← Volver a la ficha del textoAbstract
‘Abd al-Ghanl al-NabulusT’s (1641-1731) Commentary on Ibn ‘ArabT’s Fususal-
Hikam an Analysis and Interpretation
by
Andrew N Lane
St Catherine’s College
D.Phil.
Hilary Term 2001
This thesis is an analysis and interpretation of six chapters from al-NabulusT’s
commentary. One of these is an account of his intentions for writing the commentary
and the other five are commentaries on parts of the Fususal-Ifikam These chapters
chosen from al-NabulusT’s commentary treat important subjects in the Fususal-FRkam
which exemplify Ibn cArabT’s thought particularly well. They are concerned with
certain issues which were perceived to have a special importance in the Islamic
religious tradition. One issue, for example, is that of Pharaoh’s profession of faith
which was a prominent subject of debate and discussion in Islamic literature Ibn
cArabT’s position on this was severely criticised by many.
The thesis argues that there are four ways in which to appreciate the
commentary’s intellectual and religious outlook: first, with respect to its approach to
Ibn cArabT’s ideas, second, with respect to its use of Qur’an and hadnh in the specific
context of developing an independence from Ibn cArabT’s thought and in the general
context of Qur’anic exegesis; third, in its use of language, narrative and metaphor,
finally, in its legal approach towards the issue of Pharaoh’s faith evincing arguments
similar to those of Ibn cArabT, but not identical, and, like Ibn cArabI, adopting positions
different from those of the wider Islamic religious tradition.
The thesis demonstrates that the commentary’s significance can be appreciated
in two historical contexts: the anti-Ibn cArabT tendency manifest in late 17th century
Damascus, and the enduring tradition of polemics surrounding Ibn cArabT’s thought.
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Acknowledgements
Mr. Ron Nettler has been a much appreciated source of support,
encouragement and constructive criticism throughout the period of research and
writing of this thesis. I also thank Dr. Eugene Rogan for helping me with this research
in the first year. Dr. Yasin Dutton and Dr Ruba Kana’an have also offered criticism
and suggestions along the way
Two months of research in Damascus in the summer of 1 996 were made
possible through grants from various bodies at Oxford: St. Antony Paul, and
NMitte-East Centre, the Interfaculty Committee for Modem Middle Eastern Studies;
the Committee for Graduate Studies; and the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies’
Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah Research Grant (1996). I should like to thank various
individuals at the EFEAD in Damascus, whose generosity was much appreciated
Finally, I would like to express my appreciation to family and friends whose
encouragement over the years has kept this research going. There are many whose
support, conversations, ideas and suggestions have been invaluable. In particular, I
must thank my parents, my brother and his family, and Dr. Francisca Mutapi. And
finally, I must acknowledge my gratitude to the proof-readers: Gurjit, Katie, Munna,
Pippa, Samira, Sara, Andrew, Kevin, Paul, and Walid.
Table of Contents
Abstract i
Acknowledgements ii
Table of Contents iii
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
Chapter 2 The Intellectual Life of al-NabulusI 18
Chapter 3 Al-NabulusT’s Introduction to the Shark Jawahir al-Nusus
fT Hall Kalimat al-Fusus
Introduction 42
Other Commentaries And Their Readership 43
Al-Nabulusl’s Classification of Mankind according
to Epistemology and Faith 47
The One God and His Different Manifestations 57
Polemical Disputes over the Understanding of the
One God 63
The Fusus al-Hikam and its Intended Readership 68
Al-NabulusT as Interpreter 70
Chapter 4 Ibrahim
Introduction 74
Ibn cArabT and Ibrahim 75
Qur’anic Motifs 75
The Hikma 76
Takhallul 76
Ethics and God’s Freedom 79
The Divine Essence 80
Knowledge 91
The Reciprocity of Nourishment 1 06
Chapter 5 Zakariyya
Introduction 121
Ibn cArabI 122
Al-NabulusI 123
The Metaphysics of God’s Mercy 128
iii
148
The Ethical Implications of Divine Metaphysical
Mercy
Pre Ibn cArabT Sufism
Ibn cArabT
The Metaphysics of Mercy and Wrath according
to al-NabulusI
The Mercy of Felicity and Torment
The Acquisition of General Mercy and Felicity
The Acquisition of Specific Mercy
Conclusion
Chapter 6 Harun
Introduction
The One and the Many
Prophets, Messengers and Friends of God
Ibn cArabT and al-NabulusT
Conclusion
Chapter 7 Musa
Introduction
The Qur’an
Qur’anic Exegesis
Ibn cArabT and Pharaoh
Al-NabulusT and Pharaoh
Arguments for the Acceptability of Pharaoh’s Faith
Motivation for Pharaoh’s Profession of Faith
Jibnl’s Role in Pharaoh’s Profession of Faith
Pharaoh’s Death in a State of Purity
The Acceptability of Pharaoh’s Repentance
Pharaoh as Martyr of the Sea
The Debate over Pharaoh’s Punishment and Ultimate
Fate
Pharaoh as a Sign for Posterity
Conclusion
149
151
152
154
156
158
166
172
190
195
206
210
213
215
223
229
234
234
240
243
246
248
250
252
254
iv
Chapter 8 Muhammad
Introduction 258
Ibn cArabT and Muhammad 258
Al-NabulusT and Muhammad 266
Muhammad as the First Creation 269
Muhammad as Creative Principle 276
Conclusion 289
Chapter 9 Conclusion 293
Bibliography 299
Chapter 1
Introduction
The intellectual history of the Middle East has been a neglected field, especially
in the early modem period, ca. 1600-1800. This period was dismissed by an earlier
generation of scholars as one of general and uniform decline in which there was no
significant intellectual activity. Gibb and Bowen described the Islamic intellectual
culture in the 1 8th century as having fallen below its own medieval standards and that
its literary production degenerated resulting in copious amounts of unoriginal
scholastic works.1 Concerning the period from 1517 to 1800, Gibb states that:
After the Ottoman conquests a profound intellectual lethargy seems to settle on the Arab lands . .
Literary composition seems to have continued almost as actively as before, but only a pitiably small
handful of works stands out from the monotonous mass of mediocrity.2
These assumptions have remained unchallenged until comparatively recently.
Marshall Hodgson argues that ‘in the sixteenth century and well into the seventeenth,
the Muslims found themselves at a peak point not only of political power but also of
cultural activity . . the two centuries from 1500 to 1700 were by and large a time of
relatively strong institutions, of a confident intellectual life, and above all of imposing
1 Gibb & Bowen, Islamic Society and the West (London: OUP, 1957). I, 161-3.
2 Gibb, HAR, Arabic Literature - An Introduction, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1963).
pp 155-6. This paradigm of intellectual decline can be found in later works too. for example: Dodge,
B, Muslim Education in Medieval Times (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1962), p.86;
Nashabi, H, ‘Educational Institutions’, in The Islamic City, ed. by RB Seijeant (Paris: UNESCO,
1980), pp. 66-89 (p.82); and Sibai, MM, Mosque Libraries - An Historical Study (London & New
York: Mansell Publishing, 1987), p.34.
i
esthetic [sic] creation.’3 In reality this period was not devoid of intellectual vigour and
significance.4
In attempts to show this intellectual and cultural creativity, some modem
scholars have undertaken research into some of the material from this period and the
figures associated with it. A study has been written on al-ShacranI, an Egyptian Sufi
and scholar of the 16th century, whose ideas and influence were of great importance in
his time and after.5 A number of comparative studies of the famous Sufi and mufti of
17th century Jerusalem, Khair al-Dln al-RamlT, dismiss the paradigm of intellectual
decline in this period.6 Similarly, work has been conducted upon the writings of
Egyptian Sufis of the 18th century and the importance of their ideas for cushioning the
indigenous development of capitalism in pre-modem Egypt.7 There has been much
work on the Sufi ‘reformist movements’ of the 18th century. Both Rahman and
Trimingham have examined 18th and 19th century revival movements.8 John Voll
examined various biographical sources and hadnh works to discuss the informal
networks of 18th century revivalist scholars and their activities.9 Elizabeth Sirriyeh has
written about the struggle for religious renewal in the 1 8th century and its Sufi origins:
3 Hodgson. MGS, Rethinking World History - Essays on Europe . Islam , and World History, ed. by E
Burke III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 100 & 204.
4 Gerber. H, Islamic Law and Culture 1600-1840 (Leiden: Brill. 1999), pp.23. 28 & 135.
5 Winter. M, Society and Religion in Early Ottoman Egypt: Studies in the Writings ofcAbd al-
Wahhab al-Shacrani. Studies in Islamic Culture and History. 4. (New Brunswick. NJ: Transaction
Books, 1982).
6 c Abbas, I, ‘Khair ad-Dln ar-RamlT’s Fataw3: A New Light on Life in Palestine in the
Eleventh/Seventeenth Century’, in Die Islamische Welt Zwischen Mittelaltes und Neuzeit, Festschrift
fur Hans Robert Roemer, ed. by Ulrich Haarmann & Peter Bachman (Beirut: for Steiner (Wiesbaden),
1979), pp 1-19; Ze’evi, D, An Ottoman Century - The District of Jerusalem in the 1600s (Albany:
SUNY Press, 1996); Gerber, H, Islamic Law, and Gerber, H, State, Society, and Law in Islam -
Ottoman Law in Comparative Perspective (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994).
7 Gran, P, The Islamic Roots of Capitalism (Austin. Texas. 1979).
8 Rahman. F, Islam, 2nd edn (London: University of Chicago Press. 1976). Trimingham. JS. The Sufi
Orders in Islam (New York & Oxford: OUP, 1998).
9 Voll, J, ‘Linking Groups in the Networks of Eighteenth Century Revivalist Scholars’, in Eighteenth
Century Renewal and Reform in Islam, ed. by Levtzion and Voll (Syracuse, 1987).
2
whether scholarly sheikhs noted for their intellectual achievements in other branches of
Islamic learning or those noted solely for their devotion to the spiritual life, or indeed
the many ordinary members of Sufi tarTqas that espoused the reforming cause. 10 Such
works support Marshall Hodgson’s insights into the cultural and intellectual creativity
of this period.
The life and works of cAbd al-Ghanl al-NabulusT, 1641-1731, open a window
onto the cultural, religious and intellectual activity of this period. Al-NabulusI was a
scholar and Sufi who lived in Damascus within the realm of the Ottoman empire He is
renowned for his writings, travels and teaching
There are significant lacunae in the scholarship on al-NabulusT. Barbara Von
Schlegell’s thesis is the only major English language study of al-NabulusT.11 Her focus
is on the stability of the institutions of Sufi orders through the example of al-NabulusT’s
life. She also examines al-NabulusT as a defender of Sufism as part of mainstream
Islam and as a promoter of the ideas of Ibn cArabT One major flaw in her work is that
she assumes that al-NabulusT’s beliefs are the same as Ibn cArabT’s beliefs as found in
the latter’s writings and as described by various modem scholars.12
10 Sirriyeh, E. Sufis and Anti-Sufis - The Defence , Rethinking and Rejection of Sufism in the Modem
World (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1999).
11 Von Schlegell. BR, ‘Sufism in the Ottoman Arab World: Shavkh cAbd al-Ghanl al-NabulusT
(d. 1 143/1731)’ (unpublished doctoral thesis. University of California, Berkeley. 1997). In French
there is: cAla’ al-DIn, B, ‘cAbdalganI an-NabulusT (1143/1731) - Oeuvre, Vie et Doctrine’, 2 vols
(unpublished doctoral thesis, Universite de Paris i, 1985). In Arabic there are: Basil, VS, ‘Wahdat al-
Wujud cinda Ibn cArabT wa-cAbd al-Ghanl al-NabulusF (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of
Saint Joseph, Beirut, 1986); Qalaygyan. S, cAbd al-Ghanl al-NabulusT - Hayatuh wa-shicruh’
(unpublished doctoral thesis, no further details).
12 Von Schlegell, ‘Sufism’, p.170.
3
Bakri cAla’ al-DTn’s thesis is a biographical bibliographical study which
describes the major contours of his life. This work is in two parts The first part is a
biography which describes the political and social environment in which al-NabulusI
grew up and lived. He discusses the faqlh-sufi conflict of al-Nabulusf s Damascus. It
also includes an analysis of some of his mystical ideas as found in various works The
second part is a bibliographical study of the manuscripts and printed editions of al-
Nabulusf s works.
Victor Said Basil’s work compares statements from various works of al-
NabulusI with those from Ibn cArabT He focuses on a number of themes including the
oneness of existence, deeds, good and evil, free-will and predetermination, and reward
and punishment. He suggests that al-NabulusI displays in his works an excess of
comment and clarification whereas Ibn cArabI’s style is more obscure, more learned,
and broader and richer in knowledge and ideas.
Shughik Qalaygyan describes the intellectual, social, economic and political
aspects of al-Nabulusf s period He examines al-Nabulusf s family background, life,
education and writings. He provides a study of al-Nabulusf s poetry and some of the
mystical themes found therein, such as the concept of existence. He also looks at the
reasons for al-Nabulusf s devotion to Sufism.
Besides these theses, there have been a number of articles published on al-
NabulusT. Their focus is principally on his travel writings and poetic works.13 There
13 See KhalidI, WAS. tcAbd al-Ghanl b. Ismail al-Nabulusf. in. El2 (Leiden: Brill. 1960). i. 60;
Kelner-H, B, tCAbd al-Ganl an-NabulusT and His Turkish Disciples’, Revue d'Histoire
4
are occasional references to al-Nabulusi in the secondary literature on the 1 7th and 1 8*
centuries or in thematic studies of Middle Eastern history, literature, philosophy and
Sufism. 14 On the whole these are positive, but are not supported with references, for
example:
Sufism was the most significant cultural feature of the age and provided its most noteworthy writers:
. . . and the Syrian ‘ Abd al-Ghanl of Nablus (d. 173 1), a prolific author who originated a new kind of
mystical travel-literature in rhymed prose, and a gifted poet as well.15
And,
Of writers who were touched by this new Naqshbandi teaching, the most famous was Abd al-Ghani
al-Nabulsi (1641-1731), a Damascene whose voluminous works included commentaries on the
teaching of Ibn Arabi and a number of descriptions of journeys to shrines, which are also records of
spiritual progress. 1 6
There is one exception to the general praising of al-NabulusT. William C
Chittick, a prolific author on Sufism, especially on Ibn cArabi, discusses al-Nabulusi in
Maghrebine/al-Majalla al-Ta 'rikhiyya al-Maghribiyya, 59-60(1990), 107-112; Amoretti, BS, ‘A
‘modern’ example of religious feeling: marginal notes on the writings of the mystic Abd al-Ghani al-
Nablusi (1641-173 1)’, in For a Palestinian: a Memorial to Wael Zuaiter, ed. by J Venn-Brown
(London: Kegan Paul International, 1984), pp 188-199; Kamada, S, ‘Nabulusfs Commentary on Ibn
al-Farid’s Khamriyah’, Orient (Tokyo), 18 (1992), 19-40; Winter, M, ‘A Polemical Treatise by cAbd
al-Ganl al-NabulusT against a Turkish Scholar on the Religious Status of the Dimmls’, ARAB1CA, 35
(1988), 92-103; Sirriyeh, E, ‘The Mystical Journeys of cAbd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi’, Die Welt des
Islams, 25 (1985), 84-96; Sirriyyah, E, ‘The Journeys of cAbd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi in Palestine
(1 101/1690 & 1 105/1693)’, Journal of Semitic Studies , 24 (1979), 55-69; Sirriyyah, E, Ziyarat of
Syria in a Rihla of c Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi (1050/1641-1143/1731)’, Journal of the Royal Asiatic
Society, (1979), 109-122; Abahsain, MM, The Supra-Symbolic Moth in Arabic Religious Poetry
from the Late Ottoman Period’, Journal of Arabic Literature, 24i (1993), 21-27: Al-Munajjid, S, &
Wild, S, (editors), Zwei Beschreibungen des Libanon: cAbdalganJ al-Nabulusi Reise durch die BiqJ
und al-cUtaifis Reise nach Tripolis (Wiesbaden, 1979); Busse, H. (editor). Die Reise des cAbd al-GanT
an-NabulusT durch den Libanon (Beirut, 1971); Busse, H, ‘cAbd al-GanT an-NabulusIs Reisen im
Lebanon (1100/1689-1 1 12/1 700)’, Der Islam 44 (1968), 71-1 14; Al-NabulusT, Al-HaqTqa wa 'l-Majaz
fTRiblat Bilad al-Shmi wa-Misr wa 'l-Hjaz, edited by RAH Murad (Damascus, 1989).
14 For example: Gibb. Arabic Literature, p. 156: Hourani. A A History of the Arab Peoples (London:
Faber and Faber, 1991), p.240; Trimingham, JS, The Sufi Orders, pp.70 & 95; Hodgson, MGS, The
Venture of Islam - Conscience and History in a World Civilisation, 3 vols (Chicago & London:
University of Chicago Press, 1974), m, 123; Lings, M, What is Sufism? (Cambridge: The Islamic
Texts Society, 1993), p. 12 1 .
15 Gibb. Arabic Literature, p. 156.
16 Hourani. A History, p.240.
5
a more negative but focused way He says of al-NabulusT’ s commentary on Ibn
cArabT,s Fususal-Hikam
Perhaps the most widely read commentary on the Fususal-Hkam in the Arab world was written by
the prolific Sufi author cAbd al-Ghanl al-NabulusI (d. 1 143/1730); his care to define and explain every
single word and his often questionable interpretations suggest that already by his time the general
ability to read and understand the Fusus in the Arab world had severely declined.1
However, in a work published two years later, Henri Corbin, a renowned
scholar of Ibn cArabT, argues that:
The Syrian theosopher and mystic cAbd al-GhSm al-NablusT [sic] . . was a prolific writer in the
tradition of Ibn al-cArab! (he left an excellent commentary on the Fusus m two great quarto volumes)
... It is to be hoped that a complete edition of the w orks of al-NablusT, and a general study of them,
will shortly appear.18
Al-NabulusT’s intellectual outlook reflects and engages with certain earlier
intellectual traditions, especially that of Ibn cArabI. Throughout the majority of his
works, al-NabulusT discusses Sufi ideas. This is even the case in his legalistic work on
the licitness of listening to musical instruments.19 Most central to al-NabulusT’s oeuvre
is his intralinear commentary upon Ibn cArabT’s Fususal-Hikam 20 No western
scholarly analysis of this commentary exists.
17 Chittick. WC, ‘Ibn cArabT and His School’ in Islamic Spirituality - Manifestations, ed. by SH Nasr
(New York, 1991), pp.49-79 (pp.53-4). Von Schlegell, Sufism', p.77n.209, echoes Chittick when
she suggests that al-NabulusT composed his commentary' as a straightforward line-by-line
explanation’.
18 Corbin, H, History of Islamic Philosophy (London & New York: Kegan Paul International, 1993).
pp.312-3.
19 Al-NabulusI. Idah al-Dalalat fTSamf al-Alat, ed. by AR Hammush (Damascus: Dar al-Fikr. 1981).
20 Ibn cArabT, Fususal-Hkam. ed. by AA cAftft (Beirut: D3r al-Kitab al-cArabT. 1980). Al-NabulusI.
SharhJawahir al-Nususfi Hall Kalimat al-Fusus, 2 vols (Cairo: Bulaq, 1304-1323); and al-NabulusI,
Sharh Jawahir al-Nususfi Hall Kalimat al-Fusus, British Library, MS No. Orl 1877, 156 fols. I call
al-NabulusI’s commentary intralinear, because his comments are situated within rather than between
the lines of Ibn cArabT’s original.
6
Ibn cArabf s Fususal-Hikam is divided into twenty-seven chapters, each of
which is in the framework of Qur’anic verses and badith which Ibn cArabT considers
relevant to a particular Qur’anic prophet in the exposition of his own ideas.21 For Ibn
cArabT, these prophets exemplified the basic ‘truths’ of his Sufi world-view. Each
‘truth’ is called wisdom ( tikma ) and is in the form of a ‘word’ (kalima) Ibn cArabT
explains this in a general way in his opening words of the Fususal-Ifikam.
Praise be to God who brings down wisdom upon the hearts of words.22
Al-Nabulust explains with references to Qur’an 4 171, Qur’an 66: 12, and
Qur’an 7: 158 that the term ‘words’ ( kalimat ) can be applied to perfect souls which are
God’s prophets:
(Upon the hearts of words ( al-kalim ))23 [this is] the plural of word {kalima). by which is meant the
perfect human essence. It is called ‘word’ in the Qur’an. God said concerning cIs3, ‘and His word
which He bestowed upon Maryam. ,24 God said concerning the faith of Maryam in the rest of the
prophets, and she believed in the words of her Lord and in His books. ,25 God said. The unlettered
Prophet who believes in God and His words. ,26 Thus one can apply ‘words’ to perfect souls in the
virtues of knowledge and acts.27
Each chapter in Ibn cArabT’s original relates a particular ‘wisdom’ {hikma) to a
specific prophet in its title. For example, the chapter on Ibrahim discusses the
relationship between God and man in terms of delirious love and mutual pervasion.
21 The one exception to this general rule is the prophet Khalid b SinSn who does not appear in the
Quran.
22 Ibn cArabT. Fususal-Hkam, I, 47.
23 This is Ibn cArabI’s original which is followed by al-NabulusT's comment.
24 Qur’an 4:171.
25 Qur’an 66:12.
26 Qur’an 7: 158.
27 Al-NabulusI, Sharh, I, 7.
7
Ibrahim pervades God’s attributes and vice versa. The chapter on Harun discusses the
issue of leadership and the worship of the golden calf Harun’s leadership was unable
to prevent the worship of the calf, but Musa stopped it upon his return. Ibn cArabT
suggests that God was actually worshipped in the calf. The chapter on Zakariyya
discusses the role of mercy in the creation of the world. Mercy becomes less of an
ethical and more of an ontological attribute. It should be noted that there is an
ambiguity in Ibn cArabT’s writings: although he may appear to say one thing - the main
thrust of his writing - he does not disavow its negation at the same time. This is an
important feature of his style of writing.28
The appreciation of Ibn cArabf s Fususal-Hikam has never been an easy task
From the days of his first followers to the present century there has been a tradition of
commentaries upon this abstruse work.29 Al-NabulusT is a link in the chain of the
interpreters of Ibn cArabT. Most scholarship has focused upon the earliest
commentaries as an aid to the appreciation of Ibn cArabT’s original. A noteworthy
example of this is Toshihiko Izutsu’s use of cAbd al-Razzaq al-Qashanl’s (d. 1330)
commentary on the Fususal-Hikam in his outstanding analysis of Ibn cArabT’s
‘philosophy’.30 Al-NabulusT, however, felt that the previous commentaries on the
Fususal-Hikam were difficult to understand and thus there was a need for a more
28 The various chapters of this thesis will provide detailed treatment of these themes and their
interpretation by al-NabulusT
29 See Morris, JW. ‘Ibn cArabi and His Interpreters’. Journal of the American Oriental Society . 106iii
(1986), 539-551, 106iv (1986), 733-756, 107i (1987), 101-119.
30 Izutsu, T, Sufism and Taoism - A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts (London:
University of California Press, 1984).
accessible and clear commentary.31 He completed this during a spiritual retreat on the
29th May 1685.
Although their formats mirror each other and al-NabulusT viewed his
understanding of Ibn cArabI’s ideas to be the same as Ibn cArabT’s own understanding,
the texts indicate that they diverge significantly at different points. Al-NabulusT’s
commentary is no mere paraphrase. Like all commentaries that are reflecting and
attempting to be true to the original, it does also express an originality of thought for
explicating the original in its own time and place. It naturally places novel limits on the
original text in a manner to produce a subtly new and original interpretation.32
This thesis will examine six chapters from al-NabulusT’s commentary. These
are his introduction to the commentary and the chapters on Ibrahim, Zakariyya, Harun,
Musa and Muhammad. In Ibn cArabT’s original work these chapters are of particular
interest to any enquiry into his thought and ideas 33 Although each one represents the
world-view of the whole work, they exemplify particular themes too. Al-NabulusT’ s
commentary upon them will delineate and represent the contours of his own thought
31 Al-NabulusT, Shark i. 2.
32 Rahbar. D. ‘Reflections on the Tradition of Qur anic Exegesis’. The Muslim World. 52 (1962). 296-
307 (p.304) states that ‘in interlinear commentaries the authors are subject to contextual control, and
in fact in their pious effort to assure semantic continuity often transfer meanings of phrases to
contiguous verses. Thus commentaries by their influence transform the lexical history of a language’.
Such transformation introduces perforce originality.
33 Al-Shacranl, cAbd al-Wahhab. Kitab al-Yawaqil wa ’ l-Jcmahir fiBavan cAqa'id al-Akabir (Cairo:
Bfllaq, 1890), pp. 13-4, lists some of the key accusations levelled against Ibn cArabT by the 16th
century. These include themes found in the chapters on Ibrahim, Zakariyya, Harun, and Musa. This
is corroborated by Knysh, AD, Ibn cArabIin the Later Islamic Tradition - the Making of a Polemical
Image in Medieval Islam (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999). The chapter on Muhammad is of interest
because of the importance of ideas concerning Muhammad in Sufi works. Al-NabulusT's introduction
reveals his intentions in writing his commentary and his views about mankind.
9
and ideas as well as his reception and understanding of one of Ibn cArabf s most
significant works.
There are four ways in which the outlook of al-NabulusT’s commentary on the
Fusus al-Ifikam may be appreciated: first, with respect to Ibn cArabT’s ideas and
themes, second, with respect to the use of Qur’an and hadHh in explicating Ibn
cArabI’s ideas; third, in al-NabulusT’s use of language, narrative and metaphor in the
composition of his commentary, which use both reflects and moves beyond Ibn cArabI;
and finally, in his legal approach to arguing the case for the soundness of Pharaoh’s
profession of faith. These four fields of creativity constitute the uniqueness of al-
NabulusT in the commentary
The principal themes of the Fusus al-Hikam are based upon the fundamental
relationship between God and man This is the foundation upon which the structure of
ideas is constructed. Both Ibn cArabT and al-NabulusT concentrate on the metaphysical
and abstract in the Fusus al-Hikam, as well as upon the method of understanding this
relationship. What is clear from the texts is that al-NabulusT reveals different concerns
to those of Ibn cArabT
For example, in the chapter on Ibrahim, both Ibn cArabT and al-NabulusT focus
on the ontological and epistemological relationship between God and man However,
al-NabulusT reveals a tendency to stress the difference between God and man in
existential terms, whereas Ibn cArabT stresses the ontological ‘sameness’, if not
10
‘identity’ between them Al-NabulusT explains in almost syllogistic terms that God has
the ‘true existence,’ whereas all created things other than Him have no existence at all
Existentially they are utterly different. Thus, all created things exist only through God.
In one respect, they are utterly different from God, but in another respect they are
similar to Him in existing through Him. Ibn cArabT, on the other hand, presents a ‘full
reciprocity and (ontological) intertwining between God and man. ,34 Although Ibn
cArabI does and must leave some ambiguity, this ambiguity pales in comparison to al-
NabulusT’s unequivocal position that God and man are existentially different.
Another example is in the chapter on Harun where Ibn cArabT stresses that God
appears in everything and that every object of worship is God, or rather an appearance
of God. He is therefore intimating that, on one level, all forms of worship may be
understood as legitimate. Al-NabulusT qualifies this argument by suggesting that the
worshippers’ knowledge of the object of their devotion determines the status of their
worship. If they know that they are worshipping God as a manifestation in an idol,
then their worship is licit because they know that God is not the same as the idol. On
the other hand, if they are ignorant of this distinction and maintain their worship of the
idol, not knowing that God is manifest in it, then their worship is illicit: they believe
that God is the same as the idol.
Al-NabulusT’s use and interpretations of the Qur’an and badfih in the
commentary are daring. He displays great skill in weaving together different scriptural
threads into a new fabric. The method of exegesis is not novel, rather it is the
34 Nettler, RL, ‘The Figure and Truth of Abraham in Ibn cArabi's Fusus al-Hikam\ Journal of the
Muhyiddin Ibn 'Arabi Society, 24 (1998), 21-50 (p.46).
II
interpretation and aims of al-NabulusT that are noteworthy.35 In this he not only shows
creativity vis-a-vis Ibn cArabI but also vis-a-vis the tradition of tafsir 36 A notable
example of this comes in the chapter on Musa where he provides various arguments in
support of the validity of Pharaoh’s last minute profession of faith.37
Al-NabulusT quotes Qur’an 10:90 which says that Pharaoh professed belief in
the God of the Israelites and professed that he was a Muslim/one of those who submit
when he was drowning. This profession of faith is in effect the creed of the Israelites.
In this context, al-NabulusT cites Qur’an 2: 132 which he argues was Ibrahim’s and
Yacqub’s counsel for faith at the moment of death. This counsel is that the sons of
Ibrahim and Yacqub should only die while being Muslims. Al-NabulusT argues that
grammatically this is a circumstantial phrase {hat) simultaneous with the moment of
death From this he infers that professing faith at the moment of death was acceptable
35 Johns. AH. On Qur anic Exegetes & Exegesis - a Case Study in the Transmission of Islamic
Learning’, in Islam: Essays on Scripture, Thought and Society, ed. by PG Riddell & T Street, (Leiden,
New York, Koln: Brill, 1997), pp.3-49 (p. 17) states that there is potential in works of exegesis for a
richness and diversity in the movement of ideas, a shift from theme to theme, the occasional taking up
of topics at an unexpected length, all expressive of the free ranging movement of the mind of a
teacher addressing a circle of students’. This is true of al-NabulusI’s approach to both Ibn cArabI’s
Fusus al-Hkam and to his use of the Qur ’an.
36 Rahbar, D. ‘Reflections’, pp.298 & 306 argues that the entire history of Islam is one of exegesis of
the Qur’an, but laments that Western scholarship has paid inadequate attention to the history of
Qur’anic exegesis. Rippin, A, ‘The Present Status of Tafsir Studies', The Muslim World , 72 (1982),
224-238 (pp.224 & 236) states that there are large gaps in the preliminary studies in tafsr studies, but
acknowledges that there has been some focus of attention on Sufi tafsir of the classical period.
37 See Knysh. Ibn cArabi, pp.96. 106. 158-161. 164. 214. 260. 342n.l05. where he mentions and
discusses the heated debates in the polemic over Ibn cArabi ’s orthodoxy concerning his assertion that
Pharaoh died a believer. For example, Knysh describes how al-Taftazam made the problem of
‘Pharaoh’s faith’ the linchpin of his critique of how Ibn cArabT interpreted the Islamic tradition.
12
to the Israelites, in whose creed Pharaoh professed belief.38 Ibn cArabi does not make
this point about Pharaoh’s faith and neither do the traditional Qur’anic mufassirm 39
Al-NabulusT’ s understanding and use of the Arabic language also merit
recognition. For example, in his introduction to his commentary he quotes Qur’an
3:18 and provides a grammatically based exegesis to explain how there is a single
knowledge of God which descends from God to various types of beings.40 In the
chapter on Muhammad, al-NabulusI displays skilful use of scriptural sources and of
language when he weaves the light verse (Qur’an 24:35), various other Qur’anic verses
and badUhs into a framework showing his understanding of the diversity of creation
from a common single source.41 In the chapter on Ibrahim he reveals an adept use of
words, where he interprets Qur’an 13:33 in a very particular manner using the
consonantal root association between two nouns {qiyam and qayyumiyya ).42 These
38 Al-NabulusI. Shark u, 299.
39 Concerning Qur’an 2: 132. none of the following tafasir make the point that al-NabulusI makes -
that the act of becoming a Muslim is simultaneous with death, thus justifying the faith of desperation,
neither do any of them associate this verse with Qur’an 10:90: al-Tabari, Jamic al-Bayan fiTafsir al-
Qur'an (Egypt: Maimaniyya Press, 1321), I, 417; al-Qushayn. Lata'if al-Isharat Tafsir SufiKamil li 7-
Qur ’ an al-Karim, ed. by Dr I BuyunI (Cairo: Dar al-Katib al-Arabili 7- Tib if a wa ’ l-Nashr , n.d.), I,
139-40; al-Nasafi, Madarik al-Tanzil wa-Haqa’iq al-Ta wH (Cairo: al-Husainiyya. 1343), I, 59-60; al-
BaghawT, Macalim al-TanzH (Beirut: D3r al-Macrifa, 1987/1407). I. 118-9; al-Zamakhshan, al-
Kashshafcan Haqaiq Ghawami d at-Tanzll wa-Uyun al-Aqawit fTWujvh at-Ta ’wil (Beirut: Dar al-
Kitab al-cArabI, n.d ), I, 191-2; Ibn al-JawzI, Zad al-Masir ficIlm al-Tafslr (Damascus & Beirut: al-
Maktab ai-Islaml li’l-Tibaca wa’l-Nashr, 1965/1385), i, 148-9; Fakhr al-Dln al-RazI, Commentary on
the Qur ’an, 6 vols (Cairo: Bulaq, 1278), I, 516-7; al-Baydawi, Anwar al-TanzU wa-Asrar al-Ta ’wil
(Cairo: Dar al-Kutub al-cArabiyya al-Kubra, 1330), I, 190; and al-Suyutl, al-Durr al-Manthurfial-
Tafsir al-Ma ’thur (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Tlmiyya, 1990/1411), I, 256.
40 Al-NabulusI, Shark I, 3.
41 Al-NabulusT. Shark n, 309.
42 Al-NabulusI, Shark I. 146.
13
nouns give very different senses to the verse in question which reveal the fresh and
original use of traditional techniques of semantic exegesis.
Al-NabulusT reveals a talented use of narrative when describing and exploring
various themes, mundane and metaphysical.43 He frequently uses imagery that is non¬
literal and mythopoeic in quality. He is not necessarily the creator of this imagery, but
uses it in original ways. In the chapter on Zakariyya when explaining the metaphysical
theory of how God’s mercy brings everything into existence, he uses a badilh which
states that God divided mercy into one hundred parts, ninety-nine of which he kept and
the hundredth part he sent to earth and with which creation is merciful to itself.44
His metaphors are often original and illuminating, as well as at times confusing
and puzzling. In the chapter on Ibrahim, al-NabulusT uses the metaphor of letters and
words to convey his understanding of the relationship of mutual nourishment between
God and creation 45 Ibn cArabT uses the metaphor of food to convey his understanding
of this relationship. Al-NabulusT elaborates this, but introduces the new metaphor of
meanings and words. He states that meanings cannot appear without words while
words cannot appear without meanings In this aspect of language, he also follows in
the steps of Ibn cArabT and others. In the chapter on Muhammad, al-NabulusT cites
Qur’an 108. 1 and explains it thus:
43 Riddell. PG. ‘The Transmission of Narrative-Based Exegesis’, in Islam: Essays on Scripture,
Thought and Society, ed. by PG Riddell & T Street, (Leiden, New York, Koln: Brill. 1997), pp.57-80
(p.58) suggests that Islam depends heavily upon narrative as a device for transmitting messages and
morals. Exegetical works upon the Qur’an often contain lengthy and colourful stories in order to
expand, complement or make clear the Qur anic text; the second great body of Islamic scripture, the
HadBh or Traditions of the prophet Muhammad, are heavily narrative in form'.
44 Al-NabulusI, Sharh, u, 217.
45 Al-NabulusI. Sharh , I, 165.
14
God said, ‘We have given you abundance ( al-kawthar ). ' [Abundance] is a river in Heaven [The
river] is multiplicity {al-kathra) in oneness. [The multiplicity] is all the words {jaw arm1 al-kahm ) 46
Finally, al-NabulusT’s linguistic ability in commenting upon the Fusus al-Ifikam
is also displayed in his sophisticated legal approach to the formulation of arguments.
In the chapter on Musa, al-NabulusI explains that Pharaoh’s profession of faith and
submission to God is sound and compensates for his previous transgressions and sins.
He describes how this refers to the transgressions and sins against God, and not those
against other men. He examines the legal issues involved in settling these
transgressions against others, concluding that if Pharaoh were sincere in his repentance
and had intended to pay his debts then those debts are as good as paid. However, al-
NabulusI also argues that since Pharaoh died at sea after professing faith in God, he
died a martyr of the sea. Such a martyr has his transgressions forgiven and his debts
settled.47
And al-NabulusI is explicit in explaining that his attempt to comment on and
explain the Fusus al-FGkam is an issue of personal religious authority. Whereas Ibn
cArabT’s ideas engendered a polemical debate in the course of time that has not been
resolved even at the end of the 20th century, al-NabulusI is certain that he can resolve
this debate.48 This polemical debate came to signify a key test of a given Muslim’s
position in the religious spectrum.49 By stating that Ibn cArabT was an orthodox figure
maligned by notable Muslims of the past, al-NabulusI put himself at risk. Von
46 Al-NabulusT. Shark II. 309.
47 Al-NabulusI. Shark II. 279.
48 Knysh. Ibn cArabi, covers the history of polemics surrounding Ibn cArabI.
15
Schlegell has argued that al-Nabulusi waged his battles in the concrete setting of an
Ottoman Arab society.50 These battles brought about very practical repercussions. On
the level of ideology he was repeatedly threatened for his views and way of life 51 In a
work of his written in 1680 he penned his ‘conversations with God’ in which he
described his concern about what people thought of him. His ‘dialogue’ with God
suggests that he sought comfort in the divine responses to his petitions:
I said to Him [God], 'Oh my Lord! People are doing me wrong! ’ He said to me. ‘All of this is a
benefit for you. Look at the results of their wronging [you] - it is your closeness to Me. You must be
elevated over them. 52
Al-Nabulusi argues that the Fususal-Hikam is not a work of blasphemy, rather
it is a work that describes correctly, fully and with divine sanction the exact
relationship of God with man His approach to this issue is imbued with an air of
personal religious authority that suggests that he is writing to establish the veracity of
his own religious position:
The reality of belief in God has an appearance in the language (Us an) of those who blindly follow,
another in the thoughts ( tasawwur ) of those who are discursive reasoners, and yet another in the
witnessing (shuhud) of those who are gnostics. Thus, the phrases and allusions are different and
diverse. Each group speaks with what it has. Everyone is right, however they have ranks in the eyes
of their Lord. ‘We have raised some of them over others in ranks’ [Qur’an 43:32]. ... This book
which is the Fususal-Hkam is about the [divine] appearance in the witnessing [of gnostics]. By
necessity those who blindly follow and those who reason discursively are ignorant of it and deny of it
what they understand of it in accordance with what they say and think.53
He cites Qur’an 29:43, ‘those parables we have made for people are only
understood by those who know’, commenting that in this is an allusion to the fact that
49 Knysh. Ibn cArabi. p. 1.
50 Von Schlegell, ‘Sufism’, p.23. See Chapter 2: The Intellectual Life of al-Nabulusi’ for further
details.
