the major term. The premise containing the minor term is the minor premise*® while that containing the major term is the major premise.“* Thus, the middle term [i.e., according to the four figures] may be either a. predicate in the minor premise and subject in the major pre- mise, or, b. predicate in them both, or, c. subject in them both, or, d. subject in the minor premise and predicate in the major premise. Isfahani says: L 44, T 21, MS 23b The categorical connective syllogism When [Baydawi] finished his discussion of the ‘hypothetical excep- tive syllogism’, he began to discuss the ‘categorical connective syllo- gism’. In accordance with the kind of judgments of which it is composed, this is called either the ‘categorical [syllogism]’, that is * The scribe of L skipped the preceding statement. “* Middle term = [al-awsat]; major term = [al-akbar]; minor term = [al-asghar]; minor premise = [al-sughra’]; major premise = [al-kubra’]. These are the terms used regularly in logic. ARGUMENTATION 99 composed purely of categorical propositions,* or the ‘conditional [syl- logism]’, that is composed [either] purely of conditional propositions, or of both [conditional] and categorical propositions. Our author gives his attention only to the ‘categorical connective syllogism’. Now, every ‘categorical connective syllogism’ must have two premises that have a commonality in some entity that will relate to both terms of the desired conclusion. This entity is called a ‘middle term’, because it mediates between the two terms of the conclusion. One of the two premises will stand alone as the subject in the conclusion [state- ment], it being called the ‘minor term’ because usually L 45 it is more specific than the predicate; and the other premise will stand alone as the predicate in the conclusion statement, it being called the ‘major term’ because usually it is more general than the subject. The premise in which is the minor term is called the ‘minor premise’ from the fact that it comprises the minor term, and the premise in which is the major term is called the ‘major premise’ from the fact that it comprises the major term. It is as when we say, “Every man is a living being, and every liv- ing being is sensate.” Thus, “every man is sensate” is the conclu- sion, while ‘man’ is the minor term, and our statement, “Every man is a living being” is the minor premise; also, ‘sensate’ is the major term, and our statement, “Every living being is sensate”, is the major premise, while ‘living being’ is the middle term. The judgmental statement that is a part of the syllogism is called a ‘premise’, and that into which the premise may be analyzed, as a ‘subject’ and a ‘predicate’, aside from the copula, is called a ‘limit- ing term of the syllogism’. Thus, every syllogism has three ‘limiting terms’, minor, middle and major. The structure of the relationship of the middle term to the minor and major terms both as the posited ‘subject’? and as the ‘predi- cate’ is called a ‘figure’, while the interconnectional pattern of minor premise with major premise [is called] a ‘context’ or a mood’.* The statement of conclusion is called the ‘logical goal’ when [the rea- soning process] is transferred from it [i.e., the statement of conclusion] * [al-hamliyat al-sirfah]. ® [thalathat hudiid al-asghar wa-al-awsat wa-al-akbar]. “’ MS gl: Le., the middle term is the subject for them. * Posited subject [wad‘]; predicate [haml]; figure [shakl]; interconnectional pat- tern of minor and major premise [iqtiran]; context [qarinah]; mood [darb]. = 100 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER 3 to the syllogistic structure, and [it is called] the ‘result’ [i.e., of the reasoning process] MS 24a when the reasoning is transferred [back] from the syllogism to the statement of conclusion.” The ‘figures’ [of the categorical connective syllogism] are four in number, because the middle term will be [one of the following]: Figure 1—[The middle term will be] predicate in the minor premise and subject in the major premise,—this ‘Figure |’ being called the first because a) its productivity is intuitive, b) it is the basis on which the others stand, c) it will produce [a validation for] the four [logically inferred] desired goals, and d) [it will produce] the most extensive of these logical goals. Figure 2.—Or, the middle term will be predicate in both of them, that is, in both the minor and major premises,” this ‘Figure 2’ being made the second a) because it has a commonality with Figure 1 in the minor premise, this being more extensive than the major premise as 1t comprises the subject of the logical goal which in turn is more extensive than its predicate, and b) because it produces the infer- ence of a universal which is more extensive than a particular even though the universal be negative and the particular positive. Figure 3.—Or, the middle term will be subject in both the major and minor premises,’' this ‘Figure 3’ being made the third because it has a commonality with Figure | in one of its premises, namely, the major premise. Figure 4.—Or, the middle term will be subject in the minor premise and predicate in the major premise,” this ‘Figure 4’ being made the fourth because it differs from Figure 1 in both of its premises. “© Regarding his [Isfahani’s] expression, “from the syllogism back to it [the state- ment of conclusion]”: one can say that he first posits the desired goal, then arranges evidence to prove and imply it [as true], and as long as it would be in that frame of reference [ka-dhalik] it would be [called] the ‘desired goal’; thus, when the syl- logistic reasoning would be completed it would [transfer back out of the syllogism and] be [called] the ‘result’ [of the reasoning process]. [from al-Sharif al-Jurjani’s glosses on Isfahani’s commentary] 5° MS gl: As when we say, ‘All men are living beings [but] no stone is a living being’ and this results in our saying, ‘and so no man is a stone’. °! MS gl: As when we say, ‘All men are living beings’ and ‘all men are ratio- nal’; this produces ‘some living beings are rational’. °2 MS gl: As when we say, ‘All men are living beings and all rational beings are men’, and this produces, ‘some living beings are rational’. ARGUMENTATION 101 Baydawi said: L 45, T 21 Figure 1 Figure 1 will provide a valid demonstration—* la) when the middle term is affirmed [either] by all of the minor term [SaM], {b) or [when the middle term is affirmed] by some of [the minor term] [SiM], 2a) and when the major term is affirmed by L 46 all that has been affirmed of the middle term [MaP], 2b) or, the negative of this [i.e., when the major term is negated by all that has been affirmed of the middle term] [MeP], —fall 1 and 2] proving that the major term is affirmed [either] by all of the minor term or by some of [the minor term], or [the major term] is negated [either] by all of [the minor term] or by some of [the minor term]. [That is: [MaP & SaM = SaP]/[AAA-1], and [MaP & SiM = SiP]/[AII-1], and [MeP & SaM = SeP]/[EAE-1], and [MeP & SiM = SoP]/[EIO-1].] Isfahani says: L 46, T 21, MS 24a figure 1 The moods that can possibly be assembled in each of the four figures—according to their quantity, namely, universality and par- ticularity, and their quality, namely, affirmation and negation—are sixteen in number, the result of multiplying the four minor premises, affirmative-universal [Sa], affirmative-particular [Si], negative-uni- versal [Se], and negative-particular [So], by the corresponding four major premises. °° The following standard signs will be used to represent the syllogism, its moods and figures: P = Major term (from Predicate), M = Middle term, S = Minor term (from Subject) [N.B.: the code used in the Arabic texts is: [Alif] = Major term, [Ba’] = Middle term, [Jim] = Minor term.] “All are” = a; “No are” = e; “Some are” = i; “Some are not” = o. Examples: “MaP & SaM = SaP”: All M is P, all S is M, therefore all S is P. “AAA-1” Mood is three “all are” propositions—two premises and the conclu- sion; Figure is 1. 