← Volver a la ficha del textoAVERROES
The Decisive Treatise
Translated by Charles E. Butterworth
Averroes (Abū al-Walid Muhammad Ibn Ahmad
Ibn Rushd, 1126-1198) was born in Cordova to
a distinguished family of jurists: both his grand-
father and father occupied posts as jurists in that
city. Little is known of his life and activities prior
to 1168/9. He is reported to have studied jurispru-
dence, kalam, medicine, and the natural sciences;
in 1153 he went to Marrakesh, where he was re-
ceived by the founder of the Almohad dynasty,
‘Abd al-Mu’min (r. 1132/3-1163), apparently in
connection with the prince’s plans to establish a
school; and he composed a work on medicine. In
1168/9 he went to Marrakesh again, where he was
introduced to ‘Abd al-Mu’min’s son and successor,
Abt Ya‘qub (r. 1163-1184), by his aged vizier and
chief physician, Ibn Tufayl. Shortly afterward, Ibn
Tufayl reported to Averroes that the sovereign had
complained to him about the lack of coherence in
Aristotle’s style, or rather in the style of his trans-
lators, and about the obscurity of Aristotle's aims.
The sovereign hoped that someone would para-
phrase Aristotle's works and make their aims more
accessible. Ibn Tufayl himself was prevented from
doing it because of his age and his occupation
with government service (concentrating on what,
he said, “I hold more important”), and he charged
Averroes with this task. Subsequently, Averroes
was named judge in Seville in 1169, where he
started composing his commentaries (work that
likely continued until 1195). At the same time, he
returned to Cordova in 1171, probably as a judge.
Later, he became chief justice of Cordova and must
have traveled in Andalusia and Morocco. In 1182,
upon the retirement of Ibn Tufayl as chief phy-
sician to Abū Ya‘qub, Averroes took his place in
that role. He kept his favored position under Aba
Ya‘qub’s son and successor, Abt Yusuf, from 1184
to 1195. He then fell temporarily out of favor; his
works, except those that dealt with practical sci-
ences, were ordered burned; and he was exiled to
the little town of Lucena, near Cordova. But soon
afterward the prince revoked his censure, and
Averroes was called to Marrakesh, where he led a
retired life until his death.
Although The Decisive Treatise was written pro-
bably shortly before 1180 (well before his public
censure), it anticipates, and attempts to respond
to, many of the conflicts that gave rise to his
censure. Those conflicts stem from the status of
philosophy in all times and places but especially
in the Islamic world, and even more particularly
among the Almohad dynasty in North Africa and
Andalusia.
Although The Decisive Treatise is especially at-
tuned to Averroes’s own setting (which we will re-
turn to shortly), in certain respects it is also highly
124 POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN ISLAM
reminiscent of the most renowned defense of phi-
losophy before the city, Plato’s Apology. Although
both works defend philosophy before the city and
thus the laws (cf. Platos Crito), neither offers a
particularly philosophic defense of philosophy.
Rather, both works adapt themselves to the legal
setting. Indeed, in The Decisive Treatise Averroes
addresses the legal circumstances even more spe-
cifically than does Socrates in the Apology—as
one might expect of such a renowned jurist. The
reader should be especially attuned to Averroes’s
(syllogistic) form of argumentation and consider
in what ways it is philosophic and in what ways
it takes on the character of a legal brief—making
the best, if not always the most truthful, case for
the defendant.
To return to Averroes’s twelfth-century set-
ting, the Almohad princes were interested in phi-
losophy and patronized its study. They owed their
rule, however, to the revival of a popular religion
based on “the Qur’an and the sword.” Thus they
encouraged simultaneously the private study of
the philosophic sciences and the public attach-
ment to the letter of the divine Law. There were,
however, many jurists and dialectical theologians
who took the position that philosophic teachings
were contrary to the revealed teaching and that
philosophers were unbelievers. These jurists and
theologians were able to arouse the multitude of
believers to adopt their view, and they were thus
able at times to exert pressure on the rulers to pa-
tronize them, rather than the philosophers, as the
learned men of the community. Faced with popu-
lar indignation against philosophy at a time when
he was in need of public support for his campaign
in Spain, Abu Yusuf quelled it with a temporary
censure of Averroes, which he revoked as soon
as he ended the campaign and returned to Mar-
rakesh. Although The Decisive Treatise may not
have been capable of preventing Averroes’s cen-
sure in 1195, it attempts to put the alliance between
the Almohad rulers and the philosophers against
the antiphilosophic alliance of dialectical theolo-
gians and jurists on a firmer footing, by establish-
ing an alliance between philosophy and the Law.
The Decisive Treatise was translated into He-
brew late in the thirteenth or early fourteenth
century. The Arabic original was first edited by
M. J. Müller: Philosophie und Theologie von Aver-
roes (Munich, 1859). The page numbers in square
brackets in the text of the translation below refer
to the Müller edition. That edition was reedited
and extensively revised by George F. Hourani in
Ibn Rushd (Averroes): Kitab fasl al-magal (Leiden:
E. J. Brill, 1959). Hourani published an English
translation with a valuable introduction, sum-
maries, and extensive notes in Averroes on the
Harmony of Religion and Philosophy, E. J. W. Gibb
Memorial Series, n.s. 21 (London: Luzac, 1961),
which appeared in the first edition of the Source-
book. The present translation by Charles E. But-
terworth is based on Muhsin Mahdi’s revisions of
Hourani’s 1959 edition. The complete edition by
Butterworth, from which this translation is taken,
also includes the following: a critical Arabic text,
a biographical sketch of Averroes, an interpretive
introduction (including an explanation of the edi-
tor’s divisions of the text and this work), more ex-
tensive notes than could be included here, and the
Epistle Dedicatory. Butterworth’s edition is Aver-
roés: The Book of the Decisive Treatise Determining
the Connection between the Law and Wisdom and
Epistle Dedicatory (Provo, UT: Brigham Univer-
sity Press, 2001).
In the name of God, the Merciful and the Compassionate.
May God be prayed to for Muhammad and his family,
and may they be accorded peace.
[A. INTRODUCTION]
1. The jurist, imam, judge, and uniquely
learned Aba al-Walid Muhammad Ibn Ahmad
Ibn Rushd (may God be pleased with him) said:
Praise be to God with all praises, and a prayer
1. The adjectival form of sharia—that is, shar‘i—is rendered
here as “Law-based.”” The term rendered “reflection” (nazar)
should be tracked closely throughout these opening sections. It
for Muhammad, His chosen servant and mes-
senger. Now, the goal of this statement is for
us to investigate, from the perspective of Law-
based reflection,’ whether reflection upon
should also be compared closely with the adjectival form of this
root, usually rendered “theoretical,” as below, sec. 15; see also
note 19.
philosophy and the sciences of logic is per-
mitted, prohibited, or commanded—and this
Averroes, The Decisive Treatise 125
as a recommendation or as an obligation—by
the Law.’
[B. THAT PHILOSOPHY AND LOGIC ARE OBLIGATORY]
[1. That Philosophy Is Obligatory]
2. So we say: If the activity of philosophy is nothing
more than reflection upon existing things and con-
sideration of them insofar as they are an indication
of the Artisan—I mean insofar as they are artifacts,
for existing things indicate the Artisan only through
cognizance’ of the art in them, and the more com-
plete cognizance of the art in them is, the more com-
plete is cognizance of the Artisan—and if the Law has
recommended and urged consideration of existing
things, then it is evident that what this name indicates
is either obligatory or recommended by the Law.
That the Law calls for consideration of exist-
ing things by means of the intellect and for pursu-
ing cognizance of them by means of it is evident
from various [2] verses in the Book of God (may
He be blessed and exalted). There is His statement
(may He be exalted): Consider, you who have sight*
[59:2]; this is a text for the obligation of using both
intellectual and Law-based syllogistic reasoning.’
And there is His statement (may He be exalted):
Have they not reflected upon the kingdoms of the
heavens and the earth and what things God has cre-
ated? [7:185]; this is a text urging reflection upon
all existing things. And God (may He be exalted)
has made it known that one of those whom He
selected and venerated by means of this knowl-
edge was Abraham (peace upon him); thus, He
(may He be exalted) said: And in this way we made
Abraham see the kingdoms of the heavens and
the earth, that he might be... [and so on to the end
of] the verse [6:75].° And He (may He be exalted)
said: Do they not reflect upon the camels, how they
have been created, and upon the heaven, how it has
been raised up? [88:17]. And He said: And they
ponder the creation of the heavens and the earth
[3:191]—and so on, in innumerable other verses.