51 Von Schlegell. ‘Sufism’, p 44.
52 Al-Nabulusi. Munaghat al-Oadim wa 'l-Munajal al- Hakim. Maktabat al-Asad. MS No 5570. fols 16-
7 (fol. 16r) This was completed on the 27th Ramadan 1091/2 1st October 1680.
16
those who do not know ought to follow those who know and understand these
parables 54
In the chapter on Muhammad, he describes the different states of understanding
the ambiguous relationship between God and His creation:
Many people are destroyed by ignorance. Many are perplexed and stop and are not guided. Many
realise [the truth]. Whomsoever God does not give light, will not have light.55
These examples show that al-NabulusT views himself as belonging to the
category of those who witness the divine manifestations, who know and understand
the parables of the Qur’an, and who realise the truth. He considers himself, unlike
many others, to have received divine light with which he understands and experiences
the reality he explains in his commentary on the Fususal-fSkant and in other works.
The confidence of his personal religious authority is striking in the context of the
history of the polemical debates surrounding the ideas of Ibn c Arab!. 56 An analysis of
al-NabulusT’s understanding of these ideas will provide examples of the cultural,
intellectual, and religious activity in the early modern period of the Middle East.
53 Al-NabulusI, Sharp. I. 4.
54 Al-NSbulusT. Sharp. I, 8.
55 Al-NabulusI. Sharp. II, 334.
56 Rippin. A. (editor). Approaches to the History of the Interpretation of the Our ’an (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1988), p.8 indicates that the tendency of Sufi tafslr to locate a source of authority for
its positions over against the majority of Sunni community, which vested its authority in the four usul,
only very rarely reached the extent of a blatant claim to prophetic status. Al-NabulusI certainly does
not claim to be a prophet.
17
Chapter 2
The Intellectual Life of al-Nabulusi
Al-Nabulus! was born in Damascus on the 7th March 1641 (5th Dhu’l-Hijja,
1050) and died there on the 4th March 173 1 (24th Shacban, 1 143). 1 He lived in an
Ottoman society that remained vigorous intellectually throughout the 1 7th and 1 8th
centuries.2 Nevertheless, from the viewpoint of religion, there was concern in the 17th
and 1 8th centuries that Sufism had been debased among the masses and sunk into
superstition.3 Furthermore, polemical debates arising in Medieval Islam about aspects
1 Al-Muradl. MKb.A. Silk al-Durar. 2 vols (Cairo: Bulaq. 1883). II. 31 & 37. Al-MuradI died in
1206/1791 and was a member of one of the leading families of Damascus in the late 17th and 18th
centuries. This family played a significant role in the spread of the Naqshbandiyya order in the
Ottoman empire. They monopolised the function of mufti for 3 1 years (1758-1791) along with the
position of khatib of the Umayyad Mosque. Their success was due to a combination of a strong local
power base and the intervention of the Porte. The MuradT family were therefore a prominent notable
family with strong Sufi tendencies. This is an important consideration when examining al-MuradT’s
biographical dictionary. See Gibb. HAR. ‘ Al-Muradf . in El2 (Leiden: Brill. 1993), vn. 602; and Van
Leeuwen, R, Waqfs and Urban Structures - the Case of Ottoman Damascus (Leiden: Brill. 1999),
pp. 130-4. The other biographical dictionary used in this chapter is that of Muhammad al-Amln al-
Muhibbl. Brockelmann. C, ‘Al-Muhibbf. in El2 (Leiden: Brill. 1993). vn, 469-470. gives the
biographies of a number of members of this notable family. Al-MuhibbT died in 1699/1 111. The
family held important juridicial and teaching positions from one generation to the next.
2 Hodgson, MGS. The Venture of Islam - Conscience and History in a World Civilisation, 3 vols
(Chicago & London. University of Chicago Press. 1974), in, 133. Gerber, H, State, Society, and Law
in Islam - Ottoman Law in Comparative Perspective (Albany. SUNY Press, 1994), p. 183. Gerber, H,
Islamic Law and Culture 1600-1840 (Leiden: Brill, 1999). pp.22 & 27-8. This latter work refers,
inter alia, to the well received works of the Palestinian mufti Khayr al-Dln al-Ramll (d. 1081/1671)
and the Damascene mufti cAla’ al-DTn al-Haskafi (d. 1088/1677).
3 Sirriyeh, E. Sufis and Anti-Sufis - The Defence, Rethinking and Rejection of Sufism in the Modem
World (Richmond. Curzon Press, 1999), p.l.
18
of Sufism, especially the thought of Ibn cArabi, continued to rage throughout this
period.4 Al-Nabulusi played a part in these religious and intellectual issues of his age.
Al-NabulusT was bom into a well-known and prominent family. His father
taught in the Umayyad Mosque, the SalTmiyya madrasa, near Ibn cArabT’s tomb, in the
district of Salihiyya, and the Qaymariyya madrasa in Damascus.5 It is known that the
al-NabulusT family were explicitly designated the HanafT teaching appointment in the
foundation of DarwTsh Pasha (d. 1 57 1/4). 6 This was initially held by al-NabulusT’s
father, then by al-NabulusT himself, and subsequently by al-NabulusT’s son. Al-
NabulusT’ s father was a well-travelled man: he visited Anatolia four times, studied in
Cairo under various cidama\ performed the Hajj, and went to Sidon and Aleppo 7 He
was renowned for being a faqDi and a sufi.8 It is known that he changed his legal
school from ShaffT to HanafT.9
4 Knvsh. AD. Ibn cArabTin the Later Islamic Tradition - the Making of a Polemical Image in
Medieval Islam (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), pp. 161-5; and al-NabulusI. Al-Wujud al-Haqq wa 7-
Khitab al-Sdq , ed . by B cAla’ al-DTn (Damascus: IFEAD, 1995), pp. 15-20 & 30.
5 Al-Muhibbl. M. Ta ’rlkh Khulasat al-Athar fi Acyan al-Qam al-HadTcAshar . 4 vols (Cairo. 1868). I.
408. Van Leeuwen, Waqfs, p. 127 states that one of the main schools in Damascus under the
Ottomans was the al-SalTmiyya along with the Umayyad Mosque
6 Van Leeuwen. Waqfs . p. 128.
7 Al-MuhibbT, Ta ’rlkh Khulasat, i, 408-10. Van Leeuwen, Waqfs . p. 12 1 notes that one of the patterns
of culama' careers in the 17th and 18th centuries was a high degree of mobility among the culama\
both to acquire knowledge and to enhance career opportunities. He remarks on page 72 that travel
was also one of the mainstays of the culama’ network in the Ayyubid and Mamluk periods.
8 Al-MuhibbT, Ta ’rlkh Khulasat, i, 408-10.
9 Al-MuhibbT, Ta ’rlkh Khulasat , i. 408-10. This point is interesting. Voll. J. ‘Old ‘Ulama’ Families
and Ottoman Influence in Eighteenth Century Damascus’, American Journal of Arabic Studies, 3
(1975), 48-59 (pp. 56-7), examines the experience of notable religious families of Damascus in the 17th
19
Al-NabulusT attached himself to the Hanafi school as well, presumably
inheriting this affiliation from his father.10 Furthermore, al-NabulusT, like his father,
taught in the Umayyad Mosque and in the Sahmiyya in Salihiyya.11 The al-NabulusT
family maintained a presence in both of these teaching posts from one generation to the
next.12
It is possible to establish the personal networks within which al-NabulusT was
trained and began his career. 13 He is known to have studied with at least fifteen
scholars.14 Admittedly, one of these. Sheikh cAlT al-ShubramallisT (d. 1676/1087), gave
and 18th centuries. He notes a shift of madhhab among the old. established religious families from
Shaft0! to Hanafi. He concludes that this was an indication of growing Ottoman cosmopolitanism
since Hanafi affiliation was increasingly necessary for families to maintain influence and compete
effectively for posts. One of al-Nabulusi’ s teachers shifted his affiliation from Shaft0! to Hanafi; this
was Muhammad al-Ustuwan! (d. 1661-2/1072). See al-Muhibbi, Ta 'rikh Khulasat , ill. 386-9.
Furthermore, Ze’evi, D, An Ottoman Century - The District of Jerusalem in the 1600s (Albany:
SUNY Press, 1996), pp.69-70, states that the biographies of culama and other Jerusalem notables
transmitted by al-Muhibb! shed some light on the unwritten covenant between the culama' and the
Sufi orders. ’ He also indicates that culama sometimes changed their legal doctrine {madhhab).
10 Al-Muradl. Silk al-Durar. n. 30.
11 Al-Muradl. Silk al-Durar. II. 31-2.
12 Van Leeuwen, Waqfs. p. 122 argues that another pattern in culama’ careers in the 17th and 18th
centuries was that the family was the most important framework for the transfer of positions within
the local circuit from one generation to the next. The al-Nabulus! family’s experience supports this
argument.
13 1 have to acknowledge a debt for this approach to Humphreys. RS. Islamic History -A Framework
for Inquiry (London & New York: IB Tauris, 1991), pp. 187-192.
14 Al-Muradi, Silk al-Durar. n. 31. These are (with references to entries in al-Muhibbi. Ta ’rikh
Khulasat in brackets): his father, d. 1652/1062, (i, 408-10); Najm al-Dln al-GhazzI, 1651/1061, (iv,
189-200); Ahmad al-QalT, d. 1657/1067, (i, 327); cAbd al-BSq! al-Hanball. d. 1661/1071, (no ref);
Muhammad al-Mahasinl, d. 1661-2/1072, (m, 408-11); Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Ustuwanl, d. 1661-
2/1072, (m, 386-389); Muhammad al-Kurdl, d. 1682-3/1094; Muhammad al-Kiw3fi, d. 1665-6/1076,
(m, 404-5); Muhammad al-TthawI, d. 1669-70/1080, (rv, 201-2); cAbd al-Qadir al-Safluri,
d. 1671/1081, (II, 467); Muhammad b. Hamza, d. 1674-5/1085, (no ref ); °A1I al-ShubramallisI.
d. 1676/1087, (in, 174-7); Muhammad Kamal al-Dln al-Far<£, d. 1677/1088, (iv, 265); Ibrahim al-
Fattal. d. 1687/1098 (i, 51-3); Hussain b. Iskandar al-Ruml, (no ref ).
20
al-NabulusT an ijaza from Egypt.15 Al-Nabulusi’s formative years were spent with
teachers in the most notable madrasas in Damascus Seven of al-NabulusT’s teachers,
including his father, had teaching positions in the Umayyad Mosque. Three of them,
also including his father, had positions in the Satlmiyya. Both of these were prominent
teaching centres.16
Al-NabulusT was affiliated to the HanafT madhhab. Of his fifteen known
teachers, six of them were also HanafTs, four were Shafts and one was a HanbalT. Of
those that were HanafTs, two were known to have changed their affiliation from
Shaft0!. Al-Nabulusfs personal network in the 17th century displays a slight
predominance of HanafT affiliation over that of Shafi0!. The four Shaft0! affiliates all
held teaching posts in various madrasas Of the six HanafT affiliates, it is known that
three of them held teaching posts. This supports the view that in the mid- 1 1th
century the families who constituted the core of the local religious establishment
represent a variety of legal schools.17
Al-NabulusT was a prominent Sufi, whose reputation later in life was to draw
various people to him for blessings and instruction. 18 He was affiliated to both the
15 Al-MuradI, Silk al-Durar , H. 3 1. For details of al-Shubnimallisf s life, see al-MuhibbT. Ta ’rikh
Khulasat, in, 174-7.
16 Van Leeuwen, Waqfs, p. 127 lists the main schools of Damascus as the al-Sulaymaniyya. al-
Nuriyya, al-ZShiriyya, and Qubbat al-Nasr in the Umayyad Mosque.
17 Voll, ‘Old Ulama’ Families’, p.56.
18 Al-MuradT, Silk al-Durar , n, 32.
21
Qadiriyya and Naqshbandiyya turuq 19 He was introduced into these turuq by Sheikh
al-Sayyid cAbd al-Razzaq al-HamawI al-Kaylanl and Sa'td al-Balkhl respectively.20 Six
of al-NabulusT’s recognised fifteen teachers were associated with Sufism. Only one of
them is known to have had an affiliation, this is Muhammad al-Kiwafi who was
affiliated with the Qadiriyya as well as the Shaffl school of law. Another, Muhammad
al-Ustuwanl, was known to have defended Ibn cArabT from detractors. Almost half the
figures who were in al-NabulusI’s religious and intellectual circle in his formative years
were associated in some way with Sufism, but not known to be affiliated to any
particular Sufi order.21
Al-NabulusT was appointed to the prestigious position of Hanafi Mufti of
Damascus in 1722-3. 22 He was installed as Mufti on the initiative of the Damascenes.
19 Al-Muradl. Silk al-Durar, II. 31. Van Leeuwen. Waqfs. p. 127 states that the network of scholars
was partially centred around the sheikhs of Sufi orders, especially the Qadiriyya, the Naqshbandiyya
and the Khalwatiyya.
20 Al-MuradT, Silk al-Durar . n, 31. Tnmingham. JS. The Sufi Orders in Islam (New York & Oxford:
OUP, 1998), pp.43-44, states that the foundation of the first QadirT zawiya in Damascus was in the
early 15th century and that the Qadiriyya order was only introduced in any definitive fashion into
Istanbul through the initiative of Isma°n RumI (d. 1631/1041 or 1643/1053). On page 97 Trimingham
remarks that the Baghdad centre of the Qadiriyya gained the favour of the Ottoman dynasty because
of its orthodoxy. With regard to the Naqshbandiyya order, he states, on page 63, that it was important
from the Islamic point of view in ensuring the attachment of Turkish peoples to the Sunni tradition.
He notes, on page 95, that, in the Ottoman empire, the Naqshbandl silsila was of significance only in
Syria and Anatolia.
21 Ze’evi, An Ottoman Century , pp. 70-71 comments with respect to Jerusalem in the 17th century that
people who came from prominent Sufi families were members of high standing in the orthodox
establishment; indeed, most culama' were members of Sufi groups. With regard to al-NabulusT’s
mentors the fact that there is an absence of evidence for affiliations with Sufi orders does not
necessarily indicate evidence of absence.
22 Van Leeuwen, Waqfs , p. 120 describes the function of Hanafi Mufti of Damascus as being fully
incorporated into the state apparatus under the Ottomans. It was normally an appointment made for
22
This had to be ratified by the Sheikh al-Islam in Istanbul 23 For six months al-Nabulusi
remained in this position and wrote a corpus of fatwas. However, al-Nabulusi may
have lost a political battle by proxy in Istanbul.24 The Sheikh al-Islam did not ratify al-
NabulusT’s appointment and he was replaced by Muhammad Khalil al-Bakn al-Siddlql
This new Muff! had actively manoeuvred to dislodge al-Nabulusi from his
appointment. This action, which went against the general opinion in Damascus,
disappointed many Damascenes
Al-NabulusT s social networks suggest an interesting pattern. His father, when
in Istanbul, met the Sheikh al-Islam, Yahya b Zakariyya (d. 1644) who was an
accomplished mystic poet25, and the Sultan’s Imam, Yusuf b Abl al-Fath.26 He was
also a judge in Sidon for a period of time. Al-NabulusT’s teachers were an interesting
social mix One of them was the Naqib al-Ashraf 'm Damascus, another was the rector
of Al-Azhar. Two of them were Imams in Damascus. One of them represented the
sufis ( ctl-fuqara ’) and various khanqahs at ‘the Ottoman official level’.27 One belonged
life and the holder could therefore develop ties with the local elite. It was normally combined with a
professorship at al-Sulaymaniyya and the supervision of the body of madrasa teachers.
23 Rafeq. AK, Ottoman Rule in Damascus 1723-1783 (Beirut. 1966), p.49.
24 Rafeq, Ottoman Rule, pp.81-3. Van Leeuwen. Waqfs. p. 1 19 states that the interweaving of the
culama networks in Istanbul and Damascus was sufficient for shifts in the balance of power in the
capital to have far-reaching repercussions for appointments in Damascus. Conversely, pressures from
Damascus could sometimes secure the appointment of local candidates at the expense of those
favoured by the Porte.
25 Zilfi, MC, The Politics of Piety - The Ottoman Ulema in the Postclassical Age (1600-1800)
(Minneapolis. Bibliotheca Islamica, 1988), pp. 171-2.
26 Al-Muhibbl. Ta ’rUch Khulasat. I, 408-10.
27 It is uncertain what is meant by this term - presumably either the Ottoman apparatus in Damascus
or in Istanbul.
23
to a wealthy family, while another was a parvenu who had commercial interests. One
of them had a reputation as a collector of real estate and ffee-holdings. This presents a
picture of figures who combined their intellectual and religious interests with more
worldly ones. Al-NabulusT’ s teachers were not predominantly enclosed in madrasas
and mosques, but were active in the outside world of politics, commerce and
establishment religion 28
Al-NabulusT is well-known for his travels around the Ottoman empire, thanks
mainly to the travel diaries he wrote at the time.29 In 1664-5/1075, he travelled to Dar
al-Khilafa , presumably Istanbul. In 1688-9/1100, he visited the Biqac and Mount
28 This pattern is witnessed in other examples. c Abbas. I. ‘Khair ad-Dm ar-Ramlfs Fataw3: A New
Light on Life in Palestine in the Eleventh/Seventeenth Century’, in Die Islamische Welt Zwischen
Mittelaltes und Neuzeit, Festschrift fur Hans Robert Roemer , ed. by Ulrich Haarmann & Peter
Bachman (Beirut: for Steiner (Wiesbaden), 1979), pp 1-19 (p.6) where Khair al-DTn al-RamlT, the
well-known teacher and mufti, is described as possessing profitable orchards, khans and other
buildings in Ramla. Barnes, JR, An Introduction to Religious Foundations in the Ottoman Empire
(Leiden: Brill, 1986), p.42, states that from 1600-1800 the number of landed endowments {awqaf)
grew considerably, the majority of which had become semi-familial awqaf: the principal beneficiaries
were the founder and his posterity. Gerber, State, Society and Law. p. 141, argues that the founders of
semi-familial awqafhad a mixed motive: they sought to take care of their families but also to support
institutions meant for the poor. Ze’evi, An Ottoman Century . p.82, describes the sources of income
for notable families in the sanjaq of Jerusalem - waqf foundations, v arious governmental sources of
income such as poll tax payments from locally based minorities, well-paying prestigious teaching
posts and juridicial positions, tax exemptions, marriage agreements with aspiring merchant families,
and investments in commerce. Van Lee u wen. Waqfs, p. 130, notes that the local Damascene culama’
were active in all kinds of real estate transactions, not only as trustees or nazirs of waqf, but also as
private persons, or, perhaps more accurately, as heads of family households. He also argues on page
125 that certain governors of Damascus tried to secure the co-operation of scholars by founding waqfs
for them or by using them as representatives to conclude real-estate transactions.
29 Al-MuradI, Silk al-Durar , n. 32. for details of these journeys. Three of these works have been
published. The first journey in al-Munajjid, S, & Wild, S, (eds), Zwei Beschreibungen des Libanon:
cAbdalganIal~Nabulusis Reise durch die Biqif und al-Utaifis Reise nach Tripolis (Wiesbaden, 1979).
The third journey in al-NabulusI, Al-HaqTqa wa ’l-Majaz fTRihlat Bilad al-Sham wa-Misr wa ’ l-Hjaz ,
ed. by RAH Murad (Damascus, 1989). The fourth journey in Busse, H, ‘cAbd al-Ganl an-NabulusIs
Reisen im Lebanon (1100/1689-1112/1700)’, Der Islam 44 (1968), 71-114. The fourth journey again
in Busse, H, (ed ), Die Reise des cAbd al-Ganl an-N abulusl durch den Libanon (Beirut, 1971). The
24
Lebanon. Five years later in 1693-4/1 105, al-Nabulusi journeyed to Egypt and then to
the Hijaz, presumably for the Hajj.30 Finally, in 1700-1/1 1 12, al-Nabulusi went to
Levantine Tripoli. The scholarship on some of these works suggests that al-NabulusT’s
motives for travelling were partly to seek mystical experience and gain baraka by
contact with friends of God (< awliya'f 1 and partly to visit friends, former students and
make new acquaintances.32
Al-Nabulusi’ s journeys can be placed in a cultural context by examining the
travels of his teachers. At least six of al-NabulusT’s teachers travelled to Cairo and/or
Egypt, five of them visited Istanbul and/or Anatolia, three visited Aleppo, two
travelled to the Hijaz, and two to Homs. It appears that al-Nabulusfs teachers were in
the habit of travel. The cultural place and significance of al-NabulusT’s own journeys
should be appreciated in this light: his travels accord with one of the patterns in
culama’ careers in the 1 7th and 1 8th centuries - the high degree of mobility among
cttlama\ both to acquire knowledge and to enhance career opportunities 33
second journey is still in manuscript form. It is al-NabulusT, Al-Hadra al-Unsiyya fial-Rihla al-
Qudsiyya, Maktabat al-Asad, MS No. 6844. 149 fols.
30 For details of the importance of the pilgrimage in the 17th and 18th centuries see: Faroqhi. S,
Pilgrimages and Sultans, the Hajj under the Ottomans 1517-1683 (London & New York: IB Tauris,
1994); Baibir, KK, Ottoman Rule in Damascus 1708-1758 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1980), pp. 133-177; Rafeq, Ottoman Rule , pp.52-76.
31 Sirriyvah. E. ‘Ziyarat of Syria in a Rihla of cAbd al-Ghanl al-NabulusT (1050/1641-1143/1731)’.
Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, (1979), 109-122 (p. 109); Sirriyyah, E, ‘The Journeys of cAbd al-
Ghanl al-NabulusT in Palestine (1101/1690 & 1 105/1693)’, Journal of Semitic Studies , 24 (1979), 55-
69 (p.56); and Sirriyeh, E, ‘The Mystical Journeys of cAbd al-GhanT al-Nabulusf, Die Welt des
Islams, 25 (1985), 84-96 (p.96).
32 Al-Munajjid & Wild. Zwei Beschreibungen, p. 19; & Busse. Die Reise, p.29.
33 Van Leeuwen. Waqfs. p. 121.
25
Al-Nabulusi’s cultural and religious training was dominated by the Islamic
sciences. He studied the Qur’an, including tafsv and qira’a , hadRh and its auxiliary
sciences ,fiqh along with inheritance laws and arithmetic, and usul al-fiqhu He also
studied the linguistic sciences, which were related to the study of Qur’an and hadRh.
grammar ( al-nahu ), rhetoric {a/-ma anTwa ' 1-tibyan ), and inflection ( al-scirf ).35 This
fits the general theory of the divisions of Islamic studies described by Ibn Khaldun in
the 14th century.36
Besides the subjects that al-NabulusT’s teachers are known to have taught him,
some of them are also known to have taught Sufism, kalam , adab , and logic.37 Ibn
Khaldun recognised Sufism, kalam , and adab as branches of knowledge which ‘owe
their existence to Islam’.38 Together with logic, these were mainstream subjects. That
a number of al-NabulusT’s teachers were instructing students in these subjects in the
1 7th century indicates that they had remained a part of the madrasa curriculum since
the 14th century when Ibn Khaldun was writing.39
34 Al-Muradl. Silk al-Durar. II. 3 1: and al-MuhibbT. Ta ’rikh Khulasat. iv. 265.
35 Al-MurSdT. Silk al-Durar. n. 3 1 .
36 See Makdisi. G. ‘Madrasa’, in El2. (Leiden: Brill. 1986), v. 1123-1134 (p. 1 130): and Ibn Khaldun.
An Introduction to History - The Muqaddimah, trans. by F Rosenthal (London: Routledge, 1967),
pp. 344-8, 352-3, 358, 388-9.
37 Al-MuhibbT. Ta rikh Khulasat. i. 51-3. ill, 386-9. iv. 189-200.
38 See Makdisi, ‘Madrasa’. p. 1 130: and Ibn Khaldun. An Introduction . pp.348. 352-3. 358. & 360.
39 For further information on the stability of subject areas in the medieval Muslim curriculum see:
Dodge, B, Muslim Education in Medieval Times (Washington DC. The Middle East Institute, 1962);
Nashabi, H, ‘Educational Institutions’, in The Islamic City, ed. by RB Serjeant (Paris: UNESCO,
1980), pp.66-89; Makdisi, G, The Rise of Colleges - Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981); Sibai, MM, Mosque Libraries - An Historical Study
26
Al-NabulusT was renowned for his study of Sufism He was known to have
studied the writings of some of the most controversial Sufi figures in the history of
Islam: Ibn cArabT (d. 1240/638), Ibn Sab^n (d. 1269-71/668 or 669), al-cAfif al-
Tilimsam (d. 1291/690), cAbd al-Kanm al-JTlT (d. 1428/832), Ibn al-Farid (d. 1235/634),
Ahmad al-Sirhindl (d. 1624/1034), and al-Shushtan (d. 1269/668).40 None of al-
NabulusT’s teachers are known to have studied or commented on any particular Sufi
writers of the past, save one: Muhammad al-Ustuwanl (d. 166 1-2/1 072). 41 He
defended the reputation of Ibn c Arab! from detractors when he was teaching at the
SalTmiyya madrasa in Damascus 42
Al-NabulusI was also renowned for his writings on Sufism. His main
biographer, al-MuradT, provides a list of two-hundred and one of his works. This list is
not in chronological order 43 An analysis of what is known or can be deduced about
the subjects of the first twenty works in the list is noteworthy. Eleven of them are
(London & New York: Mansell Publishing, 1987); and Stanton, CM, Higher Learning in Islam - the
Classical Period AD7 00- 1 300 (Savage: Rowman & Littlefield, 1990).
40 Al-MuradT. Silk al-Durar, ll. 31-33. & 35-36. For further information on these figures in the
context of anti-Sufi and anti-Ibn cArabr polemics, see Knysh, Ibn cArabT, p. 169; and Friedmann, Y,
Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindl- An Outline of His Thought and a Study of His Image in the Eyes of Posterity
(Montreal & London, 1971), pp.9 & 94-101. Ibn Taymiyya, Al-Furqan Bayn al-Haqq wa 'l-Bapl, ed.
by K al-Mais (Beirut: Dar al-Qalam, n.d ), p 151.
41 Al-MuhibbT, Ta ’rikh Khulasat . m, 386-9.
42 This is to be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
43 For example, the sixth work in the list is al-Nabulusf s Sharh Jawahir al-NususJT Hall Kalimat al-
Fusus, which was completed in 1685/1096, whereas the twelfth work in the list, al-Mac arif al-
Ghaybiyya, was completed in 1675/1086. The seventh work, Kashf al-Sirr al-Ghamid, was completed
in 171 1/1123. Furthermore, the seventeenth work, Idah al-Maqsud min Macna Wahdat al-Wujud , was
completed in 1680/1091, and the twentieth work, Miftah al-Maciyya, in 1676/1087.
27
concerned with Sufism, two with hadHh , one with exoteric Qur’amc exegesis, and one
with Sufi exegesis of the Qur’an. Five of them cannot be easily categorised. This
suggests that the first twenty works of al-NabulusT in al-Muradfs list give prominence
to explicitly Sufi works. Al-NabulusI was remembered for his Sufi works according to
this list. However, the first three works on this list are concerned with Qur’anic
exegesis and hadnh.
In 1677/1088, al-NabulusT wrote a text defending the practice of listening to
music.44 In 1680/1091, he completed a work defending the belief in the ‘Oneness of
Existence’ {Wahdat al-Wujud)*5 Following this, in 1682/1092, a text defending the
practice of smoking was completed.46 In the following year, al-NabulusT completed a
commentary on al-BirgilT’s (d 1 573/98 1 ) al- TarTqa al-Mit harrmtadiyya 41 This pattern
of works indicates that one of al-Nabulusfs concerns between at least 1680 and 1683
was the defence of Sufi related practices, such as listening to music and smoking, and
the defence of Sufi beliefs and thought. This pattern is witnessed in the ensuing years
when he completed his commentary on Ibn cArabI’s Fususal-Ifikam (1685/1096).
44 Al-NabulusT. Idah al-Dalalat fiSamif al-AJat. ed. by AR HammGsh (Damascus: D3r al-Fikr. 1981).
This is the ninety-seventh work in al-Muradfs list of al-Nabulusf s works.
45 Al-NabulusT, Idah al-Maqsud min Macna Wahdat al-Wujud. ed. by I Hasrfya (Damascus: Matbacat
al-cIlm, 1969). This is the seventeenth work in al-Muradfs list
46 This is al-Sulh bayn al-Ikhwan fTHukm lbahat al-Dukhan . which is still an unpublished
manuscript: Maktabat al-Asad, MS No 8198, fols. 54-96. This is the two hundred and first work in al-
Muradfs list.
47 This is Al-Hadlqa al-Nadiyya - Sharh al- TarTqa al-Muhammadiyya. which is still an unpublished
manuscript. MS Ajariyya Madrasa, uncat. This is the fourth work in al-Muradf s list.
28
On the 21st October 1680727th Ramadan 1091 (Laylat al-Qadr), al-NabulusT
completed a series of dialogues, some of which are ‘with God’, which heralded a
period of mystical retreat.48 These ‘dialogues with God’ suggest that al-NabulusT may
have been subject to criticism from some of his contemporaries concerning his beliefs:
I said to Him {God]. Oh my Lord! People are doing me wrong! ’
He said to me, ‘All of this is a benefit for you Look at the results of their wronging [you] - it is your
closeness to Me. You must be elevated over them. '
I said to Him. ‘Oh my Lord! I fear that I cry lies about You! ,49
And,
I said to Him, ‘Oh my Lord! People are crying lies about me over what I claim! '
He said to me. People claim in themselves what you claim, but they are heedless and veiled [from the
Truth], So, they find lies and measure you against themselves. If only they could find truth in
themselves, they would indeed believe you! Whoever believes, will believe. And whoever cries lies,
will cry lies. ,5°
Al-MuradT states that early in al-NabulusT’s life he secluded himself in his house
near the Umayyad Mosque for seven years 51 It is clear from a number of his writings
during this period of ‘seclusion’ that al-NabulusT was not totally withdrawn from
society: he completed his commentary on the Fusus al-Hikam in 1685/1096 after
Friday prayers in the Umayyad Mosque.52 During this period, he was subject to bouts
of depression and also encountered personal criticism of his actions. According to
48 This is Munaghat al-Oadmt wa ’l-Munajat al-Hakm, which is still an unpublished manuscript:
Maktabat al-Asad, MS No 5570, fols. 16-7. This is the one hundred and eighty-fourth work in al-
MurSdTs list.
49 Maktabat al-Asad, MS No 5570. fol. 16r.
50 Maktabat al-Asad. MS No 5570. fol. 16r.
51 Al-MuradT. Silk al-Durar, n. 32.
52 Al-NabulusT. Sharh Jawahir al-Nususfi Hall Kalimat al-Fusus . 2 vols (Cairo: Bulaq. 1304-1323).
II, 344.
29
cAla’ al-DTn and Von Schlegell, it is probable that al-NabulusT began this period of
seclusion when he was composing his series of dialogues in 1680/1091 53
It is uncertain exactly why al-NabulusT decided to withdraw from wider society.
That he was aware of an anti-Sufi movement, of corruption among members of the
fuqaha ’, of corrupt Sufis, and of personal attacks against himself may have influenced
his decision. His ‘dialogues with God’ indicate that he may have suffered a crisis of
faith concerning his beliefs. The period beginning with these dialogues, ca. 1680-
6/1091-7, was when al-NabulusT was preoccupied with defending the practice and
beliefs of genuine Sufis from their detractors.
In his work in defence of listening to music three years before in 1677/1088, al-
NabulusI makes comments about contemporary social realities in Damascus. He states
that there were attacks on Sufis, specifically against the practice of listening to music
and against the concept of ‘friendship of God’ (< al-wilaya ).54 In describing how this led
to ‘enmity and hatred between people now’ in Damascus, he blames incompetent and
ignorant fuqaha ’ for these attacks on Sufism 55 However, he makes two further
interesting points. Firstly, that such attacks also occurred in the past and, secondly,
that these attacks are, to an extent justified, because there are false and corrupt Sufis.56
53 Von Schlegell, BR, Sufism in the Ottoman Arab World: Shaykh cAbd al-Ghanl al-NabulusT
(d. 1 143/173 1)’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1997), p.64; and
cAla’ al-DTn, B, ‘cAbdalganI an-NabulusT (1143/1731) - Oeuvre, Vie et Doctrine’, 2 vols (unpublished
doctoral thesis, Universite de Paris I, 1985), pp.90-3.
54 Al-NabulusT. Idah al-Dalalat. pp.22 & 73-5.
55 Al-NabulusT. Idah al-Dalalat , pp.20-2.
56 Al-NabulusT. Idah al-Dalalat, pp.50-1 & 73-5.
30
Al-NabulusT portrays a Damascus in which he was aware of an anti-Sufi
movement, stirred up by certain incompetent and ignorant fitqaha’ 51 He felt that this
movement, which had historical antecedents, had some legitimate complaints against
certain proponents of Sufism. However, he argues that these corrupt Sufis should not
ruin the reputation of those Sufis who were good Muslims This is a defence of Sufism
and some of its practices against generalised attacks caused by the pretext of the
actions of some Sufi extremists. Three years after he wrote this particular work, al-
NabulusI felt a measure of personal criticism for his Sufi beliefs and attitudes as
witnessed in his ‘dialogues with God’
It is probable that the anti- Sufi movement that al-NabulusT was criticising in
some of his works in the late 1670s and 1680s was a remnant of the Kadizadeli
movement.38 Influenced by the writings of Birgili Mehmed/al-BirgilT (d. 1 573/98 1 )59,
Kadizade Mehmed (d. 1635) and his followers, the Kadezadeliler, took up al-Birgill’s
57 Al-NabulusT s nuanced and balanced approach to the issue of anti-Sufi polemics in contemporary
Damascus indicates that this is not an example of the fas ad al-zaman topos. Therefore his statements
do not necessarily support the theory of Ottoman decline and corruption. In this respect. Gerber’s
comments on Islamic Law in the Ottoman period are pertinent: the widespread notion about the
disastrous decline in moral standards of the ilmiye (the religious institution in Ottoman parlance) in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is probably very exaggerated’ (Gerber, State, Society , and
Law, p. 183) and ‘in the minds of Muslims of the time a distinction existed between the level of
theoretical ideology and the practical affairs of the world. Fas ad al-zaman embodies the Muslim view
of history . . . yet the muftis in question (Khair al-DTn al-Ramll and Ibn cAbidIn) . . . demanded
integrity from all those around them, certainly thought of themselves as possessing it, and while they
seem highly critical of many around them, they nevertheless do not convey the impression that they
think their efforts are worthless’ (Gerber, Islamic Law, pp. 140-1).
58 Von Schlegell, ‘Sufism’, pp.22, 63-4. 82-6. & 250.
59 Kufrevi, K, ‘BirgewT’, in El2 (Leiden: Brill, 1960), i, 1235. states that Birgewi’s full name was
Mehmed b. PIr CA1T BirgewT. Two variants of the surname are given - BirgiwT and Birgili.
31
concerns about practices not sanctioned by religious law.60 Al-BirgilT discussed his
concerns in the Tariqa Mubammadiyya61 Among other things, he criticised Sufi
dance rituals and venality. That al-NabulusT wrote a commentary on al-Birgilr’s
Tariqa in the early 1680s is therefore significant, because he was addressing criticisms
against Sufism.62
In the early 17th century, Kadizade’s main target was the Sufi movement of the
time and the belief system of popular Islam 63 He was critical of wine, tobacco and
coffee, all of which were tolerated or used, to a greater or lesser degree, by the Sufis.64
His followers directed their anger in particular against the religious music and dances
of the Mevlevis .65
One of the later Kadizadeli leaders was Muhammad al-Ustuwanl from
Damascus (d. 166 1-2/1 072). 66 He arrived in Istanbul from Damascus after 1629. He
gained a reputation for scholarship and enjoyed success as a mosque lecturer and
preacher. He emerged as the most prominent of the Kadizadeli preachers. He was
apparently far more dangerous to Sufi interests than Kadizade had been In the 1650s
he ‘declared war on the Sufi orders’. However, when Kopriilu Mehmed was
60 Inalcik, H & Quataert. D (eds). An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire - Volume
2: 1600-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1994), p.561; Zilfi, The Politics of Piety,
pp. 13 1-2. Inalcik et al refer to al-BirgilT with the variant Birgevi. It is clear from the context that
this is the same person.
61 Zilfi. The Politics of Piety, pp. 144-5.
62 See Von Schlegell. ‘Sufism’, pp. 79-94.
63 Zilfi, The Politics of Piety, p. 132.
64 Zilfi, The Politics of Piety, p. 139.
65 Inalcik & Quataert. An Economic and Social History, p.561.
66 Zilfi, The Politics of Piety, pp. 140-3. Zilfi refers to him with the Turkish spelling of his name -
Ustirvani Mehmed. See al-MuhibbT, Ta ’rikh Khulasat, in, 386-389 for his biography.
32
appointed Grand Vezir in 1656, he cracked down on the Kadizadeli movement for
encouraging political instability and public disorder.67 Al-UstuwanI was banished to
Cyprus.
Muhammad al-Ustuwanl was also the name of one of al-NabulusT’s teachers.68
It appears that al-NabulusT’s teacher was the prominent leader in the Kadizadeli
movement of the 1650s in Istanbul. Al-MuhibbT’s account of al-Ustuwam confirms
much of his Kadizadeli involvement, but also suggests that it needs modification.69 Al-
Ustuwanl was a preacher. He was renowned for being faithful to the Sharfa and for
finding faults in others with regard to the Sharfa
In 1629-30/1039, he left Damascus for Istanbul, where he settled and changed
his affiliation from the Shafts to the Hanafr school of law.70 While on the pilgrimage in
1652-3/1063, he visited Damascus. He became the preacher (wtfiz) in the mosque of
Sultan Abu’l-Fath Muhammad Khan in Istanbul.71 His eloquent preaching attracted
67 Zilfi. The Politics of Piety , pp. 146-7.
68 Al-MuhibbT. Ta ’r3ch Khulasat. III. 386-9.
69 Von Schlegell. ‘Sufism’, p.82 mentions an example of the Kadizadeli reformers' actions - in
1062/1657 the Kadizadeli ‘Ustiivani Mehmed’ gained the backing of Grand Wazir Melik Ahmad
Pasha (d. 1073/1662) to tear down the Khalwati tekke at Demirkapi and he urged his followers to
strike down visitors to other tekkes. Although she acknow ledges that ‘Ustiivani Mehmed’ was
originally from Damascus, von Schlegell does not realise that he is the al-Ustuwam who taught al-
Nabulusl.