102 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER 3 a. Figure 1, if it is to be productive [of a valid proof demon- stration], stipulates that in terms of its quality the minor premise should be affirmative. (This is] because if it should be negative, then the middle term would be stripped from the minor term, the minor term would have no place under the middle term, and the governance of the major term would not extend beyond the middle term, either affirmatively or negatively to the minor term. [This is] because the governance of the major term is upon that which the middle term actually affirms, and the minor term would not be a part of that which the middle term actually affirms, on the supposition that it would be stripped from the minor term. b. Moreover, Figure 1, if it is to be productive [of a valid proof demonstration], stipulates that in terms of its quantity the major premise should be universal. [This is] because if it should be particular, then the governance of the major term would apply only to part T 22 of that which the middle term actually affirms, and there is no implication that the minor term would be included in that part. And even if the middle term should affirm [the minor term] as true still there would be no implication that the governance would extend from the mid- dle term to MS 24b_ the minor term. Thus, with respect to the affirmation of the minor premise, eight moods drop out [of consideration], these being the result [from mul- tiplying] each of the two negative minor premises [with] the four predetermined conditional propositions’ as major premises. With respect to the universality of the major premise, four other [possible moods] drop out [of consideration], these being the result [from multiplying] the affirmative and negative particular major premises with the two affirmative [i.e., universal and particular] minor premises. So [in Figure 1] there remain four productive moods: the minor premise affirmative both universal and particular, and each of these with the major premise affirmative universal and negative universal, ie., [AAA-1, AII-1, EAE-1, EIO-1]. * See A.-M. Goichon’s discussion of [hasr}, [mahsiir] and [qadiyah mahsiirah] in her Lexigue de la Langue Philosophique d’lbn Sina, pp. 72-73, and 309. These are propo- sitions in which the quantity is predetermined by the use of the terms, ‘all’, ‘none’, and ‘some’, and also the terms, ‘always’, ‘never’, ‘not at all’, and ‘sometimes’. ARGUMENTATION 103 Summary of figure I Figure | will therefore provide a valid demonstration— la) when the middle term is affirmed by all of the minor term [SaM], this being the minor premise affirmative universal, as we say, “All C is B”,® or, lb) [when] the middle term is affirmed by some of the minor term [SiM], this being the minor premise affirmative particular, as we say, “Some C is B”;%° —each of these (la and 1b) being 2a) when the major term is affirmed by all that L 47 has been affirmed of the middle term [MaP], this being the major premise affirmative universal, as we say, “All B is A”,*’ or, 2b) when the major term is negated by all that has been affirmed of the middle term [MeP], this being the major premise nega- tive universal, as we say, “No B is A”;** —f[all 1 and 2] proving: that the major term is affirmed by all of the minor term [SaP], or [that the major term is affirmed] by some of [the minor term] [SiP], or, that [the major term] is negated by all of the minor term [SeP], or [that the major term is negated] by some of [the minor term] {SoP]. In other words, [Figure 1] will provide a valid demonstration— la) when the middle term is affirmed by all of the minor term, and 2a) [when] the major term is affirmed by all that has been affirmed of the middle term, ~~[all la and 2a] proving that the major term is affirmed by all of the minor term, as we say, “All C is B, and all B is A, so [all] C is A”;°9 or, {Figure 1] will provide a valid demonstration— °° MS gl: As, ‘All men are living beings’. °° MS gil: As, ‘Some living beings are men’. °’ MS gl: As, ‘All living beings are sensate’. °° MS gil: As, ‘No living being is a stone’. * MS gil: Le., “All men are living beings, and all living beings walk, therefore all men walk.” Adjusting the syllogism to western standard order [i.e., major premise first]: [MaP & SaM = SaP]/[AAA-1]. 104 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER 3 lb) when the middle term is affirmed by some of the minor term, and 2a) [when] the major term is affirmed by all that has been affirmed of the middle term, —[all 1b and 2a] proving that the major term is affirmed by some of the minor term, as we say, “Some C is B, and all B is A, so some C is A”;°° or, [Figure 1] will provide a valid demonstration— la) when the middle term is affirmed by all of the minor term, and 2b) [when] the major term is negated by all that has been affirmed of the minor term, —fall la and 2b] proving that the major term is negated by all of the minor term, as we say, “All C is B, and no B is A, so no C is A”;®! or, [Figure 1] will provide a valid demonstration— 1b) when the middle term is affirmed by some of the minor term, and 2b) [when] the major term is negated by all that has been affirmed of the middle term, —-[all 1b and 2b] proving that the major term is negated by some of the minor term, as we say, “Some C is B, and no B is A, so some C is not A.”® [That is: [MaP & SaM = SaP]/[AAA-1], and [MaP & SiM = SiP]/[AII-1], and [MeP & SaM = SeP]/[EAE-1], and [MeP & SiM = SoP]/[EIO-1].] Thus, the author’s expression, “proving that the major term is affirmed [either] by all of the minor term” is linked to his expres- sion, “will provide a demonstration when the MS 25a middle term is affirmed [either] by all of the minor term, and when the major term is affirmed by all that has been affirmed of the middle term.” some living beings are rational.” Adjusting the syllogism to western standard order: [MaP & SiM = SiP]/[AITI-1]. 6! MS gl: As, ‘Every stone is mineral, but no mineral is rational, therefore no stone is rational’. As adjusted: [MeP & SaM = SeP]/[EAE-1]. ® MS gl: As, ‘Some living beings are men, and no men are horses, therefore some living beings are not horses’. As adjusted: [MeP & SiM = SoP]/[EIO-1]. ARGUMENTATION 105 [Baydawi’s] expression, “or by some of it”, (that follows his state- ment, “proving that the major term is affirmed [either] by all of the minor term”,) is attached to [the phrase,] “all of the minor term.” But its meaning, “proving that the major term is affirmed by some of the minor term”, is derivatively linked to his expression (1b), “or by some of it”, (that follows his statement, “when the middle term is affirmed [either] by all of the minor term”,) and to his expres- sion (2a), “and when the major term is affirmed by all that has been affirmed of the middle term;” and the meaning of it is, “or, [Figure 1] will produce a demonstration—when the middle term is affirmed by some of the minor term, and when the major term is affirmed by all that has been affirmed of the middle term,—proving that the major term is affirmed by some of the minor term.”® [Baydawi’s] expression, “or [the major term] is negated [either] by all of [the minor term]”, (that is attached to his statement, “prov- ing that the major term is affirmed [either] by all of the minor term”,) is linked to his expression, (a) “the middle term is affirmed [either] by L 48 all of the minor term”, and to his expression, (b) “or [the major term] is negated [either] by [all of the minor term].” The meaning of this is, “or, [Figure 1] will provide a demon- stration—when the middle term is affirmed by all of the minor term, and when the major term is negated by all that has been affirmed of the middle term,—proving that the major term is negated by all of the minor term.” [Baydawi’s continuing] expression, “...or [the major term is ne- gated] by some of [the minor term]”, (this other statement being attached to [his phrase], “[or the major term is negated either by] all of {the minor term]”), is linked to his statement, “[or when [the middle term] is affirmed] by some of [the minor term]” (1b), (that follows his statement, “when the middle term is affirmed [either] by all of the minor term”), and to his statement, “or [the major term] is negated by [all of the minor term] (2b).” The meaning of this is, “Or, [Figure 1] will provide a demonstration—when the middle term is affirmed by some of the minor term (1b), and when the major “ 63 MS gl: ‘Some living beings are men, and all men are rational, therefore some living beings are rational’. As adjusted: [MaP & SiM = SiP]/[AII-1]. * MS gl: ‘Every stone is mineral, and no mineral is rational, therefore no stone is rational’, As adjusted: [MeP & SaM = SeP]/[EAE-1]. 