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Religion and Philosophy: XI.
THE
PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY
OF AVERROES
Printed by Manibhai Mathurbhai Gupta at the " Arya-
Sudharak " Printing Press, llaopura, Baroda, and
Published by A. G, Widgery, the College, Baroda
1-1-1921
THE
PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY
OF AVERROES
Tractata translated from the Arabic
By
MOHAMMAD JAMIL UR-RKHM AN K. A.
Professor of Islamic History, Hyderabad
Formerly Fellow of the Seminar for the Cnmpaiative Study
of ReligioDB; Baroda
iBARODj^
DEDICATION
to
Dr. AZIMUDDIN AHMAD
Sir,
Ifc was at your feet that I firsi
learned to appreciate historical and liter-
ary research, and the following pages
constitute the earliest fruits of that
literary labour of mine the impetus for
which I am proud to have received from
you. I crave your indulgence for my
taking the liberty of dedicating the same^
to your revered name, with the hope
that it will not fail to attract the same
generous sympathy from you as you
have always shown to your pupil.
Mohammad Jamil ur Rehmani
PREFACE
It was as a Fellow of the Seminar
for the Comparative Study of Religions
at the College, Baroda, that the present
work was begun. The subject was taken
«p in the first place as a parallel study
to that contained in a paper in the
Indian Philosophical Review, Volume II,
July 1918, pp. 24-32 entitled '' Maimon-
ides and the Attainment of Religious
Truth .'^ But as I proceeded with my
investiijation I thouofht it mio^ht be bovst
to let Averroes speak for himself- For
this reason I have here translated certain
treatises of Averroes, as edited in the
Arabic text by D. K. Muller in *' Philo-
sophic und Theologie von Averroes."
Munich 1859. I am confident that the
book will prove an interesting one and
will explain itself to* the reader without
any introduction on my part.
10 PREFACE
Though owing to my appointment
at Hyderabad I resigned my position at
Baroda soon after commencinof this work
I wish here to express my thanks to
Professor Alban G, Widgery of Baroda
for his constant sjmipathy with and
encouragement for my work in and
out of the Seminar. He has also kindly
accepted the book for inclusion in the
Gaekwad Studies in Religion and Philo-
sophy, I am indebted to him for a
complete revision of the manuscript and
for the onerous work of seeing the book
through the press. I am also indebted
to my brother Mutazid Wali ur Behman,
B. A. for valuable help in rendering many
obscure passages.
Mohammad Jamil ur Rehman
Osmania University,
Hyderabad.
CONTENTS
1. A Decisive Discourse on the Delineation of
the Relation between Religion and
Philosophy.
I a. Appeiidix: On the Problem of
Eternal Knowledge which Averroes
has mentioned in his Decisive
Discourse.
II. An Exposition of the Metho^^s of Argn- *^
ment concerning the Doctrines of tP^
Faith, and a Determination of J)oub('®
and misleading Innovation brought
into the Faith through Interpreta*
tions.
A DECISIVE DISCOIKSK OX IRK DELINEATION
OK THK
I^KLATION BETWEEN KKLKilON AND PHILOSOPHY
%
A DECISIVE DISCOURSE ON THE
DELINEATION
OF THK
RELATION BETWEEN
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY.*
And after: Praise be to God for all'
His praiseworthy acts, and blessings on
Mohammad, His slave, the Pure, the
Chosen One and His Apostle. The
purpose^ of the following treatise is to
inquiry through sacred Law t whether the
learPiing of philosophy and other sciences
appertaining thereto is permitted, or
cabled dangerous, or commended by the
L?\w, and if commended, is it only
apjproved or made obligatory.
ii ■ '
* A translation of Averroes' Kitab Fasl a'l Maqal wa
T^qrir ma bain'a'l Sbariata wa'l Hikmati mina'l IttisaJL
Kt^l. by D. J. Muller, Pbilosopbie und Theologie yow
Averroes, Munich 1859.
t »". e. Shariat. Compare Jewiih Torah.
14 AVERROES
We mainfcain that the business of
philosophy is nothing other than to look
into creation and to ponder over it in
order to be guided to the Creator, — in
other words, to look into the meaninor
of existence. For the knowledge of
creation leads to the cogniscance of the
Creator, through tke knowledge of the
created. The more perfect becomes the
knowledge of creation, tha more perteet
becomes the knowledge of ^the Creator.