70 Voll, ‘Old ‘Ulama’ Families’, pp.56-7. notes a shift of madhhab among the old. established
religious families from Shafi°T to Hanafr He concludes that the Hanafr affiliation was increasingly
necessary under the Ottomans for families to maintain influence and compete effectively for posts.
Al-Ustuwanfs shift of madhhab and his migration to Istanbul indicate that his career fits some of the
patterns in culama’ careers in the 17th and 18th centuries: see Van Leeuwen, Waqfs. pp. 106 & 121-2.
71 According to Zilfi, The Politics of Piety, p 141, this was a prominent location of Kadizadeli
turbulence, despite its fifth-place imperial rank.
33
many followers, including those of Qadr Zadeh al-Rumi (the Kadezadeliler) They
went to extremes in forbidding things, which almost led to civil strife in 1 656-7/1 067,
and consequently he was banished to Cyprus and then Damascus.
In Damascus, he assumed a teaching position in the Umayyad Mosque where
he was very popular with both scholars and ordinary people. He was active in
forbidding various objectionable actions, giving orders to his followers to beat people
who were caught doing such things. However, when he took up a teaching position at
the Sahmiyya madrasa in Damascus, he defended the reputation of Ibn cArabT from
detractors.
That al-Ustuwam who taught al-NabulusI was the prominent Kadizadeli
preacher and leader appears to be borne out by al-Muhibbl It is noteworthy that when
he returned to Damascus from Istanbul for the last time in 1656/7, he assumed
teaching positions in the Umayyad Mosque and in the Sahmiyya madrasa. These were
two of the main teaching locations in Damascus.72 He gathered a following who were
willing to attack those whose actions al-Ustuwanl criticised in his preaching. It is
likely that this was a continuation of the Kadizadeli movement in Istanbul.
It is significant that al-Ustuwanl defended Ibn cArabT against the criticisms
levelled against him in the late 1650s in Damascus as this indicates an apparently
contradictory personality. Zilfi argues that the Kadizadelis made of Ibn cArab! a test of
72 Van Leeuwen. Waqfs. p. 127.
34
orthodoxy.73 However, al-MuhibbT indicates that the most prominent figurehead of
this anti-Sufi movement in the mid 17th century was a defender of Ibn cArabi. This
may suggest that whereas al-Ustuwanl was enthusiastic to criticise and act against
extreme Sufi practices and movements, he did not attack Sufism itself. It may be that
al-Ustuwam was motivated more by a drive against corruption and less by pure anti-
Sufi sentiment. He also appears to have had his own economic position and prestige
to enhance. Furthermore, this Kadizadeli leader taught the young al-NabulusT, an
outspoken and famous supporter of Ibn cArabI Al-NabulusT, in his turn, criticised
corrupt and extreme Sufis, while defending those who were true to the Sharfa 74
There was a Kadizadeli revival under the leadership of Mehmed ibn Bistam of
Van, ‘Vani’ Mehmed (d 1685) 75 He was as antagonistic to the Sufis as his Kadizadeli
predecessors. In 1665 he had public performances of Sufi music and ‘dance’ rituals
forbidden. He accused the Sufis of the usual sins of abetting unbelief and ignoring the
law A few years later the prohibition of smoking was also renewed.76 Vani’s fortunes
turned with the Ottoman debacle at Vienna in 1683. 77 He had accompanied the army
to the front, and was consequently banished until he died in 1685. Within a year of his
disgrace permission to perform Sufi music and ‘dance’ rituals was restored.78
73 Zilfi. The Politics of Piety, pp. 1 36-7.
74 Al-NabulusT. Idah al-Dalalat. pp.73-5.
75 Zilfi. The Politics of Piety, pp. 147-9.
76 This was the period in which al-NabulusT was writing in defence of various Sufi practices.
77 Zilfi, The Politics of Piety, p. 157; Inalcik & Quataert. An Economic and Social History . p.561.
78 Zilfi, The Politics of Piety, p. 158.
35
That al-Nabulusi accused the fuqaha’ of the anti-Sufi movement in Damascus
of ignorance, incompetence and ‘love of this world and vanities’ is significant.79 The
Kadizadeli movement was, in many respects, a drive to confront the challenge that the
Sufis posed to the regular mosque preacher career.80 Neither al-Ustuwaril nor Vani
was trained in the central madrasa system. They represented the less remunerative
mosque preacher career line. Al-MuradT remarks that al-Ustuwam was a preacher.
The largest and most prestigious mosques were as likely to be assigned to a Sufi as to
a preacher.81 The Kadizadelis appear to have been both a conscientious religious
protest as well as a manifestation of economic rivalry in religious garb.82 Al-UstuwanI
was successful in Istanbul in acquiring a position in the Sultan Abu’l-Fath Muhammad
Khan mosque in Istanbul probably thanks to his association with the Grand Wazir at
the time. When he was exiled to Damascus, he assumed teaching and preaching
positions in two of the prominent madrasas in the city which suggests that he still had
some influential patrons both in Istanbul and Damascus.83 Furthermore, al-NabulusT’s
writings of the late 1670s suggest that economic competition may have been the
79 Al-NabulusT, Idahal-Dalalat. pp. 17-8.
80 Zilfi. The Politics of Piety, p. 163.
81 Zilfi. The Politics of Piety , p. 166.
82 Zilfi, The Politics of Piety, p. 167.
83 Van Leeuwen, Waqfs. pp l 19 & 150, remarks that the al-UstuwanTs gained a quasi-monopoly over
the function of khatlb of the Umayyad Mosque, noting that the main families, who had access to the
most important functions, derived their status not only from their power base in Damascus, but also
from their ties with factions in Istanbul
36
underlying motivation for the fuqaha ’ leadership of the anti-Sufi movement in
Damascus in the 1670s and early 1680s.84
Criticisms of Ibn cArabT were certainly aired in the late 1650s in Damascus,
when al-Ustuwam defended his reputation. It appears that in the 17th century the
Kadizadelis attempted to gauge the degree of people’s orthodoxy by discovering
people’s views about Ibn c Arab! 85 Those who used him as an authority or recited his
verse were considered by some to be heretics. That al-NabulusT wrote a text defending
Ibn cArabT’s concept of Wahdat al-Wujud in 1680/1091 is significant.86 He reveals an
awareness of the ongoing polemic concerning Wahdat al-Wujud which had been
discussed by the culama’ of the past as well as those of more recent times, having read
many works by recent scholars about this subject.87
For al-NabulusI, the statements of Ibn cArabI, Ibn al-Farid, al-Tilimsanl, Ibn
Sab'Tn and cAbd al-Kanm al-JTlT do not contradict the beliefs of Orthodox Muslims
(ahl al-sunna wa ’ I -jam da) u Furthermore, in a possible reference to Kadizadeli
leaders, he states that it is only those people who are more concerned with acquiring
84 Von Schlegell, ‘Sufism’, p.83 compares Inalcik who sees the conflict with the Kadizadeliler and
their opponents as an ideological one between fanaticism and tolerance with Zilfi who points to social
and economic factors. See Inalcik & Quataert, An Economic and Social History , p.606 where it is
suggested that certain disputes which involve competing factions contain an element of economic
rivalry as well; this appears to apply to aspects of the Kadizadeli movement.
85 Zilfi. The Politics of Piety , pp. 136-7.
86 Al-NabulusT, Idah al-Maqsud.
87 Al-NabulusT. Idah al-Maqsud, pp.6. & 21.
88 Al-NabulusT. Idah al-Maqsud, p.6.
37
official posts and the ‘vanities of the world’ who refute Wahdat al-Wujud*9 He adds
that those false Sufis who misunderstand and misstate Wahdat al-Wujud deserve the
censure they receive from exoteric culama' and from genuine Sufis.90
During his period of seclusion from wider society, al-NabulusT corresponded
with people in various locations.91 In 1683/1094, he discussed with a correspondent
near Istanbul al-Taftazanl’s (d ca. 1389) attitudes towards Ibn c Arab!. 92 In 1686/1097,
a correspondent from Nablus also discussed with al-NabulusT these attitudes of al-
Taftazam. Al-Taftazam wrote a work entitled Sharh al-Maqasicf3 which is critical of
Ibn cArabT and those who profess Wahdat al-Wujud 9 A
One of al-Taftazam’ s students, cAla’ al-Dln al-Bukhan (d. 1437/841), wrote
Fadlbat al-Mulhidm wa-NasIhat al-Mmvahhadm , which reflects his teacher’s anti-Ibn
cArabT teaching.95 It is probable that al-NabulusT was not only aware of this particular
Ibn cArabT polemic, but wrote against it in his al-Wujud al-Haqq wa '-Khitab al-Sidq ,
89 Al-NabulusT, Idah al-MaqsOd , p.7.
90 Al-NabulusT, Idah al-Maqsud . p. 17.
91 Al-NabulusT, al-Wujud al-Haqq. pp. 19-20.
92 Al-NabulusT. al-Wujud al-Haqq. p. 19.
93 Al-Taftazanl, Sharh al-Maqasd (Cairo: Maktabat al-Kullivya al-Azhariyya. n.d.).
94 Al-NabulusT, al-Wujud al-Haqq, p.26. See Knvsh. Ibn cArabT. p. 147. who argues that al-Taftazam
held a nuanced attitude towards Sufism; he made a distinction between sound’ elements of Sufi
theory and practice and the ‘pernicious’ elements such as Ibn cArabT’s theories.
95 Al-NabulusT, al-Wujud al-Haqq, pp. 15-25. Knysh. Ibn cArabI pp. 204-5.
38
completed in 1693/1 104. 96 This indicates that al-Nabulusi was aware of the anti-Ibn
cAxabT polemics from the preceding centuries.
Both al-Taftazanl and al-Bukhan were influence by Ibn Taymiyya
(d. 728/1328). 97 Ibn Taymiyya launched a comprehensive critical attack on Ibn cArabT,
which made him the most implacable and important opponent of Ibn cArabT and his
followers98 The account of the origins, beliefs, and implications of Wahdat al-Wujud
within Islam was a recurrent subject of Ibn Taymiyya’s controversialist work: much of
his polemic is a presentation of the principal themes of Wahdat al-Wujud and
argumentation to show their incompatibility with the Qur’an and hadHh"
Although sympathetic towards Sufism, Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406/808), like Ibn
Taymiyya, did not care for the metaphysics of the later Sufis who espoused Wahdat al-
Wujud. 100 Claiming that Sufism belongs to the sciences of the religious law that
originated in Islam, Ibn KhaldQn criticises recent ‘extremist Sufis’, who speak about
ecstatic experiences, and who have confused the problems of metaphysics and kalam
with their own discipline 101
96 Al-NSbulusT. al-Wujud al-Haqq. pp.30-1.
97 Al-Nabulusi, al-Wujud al-Haqq. p. 15. Knvsh. Ibn c Arab I. p.205.
98 Knvsh. Ibn cArabl p.87. See Ibn Taymiyya. Al-Furqm. and Ibn Taymiyya. A Muslim Theologian ’s
Response to Christianity - Ibn Taymiyya ’sAl-Jawab al-Sahih, ed. & trans. by TF Michel, s.J.
(Delmar, New York: Caravan Books, 1984).
99 Ibn Taymiyya, A Muslim Theologian ’s Response, p.6.
100 Knvsh, Ibn cArabI p. 189. Ibn Khaldun, An Introduction, pp.85-7. 358-67.
101 Ibn Khaldun. An Introduction , pp. 358 & 390.
39
By the time of al-Taftazanl and his student, al-Bukhan, in the late 14th and
early 1 5th centuries the polemics concerning Ibn cArabT had been raging for at least one
hundred years. Fifty years later, in the late 1 5th century, Burhan al-DTn al-Biqa’T
(d. 1480/885) paraphrased al-Bukhari’s refutation of Ibn cArabT in a number of
works.102 One hundred years later, the Egyptian Sufi, cAbd al-Wahhab al-ShacranI
(d. 1565/973), wrote a book in defence of Ibn cArabT, in which he noted the main points
of the enduring polemical dispute.103 It is known that al-NabulusT was aware of this
particular work of al-Shacram 104 Thus, not only was he aware of al-Taftazanl’s
criticisms of Ibn cArabI, he was probably also aware of al-ShacranTs summary of the
polemical issues concerning Ibn cArabT.
It is possible to view al-NabulusT’s commentary on Ibn cArabT’s Fususal-
Ifikam in two contexts Firstly, that al-NabulusT was aware of an anti-Sufi movement
in the mid- to late-seventeenth century is certain. He was active in writing against
corrupt and extreme Sufis who were discrediting those who were genuine and devout
Muslims. Although critical of these corrupt Sufis, he also accused the leaders of the
anti-Sufi movement of being equally corrupt and venal He agreed with some of their
complaints against certain Sufis, while criticising them for improper motivations.
102 Knvsh. Ibn c Arab l p.212.
103 Al-ShacranT, cAbd al-Wahhab. Kitab al-YawaqH wa 'l-Jawahir fl Bay an cAqaid al-Akabir (Cairo:
Bulaq, 1890), pp.13-4.
104 Al-NabulusT, Sharh , II. 300.
40
Secondly, al-NabulusT was aware of the history of polemics concerning Ibn
cArabI in the Islamic tradition. This was not a debate rooted solely in the past, rather it
had relevance to the realities of 1 7th century Damascus Criticisms of Ibn cArabT had
been raised throughout the 1 7th century and al-NabulusT was aware of various works
both in praise and criticism of Ibn cArabT. Al-NabulusT wrote a number of works in
defence of Ibn cArabT’s Sufi ideas, notably his commentary on Ibn cArabT’s Fususal-
Ifikam
41
Chapter 3
Al-NabulusFs Introduction to the Sharh Jawahir al-Nusus fr Hall
Kalimat al-Fusus
Introduction
This chapter will examine al-NabulusT’s stated intentions for writing his
commentary on Ibn cArabI’s Fusus al-Hkam and it will also present an analysis of the
assumptions underlying his intentions.
In brief, the point that al-NabulusT intends to make is that none of the
commentaries on the Fususal-Hikam written until his time are of use in explaining it
correctly to either its opponents or to Sufi novices He opines that there is a need for a
‘correct’ explanation of this work. This is his fundamental intention.
To support this argument, he describes how there are different types of people
who possess different means of understanding the world and of believing in God.
From this typology he explains how the one God can appear differently to different
types of people. 1 These different appearances may lead to dogmatic clashes between
different types of people, despite the fact that they all believe in the same one God. He
proposes that the Fususal-Ifikam concerns the faith of one specific type of person
only. He argues that there is a need for an interpreter who knows the beliefs and
1 See the chapter on Harun in this thesis which discusses specifically the issue of God appearing in the
manifold forms of the created world.
42
manners of expression of the different types of people This interpreter can be the
mediator through whom the meanings of the Fusus al-Hikam may pass from the
recondite original text into the language of one of the types of people who have
difficulties in understanding it correctly. Al-NabulusI proposes himself as this
interpreter and states that he will rely upon God for inspiration in understanding the
text and in interpreting it.
Other Commentaries and their Readership
Al-NabulusI does recognise the existence of other commentaries on the Fusus
al-Hikam. However, he states that there are problems with these commentaries Their
expressions and allusions are said to be difficult and obscure.2 No names of authors
and no quotations are given to support al-NabulusI’s generalisations about the
tradition of commentaries.3 At the end of his commentary, he remarks that he made no
use of these works in ‘writing’ his own.4
The difficulties and obscurities of these commentaries do not help those who
are incompetent (al-qasirun) or who are Sufi novices (ahl al-bidayah ) when they read
the Fusus al-Hikam 5 Al-NabulusI implies that neither of these groups of people
2 Al-NabulusI. Sharp Jawahir al-Nususfl Hall Kalimat al-Fusus. 2 vols (Cairo: Bulaq. 1304-1323). I.
2.
3 Al-NabulusI, Sharp. I. 2.
4 Al-NabulusI. Sharp, n, 344.
5 Al-NabulusI. Sharp, i. 2. Al-NabulusI offers no information about whom these incompetent people
and novices might have been. Consequently, it is unwise to speculate how wide he intended his
audience to be and what the composition of that audience might have been. Only generic labels for
various groups have been provided. All that can be said is that there is the impression that he is
writing for a literate, erudite audience whose preconceptions towards Sufism may have varied
according to their prejudices. This sort of audience may be divided into the Sufi elite - masters and
novices, non-Sufi theologians, philosophers, and other thinkers, and educated ordinary people.
43
benefit from the commentaries. The only people who can benefit from these
commentaries are the great masters who possess mystical insight:
Its commentaries . ..are hardly ever of benefit to anyone save the great masters who possess mystical
experience (ah l al-adhwaq)6
Al-NabulusI intends to produce a commentary that will clarify what is obscure
in Ibn cArabT’s text and to provide elaborate discussions of various themes that are
dealt with concisely in it.7 He hopes that he will be able to do this with the clearest
words possible and in accordance with divine inspiration and revelation.8
Al-NabulusT’s stated intention to clarify the difficulties of one of the great Sufi
texts suggests that he saw himself as one of the great masters who have mystical
insight into this text and its commentaries The implication of this is that it is mystical
insight (< dhawq ) that enables him to understand the difficulties and obscurities in these
texts.9 His intention in the commentary is to impart his understanding to those who are
incompetent and those who are novices. It follows that his intended audience is these
two groups of people. He is not intent upon providing a commentary for other Sufi
great masters who possess mystical insight.
Furthermore, on page 42, al-Nabulusi confirms that when he mentions ‘the people of the beginning’
he is referring to Sufi novices. In this later context, he refers to the people of the middle' and the
people of the end.’ The latter group are associated with self-manifestation’ and veiling’, ‘survival’
and annihilation’. These terms are all raised by al-Nabulusi throughout his commentary when
discussing the Fususal-Hkam. They will appear in this chapter, as well as others such as that of
Ibrahim and Harun.
6 Al-NabulusT, Sharh, I. 2.
7 Al-Nabulusi. Sharh . I. 2.
8 Al-NabulusT, Sharh, I, 2.
9 This understanding is said to be imparted to him from God. Reference has already been made to the
fact that al-Nabulusi states that it is God who confided the commentary to him. Al-Nabulusi, Sharh,
ii, 301, states that the Sufi masters, that is to say those who posses the faculties of unveiling (kashj)
and insight (basa-a) and whose hearts have been exorcised through spiritual exercises, have no doubts
44
Al-NabulusT is explicit in communicating his certainty that he can convey his
‘correct’ understanding of the Fususal-Ifikam and that the earlier commentaries failed
in this. He is confident that those who think well of the Fususal-Ifikam as well as
those who think badly of it will be receptive to his commentary and will modify their
thoughts accordingly. Al-NabulusI assumes that those who are incompetent and those
who are novices actually want to understand the Fususal-FRkam in the way that he
himself deems to be correct. He does not address the issue that some of the members
of these groups might not want to understand the Fususal-Ifikam in the same way as
him. Al-NabulusI’ s assumption here is that he will find a receptive audience for his
commentary of the Fususal-Ifikam
Al-NabulusI has offered an image of the reception of Ibn cArabT’s ideas in his
time and place. By the 1 190s/ 1680s, Ibn cArabT’s Fususal-Ifikam was, in al-
NabulusT’s opinion, encountering various problems of reception. None of the
commentaries written over the previous centuries had helped to mitigate or resolve
these problems. They were written for specialised audiences - the Sufi masters - who
could probably dispense with them anyway. Al-NabulusI counts himself as one of
these masters. However, he perceived that there was a need to make it easier for other
less able types of person to understand the Fususal-Ifikam. It is with these less able
types of people that he is concerned in providing the commentary.
at all on any issue. He admits, though, that they are limited in what they can say publicly by the time
and place in which they live.
45
There is the impression that al-Nabulusi viewed the world as being full of
people who were incompetent in understanding Ibn cArabT’s ideas and with
inexperienced Sufis who also had problems with these ideas. This typological
abstraction of the world may have been arrived at from al-Nabulusi’ s own experiences
with both types of person. He may well have known a number of Sufi novices whose
instruction in the texts of Ibn cArabT, particularly the Fususal-Hikam , was his
responsibility. It is known that he taught the Fususal-Hikam to a number of close
disciples during his retreat 10 It is also known from a number of his works written
around the same time as his commentary that he was critical of various classes of
people.11
Furthermore, it is also known that he wrote a number of works defending the
ideas of Ibn cArabT against unnamed opponents. 12 Al-NabulusT places these opponents
in two contexts: the context of the past and the context of the present. Al-NabulusT
was aware of an anti-Ibn cArabT literature and tradition coming from the past and
10 Von Schlegell. BR. ‘Sufism in the Ottoman Arab World: Shaykh cAbd al-Ghanl al-NabulusT
(d. 1143/1731)’ (unpublished doctoral thesis. University of California. Berkeley , 1997), p.72.
11 Al-NabulusT. Idah al-Dalalat fTSamif al-Alal. ed. by AR Hammush (Damascus: D3r al-Fikr. 1981).
pp.46-7, where he describes the fuqaha’ and the commonality of people in Damascus in the 1670s as
possessing evil intentions and goals. He puts them in the same league as iniquitous and slanderous
people. Al-NabulusT is not just talking about an abstract view of the world; it seems that his own
personal experience led to such strongly worded descriptions Furthermore, in the course of this
particular text he rails against those who indulge in wild generalisations about other types of people.
In the light of this, one has to wonder whether he follows his own advice or whether his comments are
largely true.
12 See the chapter on al-NabulusI’s biography for details of these. A number of them were written
during al-NabulusT’ s seven year Sufi retreat.
46
existent in his day. 13 Thus, in clarifying and explaining various concepts and
expressions, al-NabulusT may well be responding to charges levelled at Ibn cArabT both
in the past and in his own day. 14
Al-NabulusT’s Classification of Mankind according to Epistemology and Faith
Having established three categories of people so far - the great Sufi masters
who possess mystical insight, Sufi novices and the incompetent who might be
opponents of the Fususal-Hikam - al-NabulusT moves on to a lengthy discourse that
elaborates another three categories of people - blind imitators and the incompetent,
theologians and philosophers, and gnostics who have mystical experiences.15 It
appears that there is some degree of overlap between these two sets of three
categories.
13 Al-NabulusT. Idah al-Maqsud min Macna Wahdat al-Wujud. ed. by 1 Hasriva (Damascus: Matbacat
al-Tlm, 1969). This work was written in 1090/1680.
14 See the chapter on al-Nabulusf s biography for an appreciation of al-Nabulusf s awareness of the
anti-Ibn cArabI polemics. See Knysh, AD, Ibn cArabTin the Later Islamic Tradition - the Making of a
Polemical Image in Medieval Islam (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999) for a good survey of the polemics
surrounding Ibn cArabI.
15 Here and throughout the thesis I shall refer to cArif as gnostic and macrifa as gnosis. Amaldez, R,
‘Macrifa’. in El2 (Leiden: Brill. 1991). vi. 568-571. prefers the term cognition for ma ’rifa. He
concludes (p.571) that it is a misuse to definitely translate macrifa automatically as ‘gnosis’. Al-
HujwTri, Kashf al-Mahjub, trans. by RA Nicholson (Leiden: Brill. 191 1), p.267, states: ‘Gnosis of God
[macrifat Allah] is of two kinds: cognitional film I) and emotional (hall). . . . Gnosis is the life of the
heart through God, and the turning away of one’s inmost thoughts from all that is not God. The
worth of everyone is in proportion to gnosis, and he who is without gnosis is worth nothing.
Theologians, lawyers, and other classes of men give the name of gnosis ( macrifat ) to right cognition
film) of God, but the Sufi Shaykhs call right feeling (M) towards God by that name. Hence they
have said that gnosis ( macrifat ) is more excellent than cognition (cilm), for right feeling (hat) is the
result of right cognition, but right cognition is not the same thing as right feeling, i.e. one who has not
cognition of God is not a gnostic (carif), but one may have cognition of God without being a gnostic. ’
Furthermore, Baldick, J, Mystical Islam - an Introduction to Islam (London: IB Tauris, 1989), pp.7-8,
reveals a sensitivity to avoiding Christian terms when approaching Islam and Sufism, however, when
he discusses macrifa (pages 35, 38, & 61) he uses the term ‘gnosis’.
47
There are two different sets of criteria that determine the composition of the
new set of three categories or groups of people One set of criteria pertains to
different types of knowledge - doctrine/speech ( qawl ), intellectual understanding
( fahm ), and witnessing ( shuhud ) The other set pertains to different types of faith -
through language, through reasoning, and through witnessing. He states that:
Faith in God His books. His messengers, the Last Day, and faith in Laws and Judgements is divided
into three parts.16
The types of faith are linked to the types of knowledge. Al-NabulusT not only
describes the new set of three groups in terms of these sets of criteria, he also explains
the interactions between them and to which of these new groups the Fususal-Ifikam
specifically relates. The blind imitators and incompetent are very limited in their
knowledge and faith. They merely utter prayers and statements of belief without
understanding them. Philosophers and theologians attempt to understand what they
know and what they believe and in doing so rely upon their intellectual understanding
and their doctrine. They encompass the knowledge and faith of the blind imitators.
The gnostics have also enjoyed the fruits of doctrine and intellectual understanding, but
have transcended these to experience their knowledge and faith through an ineffable
state of witnessing. Their experience is denied to the philosophers, theologians and
blind imitators. It is to the category of gnostics that the Fusus al-Hikam relates.
The first group he discusses is that of the ‘blind imitators’ ( al-muqallidm ):
The knowledge of doctrine ( al-qcnvl ) belongs to the blind imitators and those who are incompetent
(t al-qasrm ). . . The faith of the blind imitator is through doctrine only with heart-felt trust in it
without any intellectual understanding.17
16 Al-NabulusT, Shark I, 3.
48
These people are by nature very limited in what they can understand and
apprehend. They trust in their faith and in what they hear or read without
understanding it.
Al-NabulusT provides two Qur’anic verses to support the existence of this type
of faith (the sections quoted by al-NabulusT are in italics):
Say, ‘We believe in God, and the revelation given to us, and to Ibrahim, IsmaTl. Ishaq, Ya'qub, and
the tribes, and that given to Musa and Tsa, and that given to the Prophets from their Lord We make
no difference between one and another of them. We bow to God (in Islam)’ [Qur’an 2: 136], 18
And,
Say, 'He is God, the one and only ; God the eternal, absolute; He does not beget, nor is He begotten;
and there is none like Him’ [Qur’an 1 12] 19
Both of these verses commence with the order to ‘Say!’ (qul!) what is
commanded. The doctrine/speech {qawl) is important. The form of the Qur’anic
statement is being stressed. The fact that the believer is being commanded ‘to say’
things appears to be the key here. The intellectual understanding of what is said is not
stressed. Believers should exhibit heart-felt trust in what they are being asked to say
because it is a command from God and the words they will say are also from God.
Secondly, the content of these verses may also be relevant. The first Qur’anic
quotation (Qur’an 2: 136) presents a ritual statement about belief in God without
describing or explaining it. The very fact of belief in God and His revelation is
17 AI-NabulusI, Sharh , I, 3.
18 Al-N5bulusT, Sharh , i, 3.
49
paramount. There is an allusion to the aspect of different prophets believing in God
and having a revelation from Him. Although they each had different revelations, no
difference is made between them. Qur’an 1 12 is simply an affirmation of the taw MJ of
God.
Thirdly, the juxtaposition of these verses is noteworthy Qur’an 2: 136 stresses
God’s reception among man and how He transmits different revelations to different
men. Qur’an 112 stresses the utter oneness of God. Both these verses demand a trust
in their descriptive and prescriptive statements, without expecting any intellectual
understanding of them.
For al-NabulusT these two verses are support for his contention that a certain
type of people does not understand what it believes, but does trust in its truth. These
people blindly follow the words they hear and say without understanding them.
The second group which al-NabulusT discusses is ‘the learned people of the
traditional religious sciences who employ discursive reasoning’ ( al-nazirun wa 7-
mustadillun)
The knowledge of intellectual ( al-fahm ) understanding belongs to those who use discursive reasoning.
. . . The faith of those who reason is through intellectual understanding with doctrine ( al-qawl ) only.20
This group of people, like the first group, have heart-felt trust in what they
believe, while at the same time attempting to examine and understand it. It seems that
19 Al-NabulusT. Sharp. I, 3. Al-NabulusT tells us that this verse was specifically addressed to
Muhammad.
20 Al-NabulusT, Sharp , I, 3.
50
this group of people is composed of theologians ( mutakallimun ) and philosophers
( falasifah ).21
Al-NabulusT provides two Qur’anic verses to support the existence of this class
of people (the sections quoted by al-NabulusT are in italics):
Say, ‘Examine what is in the heavens and in the earth. ’ Neither the signs nor the warnings will
benefit those who do not believe [Qur'an 10:101].“
And,
Do they not look at what God has created? Their shadows turn around from the right to the left,
prostrating themselves humbly to God [Qur’an 16:4s].23
Al-NabulusT uses these two verses to support his view that a certain type of
people examines what it believes, while believing and trusting in its truth. These
people examine and look at the doctrine of revelation. Through this examination, they
attempt to understand the heavens, the earth and God’s creation. It follows that they
also attempt to understand God intellectually through what He has said about Himself
Thus, whereas with the first group of believers which believes in the one God who
transmitted different revelations to different prophets without understanding what that
21 In the chapter on Zakariyya. al-NabulusT. Sharh. n. 224. discusses the contention that God is the
same as His attributes. He states that al-AshcarT, one of the scholars of Kalam. said that God is not
the same as an attribute which belongs to Him nor is He other than it. ... He could not deny the
attributes of Him entirely because they appear in Revelation and that would entail denying Revelation
which is unbelief. Neither could he make the divine attributes the same as God because that statement
along with the affirmation that the attributes belong to God requires a mystical experience of
unveiling ( dhawq kashfi) and witnessing (mucayana), but he was one of the people of intellection and
rationality (ah l al-afkar wa l-anzar al-aqliyya). Furthermore, that [statement] would not be possible
for him unless he had to deny the attributes like the school of philosophers (madhhab al-falasifa ),
which is unbelief too. ’ This reveals that al-NabulusT associates those who use discursive reasoning
with both theologians and philosophers.
22 Al-NabulusT. Sharh, I, 3.
51
actually means, this group attempts to understand the revelation they receive from
God.
Al-NabulusT also mentions that the studies of these two types of people are
performed by their culama , 24 This suggests that in al-NabulusT’s eyes there are
culama' belonging to both classes of people. There is nothing in his use of the term
culama' to suggest that it is anything more than a broadly defined term indicating
someone who is knowledgeable in a certain subject. Thus, there were culama' or
knowledgeable people who blindly followed the doctrine found in revelation. Equally,
there were other culama' who examined the doctrine of revelation and attempted to
understand it intellectually. On the other hand, there are those people who blindly
follow the doctrine of revelation while not becoming culama\ Similarly, if one follows
the logic of al-Nabulusfs paradigm of groups of people, there are those who examine
the doctrine of revelation and attempt to understand it intellectually, while not
becoming culama\
These two groups of people appear to encompass the incompetent and the Sufi
novices mentioned earlier, neither of whom are said to possess mystical experience
(dhawq). Al-NabulusT also mentions that he has written various books about the faith
of these two types of people, but does not consider it pertinent to elaborate this theme
in the present context.25 Indeed, he does not even mention any of the titles of these
23 Al-NabulusT, Sharp. I. 3.
24 Al-NabulusT. Sharp, i, 3.
25 Al-NabulusT, Sharp, i. 3.
52
works. Nevertheless, it seems to have been a subject about which he held strong
views.26
The final group of people are those whom al-NabulusT calls ‘the gnostics who
have mystical insights’ (al-arifun al-dha'iqun). He has already stated that the people
who mostly benefit from the commentaries on the Fususal-Hikom are the great
masters who possess mystical insight.27 It follows that these great masters belong to
this third group. It is also the case that al-NabulusT sees himself as belonging to this
group.
This group of people are described as actually ‘witnessing’ the things that the
other two groups either blindly follow or attempt to understand.
The knowledge of witnessing ( al-shuhud) belongs to the mystics who have mystical experience (al-
carifm al-dha'iqm). . . . The faith of the gnostics which is through witnessing only, after doctrine (al-
qawt) and intellectual understanding (al-fahm).'2S
They have heart-felt trust in what they believe They have attempted to
understand and draw conclusions about their beliefs. Furthermore, having done this,
they are said to have transcended these types of faith and have actually ‘witnessed’ the
things in which they have blindly trusted and which they have attempted to understand.
Al-NabulusT provides Qur’anic support to prove that this type of faith is real
(the sections quoted by al-NabulusT are in italics):
God has witnessed that there is no god but He. The angels and those in possession of knowledge
standing firm on justice [also witnessed that there is no god but He], There is no god but He, exalted
in power, and wise [Qur’an 3: 18], 29
26 Al-NabulusI, Shark, i. 3. See the chapter on al-Nabulusf s biography for further details of his other
writings.
27 Al-NabulusT, Sharh, i, 2.
28 Al-NabulusT. Sharh. i, 3.
53
This is a particularly important Qur’anic verse for al-Nabulusi and, unlike the
other verses adduced so far, he provides a detailed exegesis. He focuses on the verb
‘to witness’ (shahida), while recognising that there are other aspects of the verse
worthy of exegesis. Unfortunately, these other aspects are left untouched.
He states that there is only one act of ‘witnessing’ ( al-shahada ) mentioned in
the verse; however, it is predicated of three ‘realities’ ( baqa'iq ), viz God, angels, the
possessors of knowledge, which are all the subject of the sentence:30
The act of witnessing is predicated of God firstly, and then this act lowers itself to the angels and then
to the possessor of knowledge.31
Al-NabulusT is highlighting the importance of the fact that there is only one act
of ‘witnessing’. He uses the standard grammatical language to indicate that this is
predicated of God first of all who is the first subject of the verbal sentence. The
‘witnessing’ is then revealed ( tcmazzalat ) to the angels and then to those in possession
of knowledge.32 These latter two ‘realities’ also become subjects of the sentence.
Al-NabulusT elaborates his concept of ‘witnessing’:
And so it [the act of witnessing] is an action (/?7) in God, but in the angels and the possessor of
knowledge it is a delegation of authority ( tafwld ). It is through tafwfd that witnessing occurs.
However, God only attributes the witnessing of Him to you if you delegate authority to Him. If you do
this, then He annihilates you from your essence.33
29 Al-NabulusT, Shark I. 3.
30 Al-NabulusT. Shark I, 3.
31 Al-NabulusT. Shark I. 3.
32 The word ‘ tanazzalat ’ is associated through its constituent root letters with the Qur’anic concepts of
Divine Revelation - inzal and tanzil.
33 Al-NabulusT, Shark I, 3.
54
He is stating that witnessing is an action (fict) in God. Thus, when it is
predicated of God it is an action that He, as its agent (f£ il), performs.34 On the other
hand, it is a tafwTd when predicated of the angels and possessors of knowledge.35
Witnessing is only predicated of these two groups when there is tafwTd to God on their
part.
Al-NabulusI adds a degree of sophistication to the statement that God only
attributes the witnessing of Him to someone if that person delegates authority to Him
The witnessing is not an action on the part of the angels or persons involved, rather it
is a tafwTd from the subsequent subjects to the principal agent. The action remains
God’s. In other words, if someone were to delegate authority to God, then God
would annihilate them from their essence or self ( 'ayrt ).36 Consequently, God is the
34 Leaman. O, Averrroes and his Philosophy (Richmond: Curzon Press. 1998). pp.46-52, surveys the
different views of various theologians and philosophers on the issue of whether God is really an agent
(/ac/7). He looks at Ghazali, Avicenna, Averroes, the Ashcarites. There is a hint of this history in al-
Nabulusl’s choice of words here.
35 Gilliot. Claude. Exegese, Langue et Theologie en Islam - L 'Exegese Coranique de Tabari (Paris:
Librairie Philosophique J Vrin, 1990), p.266. Gilliot explains that in traditional Kalam, tafividwas a
belief held by the Qadarites, the proponents of free will. They understood it to mean that God left the
acts of man to his entire discretion. It is apparent that al-Nabulusi’s position in his introduction with
regard to this term is quite different. He is using the term to signify man’s delegating authority for
his acts to God. The entry on al-tafwid in Department of Theology, A Commentary of Theology
Expression (Mashhad: Islamic Research Foundation, 1995), p.74, suggests that there is the possibility
of going to extremes in delegating authority ( tafwTd) to God to the extent that the servant is in the
position of something lifeless, possessing no will and no choice. This seems pertinent here. Qur’an
40:44 seems to support a similar use of this term: And I delegate authority for my affair to God’ This
is in a context where someone who believes in God is attempting to convince his people to believe in
God too. He pleads the case that he delegates authority for his own affairs to God because God
watches over His servants.
36 See the chapter on Ibrahim for a full discussion of this concept of annihilation. ’ Izutsu, T.
Creation and the Timeless Order of Things - Essays in Islamic Mystical Philosophy (Oregon: White
Cloud Press, 1994), pp. 11-17, discusses the mystical-philosophical concepts of annihilation (fana ’)
and survival ( baqa ’). It should be noted that his description of the concept of annihilation is similar
in broad outline to what al-NabulusI is elaborating here. Al-NabulusI is using the term mahq for
annihilation rather than fana. This is not an odd term to be used here for Ibn cArabI himself used
55
agent who actually witnesses and is also the object that is witnessed. The person who
has delegated authority to God is not an agent of the action of witnessing. Al-
NabulusI adds that, while in this state of consciousness, some gnostics say, ‘Only God
knows God.’37
Al-NabulusT is suggesting that the people of witnessing (ahl al-shuhud) enter a
mystical state in which they delegate authority to God and, in some way, participate in
God’s witnessing of Himself. 38 They are able to know God as God knows Himself. It
is only through transcending the blind following of their beliefs and through
transcending the intellectual understanding of them that they reach this apparently
ultimate state of knowledge and faith. Their essence or self is annihilated so that they
participate, in some manner, with an action predicated of God.39
this term to indicate fan a' (See al-Hakim, S, al-Mucjam al-SufT- al-Hkma fiHudud al-Kalima
(Beirut: Dendera, 1981), p. 1015). The annihilation of the ego-consciousness is the means through
which to witness Reality in its absolute indetermination. In achieving this, man himself is not the
subject of the act of witnessing, rather it is Reality. The epistemological subject with which to see
things is gone and thus there are no objects to be seen. Multiplicity disappears. The concept of
survival ( baqa’ ) is a state where one sees oneself and all other things as determinations of one single
reality. The multiplicity reappears, but the ego-consciousness is aware of the fundamental unity of
Reality.