[2. The Case for Syllogistic Reasoning]
3. Since it has been determined that the Law
makes it obligatory to reflect upon existing
things by means of the intellect; and to consider
them; and consideration is nothing more than
inferring and drawing out the unknown from
the known; and this is syllogistic reasoning or
by means of syllogistic reasoning, therefore, it is
obligatory that we go about reflecting upon the
existing things by means of intellectual syllogistic
reasoning. And it is evident that this manner of
2. In his manual of law, Averroes explains that the jurists un-
derstand the judgments of the divine Law to fall into five categories:
obligatory, recommended, prohibited, reprehensible, and permit-
ted. Here, however, Averroes groups the first two under the more
comprehensive category of “commanded” and—perhaps since it is
not applicable to the present question—passes over “reprehensible”
in silence. See Bidayat al-mujtahid wa nihayat al-muqtasid [The
Legal Interpreter’s Beginning and the Mediator’s Ending], ed. ‘Abd
al-Halim Muhammad ‘Abd al-Halim and ‘Abd al-Rahman Hasan
Mahmtd (Cairo: Dar al-Kutub al-Haditha, 1975), 1:17-18.
3. Words derived from the Arabic root ‘r.f will be translated
as “cognizant” or by related terms. Words derived from the Ara-
bic root ‘Lm. will be translated as “knowledge” or “science” or by
related terms. These Arabic terms seem to be used by Averroes to
reflection the Law calls for and urges is the most
complete kind of reflection by means of the most
complete kind of syllogistic reasoning and is the
one called “demonstration.”
4. Since the Law has urged cognizance of God
(may He be exalted) and of all of the things exist-
ing through Him by means of demonstration; and
it is preferable—or even necessary—that anyone
who wants to know God (may He be blessed and
exalted) and all of the existing things by means
draw distinctions similar to those between gigndskein and epistas-
thai in Greek.
4. All Quranic translations in this selection are by Charles E.
Butterworth.
5, The term translated by “syllogistic reasoning” is giyds. Trans-
lators often render this term briefly as “syllogism” and at times even
as “analogy.” The latter translation reflects the fact that Law-based
or legal reasoning primarily takes the form of analogical reasoning.
The reader should attend to the many different forms of “syllogistic
reasoning” Averroes enumerates.
6. The rest of the verse reads: one of those who have certainty.
126 POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN ISLAM
of demonstration set out first to know the kinds
of demonstrations, their conditions, and in what
[way] demonstrative syllogistic reasoning differs
from dialectical, rhetorical, and sophistical syl-
logistic reasoning; and that is not possible unless,
prior to that, he sets out to become cognizant of
what unqualified syllogistic reasoning is, how many
kinds of it there are, and which of them is syllo-
gistic reasoning and which not; and that is not
possible either unless, prior to that, he sets out to
become cognizant of the parts of which syllogistic
reasoning is composed—I mean, the premises and
their kinds—therefore, the one who has faith’ in
the Law and follows its command to reflect upon
existing things perhaps coming under the obliga-
tion to set out, before reflecting, to become cogni-
zant of these things whose status [3] with respect
to reflection is that of tools to work.
For just as the jurist infers from the command
to obtain juridical understanding of the statutes
the obligation to become cognizant of the kinds of
juridical syllogistic reasoning and which of them
is syllogistic reasoning and which not, so, too, is it
obligatory for the one cognizant [of God] to infer
from the command to reflect upon the beings the
obligation to become cognizant of intellectual syl-
logistic reasoning and its kinds. Nay, it is even
more fitting that he do so; for if the jurist infers
from His statement (may He be exalted): Consider,
you who have sight [59:2], the obligation to become
cognizant of juridical syllogistic reasoning, then
how much more fitting is it that the one cognizant
of God infer from that the obligation to become
cognizant of intellectual syllogistic reasoning.
It is not for someone to say, “Now, this kind of
reflection about intellectual syllogistic reasoning
is a heretical innovation, since it did not exist in
the earliest days [of Islam].” For reflection upon
juridical syllogistic reasoning and its kinds is also
something inferred after the earliest days, yet it
is not opined to be a heretical innovation. So it
is obligatory to believe the same about reflection
upon intellectual syllogistic reasoning—and for
this there is a reason, but this is not the place to
mention it. Moreover, most of the adherents to
this religion support intellectual syllogistic rea-
soning, except for a small group of strict literalists,
and they are refuted by the texts [of the Qur’an].
5. Since it has been determined that the Law
makes reflection upon intellectual syllogistic
7. Amana (and terms from the same root) is translated
throughout as “to have faith” (or by related phrases). I'tagada (and
reasoning and its kinds obligatory, just as it makes
reflection upon juridical syllogistic reasoning
obligatory, therefore, it is evident that, if someone
prior to us has not set out to investigate intellectual
syllogistic reasoning and its kinds, it is obligatory
for us to begin to investigate it and for the one who
comes after to rely upon the one who preceded,
so that cognizance of it might be perfected. For it
is difficult or impossible for one person to grasp
all that he needs of this by himself and from the
beginning, just as it is difficult for one person to
infer all he needs to be cognizant of concerning
the kinds of juridical syllogistic reasoning. Nay,
this is even more the case with being cognizant of
intellectual syllogistic reasoning.
6. If someone other than us has already investi-
gated that, it is evidently obligatory for us to rely
on what the one who has preceded us says about
what we are pursuing, regardless of whether that
other person shares our religion or not. For when
a valid sacrifice is performed by means of a tool,
[4] no consideration is given, with respect to the
validity of the sacrifice, as to whether the tool be-
longs to someone who shares in our religion or
not, so long as it fulfills the conditions for valid-
ity. And by “not sharing [in our religion]; I mean
those Ancients who reflected upon these things
before the religion of Islam.
7. Since this is the case—and all that is needed
with respect to reflection about the matter of intel-
lectual syllogistic reasonings has been investigated
by the Ancients in the most complete manner—
therefore, we ought perhaps to seize their books
in our hands and reflect upon what they have said
about that. And if it is all correct, we will accept it
from them; whereas, if there is anything not cor-
rect in it, we will alert [people] to it.
8. Since we have finished with this type of reflec-
tion and have acquired the tools by which we are
able to consider existing things and the indication
of artfulness in them—for one who is not cognizant
of the artfulness is not cognizant of what has been
artfully made, and one who is not cognizant of what
has been artfully made is not cognizant of the Arti-
san—therefore, it is perhaps obligatory that we start
investigating existing things according to the order
and manner we have gained from the art of becom-
ing cognizant about demonstrative syllogisms. It is
evident, moreover, that this goal is completed for
us with respect to existing things only when they
terms from the same root) is translated throughout as “to believe”
(or by related phrases).
are investigated successively by one person after an-
other and when, in doing so, the one coming after
makes use of the one having preceded—along the
lines of what occurs in the mathematical sciences.
For if we were to assume the art of geometry
and, likewise, the art of astronomy to be non-
existent in this time of ours, and if a single man
wished to discern on his own the sizes of the heav-
enly bodies, their shapes, and their distances from
one another, that would not be possible for him—
for example, to become cognizant of the size of the
sun with respect to the earth and of other things
about the sizes of the planets—not even if he were
by nature the most intelligent person, unless it
were by means of revelation or something resem-
bling revelation. Indeed, if it were said to him that
the sun is about 150 or 160 times greater than the
earth, he would count this statement as madness
on the part of the one who makes it. And this is
something for which a demonstration has been
brought forth in astronomy and which no one
adept in that science doubts.
There is hardly any need to use an example from
the art of mathematics, for reflection upon this art
[5] of the roots of jurisprudence, and jurisprudence
itself, has been perfected only over a long period
of time. If someone today wished to grasp on his
own all of the proofs inferred by those in the legal
schools who reflect upon the controversial ques-
tions debated in most Islamic countries, even
excepting the Maghrib,’ he would deserve to be
laughed at, because that would be impossible for
him—in addition to having already been done.