106 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER 3 term is negated by all that has been affirmed of the middle term (2b),— proving that the major term is negated by some of the minor term.” Baydawi said: L 48, T 22 Figure 2 Figure 2 will provide a valid demonstration— la) when the middle term is affirmed by all of the minor term [SaM], and lb) [when the middle term is] negated by all of the major term [PeM]; or, 2a) when the case is the reverse of this [i.e., when the middle term is negated by all of the minor term [SeM], and 2b) when [the middle term] is affirmed by all of the major term] [PaM], —fall 1 and 2] proving that the major term is negated by all of the minor term. [That is: [PeM & SaM = SeP]/[EAE-2], and [PaM & SeM = SeP]/[AEE-2].] Or, [Figure 2 will provide a valid demonstration]— 3a) when the middle term is affirmed by some of [the minor term] [SiM], and 3b) when [the middle term] is negated by all of the major term [PeM]; or, 4a) when [the middle term] is negated by some of the minor term [SoM], and 4b) when [the middle term] is affirmed by all of the major term [PaM], —|[all 3 and 4] proving that the major term is negated by some of the minor term. [That is: [PeM & SiM = SoP]/[EIO-2], and [PaM & SoM = SoP]/[AOO-2].] This stipulates that the time of the negation and the affirmation should be the same, or that it should be one of the two continuously. ®° MS gl: ‘Some living beings are men, and no men are horses, therefore, some living beings are not horses’. As adjusted: [MeP & SiM = SoP]/[EIO-1]. ARGUMENTATION 107 Isfahani says: L 48, T 22, MS 25a Figure 2 a. Figure 2, if it is to be productive [of a valid proof demon- stration], stipulates that there should be a difference between its two premises, in [that one should be] affirmative and [the other] negative. [This is because] it would be admissible that propositions in agree- ment® as well as propositions in disagreement” should have a com- monality either in affirming a single thing together® or in negating a single thing together. In such a case, the syllogism in Figure 2 might be composed of two affirmative premises in some matters together with an agreement between the two terms,®? and in some other matters together with a difference between them; likewise, [the syllogism] might be composed of two negative premises in some mat- ters together with an agreement between the two [terms], and in some other matters together with a difference between them. However, there would be no implication from either of them” of any assigned inference,’ this [absence of implication] being [the kind of syllogistic] ‘difference’ [i.e., between propositions] that is neces- sarily sterile of any conclusion. It would be as we say, “Every man is a living being, and every rational being is a living being”, and truly there would be a coor- dinating statement, namely, “every man is a rational being.” Now, if the major premise should be exchanged for our saying, “and every horse is a living being,” then truly there would be a differentiating statement, namely, “No man is a horse.” And, it would be as we say, “No man T 23 is a horse, MS 25b and no rational being is a horse”; and truly there would be a coordinating statement, namely, our saying, “every man is a rational being.” Now, if the major premise should be exchanged for our say- ing, “no donkey is a horse”, then truly there would be a differen- tiating statement, namely, “no man is a donkey.” % L gl: Le., subjects of minor and major premises that are equal and coordi- nate in affirmation, as ‘man’ and ‘rational being’. * L gi: Le., subjects that are neither equal nor coordinate in affirmation, as ‘man’, ‘horse’ and ‘donkey’. ® MS gl: This being the middle term. 5° MS el: The agreement or difference in terms, refers to the logical goal, these being the minor and major terms [i.e., as subject and predicate of the conclusion]. 7 T.e., from the statements either of coordination or differentiation. " Assigned inference [‘ala’ al-ta‘yin]. 108 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER 3 b. Furthermore, [i-e., another condition upon which Figure 2 will result in a valid proof demonstration is that] the major premise should be universal. [ This is] because, if it should be L 49 _ particular, then it would imply the [kind of syllogistic] difference [between propositions] that is necessarily sterile of any conclusion. It would be as we say, “Every man is rational, and some living beings are not rational”, or, “...some horses are not rational.” However, in the first example, truly there would be a coordinating statement, namely, “Every man is a living being”, and in the sec- ond example, there would be a differentiating statement, namely, our saying, “No man is a horse.” And, it would be as we say, “No man is a horse, and some liv- ing beings are horses”, or, “...some neighing animals are horses”, and truly in the first example there would be a coordinating state- ment, namely, our saying, “Every man is a living being”, and in the second example there would be a differentiating statement, namely, our saying, “No man is a neighing animal.” Thus, by reason of the second condition, eight moods drop out of consideration, these resulting from [multiplying] each of the two particular major premises with the four predetermined conditional propositions [i-e., predetermined by the terms ‘all’, ‘no’, ‘some are’, etc.] as minor premises. And by reason of the first condition, four other moods drop out of consideration, these resulting from [multi- plying] the affirmative universal major premise with each of the two affirmative minor premises, and from [multiplying] the negative uni- versal major premise with each of the two negative minor premises. Thus, [in Figure 2] there remain four productive moods: a) affirmative universal minor premise with negative universal major premise, b) negative universal minor premise with affirmative universal major premise, c) affirmative particular minor premise with negative universal major premise, d) negative particular minor premise with affirmative universal major premise. ARGUMENTATION 109 Summary of figure 2 Figure 2 will therefore provide a valid demonstration— la) when the middle term is affirmed by all of the minor term [SaM], and 1b) [when] the middle term is negated by all of the major term [PeM], as we say, “All C is B, and no A is B”, or, [Figure 2 will provide a valid demonstration] by the reverse of the foregoing, that is,— 2a) when the middle term is negated by all of the minor term [SeM], and 2b) [when] the middle term is affirmed by all of the major term [PaM], as we say, “No C is B, and all A is B”, -—fall 1 and 2] proving that the major term is negated by all of the minor term, this being our saying, “No C is A.” [That is: [PeM & SaM = SeP]/[EAE-2], and [PaM & SeM = SeP]/[AEE-2].] [Baydawi’s] expression, “proving that the major term is negated by all of the minor term”, is linked to the first two moods, for the resulting inference of both of them is one and the same, namely, negative universal. Or, [Figure 2] will provide a demonstration— 3a) when the middle term is affirmed by some of the minor term [SiM], and 3b) [when] the middle term is negated by all of the major term [PeM], as we say, MS 26a “Some C is B, and no A is B”; —or, [Figure 2] will provide a demonstration— 4a) when the middle term is negated by some of the minor term [SoM], and 4b) [when] the middle term is affirmed by all of the major term [PaM], as we say, “Some C is not B, and all A is B”, —f[all 3 and 4] proving that the major term is negated by some of the minor term, as we say, “Some C is not A.” [That is: [PeM & SiM = SoP]/[EIO-2], and [PaM & SoM = SoP|/[AOO-2].] Thus, [the author’s] expression, “proving that the major term is negated by some of the minor term”, is linked to the last two moods, 110 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER 3 L 50 for the inference of both of them is the same, namely, a neg- ative particular [proposition]. The condition upon which these four moods would produce [a valid proof demonstration] is that there should be one of the two [following sets of] circumstances: either a) the time of both the affirmation and the negation would