37 Al-NabulusT. Shark I, 3. Towards the end of his commentary. al-NabulusI. Shark n, 312 & 314.
states that God is both the one who knows ( calim ) and what is known ( macl&n ). He adds that God is
also the knowledge of the one who knows {film al-alim ), as well as being the one who witnesses (al-
shahid) and what is witnessed (al-mashhiid). This corroborates al-NabulusI’s statements to this end in
the introduction to his commentary on the Fususal-Hkam.
38 Al-NabulusI, Shark I, 42, uses the term ‘ ahl al-nihaya' - adepts - to refer to those who are
characterised by divine self-manifestation and veiling, and survival and annihilation. This is in
contrast to the ‘ ahl al-bidaya ’ - novices. At both a semantic and conceptual level, the ahl al-shuhud
and ahl al-nihaya refer to the same category of people.
39 Izutsu, Creation, p.7. states in the context of a discussion of Iranian philosophy’s inclination for
mysticism’ that whatever the object of knowledge, the highest degree of knowledge is always achieved
when the knower, the human subject, becomes completely unified and identified with the object so
much so that there remains no differentiation between the two. Thus differentiation means distance
which, in cognitive relationships, signifies ignorance. It may follow that al-NabulusI is ultimately
suggesting the identity of God and man, however the strict logic of the language he uses does not
necessarily lead to this conclusion. Throughout this thesis it will be shown that al-NabulusI is
56
Qur’an 3: 18 is support for al-Nabulusi’s contention that a certain type of
people actually witnesses what it believes, while having heart-felt trust in that object of
belief These people witness what they believe through their delegation of authority to
God.
At this point, al-NabulusT states that the Fususal-Hikam concerns the faith of
this latter type of people only:
This great book which is the Fususal-Hkam is, howev er, about the faith of the people of witnessing
only .... Only those whose spiritual power ( himma ) has risen from the depths of doctrine and
intellectual understanding and whose veil of imagination ( wahm ) has been rent . . . [will be close to]
the understanding of the realities and witnessing of the intricacies.40
The One God and His Different Manifestations41
Although the Fususal-Hikam is said to concern only the faith of those people
who witness God through the delegation of authority to Him, al-NabulusT has
discussed two other types of faith. These descriptions constitute a hierarchy of faith
and knowledge At the top of this hierarchy are those who witness God, in the middle
are those who attempt to understand God intellectually, and at the bottom are those
who simply reiterate the Qur’anic and Prophetic descriptions of God without any
understanding of what they mean. Al-NabulusT adduces a Qur’anic verse to support
his hierarchy of faith and of knowledge:
And We have raised some of them over others in ranks [Qur’an 43:32], 42
frequently at pains to establish the utter difference between the transcendent God and originated
creation.
40 Al-NabulusT, Shark I, 3.
41 The chapters on Ibrahim. Zakariyya and Harun in this thesis cover the issue of the one God
appeanng in a multitude of different manifestations or forms. These chapters approach this
fundamental issue from different, yet related, angles.
57
Al-NabulusT argues above that there is only one act of witnessing which is an
action belonging to God and performed by Him, yet it is also revealed to angels and to
those who have knowledge if they delegate authority to God. He also states:
And there is no doubt that the three divisions of faith stem from a single division, which is what has
come from God.43
The object of faith is defined by al-NabulusT as being God, His books, His
messengers, the Day of Judgement and the Laws and Judgements.44 Although there
are different categories of faith which are determined by the epistemological category
of their adherents, the object of faith remains one. This is an assertion of a form of
tawhid. Al-NabulusT is emphasising the fact that God is one and that the object of
belief is one. He is maintaining the monotheism of Islam, but in a sophisticated
manner
Al-NabulusT argues that God is one, yet is experienced in different ways by
different people:
God, in whom one must have faith, is one. However. He [God] differs according to His appearances.
Thus, His appearance in the people of doctrines is different to His appearance in the people of
discursive reasoning. Equally, His appearance is also different in the people of the witnessing of
states (a hw 3). 45
42 Al-NabulusT. Shark I, 4.
43 Al-NabulusT, Shark I, 3.
44 Al-NabulusT, Shark I. 3.
45 Al-NabulusT. Shark I. 3. This is probably a reference to the Sufi concept of states ( ahwat) which
are associated with stations ( maqamat ) on the path to God. Al-HujwTn, Kashf p. 181 says: that
‘“Station” ( maqam ) denotes anyone’s “standing” in the Way of God. and his fulfilment of the
obligations appertaining to that “station” and his keeping it until he comprehends its perfection so far
as lies in a man’s power. . . . “State” (hal), on the other hand, is something that descends from God
into a man’s heart, without his being able to repel it when it comes, or to attract it when it goes, by his
own effort. . . . “Station” belongs to the category of acts, “state” to the category of gifts. ’
58
A little later, while using the metaphor of fire for God, al-Nabulusi states:
And it [fire] is one and is not repeated, however it has appeared in every place in accordance with that
place’s predisposition.46
Al-NabulusT is arguing that while God is one, it is the predisposition of the
place where He appears, or locus of manifestation, that determines how He is received.
Thus, if the locus of manifestation is a blind imitator then God will be believed in but
neither understood nor witnessed. On the other hand, if the locus is someone who
examines what they believe, then God is believed in and understood, but not witnessed.
Finally, if the locus is someone who witnesses God, then God is believed in,
understood and then witnessed
God’s manifestation in the locus of the blind imitator is in accordance with this
person’s predisposition. This predisposition is doctrine ( al-qawl) and so on. The
aspect of doctrine predisposes the blind imitator to experience God in certain ways and
to depend on others, who are like him, to acquire and talk about this experience:
The one who talks relies on someone else when he talks, narrating on his authority. . . The teacher of
the first [division of people who are the blind imitators] is another like him.47
God’s manifestation in the locus of someone who uses discursive reasoning is
in accordance with this person’s particular predisposition. This predisposition is
intellectual understanding (al-fahm) and so on. The aspect of understanding
predisposes the one who uses discursive reasoning to experience God in certain ways
and to depend on his intellect and mind to acquire and talk about this experience.
46 Al-Nabulusi, Sharp, I, 4.
47 Al-NabulusT, Sharp . I, 3.
59
He who conceptualises ( al-mutasawwir ) relies on his mind w hen conceptualising, narrating on its
authority. . . . The teacher of the second [division of people who reason discursively] is his intellect
and mind.48
Before progressing to al-NabulusT’s presentation of the minutiae of the higher
category of faith through witnessing only after doctrine and intellectual understanding,
it is important to stress a point about the first two categories of people. In both these
categories there is a dependence on something other than the self in order to have a
degree of knowledge about the object of belief. This ‘something other’ is either
another person similar to the self or is the mind or intellect upon which the self
depends. Thus, the manifestation of God in both these epistemological categories is
‘intended through what is other than it’:
The first two appearances . . are intended through the other 49
The ramification of this medium of otherness is differentiation. This
differentiation necessitates degrees of ignorance of the object known The object
cannot be fully known unless the cognitive distance between the subject and object is
completely effaced.50 Al-NabulusT argues that this occurs only in the faith of those
whose epistemological category is that of witnessing only after language and
understanding.
Al-NabulusT’s theory of the effacement of the self through taJwTd leads to
God’s act of knowing Himself through the medium of that effaced self.51 This seems
48 Al-Nabulusl. Sharh. I. 3.
49 Al-N5bulusl, Sharh. i. 4.
50 See the earlier footnote about Izutsu. Creation . p.7. where there is an explanation for the theory that
the highest knowledge of a given object is where there is no differentiation between the knowing
subject and the object known.
51 Al-Nabulusl, Sharh , I, 3.
60
to be a reformulation of traditional Sufi theories concerning /aw#’ and baqa' 52 The act
of tafwid is equivalent to the act of fan a ’, where man’s ego-consciousness is
annihilated and he is thus able to witness God in His utter oneness, or rather God
witnesses Himself through man The state of baqa’ follows that of fan a ' and is where
man sees both himself and all other things as entities in the utter oneness of God. For
al-NabulusT, this theory is relevant to the people of the higher category of faith which
is through witnessing only after speech and understanding, since God has annihilated
them from their essence or self. This is the experience of fana ' and baqa’.
Gnostics witness it [the pristine single division of faith coming from God] through their secrets.
The one who witnesses relies in his witnessing on the reality of what he witnesses, narrating on its
authority. . . The teacher of the third [division of people who witness] is his Lord.53
Al-NabulusT adduces a Sufi adage to emphasise the value judgement implicit in
his hierarchical categorisation of the different types of faith. This adage highlights the
supremacy of the faith of witnessing over the other types of faith. It also stresses the
source of knowledge for those of superior faith. This source is the living God and not
dead people, whether thinkers or blind imitators. Furthermore, the knowledge derived
from the faith of witnessing is living and not dead:
You have taken your knowledge as one dead person from another whereas we have taken our
knowledge from the one who lives and never dies.54
God’s manifestation in the locus of the one who has mystical knowledge is said
to be the most complete of the three manifestations:
52 See Rahman. F, ‘Baka’ wa-Fan3’\ in El2 (Leiden: Brill. 1960), I, 951. See the chapter on Ibrahim,
where al-NabulusI deals with this theory of fana and baqa' thoroughly
53 Al-NabulusI. Shark I, 3.
61
There is nothing more complete than the appearance connected with witnessing because it is what is
intended .... It is intended through itself.55
This reinforces the sense that al-NabulusT is reformulating aspects of traditional
Sufi cognitive theory. There is no cognitive distance between the subject and object.
It is through the effacement or annihilation of the ego-consciousness that adept Sufis
arrive at some form of complete experience of God 56 The implication of the
annihilation of the ego-consciousness is that the Sufi merges into some form of
consciousness which is actually God’s. Through this experience of God as He
intended Himself to appear and how He knows Himself, the Sufi has a complete
knowledge of God.57 This is an explanation of the Sufi experience of witnessing God
according to al-NabulusI.
Al-NabulusT has systematically described and explained his understanding of
mankind according to categories of faith and epistemology This is a sophisticated and
intellectualised approach to the experience of God. The broad structures of earlier
Sufi descriptions of the mystical experience of God appear to be present in al-
NabulusT’s thought. However, whereas the mystical experiences of the pre-Ibn cArabT
era seem much more overtly religious, ritualised and lacking formulation, al-NabulusT,
like Ibn cArabT, describes his experiences and those of others in a much more
54 Al-NabulusT. Sharh, I. 3.
55 Al-NabulusI, Sharh . I. 4.
56 See the chapter on Ibrahim for a thorough discussion of this.
57 Al-NabulusT, Sharh, n, 312. states that God is the one who knows (al-alim) and what is known (al-
maclwi), and also the knowledge of the one who knows (cilm al-alim). Furthermore, he adds that
God is also the one who witnesses ( al-shahid) and what is witnessed ( al-mashhud ). It would follow
that He is also the witnessing of the one who witnesses (shahadat al-shahid). See earlier in this
62
intellectualised formulation. In this respect he is very much in the school of Ibn cArabT
who represents a great watershed in the systematisation and intellectualisation of
Sufism. Annemarie Schimmel writes about Ibn cArabT:
Even though Ibn cArabI may have claimed not to have created any system, his sharp and cool intellect
certainly brought him to systematise his experiences and thoughts, and the influence of his
terminology upon later Sufis seems to show that they accepted his thoughts as a handy systematisation
of what formed, in their view , the true essence of Sufism.58
Nevertheless, the aspect of religious and mystical experience is present in al-
NabulusT’s writings, as much as it is present in Ibn cArabT’s, and this must be borne in
mind while appreciating the heavily intellectualised formulations of his thought.
Polemical Disputes over the Understanding of the One God
Having described and explained the existence of a hierarchy of people
determined by faith and knowledge, al-NabulusT presents a theory of how these people
argue over the validity of their beliefs It is God’s different appearances to different
classes of people that engenders the polemical disputes over the identity and role of
God
Al-NabulusT emphasises the existence of his hierarchical classification of
mankind:
It is known that there is nothing more complete than the appearance of God who is connected to
witnessing; beneath this is the appearance [of God] connected to discursive reasoning and intellection;
and beneath this is the appearance [of God] related to doctrine and blind imitation.59
chapter where al-NabulusT interprets Qur’an 3:18 and where he states that some gnostics have said
that only God knows God. ’
58 Schimmel, A, Mystical Dimensions of Islam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
1975), p.273
59 Al-NabulusT, Sharp, I, 4.
63
This hierarchy can be appreciated as an inverted pyramid. At the top, which is
the widest and most complete location, is the appearance of God to the people of
witnessing. The next rank down is less wide and less complete. This belongs to the
people of intellect and reasoning. Finally, at the bottom is the narrowest and least
complete location, where the people of doctrine and blind imitation are placed.
Although the knowledge of God becomes progressively less complete as one
descends from top to bottom, it is no less valid.60 The issue for al-NabulusT is that the
less knowledge of God someone has, the less able they would be to appreciate the
more complete knowledge of God belonging to someone of a higher rank of faith.
This lack of appreciation or ignorance of what belongs to higher ranks of faith and
knowledge is pivotal. It also leads to the issue of religious authority which is implicit
in al-NabulusT’s arguments here.61 This hierarchy explains the existence of polemical
debates over the truth claims of Sufis and non-Sufis. Al-NabulusT says:
Likewise the reality of the belief in God has an appearance in the doctrine of the blind imitators which
is different to its appearance in the conceptualisation of those who use discursive reasoning. {This
latter appearance is in turn] different to its appearance in the witnessing of the gnostics who realise
[God], Thus, the phrases vary and the allusions are diverse. Each group talks with what they possess.
Everyone is right. They all have ranks in the eyes of their Lord.62
Al-NabulusT explains that because God appears differently to each category,
the people of each category talk about the one God with different expressions.
60 Of course, to be more precise one should state that it is know ledge of God His Books. Messengers,
the Day of Judgement and of His Laws and Judgements that is perceived differently by the members of
this epistemological hierarchy (al-N5bulusI, Sharh, i, 3). It is these objects of knowledge that are
spoken of, understood and experienced.
61 Al-NabulusT, Sharh, n. 301, explains that Sufis who are graced with the faculties of unveiling and
insight have no doubts about any issue at all. They are limited in what they can say by the time and
place in which they five. They are also limited by the language of the people among whom they live.
Thus, they are only limited by their sound unveiling ( kashf) and mystical insight ( dhawq ) when they
address others like themselves.
64
Despite these differences they are all correct in their descriptions, however limited they
might be due to their position in the hierarchical structure of faith and knowledge.
Al-NabulusT states that the Fusus al-Hikam concerns the appearance of God to
the people of witnessing.63 The expressions used in the Fusus al-Hikam to describe
this manifestation of God may be difficult for those people of the other lower
categories.64 Furthermore, these lower people are said to be ignorant perforce of this
manifestation of God. They will reject what they understand of this manifestation
according to their own knowledge of God, whether that be through doctrine or
conceptualisation.65
Al-NabulusT states that if the people of a certain category were to abandon
their faith in and knowledge of God that would be an act of unbelief toward God
(Jcufr).
And so if they were to leave it [the state], they would leave the extent of what they know of God. This
is unbelief.66
There is hope for people of lower categories of faith and knowledge to
appreciate God’s appearance to those who are of higher categories. This appreciation
is not something for which they themselves can actively strive. On the contrary, it is
God alone who can impart this appreciation to them.67 Other than through the
intervention of God, the position of a certain person in the hierarchy of faith and
62 Al-NabulusT. Shark I. 4.
63 Al-NabulusT, Shark I, 4.
64 Note that al-NabulusI has stated that the people of witnessing are those who have mystical insight
(i dhawq ) which is a factor differentiating them from others and enabling them to experience God as
He knows Himself.
65 Al-NabulusI. Shark I, 4.
66 Al-NabulusT, Shark I, 4.
65
knowledge is fixed. Furthermore, this strengthens the implicit authority possessed by
those persons who are in the highest rank. Not only do they have the broadest and
most profound knowledge of and faith in God, His books and so on, they are also said
to have received this from God Himself.
On the other hand, if people do want to understand what is above their own
state or category without any inspired understanding from God, then they would lower
the higher category to that of their own. Rather than elevating themselves to a more
complete belief in and knowledge of God, they would constrict this to their own
narrow view of God. The higher category would frustrate or invalidate their own
lower category in which they worship God. The expressions, allusions, and knowledge
of the higher category would be incompatible with those of the lower. The differences
between the two categories would lead to contusion. The people of the lower
category would only be able to reject the higher category since it would have come to
them as filtered through their own level of understanding and not as understood by the
people of the higher category .68
Al-NabulusT uses two examples to explain this theory. They both make the
same point. He presents a situation in which someone, whose belief in and knowledge
of God are through intellectual understanding and doctrine only, talks about his
conceptualisations of God to someone else, whose belief in and knowledge of God are
through doctrine only. The second situation is one in which one of the people of
witnessing talks about his insights into God in the presence of the people of the two
lower categories. This is al-NabulusT’s second example:
67 Al-NabulusT, Sharh, I, 4.
68 Al-NabulusT. Shark I. 4.
66
If the person who witnesses, talks about God, whom he finds in his insight, in the presence of the
blind imitator and the one who uses discursive reasoning, then these latter two would find that he has
something of God that they themselves do not have. And so, if the perfection of his state appears to
them out of obedience, submission and success from God, then they demand his state and strive to
reach it. However, if that does not appear to them, they maintain the extent of God that they know,
avoid him out of praise or censure, and are occupied with themselves. [This is the case only] if they
have some divine success [that is to say if God grants them some success]. If God forsakes them, they
lower his state to the doctrine and discursive reasoning in which they are found. Thus, his state
appears in the doctrine of the blind imitator as unbelief and as deviation and error in the mind of the
one who uses discursive reasoning. They both rebuke him for his state, but they do not know that
what they have understood of his state and for which they have censured him is what he censures too
and is that of which he declares himself innocent. However, they do not understand his state
according to what it is as he himself knows it.69
God alone is able to impart the understanding of higher categories of faith to
those of lower ones.70 Al-NabulusT re-emphasises this in the above quotation. It is
only through the success granted by God (tawfTq) that the perfection of the highest
category, which is that of the Sufi, appears to those of the lower categories. Thus,
God is the ultimate actor in deciding who will know Him completely, partially or not at
all.
Among the two lower categories of faith in and knowledge about God there
are three possible reactions to the Sufi’s insights into God. These reactions are
determined and decreed by God. The first reaction is that the person of the lower
category, on receiving iawJTq from God, seeks and strives to reach the highest
category of faith in and knowledge of God Those who receive only some tawflq keep
their own category of faith and knowledge and avoid the person of the highest
category. Finally, those who are forsaken by God, lower the highest category to their
own baser category. The highest category appears to the forsaken of the lowest
category, which is that of blind imitation, as an act of unbelief. To the forsaken of the
69 Al-NSbulusT, Sharp, I, 4-5.
67
middle category, which is that of discursive reasoning, it appears as deviation and
error. This leads both types of forsaken person to reject what they consider to be the
Sufi’s category - that of mystical insight and witnessing.
Al-NabulusT is suggesting that this third type of reaction to the highest category
of faith in and knowledge of God has led to the history of polemics between certain
Sufis and those who do not share their vision of God and the world. This is the main
reason for his commentary on the Fususal-Hikam He wants to put an end to this
type of reaction whose deleterious effects for true Sufis he wished to counteract. His
explanation of the criticism of the true Sufis suggests that these critics are God¬
forsaken and have no divine tawfJq at all. These forsaken critics criticise what they
consider to be the beliefs of the Sufis; however, al-NabulusT suggests that what they
criticise is their own debasement of those beliefs, not the beliefs themselves. The
critics are merely engaging in self-criticism.
The implicit authority associated with the highest category of faith in and
knowledge of God may suggest that, for al-NabulusT, the criticisms levelled against
these true Sufis are not only a rejection of Sufis but also of God’s own authority. This
would make critics of true Sufis unbelievers and ungrateful towards God.
The Fususal-Hikam and its intended Readership
Al-NabulusT states.
This book which is the Fususal-Hkam is about the explanation of the manifestation [of God]
connected with witnessing.71
70 Al-NabulusT, Sharp , I, 4.
71 Al-NabulusT. Sharp. I, 4.
68
The Fususal-Ifikam was intended for a specialised audience. Al-NabulusT
believed this audience was meant to be accomplished great Sufi masters who possessed
the right category of faith and knowledge with which to interpret the difficult
expressions in the Fususal-Hikam.
The Fususal-Ifikam has been read by Sufi novices and opponents of this form
of Sufism as well as by the intended great Sufis. These Sufi novices and opponents,
lacking dhawq, might have misunderstood the contents of the Fususal-Ifikam as well
as its commentaries. At worst, they might have come to view it as kufr or deviation
and error. In fact, the logic of al-NabulusI’s arguments suggests that unless God had
imparted tawflq to a novice or opponent they would certainly have misunderstood the
Fususal-Ifikam
Believing himself to possess dhawq , al-NabulusT considers it important and
necessary to provide a commentary that will help those who are less privileged to
come to the ‘correct’ understanding of the Fususal-Ifikam His dhawq enables him to
speak with authority on the subject unlike all those who lack dhawq This authority
puts him in a position to state that the Fususal-Ifikam is an orthodox book. Since
these critics must await divine inspiration in order to understand the book correctly,
they must in the interim put trust in al-NabulusI’s authority as its interpreter.
69
Al-NabulusT as Interpreter
Al-NabulusT presents himself as an interpreter {tarjuman) between those who
have dhawq , and who understand the Fusus al-Hkam ‘correctly’, and those who are
either Sufi novices or are incompetent and see error in the Fusus al-Hkam. Al-
NabulusT hopes to overcome the tension and misunderstanding between the God¬
forsaken ( khadhalahum Allah), who see the Fusus al-Hikam and all other works of
those who have the most complete faith in and knowledge of God as either kufr or
deviation and error and those who belong to this highest form of faith:
So the matter was in need of an interpreter knowing both languages and informed of the intentions of
both groups .... I hope with the assistance of God to be that interpreter of this book which is the
Fusus al-Hkam [and to be this] with providence and success from the much-forgiving Lord.72
Al-NabulusT argues that such an interpreter would be able to speak on behalf of
one group against another and vice versa.73 In the same manner that he argued that the
same object of worship is perceived differently by the different types of faith and
knowledge, al-NabulusT argues that what the exoteric scholars deny of the esotericists
is what the latter themselves would deny.74 For al-NabulusT, there is a
misunderstanding of an object of belief among these different types of people, and not
a fundamental difference of belief.75 On the other hand:
72 Al-NabulusT, Shark I, 5.
73 Al-NabulusT, Shark I, 5.
74 Al-NabulusT. Shark I, 5.
75 Al-NabulusT does state that the object of belief is composite. It is in God, His books. His
messengers, the Day of Judgement and in His Laws and Judgements.
70
If that which the esoteric scholars acknowledge and of which the exoteric scholars are ignorant were
to appear as it is to the exoteric scholars they would believe in it and submit to it without any doubt or
hesitation.76
However, this reasoning leaves the person without dhawq having to place their
trust in the authority and knowledge of the esoteric true Sufi. It is this trust in his own
authority that al-NabulusI is asking of those he is addressing.
Al-NabulusI is suggesting in his introduction to his commentary that none of
the previous commentaries on the Fususal-F&kam are of use in explaining it
‘correctly’ to its opponents and to Sufi novices. This implies that the Fususal-Hikam
can be explained to these people and that they might be willing to have it explained to
them in a way to which their incipient beliefs or confirmed prejudices are not
accustomed.
Furthermore, there is the fact that al-NabulusI has stated a number of times that
one reaches the stage of faith in and knowledge of God, not through oneself, but
through tafwFdin God. It is God who knows God, and not the Sufi master. The Sufi
master is but a vehicle in which God comes to know Himself This gift of knowing
God as God knows Himself comes from God, not from man.77 The question begs to
be asked as to what extent al-NabulusI could reconcile his act of composing a
commentary to lead the incompetent and the novices to an understanding of the beliefs
76 Al-NabulusI. Shark i. 5.
77 Al-NabulusI. Shark n, 3 12 & 3 14. states that God is the one who knows and what is known. He
adds that God’s ‘being known’ ( macli*nuh ) is from God as the spirit (ruk) which He breathes into
man. See Qur’an 38:72 and 15:29.
71
of the people of witnessing with the fact that it is God who bestows the tawfiq
necessary for striving for or tolerating the perfection of the Sufi’s witnessing of God.
This issue does not seem apparent to al-NabulusT. He seems confident that he
can compose a cogent exegesis of the Fusus al-Hikam His writings suggest that he
saw himself as the mediator through whom the meanings of the Fusus al-Hikam may
pass from the recondite original text into the language of one of the types of people
who have difficulties in understanding it correctly. This may well be in a diluted form,
but it would be a ‘correct’ form.
That he believes his knowledge of God is given to him by God implies that al-
NabulusI thinks he has a divinely-invested authority to talk about God and to explain
the Fusus al-Hikam. Furthermore, the belief that his knowledge of God comes from
God means that no opposition to his views can be brooked Criticism of al-NabulusT
could mean criticism of God.
As is to be expected, he does state that he puts his reliance upon God for
inspiration in understanding the text and in interpreting it At the end of his
commentary he states boldly that he was not the author of the commentary, rather God
confided it to him.78 He also emphasises the fact that he made use of divine inspiration
only, and not of any of the earlier commentaries. His trust was placed in the help and
favour of God.79
78 Al-NabulusT. Shark n, 343.
79 Al-NabulusT. Shark II, 344.
72
Al-Nabulusi has implied in the introduction to his commentary on the Fusus al-
Ifikam that his experience of the objects of his faith and knowledge is such that he can
speak with complete authority concerning them Those who lack the same experience
are in no position to criticise him, rather they should accept on trust his statements of
explanation and hope to be inspired by God in a similar manner. It is implied that until
that inspiration comes, one must not attempt to understand what cannot be understood
by human faculties alone. Al-NabulusT’s arguments are strong if the Sufi world-view
he delineates is accepted. If, on the other hand, this world-view is not accepted then
his arguments appear weak and hollow
73
Chapter 4
Ibrahim
Introduction
Al-Nabulusl’s commentary on the chapter on Ibrahim constitutes an
understanding of God’s relationship with Himself and with man. Al-NabulusI states
that the chapter on Ibrahim is concerned with the wisdom of real sublimity ( al-alual -
haqTqi). 1 This real sublimity refers to the idea that God in His Sublime Essence is
utterly beyond the knowledge and experience of any created thing. Implicit in this is
the contrast with metaphorical (< al-majazi ) sublimity, which may be attributed to God
as known by man.2 Although the Divine Essence is not known, God is said to be
known with respect to the fact that He possesses the worlds and is their God.3 This
involves God in a relationship with His creation. Man does experience and does have
1 Al-NabulusI. Sharh Jawahir al-NususfT Hall Kali mat al-Fusus. 2 vols (Cairo: Bulaq. 1304-1323). I.
144.
2 This is a constant theme appearing in many of al-NabulusI’s comments on the Fususal-Hkam. For
example, al-NabulusI, Sharh, i, 6, states, ‘Every legally responsible person is commanded to affirm
the transcendent god, who is in [people’ s] beliefs, but He [the transcendent god] is not the True God
with whom rational judgement is not connected, neither by affirmation nor negation. ’ Furthermore.
al-NabulusI, Sharh , n, 340, states, ‘If He [God] wishes, He is transcendent in his belief with respect to
the lack of specification of form in His self which that serv ant knows. This is rational metaphorical
transcendence, not real transcendence in which God is in His self ’ Similar statements establishing
the contrast between the known, manifest, metaphorical God and the unknown, transcendent, real
God can be found frequently, such as: al-NabulusI, Sharh, n, 320, 337, 339 & 341.
3 Al-NabulusT. Sharh, I, 144, states this directly when explaining the ‘wisdom’ associated with
Ibrahim. Ibrahim is said to have come to experience and know God holding him and penetrating
every part of him. This is attributed to God’s possession of the corporeal and spiritual world.
However, al-NabulusI emphasises the point that God in His Sublime Self is neither experienced nor
known by Ibrahim or anyone else.
74
knowledge of God but not of what God is in His Sublime Self ( nafsuh al-aliyya ) 4
This experience and knowledge is in a hierarchy of graded degrees.5 Al-Nabulusl
characterises the relationship between God and man, indeed all creation, by the
reciprocity of nourishment, which signifies that they need each other. God needs man
in order to be known by something other than Himself whereas man needs God in
order to exist.6
Ibn cArabT and Ibrahim
Qur’anic Motifs
Ibn cArabT employs two principal Qur’anic motifs in his discussion of Ibrahim:
Ibrahim as friend of God and Ibrahim as offering hospitality and food to others.7
Three subjects may serve as a framework for understanding Ibn cArabI’s exposition of
4 Al-Nabulusl. Sharh. i. 144 He states on page 145 that if someone perceives their Creator possessing
him, then this is only in accordance with the Creator’s appearance to him, and not in accordance with
what He is in His Self.
5 See the chapter on al-NabulusI’s introduction to his commentary on the Fususal-Hkam where he
presents his views on such a hierarchy in detail. In summary , this hierarchy is threefold and
determined by the measure of an individual’s knowledge and faith: the people of blind imitation
whose faith is through doctrine/speech, the people of discursive reasoning whose faith is through
understanding with doctrine/speech, and the people of witnessing whose faith is after understanding
and speech. The first category are the majority of people, the second category are a minority of
thinkers, theologians and philosophers, whereas the third category are another minority who are Sufis
gifted with gnosis and experience of God.
6 Al-Nabulusl, Sharh , i, 21, ‘God wanted to see His Essence particularised in the archetypes of His
attributes called the Realities of His Names in all His ‘Planes of Being’ . . . [because] seeing the self
appearing in the form of the other is not like seeing the self without that other. ’ Al-Nabulusl, Sharh ,
i, 36, ‘If it were not for the Lord, the servant would not exist. If it were not for the servant, the Lord
would not be described by attributes. Existence is from the Lord. Attributes are from the servant. ’
7 Ibn cArabT, Fususal-Hkam , ed. by AA cAftfi (Beirut: D3r al-Kitab al-cArabT. 1980), i, 80 & 84.
These can be found in Qur’an 4: 125, 11 :69, and 5 1 :24-30.
75
Ibrahim: Ibrahim’s hikma in the title of the chapter; the takhallul of God and man; the
ethical dimension and God’s freedom and efficacy with respect to that.8
The Hikma
Ibn cArabT’s title of the chapter on Ibrahim is:
The Wisdom of Rapturous Love ( al-muhayyamiyva ) in Ibrahim’s Word.9
Ibn cArabI does not use the word for rapturous love again in this chapter. He
immediately begins his discussion of Ibrahim who is referred to as the friend of God
(< al-khalU ). However, this ensuing discussion does raise the issue of Ibrahim’s
relationship with the Divine Essence, where both are hidden and veiled by the other.
From one perspective, Ibrahim is lost in the Divine Essence’s attributes, while from
another perspective the Divine Essence is lost in Ibrahim’s attributes. The rapturous
love of the title may refer to this relationship
Takhallul
Ibrahim as friend of God (al-khalU) is said to pervade (yatakhallal) the Divine
Essence’s attributes while the existence of his own form (sura) is pervaded by God.
This mutual pervasion is the central theme of Ibn cArabI’s discussion of Ibrahim. Ibn
cArabI amplifies this.
Do you not see God appearing in the attributes of originated things? ... Do you not see creation ( al -
makhluq) appearing in all the attributes of God?10
8 Nettler, RL. ‘The Figure and Truth of Abraham in Ibn cArabi’s Fusus al-Hikam\ Journal of the
Muhyiddin Ibn ‘Arabi Society, 24 (1998), 21-50 (p.23).
9 Ibn cArabI, Fusus al-Hkam, i, 80.
76
Ibn cArabT argues that whatever is pervading is veiled by whatever is being
pervaded. That which is passive in this relationship is seen, while that which is active
is unseen. The active is also said to be ‘food’ (ghidha ’) for the passive.11 Ibn cArabI
returns to this imagery of food and nourishment at the end of chapter where he
introduces the motif of Ibrahim establishing the tradition of hospitality to strangers:
Those who are nourished are fed with nourishment ( al-arzaq ). If nourishment pervades the essence of
whoever is nourished so that it pervades every part of him. then the food penetrates all the parts of
whoever is fed. But there are no parts; so it must pervade all the divine stations which are expressed
as names: and so His essence appears in them.12
Ibn cArabi characterises the relationship between God and Ibrahim as one of
mutual pervasion and feeding. There is a mutuality, intertwining and interdependence
that is noteworthy. Ibn cArabI does reveal what God and Ibrahim depend on each
other for:
If God is apparent, then creation is veiled in Him; and so, creation is all the names of God . . . , all His
relations ( nisab ) and perceptions. If creation is apparent, then God is veiled and hidden in it; and so,
God is creation’s hearing, sight, hands, legs, and all its powers ... If the [Divine] Essence is stripped
of these relations (nisab), it is not a god. These relations are originated by our archetypes (acyan). and
so, we have made Him a god through our being subject to divinity; He is not known until we are
known.13
And,
You are His food ( ghidha’uh ) through determinations (ahkam) and He is your food (ghidha uk)
through existence.14
10 Ibn cArabI. Fusus al-Hkam , I, 80.
11 Ibn cArabI, Fusus al-Hkam, I, 81.
12 Ibn cArabI, Fusus al-Hkam, I, 84.
13 Ibn cArabT, Fusus al-Hkam, i, 81.
14 Ibn cArabI, Fusus al-Hkam, I. 83. See below in the section concerning Ethics and God’s Freedom
for an explanation of what is meant by determinations (ahkam).
77
Ibn cArabi emphasises that creation is what it is; it cannot be changed and it
determines the whole of God’s knowledge God needs His creation in order to be
known. Without creation, God has no divine names, attributes and so on. However,
God imparts existence to His creation. Without that existence, creation would not be.
They are constrained by each other and pervade each other. God’s existence pervades
all creation, while God is known through His creation. If it were not for His creation.
He would remain an unknown and unknowable essence. For this essence to be known
as God, it needs an existent creation to be subject to and to know the divine in its
manifold attributes and names. 15
Ibn cArabT uses the ‘terminology of abstraction [which] posits a divine essence
and divine attributes, the basic formulation and description of God’s nature found in
various trends of Islamic thought.’16 His use of the Essence-attributes model applied
to God is different to the conventional in the notion that a particular human being
enters and fully possesses those attributes which characterise the Divine Essence.17
The interior of man being the venue of the human adoption of divine attributes is
15 There is no contradiction in the fact that God cannot be known in one aspect, yet can be known in
another. God qua Essence is unknown and unknowable, but God qua God is known and knowable.
16 Nettler, ‘The Figure’, p.25. Ibn cArabf s conception of God as Essence and attributes is different
from that held by theologians and philosophers; Nettler argues, p.3 1, that for conventional thinkers
the Divine Essence was in a sense the true’ God, the attributes being there for God’s own reason with
respect to His creation. Nettler suggests, p.32, that the concept of the true God’ was formulaic and
devoid of any significance for Ibn cArabT and thus does not figure significantly in his thought. For Ibn
cArabI, the created world is the divine attributes and, thereby, is identified with God.
17 Nettler, ‘The Figure’, p.26. See Ibn cArabI, Fususal-Hkam , i, 80.
78
exemplary of Ibn cArabT’s general central idea of the true God as dwelling within His
creation.18
Ethics and God’s Freedom
The above discussion of Ibn cArabI’s theme of takhallul does present some
ethical issues which Ibn cArabT himself addresses in the chapter on Ibrahim. It has been
mentioned that, for Ibn cArabT, creation ‘is His [God’s] food through determinations
(ahkam) and He is your [creation’s] food through existence.’19 This concept of
determination ( hukm ) is important in Ibn cArabT’s discussion of the relationship
between God and man 20
Ibn cArabT argues that the two insights that man can grasp concerning his
relationship with God - that the world is only God’s manifestation in the forms of the
archetypes of creation and that creation’s forms appear in God - together produce the
realisation that.
We determine ourselves through ourselves but in Him.21
18 Nettler, ‘The Figure’, p.26. Even Ibn cArabi. Fusus al-Hkam. i, 226. qualifies this at the end of the
chapter on Muhammad where he says, the god of beliefs is taken by constraints and it is the God
which is encompassed by the heart of His servant. However, the absolute God is not encompassed by
anything . . . . ’ Al-NabulusT holds a similar view, but elaborated in terms of existence and non¬
existence. For him. it is the metaphorical God. not the Real God, who is encompassed by His
believing servant. Al-NabulusT, Sharh, n, 341, The god of beliefs . . is taken by constraints, that is to
say determinations, forms and divine matters according to various intellects. He is the God which, as
is related in the hadfth qudsT, is encompassed by His believing servant .... However, the True God
who is absolute with real absoluteness is not encompassed by anything at all. All things in relation to
Him are pure non-existence while He is Real True Existence. ’
19 Ibn cArabI, Fusus al-Hkam, I, 83.
20 Nettler. ‘The Figure’, pp.33-4. notes that the b-k-m root ordinarily signifies determination or
control, and remarks that Ibn cArabT’s use of it is redolent of ‘free-will’ doctrines, i.e. we determine’
our lives and bear responsibility for our actions. Hukm is also a key metaphysical concept, connoting
the nexus of metaphysical efficacy between various planes of being.
21 Ibn cArabT, Fusus al-Hkam, i, 83.
79
This evokes both ethical and metaphysical aspects. There is the aspect in which
‘we’ determine our lives and actions and are responsible for them. Furthermore, there
is the aspect in which ‘we’ determine our metaphysical selves or archetypes. Ibn
cArabT is alluding to both aspects at one and the same time. He proceeds to discuss the
nature of God’s knowledge and how creation determines or, rather, ‘affects’ this divine
knowledge. This explains how, on the metaphysical plane, creation can determine
itself through itself in God.
Ibrahim pervades all of God’s names and ‘feeds’ Him with his determinations
{ahkam). God pervades the existence of Ibrahim’s form and ‘feeds’ him with
existence. Ibrahim enables God to be known while God brings Ibrahim into existence.
Nettler sums this up:
Abraham as God’s friend (khalil Allah) and Abraham as bestower of hospitality, particularly food,
indicate the intermingled being of God and His creation ( takhallul) and the thoroughgoing nature of
this intermingling.22
The Divine Essence
Al-NabulusI acknowledges Ibn cArabT’s title for the chapter on Ibrahim, but
merely gives a semantic explanation of the terms used in it. He then provides an
introductory preamble to the chapter on Ibrahim which includes an exegesis of the
Qur’anic story of Ibrahim asking God for a favour.23 This precedes his actual
commentary on the lines of Ibn cArabT’s text. This preamble is his initial comment on
22 Nettler, ‘The Figure’, pp.49-50.
the fass. This Qur’anic story is not mentioned by Ibn cArabi in this chapter. A 1-
Nabulusi is taking his own line on Ibrahim from the outset.