This is a self-evident matter, not only with respect
to the scientific arts, but also with respect to the
practical ones. For there is not an art among them
that a single person can bring about on his own. So
how can this be done with the art of arts—namely,
wisdom?
9, Since this is so, if we find that our predeces-
sors in former nations have reflected upon existing
things and considered them according to what is
required by the conditions of demonstration, it is
perhaps obligatory for us to reflect upon what they
say about that and upon what they establish in their
books. Thus, we will accept, rejoice in, and thank
them for whatever agrees with the truth; and we will
alert to, warn against, and excuse them for whatever
does not agree with the truth.
8. Spain and North Africa.
9. That is, the books of the Ancients referred to above.
Averroes, The Decisive Treatise 127
10. From this it has become evident that reflec-
tion upon the books of the Ancients is obligatory
according to the Law, for their aim and intention
in their books is the very intention to which the
Law urges us. And [it has become evident] that
whoever forbids reflection upon them by anyone
suited to reflect upon them—namely, anyone who
unites two qualities, the first being innate intelli-
gence and the second Law-based justice and moral
virtue—surely bars people from the door through
which the Law calls them to cognizance of God—
namely, the door of reflection leading to true cog-
nizance of Him. That is extreme ignorance and
estrangement from God (may He be exalted).
If someone goes astray in reflection and
stumbles—due either to a deficiency in his innate
disposition, poor ordering of his reflection, being
overwhelmed by his passions, not finding a teacher
to guide him to an understanding of what is in them,
or because of a combination of all or more than one
of these reasons—it does not follow that they’ are to
be forbidden to the one [6] who is suited to reflect
upon them. For this manner of harm coming about
due to them is something that attaches to them by
accident, not by essence. It is not obligatory to re-
nounce something useful in its nature and essence
because of something harmful existing in it by acci-
dent. That is why he [thatis, the Prophet] (peace upon
him) said to the one who complained about having
been ordered to give his brother honey to drink for
his diarrhea—because the diarrhea increased when
he was given the honey to drink—“God spoke the
truth, whereas your brother’s stomach lied?
Indeed, we say that anyone who prevents some-
one suited to reflect upon the books of wisdom
from doing so on the grounds that it is supposed
some vicious people became perplexed due to re-
flecting upon them is like one who prevents thirsty
people from drinking cool, fresh water until they
die of thirst because some people choked on it and
died. For dying by choking on water is an acciden-
tal matter, whereas [dying] by thirst is an essential,
necessary matter. And what occurred through this
art is something accidental, [occurring] through
the rest of the arts. To how many jurists has juris-
prudence been a cause of diminished devoutness
and immersion in this world! Indeed, we find most
jurists to be like this, yet what their art requires in
essence is practical virtue.
10. An allusion to Quran 16:69.
128 POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN ISLAM
Therefore, it is not strange that there occurs,
with respect to the art requiring scientific virtue,
what occurs with respect to the art requiring prac-
tical virtue.
[C. THAT DEMONSTRATION ACCORDS WITH THE LAW]
[1. The Law Calls to Humans by Three Methods]
11. Since all of this has been determined and we,
the Muslim community, believe that this divine
Law of ours is true and is the one alerting to and
calling for this happiness—which is cognizance
of God (Mighty and Magnificent) and of His
creation—therefore, that is determined for every
Muslim in accordance with the method of assent
his temperament and nature require.
That is because peoples natures vary in excel-
lence with respect to assent. Thus, some assent by
means of demonstration; some assent by means
of dialectical statements in the same way the one
adhering to demonstration assents by means of
demonstration, there being nothing greater in
their natures; and some assent by means of rhe-
torical statements, just as the one adhering to
demonstration assents by means of demonstrative
statements.
That is because, when this divine Law of ours
[7] called to people by means of these three meth-
ods, assent to it was extended to every human be-
ing—except to the one who denies it obstinately in
speech or for whom no methods have been deter-
mined in it for summoning to God (may He be ex-
alted) due to his own neglect of that. Therefore, he
[that is, the Prophet] (peace upon him) was selected
to be sent to “the red and the black”"'’—I mean,
because of his Law containing [different] methods
of calling to God (may He be exalted). And that is
manifest in His statement: Call to the path of your
Lord by wisdom, fine preaching, and arguing with
them by means of what is finest [16:125].
[2. Demonstration Does Not Differ from the Law]
12. Since this Law is true and calls to the reflec-
tion leading to cognizance of the truth, we, the
Muslim community, know firmly that demonstra-
tive reflection does not lead to differing with what
is set down in the Law. For truth does not oppose
truth; rather, it agrees with and bears witness to it.
13. Since this is so, if demonstrative reflection
leads to any manner of cognizance about any exist-
ing thing, that existing thing cannot escape either
being passed over in silence in the Law or being
made cognizable in it. If it is passed over in silence,
there is no contradiction here; it has the status of
the statutes passed over in silence that the jurist in-
fers by means of Law-based syllogistic reasoning.
If the Law does pronounce about it, the apparent
sense of the pronouncement cannot escape either
being in agreement with what demonstration leads
to, or being different from it. If it is in agreement,
there is no argument here. And, if it is different, that
11. That is, to all human beings.
12. Ikhraj dalalat al-lafz min al-dalala al-haqīqiyya ilā al-
dalala al-mujaziyya. The language here is somewhat ambiguous
is where an interpretation is pursued. The mean-
ing of interpretation is: drawing out the figurative
significance of an utterance from its true signifi-
cance’? without violating the custom of the Arabic
language with respect to figurative speech in doing
so—such as calling a thing by what resembles it,
its cause, its consequence, what compares to it, or
another of the things enumerated in making the
sorts of figurative discourse cognizable.
14. Since the jurist does this with respect to many
of the Law-based statutes, how much more fitting
is it for the one adhering to demonstrative science
to do so. The jurist has only a syllogism based on
supposition, whereas the one who is cognizant has
a syllogism based on certainty. And we firmly af-
firm that, whenever demonstration leads to some-
thing differing from the apparent sense of the Law,
[8] that apparent sense admits of interpretation ac-
cording to the rule of interpretation in Arabic.
and reads, literally: “drawing the significance of an utterance out
from its true significance to its figurative significance”
No Muslim doubts this proposition, nor is any
faithful person suspicious of it. Its certainty has
been greatly increased for anyone who has pur-
sued this idea, tested it, and has as an intention
this reconciling of what is intellected with what
is transmitted. Indeed, we say that whenever the
apparent sense of a pronouncement about some-
thing in the Law differs from what demonstration
leads to, if the Law is considered and all of its parts
scrutinized, there will invariably be found in the
utterances of the Law something whose apparent
sense bears witness, or comes close to bearing wit-
ness, to that interpretation.
Because of this idea, Muslims have formed a
consensus” that it is not obligatory for all the ut-
terances of the Law to be taken in their apparent
sense, nor for all of them to be drawn out from
their apparent sense by means of interpretation,
though they disagree about which ones are to
be interpreted and which not interpreted. The
Ashiarites,'* for example, interpret the verse about
God's directing Himself [2:29] and the Tradition
about His descent,'° whereas the Hanbalites’® take
them in their apparent sense.
The reason an apparent and an inner sense are
set down in the Law is the difference in people’s
innate dispositions and the variance in their in-
nate capacities for assent. The reason contradic-
tory apparent senses are set down in it is to alert
“those well grounded in science” to the interpreta-
tion that reconciles them. This idea is pointed to
in His statement (may He exalted): He it is who
has sent down to you the Book; in it, there are
fixed verses...on to His statement, and those well
grounded in science [3:7].'”
15. If someone were to say: “Muslims have
formed a consensus that in the Law are things to
be taken in their apparent sense and things to be
interpreted, and there are things about which they
disagree. So, is it permissible for demonstration to
13. Ajmaa: From it is derived the noun “consensus” (ijma’).
Consensus is accepted in some schools of Islamic Law as a root or
source of Law after the Qur'an and Tradition (hadith).
14. Those who follow the theological teachings of Abū al-
Hasan ‘Ali al-Ashiari (873-935).
15. The Tradition in question is, “God descends to the
lower world”
16. Those who follow the juridical teachings of Ahmad Ibn
Hanbal (780-855), who was a strict literalist.
17. Following the reference to fixed verses, the Qur'an goes on
to contrast them with verses that resemble one another. The former
admit of no interpretation; the latter do admit of interpretation.