be one and the same, or, b) that one of the two premises would be validated as continuing [in exis- tence], either bl) continuing in accordance with its essence, or b2) continuing” in accordance with its descriptive characteristic. This is so because if one of the two sets of circumstances should not be true, then the syllogism [of Figure 2] would not be productive. It would be as we say, “The whole moon is eclipsed necessarily at the time the earth is interposed between it and the sun, but [this is] not continuously”, and, “None of the moon is eclipsed” at the time of the lunar quarter” [i.e., because of the earth being] between it and the sun, but [this is] not continuously”, together with a false proposition, as we might say, “Some of the moon is not the [whole] moon as a general possibility.” Baydawi said: L 50, T 23 Figure 3 Figure 3 will provide a valid demonstration— lab) when the two terms [i.e., major and minor] are affirmed by all of the middle term [MaP & MaS], or, 2a) when one of them [is affirmed by [all of the middle term] [MaP or MaS], and 2b) [when] the other [is affirmed] by some of [the middle term] [MiS or MiP], —f[all 1 and 2] proving that the major term is affirmed by some of the minor term. [That is: [MaP & MaS = SiP]/[AAI-3], and [MaP & MiS = SiP]/[AII-3], and [MiP & MaS = SiP]/[IAI-3].] Or, [Figure 3 will provide a valid demonstration]— ” In T the third occurrence of [al-dawam] is misspelled [al-dam]. ® The MS alone adds here, “necessarily” [bi-al-dariirah]. ™ Lunar quarter [al-tarbi‘]. ARGUMENTATION 111 3a) when the minor term is affirmed by all of [the middle term] [MaS], and 3b) [when] the major term is negated by all of [the middle term] [MeP], or 3c) [when the major term is negated] by some of [the middle term] [MoP], or 4a) when [the minor term] is affirmed by some of [the middle term] [MiS], and 4b) [when] the major term is negated by all of [the middle term] [MeP], —[all 3 and 4] proving that the major term is negated by some of the minor term. [That is: [MeP & MaS = SoP]/|EAO-3], and [MoP & MaS = SoP]/[OAO-3], and [MeP & MiS = SoP]/{EIO-3].] Isfahani says: L 50, T 23, MS 26a Figure 3 Figure 3, if it is to be productive [of a valid proof demonstration], stipulates 1) that the minor premise should be affirmative, and 2) that one of the two [i.e., major and minor premises] should be universal. a. The minor premise should be affirmative, because if it should be negative then it would imply the [kind of syllogistic] ‘difference’ [i.e., between propositions] that is necessarily sterile of any conclusion. It would be as we say, “No man is a horse, and [so] every man is a living being”, or, “[and so] every man is a rational being”, and truly, in the first example there would be a coordinating statement, namely, “Every horse is a living being”, and in the second example there would be a differentiating statement, namely, “No horse is a rational being.” But if the major premise should be exchanged for our saying, “No man is a neighing animal”, or, “no man is a donkey”, then the major premise would become negative, and truly in the first exam- ple there would be a coordinating statement, namely, “Every horse is a neighing animal”, and in the second example there would be a differentiating statement, namely, “No horse is a donkey.” b. Further, [in Figure 3] one of the two premises should be uni- versal, because if they both should be particular then it would imply the [kind of syllogistic] ‘difference’ [i-e., between propositions] that is necessarily sterile of any conclusion. 112 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER 3 It would be as when we say, “Some living beings are men, and [so] some living beings are rational beings”, or, “[and so] some liv- ing beings are horses”, and truly in the first example there would be a coordinating statement, namely, “Every man is a rational being”, and in the second example there would be a differentiating state- ment, namely, “No man is a horse.” But if the major premise should be exchanged for our saying, “Some living beings are not rational beings”, or, “Some MS 26b living beings are not horses”, then the major premise would become negative, and truly in the first example there would be a coordi- nating statement, and in the second example there would be a differentiating statement. Thus, ten moods would fall away [out of consideration]: eight from the first condition, these resulting from [multiplying] the two [i.e., universal and particular] negative minor premises by the four predetermined conditional propositions [i.e., predetermined by the terms ‘all’, ‘no’ and ‘some’, etc.] as major premises, and two moods from the second condition, these being the two moods resulting from [multiplying] the affirmative particular T 24 minor premise with the two [affirmative and negative] particular major premises. L 51 So then there are six moods that are productive [i.e., of a valid proof demonstration, namely], the minor premise affirmative uni- versal [multiplied] with the four predetermined conditional proposi- tions as major premises, and the minor premise affirmative particular [multiplied] with the two [1e., affirmative and negative] universal [major premises]. Now, this Figure 3 will not produce anything except a particular proposition, because the most specific moods of this figure are the two affirmative universals,” the two universals being with the major premise negative. These two will not produce a universal proposi- tion’”® because of the possibility that the minor term might be more general than the major term, as when we say, “All men are living beings, and [so] all men are rational”, or, “[and so] no men are horses.” However, it truly should be, in the first example, “Some MS gl: Le., the minor and major affirmative universals, as we say, “All men are living beings”, and “all men are rational beings.” ® MS gl: Because it is impossible for a more specific [premise] to affirm every individual case of a more general [premise], or to negate it. ARGUMENTATION 113 living beings are rational”, and in the second example, “Some liv- ing beings are not horses.” Thus, if these two [universal] moods should not produce a uni- versal, then the rest’? would not produce [one], since [these two moods] are more specific than the rest of the moods. The first exam- ple” is more specific than any mood composed of two affirmative [premises],’? and the second example® is more specific than any mood composed of an affirmative and a negative [premise]. And as long as the more specific [premises] will not produce a certain thing, the more general [premises] will not produce it, otherwise, the more specific [premises] would have produced it. This is because the result- ing inference of a more general [premise] is [also] its own conclud- ing consequent; and the more general being a concluding consequent of the more specific, the consequent of a consequent would be a consequent.®! Summary of figure 3 Figure 3 will thus provide a valid demonstration— lab) when both the minor and major terms are affirmed by all of the middle term [MaS and MaP],” as we say, “All B is C, and all B is A”, or 2a) when one of the terms is affirmed by all of the middle term [MaP or MaS], and 2b) [when] the other term is affirmed by some of the middle term [MiS or MiP]; this latter statement [i.e., 2a & 2b)| having two aspects, that is, [Figure 3] will provide a valid demonstration— 7 L: [al- Hbaaivall T and MS Garrett 989Ha: [al-baqi]; the MS: [al- -bawaqi]. 8 MS gl: Le., two affirmative universals are more specific than a minor premise affirmative particular with [lit.: and] a major premise affirmative universal, or [than] a minor premise affirmative universal with a major premise affirmative particular. MS gl: Le., a minor premise affirmative universal a major premise affirmative particular, and the reverse. ° MS gl: Le., a mood composed of an affirmative universal and a negative uni- versal, as we say, “All men are living beings, and [so] no man is a horse.” *! Le., [lazim al-lazim lazim]; the MS supplies a gloss for each of these three terms: 1) [natijah], 2) [a‘amm], 3) [akhass], which may be joined to read, “The resulting inference of a more general [proposition] is a more specific [proposition].” 