The favour that Ibrahim asks for is the knowledge of how God gives life to the
dead. God simply asks Ibrahim whether he believes or not. Ibrahim replies that he
does, but that his heart needs to be assured. God, seemingly content with this, tells
Ibrahim what to do so that he might see how God gives life to the dead.24
In his exegesis of this story, al-NabulusI provides some clues to his
understanding of the broad themes of the chapter as a whole:
Ibrahim began to find God . . pervading every part of him . . not in accordance with what He is in
relation to His Sublime Self, for He [God] is in accordance with what He is in His eternity without
beginning, while Ibrahim is an originated created thing. If the originated created thing perceives the
eternally pre-existent creator possessing him. he does so only according to His [God s] appearance to
him, and not according to what He is in Himself. If he [the created thing] is in rapturous love with
Him [God], then this love is from the perspective of that special appearance and belief in the absolute
unseen accompanies it in all states.25
According to al-Nabulusi there are a number of distinctions between God and
all things other than Him. On the one hand, God is said to be uncreated and in eternity
without beginning, whereas Ibrahim, and by extension everything else other than God
too, is created and with a beginning.26 On the other hand, a distinction is established
between God’s appearance to Himself and His appearance to everything other than
23 Al-NabulusT. Shark, i, 145. The Qur’anic story is from Qur’an 2:260.
24 See Qur’an 2:260.
25 Al-NabulusT, Sharh , I, 144-5.
26 This distinction between God and creation is consistently maintained. On p. 158 al-Nabulusi states
that there is only God and creation. God is said to be pure existence utterly transcendent from
quantity, manner, time and space and so on, and even from what is understood by transcendent. In
contrast, creation is said to be utterly non-existent determinations encompassing quantity, manner,
time and space and so on. Later, on p. 161, he states that the Truth (God) is truth according to what it
81
Himself. This creates a transcendent or remote God known only to Himself and an
immanent or manifest God known to Himself and everything other than Him. Thus, if
someone feels a rapturous love for God then that love is from the perspective of God’s
special appearance to that person.27
This sets the scene for the exegesis and the various lessons that al-NabulusT
wishes to draw from it. Firstly, al-NabulusT states:
He [Ibrahim] asked his Lord ‘My Lord! Show me how you bring the dead to life' [Qur’an 2:260]
asking for gnosis ( macrifa ) of Him with respect to His possession ( istila’uh ) of His creation through
acts (bi 'l-afM) 2*
Earlier it was noted that Ibrahim perceived the creator possessing him in
accordance with the creator’s appearance to him. This perception is the gnosis for
which Ibrahim is asking God It is said that this possession of creation is through
deeds. God is acting through deeds Furthermore, it seems that Ibrahim is not able to
reach gnostic knowledge of God alone, he petitions God for it. It is implied that the
gnostic knowledge of God is a gift from God, if it comes at all, in response to that
petition.
is while creation is creation according to what it is. He adds that perfection belongs to God while
deficiency belongs to everything other than Him.
27 Nettler. ‘The Figure’, p.24. notes that ‘the adjective muhayyamivya attached to hikma conveys a
basic idea here round which Ibn cArabi by extensions builds his metaphysical explication of
Abraham’s essential truth: a rapturous, ecstatic, even reckless love through which one loses oneself in
another. This loss of self (or transcendence of self) may also imply the effacing of the seifs
boundaries: loss of self in rapturous love of the other may then mean a final blending which renders
the self inextricable from and part of the other. ’ This is partially true in the case of al-NabulusI. See
the section on Knowledge in this chapter where al-NabulusT’s understanding of the traditional Sufi
paradigm of annihilation and survival or union and separation is imposed upon Ibn cArabI’s original
ideas. Al-NabulusT discusses the mystic’s loss of self in his union with God and then the mystic’s
awareness of that union while also aware of his separation from God. This concurs with the thrust of
Nettler’s understanding of ‘muhayyamiyya .
28 Al-NabulusI. Sharh, i, 145.
82
Secondly, al-NabulusT elaborates his understanding of God’s response which is
an enquiry after Ibrahim’s faith:
God replied to him, ‘Do you not believe?’ [Qur’an 2:260]. That is to say: [Do you not believe] in the
absolute unseen ( al-ghayb al-mudaq) between you and which there is no connection for you to
perceive it?29
The absolute unseen is utterly beyond the apprehension of Ibrahim who is in
rapturous love with God. Likewise, it is also beyond the apprehension of any other
originated created thing. This absolute unseen is the remote or transcendent God.
This belief in the absolute unseen accompanies the state of rapturous love with God.
Ibrahim is in rapturous love with God from the perspective of God’s special
appearance to him. He must believe in the absolute unseen at the same time. The
other thing that is unknown to him, and which appears to be the same as the absolute
unseen, is what God is in Himself in eternity without beginning - that is the Divine
Essence
Thirdly, al-NabulusT interprets Ibrahim’s response to God’s question about his
faith:
He [Ibrahim] said, ‘Yes [I do believe], but [I ask] in order to reassure my heart’ [Qur'an 2:260], That
is to say. [to reassure my heart] through witnessing that [divine miracle of bringing the dead back to
life] according to what is appropriate for me, although it may not be according to what the matter
really is.30
29 Al-NabulusI, Sharh, I, 145.
30 Al-NabulusI, Sharh , I, 145. See Schimmel. A. Mystical Dimensions of Islam (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1975), p. 1 12, where she elucidates the role of the soul (nafs) in
the Sufi Path. She recognises the Qur anic foundations for the Sufi emphasis on the struggle against
the soul. These are Qur’an 79:40, 12:53, 75:2, and 89:27. This latter verse, she argues, is the
foundation for the belief that once purification of the soul has been achieved, the soul may become at
peace’ (mupna ’inna). Al-NabulusI, in his exegesis of Ibrahim’s petition of God, cites Qur’an 2:260 to
adduce Ibrahim’s motivation. He wants his heart to be at peace’ (yatma inn). Al-NabulusI does not
confuse the heart and the soul in his commentary. Al-NabulusI, Sharh, i, 12, states that the heart (al-
83
Thus, Ibrahim is aware that he is asking to witness things which belong to the
world of the absolute unseen - the world where God in Himself resides. This maintains
the distinction between the uncreated, eternal world of God and the created originated
world of man and all things other than God. Furthermore, al-NabulusT has established
that Ibrahim, as man of religion, is a mystical gnostic belonging to the category of
witnessing ( al-shuhud) after intellectual understanding ( al-fahm ) and doctrine/speech
( al-qawl) only
The point that seems to emerge from this exegesis is the distinction between
the unknown and known God. This is an important issue for al-NabulusT. 31 It enables
him to establish the transcendence and difference of God from creation. The
transcendent God is the Divine Essence, utterly unknown and unknowable. The Divine
Essence as it appears to creation is the God of mankind. As al-NabulusT said earlier:
If the originated created thing perceives the eternally pre-existent Creator possessing him, he does so
only in accordance with His appearance to him, and not in accordance with what He is in Himself.32
He also stated
The Absolute Unseen between which and yourself there is no connection so that you might perceive
it.33
qalb) is living while the soul ( al-nafs ) is dead. It is of note here that in a description of a path to an
awareness of God, al-NabulusI cites a Qur’anic verse which uses the term ‘to be at peace’ ( vapna 'inn)
in association with the concept of the heart, which term is also found in association with the soul in
the context of the Sufi Path.
31 It is dealt with in other chapters, including that on Muhammad.
32 Al-NabulusT, Shark I, 145.
33 Al-NabulusT, Shark h 145.
84
This is an important distinction which Ibn cArabT also highlights in th efass on
Ibrahim. The absolute transcendent God is practically an insignificant concept for Ibn
cArabI. The God that matters is the God who is known through His attributes and
names. Al-NabulusI adopts a different line on this issue The absolutely transcendent
God, that is the Divine Essence, may be unknown and unknowable to creation,
however, it is still a significant concept. It is the Divine Essence that bestows
existence.34 Al-NabulusT agrees with Ibn cArabT that the God which is known is the
God of the attributes and names
However, unlike Ibn cArabI, al-Nabulus! places equal emphasis on the concept
of the unknown God. He is also novel in the terminology that he uses. His use of the
terms ‘ ijmal ’ and ‘tafsiT marks a striking difference from Ibn cArabI. The God which
is not apprehended by created originated things is referred to as God’s summation
(ijmal mujmal) 35 In effect, this is the oneness of the ineffable true God. By contrast,
the God that is known is the revealed God of multiplicity. That is to say, the known
God is the God who is in accordance with His appearance to every thing. Everything
comprises the world of multiplicity. If God’s appearances to these things differ, then
the known God must be the God of multiplicity. Al-NabulusT continues:
34 See later in this chapter for a discussion of the Essence’s role as bestower of existence. See also the
chapter on Zakariyya
35 Al-NabulusT. Sharh. i. 149. This concept is referred to henceforth as either ijmal or mujmal. See
the chapter on Muhammad for a discussion of this concept and the related term tafsil. In brief, al-
NabulusT, Sharh, i, 21, discusses the motivation for God’s creation of the world. The totality of
spiritual and corporeal existence is said to come from God as a differentiation (tafsil) from a
summation (ijmal) and returns to Him as summated (mujmal) from differentiation. God in Himself is
85
He [God] is not known except in differentiation ( tafsil ). not in ijmal 16
This ijmal is related to the Divine Essence also:
The gnostic knowledge of God which everyone can have is the gnostic knowledge of an unseen
essence [which is] mujmala 37
This ijmal , although known in its differentiation ( tafsil X remains what it
actually is in its own self. This is in harmony with al-NabulusT’s earlier statements
about Ibrahim’s, the originated created thing’s, awareness of God.38 Furthermore, al-
NabulusT states that God is in no need of the worlds:
With respect to the rank of His Sublime Essence, He is in no need of you and of anything else from
the worlds. As He Himself said. And God is in no need of the worlds. ,39
By giving equal emphasis to this concept of the unknown God and by linking it
to the Qur’anic ideas of God’s independence from creation, al-NabulusT is appealing to
Islamic Tradition to understand that his God is their God 40 However, unlike Islamic
Tradition, al-NabulusI argues that it is creation that differentiates the ijmal into the
known god of differentiation:
We have differentiated His ijmal among ourselves through our possibility, but He is in accordance
with what He is among Himself and God is in no need of the worlds. If we are the ones who through
our possibility have differentiated the ijmal of His Essence and have distinguished between His
the oneness of summation, while creation is the multiplicity of differentiation. He argues that God
wanted to see His summated Essence in the mirror of differentiation.
36 Al-NabulusT, Shark I, 149.
37 Al-NabulusT, Shark I. 150.
38 Al-NabulusT, Shark I, 145.
39 Al-NabulusT, Sharh, i, 158. He cites Qur’an 3:97. This is echoed on p. 149.
40 Gardet. L, ‘Allah’, in El2 (Leiden: Brill. 1960). i. 406-417 (409). where he states that ‘the Qur’anic
preaching about God is entirely centred on its affirmations of Oneness and Unity, of transcendence
and subsistence, of absolute perfections. The forbidding inaccessibility of the divine nature is
resolutely maintained; God, omniscient and “near”, can be known only by His Word, by the Names,
the attributes and acts of His paramount Sovereignty, w hich He Himself reveals. ’
86
Essence, attributes, names, deeds and ahkani so that we have manifested through our non-existent
possible realities and essences His divinity and lordship ... 41
This passage demonstrates al-NabulusT’s understanding that it is creation,
notably mankind, that makes God’s divinity and lordship apparent. The implication is
that if it were not for creation, God’s divinity and lordship would not be apparent. Al-
NabulusT realises this and proposes, hypothetically, that if it were not for the non¬
existent possibles, which are creation, then God would remain a single ijmal. He is
again using striking terminology. Rather than state that it is creation that makes God a
god, al-NabulusT expands this and uses terms with philosophical and theological
connotations:
If it were not for the non-existent possible things ( al-mumkinat al-adamiyya ). He [God] would be a
single mujmal. His attributes would be in His Essence, His names in His attributes, His deeds in His
names, and His ahkam in His deeds.42
However, it is these non-existent possible things which differentiate the ijmal
and distinguish between His ‘planes of Being’ ( badarat ) 43 In the quotation above, al-
NabulusT is referring to creation or the ‘we’ by non-existent possible things.
Furthermore, his reference to ‘planes of Being’ is a term for the attributes, names and
so on, of God.
41 Al-NabulusT. Sharh. i. 149.
42 Al-NabulusT. Sharh , i. 149.
43 Al-NabulusT, Sharh. I, 149. Izutsu. T, Sujism and Taoism - A Comparative Study of Key
Philosophical Concepts (London. University of California Press. 1984), p. 1 1, renders the term
‘ badaraf as ‘planes’ of Being in the context of a discussion of Ibn cArabI’s ontological conceptions.
87
Al-Nabulusi continues to stress the pivotal role of creation in enabling God to
be known, although he emphasises the fact that God in His oneness, or Divine Essence,
is utterly unknown and unknowable:
It is impossible for anyone other than Him to know Him . . until we are known since we are the great
origin in the differentiation ( tafstt) of His ijmal ,44
The point that al-NabulusT is making is that God is God thanks to His creation,
notably mankind. If it were not for this creation, God would merely be an Essence in a
state of ijmal known only to Himself. However, the logic of al-Nabulusf s argument is
that since God is not merely an Essence in a state of oneness or ijmal but is known,
then creation must have differentiated Him or brought Him into the created world of
multiplicity. This is a sophisticated elaboration of Ibn cArabT’s argument that mankind
made God a god through their being subject to Him as the divine:
So, we have made Him, through our state of being subject to the divine (bi-ma ’ luhiyyatina ), a god.
Thus He is not known until we are known.45
It is important to elucidate and substantiate al-NabulusT’s understanding of Ibn
cArabT’s statement that mankind made God a god before addressing some of the
related issues emerging from this theme of the unknown Divine Essence and the known
God. He says:
And so we - because we are the same as those non-existent possible determined things - have made
Him - with respect to His appearance to us - through our being subject to the divine - that is to say
because of the fact that we are subject to Him as divine and that He is our god - a god. The god is the
one who possesses all the needs of His servants with regard to existentiation and assistance.46
44 Al-Nabulusl. Shark I, 149.
45 Ibn cArabT, Fususal-Hkam , I, 81.
46 This anticipates the later discussion concerning Ibrahim being God’s friend and God being
Ibrahim’s friend, as well as the theme of Ibrahim’s bestowing hospitality and food on others. In
Divinity is the totality’ of attributes, names, deeds and determinations (ahkam). It is an attributive
adjective in relation to those subject to the divine; these are His servants and He is their god. He is not
a god for Himself because His self is not subject to Him as divine. Through His self. He is in no need
of the worlds, but not through His attributes, names, deeds or ahkam , because if it were not for the
worlds neither His attributes, names, deeds nor ahkam would be distinguished from His Essence.
Firstly, it must be noted that al-NabulusT refers again to mankind - the ‘we’ - as
being non-existent and possible. ‘We’ are denoted by essences (« dhawat ), realities
(baqa’iqf and determined things ( maqdurat) ** In contradistinction to this is the way
in which God - or the Divine Essence - is referred to. The Divine Essence is necessary
whereas everything other than It is possible. The Divine Essence is also existent in
contradistinction to everything other than It which is non-existent 49
effect, al-NabulusT has described here the reciprocal relationship between God and creation. Creation
enables God to be a god. God needs something other than Himself in order to be a God. Creation
fulfils this need of His. On the other hand, creation needs existence among other things from
something other than themselves in order to exist. God satisfies this need of theirs. There is
established here a reciprocity of need between God and His creation.
47 Al-NabulusT. Sharh. I. 148-9.
48 Al-NabulusT. Sharh. I, 155. argues that every non-existent thing is revealed to God in his eternally
pre-existent knowledge. On p. 158. he states that creation is utterly non-existent determinations
encompassing quantity, manner, time, space and so on. On p. 161 al-NabulusT comments that one is
non-existent in one’s possibility in eternity without beginning God is said to have manifested
Himself to the non-existent in this state, and so He knew, determined and then created this non¬
existent thing. On p. 164 he states that we are the community of determined possibles which are
decreed in His knowledge. It is important to note al-NabulusI’s consistent use of such terms to denote
creation.
49 This, like many of the ideas of Ibn c Arab! himself, echoes themes to be found in falsafa and cilm al-
kalam. Before exploring these insofar as is relevant here, it can only be argued that both Ibn cArabT
and al-NabulusI would have been masters of these areas of scholastic endeavour. Amaldez, R,
‘Falsafa’. in El2 (Leiden: Brill. 1965), II. 769-775 (771-2). presents a noteworthy survey of the issue of
existence-essence in the first period of falsafa (3rd/9th-5th/l 1th centuries). He states that falsafa was a
method of inquiry independent of dogma, but not rejecting dogma or ignoring its sources. It faced
similar problems to cilm kalam. An example is that of existence-essence. The Muctazila strove to
establish the absolute transcendence of God by distinguishing between essence and existence in
created things. The Creator was seen as bestowing existence on essences which are in a state of
nothingness. God, whom nothing resembles, was said to be beyond this. Falsafa took up this
problem of ontology. Falsafa maintained the absolute transcendence and unity of God while
preserving the distinction between essence and existence in all things other than God. For God only is
existence identical with essence. Thus , falsafa attempts to unite two seemingly contrary concepts of
the universe: emanationist monism where there is a continuity of being; and the absolute
transcendence of God the Creator where there is an ontological discontinuity. See also Goodman, LE,
89
When the Divine Essence chooses to appear to the non-existent possible
determined things - the ‘we’ - then the Essence is differentiated into attributes, names,
deeds and abkam 50 It is clear that the Divine Essence does choose to appear to Its
creation, which means that the Essence is known. It can only be known in the state of
divinity. Al-NabulusT acknowledges that creation has a god and this state of having a
god means that they are subject to a divine being.
Al-NabulusT describes his understanding of what it means to have a god by
stating that a god possesses all the needs of his servants in terms of existentiation and
assistance. Having implied that all creation is composed of non-existent possible
determined things or essences, it follows that they must depend on something other
than themselves for their existence. This is provided by their God who possesses their
existential needs The Divine Essence is a God for what is other than it because they
are in need of existentiation. However, it is not its own God because it needs nothing
else to bring it into existence - it is necessarily existent. This is the function of the God
of creation according to al-NabulusI’s statements in this context.
Furthermore, al-NabulusT elaborates his understanding of divinity. To be divine
means that something possesses the attributes, names, deeds and ahkam that creation
attributes adjectivally to the necessary Essence. God is divine only in relation to the
worlds which need Him in order to enter into existence from their essentially non-
Avicenna (London & New York: Routledge, 1992), pp.67, 70. 74, 76-7, 96; and Goichon, AM, ‘Ibn
Sma\ in El2 (Leiden: Brill, 1971). m, 941-7. It will be noted in this chapter that al-NabulusT attempts
to reconcile these two contrary concepts of the universe, whereas Ibn cArabl seems rooted in the
emanationist monism of ontological continuity
50 Al-NabulusT clarifies this on p. 149 by stating that God only appears to be described by the
attributes, names, and so on, since the Essence is not actually described by them.
90
existent and possible state. In relation to Himself God is essentially in no need of the
worlds. However, in relation to the worlds God is in need of them in order to be
attributed with and known by attributes, names, deeds and ahkam.
Ibn cArabT and al-Nabulus! are in broad agreement here. However, they do
emphasise different things. Whereas Ibn cArabT emphasises the similarity and
intermingling between the known God and creation, while ignoring the concept of the
unknown God, al-NabulusT stresses the difference between the known God and
creation, while constantly acknowledging the position and importance of the unknown
God. Furthermore, al-NabulusT is original in his use of terms in describing these
concepts, viz. ijmal and tafsil
Knowledge
That this chapter has an important epistemological component is clear from the
discussion of the Divine Essence. Furthermore, this epistemological component
provides another perspective on al-NabulusT’s introduction to his commentary. In that
earlier context, he classified mankind into three categories which were dependent on
states of knowledge of and faith in God. He also mentioned that the Fususal-Ifikam
was concerned with the people of the highest category only - the people of witnessing.
In the chapter on Ibrahim, al-NabulusT begins a series of discussions about how God
knows man and how man knows God.
Al-NabulusT argues that God is the one who brings everything into existence:
91
The existence which belongs to beings is from God and nothing else.
Once things are in existence they can know God 52 God depends on these
things for Himself to be known. These things and their states determine the corpus of
His knowledge. They constitute the object of His knowledge. Thus, God’s ability to
know and be known is connected with the things comprising creation:53
He only knows something in accordance with what it is in itself. . . Divine knowledge has no effect
(athar) with respect to existentiation {gad) or specification (j takhsTs ) on what is known at all. [This is]
because it [the divine knowledge] rev eals it [w hat is known] in accordance with what it actually is. If
it were to reveal it with something more or less so that it were to have an effect on it. then it would not
be knowledge, rather it would be ignorance.54
Without these objects of knowledge, God would know nothing Thus, in one
sense, they are as necessary as He is. This emphasises the mutually necessary
relationship between God and His creation. Creation is necessary for God to be
known by what is other than Him. God is necessary for creation to be existent. This
reiterates the main point of the previous discussion of the Divine Essence. This is,
arguably, the dominant theme in al-NabulusT’s commentary on this chapter.
The differentiation of the ijmal of the Divine Essence is engendered through
creation’s being brought into existence That is to say, that as God brings the non-
51 Al-Nabulusl. Shard. I, 154. See the chapter on Zakariyya where the connection between God,
mercy and existence is discussed in depth. Also, al-NabulusT, Shard, i, 148-9. has already discussed
the Essence as being god through Its meeting the existential needs of Its creation.
52 It has been shown how all things other than God are responsible for God being known. God knows
Himself through them. Without them God is one and unknown through an other. ’ However, God
still knows them in His one eternally pre-existent knowledge. The paradox here is that God’s pre¬
existent knowledge is ‘lost’ in the oneness of the Divine Essence until that Essence’s oneness is
brought out into the multiplicity of attributes, names, and effects that constitute creation.
53 This introduces the traditional Sufi dichotomy of knower ( calim ) and known {maclOn). On the one
hand, God is calim and His creation is malian. On the other hand, creation is calim and God is
malum. However, it is clear from al-NabulusI that the Divine Essence in Itself is never maclum, only
the Divine attributes and names.
54 Al-Nabulusl, Shard , I, 155.
92
existent objects of His knowledge into existence, God is making Himself known
through these things:
You are non-existent. And so He revealed you through His eternally pre-existent knowledge and
brought you into existence thus. You were not a mentioned thing55 and so He made you a mentioned
thing through His existentiation of you and through His determining ( hukm ) of you in accordance
with what He knew of you from your determining (hukm) of yourself. And so all your states are from
you to Him firstly in non-existence: and from Him to you secondly in existence.56
God knows all things as they actually are in His eternally pre-existent
knowledge. In His Divine Essence there is no difference between His Essence and His
knowledge:
The attributes of God are the same as His Essence.5
The dynamics of His knowledge in this plane are utterly unknowable.
However, al-NabulusT has argued that it is creation that differentiates the ijmal of the
Essence into four ‘planes of Being’ ( hadarat ). These are the attributes, names, deeds
and ahkam This elaboration is a notable difference from Ibn cArabT. From the
Essence’s perspective these are the same as the Essence.58 However, once creation is
55 This seems to be an allusion to Qur’an 76:1: Has there not been over man a long period of time,
when he was not a mentioned thing?’
56 Al-NabulusT, Sharh. i, 157. See the chapter on Zakarivya which discusses al-NabulusT’s
understanding of the metaphor of God’s mentioning something and thereby bringing it into existence.
57 Al-Nabulusr, Sharh , i, 149. See also p. 150. where he says, ‘since they [the attributes, names, deeds,
and ahkam ] in relation to Him [God] are the same as the Essence. ’
58 See Nettler. ‘The Figure’, pp.25-6 & 31-2, where he states that the Divine Essence and attributes
were the basic formulation and description of God’s nature found in various trends of Islamic thought.
Many interpretations of this way of understanding God were expressed in Islamic thought, sometimes
resulting in fierce intellectual polemics. The relationship between the Essence and the attributes was
particularly contentious. For example, Hourani, GF, Islamic Rationalism - the Ethics ofcAbd al-
Jabbar (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p.97, states that cAbd al-Jabbar, like most of his Muctazill
predecessors, maintained a sharp distinction between God’s Essence and His acts and their attributes,
thus making logically possible a perfect Essence combined with evil acts. Ibn cArabT disagrees with
the ‘conventional’ thought which posits the Divine Essence/ Attribute distinction where there may be
an ‘essential God’ who is somehow knowable to us apart from His attributes. For Ibn cArabI the
93
existent, these ‘planes of Being’ are known in their differentiation. This differentiation
occurs through the self or soul ( tiafs ) of creation (or perhaps only the mystic).59
At this juncture, al-NabulusT elucidates his exegesis of the Sufi adage cited by
Ibn cArabT:
Whoever knows his self [or soul], knows his Lord.60
This self is said to be a possible thing which is sustained on God’s four ‘planes
of Being’. Al-NabulusT has been consistent in stating that creation is the totality of
non-existent possible things or determinations (al-maqdurat) which encompass
quantity, manner, time and space. These possible things are also known as archetypes.
This totality of possible things is subject to the divine ( ma ' luh ) and as such makes the
Divine Essence a God. ‘Lordliness’ is linked to divinity, which is the totality of the
four eternally pre-existent ‘planes of Being.’
Al-NabulusT means that whoever knows their self as a non-existent possible
thing will also know their lord who is the totality of the four eternally pre-existent
‘planes of Being. ’ After all, it follows that the Divine Essence is only known as the
attributes, names, deeds and ahkam. At the same time, this person would be aware
that his self is sustained upon these four ‘planes of Being’ on the level of existence, yet
these ‘planes of Being’ need him to be known.
attributes are God. Note that for al-NabulusT, these attributes are God from the perspective of the
Essence.
59 Evidence to suggest that it is the soul/self of the mystic in question comes on p. 150 where al-
NabulusT states, ‘the gnostic knowledge of God which is possible for everyone is the gnostic
knowledge of an unseen essence in its ijmal from which the soul/self of the mystic has differentiated
the unseen attributes also, and the names, deeds and the ahkam\
94
There is an element of reciprocity in this which makes it difficult, if not
impossible, to ascertain if there is any priority among these things. This is an important
point since the Qur’anic God is the Creator and Originator of all things.61 Any
suggestion of God’s lack of priority over His creation would incur the criticism of
Islamic tradition. For al-NabulusI the Essence does exist a priori as the ijmal , but is
not known by any other thing until creation, notably man, is known. And as soon as
man is known, the ijmal of the Essence is differentiated into the four ‘planes of Being’
which sustain man.62
Before explaining al-NabulusT’s views of the threefold appreciation of God
among mankind, it is important to reiterate his view of mankind. It has already been
elaborated that al-Nabulus! viewed the world in a hierarchical form, where certain
people could have a more extensive and profound knowledge of and faith in God than
others depending on their position in that hierarchy.63 In the present context, al-
NabulusT cites Qur’an 37: 164 to support his contention that this hierarchy exists:
There is not one of us save that he has a known position.64
Al-NabulusT states that the laws of religion (al-shara'f ) are addressed to the
generality of mankind and not the elite (< al-khitab cala j-umum la'l-khusus ).65 Al-
60 Al-NabulusI, Shark . I, 149-50.
61 Gardet, ‘Allah’. 406.
62 It is noteworthy that al-NSbulusI agrees with Ibn cArabT in stating that Muhammad is the most
knowledgeable creature there has ever been with respect to the knowledge of God. See al-NabulusI,
Sharh, i, 150.
63 See the chapter on al-NabulusI's Introduction to his commentary on the Fususal-Hkam.
64 Al-NabulusI, Shark i, 156.
95
Nabulusi is making a very important distinction between what he calls the generality
( al-umum ) and the elite (al-khusus) of mankind
The generality of mankind, for whom the divinely originated religious laws
were revealed, are said to possess weak intellects. The generality of mankind are also
said to be numerous. Furthermore, they are said to be those who believe in the unseen
world, but do not have any gnostic knowledge of it. It was for this reason that they
were in a state of ignorance prior to the coming of Islam. Al-NabulusT quotes Qur’an
14:4 and gives a little historical exegesis of it to support this point:
‘We only sent a messenger with the language of his people to make (things] clear for them. ’ The
people of the messenger of God Muhammad were the people of ignorance, the possessors of weak
intellects.66
Furthermore, he argues:
The tool of the generality [of mankind] in apprehending [things] is the intellect ( al-aql ), but the elite
have another, different tool which is insight ( al-basra ) enlightened by the Light of God. It [insight]
is only different to intellect in turning to or away from God. Every intellect either turns to or away
[from God], Insight is created from [the intellect’s] turning [to God] while weak intellects [are
created] from its turning [from God], The language of religious Law is the language of weak
intellects.67
65 Al-Nabulusl. Shark I, 156.
66 Al-NabulusT. Sharh, I. 156.
67 Al-NabulusT. Shark, I, 156. Hourani, Islamic Rationalism, p.20. argues that cAbd al-Jabb3r benefits
from the major division of knowledge into immediate ( daruri ) and acquired ( muktasab ). It is noted
that this was a well-established division, taken as primary also by the Ashcarite dogmatists of his time,
Baqillanl and cAbd al-Qahir al-BaghdadT. On pp. 129-130, Hourani states that cAbd al-JabbSr, like all
Muctazila, fully accepted two sources of ethical knowledge, reason and revelation. Revelation is
classified as acquired, because its acceptance is based on reasoning. However, many believers in
Medieval Islam, according to Hourani (p. 135), were dissatisfied with this role for revelation and
reacted strongly against the rationalists. Gardet, L, Tim al-Kalam’. in El2 (Leiden: Brill. 1971), in,
1141-1150 (1146) states that the primary basis of c Ilm al-Kalam is that a harmony is to be
acknowledged between religious law and the efforts of reasons brought to bear on it. He adds that for
both Muctazilism and Ashcarism the religious Law is the bearer of absolute truth and, as such, it
defines the limits of reason and controls its activity. Al-NabulusT makes a distinction between reason
and revelation. Revelation, for him. has the power to support weak intellects or reason. Indeed, weak
reason needs revelation in order to find God. However, strong intellects or reason, which he calls
insight, find God through God’s light. It is implied that revelation is not needed by insight in order to
find God.
96
Since the generality of people are said to be the audience of the religious Law
or revelation and since their instrument of apprehending things is said to be a weak
intellect, they constitute the people of ignorance. Furthermore, this qualifies al-
NabulusT’s portrayal of mankind as forming a hierarchy which appears to be a
permanent aspect of mankind. It is implied that the generality of people at all times
have weak intellects and thus need the religious Laws. From al-NabulusT’s Sufi
perspective, they constitute the people of ignorance.
By contrast, there is the situation of the elite of mankind. They turn towards
God by nature. Their intellects are strong and are in fact known as instruments of
divinely illuminated insight The implication is that the religious Law (al-shara'ic) is
not for them or that they can penetrate its outer shell, its language, since that is
directed at the ignorant masses. These are said to be very few in number. They are
said to possess the revelation of God’s ‘planes of Being’ ( badarat ).68 Furthermore, al-
NabulusT sub-divides them into the elite ( al-khassa ) and the elite of the elite ( khassa al-
khassa ).69 From this perspective, al-NabulusT elaborates his understanding of the three
forms of knowing God.70 These are the traditional Sufi modes of knowing God - ‘the
first separation’, ‘the union after the first separation’, and ‘the union of the union’ or
68 It is assumed from the correspondence of terms that these hadarat are the four ‘planes of Being’
described earlier, notably the attributes, names, deeds and ahkam of God.
69 Al-NabulusT. Shark , I, 156.
70 Izutsu, T, Creation and the Timeless Order of Things - Essays in Islamic Mystical Philosophy
(Oregon: White Cloud Press, 1994), pp.21-6, delineates the same tripartite division of mankind that
al-NabulusT establishes here.
97
‘the second separation.’71 This paradigm is neither discussed nor mentioned in Ibn
cArabI’s text on Ibrahim.
Al-Nabulusi describes the first separation ( al-farq al-awwat) thus:
The first separation in which are [to be found] the generality of people. This is the witnessing of
themselves and everything else only. [It is also] the absence from the witnessing of God. However,
they witness the universal [God] in a specific, partial, intellectual or sensory locus of manifestation.
They worship Him in it. However, the Law has forbidden them the worship of a sensory locus of
manifestation, such as an idol or star and so on It [the Law] has not forbidden them the worship of
an intellectual locus of manifestation; although that is heresy in the next world, it is not so in this
world according to the letter of the Law.72
According to this statement, the generality of mankind have a view of reality in
which all things are separated and from which God is utterly transcendent. This is a
view endorsed by revelation. They only witness themselves and the world around
them. They do not witness God at all. It is implied that the vision of God which they
do not have is the true ‘universal’ vision of God. It is explicit that they do witness Him
in ‘specific’, partial, intellectual or sensory forms - without necessarily really knowing
Him. This is an explanation of the existence of the worship of stone or celestial idols.
Such worship is forbidden by the Law However, the worship of God in specific
intellectual concepts is not forbidden by the Law in this world, only in the next. This
71 Izutsu. Creation . p. 16, states that separation (farq) refers mainly to the common-sense view of
reality, that is to say the separation of the Absolute from the phenomenal, relative world.
Furthermore, all things are separated from one another by essential demarcations, for example
mountain and river are essentially different from one another. He adds (pp. 1 7-8) that the innumerable
things stand opposed to the Absolute as two entirely different ontological domains between which
there is no internal relationship. He states (pp. 16-7) that at the stage of gathering [union] (jam0) there
is said to be only the believer witnessing God, and God alone, without seeing any creature. In fact,
even the limitation of the ego of the believer disappears. The next stage (pp 17-8) is where all the
things that were gathered up into unity are again separated from one another as so many different
entities. This stage is known as separation after unification (farq bacd al-janf) or second separation
( farq th&ii). It is added (p. 18) that the second separation is not sheer multiplicity, rather all the
essential demarcations of the things, although clearly observable, are known to be nothing other than
so many self-determinations of the absolute unity itself.
72 Al-Nabulusl. Sharh , I, 151.
form of worship is condoned by Islam as long as God is worshipped as an intellectual
or imaginary concept, not as a sensory form, which is kufr.
This is elaborated further in al-NabulusT’s interpretation of Ibn cArab!’s main
poem in the chapter:73
And in another of my states, which is the state of His [God’s] absence from me in my appearance to
myself among the essences appearing to me from me and everything else. I deny His appearance in
anything of them [the essences] owing to the dominance of otherness over sameness. And so He
knows me then in this second state and I have no knowledge of Him in it. This is because if He knows
me, He has separated me from Him and has differentiated me from His ijmal. Thus, this second state
occurs to me and so I enter into separation, thereby' denying Him in my form and ha\ing no
knowledge of Him in it.74
The subject of the poem is in a state where he acknowledges himself and
everything else like him, but denies God God is absent from him, and, presumably,
transcendent from this realm of reality. He has no knowledge of God, but God knows
him since He [God] has separated him from the ijmal of His Essence. Thus, God
witnesses him, but he does not witness God. He only witnesses himself and everything
else like himself. Al-Nabulusl explains this:
If He [God] witnesses me in my form, but does not witness Himself, then I witness my form and deny
Him in it since I do not witness Him in it.75
Al-Nabulusi also states that if God manifests Himself through witnessing His
creation, then creation witnesses itself and nothing else.76 While in this state of
witnessing itself only, creation believes that its form is complete and independent.
73 Ibn cArabf s poem is: He praises me and I praise Him. He worships me and I worship Him. But in
a state [of being] I affirm Him and in the archetypes (al-ayan) I deny Him. He knows me and I am
ignorant of Him. But I know Him and so witness Him. Where is [His] independence when I help
Him and make Him happy? Thus God brings me into existence while I know Him and so bring Him
into existence. In this way the [divine] word comes to us and He realises His intention in us.
74 Al-NabulusT, Sharh , I, 160.
75 Al-Nabulusl, Sharh, I, 160.
99
Thus, it seems to depend on nothing else in any way.77 The implication is that this
completeness and independence are on the level of existence. Al-NabulusT has been
consistent in maintaining creation’s utter need for existence from God. God alone can
satisfy this need since He is existence. Thus, al-NabulusT argues that separation alone
is error, forgetfulness [of God], and tyranny.78 In effect, the belief in separation alone
is an existential heresy, since it posits the possibility of another existence apart from
God’s.
For al-NabulusT the state of the first separation is one that belongs to the
generality of mankind who possess weak intellects and that it alone is error and
forgetfulness of God. It elucidates his reasoning for the generality’s need for the
religious Law to keep them on the straight path prescribed by God through His
prophets
The next state possible for mankind belongs to the elite and is called union after
the first separation. Al-NabulusT states:
In this revelation the witnessing of ourselves and of others is absent from us due to our immersion in
the witnessing of God in the universal [God], which is the station of union after the first separation.79
The revelation mentioned in this quotation is that God Himself is the same as
the world which is the evidence for His existence.80 Al-NabulusT says:
He [God] is the same as the evidence ( al-dalU ), what is proven ( al-madlul ), and what is drawing
conclusions ( al-mustadill ). There is nothing in being except Him [God] appearing through the form
76 Al-NabulusT, Sharb, I, 161.
77 Al-NabulusI, Sharb. I, 160.
78 Al-NabulusT. Sharb. I, 161.
79 Al-NabulusT, Sharb , I, 151.
80 Al-NabulusT, Sharb , I, 150.
too
of every non-existent possible thing because of His holding the non-existing forms with His power
which is the same as His Essence.81
This quotation suggests that the mystic witnesses a oneness in which there is no
differentiation. The oneness is God There is only God Unity is clearly dominating
multiplicity, which has disappeared. In this sense, creation is through God and He
appears and acts through creation. God is said to do everything that creation does.82
This is because there is only God. Al-NabulusT highlights the fact that this revelation is
not as high as the one that follows it - the second separation or union of union:
The person who has the first revelation says, we are all through Him [God], ’ The person who has the
second revelation, which is higher, says, ‘we are all through us not through Him [God], however in
Him [God] and not in us. ,83
Again, al-Nabulusi elaborates this state of union in his exegesis of Ibn cArabf s
main poem in the chapter:
And so in one of [my] states, which is the state of His [God s] appearance to me which is expressed as
the state of my annihilation from myself, I acknowledge Him through His appearance in my locus of
manifestation to me where there is no I. . . If He knows Himself , then He gathers me to Him and
makes me an ijmal in His differentiation. Thus, this first state occurs to me and so I enter into the
heart of union. Thereby, I acknowledge Him and deny myself, having no knowledge of it [myself] at
the moment of His appearance. Thus, he [the poet] said. I know Him [God]' in the first state and
witness Him [God]' in it.84
The subject of the poem is in a state where he acknowledges God but denies
himself and everything else like him. He has neither knowledge of himself nor of what
is other than him, since God has gathered him up in His ijmal while still existent in the
world of differentiation or multiplicity Thus, God knows the subject of the poem and
81 Al-Nabulusi, Shark I, 150. See the first section of this chapter which deals with the issue pf the
Divine Essence. See also the chapter on Zakanyya which discusses the relationship of the attributes
and names of God to the Divine Essence.