Regarding the latter, the Qur'an goes on to say: None knows their
interpretation but God and those well grounded in science. They say,
Averroes, The Decisive Treatise 129
lead to interpreting what they have formed a con-
sensus to take in its apparent sense, or to taking in
its apparent sense what they have formed a con-
sensus to interpret?” we would say: “If the consen-
sus were established by a method of certainty, it
would not be valid [to do so]; but if the consensus
about them were suppositional, then it would be
valid [to do so]? That is why Abū Hamid [Alghaz-
ali], Abū al-Ma‘ali [al-Juwayni],'* and others from
among the leading thinkers said that unbelief is to
be affirmed of no one for going against consensus
by interpreting things like these.
What may indicate to you that consensus is not
to be determined with certainty about theoretical
matters,” as it is possible for it to be determined
about practical matters, is that it is not possible [9]
for consensus to be determined about a particular
question at a particular epoch unless: that epoch is
delimited by us; all the learned men existing in that
epoch are known to us, I mean, known as individ-
uals and in their total number; the doctrine of each
one of them on the question is transmitted to us by
means of an uninterrupted transmission;” and, in
addition to all this, it has been certified to us that
the learned men existing at that time agreed that
there is not an apparent and an inner sense to the
Law, that it is obligatory that knowledge of every
question be concealed from no one, and that there
is only one method for people to know the Law.
It has been transmitted that many in the earliest
days [of Islam] used to be of the opinion that the
Law has both an apparent and an inner sense and
that it is not obligatory for someone to know about
the inner sense if he is not an adept in knowledge
of it nor capable of understanding it. There is, for
example, what al-Bukhari relates about ‘Ali Ibn
Abū Talib (may God be pleased with him), say-
ing, “Speak to the people concerning what they
are cognizant of. Do you want God and His mes-
senger to be accused of lying?”” And there is, for
“We believe in it; everything is from our Lord.” Some interpreters
believe the Quran insinuates divine guidance will somehow lead
the interpreter; others, like Averroes, stress the role of “those well
grounded in science.”
18. See the historical introduction to the Alghazali selection
(selection 8 above).
19. Al-nazariyyat: literally, “reflective matters.” Unless other-
wise noted, all future occurrences of the term “theoretical” trans-
late this adjectival form of nazar.
20. Uninterrupted transmission is one of the criteria for judg-
ing the soundness of Traditions about the Prophet.
21. Muhammad Ibn Isma‘il al-Bukhari (810-870) is the au-
thor of one of the six canonical collections of Tradition. ‘Ali Ibn
Abū Talib (d. 661) was the fourth orthodox caliph.
130 POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN ISLAM
example, what is related of that about a group of
the early followers [of Islam]. So how is it possible
to conceive of consensus about a single theoretical
question being transmitted to us when we firmly
know that no single epoch has escaped having
learned men who are of the opinion that there are
things in the Law not all of the people ought to
know in their true sense? That differs from what
occurs with practical matters, for everybody is
of the opinion that they are to be disclosed to all
people alike; and, for consensus about them to be
reached, we deem it sufficient that the question be
widely diffused and that no difference [of opinion]
about it be transmitted to us. Now, this is sufficient
for reaching consensus about practical matters;
but the case with scientific matters is different.
[3. Whether the Philosophers Are Guilty of Unbelief]
16. If you were to say: “If it is not obligatory
to charge with unbelief one who goes against
consensus with respect to interpretation, since
consensus with respect to that is not conceivable,
what do you say about the philosophers among the
adherents of Islam like Abt Nasr [Alfarabi] and
Ibn Sina [Avicenna]? For in his book known as
The Incoherence [of the Philosophers], Abt Hamid
[Alghazali] has firmly charged both of them as
unbelievers with respect to three questions: the
argument about the eternity of the world, that
the Exalted does not know particulars—may He
be exalted above that—and [10] the interpreta-
tion of what is set forth about the resurrection of
bodies and the way things are in the next life,’
we would say: “The apparent sense of what he
says about that is that he does not firmly charge
them with unbelief about that, for he has declared
in the book The Distinction that charging some-
one with unbelief for going against consensus
is tentative.” And it has become evident from
our argument that it is not possible for consen-
sus to be determined with respect to questions
like these because of what is related about many
of the first followers [of Islam], as well as others,
holding that there are interpretations that it is not
obligatory to expound except to those adept in
interpretation.”
These are those well grounded in science—for we
choose to place the stop after His statement (may
He be exalted): and those well grounded in science
[3:7]. Now, if those adept in science did not know
the interpretation, there would be nothing supe-
rior in their assent obliging them to a faith in Him
22. See Tahafut al-faldsifa, ed. Maurice Bouyges (Beirut: Im-
primerie Catholique, 1927) 376.2-10.
23. See Faysal al-tafriqa [Arbitrator of the Distinction] in Al-
qusur al-awali min ras@il al-Imam al-Ghazali (Cairo: al-Jundi,
n.d.), 168-71.
not found among those not adept in science. Yet
God has already described them as those who have
faith in Him, and this refers only to faith coming
about from demonstration. And it comes about
only along with the science of interpretation.
Those faithful not adept in science are people
whose faith in them” is not based on demonstra-
tion. So, if this faith by which God has described the
learned is particular to them, then it is obligatory
that it come about by means of demonstration. And
if it is by means of demonstration, then it comes
about only along with the science of interpreta-
tion. For God (may He be exalted) has already an-
nounced that there is an interpretation of them that
is the truth, and demonstration is only of the truth.
Since that is the case, it is not possible for an exhaus-
tive consensus to be determined with respect to the
interpretations by which God particularly charac-
terized the learned. This is self-evident to anyone
who is fair-minded.
17. In addition to all of this, we are of the opin-
ion that Aba Hamid [Alghazali] was mistaken
about the Peripatetic sages when he accused
them of saying that He (Holy and Exalted) does
not know particulars at all. Rather, they are of
the opinion that He knows them (may He be ex-
alted) by means of a knowledge that is not of the
same kind as our knowledge of them. That is be-
cause our knowledge of them is an effect of what
is known, so that it is generated when the known
thing is generated and changes when it changes.
And the knowledge God (glorious is He) has of
existence is the opposite of this: it is the cause of
the thing known, which is the existing thing.
24. That is, the verses of the Qur'an.
So, whoever likens [11] the two kinds of
knowledge to one another sets down two oppo-
site essences and their particular characteristics as
being one, and that is the extreme of ignorance. If
the name “knowledge” is said of knowledge that
is generated and of knowledge that is eternal, it is
said purely as a name that is shared, just as many
names are said of opposite things—for example,
al-jalal, said of great and small, and al-sarim, said
of light and darkness. Thus, there is no definition
embracing both kinds of knowledge, as the dialec-
tical theologians of our time fancy.
Prompted by one of our friends, we have de-
voted a statement to this question.” How is it to
be fancied that the Peripatetics would say that He
(glorious is He) does not know particulars with
eternal knowledge, when they are of the opinion
that true dream-visions contain premonitions of
particular things that are to be generated in the
future and that this premonitional knowledge
reaches human beings in sleep due to the everlast-
ing knowledge governing the whole and having
mastery over it? Moreover, it is not only particu-
lars that they are of the opinion He does not know
in the way we know them, but universals as well.
For, the universals known to us are also effects of
the nature of the existing thing, whereas, with that
knowledge [of His], it is the reverse. Therefore,
that knowledge [of His] has been demonstrated to
transcend description as “universal” or “particu-
lar” So there is no reason for disagreement about
this question—I mean, about charging them with
unbelief or not charging them with unbelief.
18. As for the question whether the world is eter-
nal or has been generated, the disagreement be-
tween the Ashiarite dialectical theologians and the
ancient sages almost comes back, in my view, to
a disagreement about naming, especially with re-
spect to some of the Ancients. That is because they
agree that there are three sorts of existing things:
two extremes and one intermediate between the
extremes. And they agree about naming the two
extremes but disagree about the intermediate.
One extreme is an existent thing that exists
from something other than itself and by some-
thing—I mean, by an agent cause and from mat-
ter. And time precedes it—I mean, its existence.