8 MS gl: This is a reference to the first mood of Figure 3, as when we say, “Every man is a living being and every man is rational—and this produces—Some living beings are rational.” [MaP & MaS = SiP]/[AAI-3] 114 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER 3 2al) when the minor term is affirmed by all of the middle term [MasS],®* and 2b1) [when] the major term is affirmed by some of the middle term [MiP],—just as if the major premise in the example given should be exchanged for our saying, “Some B is A”; and [Figure 3] will provide a valid demonstration— 2a2) when the major term is affirmed by all of the middle term [MaP], and 2b2) [when] the minor term is affirmed by some of the middle term [MiS],—just as if the minor premise [in the example given above] should be exchanged for our saying, “Some B is C”, — all 1 and 2] proving that the major term is affirmed by some of the minor term. [ That is: [MaP & MaS = SiP]/[AAI-3], and [MiP & MaS = SiP]/[IAI-3], and [MaP & MiS = SiP]/[AII-3].] In other words, [Figure 3] will provide a valid demonstration {when it is done] by means of the three foregoing moods, all proving that the major term is affirmed by some of the minor term, as when we say, “Some C is A.” Or, [Figure 3] will provide a valid demonstration— 3a) when the minor term is affirmed by all of the middle term [MaS], and 3b) [when] the major term is negated by all MS 27a _ of the mid- dle term [MeP], or 3c) [when] the major term is negated by some of the middle term [MoP], as when we say, “All B is C, and—no B is A, or,—some B is not A.” Or, [Figure 3] will provide a valid demonstration— 4a) when the minor term is affirmed by some of the middle term [MiS], and 4b) [when] the major term is negated by all of the middle term [MeP], as when we say, “Some B is C, and no B is A”, 83 MS gl: So when the minor premise is affirmative universal and the major premise is affirmative particular it will produce [as a valid inference] the affirmative particular, as when we say, “Every living being is a sensate being and some living beings are rational—and this produces—some sensate beings are rational.” ARGUMENTATION 115 —f[all 3 and 4] proving that the major term is negated by some of the minor term. [That is: [MeP & MaS = SoP]/[EAO-3], and [MoP & MaS = SoP]/[OAO-3], and [MeP & MiS = SoP]/[EIO-3].] In other words, [Figure 3] will provide a valid demonstration L52 [when it is done] by means of the three foregoing moods, [all] prov- ing that the major term is negated by some of the minor term, as when we say, “Some C is not A.” Baydawi said: L 52, T 24 Figure 4 Figure 4 will provide a valid demonstration— la) when the minor term is affirmed by all of the middle term [Mas], and lb) [when] [the middle term] is affirmed by all of the major term {PaM], or 2a) [when the minor term is affirmed by all of the middle term [MaS],] and 2b) [when [the middle term] is affirmed] by some of [the major term] [PiM], —f[all | and 2] proving that the major term is affirmed by some of the minor term. [That is: [PaM & MaS = SiP]/[AAI-4], and [PiM & Mas = SiP]/[IAI-4].] Or, [Figure 4 will provide a valid demonstration]— 3a) when [the minor term] is affirmed by all of [the middle term] [Mas], and 3b) [when] the middle term is negated by all of the major term [PeM], or 4a) [when [the minor term] is affirmed] by some of [the middle term] [MiS], and 4b) [when the middle term is negated by all of the major term [PeM],| —[all 3 and 4] proving that the major term is negated by some of the minor term. {That is: [PeM & MaS = SoP]/[EAO-4], and [PeM & MiS = SoP]/[EIO-4].] Or, [Figure 4 will provide a valid demonstration]— 3a) when the minor term is negated by all of the middle term [MeS], and 116 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER 3 5b) [when] [the middle term] is affirmed by all of the major term [PaM], —fall 5] proving that the major term is negated by all of the minor term. [That is: [PaM & MeS = SeP]/[AEE-4].] Isfahani says: L 52, T 24, MS 27a Figure 4 Figure 4, if it is to be productive [of a valid proof demonstration], stipulates (a.) that the two lesser categories, [namely] negation and particularity,** should not be together, either in a single premise,” or in [the] two premises, equally whether they are of one kind, as when both premises are either negative or particular, or whether they are of two kinds, as when one of them is negative and the other is particular; unless of course, if the minor premise should be affirmative particular, then in that case it [i.e., Figure 4] would neces- sarily stipulate (b.) that the major premise should be negative universal. a. The reason for the first stipulation, namely, that the two cat- egories should not be together in [a Figure 4 syllogism], [and] assum- ing that the minor premise would not be affirmative particular, is because if the two lesser categories should be together in [one [Figure 4] syllogism], [and] assuming that the minor premise would not be affirmative particular, then it would imply the [kind of syllogistic] difference that is necessarily sterile of any conclusion. [It would be] as when we say, “No men are horses, and no don- keys are men”, or, “no neighing animals are men.” Rightly, in the first example, there should be a differentiating statement, namely, “No horses are donkeys”, and in the second example there should be a coordinating statement, namely, “All horses are neighing animals.” Now, if the major premise should be exchanged for our saying, “Some living beings are men”, or, “Some rational beings are men”, then the major premise would become affirmative particular and the minor premise negative universal. But rightly, in the first example there should be a coordinating statement, namely, “All horses are 84 “Negatives and particulars are counted inferior to affirmatives and universals.” from A Grammar of Logic, by Alexander Jamieson. New Haven: 1822, p. 255. 8 MS gl: Their being in one premise would be if that premise were both neg- ative and particular. ARGUMENTATION 117 living beings”, and in the second example there should be a differ- entiating statement, namely, “No horses are rational beings.” It would be as when we say, “Some living beings are not men”,*° and, “All rational beings are animal beings”, or, “All horses are liv- ing beings.” Rightly, in the first example there should be a coordi- nating statement, namely, “All men are rational beings”, and in the second example there should be a differentiating statement, namely, “No men are horses.” And it would be as when we say, “All rational beings are men”, and “Some living beings are not rational”,®’ or, “Some donkeys are not rational.” Rightly, in the first example there should be coordi- nating statement, namely, “All men are living beings”, and in the second example L 53 there should be a differentiating statement, namely, “No men MS 27b are donkeys.” These combinations® are more specific than those in which the two lesser categories are together, except for the one compounded of the minor premise affirmative particular with the major premise negative universal and the one compounded of the two affirmative particulars. The combinations in which the two lesser categories are together are eleven in number: 1) minor premise affirmative universal & major premise negative particular, 2) minor premise affirmative particular & major premise negative universal, 3)" ‘ i" & " 7 negative particular, 4) " " 7 - & " "affirmative particular, 5) minor premise T 25 negative universal & major premise nega- tive universal, 85 MS gl: This is an example of the two lesser categories being in one premise, the minor premise, since [here] the minor premise is negative particular. *7 MS gl: This is an example of the two lesser categories being in one premise, the major premise, since the major premise is negative particular. 8 MS gl: Le., the four combinations, which are: 1) minor premise negative universal & major premise negative universal, 2) minor premise negative universal & major affirmative particular, 3) minor premise negative particular & major affirmative universal, and 4) minor premise affirmative universal & major premise negative particular. 118 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER 3 6 " n U " & vn " negative particular, 7 " w " a & uw " affirmative particular, 8) minor premise negative particular & the four preconditioned major ones: [namely, # 8 =] minor pr. negat. partic. [& major premise affir- mative universal,] 9 . : : [& " "negative universal, ] 10 : : . e!" ’ affir- mative particular,] 11 y 7 5 [& " "negative particular]. 