82 Al-NabulusT, Shark I, 152.
83 Al-N5bulusl, Shark I. 152.
101
Himself. There is a denial of the ‘I’ which is the ego of the subject. The T does not
witness itself, just God. In fact, it is God that does this witnessing.85 God witnesses
Himself and the subject of the poem witnesses God, denying all else Al-NabulusT
explains this:
If He [God] witnesses Himself in my form, I too witness Him in it, ha\ing no know ledge of anything
else.86
Al-NabulusT adds that if God manifests Himself through witnessing Himself in
the form of His creation, then creation witnesses God in the forms of creation.87 While
in this state of witnessing God in the forms of creation, creation believes that its forms
are God’s creation subsisting upon God. The subsistence that God provides is
existence, since God provides existential subsistence for all creation. Thus, creation is
existentially dependent upon God.88 It is not stated that union alone is error,
forgetfulness of God, and tyranny. Furthermore, it is not stated that it is light,
guidance, and perfection either. It is apparent that this revelation is not as high in the
mystical hierarchy as the second revelation, which belongs to the state of the union of
the union, or the second separation
Al-NabulusT describes the final, ultimate state in the following manner, also
giving some detail to what the revelation encompasses:
84 Al-NabulusT. Shark I, 160.
85 See chapter on al-NabulusT’s introduction to the commentary on the Fususal-Hkam where he
explains that angels and possessors of know ledge only witness God through delegating authority to
God; God is the sole agent of the act of witnessing.
86 Al-NabulusT, Shark I, 160.
87 Al-NabulusT, Shark I, 161.
88 Al-NabulusT, Shark I, 160.
102
And then the other sound revelation comes, which is the station of the second separation due to
realisation through God and creation,89 And so this other revelation shows you our forms - the
community of non-existent, determined possibles - in Him [God], that is to say in the existence of
God’s Essence. Do not speak of incarnation, because the non-existent possibles have no existence
other than that of God’s Essence so that they might incarnate themselves in the existence of God.
Incarnation is only between two things which are existent through two [distinct] existences. However,
here there is only one existence; and the one existence does not incarnate itself in itself.90
This revelation, higher than the previous one, is quite different in substance to
what was previously revealed. Whereas previously the revelation was that God was
the same as the world which was the evidence for His existence, here all the non¬
existent forms that constitute creation are revealed as being ‘in’ the existence of God’s
Essence. Thus, whereas previously the non-existent possibles were dissolved in the
unity of God, here their multiplicity returns, but ‘in’ the oneness of God’s existence.91
Al-NabulusT is at pains to establish and explain the fact that the concept of
incarnation ( hulul) is not involved. The essential non-existence of the possible things
prohibits them from incarnating themselves in the existence of God’s Essence. Rather,
they are dependent on God for existence, which explains why they are awash in the sea
of His existence. Without this existence they would remain in their non-existent
state.92
89 See al-NabulusI. Shark n. 1 17. where, in the chapter on TJzair. it is argued that realisation
(tahaqquq) is a form of gnosis ( macrifa ).
90 Al-NabulusT, Shark I, 151.
91 See the chapter on Zakariyya. (al-NabulusT. Shark n. 217). which argues that the One Essence is
mercy. There are the archetypes of the divine names in this Essence. These archetypes demand’
their existence. The Essence gives them existence and they appear as the divine names. The divine
names appear in forms through the archetypes of the effects (ath&), which, in turn, demand their own
existence. The Essence as divine mercy encompasses them and brings them into existence through
the divine names. These effects are originated and constitute creation. The divine mercy determines
them to be effects, by which they are made to be imperfect in contrast to the perfection of the divine
names.
92 As earlier, he establishes and continues to maintain fundamental differences between God and man
possibly due to the context of the centuries’ old polemics over certain issues arising out of Ibn cArabI’s
ideas. Al-NabulusT establishes that there is no hint of the concepts of incarnation or union in what he
103
The mystic witnesses an existential oneness in which ‘resides’ a multiplicity of
the forms of non-existent possible things. The oneness is God’s existence, while the
multiplicity is the forms of creation. Unity and multiplicity are balanced, giving the
‘highest’ appreciation of reality .93 In this sense, creation is through itself but in God.
As such, creation performs its own acts but in God 94
Whereas in the previous revelation the mystic witnesses that there is only God,
in this revelation he witnesses the difference between God and creation:
Everything is from us with regard to possibility, predisposition, and acceptance, while everything is
from Him [God] with regard to existentiation and manifestation He [God] said, ‘Say everything is
from the presence of God (min cinda 7 lah). ' [Qur’an 4:78] He did not say, ‘from God (min AII&j).'
because ‘the presence of God’ is the presence of the non-existent ranks of possibility in His
knowledge.95
Al-NabulusT is distinguishing between God, from which nothing comes, and the
presence of God, from which everything comes.96 The non-existent ranks of possibility
are utterly different from God with regard to existence, which they utterly lack.
However, they are resident in God’s knowledge, which from the Sublime Essence’s
perspective is the same as Itself The question begs to be asked whether there is a
is elucidating. Charges of incarnation or union were frequently levelled at Ibn cArabI and the school
of thought that arose out of his writings. See Knysh, AD, Ibn cArabIin the Later Islamic Tradition -
the Making of a Polemical Image in Medieval Islam (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999).
93 Izutsu, Creation , p.26 says that only through this single act of cognition is a whole integral view of
Reality as it really is grasped. This is the fundamental intuition of the one single reality of existence
in eveiything without exception. In the Absolute (God, theologically), existence in its absolute purity
and unconditionality is seen. In the things of the phenomenal world, the concrete differentiations of
the selfsame reality of existence in accordance with its own inner articulations are recognised.
Philosophically this is the position of ‘Unity of Being’ (wapdat al-wujud).
94 Al-NabulusI, Sharp, I, 152.
95 Al-NabulusT. Sharp , I, 151-2.
96 This seems to present two concepts of God - one is the utterly transcendent God who is completely
unknown, the other is the known God who is seemingly responsible for bringing everything into
existence. In this sense, the latter concept of God seems equivalent to ideas of the Demiurge, which
dirties its ‘hands’ in the act of bringing originated possible determined things into existence. The
transcendent God is kept clean of such malodorous’ tasks. This is discussed in more depth in the
chapter on Muhammad
104
distinction between God’s knowledge, the content of that knowledge, and His Essence,
when matters are appreciated from the perspective of that Essence. Al-NabulusT is
silent on this issue.
Nevertheless, the non-existent ranks of possibility are said to depend on God
for existence. They possess possibility, predisposition and acceptance. Furthermore,
they are said to possess quiddities, their states, and the act of distinguishing between
them. God possesses existence and the act of manifestation.97
God is needed for the existence He imparts, but the non-existent possible
things, in their various ranks, give to God their possibility, predisposition and
acceptance. It is through them that God is differentiated out of His ijmal, thus
becoming God rather than remaining the Divine Essence. Thus, creation appears
through itself, acts through itself, and forcefully determines itself through itself, but in
the infinite existence of God’s Essence:
God has not done through them what they have done; rather, they are doing through themselves all of
what they have done, because He [God] knew them thus and so brought them into existence in
accordance with His knowledge.98
Al-NabulusT expounds on the state of second separation in his exegesis of Ibn
cArabT’s main poem in the chapter:
And so His [God’s] help is His appearance where there is no we, while our help is our appearance
where there is no He. So, He [God] has the hukm in union, while we have the hukm in separation.
Thus, some of the infallible people implored in His [God’s] saying, ‘My Lord! Give me a judgement
[or hukm]V" So he asked for separation, and then He [God] said. ‘Make me one of the righteous!’100
97 Al-NabulusT, Shark I. 151.
98 Al-NabulusT. Shark I, 153.
"Qur’an 26:83.
100 Qur’an 26:83. Al-NabulusT uses ‘wa’falnf rather than ‘wa ’IMqnT. However, from the context it
is clear that although he changed the verb in the second half of this Qur’anic verse, it is the same
verse that is cited.
105
That is [make me one of] the people of union, because separation alone is error, forgetfulness, and
tyranny, but with union - which is called the union of union and the second separation - it is light,
guidance, and perfection due to the utter lack of needs of the(se] two aspects which belong to God in
the plane of His knowledge.101
Al-NabulusT states that in the state of union alone, God has the hukm This
state is where everything dissolves into the unity of the existence of God’s Essence.
Only God is witnessed There is no ‘we’ which is in contradistinction to Him.
Equally, it is stated that in the state of separation alone, creation - the ‘we’ - has the
hukm. This state is where everything is distinct and differentiated. God is not
witnessed, only creation. There is no ‘He’, only ‘we.’
Al-NabulusT has explained, using a Qur’anic citation for support, that the
mystic seeking the fullest, most complete revelation asks for both separation, which is
judgement (or hukm) in the Qur’anic verse, and union, which is the grace of becoming
one of the righteous. It is this idea of someone reaching an awareness of both aspects
of reality - the ‘He’ and the ‘we’ - that results in discussions of the relationship
between them. These aspects are neither utterly separated nor utterly unified as al-
NabulusT’s various statements imply. They are in need of each other.
The Reciprocity of Nourishment
The dependency of God on man and of man on God has been emphasised in the
above sections. Although different, God and man have similar needs of dependency on
another entity, whether existent or non-existent. Al-NabulusT makes use of the
Qur’anic stories provided by Ibn cArabT to elaborate his interpretation of Ibn cArabT’s
101 Al-NabulusT, Shark, I, 161.
106
discussions on the relationship between God and man, as typified in the case of the
prophetic figure of Ibrahim
The discussion of the section on God’s Divine Essence began with an
explication of al-NabulusI’s exegesis of a Qur’anic story concerning Ibrahim. That
exegesis encapsulated al-NabulusI’s understanding of the central themes of the chapter.
The Qur’anic story concerned Ibrahim asking God for the favour of knowing how his
Lord can perform miraculous acts such as resuscitating the dead. This led into a
discussion of the relationship between God and man, and how they know each other.
This story is not used by Ibn cArabI. He uses the Qur’anic stories concerning Ibrahim
being God’s friend and his feeding of others.102 Al-NabulusI comments on these
Qur’anic citations and develops Ibn cArabI’s use of them in his own distinct way.
Before discussing al-NabulusI’s explication of the concepts of friendship and
nourishment in the context of Ibrahim, it is worth highlighting a few points that he
seems to stress. Firstly, he makes it clear that Ibrahim is a kind of archetypal Sufi
wayfarer:
The wisdom of Ibrahim is characterised by rapturous love because his [Ibrahim’s] reality is in
rapturous love with the love of God; and so, it [his reality] has reached the station of friendship from
the station of love such that he began to find God, who holds him. penetrating ev ery part of him with
respect to the fact that what he finds is due to the perfection of the merciful possession of the corporeal
102 Ibrahim as friend, Qur’an 4: 125; Ibrahim feeding others, Qur’an 1 1:69. and Qur’an 51:24-30.
Firestone, R, Journeys in Holy Lands - the evolution of the Abraham-lshmael legends in Islamic
exegesis (Albany, SUNY Press, 1990), p. 19, says that Islamic legends about Ibrahim are influenced by
the Biblicist legends extant in pre-Islamic Arabia and early Islamic society, but they also exhibit
influences from indigenous Arabian culture as well as styles, structures, and motifs that are unique to
Islam. On p.58, he adds that most of the commentary literature about the angels’ visit to Ibrahim and
his hospitality consists of running Islamic commentaries, unauthoritative traditions with many of the
earmarks of Biblicist legends, and brief non-narrative exegesis dating from the Islamic period.
107
and spiritual world, and not with respect to what He [God] actually is in relation to His Sublime
Self.103
In the above citation al-Nabulusi is discussing Ibrahim as though he were a Sufi
progressing along a path divided into spiritual stations. He mentions only two such
stations - those of love and friendship. The word which he uses for friendship ( al -
khulla ) is related by its constituent root consonants to the word for penetration (al-
takha/Zul) which he uses to describe God’s action upon the reality of Ibrahim. In this
manner, he is engaging in the same style of semantic wordplay in which Ibn cArabT also
engages. Furthermore, al-Nabulusi has also maintained the difference between God in
His Divine Essence and God as known or experienced by His creation.
It is noteworthy that al-Nabulusi has already given an indication of the
importance of Ibrahim’s discovery, in the station of friendship, that God is appearing
to him through him In this way, he has already commented on Ibn cArabT’s use of the
motif of Ibrahim being God’s friend
Al-Nabulusi cites Qur’an 4: 125 when commenting on Ibn cArabT’s use of the
appellation ‘friend’ that is applied to Ibrahim:
And God took Ibrahim as a friend. 104
At this point, al-Nabulusi stresses the fact that this friendship is reciprocal. He
says that if Ibrahim is God’s friend, then God must be Ibrahim’s friend. In terms of
103
Al-Nabulusi. Shark. I. 144.
Arabic grammar, he states that the word ‘friend’ ( khalU) is one of the nouns of
correlation, or reciprocal relation {ism al-idfifa), so that one of the two cannot be
conceived in the mind without the other. 105 In terms of friendship, Ibrahim and God
are in a reciprocal relation
Al-NabulusI states that on a par with the word ‘friend’ {khalil) is the word
‘beloved’ {habib). It is stated that Muhammad is both the beloved and friend of
God.106 Thus, God is Muhammad’s beloved and friend. They, like God and Ibrahim,
are in a reciprocal relationship. This is supported by a reference to a badHh
If I had taken someone as friend other than my Lord I would have taken Abfl Bakr.107
For al-NabulusT, this demonstrates that Muhammad, like Ibrahim, was a friend
of God. He examines the grammar of this hadnh , arguing that since Muhammad took
his Lord as friend, his Lord took him as friend too They are thus in a reciprocal
relationship.
Friendship for al-NabulusI is a state of reciprocal relationship.108 However, he
distinguishes between Muhammad and Ibrahim. Muhammad’s friendship with God
104 Al-NabulusI, Shark I. 145.
105 Al-NabulusI. Shark I, 145.
106 Al-NabulusI. Shark I. 145.
107 Al-NabulusI. Shark I. 145.
108 Trimingham. JS, The Sufi Orders in Islam (New York & Oxford: OUP. 1998). p.224. states
concerning al-ShacranI’s thought that ‘although a ‘favourite’ of God not even a wa/fcan attain
nearness to God consequently we translate wallas God’s ‘protege’ rather than ‘friend’, for friendship
would naturally imply some degree of reciprocity in the relationship of the man and his God. ’ This
makes an interesting comparison and difference between these two Sufi thinkers. Al-NabulusI clearly
has no qualms about talking about reciprocity in the relationship ‘of the man and his God. ’
109
was superior to Ibrahim’s, because Muhammad took God as his friend whereas God
took Ibrahim as friend. Qur’an 4: 125 and the hadlth are quoted again to emphasise
this difference in terms of activity and passivity:
And of the perfection of God s appearance in our Prophet Muhammad was the act of taking being on
his part and not on Ibrahim’s. And so God said concerning Ibrahim. ’And God took Ibrahim as a
friend. ’ And he [the Prophet] said concerning himself. If I had taken someone other than my Lord as
friend, I would have taken Abu Bakr. ’ Thus, the two loci of manifestation and the two friendships
were different.109
Although al-NabulusT has discussed friendship as being a state of reciprocal
relationship, a given friendship can differ from another in terms of which of two friends
was active in initiating it. Ibrahim, representative of mankind, is passive in his
friendship with God. This is important for al-NabulusI’s understanding of this/ayy.
However, for al-NabulusI, Muhammad is active in his friendship with God.
Nevertheless, as is clear from the previous quotation, it must be borne in mind that al-
NabulusT also stresses the fundamental activity of God and the fundamental passivity of
man - it is God who appears in the two loci of manifestation, which are known as
Muhammad and Ibrahim. Both seem passive before God in one respect, yet in another
respect one of them appears active, the other passive 110
At this point, it is necessary to follow al-NabulusT’s understanding of the
reasons for Ibrahim’s being called ‘friend’. He has already mentioned that Ibrahim
found God permeating him, the root of which Arabic word ( takhallal) is related to the
109 Al-Nabulusl. Shark I, 145.
110
word for ‘friend’ (khalif). However, these two reasons are parallel to the two
revelations discussed earlier in the context of man’s knowledge of God The first
revelation was that God is the same as the world The oneness of God dominates and
dissolves the multiplicity of the ephemera of the world The second revelation was that
the multiplicity of the ephemera of the world are ‘in’ the existence of God’s Essence.
This combines the seemingly real multiplicity of the world’s ephemera that the ordinary
man witnesses with the utter oneness of God witnessed by the Sufi. The reasons for
Ibrahim’s being called friend reflect this
Al-NabulusI states, echoing Ibn cArabT, that the first reason is that Ibrahim
pervades and encompasses all the attributes, names, deeds, and ahkam with which the
Divine Essence is described This seems to follow from his earlier explication of the
differentiation of the Essence’s ijmal into attributes and so on by the non-existent
possibles that constitute creation. However, al-NabulusI differs from Ibn cArabI when
he adds that this apparent action of pervasion and encompassment on Ibrahim’s part is
a ‘metonym’ for the Divine Essence’s possession of him through all the four ‘planes of
Being’ (the attributes and so on), and for Ibrahim’s acceptance of this:
And this pervasion and encompassment on Ibrahim’s part of what has been mentioned is a metonym
for God’s possession of Ibrahim through all of what was mentioned and for Ibrahim's acceptance of
that possession.111
110 See the chapter on Muhammad for a fuller discussion of Muhammad’s function in al-NabulusI’s
thought as elucidated in his commentary on the Fususal-Hkam.
111 Al-NabulusI, Shark I. 145.
ill
Al-NabulusT mentions that the first reason for Ibrahim’s being called ‘friend’ is
correct according to the sense that:
The appearance of all the eternally pre-existent attributes of God through the originated accidental
attributes [of creation] in a way in which the originated attributes disappear due to their essential non¬
existence and the eternally pre-existent attributes appear due to their essential existence with regard to
the fact that they are same as the Essence, although [thev are] other than the Essence in another
, 112
respect.
This reinforces the sense in which the originated, created Ibrahim and his
accidental attributes are fundamentally passive in the face of God. God appears to
him, penetrating and thus effacing him and his attributes. Thus, God appears through
Ibrahim God and Ibrahim are different, but Ibrahim is dissolved in the essentially
existent attributes of God. There is a sense of communion which seems identical with
union {jarrf ).
The second reason for Ibrahim being called ‘friend of God’ is because God
pervades and possesses the existence of his form. This is because God supports it and
brings it into being. Ibrahim’s form remains strictly in accordance with God’s
knowledge and will. Its existence is only through God. Al-NabulusT re-states that:
The second reason ... is correct also not according to the sense of incarnation (al-hulul) or
union ( al-ittihad) since that is not conceived of by those who believe that God has the True Existence
and that every created thing other than Him has no essential existence. Their existence is through
Him. There is no other existent thing with Him in His rank. Although they are other than Him with
regard to their forms and determinations ( maqadriha) and they are the same as Him with regard to
their existence and immutability. It is not conceived of that an existent thing can incarnate itself in a
non-existent thing nor that the former unite with the latter. . . . One of them does not mix with the
other.113
112 Al-NabulusT, Shark I, 146.
113 Al-NabulusT, Shark I, 146. This highlights again the importance of the need to challenge all
charges of the ‘heresy’ of incarnation or union. This is a further indication of al-NabulusI’s reacting
to the history of polemics over issues arising out of Ibn "Arabl’s ideas.
112
Al-Nabuiusi implies that the second reason for Ibrahim being called ‘friend’ is
correct according to the sense that God has the true existence and that all creation
which is other than Him is essentially non-existent. Their existence is through God.
Their multiplicity appears ‘in’ God’s existence, thus becoming, in a sense, existent
through it. However, there is no other existent thing in the same rank as God. God is
one in His existence, but with the multiplicity of non-existent possible determinations
‘in’ Him. If someone were unaware of God, this would be seen as the ‘first
separation. ’ However, if that person were aware of God, then this would be
appreciated as the ‘second separation’ or ‘the union of union’. Nevertheless, al-
NabulusI does state:
Although they [created things] are different to Him [God] with regard to their forms and
determinations they are the same as Him with regard to their existence and immutability 1 14
These reasons for Ibrahim’s being called ‘friend of God’ appear to be parallel
to the revelations that the Sufis can have: firstly, there is the sense in which creation is
dissolved in God who pervades them and whose essentially existent descriptions
thereby efface their originated and essentially non-existent descriptions. There is a
sense in which the first reason for Ibrahim’s name is equivalent to the annihilation of
the mystic in God. However, there is also the aspect of creation’s non-existent forms
existing in God, their multiplicity is affirmed and given reality through being in God.
They are the same and yet different from God. This seems to be equivalent to the
mystic’s awareness of the second separation.
114 Al-NabulusT. Sharp, I, 146.
113
There is another dimension to this theory There is the aspect in which God
needs Ibrahim for His attributes, names and so on to appear. They appear through
him. Although Ibrahim is lost when they appear through him, without him they would
not appear. Furthermore, there is the sense in which Ibrahim needs God for his form
and determination to have existence. He appears in God’s existence. Although he is
existent when in God, without God he would have no existence at all. This is a
reiteration of the theme of creation’s need of existence from God and God’s need to be
known by creation. The theme of dependency is maintained.
There is a theme of nourishment here too: both God and Ibrahim offer different
types of nourishment to each other, without which they would not be what they are.
The nourishment is another facet of their dependence on each other.
During the chapter on Ibrahim and more specifically at its end, Ibn cArabI
deals specifically with the aspect of Ibrahim’s association with feeding others. Al-
NabulusI also brings this theme of nourishment up at different junctures but he makes
the same underlying point consistently.
During the discussion of pervasion in the context of the reasons for Ibrahim
being called ‘friend’, al-NabulusI agrees with Ibn cArabT in saying that whoever is
active in penetrating something else is hidden in that thing and is food for it with regard
to the fact that its subsistence is upon it Whatever is nourished and subsisting upon
114
what is active is manifest. Whatever is manifest is thus passive. 115 Al-NabulusT
recognises that if creation, or Ibrahim, is hidden, then God is manifest He adds:
Gnostics witness Him [God] like this without witnessing that creation has any other existence other
than His existence so that creation has to be incarnate in God However God's knowledge, will and
power comprise the appearance of all the forms of the world.116
In this instance, creation is said to be all the names of God. 117 This is
equivalent to the earlier description of the first revelation enjoyed by some Sufis - the
vision of union (jam0 ) and the state of annihilation (fan a’) in God.
Al-NabulusI also follows Ibn cArabT in discussing the situation where God is
hidden and Ibrahim is manifest. This is what Sufi gnostics who are close to God
witness. When they witness this they also realise that God is all the attributes of
creation. 118 This is equivalent to the earlier description of the second revelation
enjoyed by the elite of the elite of Sufis - the vision of union of union (jam 0 al-jam°) or
the second separation (al-farq al-thani ) and the state of survival (baqaj in God.
Al-NabulusI, like Ibn cArabI, argues that food or nourishment is connected with
the relationship between God and creation. If creation feeds God, then God is
manifest, however if God feeds creation, then creation is manifest. This fits with the
paradigm of jam 0 and farq. However, the issue of how something that is essentially
non-existent being able ‘to feed’ what is existent emerges.
115 Al-NabulusT. Shark I, 148.
116 Al-NabulusI, Shark I. 148.
117 Al-NabulusT, Shark I, 148.
118 Al-NabulusI. Shark I, 148.
115
Al-NabulusI states that Ibrahim is called ‘friend’ and established the tradition of
feeding others, whether in groups or as individuals, because he possessed the rank
which is the nourishment belonging to the two sides in the appearance of the essence
or self This is rather cryptic and so al-NabulusT feels obliged to clarify it:
[This] is like the dye composed of two colours: one of them feeds the other in the appearance of that
colour. It is also the union and separation that we mentioned with respect to God’s knowledge of
Himself appearing to Himself in His non-existent possible matters1 19 and with respect to God's
knowledge of those non-existent possible matters through themselves. There is no doubt that the
friend [Ibrahim] belongs to the totality of those matters, however he is separate from them through the
awareness and revelation of what he actually is that is in his possibility and determination. Thus, he
is characterised by this rank.120
It has been argued that the elite of the elite Sufis witness themselves and the
multiplicity of the world around them, but ‘in’ God. This is ‘al-farq al-thanT or ‘jam0
al-jam°\ This synthesises the knowledge, vision or experience of the previous two
levels of people in order to produce the most profound vision of ‘Reality’ available to
man. In a sense, it is the synthesis of the two aspects of ‘Reality’ - the oneness and
multiplicity or God and creation. This is encapsulated in the symbolic figure of
Ibrahim who reveals the reciprocal relationship between God and His creation. Thus,
Ibrahim is ‘the dye composed of two colours. ’
Both Ibn cArabT and al-NabulusI make use of the Qur’anic motifs surrounding
Ibrahim with regard to feeding others. Al-NabulusI has already hinted at what he has
consistently argued: that God needs creation in order to be known by everything other
than Him, and that creation is in utter need of Him in order to become existent. This
fits into the paradigm of union (jam0) and separation (farq ), where food or
119 This echoes Qur’an 55:29, ‘Every day He is in a matter/affair (sha ’n). ’
116
nourishment is connected with the reciprocal relationship between God and creation.
If creation feeds God, then God is manifest To be aware only of this, Sufi gnostics
would be in a state of jarrf . However, if God feeds creation, then creation is manifest.
If a Sufi gnostic is aware of this state, he would be either in a state of farq awwal or
farq thanp depending on his progress along the ‘Path’. Al-NabulusT states:
You are His food, that is to say God’s food through the ahkam , which He took from you through His
eternally pre-existent knowledge. And so He knew you through them. That is from the perspective of
the rank of His divinity from which is His ability to know you, want you, determine you. From this
perspective, He is fed by you and by your states so that there follows to Him the rank of divinity which
is from the totality of ‘planes of Being’ which descend to you through that rank in the likeness of a
body which needs food.121
It is through creation that the Divine Essence is differentiated into the four
‘planes of Being’ constituting the rank of divinity, which are the attributes, names,
deeds, and ahkam. Thus, God needs to be fed by creation in order to be known.
Creation can have different degrees of knowledge of God, but the fact is that God
would not be known without creation to know Him. However, al-NabulusT ensures
that we understand that the imagery of food and body with respect to God is purely
allegorical as his use of the word ‘likeness’ (mithal) indicates. Indeed, a little later in
describing the same phenomenon, he states explicitly that the food that penetrates the
divine states, as though they were parts of a body, is done in a metaphorical manner
and not a real one. 122
Al-NabulusT has reiterated the earlier point in the section on the Divine Essence
that God is not known until creation is known. Creation feeds God through being the
120 Al-Nabulusl. Sharp, I, 162-3.
121 Al-NabulusT, Sharh . I, 158.
122 Al-NabulusT, Sharp, I, 164.
117
object of His knowledge, which thereby enables Him to be known. He can only be
known through the differentiation of the ijmal of His Divine Essence into the attributes
and so on which are revealed to man in the Qur’an. However, in order for man to
know God, he needs to exist. And so God feeds man through the gift of existence.
Al-NabulusT states.
And He, that is God, is your food through existence which is pouring forth from Him upon you.
However, there is no pouring forth nor food. That is a tool of connection through a specific term in
order to convey the intended sense to the wayfarer. . . . Thus, it is sound to state that there is the
pouring forth of existence in one respect, but in another respect it is not sound.123
It is noteworthy that al-NabulusT stresses again the metaphorical nature of the
language that he is using God’s existence is not really food. These are images and
metaphorical concepts used to convey the point that al-NabulusT wishes to make. This
point is that man needs God in order to exist. There is a reciprocity of need Although
God in His Essence has no need at all of anything else. He does need creation in order
to be known and worshipped. Creation needs the existence that only God can bestow
in order to know God and worship Him.
And since we have stated that there is the dyeing of non-existent possible things with existence, we
can state also that there is the dyeing of existence with non-existent possible things too. So,
existence’s being food for the non-existent possible things is sound because they are only existent
through it. In themselves, they are pure non-existence. And the non-existent possible thing’s being
food for existence is sound too because it is enformed and shaped through them. And so it has
appeared in forms and shapes to the senses and the intellect. But it is in itself pure existence utterly
transcendent from all that.124
Finally al-Nabulusi says:
There is no doubt that food is that upon which something subsists and survives. The allegory here is
understood. The non-existent possible things have no subsistence and no survival save through
existence. Likewise, existence, with respect to its appearing enformed through them, has no
123 Al-NabulusT. Shark I, 158.
124 Al-NabulusT, Shark I, 158-9.
118
subsistence nor survival save through them But with respect to what it is in itself, there is no
discussion of that at all.125
The reciprocity of need between God and creation is at an epistemological and
existential level. Al-NabulusT explains this ‘metaphysical reality’ - that God needs
creation to be known and that creation needs God’s existence to exist - with a
discussion of what this actually means for Sufis who are travelling along the ‘Path’ to
closeness to God. This closeness is described in epistemological terms. Ordinary
people do not witness God, they only see themselves and the seemingly real world of
multiplicity around them. The first level of the elite Sufis witness God only, losing
sight of themselves and the world of multiplicity around them. This appreciation of
‘Reality’ is more profound than that enjoyed by ordinary people, however the highest
level of the elite Sufis enjoys the most profound vision of ‘Reality’. They witness
themselves and the multiplicity of the world around them, but ‘in’ God. This
synthesises the knowledge, vision or experience of the previous two levels of people in
order to produce the most profound vision of ‘Reality’ available to man. This level is
typified in the wisdom of Ibrahim For al-NabulusI, the figure of Ibrahim demonstrates
this ‘truth. ’
In describing these epistemological categories, al-NabulusT stresses that
although God and man need each other for different, yet complementary reasons, God
is essentially and utterly self-sufficient and utterly transcendent from the various worlds
of His creation. Thus, although at one level al-NabulusI is able to present a
sophisticated picture of the interrelations and dependencies of God and man, he is also
125 Al-NabulusT. Shark I, 159.
119
able to maintain the essential oneness and utter difference of God from His creation.
In this way, he finishes his commentary on the chapter with a ‘paradoxical’ statement:
God is in us despite His transcendence from us. God is not in us despite His connection to us. God is
limited by us despite His transcendence in His Essence.126
126 Al-Nabulusl. Shear h, , I, 165.
120
Chapter 5
Zakariyya
Introduction
A contemporary scholar has noted that ‘the Qur’anic story of Zakariyya is a
tale of God’s power and mercy. His mercy being the main expression of His power.’1
Al-NabulusT refers to this theme by commenting on the placement of the chapter on
Zakariyya within Ibn cArabT’s Fusus al-Hikam 2 God’s mercy and power are revealed
to Zakariyya through His giving a son to Zakariyya.3 Al-NabulusT suggests that Ibn
cArabI places the chapter on Yahya before that on his father, Zakariyya, out of respect
for God, who is the giver, and for Yahya, who is the gif!.4 Thus, al-NabulusT
recognises the fundamental role of power and mercy in the Qur’anic stories
surrounding Zakariyya. He sees the role of God’s mercy and power in God’s giving
1 Nettler. RL. ‘Ibn cArabi’s Conception of God’s Universal Mercy: The Chapter on Zakariyya’ in the
Fusus al-Hikam’, in Consciousness and Reality - Studies in Memory ofToshihiko Izutsu (Tokyo:
Iwanami Shoten, 1998), pp.213-231 (p.214).
2 Al-NabulusT, SharhJawahir al-Nususfi Hall Kalimat al-Fusus , 2 vols (Cairo: Bulaq. 1304-1323). n.
216.
3 The first fifteen verses of Qur’an 19 are on the subject of Zakariyya and his petitioning God for a
son.
4 There is a structure in his thinking which establishes the giver (or the agent) as first, the gift (or
action) as second or median, and the thing that receives the gift (the recipient) as third.
121
Zakariyya a son. Like Ibn cArabi, al-Nabulusi transforms a personal and pietistic story
into a metaphysical one.5
Ibn cArabT
It has been argued that Ibn cArabT’s discussion of the Qur’anic Zakariyya is
organised according to three themes: the metaphysics of God’s mercy; the ethical
implications of the divine metaphysical mercy; and the names and attributes, divine and
otherwise, in the expression and manifestation of God’s mercy.6 Ibn cArabT’s opening
remarks develop the Qur’anic ethical theme of God’s mercy into a metaphysical one:
Know that God’s mercy' encompasses everything in terms of existence and determination. . . .
Through this mercy' with which He [God] was merciful to it [a thing’s essence] He accepted its desire
for its essence’s existence, and thus brought it into existence.7 8
This intertwining of ethics and metaphysics is articulated in stronger language
revealing the extent to which traditional ethical themes are subsidiary to ontology:
Everything mentioned by mercy is felicitous and everything is mentioned by mercy. Mercy's
mentioning of something is the same as its bringing it into existence. Every existent thing is mercy-
full (mar him). Do not be veiled, oh friend [of God], from perceiving what we have said by what you
see of those who are misfortunate and by what you believe of the pains of the next life which do not
abate for those who are beset with them. . . . Everything mentioned by mercy' is merciful ( rathma ).
The active noun is ‘the compassionate’ ( al-rahm ) and ‘the merciful’ ( al-rahim)s
5 Rahman, F, Islam, 2nd edn (London: University of Chicago Press, 1976), pp. 144-5. states that ‘in
place of the moral, non-metaphysical mystic experience of orthodox Sufism, an out-and-out
philosophical intuitionism was now substituted whereby men claimed to arrive at metaphysical
knowledge. The classic formulation of the new Sufi epistemology was worked out by Ibn al-cArabT. ’
6 Nettler, ‘Ibn cArabi’s Conception’, p.214.
7 Ibn cArabI, Fususal-Bkam , ed. by AA cAfffi (Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-cArabI, 1980). i. 177.
8 Ibn cArabT, Fususal-Bkam, i, 178.
122
Ibn cArabT also raises the theme of names and attributes in connection with
mercy. He is principally concerned with the ways in which these are related to beings
and things that are defined by them:
So, ‘someone who knows’ Calim) is an essence (dhat) having knowledge (cilm) as an attribute. It
Calim) is not the same as the essence nor the same as the attribute There is only knowledge and
essence in which this knowledge has inhered. Its being someone who knows' is a mode ( hal) of this
essence in its having this sense ( al-macna) as an attribute. The relation ( nisba ) of knowledge to it
takes place and it is called ‘someone who knows . 9
Ibn cArabT applies this theory to God.
He [God] is the merciful ( al-rahim ). The merciful is only merciful through mercy’s inhering in Him.
So it is certain that He is the same as mercy.10
Ibn cArabT’s thesis points at an identity between God and creation. If God is
mercy, and therefore existence, and if everything mentioned by mercy is brought into
existence and is also merciful, then both God and creation are mercy. God is all and all
are God.
Al-NabulusT
Ibn cArabI calls this chapter ‘the Wisdom of Divine Sovereignty (. tnkma
mahkiyya) in the Word of Zakariyya. ’ Al-NabulusT provides an explication of this title,
summarising the main themes of the chapter as a whole. These themes are
metaphysical, rather than ethical as might be conventionally expected.
Al-NabulusT states that the word for ‘divine sovereignty’ is derived from a
divine name:
9 Ibn cArabI, Fusus al-Hkam, i, 179.
123
The chapter of the wisdom of divine sovereignty ( malikivya ) - that is to say pertaining to the
Sovereign God ( al-malik ) may He be praised.11
Al-NabulusT states that the wisdom associated with Zakariyya is distinguished
by being sovereign because it encompasses the mentioning (or remembrance) of
general and specific divine mercy.12 He therefore differentiates between general and
specific divine mercy .13 For al-NabulusT the wisdom of divine sovereignty refers to
God’s dominion as manifested in His mercy. He has linked mercy and power.
Furthermore, he has linked the divine name ‘the sovereign’ to the divine attribute
‘mercy.’
Al-NabulusT strengthens his contention that the sovereignty referred to in the
title is linked to mercy with a doubly relevant Qur’anic quotation:
The mentioning [or remembrance] of the mercy of your Lord for His servant Zakariyya [Qur’an
19:2] 14
Al-NabulusT cites the fact that Zakariyya has been linked to the mercy of his
Lord in the Qur’an. He has already hinted at a transformation of the Qur’anic concept
of mercy in the notion of the two types of mercy - general and specific. The
10 Ibn cArabI. Fususal-Hkam . I. 179.
11 Al-NabulusT. Sharh , II, 216.
12 Al-NabulusT, Shark II, 216.
13 This hints at the transformation of the Qur anic concept of mercy to a notion of two distinct, yet
related types of mercy. Nettler, ‘Ibn cArabi’s Conception’, p.215, notes that Ibn cArabT’s universalist
conception of God’s mercy is drawn from a Qur anic context which is a mix of mercy’s universal
application with a more restrictive notion For al-NabulusT, although he does not give specific
definitions of these terms, the evidence of his text, as will be shown, suggests that his concept of
general mercy is an existence-bestowing mercy whereas specific mercy is mercy determining things to
be what they actually are.
14 Al-NabulusT, Sharh , II, 216.
124
importance of the term ‘mentioning’ will become clear later in this chapter when its
existential function is discussed.15 Al-NabulusT uses the ambiguity of the language of
this Qur’anic citation, which can be read in at least two different ways.
Conventionally, it is read as ‘(this) is an account of your Lord’s mercy to His servant
Zakariyya. ’ However, there is the possibility, recognised by al-NabulusT, that it can be
read as ‘Your Lord’s mercy’s mentioning of His servant Zakariyya.’16
Strengthening the links between the concepts of mercy and sovereignty, al-
NabulusT states that mercy possesses ‘sovereignty’ or ‘power’ ( mulk ) over those who
are objects of this mercy:
Mercy has sovereignty over those who are recipients of it in [mercy’s] existence-giving nature and in
[its] supporting nature.17
This establishes a particular relationship between mercy and its recipients.