25. See the introduction to the Epistle Dedicatory in Butter-
worth’s complete edition of The Decisive Treatise, from which this
translation has been taken, for his explanation of the relation be-
tween the Epistle and the rest of the Treatise. The complete edition
Averroes, The Decisive Treatise 131
This is the case of bodies whose coming into being
is apprehended [12] by sense perception—for ex-
ample, the coming into being of water, air, earth,
animals, plants, and so forth. The Ancients and
the Asharites both agree in naming this sort of ex-
isting things “generated.”
The extreme opposed to this is an existent thing
that has not come into existence from something
or by something and that time does not precede.
About this, too, both factions agree in naming it
“eternal.” This existent thing is apprehended by
demonstration: it is God (may He be blessed and
exalted) who is the Agent of the whole, its Giver
of Existence, and its Sustainer (glorious is He, and
may His might be exalted).
The sort of being between these two extremes is
an existent thing that has not come into existence
from something and that time does not precede,
but that does come into existence by something—I
mean, by an agent. This is the world as a whole.
Now, all of them agree on the existence of these
three attributes with respect to the world. For, the
dialectical theologians admit that time does not
precede it—or, rather, that is a consequence of
their holding that time is something joined to mo-
tions and bodies. They also agree with the Ancients
about future time being infinite and, likewise, fu-
ture existence. And they disagree only about past
time and past existence. For the dialectical theolo-
gians are of the opinion that it is limited, which is
the doctrine of Plato and his sect, while Aristotle
and his faction are of the opinion that it is infinite,
as is the case with the future.
19. So it is evident that this latter existent thing
has been taken as resembling the existing thing
that truly comes into being and the eternally exist-
ing thing. Those overwhelmed by its resemblance
to the eternal rather than to what is generated
name it “eternal,” and those overwhelmed by its
resemblance to what is generated name it “gener-
ated.” But, in truth, it is not truly generated, nor
is it truly eternal. For what is truly generated is
necessarily corruptible, and what is truly eternal
has no cause. Among them are those who name
it “everlastingly generated”—namely, Plato and his
sect, because time according to them is finite with
respect to the past.
includes the Arabic on facing pages, more extensive footnotes, and
in-depth interpretation of the text. See the historical introduction
to the present selection for bibliographical information.
132 POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN ISLAM
20. Thus, the doctrines about the world are not
all so far apart from one another that some of them
should be charged as unbelief and others not. In-
deed, for opinions [13] to be such that this should
happen, it is obligatory that they be excessively
far apart—I mean, that they be opposites of each
other, as the dialectical theologians suppose they
are with respect to this question—that is, that the
name “eternity” and that of “generated” with re-
spect to the world as a whole are opposites of each
other. And it has already become evident from our
statement that the matter is not like that.
21. In addition to all this, these opinions about
the world do not conform to the apparent sense
of the Law. For if the apparent sense of the Law is
scrutinized, it will become apparent from the verses
comprising a communication about the coming
into existence of the world that, in truth, its form
is generated, whereas being itself and time extend
continuously at both extremes—I mean, without
interruption. That is because His statement (may
He be exalted): And He is the one Who created the
heavens and the earth in six days, and His throne
was on the water [11:7], requires, in its apparent
sense, an existence before this existence—namely,
the throne and water—and a time before this time,
I mean, the one joined to the form of this existence,
which is the number of the movement of the heav-
enly sphere. And His statement (may He be exalted):
On the day the earth shall be changed into other than
earth, and the heavens also [14:48], in its apparent
sense also requires a second existence after this ex-
istence. And His statement (may He be exalted),
Then He directed Himself toward the heaven, and
it was smoke [41:11], requires in its apparent sense
that the heavens were created from something.
22. Nor do the dialectical theologians conform
to the apparent sense of the Law in what they say
about the world, but interpret it. For it is not [said]
in the Law that God was existing along with sheer
nothingness; no text whatever to this effect is to
be found. So how is it to be conceived that the dia-
lectical theologians’ interpretation of these verses
would meet with consensus when the apparent
sense of the Law with respect to the existence of
the world, which we have stated, has already been
stated by a faction among the sages?
23. It seems that those who disagree about the
interpretation of these recondite questions have ei-
ther hit the mark and are to be rewarded or have
26. See Aristotle On the Soul 3.3 427b20.
erred and are to be excused. For assent to some-
thing due to an indication arising in the soul is
compulsory, not voluntary—I mean that it is not
up to us not to assent or to assent as it is up to us to
stand up or not to stand up.” Since a condition of
responsibility is having choice, the one who assents
to error because of vagueness occurring in it is ex-
cused if he is an adept of science. [14] Therefore, he
(that is, the Prophet) said (peace upon him), “Ifthe
judge hits the mark after exerting himself, he will
be rewarded twofold; and if he errs, he will have a
single reward.”
Now what judge is greater than the one who
makes judgments about existence, as to whether
it is thus or not thus? These judges are the learned
ones whom God has selected for interpretation,
and this error that is forgiven according to the Law
is only the error occasioned by learned men when
they reflect upon the recondite things that the Law
makes them responsible for reflecting upon.
24. ‘The error occasioned by any other sort of
people is sheer sin, whether it is an error about
theoretical or practical matters. Just as the judge
who is ignorant of Tradition is not excused when
he errs about a judgment, neither is the judge
about existing things in whom the conditions for
judgment do not exist excused; indeed, he is either
a sinner or an unbeliever. And if it is stipulated,
with respect to the judge about what is allowed and
what is proscribed, that he combine within himself
the reasons for exercising personal judgment” —
namely, cognizance of the roots and cognizance of
what is inferred from these roots by means of syl-
logistic reasoning—then how much more fitting is
it for this to be stipulated with respect to the one
who is to judge about existing things, I mean, that
he be cognizant of the primary intellectual notions
and how to infer from them.
25. In general, error with respect to the Law is
of two types:
There is error that is excused for one who is
adept in reflection about that thing concerning
which error occurs, just as the skillful physician is
excused if he errs with respect to the art of medi-
cine and the skillful judge if he errs with respect
to a judgment. But one who is not adept in that
concern is not excused.
And there is error that is not excused for any-
one whosoever. Rather, it is unbelief if it occurs
with respect to the principles of the Law and
27. Ijtihād.
heretical innovation if it occurs with respect to
what is subordinate to the principles.
26. ‘This error is the very one that comes about
concerning the things that all the sorts of methods
of indications lead to cognizance of. Thus, cog-
nizance of that thing is, in this manner, possible
for everyone. Such, for example, is affirmation of
[the existence of] God (may He be blessed and
exalted); of the prophetic missions; and of happi-
ness in the hereafter and misery in the hereafter.
That is because the three sorts of indications [15]
due to which no one is exempted from assenting
to what he is responsible for being cognizant of—I
mean, the rhetorical, dialectical, and demonstra-
tive indications—lead to these three roots.
So that one who denies things like these, when
they are one of the roots of the Law, is an unbeliever
who resists obstinately with his tongue but not his
heart, or [who resists obstinately] due to his ne-
glecting to expose himself to cognizance of what
indicates them. For if he is an adept of demonstra-
tion, a path to assenting to them has been placed
before him by demonstration; and if he is an adept
of dialectic, then by dialectic; and if he is an adept
of preaching, then by preaching. Therefore, he [the
Prophet] (peace upon him) said, “I was ordered to
combat people until they say, “There is no god but
God; and have faith in me’—he means by what-
ever one of the three methods of bringing about
faith that suits them.
27. Concerning the things that are known only
by demonstration due to their being hidden, God
has been gracious to His servants for whom there
is no path by means of demonstration—either
due to their innate dispositions, their habits, or
their lack of means” for education—by coining
for them likenesses and similarities of these [hid-
den things] and calling them to assent by means
of those likenesses, since it is possible for assent
to those likenesses to come about by means of the
indications shared by all—I mean, the dialectical
and the rhetorical. This is the reason for the Law
being divided into an apparent sense and an inner
sense. For the apparent sense is those likenesses
coined for those meanings, and the inner sense
is those meanings that reveal themselves only to
those adept in demonstration. These [likenesses
and meanings] are the four or five sorts of existing
things that Abu Hamid [Alghazali] mentioned in
the book The Distinction.”