1. The first combination of those mentioned, that composed of the two negative universals [i.e., #5], is more specific [and definite]** than (a) the two negative particulars [#11] and (b) the minor premise negative universal & the major negative particular [#6] and (c) the minor premise negative particular & the major premise negative uni- versal [#9]. 2. The second combination of those mentioned, that composed of a minor premise negative universal & a major premise affirmative particular [#7], is more definite than [that] composed of a minor premise negative particular and a major premise affirmative partic- ular [#10]. 3. The third combination of those mentioned, that composed of a minor premise negative particular & a major premise affirmative universal [#8], is more definite than a minor premise negative par- ticular & a major premise affirmative particular [#10]. 4, The fourth combination of those mentioned, that composed of a minor premise affirmative universal & a major premise nega- tive particular [#1], is more definite than a minor premise affirmative particular & a major premise negative particular [#3]. Now, when the most specific [and definite] one is not productive [of a valid proof demonstration] then the most general [and indefinite] *° L gl: The universal is more specific [and definite] [akhass] than the particu- lar, because wherever there exists a universal there will exist the particular, and not wherever there exists a particular there will exist the universal. While the adjective translated, “more definite”, also means, “more specific”, the sense here is of a reliable coverage of intent in reference. ARGUMENTATION 119 one will not be productive. So it is established that nine combina- tions are unproductive because of the first stipulation.” b. The second stipulation [for the productivity of a Figure 4 syl- logism], namely, that the major premise must be negative universal; if the minor premise should be affirmative particular, it is because if that should not be so then it would imply the [kind of syllogistic] difference that is necessarily sterile of any conclusion. It would be as when we say, “Some living beings are men”, and “all rational beings are living beings”, or, “all horses are living beings.” Rightly, in the first example there would be a statement of coordi- nation, namely, “All men are rational”, and in the second example there would be a statement of differentiation, namely, “No men are horses.” This is more specific [and definite] than the two affirmative particulars. And when the more specific [and definite] are not pro- ductive then the more general [and indefinite] are not productive. Thus there drops out [of consideration] because of the second stipulation two other moods. So [in Figure 4] there are five pro- ductive moods: (1-3) minor premise affirmative universal & the three [major premises, namely, affirmative universal, affirmative particular, and neg- ative universal], (4) minor premise affirmative particular & major premise negative MS 28a _ universal, (5) minor premise negative universal & major premise affirmative universal. The first four [of these] validly produce only a particular conclu- sion”! because of the possibility that the minor term might be more general [in extension] than the major term. 1. [The first] would be as when we say, “All men are living beings, and all rational beings are men.”” [#1: PaM & MaS = SiP/AAI-4] °° MS gl: This being that the two lesser categories should not be together [in a syllogism]. *' MS gl: Because of the impossibility of predicating a more specific [proposi- tion] of any individual [proposition] that is more general. ” MS gl: This [syllogism] does not produce the conclusion, “All living beings are rational”, but rather, “Some living beings are rational”, because of the impos- sibility of predicating what is more specific of any individual example of what is more general in extension. 120 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER 3 2. So if there should be no productivity of a universal [propo- sition] L 54 in this [first] mood, then there would not be any productivity of a universal in the second one because it [ie., the first] is more specific [and definite] than the second. [#2: PiM & MaS = SiP/IAI-4] 3. And [in the third] it would be as when we say, “All men are living beings, and no horses are men.”*? [#3: PeM & MaS = SoP/EAO-4] 4. And if this mood should not produce a universal proposi- tion, then [neither] would [the fourth one] a minor premise affirmative particular with a major premise negative universal produce a uni- versal proposition because the former mood [#3] is more specific [and definite] than the latter. [#4: PeM & MiS = SoP/EIO-4] 5. But the minor premise negative universal with the major premise affirmative universal will produce a negative universal [con- clusion]. [#5: PaM & MeS = SeP/AEE-4] Summary of figure 4 Figure 4 will produce a valid demonstration— la) when the minor term is affirmed by all the middle term [MaS], and lb) [when] the middle term is affirmed by all the major term [PaM], as when we say, “All B is C & all A is B”, or 2a) when the minor term is affirmed by all the middle term [MaS], and 2b) [when] the middle term is affirmed by some of the major term [PiM], as when we say, “All B is C & some A is B”, —fall 1 and 2] proving that the major term is affirmed by some of the minor term, as when we say, “Some C is A.” In other words, [Figure 4] will produce a valid demonstration when [either of] these two moods [lab or 2ab] is used, proving that the major term is affirmed by some of the minor term. Or, [Figure 4] will provide a valid demonstration— % MS gl: This [syllogism] does not produce, “No living beings are horses”; but rather it produces, “Some living beings are not horses”, because of the impossibil- ity of negating the species of all individual examples of the genus. ARGUMENTATION 12] 3a) when the minor term is affirmed by all the middle term [Mas], and 3b) [when] the middle term is negated by all the major term [PeM], as when we say, “All B is C & no A is B”; or, [Figure 4] will produce a valid demonstration— 4a) when the minor term is affirmed by some of the middle term [MiS], and 4b) [when] the middle term is negated by all of the major term [PeM], as when we say, “Some B is C & no A is B”; ~——[all 3 and 4] proving that the major term is negated by some of the minor term. In other words, [Figure 4] will produce a valid demonstration when [either of] these two moods [3ab or 4ab] is used, proving that the major term is negated by some of the minor term. Or, [Figure 4] will produce a valid demonstration— 5a) when the minor term is negated by all the middle term [MeS], and 5b) [when] the middle term is affirmed by all the major term [PaM], —f[all of 5] proving that the major term is negated by all the minor term. | That is: [PaM & MaS = SiP/AAI-4], and [PiM & MaS = SiP/IAI-4], and [PeM & MaS = SoP/EAO-4], and [PeM & MiS = SoP/EIO-4], and [PaM & MeS = SeP/AEE-4].] Baydawi said: L 54, T 25 Summary of the types of the syllogisms Thus, the syllogistic combinations that are productive [of a valid proof demonstration] are twenty-three in number: four hypothetical exceptive, and nineteen categorical connective. A discussion thor- oughly examining them all is to be found in the books on logic.” %* See the note at the end of Chapter 2 above, “Explanatory statements.” A.-M. Goichon follows her discussion there (in the En-I-2 s.v. “hadd”) by listing a num- ber of these books on logic available to Baydawi and Isfahani. 122 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER 3 Isfahani says: L 54, T 25, MS 28a Summary of the types of the syllogisms It is clear from what has been said® that the syllogistic combina- tions that are productive [of a valid proof demonstration] are twenty- three in number. a. Four [of these] are ‘hypothetical exceptive’ in type. 1. Two of these four [combinations] are composed of a ‘con- ditional conjunctive’ that is decisively affirmative of inherent neces- sity,°* and [either] asserting the factual truth of its condition,” or, denying the fact of what is conditioned.” 