These objects are subject to mercy’s power and thus dependent upon mercy.
Furthermore, al-NabulusT mentions that nothing else has the unfettered control
(tasarruf) that mercy exhibits over its recipients. It alone has power over everything
and it alone also possesses everything. 18
15 Earlier, in the chapter on Ibrahim, it was noted that creation was originally not mentioned’, and
then God ‘mentioned’ it, thus bringing it into existence. There was clearly a link in metaphysical
terms between the concepts of mentioning’ and existentiating’. This is developed further in the
present chapter.
16 Al-NabulusI, Sharh. II, 220. Al-NabulusI follows Ibn cArabI in stating that mercy’s mentioning of
all things - whether sensory, intelligible or imaginary - is the same as mercy’s bringing them into
existence.
17 Al-NabulusI, Shark II, 216.
18 Al-NabulusI, Sharh, II. 216.
125
Al-NabulusT is inclining away from a Qur’anic mercy, which is personal and
pietistic, to that of a metaphysical mercy Those who are objects of this mercy are its
objects with regard to existentiation {Tjad) and support ( imdad ). In this he is following
Ibn cArabT.
This transformation of language and concepts reveals another level of al-
Nabulusl’s understanding of the Qur’anic stories of Zakariyya and God’s mercy: divine
mercy has power over the essences ( dhawat ) and attibutes {a fat) of those who are
recipients of mercy.19 In the light of the previous statement about existentiation and
support, it appears that the divine mercy brings into existence and supports the
essences and attributes of those subject to it. This is its power over them. Al-
NabulusT has moved away from talking about people, such as Zakariyya, who might
receive mercy from their God with regard to a personal petition. He is now discussing
mercy’s sovereign hold over the essences and attributes which receive it.
Mercy’s possession of everything ( al-rahma ... falaha ... al-islUa' c ala hull
shay ’)20 is reminiscent of terminology used in the chapter on Ibrahim:
[Ibrahim] finds that God is pervading him with respect to what he finds due to the perfection of the
Merciful possession of the corporeal and spiritual world and not with respect to what He really is in
relation to His Sublime Self.21
Mercy is connected to God’s possession of the world. God’s possession of the
world is merciful, and, with the present context in mind, this is with respect to
19 Al-NabulusT, Shark II. 216.
20 Al-NabulusT, Shark II, 216.
21 Al-NabulusI, Sharh, I, 144-5.
126
existentiation and support. In the chapter on Ibrahim, ‘possession’ was also equivalent
to ‘pervasion’ ( takhallul ). There were two aspects to that pervasion, one of which
was that creation is only existent through God’s existence, which pervades the forms
of creation.22
God’s possession of the world is equivalent to mercy’s unfettered control over
everything at the level of existence. Mercy is sovereign and so is God There is a
logic in al-NabulusT’s statements leading to the conclusion that God is mercy, and that,
at the level of existence, that is all that really matters:
Mercy has existential sovereignty over those who are recipients of mercy .... It [mercy] has
sovereignty over and possession of everything.23
The chapter on Ibrahim raised a number of issues pertinent to Zakariyya. Al-
NabulusI refers to God’s possession of the spiritual and corporeal worlds as being
merciful. This possession is also defined as being God’s dyeing all of creation, which
is in itself non-existent, in His existence.24 This establishes a coherence between the
merciful act of possession and dyeing everything in existence. Mercy is linked to
existence as well as to possession.
Furthermore, when dealing with Ibrahim, al-NabulusI strives to establish that,
although creation is existent through God’s existence, this does not mean that one or
the other was incarnated in the other or united with it The concepts of incarnation
22 Later in this chapter it shall be shown that the forms of creation are said to be the forms of the
manifestations of the divine names
23 Al-NabulusT, Sharh. II. 216.
24 Al-NabulusT, Sharh, i, 157, in the commentary on Ibrahim, states: ‘Every being ... is without its
own existence. Then the time for everything comes . . and it is dyed with the dye ( sibgha ) of the True
Existence’; and p. 158. ‘it is correct to assert the pouring forth of existence in one respect and it is not
127
and union are impossible in such a context, since what is non-existent cannot incarnate
itself in or unite itself with what is existent or vice versa:
Incarnation ( al-hulul) and union (al-ittihM) are not conceived of by those who believe that God has
the True Existence (al-wujud al-haqq) and that all the created things other than Him have no
existence from themselves. On the contrary their existence is through Him. There is no other existent
thing with Him in His rank. Although they are other than Him with regard to their forms ( suwariha)
and their determinations (< maqadoiha ), they are the same as Him with regard to their existence
(wujudiha) and their immutability ( thubutiha ). It is not thought that an existent thing ( mawjud) may
inhere in a non-existent thing (mcfdurn) nor that it unites with it, nor that a non-existent thing
(macdum) may inhere in an existent thing (mawjud) nor unite with it. Neither one mixes with the
other.25
Although it is impossible to conceive of an essentially non-existent creation
incarnating itself in or uniting itself with an essentially existent God or vice versa, there
is a hint of an existential identity between them.26 The chapter on Zakariyya develops
the thesis of an identity or equivalence between God and His creation from different
premises to those used in Ibrahim
The Metaphysics of God’s Mercy
With regard to Ibn cArabT, Ron Nettler argues that ‘the metaphysics of God’s
mercy is formulated through a transformation of the idea of God’s mercy found in the
correct [to assert this] in another respect. Since we assert the dyeing of non-existent possible things
with existence, we also assert the dyeing of existence with the non-existent possible things. ’
25 Al-NabulusT. Shark I, 146.
26 Falsafa and, to an extent. Kalsn maintained the absolute transcendence and unity of God while
preserving the distinction between essence and existence in all things other than God. Existence is
identical with essence for God only. God is essentially and eternally existent {qadori) whereas
everything other than Him is essentially non-existent and therefore only temporal ( muhdath ). God as
creator bestows existence on essences which are in a state of non-existence. Inasmuch as this
existence is identical with God’s essence, these non-existent essences of creation share in both God’s
existence and essence. However, constant efforts are made to state the essential non-existence of
creation and the essential existence of God. See Gardet, L. ‘Allah’, in El2 (Leiden: Brill. 1960), i,
406-417 (pp.411 & 415); Amaldez. R. ‘Falsafa’, in El2 (Leiden: Brill. 1965), n, 769-775 (pp.771-2);
Goodman, LE, Avicenna (London & New York: Routledge, 1992), pp.67, 70, 74, 76-7, 96; Goichon,
128
Qur’an.’27 That the opening words of the chapter on Zakariyya are a paraphrase of a
Qur’anic statement on the subject of God’s universal mercy is no surprise.28 This is
Qur’an 7: 156: ‘My mercy encompasses everything.’
Al-NabulusT does not allude to the original Qur’anic citation from which Ibn
cArabT’s paraphrase is drawn. He does not make reference to the ethical implications
of mercy in that original context. He launches straight into the technical vocabulary
specific to metaphysical issues. In this manner, the ethical is integrally related to, as
well as treated as subordinate to, the metaphysical.
Al-NabulusT establishes that mercy is one of God’s eternal attributes.29 He
explains what he understands by Ibn cArabT’s statement that mercy encompasses
everything in terms of ‘wujucf and ‘ hnkm\30
AM. ‘Ibn Sma’. in El2 (Leiden: Brill. 1971), III, 941-7: Frank. RM. ‘Hal’, in El2 Supplement (Leiden:
Brill, 1982), fascicules 5-6, 343-8 (p.346).
27 Nettler. ‘Ibn cArabi’s Conception’, p.214.
28 Nettler. ‘Ibn cArabi’s Conception', p.215 notes that the universalist conception of God’s mercy is
drawn from a Qur’anic context which is a mix of mercy’s univ ersal application with a more restrictive
notion, making God’s mercy available only to those who obey Him. He concludes that for Ibn cArabT
the restrictive and conditioned giving of divine mercy is here irrelevant, though perhaps not untrue.
However, the interest in the present analysis is what al-NabulusT makes of Ibn cArabT’s statements.
29 Al-NabulusT, Sharh. II, 216.
30 Ibn cArabT. Fususal-Hkam , i. 177. simply states that mercy encompasses everything in terms of
wujud and hukm, but he does not actually clarify what they mean. He implies by associating them
together that they indicate the same thing - the act and process of giving existence. Nettler, ‘Ibn
cArabi’s Conception’, pp.215-6, renders these terms into English as existence-giving nature’ and
‘ontological governance’ respectively. Frank, RM, Beings and their Attributes (Albany: SUNY Press,
1978), p.27 states: ‘The thing or “essence’Vthing itself is given to our knowing as being in some state
(cala halin, afatin ) by which it is known and distinguished through particular characteristics
( abk&n ).’ Frank, ‘Hal’, pp.345, 346 & 347 also refers to hukm ( abkam ) as characteristic(s) or
attribute(s). Frank’s understanding of hukm in the context of Muctazill Kalam appears relevant.
Nettler’s phrase ‘ontological governance’ may signify the determination of the
characteristics/attributes of a given thing whereas existence’ signifies the giving of existence. For the
rest of the chapter, I shall keep these terms in a transliterated form.
129
God’s mercy . . . encompasses every thing . . . in terms of wujud - that is, with respect to the existence
of that thing through it [mercy] - and in terms of hukm - that is, with respect to the hukm of that thing
as being either made an effect or made perfect, or being either a good or bad effect, or being in
possession of goodness or evil, or being stripped of them [effects].31
That which is made perfect may refer to God’s eternally pre-existent attributes
and names, while that which is made into an effect is God’s originated creation, which
by its difference to God and His attributes cannot be perfect.
This signifies that mercy brings everything into existence, whether in the
perfect realm of God or the imperfect realm of creation. God’s realm is composed of
His Essence, attributes, and names, whereas creation’s realm consists of the essences
of all created things.32 These created things are essentially non-existent and need
God’s existence in order to enter into a state of existence. God’s Essence is one, but
through the action of divine mercy it becomes internally plural through the existence of
the divine attributes and names.33 These eternal attributes and names are connected
with the non-existent essences which need God’s existence to become existent in the
world of multiplicity:
Since ev ery archetype (cayn), whether one of the archetypes of names ( al-acyan al-asma’iyya), which
are simply relations (nisab) and ranks (rutab) m the One Essence, or one of the archetypes of effect
(< al-acyan al-athariyya), which are the forms of the manifestations of those relations and ranks of the
names, has an existence, it [each type of archetype] demands its conditioned existence (wujuduh al-
muqayyad) from the presence of God’s absolute existence {wujud Allah al-mutiaq) which sustains
everything.34
And,
31 Al-Nabulusl. Sharh. II, 216-7.
32 Al-Nabulusl. Sharh . II, 217.
33 Ibn cArabT. Fususal-Hkam . i, 179-180. discusses the relationship between the Divine Essence and
its attributes and names. Al-NabulusT does this much earlier in his commentary, but in a more
sophisticated manner. He stresses the relationship between God as Divine Essence, attributes and
names and creation. In this he is significantly different from Ibn cArabT.
34 Al-NabulusT, Sharh II. 217.
130
And so God’s encompassing mercy is pervading all the originated beings ( al-akwan al-haditha )
through the attribute of subsistence of everything ( al-qayywniyya cala hull shov ’). Nothing has any
subsistence but through it [mercy]. [And mercy is pervading] all the essences even the Divine
Essence with respect to its appearance in the eternal archetypes of names {acyan al-asma’) and [mercy
is pervading] the archetypes (al-acyan) too, that is to say the archetypes of those essences which are
their names, whether they are eternally pre-existent ( qadona ) or originated ( haditha ).35
On one level, the above quotations reveal a fundamental difference between
what is God and what is creation in al-NabulusT’s thought - God and His attributes and
names are eternally pre-existent whereas creation is originated. However, there is an
ambiguity in al-NabulusT’s thought between the difference between God and His
creation and the all encompassing nature of God’s existence or mercy - equivalent to
the Divine Essence - which touches everything. This issue is less apparent in Ibn
cAjabT’s text.
Al-NabulusT explains what it means for every thing to be encompassed by
God’s mercy, drawing on a number of Qur’anic citations for support.36 He states:
God’s mercy . encompasses everything, be it eternally pre-existent (qadmt ) or originated ( hadith ).37
Everything is divided into two classes: the eternally pre-existent ( qadmn ) and
the originated (hadith). Al-NabulusT has proposed that God determines everything to
be either made perfect or to be made an effect, which, in turn, is divided into a number
35 Al-Nabulusl. Sharh. II, 220.
36 Qur’an 17:110, 4:126, and 20:5.
37 Al-NabulusT, Sharh. II, 216.
131
of sub-species. It is difficult not to equate, tentatively, eternally pre-existent with
being made perfect and originated with being made an effect 38
Al-NabulusT’s first reference to what is eternally pre-existent ( qadmt ) comes
immediately after Ibn cArabT’s initial statement that God’s mercy encompasses every
thing.39 Al-NabulusT gives a description of what it means for mercy to encompass all
things:
Its [mercy’s] encompassing of the eternally pre-existent is its [mercy's] being characterised by it [the
eternally pre-existent]. Thus, it [mercy] is attributed with all the divine attributes. Consequently, it
[mercy] is encompassing all that. The name [that is derived] from it [mercy] is gathering together all
the names. So, it [the name] is encompassing them [all the names]. God said ‘Say: call upon God or
call upon the Merciful One. Whichever you call, that possesses the beautiful names’ [Qur’an
17:110]. 40
Mercy, through its existential and determinative encompassment of the
eternally pre-existent, is associated with all the divine attributes.41 They are all
38 Department of Theology. A Commentary of Theology Expression (Mashhad: Islamic Research
Foundation, 1995), pp.267-8, covers the development and use of the term qadmt. A common
definition is that it refers to that the existence of which is necessarily existent and which is not
preceded by anything else at all, whether existent or non-existent. It is said that the Muctazila used it
to refer to God and nothing else. The Ashcarites used it to refer to God and His attributes. The
philosophers used it to refer to God and the world in its entirety and also to that the existence of
which is not connected to anything else. Furthermore, the mutakallimun referred to that which is
hadith as being something the existence of which has a beginning and which is preceded by non¬
existence. That which is qadmt is its opposite. On pp. 1 1 1-2, this same work follows the development
and use of the term hadith. The definitions are consistent. These are that this term refers to
something that was non-existent and then became existent or something that was not and then was.
Al-HujwTrT, Kashf al-Mabj ub , trans. by RA Nicholson (Leiden: Brill, 1911). p.386 states that qadnn is
being anterior in existence, that is to say, something always was, and its being was anterior to all
beings. This is nothing but God. Frank, Hal’, p.346 states that God is qadnn or eternal and that
everything else is temporally existent or muhdath. Al-NabulusI is stating here that God’s mercy
encompasses God and His attributes as well as creation. God and His attributes are perfect in their
being qadmt , while creation is imperfect in its being hadith.
39 Ibn cArabI, Fususal-Hkam , I, 177.
40 Al-NabulusI, Sharh. u, 216.
41 Like Ibn cArabI, al-N3bulusT stresses the paramount of mercy over all other attributes of God.
This simple idea emerges out of early Sufism’s stress on the love and mercy of God. See the second
half of this chapter. However, out of the simple idea of God’s overriding love and mercy for creation
comes the complex interplay of metaphysical and ethical concepts of mercy, existence and creation.
132
attributed to mercy.42 The divine name ‘the Merciful’ (< al-rahman ) holds an identical
rank with respect to all the other divine names All these divine names denote ‘the
Merciful.’ Furthermore, the name ‘the Merciful’ is on a par with the name ‘Allah ’ It
appears that the eternally pre-existent consists of the Divine Essence, attributes, and
names.
Al-NabulusI strengthens this argument with two versions of a hadnh
concerning God’s division of mercy into one hundred parts God kept ninety-nine of
these with Him and let one part descend to earth where creation is merciful owing to
this piece of mercy:
Abu Huraira relates on the authority of the Prophet that he said that God made mercy into one
hundred parts. He kept for Himself ninety-nine parts and let one part descend to earth. And so with
that [one part of mercy ] creation is merciful to itself so that even the mare raises its hoof from its foal
for fear that it might trample it. A1 -Hasan’ s account is that God has one hundred mercies, of which
He let one descend to the inhabitants of earth. And so it encompassed them until the time of then-
death God will return that mercy on the Day of Judgement to the ninety-nine. He will perfect them
into one hundred mercies for His friends and for the people who obey Him.43
AJ-Nabulusi interprets this hadnh
Mercy was divided into one hundred parts, which are the ninety-nine divine names and the one-
hundredth part is the name of the essence which gathers them all together.44
Every divine name is one part of mercy and so denotes that mercy. The pivotal
and central function of mercy and of the name derived from it, ‘the Merciful,’ is
stressed. Mercy encompasses the eternally pre-existent, thereby bringing it into
42 Al-NabulusI. Sharh. H, 217, when describing wrath’s relationship to mercy, he uses grammatical
terminology to make his point that the attribute of wrath is attributed to mercy. See the next
discussion concerning the hadnh on the hundred parts of mercy.
43 Al-NabulusI, Sharh. n, 217. Variations of this hadnh can be found in al-Bukhari 8:29 (related by
Aba Huraira), Muslim 663 1 (related by Abu Huraira), and Muslim 6632 (related by Salman al-FarisT).
44 Al-NabulusI, Sharh. II, 217.
133
existence and determining it. In doing this, mercy is itself attributed with all the divine
attributes and the name derived from it is denoted by all the other divine names Al-
NabulusT is more explicit when explaining the relationship of wrath to mercy. He uses
grammatical terms:
Wrath comes after it [mercy] in the way that the attribute comes after the noun which has an attribute,
and [also] in the way that the noun comes after what is denoted.45
From al-NabulusT’s use of Qur’an 17: 1 10 and from his statements about the
relationship between mercy and the other divine attributes, a dominant theme emerges.
Mercy is an attribute indicated by all the other attributes and that the name derived
from it, ‘the Merciful,’ is indicated by all the other names. All these other attributes
and names depend on mercy for their existence and determination.46 Thus, whereas on
the ethical plane, the attribute of wrath is the polar opposite of mercy, on this
metaphysical plane, wrath is dependent on mercy for its existence and determination.47
Mercy is the existential and determinative principle of God’s divine attributes
and of the ninety-nine divine names This mercy has unfettered sovereign control over
and possession of everything that it encompasses. All the other attributes and names
denote this sovereign by their being subject to it. Al-NabulusT quotes Qur’an 20:5
45 Al-Nabulusi. Sharh. n. 217.
46 It has to be acknowledged that Ibn cArabr is also arguing that all the other attributes and names of
God depend on mercy for their existence and determination. Nettler, ‘Ibn cArabi's Conception’,
p.225 states that ‘in the same manner as God’s mercy in its metaphysical mode is absolute being, so
too are all the other divine names and attributes absolute being in their reduction to the one divine
essence which is coterminous with mercy. ’ Al-NabulusI agrees with this, but attempts to highlight the
differences between God as essence and God as attributes from the perspective of mankind, which is
the only perspective that appears to really matter. Equally, al-N5bulusT stresses the differences
between the Divine Essence, attributes and names and the realm of creation.
47 This is an interesting development from the early Sufi position that God’s mercy was paramount.
For the early Sufis, mercy was the opposite of wTath, but they held that God was inclined to be more
merciful than wrathful. However, for both Ibn cArabI and al-NabulusI, God’s wrath is dependent on
134
which develops this sovereign image of mercy: ‘The Merciful One upon the throne has
sat down. ,48
Alluding to Qur’an 20:5, he states:
His [God’s] mercv, with which He is sitting down upon the throne, has preceded all His attributes and
49
names.
Only the concept of the Divine Essence precedes all the divine attributes and
names. The logic of al-NabulusT’s statements leads to the conclusion that the Divine
Essence and mercy share metaphysical functions.50 He has stated that the divine name
‘the Merciful’ gathers together and encompasses all the other divine names. He has
also cited Qur’an 17: 1 10 which suggests that both the divine name ‘Allah’ and the
name ‘the Merciful’ possess all the other divine names. He takes this further:
Mercy has taken the place of the Essence, which gathers [all] together, for the divine attributes and
names.51
The Essence gathers all together and the name ‘the Merciful’ also gathers
together all the other divine names Al-NabulusT establishes a functional
correspondence, or even identification, between the Essence or God and the attribute
of mercy:
He [God] is the merciful one ( al-rahim ), that is to say He is characterised by mercy (al-rabnia), the
merciful one is only merciful through the inherence ( qiyam ) of the attribute of mercy in him .... So, it
His mercy. Thus, even God’s wrath is an aspect of His mercy! See the second half of this chapter for
a discussion of pre-Ibn cArabT Sufism.
48 Al-Nabulusl. Shark n, 216.
49 Al-Nabulusl, Shark II, 217.
50 Nettler. ‘Ibn cArabi’s Conception’, p.219 states that Ibn cArabI made the Sufi universalisation of
God’s mercy synonymous with existence and thereby with God Himself.
51 Al-NabulusT, Shark n, 217.
135
is affirmed in accordance with His being merciful that He [God] is the same as the encompassing
mercy.52
This is consistent with the metaphorical imagery with which he has described
the attribute of mercy. This imagery is used in the Qur’an to describe God in His most
powerful and sovereign aspects. Al-NabulusT is supporting his views with Qur’anic
citations.
It is possible to visualise a hierarchy where there is mercy on the throne above
all else. This mercy brings everything else, whether eternally pre-existent (perfected)
or originated (made an effect), into existence. Al-Nabulusl is arguing that mercy is
functionally equivalent to the Divine Essence. He states, on the basis of Qur’an
17:1 10, that the divine name ‘the Merciful’ (rahman) is equivalent to the divine name
‘ Allah'. All the other divine names denote either of these names. He also argues that
the ‘effects’ of these divine names are their ‘forms’ which are manifested as creation.
In this manner, there is a kind of emanational hierarchy flooding from the fount of
mercy, which provides the hierarchy’s existence and ontological determination. This
metaphor of emanation blurs the boundaries between what is apparently eternally pre¬
existent or perfected and what is apparently originated and effected, that is to say
imperfect.53
52 Al-Nabulusl. Sharh. II, 224.
53 See the chapter on Harfln. where al-Nabulusl understands Ibn cArabi’s idea that God is seen to
appear as everything else as indicating that God as existence is the same as everything else. God and
creation are said to be one on the level of existence only. It is implied that God and creation are
essentially different. God’s essence is utterly one and unknown God’s attributes and names are
known to creation. These are the nexus between God and creation. The forms of creation are the
manifestations of these names and attributes. See also the chapter on IbrahTm which examines the
relationship between man’s knowledge and the Divine Essence.
136
In the chapter on Ibrahim al-Nabulusi argued:
We are the ones who through our possibility have differentiated His Essence's ijmal and have
distinguished between His Essence, attributes, names, deeds and ahkam so that we have manifested
through our non-existent possible realities and essences His divinity' and lordship. 54
This was a statement professing that it was the originated creation that made
God known or differentiated This entailed the differentiation of the sublime unknown
Essence into the various ranks or ‘planes of being’ ( al-badarat ) which constitute
God’s divinity. From His Essence came His attributes, from His attributes came His
names, and from His names came His determinations (< ahkamuh ).55 This suggests that
there is a link between the names of God and His determinations which is the same as
the link between His names and His effects. This supports the contention that an
emanational metaphor is being employed by al-Nabulusi This metaphor is
strengthening the theme of the blurring of distinctions between God and His creation.56
Al-NabulusT makes a direct correspondence between God’s mercy and its
relationship with the divine attributes and names and God’s Essence and its
relationship with its modes {ahwat) 51 The Essence and mercy are both in a
54 Al-Nabulusi. Sharh. I. 149. See the footnote above concerning hukmlabkam.
55 The term bukml ahkam used in the present context appears to indicate the classifying of everything
other than the Essence or God into what is made perfect or what is made an effect, that is to say,
establishing their characteristics. See the footnote above concerning this term.
56 This is an example of the ambiguity in al-Nabulusf s writings between his attempt to establish
strong distinctions between God and creation and the implications in his writing of the blurring of
these distinctions.
57 Al-NabulusT. Sharh. II. 217. Department of Theology. A Commentary, p. 1 13, covers the
development and use of the term hal. It states consistently that this term indicates an attribute (afa).
which is neither existent nor non-existent, of an existent thing. Another definition of it is that it is a
medium between what is existent and what is non-existent. Al-NabulusT, Sharh, n, p.223, follows Ibn
cArabT in saying that ‘the modes associated with the divine names are neither existent nor non¬
existent in themselves or in other things because they are relations (nisab) of the Absolute True
137
relationship of priority with things that characterise them and denote them. These are
either attributes and names or modes.58 This establishes a positional correspondence
between the Essence and mercy. The earlier functional correspondence is supported
by this. Al-NabulusT is not stating that there is an identity between these two concepts,
but his statements are developing a strong theme of correspondence that appears to
indicate an aspect of equivalence.
Ibn cArabT describes mercy’s relationship to wrath:
The existence of wrath is from the mercy of God for WTath. So. His [God's] mercy precedes His
wTath. that is to say. the relation of mercy to Him precedes that of wrath to Him.59
This introduces a new dimension. According to Ibn cArabT, the attributes of
God all have relations {nisab) to God. Some of these have precedence over others.
Mercy logically precedes all others, since it brings them all into existence and
Existence. ' Wolfson, HA The Philosophy of the Kalam (Cambridge and London: HUP, 1976),
pp.167, 172-4, 180. 204, 216-7 also discusses modes ( ahwaT ). He states that Abu'l-Hudhayl in the 9th
century argued that terms predicated of God were aspects of the essence and that these aspects were
the same as Abu Hashim’s modes (ahwat) in the 10th century. Abu Hashim developed a theory7 of
modes and applied it to the problem of the divine attributes. These modes were said to be neither
existent nor non-existent and neither cognisable nor incognisable. Although, Ashcari. as an orthodox
attributist, was anti-modes, a modalist Ashcarite trend emerged. This became a moderate orthodox
view, which held that it was possible for men to believe in modes and universal concepts which are
neither existent nor non-existent, neither known nor not known, neither created nor uncreated neither
beginningless nor originated and neither real nor unreal. This moderate orthodox view that modes
were attributes had thus developed out of a moderate Muctazilite view. Indeed Ibn Khaldun believed
that belief in modes was a common characteristic of Kalam. See also, Frank, ‘Hal’, pp.343, 345, 347,
& 347; Gardet, ‘Allah’, p.411; and Frank, Beings, pp. 19, 23, & 26.
58 Al-NabulusT, Sharh. n. 223, states that there are modes related to the divine names, ‘which are
relations (nisab) of that absolute true existence (God) They are also matters inhering in the mind of
those that think about them, but they have no extra sense, although they may have an extra sense in
the mind of those that think about them. Thus, JamI said in his Risala, “The Sufis believe that God’s
attributes are the same as His essence according to existence, yet other than it according to the
mind.’” Clearly these nisab are the same as modes and attributes. Al-NabulusT adds on p.224 that
philosophers ( hukama al-falsafa) hold that the attributes are the same as the essence in the sense that
there is not an essence and attributes, rather a single essence. If God is powerful with the essence,
then the essence is the same as what is called power, but there is no rank ( rutba ) there nor any
relation ( nisba ) at all. Al-NabulusT states that in terms of reason and revelation this view is false.
138
determines them. Ibn cArabT suggests that every archetype or essence (cayn) demands
an existence from God and so God’s mercy encompasses every archetype.60 It follows
that the attributes, such as wrath and mercy as well as everything else, have
archetypes. It is these that demand existence and God brings them all into existence
through His mercy
These relations seem to indicate something different for al-NabulusT. He has
stated that wrath’s relation to God comes after mercy’s. ‘Relation’ ( nisba ) seems to
indicate attribute or mode for him.61 He has already argued that through its existential
and determinative encompassment of the eternally pre-existent, mercy is associated
with all the other divine attributes.62 They are all attributed to mercy. The implication
of this is that mercy is a ‘substantive’ qualified by an attribute and that wrath is that
attribute:
Wrath comes after it [mercy] as the attribute ( al-afa ) comes after the noun having an attribute (al-
mcn\>suf) and [as] the noun ( al-ism ) comes after the meaning ( al-musamma ).63
This is a different point to that made by Ibn cArabT, who appears to be saying
that mercy’s relation to God comes before wrath’s. Al-NabulusT is arguing that all the
divine attributes are associated with God through divine mercy He suggests that these
‘relations’ are not just connections between attributes or their archetypes and God:
Since every archetype, whether one of the archetypes of names, which are simply relations (nisab) and
ranks (rutab) in the unitary essence, or one of the archetypes of effect, which are the forms of the
manifestations of those relations and ranks of the names, has an existence.64
59 Ibn cArabI, Fususal-Hkam , I. 177.
60 Ibn cArabI, Fususal-Hkam . I. 177.
61 Al-NabulusT, Sharh. II, 223.
62 Al-NabulusT. Sharh , n. 216.
63 Al-NabulusT. Sharh. II. 217.
64 Al-NabulusT. Sharh. II, 217.
139
The names of God are archetypes which are relations and ranks in the unitary
Essence of God. God is one, but with internal relations and ranks which are the
archetypes of His names. These names are in turn derived from His attributes which
also indicate His unitary Essence. These divine names, now viewed as internal
relations and ranks, are eternally pre-existent. Al-NabulusT has also argued that these
relations are the same as attributes and modes Thus, God’s names are the modes or
attributes in the unitary Divine Essence 65
These divine names, viewed as relations, throw light on the discussion of
mercy’s relation to God vis-a-vis wrath’s relation. Both Ibn cArabT and al-NabulusT
agree that mercy’s relation to God precedes wrath’s relation. If that relation (nisba) is
defined as the divine name derived from a given attribute, then that signifies that the
divine name The Merciful’ precedes the divine name ‘the Wrathful’. When this is seen
in the context of mercy being the substantive denoted by the attribute ‘wrath’, this
emphasises the dependency of all divine names and attributes on the merciful one and
on ‘mercy.’ Not only do mercy and the merciful one come before all else, everything
else, except for God and the Divine Essence, follow and depend on mercy and the
merciful one.
Al-NabulusT states:
65 Wolfson. The Philosophy, pp. 173-4. shows that Abu Hashim proposed that all the various modes
predicated of God stemmed from one single mode and that God's essence has a mode necessarily
causing another. Clearly, both Ibn cArabI and al-NabulusT are proposing that God’s essence has a
mode/attribute called mercy which causes all the other modes/attributes to exist. However, they
suggest that God’s essence is His mercy. For further information concerning modes/states, see:
Frank, ‘Hal’, pp.343-348; Frank, Beings, pp 19, 23, & 26; & Gardet, Allah’, p.411.
140
The archetypes of effect {al-ayan al-athariyya) ... are the forms of the manifestations of those
relations and ranks of the names ( al-nisab wa ’l-rutab al-asma’iyya)66
This provides a key link to the realm of the originated creation (al-hadith).
This also supports the emanational system of appearance from or within the unitary
essence. There is the One Essence or mercy at the head of a hierarchy. Within this are
the archetypes of the divine names. These demand their existence. The Essence or
mercy gives them their existence and these archetypes appear as divine names. These
names appear in forms through the archetypes of the effects, which, in turn, demand
their own existence. This is granted to them by mercy which encompasses and
existentiates them through those names These effects are originated and constitute
creation.67 Mercy also determines them to be effects, by which they are made to be
imperfect in contrast to the perfection of the divine names. These effects are thereby
related to relative dichotomous values such as good and evil.68
All forms in the phenomenal temporal world are connected essentially with the
divine names in the eternal and perfect world of the Divine Essence.69 Al-NabulusT
supports this with the hadnh concerning mercy being divided into one hundred parts:
66 Al-Nabulusl. Sharp , 11, 217.
67 The chapter on Ibrahim examines al-NabulusI s understanding of God's pervasion of Ibrahim on
the level of existence. God nourishes Ibrahim with existence, thereby bringing him into existence.
On the other hand, Ibrahim nourishes God with knowledge, thereby making God known as God.
68 Al-Nabulusl, Sharp, II, 217.
69 Nettler, ‘Ibn cArabi's Conception’, pp.223-5. argues that if. for Ibn cArabI, God is mercy and
mercy, redefined as absolute existence, is all creation, then creation is identified with God.
Furthermore, Ibn cArabI acknowledges the notion that all the divine names indicate one essence. It is
mercy which represents, subsumes and absorbs all the other attributes, just as all being, including
God, is reduced to mercy. Thus, all the divine names and attributes are reduced to the one Divine
Essence which is the same as mercy. He also hints at the fact that the names of God are all modally
inhering in creation, thus establishing a nexus between creation and the one Divine Essence through
the universal application of mercy
141
It was recounted that mercy was divided into one hundred parts, which are the ninety -nine divine
names and the one-hundredth part is the name of the Essence that gathers them all together, and that
the one part of them [the 100 parts] was in the world. This was the name which gathers [them all
together] and is of the Essence and is appearing in ev ery thing. 0
And in the chapter on Muhammad al-NabulusT states:
[The world] is the effects of His different beautiful names which are His form. So. all the meanings
(musammayat) of those names have appeared in the w orld.71
Not only are the divine names reflected in the world of originated things
through their forms which are the archetypes of effects, but the Divine Essence itself or
the main part of mercy is also present in every thing in the world. This statement
highlights the blurring of the boundaries between the eternally pre-existent and the
originated, or between God and His creation. This blurring is undeniable, yet al-
NabulusT maintains distinctions such as the fact that the originated effects of the names
are forms which nothing eternally pre-existent can actually be:
There is no doubt that the eternally pre-existent divine names ( al-asma ’ al-qadma ) are of the totality
of things because they are simply relations ( nisab ), regards ( i'tibaral ) and additions ( idafat ) between
God’s Essence and the archetypes of being ( al-acyan al-kawnivya), which are immutable in their
original non-existence, that He has originated before their existence. If those immutable archetypes
acquire the attribute of existence from those essential relations, the addition is from the Divine
Essence through those relations. Those above-mentioned relations appear not to be originated
{ tuhdath ) because they are eternally pre-existent ( qadma ) with the eternal pre-existence ( qidam ) of
the Divine Essence since they are relations, regards and additions of the Essence.72
And in the chapter on Muhammad he states:
God in [His] Essence, that is to say with respect to His being without a locus of manifestation
(i mazhar ), which is one of the effects (athar) of His names, in which to manifest Himself to His gnostic
servants, is in no need of the worlds and so has no appearance from this essential aspect.73
70 Al-NabulusT. Sharb, ii, 217.
71 Al-NabulusT, Sharb , n, 326.
72 Al-NabulusT, Sharb . n, 217-8.
73 Al-NabulusT, Sharb, II, 317.
142
The Essence, its attributes and divine names are all eternally pre-existent
(< qadlm ). They are without form They are all brought into existence and determined
through mercy which is the same as the Divine Essence. Everything, including the
Divine Essence, is existent through mercy. Thus al-NabulusT amplifies Ibn cArabI’s
remarks:
God is the Merciful one ( al-rakm ), that is to say characterised with mercy. The Merciful one is only
merciful through the inherence of the attribute of mercy in Him so that if He is merciful with it to
something else. He makes it appear in that thing. Thus, He is merciful with mercy to mercy. It was
stated earlier that the first thing to receive mercy was mercy. So, it is confirmed by the necessity of
God's being merciful that He is the same as mercy which encompasses everything.74
The logic of this statement is that whatever receives mercy, whether the Divine
Essence or the divine attributes and names, becomes, on one level, the same as mercy
For al-NabulusT, Qur’an 17: 1 10 is the support for proposing that mercy is
characterised by all the divine attributes and that the divine names are gathered
together by the divine name ‘the Merciful.’ Inasmuch as mercy has encompassed and
thereby brought them into existence, they have all received mercy and as such are
mercy. Furthermore, al-NabulusT states:
A single essence, which is the Divine Essence and Absolute Existence, which permeates without
permeation all the attributes associated with names and being. This essence is the same as
everything.75
The attributes and names appear to be the Essence, since the Essence is mercy
and they have received that mercy.
74 Al-NabulusT, Shark n, 224.
75 Al-NabulusT. Shark n, 217.
143
Through the logic of the emanational system, all the effects or forms of the
divine names, or created originated things, all indicate mercy and thereby are mercy.
Furthermore, it is not a huge leap from this position to argue that created things also
indicate the Divine Essence and therefore ‘are’ the Divine Essence. Al-NabulusT does
argue that the One, Essential part of mercy is in this originated world.
However, in no way can it be argued that al-NabulusT’s position is that the
Divine Essence has a form which is either sensory, intelligible, or imaginary.76 These
are characteristics of the ‘formed’ (musawwar) originated things of creation. Al-
NabulusT explains what it means for God’s mercy to encompass the originated.
Its [mercy ’s] encompassment of the originated, whether it be sensory, intelligible, or imaginary, is
because it [mercy] has the encompassment of all archetypes. As God said, ‘And God is all things
encompassing’ [Qur’an 4: 126], [Encompassing ( jnuhTt )] the thing is encompassing {wasi*) it. God
only encompasses through the attribute of mercy which is sitting on the throne, which is gathering
together every thing through the name which is derived from it [mercy]. This is the name ‘the
Merciful. ’ All the names follow it [the name ‘the Merciful’] in accordance with the previous verse
[Qur’an 17: 1 10], God said. The Merciful upon the throne is sitting’ [Qur’an 20:5]. Every name
encompasses its effect through mercy from which it has turned. Thus, mercy is the thing that is
encompassing ( al-muhlta ). and so it is the thing that is encompassing ( al-wasica ) everything.77
Al-NabulusT’ s point is that God’s mercy encompasses the originated because
the Qur’an states that God encompasses everything. This implies that God’s mercy is
identical with God.78 Two Arabic words for ‘encompassing’ are used. Al-NabulusT
76 In the chapter on Ibrahim, in the context of a discussion on the reciprocity of nourishment, al-
NabulusI, Shari, i, 158-9, states, ‘we can also state that there is the dyeing of existence with non¬
existent possible things .... And the non-existent possible thing’s being food for existence is sound
too because it [existence] is ‘formed’ ( musawwar ) and shaped ( mushakkal) by them. And so it has
appeared in forms and shapes to the senses and the intellect. But it is in itself pure existence utterly
transcendent from that. ’
77 Al-N5bulusl, Sharh , u, 216.
78 It was noted above that al-NSbulus! establishes a functional correspondence, or even identification,
between the Divine Essence and the divine attribute of mercy.
144
equates them to provide coherence between the various Qur’anic citations and within
his own writings. God’s mercy encompasses ( wasfat ) everything (Qur’an 7: 156) and
God is encompassing ( mu hit ) everything (Qur’an 4: 126). For al-NabulusT these verbs
denote the same action.