28. Asbab, pl. of sabab.
29. See Faysal al-tafriqa, 150-56.
Averroes, The Decisive Treatise 133
28. If it happens, as we have said, that we know
something in itself by means of the three methods,
there is no need for us to coin a likeness for it; and,
as long as it is in its apparent sense, it does not
admit of interpretation. If this manner of appar-
ent sense refers to the roots [of the Law], the one
who interprets it would be an unbeliever—like
someone believing that there is no happiness or
misery in the hereafter and that such a statement
is intended only to safeguard people from one an-
other in what pertains to their bodies and physi-
cal senses, that it is a stratagem, and that a human
being has no end other than sensual existence.
29. If this has been determined for you, [16]
then it is apparent to you from our statement that
there is an apparent sense of the Law that it is not
permissible to interpret. To interpret it is unbelief
when it has to do with principles and heretical in-
novation when it has to do with what is subordi-
nate to principles. There is also an apparent sense
that it is obligatory for those adept in demonstra-
tion to interpret, it being unbelief for them to take
it in its apparent sense. Yet for those not adept in
demonstration to interpret it and draw it away
from its apparent sense is unbelief or heretical in-
novation on their part.
30. Of this sort is the verse about God's direct-
ing Himself [2:29] and the Tradition about His
descent.” Therefore, he [the Prophet] said (peace
upon him) with respect to the black woman, when
she announced that God was in heaven: “Set her
free, for she is one of the faithful.” For she was not
one of those adept in demonstration. The reason
for that is that for the sort of people who come to
assent only due to the imagination—I mean, those
who assent to something only insofar as they can
imagine it—it is difficult to come to assent to an
existing thing that is not linked with something
imaginable.
This also applies to those who understand the
link only as [God having] a place—they are the
ones who in their reflection have moved some-
what beyond the rank of the first sort’s belief in
corporeality. Therefore, the answer to these people
about verses and Traditions like these is that they
pertain to the verses that resemble one another
and that the stop is at His saying (may He be ex-
alted), None knows their interpretation but God
[3:7].2' Even though there is consensus among the
people of demonstration that this sort admits of
30. See above, sec. 14 and note 15.
31. See above, secs. 14 and 16.
134 POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN ISLAM
interpretation, they disagree about its interpreta-
tion. And that is according to each one’s rank with
respect to cognizance of demonstration.
31. There isa third sort [of verses and Traditions]
with respect to the Law, one wavering between these
[other] two sorts and about which there is doubt.
One group of those who occupy themselves with
reflection attach this sort to the apparent sense that
it is not permissible to interpret, and others attach
it to the inner sense that it is not permissible for
the learned to take according to its apparent sense.
That is because this sort [of verses and Traditions]
is recondite and abstruse. One who commits an
error with respect to this is to be excused—I mean,
one of the learned.
32. If it were said, “Since it has become evident
that, in this respect, there are three ranks in the
Law, then in which of these three ranks, according
to you, belongs what is set forth with respect to
descriptions of the next life and its conditions?”
we would say, “With respect to this question, it
is an evident matter that they belong to the sort
about which there is disagreement.” That is be-
cause we see [17] a group who pretend to dem-
onstration, saying that it is obligatory to take
these descriptions in their apparent sense since
there is no demonstration rendering that appar-
ent sense preposterous; and this is the method of
the Ashiarites. Yet another group, who also occupy
themselves with demonstration, interpret these
descriptions; and they disagree greatly among
themselves in their interpretation. Among this
sort are to be counted Abū Hamid [Alghazali]
and many of the Sufis. And some combine both
interpretations, as Abū Hamid [Alghazali] does in
some of his books.
33. It seems that the learned person who com-
mits an error with respect to this question is to
be excused and the one who hits the mark is to be
thanked or rewarded—that is, if he acknowledges
the existence [of the next life] and gives a manner
of interpretation of it not leading to the disavowal
of its existence. With respect to this [question],
denying its existence is what is unbelief, because
it is one of the roots of the Law and something to
which assent comes about by the three methods
shared by the red and the black.
34. For anyone not adept in science, it is obliga-
tory to take them [the descriptions of the next life]
32. This verse is by ‘Imran Ibn Hittan al-Sadisi, a poet who
lived in the seventh century. South Arabian tribes were considered
in their apparent sense; for him, it is unbelief to
interpret them because it leads to unbelief. That is
why we are of the opinion that, for anyone among
the people whose duty it is to have faith in the ap-
parent sense, interpretation is unbelief because it
leads to unbelief. Anyone adept in interpretation
who divulges that to him calls him to unbelief; and
the one who calls to unbelief is an unbeliever.
35. This is why it is obligatory that interpretations
be established only in books using demonstrations.
For if they are in books using demonstrations, no
one but those adept in demonstration will get at
them. Whereas, if they are established in other
than demonstrative books with poetical and
rhetorical or dialectical methods used in them,
as Abt Hamid [Alghazali] does, that is an error
against the Law and against wisdom.
Yet the man intended only good. That is, he
wished thereby to make those adept in science
more numerous. But he actually made those adept
in wickedness more numerous, yet not without
some increase among those adept in science. In
that way, one group came to slander wisdom, an-
other group to slander the Law, and another group
to reconcile the two. It seems that this was one of
the intentions of [18] his books.
An indication that he wished thereby to alert
people's minds is that he adhered to no single doc-
trine in his books. Rather, with the Ash’arites he
was an Asharite, with the Sufis a Sufi, and with the
philosophers a philosopher—so that he was, as it
is said:
One day a Yamani, if I meet a man from Yaman,
And if I meet a Ma‘addi, then I’m of Adnan.”
36. What is obligatory for the imams of the
Muslims is that they ban those of his books that
contain science from all but those adept in sci-
ence, just as it is obligatory upon them to ban de-
monstrative books from those not adept in them.
Yet the harm befalling people from demonstrative
books is lighter, because for the most part only
those with superior innate dispositions take up
demonstrative books. And this sort [of people]
is misled only through a lack of practical virtue,
reading in a disorderly manner, and turning to
them without a teacher.
to be Yamanites; north Arabian tribes—among them the Ma‘addi—
were considered to be Adnanites.
Still, totally forbidding demonstrative books bars
from what the Law calls to, because it is a wrong to
the best sort of people and to the best sort of exist-
ing things. For justice with respect to the best sort
of existing things is for them to be cognized to their
utmost degree by those prepared to be cognizant of
Averroes, The Decisive Treatise 135
them to their utmost degree, and these are the best
sort of people. Indeed, the greater the worth of the
existing thing, the greater is the injustice with re-
spect to it—namely, ignorance of it. Therefore, He
said (may He be exalted): Associating [other gods
with God] is surely a major wrong [31:13].”
[D. SUMMARY]
37. So this is what we were of the opinion we should
establish with respect to this type of reflection—I
mean, the discussion between the Law and wisdom
and the statutes for interpreting the Law. Ifit were not
for this being so widespread among people and these
questions we have mentioned being so widespread,
we would not have deemed it permissible to write a
single letter about it; nor would we have to excuse
ourselves to those adept in interpretation for doing
so, because these questions are such as to be men-
tioned in demonstrative books. God is the Guide to
and the Successful Giver of what is correct!
[E. ON WHAT IS INTENDED BY THE LAW AND ITS METHODS]
[1. What Is Intended by the Law]
38. You ought to know that what is intended
by the Law is only to teach true science and true
practice. True science is cognizance of God (may
He be blessed and exalted) and of all the existing
things as they are, especially the venerable ones
among them; and cognizance of happiness in
the hereafter and of misery in the hereafter. True
practice is to follow the actions that promote hap-
piness [19] and to avoid the actions that promote
misery; and cognizance of these actions is what is
called “practical science.”
These [actions] are divided into two divisions.
One is the apparent, bodily actions. The science of
these is what is called “jurisprudence.” The second
division is actions of the soul—like gratitude, pa-
tience, and other moral habits that the Law calls to
or bans. And the science of these is what is called
“asceticism” and “the sciences of the hereafter.”
Aba Hamid [Alghazali] directed himself to
this in his book. Since people had turned away
from this type and become immersed in the other
type—even though this type is more involved
with piety, which is the cause of happiness—he
33. In this Quranic passage, Luqman instructs his son to
avoid associating other gods with God. Averroes uses the passage
to illustrate how great the wrong can become when the learned,
called his book The Revival of the Sciences of
Religion.
But we have digressed from the path we were
on, so let us come back.