2. Two of the four [combinations] are composed of a) a ‘[conditional] disjunctive’ that is real and affirmative of incompatibility,” that is, it is ‘impossible to match’ as it affirms its incompatibility in affirming the position of one of its two parts,'° and b) a ‘[conditional] disjunctive’ that is real and affirmative of incompatibility, that is, it is ‘impossible to isolate’ L 55 as it affirms its incompatibility in negating the position of one of its two parts.'®! b. Nineteen [combinations] are ‘categorical connective’ in type: four in Figure 1, four in Figure 2, six in Figure 3, and five in Figure 4. A discussion thoroughly examining both explanatory statements and their parts, and argumentation and its parts and properties, MS 28b its classes and conditions, is presented’ in the books on logic. Therefore, let us confine ourselves to what [Baydawi] has set forth, so that the commentary will correspond to the text. % T alone reads, “we have said” [dhakarna]. 6 [al-shartiyah al-muttasilah al-mijibah al-luzimiyah]. 7 [wad‘ muqaddamaha]. If A is, then B is; now A is, therefore B is: tradition- ally called “modus ponendo ponens.” Cf. Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. D.G. Runes, the article, “Logic, formal”, section 2: ‘Hypothetical syllogism’ etc. % Tf A is, B is; now B is not, therefore A is not; traditionally called, “modus tollendo tollens.” Cf. Dictionary of Philosophy, the location cited. % [al-haqiqiyah al-mijibah al-‘inadiyah]. 100 MS gl: As a number will be either even or odd. ‘01 MS gl: As, the case is that either this thing is not a man, or it is not a horse. 102 The MS alone supplies “is set forth” [madhkir]. ARGUMENTATION 123 Baydawi said: L 55, T 25 3. The premised materials of argumentation An argument may be structured either upon the basis of rationality or upon the basis of authoritative tradition. a. Argumentation structured on rationality In this first [basis of argumentation], the premises are either 1. very positive, in which case [the argument] is called ‘proof’ or ‘proof demonstration’, or they are 2. presumptive or popularly accepted, and [the argument] is called ‘rhetorical’, or ‘hortatory’, or they 3. may only resemble T 26 one of these two, and then [the argument] is called ‘fallacy’. Isfahani says: L 55, T 26, MS 28b 3. The premised materials of argumentation Topic 3 is on the materials of argumentation, namely, the judg- mental propositions [i.e., premises] of which the syllogistic argument is composed. An argument may be structured either upon the basis of ration- ality, in that it is a product of the intellect, without any need to draw on the oral religious tradition, or, it may be structured upon the basis of the authoritative tradition,’ in that oral religious tra- dition freely enters into it. The former is as when we say, “The universe is a possible reality and every possible reality has its cause, so the universe has a cause.” The latter is as when we say, “Whoever abandons what he has been commanded to do is disobedient, in accordance with the word of the Most High, ‘Have you disobeyed my command?’” [Qur’an 20:93] and [when we say], “Every disobedient person deserves the Fire! in accordance with the word of the Most High, ‘Whoever 8 Oral religious tradition [sam4‘]; authoritative tradition [naq]. 124 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER 3 disobeys God and His Messenger thereby shall get the Fire of Hell.’” [Qur’an 72:23] Let no one say that restriction [from one type or the other] is prohibited,—-since it is admissible that an argument should be composed of both traditional and rational [elements], and thus an argument might be either rational completely or traditional completely, or com- posed of both these factors;—because our [i-e., Isfahani’s] position is that something ‘purely traditional’, wherein the intellect would have no entry, would be impossible. Indeed, the ‘argument’, equally whether it be structured upon the basis of ‘rationality’ or upon ‘tra- dition’, has [both] ‘form’! and ‘substance’. Thus, [for example], its ‘form’ would be structured rationally, ‘tradition’ not entering into it; while the veracity of its ‘substance’ would be dependent on the intellect,’ so a ‘purely traditional’ [argument] would be impossible. Thus, from this mentioned standpoint, restriction certainly applies to both the rational and the traditional [forms of argument]. Unless, of course, if it should be that what is intended by the ‘purely rational’ would be something whose two premises would be certified by the intellect, and [what is intended] by the ‘purely tra- ditional’ would be something whose two premises would be certified by tradition; then in that case, the argument would not be restricted to the ‘purely rational’ or the ‘purely traditional’. Rather, a third division would [come to be] realized which would be composed of both the rational and the traditional, in that one of its two premises would be certified by the intellect L 56 and the other by author- itative tradition. It would be as when we say, “Ablution is an act [of religious import], and every act [of religious import] is [to be judged] by the ‘intention’ [i.e., that motivates it].” This is in accordance with the saying of the Prophet, “Deeds [of religious import may be judged] only by their [motivating] intentions.”'” The first premise [here] is a rational statement, and the second is a traditional one. 1% MS gl: Le., its syllogistic figure. 105 MS gl: Le., the minor and major premises. 16 L, alone reading, “tradition” [naql], while T, the MS and MS Garrett 989Ha read, “intellect” [‘aql], which correctly fits the context. 107 A well known hadith, indexed in Wensinck’s Handbook of Early Muhammadan Tradition, under the rubric, “Intention”: “The value [and reward] of works is in the intention.” It is quoted in several of the Hadith collections. ARGUMENTATION 125 [Baydawi], our author, regarded the former aspect [with prefer- ence],’” so he set up two divisions, ‘rational’ and ‘traditional’, while the Imam [Fakhr al-Din Razi] regarded the latter aspect [with pref- erence],'° so he set up three divisions, ‘purely rational’, ‘purely tra- ditional’ and ‘a composite of them both’. a. Argumentation structured on rationality In the first [of the two methods of argumentation], that is, argu- mentation structured upon [the basis of] rationality, the premises are either 1. ‘very positive’ and ‘necessary’ or ‘acquired’ [by logical rea- soning], this [kind of rational argumentation] being called ‘proof’ or ‘proof demonstration’; or they are 2. ‘presumptive’ or ‘popularly accepted’, this kind [of argu- mentation] being called ‘rhetorical’ and ‘hortatory’; or they only 3. have resemblance to one of these two [types of premises], namely, to the ‘very positive’ or to the ‘presumptive’!’® ‘popularly ac- cepted’ [types], this kind [of argumentation] being called ‘fallacious’. (1.) Thus, a ‘proof demonstration’ [argument] is a syllogism composed of ‘very positive’ [i.e., as distinct from ‘affirmative’] premises that produce a ‘very positive’ result; (2.) the ‘hortatory’ [argument is a syllogism] composed of pre- mises that are both ‘presumptive’ or both ‘popular in acceptance’, or they are a mixture of these two, or of one of the two and a ‘pos- itive’ one that produces a ‘presumptive’ result;''' MS 29a_ while (3.) a ‘fallacious’ [argument is a syllogism] composed of premises having [only] a ‘resemblance’ to the ‘very positive’, or to the ‘pre- sumptive’, or to the ‘popularly accepted’ [premises]. '8 MS gl: Le., wherein there would be an entry for the religious tradition; [cf. “Qur position,” above]. 09 MS gl: Le., wherein both [the syllogism’s] premises would be established by tradition. 0 The ‘presumptive’ and/or ‘popularly accepted’ are reckoned as one, being the second of the two kinds of rational argument; as conjunction between these two L and T use ‘or’, while the MS uses ‘and’. "! Text varies slightly: L [min ahadayhima aw min qat‘Iyah mufid li-zanniyah]; T [min ihdahima wa-min gat‘tyah mufid li-zanniyah]; MS [min ahadayhima wa-min gat‘tyah mufidah li-natijah zanniyah]; MS Garrett 989Ha [min ahadayhima wa-min gat‘Tyah mufidah lil-zanniyah]. 