Mercy encompasses everything: all archetypes (cfyati). There are two types of
archetypes - those related to the divine names and those related to the effects of those
names. These effects are the originated things of creation. These effects are forms
which are either sensory, intelligible, or imaginary. Mercy encompasses them all,
bringing them all into existence, and determining them all to be effects, whether good
or bad. The existence that is imparted to the names and effects is absolute and sustains
them both:
Every archetype [those related to names and those related to effects] demands a conditioned existence
from the ‘plane’ ( ha&a ) of God’s absolute existence which sustains everything.79
The names are sustained through mercy’s being characterised by them and the
effects are sustained through mercy’s causing an effect.80
If mercy or the Divine Essence is characterised by all the divine names which it
brings into existence, then that same mercy may also be characterised by the effects of
those names which it also brings into existence, but through those names. It may be
inferred that mercy’s being characterised by the eternally pre-existent names does not
infringe mercy’s own pre-existent state. Mercy is equivalent to the Essence and its
relationship to the names is the same as the Essence’s to the divine names. The names
are internal relations and ranks in the One Essence and are also parts of mercy.
79 Al-NabulusT, Sharh , II, 217.
145
However, mercy is also characterised by the originated effects, which are the
forms of the manifestations of the eternally pre-existent names. This seems to blur the
distinction between the eternally pre-existent and the originated, either elevating the
originated to the status of the eternally pre-existent, or relegating the eternally pre¬
existent to the status of the originated.
Al-NabulusT is suggesting the inclusion of the eternally pre-existent in the
world of the originated. Reference has already been made to the hadnh that he uses to
explain the ninety-nine names being derived from mercy, thereby suggesting that they
are mercy and yet different from it. The hundredth part was said to be the Divine
Essence which gathers all the other names together. This one part is in the world. It is
through this one part that the originated world of the archetypes of being or effect are
brought into existence. However, in the same way that the divine names are mercy by
virtue of their being brought into existence by it, likewise, the originated world is also
mercy.
Al-NabulusT uses this hadnh to refer to the ethical dimensions of mercy. This
one part of mercy, the part signifying the Divine Essence, is not just in the world as an
existentiating force. It is through this mercy that the world of originated things is able
to be merciful:
It [100th part of mercy] was the name which gathers [them all together] and is of the Essence and is
appearing in every thing, by which name the beast raises its hoof from its offspring out of compassion
and mercy for it lest it trample it.81
80 Al-NabulusT. Shark n, 216.
81 Al-N§bulusl, Shark II, 217.
146
At one level, this can be interpreted to be another dimension of the
metaphysical argument concerning the concept of mercy, where mercy is the
connecting link between all the rungs in the existential ladder of ‘reality. ’ It must be
stressed though that al-NabulusT does emphasise both the existential oneness of the
Divine Essence and its utter difference from anything known by creation.
There is also the level at which one can interpret the hadlth about mercy in
ethical terms. Al-NabulusT recognises this, but comments on it ambiguously. Whereas
the hundredth part of mercy, the essential part, is manifested in everything, the ninety-
nine other parts, the divine names, are only differentiated on the Day of Resurrection.82
Just the mere reference to the Day of Resurrection in the context of a discussion of
mercy, is indicative of ethical issues He states:
And so God will be merciful with them [the ninety-nine parts of mercy] to His serv ants The scale
will be built on justice and no soul shall be dealt with unjustly at all owing to the appearance of divine
justice on that Day.83 And the gnostics shall be transformed by all the parts [of mercy].84
This statement combines ethical with metaphysical themes: both justice and
mercy are stressed. Although His servants are to be judged, God will be merciful to
them. It is uncertain whether this mercy is ethical or metaphysical, or both
Furthermore, the mystics will be pervaded and transformed by the totality of the one
hundred parts of mercy which are all the divine names, thus becoming mercy, and
possibly the Divine Essence, in the next life.
82 Al-NSbulusI, Sharh, II, 217.
83 This is an allusion to Qur’an 21:47.
84 Al-Nabulusl. Sharh , II. 217.
147
The Ethical Implications of Divine Metaphysical Mercy
Like Ibn cArabT, al-NabulusT transforms a personal and pietistic story about
Zakariyya into a metaphysical one. However, al-NabulusT refers to the ethical more
than Ibn cArabT. In order to appreciate al-NabulusT’ s and Ibn cArabT’s understanding
of mercy - whether seen as ethical, metaphysical, or both - more fully, a brief survey of
pre-Ibn cArabI Sufism and Islam will provide a useful context.
Islam, when viewed from a purely Qur’anic perspective, is certainly, from one
point of view, an essentially ethical religion Man’s existence in this world ( al-dunya )
is to be appreciated as a preparation, or a test, for life in the next {al-akhirah). Man’s
existence rests on the pivot of the Day of Judgement, whose importance in the Qur’an
is unassailable. Fazlur Rahman argues:
Chronologically, the first belief that the Qur’an inculcated after monotheism and socio-economic
justice was that of judgment or final accountability. . . . There must, therefore, be a moral reckoning
w here dire punishment awaits the non-believers and the evildoers while immense recompense will be
bestowed on the righteous.85
W. Montgomery Watt and Richard Bell agree with Rahman:
After the doctrine that God is one the doctrine of the Last Judgement may be reckoned the second
great doctrine of the Qur’an. In essentials this is the doctrine that on the Last Day men will be raised
to life and will appear before God to be judged and to be assigned to Paradise or Hell according as
their deeds are mainly good or mainly bad.86
Daud Rahbar stresses that the meaning of the Qur’an to the Prophet and the
people around him, within their historical context was that of God’s strict justice of the
85 Rahman, Islam , p. 15.
86 Watt. WM & Bell. R, Introduction to the Qur an (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994),
p.158.
148
Judgement Day. He argues therefore that this was the dominant note of the Qur’an’s
doctrine of Allah:
The idea of God as the Essence, which characterises the anti-anthropomorphic theology of Islam, has
obscured the dominant note of the Qur an, the idea of God's justice.87
Toshihiko Izutsu has elaborated his understanding of Islamic ethics as
described in the Qur’an in two invaluable works.88 He argues that Islam is essentially
ethical and that the ethical relationship between man and God is grounded in two basic
concepts: absolute trust in God and pious fear of God.89 Furthermore, he states that
the ethico-religious system of the Qur’an is based on the conception of eschatology:
The structure of the ethics of the present world is determined by the ultimate (eschatological) and to
which the present world ( al-dunya) is destined.90
Pre-Ibn c Arab T Sufism
In the 8th and 9th centuries mysticism flowered among Muslims.91 This evolved
from earlier ascetic tendencies which had been a reaction to the secularisation,
materialism and dissensions of Umayyad times.92 The early Mystics were characterised
by retired lives, voluntary poverty and their meditation on the Qur’an and names of
87 Rahbar. D, God of Justice - A Study in the Ethical Doctrine of the Qur 'an (Leiden: Brill. 1960).
p.xill.
88 Izutsu, T, Ethi co-Re ligious Concepts in the Qur an (Montreal: McGill University Press. 1966) and
God and Man in the Koran - Semantics of the Koranic Weltanschauung (Tokyo: Keio Institute of
Cultural and Linguistic Studies, 1964).
89 Izutsu, Ethi co-Re ligious, pp.vn & 17-8.
90 Izutsu, Ethico-Religious, p. 108.
91 Hodgson, MGS. The Venture of Islam - Conscience and History in a World Civilisation. 3 vols
(Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1974), i, p.394.
92 Massignon. L, [Radtke, B] Tasawwuf - 1 . Early Development in the Arabic and Persian Lands', in
El2 (Leiden: Brill. 1998), X, 313-317 (p.313); Smith, M, Studies in Early Mysticism in the Near and
Middle East (London: The Sheldon Press, 1931). pp.154, 157, 167.
149
God in order to draw near to God 93 Early Sufism developed out of the spirit of
Qur’anic piety that had flowed into the lives and modes of expression of the early
devotees and ascetics. Their aim was to attain ethical perception and, as such, J.
Spencer Trimingham states that:
Early Sufism was a natural expression of personal religion in relation to the expression of religion as
a communal matter.94
Annemarie Schimmel, who admits that little is known of the earliest ascetic
tendencies in Islam, examines the poetry of a number of early mystics and states that
such writings show not only variety of expression but an increasing profundity of
thought as the mystical experience is refined 95
Ron Nettler echoes this when he states that, ‘the God-Man relationship was
understood by most sufis in more personal and pietistic terms. Mercy, God’s most
prominent characteristic for them, was the gift of a loving God to His beloved
creatures. The depth of mystical experience often both confirmed and made possible
this truth. ,96
The mystics of the 9th century strove to procure a coherent foundation of their
theory and practice.97 Sufism attempted to follow the lines of Orthodox Islam in its
emphasis on devotion to the religious practices of Islam with the addition of various
93 Massignon. L, ‘Tasawwuf, in El (Leiden. Brill. 1934), iv, 681-5 (pp 682-3); Hodgson. The
Venture, I, p.395.
94 Trimingham, JS, The Sufi Orders in Islam (New York & Oxford: OUP. 1998). p.2
95 Schimmel, A. Mystical Dimensions of Islam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
1975), p.33.
96 Nettler, Ibn cArabi’s Conception’, p.2 18.
97 Massignon, L, [Radtke, B] ‘Tasawwuf , p.314.
150
works of supererogation.98 Moderate Sufism was never ‘excommunicated’ by Sunni
Islam.99
In the 9th century Sufis entered upon a course of conflict with ordinary
believers and provoked the learned in society with claims to be a chosen elite. 100 In
effect, some Sufis fell into conflict with the Sharia.101 From the ninth century onwards
Sufis were to suffer denunciations, charges of heresy or accusations of unbelief. 102
However, some of these cases were not between Sufis and their non-Sufi opponents:
some were an intra-Sufi affair which involved the authorities of the day in their
quarrels. 103
Ibn cArabf
Izutsu, in his tour de force on Ibn cArabT’s thought, describes what Ibn cArabT
had done to the ordinary understanding of mercy:
In the ordinary understanding rahmah [mercy] denotes an essentially emotive attitude, the attitude of
compassion, kindly forebea ranee, pity, benevolence, etc. But for Ibn cArabT. rahmah is rather an
ontological fact. For him, rahmah is primarily the act of making things exist, giving existence to
them. It is bestowal of existence, with, of course, an overtone of a subjective, emotive attitude on the
part of the one who does so.104
Nettler argues that Ibn cArabT disrupted conventional doctrinal stipulations with
regard to the centrality of divine mercy further than what had preceded with a shift to
the metaphysical realm:
98 Smith. Studies , p. 169.
"Massignon, ‘Tasawwuf, pp.682-3.
100 Bdwering, G. ‘Early Sufism between Persecution and Heresy', in Islamic Mysticism Contested, ed.
by De Jong, F & Radtke, B (Leiden: Brill, 1999), pp .45-67 (p.54); Smith, Studies, pp. 157-8.
101 Hodgson, The Venture , I, p.401,
102 Bdwering, ‘Early Sufism’, p.54.
103 Bdwering, ‘Early Sufism’, p.54; Smith, Studies, pp. 157-8.
104 Izutsu. T. Sufism and Taoism - A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts (London:
University of California Press, 1984), p. 1 16.
151
The usual sufi universalisation of God's mercy was extended beyond the realm of the individual and
personal, becoming synonymous with existence itself and, thereby, in Ibn cArabf s terms, with God,
Himself.105
Both Izutsu and Nettler agree that Ibn cArabT’s understanding of mercy gives a
particular colouring to the interpretation of the ethical nature of God. For Izutsu, Ibn
cArabT’s concept of mercy signifies that beings obtain their existence by the Essence of
the Absolute manifesting itself in accordance with the capacity determined in eternity
for each thing. This encapsulates the two aspects of mercy: a universal mercy
synonymous with existence which is a gratuitous gift from God; and a more human
mercy which is exercised with ‘discrimination’. Such ‘discrimination’ is in accordance
with what each person actually has done, or ontologically, in accordance with the
‘preparedness’ of each individual being 106
For Nettler, there is also a twofold nature of God’s mercy - the personal
(conventional) and the metaphysical. He suggests that there is a total intertwining of
the traditional ethical and Ibn cArabT’s sufi metaphysical outlooks. The focal point for
these outlooks is the Qur’anic term mercy, which in its metaphysical transformation
resonates with traditional meanings. However, heaven and hell are made ‘equal,’ both
in a more conventional sense, with a usual sufi notion of God’s universal (personal)
mercy, as well as with Ibn cArabT’s great shift in mercy’s ontological meaning.107
The Metaphysics of Mercy and Wrath according to al-NabulusT
105 Nettler, ‘Ibn cArabi’s Conception’, p.219.
106 Izutsu, Sufism, pp. 121 & 129.
107 Nettler, ‘Ibn cArabi’s Conception’, pp.220 & 222.
152
Ibn cArabI does not ignore the ethical, yet stresses the metaphysical
transformation of mercy. Al-NabulusT mirrors this. However, the ethical implications
are much more pronounced in his commentary than in Ibn cArabT’s original. This is
apparent from various hadUhs that he adduces and from the comments that he makes.
Nevertheless, that al-NabulusT constantly stresses the ontological dimension of mercy
is never in doubt:
God’s mercy encompasses every eternally pre-existent and originated thing . . . with respect to the
existence of that thing through it [mercy] and with respect to the determination of that thing in its
being effected (mu aththar) or perfected ( mukammal ), or a good or bad effect, or possessing goodness
or badness, or being stripped of all that 108
The determinative force ( hukm ) of mercy may also have an ethical as well as an
ontological aspect. That which is not perfect is imperfect, and the imperfect is
determined to be relative to a certain range of dichotomous values, for example good
and evil. What seems to be stressed here is less the ethics of goodness and evil, and
more the ontology of goodness and evil.
Likewise, in the same manner as Ibn cArabT, al-NabulusT discusses the ethical
concept of divine wrath in ontological terms:
Mercy’s relation to Him with regard to the bringing of everything into existence . . . from those divine
names and lordly attributes precedes the relation of wTath to Him.109
Wrath is said to be existentially dependent on mercy, even though it is one of
the Divine Essence’s attributes. There is no discussion of how wrath might be in a
dichotomous, ethical relationship with mercy. It seems that, al-NabulusT, like Ibn
108 Al-NabulusT, Shark II, 216-7.
153
cArabi, is stating that all of God’s names, including the ethical ones, are to be viewed
from an ontological perspective.
The realm of traditional ethics is transcended. Mercy stands above what is
pleasurable and what is painful in order to bring both into existence and to determine
what is good and what is evil in creation The divine mercy of the Day of Judgement is
lost in a new concept of mercy which brings into existence and determines what is to
be good and evil. Mercy is no longer equivalent to what is good in contrast to wrath
which is evil. Ethics is now subordinate to ontology - ontological mercy touches
everything whether good or evil. Heaven and hell are not in dispute. They are both
touched by mercy, but neither is the sole preserve of mercy.
Al-NabulusT’s text does not address the ethical dimensions of the Qur’an and
hadnhs , rather it by-passes them, even if their content has, from an ordinary
perspective, strong ethical overtones
The Mercy of Felicity and Torment
Despite the transcendence of traditional ethics, both al-NabulusT and Ibn cArabT
keep using ethically laden terms. An especially ethical term is that for felicity (. sacada ).
This is a term normally reserved for those who enter heaven as opposed to
wretchedness (shaqawa) which is for those doomed to hell. Al-NabulusT completely
transforms this concept. Ibn cArabT indicates that every thing mentioned by mercy is
109 Al-NabulusT, Sharh, n, 217.
154
felicitous, which appears to mean existent.110 For him, felicity is existence. This holds
equally true for al-NabulusI, however he qualifies this felicity:
Every thing mentioned by that divine encompassing mercy is felicitous in this world and the next.
That is to say, its reward is felicity which is eternal without end. There is nothing in existence save
what has been mentioned by that mercy. Mercy’s mentioning of all imaginary, intellectual and
sensory things is the same as its bringing them into existence.111
Al-NabulusI refers to universal existential mercy in this citation The effect of
this mercy on all things is not just to bring them into existence. It engenders their
eternal felicity in this world and the next This felicity seems to denote that all things
will be eternally in existence both in this world and the next. Felicity, although still
echoing its original ethical significance, has been transformed as much as mercy. It no
longer signifies a reward for those who have earned God’s favour through following
the strictures of His Law, rather it now signifies the universal existence that God
bestows on all things
Both Ibn cArabI and al-NabulusI are at pains to establish that ethics is not the
issue in this discussion. Al-NabulusI elaborates Ibn cArabT’s statements to the effect
that one should not be put off the ontological truths under discussion by the sight of
those who are suffering psychological and physical torment in this world or by the
belief in the infinite and everlasting torments of the next world. He explains that the
torments of this world and the next do not prevent the acquisition of eternal felicity by
all those who are encompassed by mercy.112 Since there is nothing in existence that is
110 Ibn cArabT, Fususal-Hkam. I, 178.
111 Al-N5bulusl, Sharh , n, 220.
1 1 2 Al-NabulusI, Sharh , II, 22 1
155
not touched by mercy, it follows that everything in existence is guaranteed an eternal
felicity. This is not the felicity of ‘convention’.
The Acquisition of General Mercy and Felicity
Like Ibn cArabT, al-NabulusT elaborates the theme of two types of mercy -
whether denoted by terms such as ‘essential,’ ‘gratitude,’ or ‘asking,’ ‘obligation’ -
which are attained in two different ways. In his preface to the commentary on this
chapter, he stated that mercy was sovereign because it encompasses the mentioning (or
remembrance) of general and specific divine mercy .113 That act of ‘mentioning’ is
equivalent to the act of bringing things into existence. The general mercy is equivalent
to the essential mercy attained through Ibn cArabT’s concept of the ‘way of gratitude.’
The essence of every thing has a pre- and post-existent state. When in a pre¬
existent state, the essence of a thing is immutable or permanent. Mercy’s existential
effect on this essence is ineffective at this point, although God still knows that thing’s
essence. The thing’s essence needs existence and so God mentions it, thereby bringing
it into existence through His existence. Like Ibn cArabT, al-NabulusT stresses that all
things are brought into existence in this general way by and through God’s mercy.
There is no question of an aim or no aim, or appropriateness or no appropriateness
entering this formula of existentiation. 1 14
This theory of general mercy is restated at the end of the chapter where it is
discussed by both Ibn cArabI and al-NabulusT in terms of God’s divine gratitude
( imtinan ) or grace {fad) and munificence {kararri). Being divine grace, this gift of
113 Al-NabulusT. Shark ii, 216.
114 Al-N5bulusl, Shark H, 221.
156
existence is not associated with any act at all This echoes the above statement that
neither an aim nor a lack of aim, and so on, is associated with the existential powers of
mercy. Furthermore, this type of mercy, attained in this general way, is associated
with Qur’an 7: 156:
The other way of attaining this divine mercy is the way of divine gratitude, that is to say grace and
munificence, . . . which is God s statement, ‘And My mercy encompasses every thing’ [Qur’an 7:156],
that is to say as a blessing, grace, and munificence, w hich (mercy) is the fav our of bringing every
thing into existence. 1 1 5
It is clear from al-NabulusT’s comment on Ibn cArabI’s citation of various
Qur’anic verses and hadilhs at the end of the chapter that this mercy is general and
existential in nature. That these ethical verses are being transformed by the newly
shaped concept of general existential mercy is also evident. In these verses and hadfths
mercy is associated with forgiveness, and both terms seem equivalent to existentiation.
Furthermore, al-NabulusI explains that each citation refers to different people. The
first citation refers to the Prophet, the second to the Islamic Umma, the third to
gnostics, and the fourth to the people of Badr.
Al-NabulusT states that God’s mercy for His Prophet in Qur’an 48:2 is an
example of the way of gratitude: ‘So that God might forgive you all your sins - those
in the past and in the future.’116
He states that God’s mercy for everybody else in the Islamic Umma in Qur’an
4:48 or 4: 1 16 is also an example of the way of gratitude: ‘And He forgives everything
else for those He wants.’117
115 Al-NabulusT, Sharh . n, 227.
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For al-NabulusT, Qur’an 39:53 refers to God’s mercy for His special servants
which they attain through the way of gratitude These servants are said to be related
to God through turning away from everything else and through their seeking refuge in
Him through annihilation from every thing:
Say: ‘My servants who have gone too far with regard to themselves - do not despair of the mercy of
God. God will forgive all sins. He is the Most Forgiving and the Most Merciful. ,n 8
And finally there is the hadHh concerning the people of Badr: ‘Do what you
want, I have forgiven you.’119
Al-NabulusT proposes that each of these citations refers to God’s mercy for
different elements of His creation through the way of gratitude. This way of gratitude
is that all things receive the grace of existence. Each of these citations stresses the
mercy of God’s forgiveness. Forgiveness has the same force as God’s existential
mercy. It is also transformed from a fundamentally ethical sense to a metaphysical one.
Forgiveness, felicity and mercy all refer to God’s general and existential mercy for all
things.
The Acquisition of Specific Mercy
Specific mercy, like general mercy, was mentioned in al-NabulusT’s preface to
this chapter. Specific mercy may be viewed as a ‘species’ of general mercy, it belongs
to the larger family of general mercy, and in this way these concepts are related to each
other.
116 Al-NabulusT, Sharh , n, 227.
117 Al-NabulusT, Sharh. II, 227-8.
118 Al-NabulusT, Sharh. n, 228.
119 Al-NabulusT, Sharh, n, 228.
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The essence of every non-existent thing needs existence. In the first half of this
chapter it was remarked that the archetypes related to names and to effects both
demand an existence, which is appropriate to their specific appearance, from God’s
absolute existence which sustains everything. 120 Al-NabulusT, in an allusion to Qur’an
7: 156 and amplifying Ibn cArabT’s text, states that specific mercy is what God wrote
for those who believe and those who are God fearing. 121
Al-NabulusT’ s discussion of this specific mercy is ontological in nature. He
follows Ibn cArabI in stating that there are two types of people who ask for God’s
mercy. They are those who are veiled from the gnostic knowledge of God and those
who possess this knowledge .122 It seems that both types of person are included in the
description of those for whom God has written His mercy - those who believe and
those who are fearful of God.
Those who are veiled from gnostic knowledge are constrained by narrow views
of God. These views are not wrong, rather they are just incomplete. What they know
is true, but not the wholesome truth of the gnostics. The faculties of their psyche
impede their appreciation of God’s mercy:
Those who are veiled from the gnostic knowledge of God ask, petition and demand God to be merciful
to them with this specific mercy in the state of that God’s being in the [doctrine of] belief, that is to
say they are formulating Him through their imagination that He is God, but He is the God created in
belief [only] .123
The veiled believers ask a specific manifestation of God to be merciful to them.
That this mercy is probably ethical in nature is clear from the fact that it is the God of
120 Al-NabulusT. Shark n. 217.
121 Al-NabulusT, Shark n, 222.
122 Al-NabulusT. Shark II, 222.
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conventional beliefs that is petitioned This is clearly not wrong, but it is not the
complete and sophisticated picture of the real dynamics of the situation which al-
NabulusT and Ibn cArabI are trying to impart.
On the other hand, the gnostics, for whom God also wrote His mercy, also ask
God to be merciful to them. However, this is really a request for the all-encompassing
mercy to appear in them. This petition for specific mercy seems to be identical with
what general mercy does. Furthermore, the difference between them and those who
are veiled is that the gnostics know the dynamics of the reality of mercy, whereas those
who are veiled do not appreciate that reality for what it is. Ultimately, the effect of the
petitions of both types of person is the same:
They [the gnostics] know that nothing is merciful to them save the appearance of divine mercy in
them, just as it appears in the presences of the names and in the essential ranks of the attributes. 124
Whereas those who are veiled cannot appreciate this, the gnostics can do so
only through dhawq. Dhawq is said to be the process of unveiling and witnessing
rather than imagination and understanding. 125
Ethics is not really addressed in this discussion. With another allusion to
Qur’an 7: 156, al-NabulusT finishes the initial discussion of specific mercy by confirming
that general mercy becomes specific mercy when it has appeared in His creation:
And so that general mercy has become specific to them, which is what God said, ‘And so I shall write
it [mercy] for those who fear [God].’ after stating that. ‘And My mercy encompasses every thing. ’ 126
123 Al-Nabulusl. Sharp. n, 222.
124 Al-NabulusT, Sharp, II, 222.
125 Al-NSbulusI, Sharp, II, 222.
126 Al-NabulusT, Sharp, II, 222.
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The theory of specific mercy, like that of general mercy, is restated at the end
of the chapter where it is discussed by both Ibn cArabT and al-NabulusT in terms of God
making this mercy obligatory for Himself. Ibn cArabT quotes the second half of Qur’an
7: 156 to support this: ‘I shall write it [mercy] for those who fear [God].’127 Al-
NabulusT adds Qur’an 6:54: ‘Your Lord has written for Himself mercy.’128
Unlike general mercy, specific mercy is linked to acts on the part of those who
receive it:
And so I [God] shall write mercy for those who guard themselves from both manifest and hidden
association of others with God [shirk] . Unbelief [kufr] is the result of manifest shirk , whereas sins are
the result of hidden shirk. [And I (God) shall write mercy for those who] perform almsgiving with
two and a half percent of their wealth and with the annihilation of the ego of their souls.129
Al-NabulusT and Ibn cArabT also add that God has also obligated these people
through the revealed Law to act and think in certain ways.130 Al-NabulusT uses the
examples given by the verses he has cited - godliness or piety ( taqwa) and almsgiving
(zakat). He has used examples of protecting oneself from all forms of shirk, of giving
up a legally prescribed proportion of one’s wealth, and of the mystically sanctioned
attempt to annihilate one’s ego. If one is able to do these things, one will be rewarded
with specific mercy
However, whereas one can protect oneself from all shirk and can give a
percentage of one’s wealth to charity, it is not as easy to annihilate the ego. This is
127 Ibn cArabT, Fusus al-Hkam , i, 180.
128 Al-NabulusT, Shark n, 227.
129 Al-NabulusT, Shark n. 227.
130 Al-NabulusT, Shark n, 227; Ibn cArabT. Fusus al-Hkam, i. 180.
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something normally found in the Sufi context of traversing the path to God. 131 It must
be re-stated that al-NabulusT has argued that both those who are veiled and those who
are not will be recipients of divine mercy. They, like everything else in creation, exist
through divine mercy’s appearing in them This metaphysical reality is not in
accordance with God’s having obligated Himself with being merciful to those who
perform certain acts. Despite this, if this theory is viewed through the prism of al-
NabulusT’s hierarchy of faith in and knowledge of God, it can be argued that these acts
do not necessarily dictate whether one receives mercy or not, rather whether one
appreciates that specific mercy as being the same as general mercy or not.132
It has been argued that the ethics of the Qur’an are not addressed by al-
NabulusT even if the content of his citations has, from a conventional perspective,
ethical overtones. However, the hadnh which al-NabulusT cited in the earlier context
of the metaphysical transformation of mercy is of great value in appreciating the
differences between general and specific mercy. That hadnh was:
Abu Huraira relates on the authority of the Prophet that he said that God made mercy into one
hundred parts. He kept for Himself ninety-nine parts and let one part descend to earth. And so with
that [one part of mercy] creation is merciful to itself so that even the mare raises its hoof from its foal
for fear that it might trample it. Al-Hasan’s account is that God has one hundred mercies, of which
He let one descend to the inhabitants of earth. And so it encompassed them until the time of their
death. God will return that mercy on the Day of Judgement to the ninety-nine. He will perfect them
as one hundred mercies for His friends and for the people who obey Him.133
Contained in the first account of this hadnh is the concrete image of a mare and
its foal. This image has strong ethical connotations: the mare shows kindness to her
131 See the chapter on Ibrahim for al-Nabulusfs views on ‘annihilation'.
132 See the chapter on al-Nabulusfs introduction to the Fususal-Hkam.
162
foal for fear it be hurt by its hoof. From this image of animals, the hadnh moves to an
image of the Day of Judgement. This latter image has obvious ethical implications.
However, al-NabulusT entangles ethical implications with those of metaphysics.
Mercy is divided into one hundred pieces. Ninety-nine of these are the divine
names. The hundredth piece is the Divine Essence. Mercy is the same as the divine
names and the Divine Essence. From the moment of creation until the Day of
Judgement, the Divine Essence, as represented by the hundredth piece of mercy, shall
be on earth, by whose power creation is merciful to itself. The ninety-nine divine
names remain with God. On the Day of Judgement, those divine names will be
differentiated from each other and it is with them that God shall be merciful to His
servants. Furthermore, it is with all one hundred pieces of mercy that the gnostics shall
be transformed on that Day. 134
It is unclear whether God’s being merciful to His servants - those who are
unveiled and those who are gnostics - is metaphysical in the sense of giving them
existence or ethical in the sense of judging them for their actions. Ethics and
metaphysics are entangled
Al-NabulusI alludes to Qur’an 21 :47 which stresses ethics, justice and
eschatology. These concepts have been transformed by the new use of mercy, which
gives them a metaphysical as well as an ethical dimension. It is unclear whether these
dimensions are equal in weight or whether one is heavier than the other.
133 Al-NabulusI. Shark n. 217.
134 Al-NabulusI. Shark n. 217.
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The hadnh states that gnostics will be transformed by all the parts of mercy on
the Day of Judgement. This would include the hundredth piece of mercy which is
identical with the Divine Essence. This is in contrast with the ordinary servants with
whom God will be merciful on that Day with the ninety-nine divine names which are to
be differentiated from each other. For all classes of person, ethics and metaphysics are
entangled.
Al-NabulusT continues by stating that the one piece of mercy, which God lets
descend to earth, possesses the name of the Divine Essence, which gathers together all
the other pieces of mercy. 135 The one piece of mercy which is equivalent to the Divine
Essence and which is in this world performs an important function in establishing two
categories of people.
One category of people is made up of those who are aware of or realise the one
piece of mercy in this world.136 This one piece is the same as the Divine Essence.
Those that have this awareness will not miss the rest of the ninety-nine pieces of mercy
which represent the divine names on the Day of Resurrection or in the next world.
These people will also be aware of or realise the rest of the ninety-nine pieces of
mercy. 137 This one piece of mercy or the Divine Essence is pivotal. It is the one-
hundredth piece of mercy because it is the same as the Divine Essence:
And this piece which is in this world is what is intended in everything because it is the same as the
Essence.138
135 Al-NabulusT. Sharp, n. 217.
136 Al-N§bulusl, Sharp, II, 218.
137 Al-NabulusT. Sharp, n. 218.
138 Al-NabulusT. Sharp, II. 218.
164
Al-NabulusT stated earlier that the gnostics would be transformed by all the
pieces of mercy on the Day of Judgement It follows that the first category of people
alluded to here are these gnostics. That they are aware of the Divine Essence or the
essential piece of mercy in this world is what leads to their perfection and qualification
by all the things qualifying God Himself
The other category of people is made up of those who are not aware of or do
not realise the one part of mercy or the Divine Essence in this world. 139 They will miss
the rest of the ninety-nine pieces of mercy which represent the divine names on the
Day of Resurrection or in the next world. These people will not be aware of or realise
the rest of the ninety-nine pieces of mercy. 140
Al-NabulusT states that whereas the one piece of mercy was in this world, the
rest of the pieces of mercy would be differentiated from each other on the Day of
Judgement.141 God is to be merciful to His servants with these pieces of mercy on that
Day. Al-NabulusT alluded to Qur’an 21 :47 to support this point. These pieces of
mercy represent the ninety-nine divine names. It is doubtful whether these servants are
the people of the second category since if they are not aware of the Divine Essence or
the hundredth piece of mercy in this world, they will not be aware of the divine names
or the rest of the pieces of mercy in the next world. It is only God’s friends, those who
obey him or the gnostics who will be aware of these names This implies that they all
will have been aware of the Divine Essence in this world. There are ethical and
metaphysical implications of this theory.
139 Al-NabulusT, Sharh, II, 218.
140 Al-NabulusT, Sharh, u, 218.
141 Al-NabulusT. Sharh , II, 217.
165
Al-NabulusT proceeds to a discussion of heedlessness (ghafla), which is a
metaphysical and ethical danger Having explained that there are two types of people
in this world - those aware of the Divine Essence and those who are not - and what
that means for the next life, he states:
Thus, heedlessness on the part of those who are ignorant of this piece [of mercy] has become
numerous in this world. Heedlessness is the same as being awake to it [the piece of mercy], and to its
being an indivisible piece, and to the fact that gnostic knowledge is the same as it, while wanting that
knowledge to be different to it - which is impossible rationally and legally. They are not aware
because they are aware of too much. If they were aware of less, they would become aware of the
reality of this Powerful One [piece of mercy, which is the same as the Divine Essence] 1 4“
In terms of the two categories of people elaborated above, the gnostics who
are aware of the Divine Essence have clearly recognised the truth that the gnostic
knowledge of a thing is the same as the known thing and that they have to remove the
distractions of this world in order to contemplate the Divine Essence. This Divine
Essence is close to them after all - it is in this world, within them and without. This
awareness will entitle them to be transformed or qualified by the ninety-nine divine
names in the next world. Those who are not gnostics are both ignorant and heedless
of the Divine Essence in this world. Their ignorance and heedlessness will prevent
their being transformed or qualified by the divine names in the next world.
Conclusion
Al-NabulusT agrees with Ibn cArabT in the fundamental ideas of his text.
However al-NabulusT introduces new elements and sophisticated interpretations that
are not obviously present in Ibn cArabf s original For example, that al-NabulusT
142 Al-NabulusT. Sharh. II, 218. See the chapter on Ibrahim where aspects of Sufi epistemology as
understood by al-NSbulusT are addressed.
166
agrees with Ibn cArabT that mercy has an existential function is apparent. However, al-
NabulusT presents the paradigm of planes of existence in exploring the ramifications of
mercy’s existential function: the eternally pre-existent Divine Essence comprises a host
of perfect eternally pre-existent attributes which are internal relations in that Unitary
Divine Essence. These attributes are the same as the Essence and enable the Essence
to be known by various names The forms of these names are manifested in the world
of creation, whose existence is provided by the Divine Essence.
The Divine Essence is absolute existence. When this absolute existence is
‘given’ to the non-existent archetypes of creation it becomes conditioned existence.143
Unlike Ibn cArabT, who hints at an existential identity between God and creation
through the existential role of mercy, al-NabulusT is more nuanced and cautious with
respect to his belief in this identity. This caution is not as apparent in Ibn cArabT’s text.
There is a tension in his thought between an identity and a difference between God and
creation
For Ibn cArabT and al-NabulusT the issue of ethics is subordinate to that of
ontology and metaphysics However, it is striking that al-NabulusT presents more
specifically ethical images and themes than Ibn cArabT in explicating the metaphysical
functions of Divine Mercy. He discusses the obligations of the religious law with
regard to polytheism, godliness and charity. However, he compares the religiously
sanctioned acts related to godliness and charity with the Sufi ideals of the annihilation
of the ego. He suggests that those Sufis who are aware of the metaphysical truths in
167
this world will be rewarded in the next unlike those who are ignorant or heedless of
these truths.
Finally, al-NabulusT is creative in his use of various scriptural themes and
images that are not present in Ibn cArabT’s text. He cites the hadflh concerning the one
hundred parts of mercy as well as certain Qur’anic verses concerning mercy. His
interpretation of these verses displays a bold and free-thinking spirit willing to impose
its own ideas on Ibn cArabT’s text
143 Note that this is reminiscent of ideas in the chapter on Ibrahim in which God is said to need
creation in order to be known whereas creation needs God in order to be existent.
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Chapter 6
Harun
Introduction
Ibn cArabT’s chapter on Harun in the Fususal-Hikam, like that on Ibrahim,
exhibits some of Ibn cArabT’s most explicitly controversial writing. From an exegesis
of the Qur’anic accounts of the worship of the golden calf, he argues that God
commanded that only He is to be worshipped and that, therefore, everything that is
worshipped is in fact, in one sense, God or a manifestation of God:
Musa had a better knowledge of the matter than Harun because he knew what the followers of the calf
were worshipping [This was] due to his knowledge that God commanded that nothing should be
worshipped except Him and that God does not order a thing except that it happens. The gnostic is
he who sees God in every thing, rather he sees Him as the same as everything. . . . And each perfect
gnostic is he who sees every object of worship as a manifestation of God in which He is worshipped.1 2
The theme of God appearing in or as everything occurs later in the chapter,
where Ibn cArabI states:
He has commanded that nothing be worshipped save Himself in many different ranks each of which
has produced a divine manifestation in which they are worshipped."
1 Ibn cArabT, Fususal-Hkam. ed. by AA cAfffi (Beirut: D3r al-Kitab al-cArabT. 1980) i. 192 & 195.
See Ibn Taymiyya, Al-Furqan Bayn al-Haqq wa '1-BapI, ed. by K al-Mais (Beirut: Dar al-Qalam,
n.d ), pp. 155-6, where he criticises strongly this passage of Ibn cArabT on Harun, Musa, and the
worship of the Golden Calf.
2 Ibn cArabI, Fususal-Hkam , I, 192.
169
The passages above elucidate the theme of the One God appearing in and as
the world of multiplicity. Al-NabulusT recognises this and in so doing reveals the
proximity of his position to that of Ibn cArabT. He states that:
The wisdom associated with Harun comprises the clarification of the appearance of the One Essence
in many forms.3
Ibn cArabT begins the chapter with an explanation of his understanding of the
relationship and differences between Harun and Musa. This precedes his account of
Musa’s reproaching Harun for allowing the worship of the golden calf while he was
absent from his people, which is based on the two main Qur’anic accounts of this
episode in the history of the Israelites: Qur’an 7: 148-154 and 20:83-98.
The account found in the seventh chapter of the Qur’an describes how the
Israelites made the calf an object of worship while Musa was absent. It states that this
was wrong and that they realised this eventually, repenting in the hope of receiving
God’s mercy and forgiveness When Musa returns he is angry with his people He
seizes Harun roughly, but Harun pleads in the name of their mother that their people
ignored him and almost killed him He suggests that the worship of the calf was not
his fault. Musa asks God for forgiveness and mercy for himself and his brother. This
Qur’anic account states that those who worship the calf are to suffer the wrath of God
3 Al-NSbulusT, SharhJawahir al-Nususff Hall Kalimat al-Fusus ; 2 vols (Cairo: Bulaq, 1304-1323), n,
254.
170
and shame in this life. It also emphasises that those who do wrong but repent
afterwards and truly believe, are to receive the mercy and forgiveness of God.
The account of the worship of the calf found in Qur’an 20 begins with a
description of Musa’s meeting with G
Fusus al-Hikam — Los Engastes de la Sabiduría
Ibn Arabi