39. We say: Since what is intended by the Law
is teaching true science and true practice; and
teaching is of two sorts—forming a concept and
bringing about assent—as those adept in dialecti-
cal theology have explained; and there are three
methods of bringing about assent for people—
demonstrative, dialectical, and rhetorical—and
two methods of forming concepts, either by means
of the thing itself or by means of a likeness of it;
and not all people have natures such as to accept
demonstrations or dialectical arguments, let alone
demonstrative arguments, given the difficulty in
teaching demonstrative arguments and the lengthy
time needed by someone adept at learning them;
and since what is intended by the Law is, indeed,
to teach everyone, therefore, it is obligatory that
the Law comprise all the manners of the methods
of bringing about assent and all the manners of
the methods of forming a concept.
prohibited from reading demonstrative books, are led to ignorance
of God, and thus to associationism or polytheism.
136 POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN ISLAM
[2. The Methods in the Law for Assent and Concept]
40. Since some of the methods for bringing
about assent—I mean, assent taking place because
of them—are common to most people, namely, the
rhetorical and the dialectical, the rhetorical being
more common than the dialectical; and some of
them are particular to fewer people, namely, the
demonstrative; and what is primarily intended by
the Law is taking care of the greater number with-
out neglecting to alert the select [few], therefore,
most of the methods declared in the Law are the
methods shared [20] by the greater number with
respect to concept or assent taking place.
41. There are four sorts of these methods in
the Law.
One, even though it is shared, is particular**
in both respects—I mean that, with respect to
forming a concept and bringing about assent, it is
certain, even though it is rhetorical or dialectical.
These syllogisms are the ones whose premises hap-
pen to be certain, even though they are generally
accepted or suppositional, and whose conclusions
happen to be matters taken in themselves rather
than as likenesses. For this sort of Law-based
statements there is no interpretation, and the one
who denies or interprets it is an unbeliever.
The premises in the second sort are certain,
even though they are generally accepted or suppo-
sitional, and the conclusions are likenesses of the
matters intended to be brought forth. This [sort of
Law-based statements]—I mean, its conclusions—
admits of interpretation.
The third is the reverse of this, namely, that the
conclusions are the very matters intended to be
brought forth, while the premises are generally ac-
cepted or suppositional without happening to be
certain. For this [sort of Law-based statements]—I
mean, its conclusions—interpretation is not ad-
mitted either, but its premises may admit of it.
The premises in the fourth are generally ac-
cepted or suppositional without happening to
be certain, and its conclusions are likenesses of
the matter intended to be brought forth. With re-
spect to these [Law-based statements], the duty
of the select is to interpret them, and the duty of
the multitude is to let them stand in their appar-
ent sense.
42. In general, with respect to everything in
these [Law-based statements] admitting of an
interpretation apprehended only by demonstra-
tion, the duty of the select is that interpretation,
whereas the duty of the multitude is to take them
in their apparent sense in both respects—I mean,
with respect to concept and assent—for there is
nothing more than that in their natures.
43. Interpretations may occur to those who re-
flect upon the Law due to the superiority some
of these shared methods have over others with
respect to bringing about assent—I mean, when
the indication of the interpretation is more com-
pletely persuasive than the indication of the ap-
parent sense. Interpretations such as these are
for the multitude, and it is possible that they be-
come a duty for those whose reflective powers
reach that of dialectic. Into this type enter [21]
some of the interpretations of the Ash‘arites and
the Mu'tazilites,* although for the most part the
statements of the Mu'tazilites are more reliable.
The duty of those within the multitude who are
not capable of more than rhetorical statements is
to let them stand in their apparent sense, and it is
not permissible for them to know that interpreta-
tion at all.
[3. The Three Sorts of People and the Law’s Provision for Them]
44. For people are of three sorts with respect to
the Law.
One sort is in no way adept at interpretation.
These are the rhetorical people, who are the over-
whelming multitude. That is because no person of
unimpaired intellect is exempted from this kind
of assent.
34, That is, limited to fewer people.
Another sort is those adept in dialectical inter-
pretation. These are those who are dialectical by
nature alone, or by nature and by habit.
Another sort is those adept in certain [or de-
monstrative] interpretation. These are those who
are demonstrative by nature and art—I mean, the
art of wisdom. This interpretation ought not to be
35. See note 23 to Alghazali’s Deliverer from Error (above,
selection 8) on Mu'tazilites. Cf. note 14 above on Ash‘arites.
declared to those adept in dialectic, not to men-
tion the multitude.
45. When something pertaining to these inter-
pretations is declared to someone not adept in
them—especially demonstrative interpretations,
due to their remoteness from things about which
there is shared cognizance—both he who declares
it and the one to whom it is declared are steered
to unbelief. The reason is that interpretation in-
cludes two things: the rejection of the apparent
sense and the establishing of the interpretation.
Thus, if the apparent sense is rejected by some-
one who is an adept of the apparent sense without
the interpretation being established for him, that
leads him to unbelief if it is about the roots of the
Law. So interpretations ought not to be declared
to the multitude, nor established in rhetorical or
dialectical books—I mean, books in which the
statements posited are of these two sorts—as Abt
Hamid [Alghazali] did.*°
46. For this kind [of people], it is obligatory
to declare and to say, with respect to the appar-
ent sense—when it is such that the doubt as to
whether it is an apparent sense is in itself appar-
ent to everyone, without cognizance of its inter-
pretation being possible for them—that it is one of
those [verses] that resemble one another [whose
interpretation is] not known, except to God, and
that it is obligatory for the stop in His saying (may
He be exalted) to be placed here: None knows their
interpretation but God [3:7].” In the same way is
the answer to come forth with respect to a ques-
tion about obscure matters for whose understand-
ing no path exists for the multitude—as with His
saying (may He be exalted): And they will ask you
about the spirit; say: “The spirit is by the command
of my Lord; and of knowledge you have been given
only a little” [17:85].
47. Now, [22] anyone who declares these in-
terpretations to those not adept in them is an
unbeliever because of his calling people to unbe-
lief. This is contrary to the call of the Lawgiver,
especially when they are corrupt interpretations
having to do with the roots of the Law—as has
occurred with a group of people in our time. For
we have witnessed some groups who suppose
they are philosophizing and have, by means
of their astounding wisdom, apprehended things
that disagree with the Law in every manner—
36. Literally, “as Abū Hamid [Alghazali] artfully did?
37. See above, sec. 14.
Averroes, The Decisive Treatise 137
I mean, [things] not admitting of interpretation.
And [they suppose] that it is obligatory to de-
clare these things to the multitude. By declar-
ing those corrupt beliefs to the multitude, they
have become the reason for the multitude’s and
their own perdition in this world and in the
hereafter.
48. Here isa likeness of these people’s intention
as contrasted to the intention of the Lawgiver:
Someone is intent upon [going to] a skilled phy-
sician who is intent upon preserving the health
of all of the people and removing sicknesses from
them by setting down for them statements to
which there is common assent” about the obliga-
tion of practicing the things that preserve their
health and remove their sicknesses, as well as of
avoiding the contrary things. He is not able to
make them all become physicians, because the
physician is the one who knows by demonstra-
tive methods the things that preserve health and
remove sickness. Then this one goes out to the
people and says to them, “These methods this
physician has set down for you are not true.”
And he sets about rejecting them until they have
rejected them. Or he says, “They have interpre-
tations.” Yet they do not understand them and
thus come to no assent as to what to do because
of them.
Now are you of the opinion that people who are
in this condition will do any of the things useful
for preserving health and removing sickness? Or
will this one who has declared that they should re-
ject what they used to believe about those [things]
be able to practice that with them—I mean, pre-
serving health? No! Rather, he will not be able to
practice these with them, nor will they be able
to practice them; and perdition will encompass
them all.
49. This is if he declares sound interpretations
about those things to them, because of their not
understanding that interpretation—not to men-
tion his declaring corrupt interpretations to them.
Because he will so interpret the matter to them
that they will not be of the opinion that there is
a health that must be preserved or a sickness that
must be removed, not to mention [23] their being
of the opinion that there are things such as to pre-
serve health and remove sickness. And this is what
happens with respect to the Law when anyone
38. Literally, “statements of shared assent.’ Compare secs.
53-55 and 57 below.
138 POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN ISLAM
declares an interpretation to the multitude or to
someone not adept for it. He corrupts it and bars
them from it; and the one who bars others from
the Law is an unbeliever.