126 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER 3 Baydawi said: L 56, T 26 1. Proof demonstration a) The principles of convinced certainty are those [judg- mental propositions, i.c., premises] by which the intellect becomes absolutely certain simply on the basis of a conception of the [premises’] two terms [major and minor], these being called ‘axiomatic first prin- ciples’ and ‘intuitive principles [of knowledge]’.!? b) Or, [certainty comes] through an intermediate factor that the mind conceives while forming a conception of the two terms, as, for example, that four is an even number, this factor being called ‘judgments already in syllogistic form’.!!® c) Or, [certainty comes] through sense perception, this fac- tor being called ‘direct observations’ and ‘sensate perceptions’.''* d) Or, [certainty comes] by way of these latter two together, the [external] sense [involved] being the sense of hearing, as when a great many people join in reporting the fact of an entirely possi- ble event and one’s intellect is thus made absolutely certain that their being in collusion to he would be impossible, these factors being called ‘evidence based on continuous reportings’.'?” e) Or, [certainty comes] by other means, as, for example, when one observes the pattern of a certain thing being set together with another on many occasions in such a way that one’s intellect judges that it is not merely a coincidence,—otherwise, it would always happen, not just most of the time,—as there being a usual sequence of diarrhea following upon the drinking of a preparation of scam- mony,''® this factor being called the ‘testimony of experience’.'”” Sometimes the observation [of a phenomenon] once or twice may be enough to join its contextual features’ to it, as in the judgment 12 Tawwaliyat wa-badihiyat]. "3 [qadaya qiyasatuha ma‘aha]. "4 [mushahadat wa-hissiyat]. NS fmutawatirat]. 16 [al-saqmuniya|]—Identified as ‘bindweed—{[convolvulus scammonia]’ from whose tuberous roots a cathartic resin is obtained. In appearance and function the plant seems closely related to ‘jalap’, associated with Central America and thence to Europe. "7 [tajarrubiyat}. "8 (qara@in]. ARGUMENTATION 127 that the light of the moon is borrowed from the sun, [factors of this sort] being called ‘intuitive surmise’.'' Isfahani says: L 56, T 26, MSA 29a 1. Proof demonstration After he had set forth the classes of rational argumentation, namely, ‘proof demonstration’, ‘rhetoric’ and ‘fallacy’, he desired to clarify their principles, these being the judgmental propositions [i.e., premises] from which argument is composed. So he proceeded with the prin- ciples of proof demonstration. a) The principles of convinced certainty are the first prin- ciples of proof demonstration, these being the judgmental proposi- tions [i.e., premises] by which the intellect becomes absolutely certain, either— 1) simply on the basis of a conception L 57 of both the two terms [major and minor of the premises], equally whether the conception of their two terms is by the logical ‘acquisition’ [of knowledge] or whether it is by ‘intuition’; 2) or, by a conception of one of the two terms [derived] through logical acquisition and by a conception of the other [term derived] through intuition, as when we say, “The whole is greater than any part”, and, “In [the balance of whether it will have] its own existence a possible reality has need for an agency of prefer- ence”,—these [principles] are called ‘axiomatic first principles’ and ‘intuitive principles [of knowledge’]. b) Or, [certainty comes] through judgmental propositions [or, premises] through which the intellect becomes absolutely cer- tain, not simply on the basis of a conception of their two terms, but rather by ‘an intermediate factor’ that the mind conceives while forming a conception of their ‘two terms’, such as that ‘four’ is ‘an even number’. Indeed, the intellect becomes absolutely certain that ‘four is an even number’, not simply on the basis of a conception of [this proposition’s] two terms, but rather by an intermediate factor that it conceived while forming the conception of both ‘evenness’ "N° fhadstyat] Cf. the discussion of this term in A.-M. Goichon’s Lexique de la Langue Philosophique @Ibn Sina, no. 140 on p. 65. 128 INTRODUCTION, CHAPTER 3 and ‘four’, this [intermediate factor] being [the concept of] ‘divisi- ble into two equal portions’. Thus, while the intellect is forming its conception of [what is] ‘evenness’ and of [what is] ‘four’, it con- ceives of ‘divisible into two equal portions’ and a syllogism occurs to it [as follows]: ‘Four’ is ‘divisible into two equal portions’, and everything “divisible into two equal portions’ is ‘even’, as is a ‘pair’, thus ‘four’ is an ‘even’ number. These [propositions with intermediate factors] are called ‘judg- ments already in syllogistic form’ because when the two terms are conceived the intermediate factor is also conceived, so the syllogism occurs as a result of conceiving the two terms and the middle term. c) Or, [certainty comes] by way of judgmental propositions [or, premises] that give certainty in accordance with sensate [testi- mony to them], that is to say, judgments by which the intellect becomes certain, not simply on the basis of a conception of the [propositions’] two terms, but rather through either an external sense, as when we say, “The sun is shining brightly” and, “fire is very hot”, or through an inner sense, as is our knowledge that we are happy or angry or hungry or thirsty. These judgmental propositions are called T 27 ‘direct observations’ and ‘sensate perceptions’, Indeed, the agent of judgment is the intellect, but this is by the inter- mediation of sense [evidence], so the sense is called an agent of judg- ment, since the judgment comes by reason of it. d) Or, [certainty comes] through judgmental propositions [or, premises] by which the intellect is convinced together with sen- sate evidence,'”’ the sense involved being the sense of hearing, as when a great many people join in reporting the fact of an entirely possible event, and one’s intellect is thus made absolutely certain that their being in collusion to lie was impossible. These [factors] are called, evidence [based on] continuous reportings’, as is our knowl- edge of individual people in past history and of far distant lands. 120 Text varies slightly: L and T: [al-‘aql wa-al-hiss huwa hiss al-sam‘]; MS: [al- ‘aql wa-al-hiss, wa-al-hiss huwa hiss al-sam‘]; MS Garrett 989Ha: [al-‘aql wa-al-hiss ma‘an, wa-al-hiss huwa hiss al-sam‘], this latter being most closely similar to the Baydawi statement. ARGUMENTATION 129 [Baydawi] considered {it important] that this report should be only of sensate evidence, because with anything other than [objective] sensate evidence a report about something from a great many peo- ple would not be useful in providing certainty. MS 29b And he considered it important that [the report] should be of an entirely possible event, because if it should be an impossible event, then no certainty would come about from a report of its occurrence. Further, if the report should come from many people indeterminate in num- bers, Baydawi considered it important that one’s intellect should be absolutely certain of the impossibility of their being in collusion to lie, since, if one’s intellect should not be certain of the impossibility of their being in collusion to lie, then their report would not pro- duce any certainty of an event. e) Or, [certainty comes] through judgmental propositions [ie., premises] by which the intellect is convinced, the sense!*! involved being a sense other than hearing, such as the observation that there was a pattern arrangement of one thing in association with another L 58 many times, so that one’s intellect would judge that it was not by coincidence but because some hidden syllogism was joined with it. This would be that if the arrangement mentioned should be a coincidence then it would not always be that way or even most of the time. It would be as when we judge that drinking a prepa- ration of scammony causes diarrhea, by reason of our observation that diarrhea is its consequence time after time. These judgmental propositions are called ‘the testimony of experience’. Sometimes an observation made only once or twice will be enough for the [mental] joining together of the contextual features of an event, as is the judgment that the light of the moon is borrowed from the sun, because of the varying shapes that the lig