50. Now this illustration is certain and not po-
etical, as someone might say. It is a sound linking
between the one and the other. That is because the
link between the physician and the health of bod-
ies is [the same as] the link between the Lawgiver
and the health of souls—I mean, the physician is
the one who seeks to preserve the health of bod-
ies when it exists and to bring it back when it has
disappeared, while the Lawgiver is the one who
aspires to this with respect to the health of souls.
This health is what is called “piety.” And the
precious Book has declared in various verses
that it is to be sought by means of Law-based ac-
tions. Thus, He (may He be exalted) said: Fasting
was prescribed for you, just as it was prescribed
for those before you, so that you might come to be
pious [2:183). And He (may He be exalted) said:
Neither their flesh nor their blood will reach God,
but piety on your part will reach Him [22:37]. And
He said: Indeed, prayer puts an end to iniquity and
to transgression [29:45]; and so on in innumer-
able other verses to this effect contained in the
precious Book.
Now the Lawgiver seeks this health only
through Law-based knowledge and Law-based
practice. And this health is the one from which
happiness in the hereafter derives and misery in
the hereafter from its contrary.
51. From this, it has become evident to you
that sound interpretations—not to mention cor-
rupt ones—must not be established in books for
the multitude. Sound interpretation is the deposit
mankind was charged with holding, and held,
whereas all existing things shirked it—I mean the
one mentioned in His statement (may He be ex-
alted): Indeed, we offered the deposit to the heavens,
to the earth, and to the mountains, [and so on to
the end of] the verse [33:72].
[F. ON THE EMERGENCE OF FACTIONS WITHIN ISLAM]
[1. Different Opinions regarding Interpretation]
52. Because of the interpretations with respect
to the Law—especially the corrupt ones—and the
supposition that it is obligatory to declare them
to everyone, factions emerged within Islam so
that one charged the others with unbelief or with
heretical innovation. Thus, the Muttatzilites in-
terpreted many verses and many Traditions and
declared their interpretations to the multitude,
‘as did the Ashiarites, although they resorted
less to [23] interpretation. Because of that,
they threw people into loathing, mutual hatred,
and wars (hurub); they tore the Law to shreds;
and they split the people up into every sort of
faction.
53. In addition to all this, in the methods they
followed to establish their interpretations they
were neither with the multitude nor with the
select. They were not with the multitude be-
cause their methods were more obscure than
the methods shared by the majority. And they
were not with the select because, if their meth-
ods are examined, they are found to fall short of
the conditions for demonstration—and that will
be grasped after the slightest examination by
anyone who is cognizant of the conditions for
demonstration. Rather, many of the roots upon
which the Asharites base their cognizance are so-
phistical. For they deny many necessary things,
such as the stability of accidents, the influence of
some things upon others, the existence of neces-
sary reasons for what is made to occur, substan-
tial forms, and intermediates.
54. Those among them who reflect have wronged
the Muslims in the sense that a group of Asharites
has charged with unbelief anyone who is not cog-
nizant of the existence of the Creator (glorious is
He) by the methods they have set down for cog-
nizance of Him in their books. But, in truth, they
are the ones who are the unbelievers and those
who are misguided. From here on they disagreed,
with one group saying, “The first obligation is re-
flection,’ and another group saying, “Faith is’—I
mean, because they were not cognizant of which
methods are the ones shared by everyone through
whose doors the Law calls all the people and sup-
posed that there is [only] one method. So they
erred about the intention of the Lawgiver and were
misguided and made others become misguided.
Averroes, The Decisive Treatise 139
[2. How to Avoid the Evils Brought About by Factions]
55. If it were said, “If these methods followed by
the Asharites and others adept in reflection are
not the shared methods by which the Lawgiver in-
tended to teach the multitude and by which alone
it is possible to teach them, then which ones are
these methods in this Law of ours?” we would say:
“They are the methods that are established in the
precious Book alone. For if the precious Book is
examined, the three methods existing for all the
people will be found in it; and these are the shared
methods for teaching the majority of the people
and [the method for teaching] the select. And if
the matter is examined with respect to them, it
will become apparent that no better shared meth-
ods for teaching the multitude are to be encoun-
tered than the methods mentioned in it.”
56. So anyone who distorts these methods by
making an interpretation that is not apparent in
itself or that is more apparent to everyone than
they are—and that is something nonexistent—
rejects [25] their wisdom and rejects their in-
tended action for procuring human happiness.
That is very apparent from the condition of those
in the earliest days [of Islam] and the condition of
those who came after them. For those in the earli-
est days came to have perfect virtue and piety only
by practicing” these statements, without making
interpretations of them; and any one of them who
grasped an interpretation did not think fit to de-
clare it. When those who came after them prac-
ticed interpretation, their piety decreased, their
disagreements became more numerous, their love
for one another was removed, and they split up
into factions.
57. Itis obligatory for whoever wants to remove
this heretical innovation from the Law to apply
himself to the precious Book and pick from it the
indications existing for every single thing we are
responsible for believing. In his reflection he is to
strive for their apparent sense as much as he can
without interpreting anything, except insofar as
the interpretation is apparent in itself—I mean,
of an apparentness shared by everyone. For if the
statements set down in the Law for teaching the
people are examined, it seems that one reaches a
point in defending them such that only someone
who is an adept at demonstration pulls out of their
apparent sense something that is not apparent in
them. And this particular characteristic is not
found in any other statements.
58. The statements of the Law declared to ev-
eryone in the precious Book have three particu-
lar characteristics that indicate their inimitability.
The first is that nothing more completely per-
suasive and able to bring about assent for ev-
eryone is to be found than they. The second is
that by their nature they admit of defense, end-
ing up at a point where no one grasps an inter-
pretation of them—if they are such as to have an
interpretation—except those adept in demon-
stration. The third is that they contain a means
of alerting those adept in the truth to the true
interpretation. And this is not found in the doc-
trines of the Asharites, nor in the doctrines of the
Muttazilites—I mean, their interpretation neither
admits of defense, nor contains a means of alert-
ing to the truth, nor is true. Therefore, innovative
heresies have increased.
[G. CONCLUSION]
[1. The Need to Pursue the Task Set Forth Here]
59. We would love to devote ourselves to this
intention and carry it out thoroughly; and if God
prolongs our life, we shall establish as much of it as
we can. That could possibly be a starting point for
someone who comes afterwards. Now our soul is
39. Although “using” might be a less awkward rendering of
istimal, Butterworth’s rendering as “practicing” has been retained
because it highlights the connection to the repeated usage of the
same word in the next sentence in “practiced interpretation.”
in [26] utmost sorrow and pain due to the corrupt
dissensions and distorted beliefs that have perme-
ated this Law, especially those that have occurred
to it from among people linking themselves to
wisdom. For injuries from a friend are graver than
Furthermore, it is unclear whether Averroes means to imply that
it is the mere use of the relevant statements or their “implementa-
tion” in action that leads to “perfect virtue and piety’—though the
latter seems more plausible.
140 POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN ISLAM
injuries from an enemy—I mean that wisdom is
the companion of the Law and its milk sister. So
injuries from those linked to it are the gravest inju-
ries apart from the enmity, hatred, and quarreling
they bring about between both of them. These two
are companions by nature and lovers by essence
and instinct. It [the Law] has also been injured by
many ignorant friends from among those who
link themselves to it, namely, the factions existing
within it. But God shows all people the right
way, brings everyone to love Him, unites their
hearts in pious fear of Him, and removes ha-
tred and loathing from them through His grace
and mercy.
[2. The Positive Role of the Present Rulership]
60. God has removed many of these evils, ignorant
occurrences, and misguided paths by means of this
triumphant rule. By means of it, He has brought
many good things closer, especially for that sort who
follow the path of reflection and yearn for cognizance
of the truth. That is, this rule calls the multitude to
40. The reference is to the rule of the Almohad sovereign Abu
Ya‘qub Yusuf (r. 1163-1184).
a middle method for being cognizant of God (glori-
ous is He), raised above the low level of the tradi-
tionalists yet below the turbulence of the dialectical
theologians, and alerts the select to the obligation for
complete reflection on the root of the Law. By His
grace, God is the Giver of success and the Guide.
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Fasl al-Maqal — Tratado Decisivo
Averroes (Ibn Rushd)