The Law encouraoes and exhorts us to
observe creation. Thus, it is .clear that
this is to be taken either as a religious
injunction or as something apprdiWed by
the Law, But the Law urges \us to
observe creation by means of reasoi.^ and
demands the knowledge thereof thrc>ugh
reason. This is evident from different
verses of the Quran. For example the
Quran says: "Wherefore take example
from them, ye who have eyes.''^ Thar^ is
a clear indication of the necessity I of
using the reasoning faculty, or ratFier
1. Quran lix, 2.
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 15
both reason and religion, in the inter-
pretation of things. Again it says:
**0r do they not contemplate the king-
dom of heaven and earth and the things
which God hath created/'^ This is a
plain exhortation to encourage the use
of observation of creation. And remember
that one whom God especially distingui-
shes in this respect, Abraham, the
prophet. For He says : *' And this did
we show unto Abraham : the kingdom
of heaven and earth."^ Further He says ;
''Do they not consider the camels, how
they are created ; and the heaven, how
it is raised."* Or still again : ''And (who)
meditate on the creation of heaven and
earth, saying, O Lord tliou hast nob
created this in vain,"^ There are many
other verses on this subject : too numer-
ous to be enumerated.
Now, it being established that the
Law makes the observation and considera-
tion of creation by reason obligatory —
2, Quran vii, 184. 3. Quran vi, 75,
4. Quran Ixxxviii, 17. 5. Quran iii, 176.
16 AVKRROES
and consideration is nothing but to make
explicit the imphcit — this can only be
done through reason. Thus we must
look into creation with the reason^
{ Moreover, it is obvious that the observa-
tion which the Law approves and en-
courages must be of the most perfect
type, performed with the most perfect
kind of reasoning. As the Law empha-
sises the knowledge of God and His
creation by inference, it is incumbent
on any who wish to know God and His
whole creation by inference, to learn the
kinds ot inference, their conditions and
that which distinguishes philosophy from
dialectic and exhortation from syllog-
ism. This is impossible unless one
possesses knowledge beforehand of the
various kinds of reasoning and learns ta
distino^uish between reasoninor and what
is not reasoning. This cannot be done
except one knows its different parts^
that is, the different kinds of premises.
Hence, for a believer in the Law and
a follower of it, it is necessary to know
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 17
these thinors before he beoriiis to look into
creation, for they are like instruments
for observation. ) For, just as a student
discovers b}' the study of the law, the
necessity of knowledge of legal reason-
ing with all its kinds and distinctions, a
student will find out by observing the
creation the necessity of metaphysical
reason insr. Indeed, he has a orreater
claim on it than the jurist. For if
a jurist argues the necessity of legal
reasoning from the saying of God:
"Wherefore take example from them O
ye who have eyes/'^ a student of divinity
has a better I'iorht to establish the same
from it on behalf of metaphysieiil
reason in Of.
One cannot maintain that this kind
of reasoning is an innovation in religion
because it did not exist in the early
days o{ Islam. For legal reasoning and
its kinds are things which were invented
also in later ages, and no one thinks
they are innovations. Such should, alsc?
6. Quran lix, 2,
3
18 AVERROES
be our attitude towards philosophical
reasoning. There is another reason why
it should be so, but this is not the
proper place to mention it, A large
number of the followers of this religrion
confirm philosophical reasoning, all except
a small worthless minority, who argue
from religious ordinances. Now, as it is
established that the Law makes the
consideration of philosophical reasoning
and its kinds as necessary as legal
reasoning, if none of our predecessors
has made an effort to enquire into it,
we should begin to do it, and so help
them, until the knowledge is complete.
For if it is difficult or rather impossible
for one person to acquaint himself single-
handed with all things which it is
necessary to know in legal matters,' it is
still more difficult in the case of philo-
sophical reasoning. And, if before us,
somebody has enquired into it, we should
derive help from what he has said. It is
quite immaterial whether that man is
QUr Qo-religionist or not ;: for the instru"
BELrCxIONAND PHILOSOPHV
ment by which purification is perfected
is not made uncertain in its usefuhiess,
by its being in the hands of one of our
own party, or of a foreigner, if it
possesses the attributes of truth/\ By
tliese hxtter we mean those Ancients
wlio investiofated these things before the
advent of Islam.
Now, such is the case. All that is
wanted in an enquiry into philosophical
reasoning has already been perfectly
examined by the Ancients. All that is
required of us is that we should go back
to their books and see what they have
said in this connection. If all that they
say be true, we should accept it and if
there be something wrong, we should
be warned by it. Thus, when we have
finished this kind of research we shall
have acquired instruments by which we
can observe the universe, and consider
its ficenernl character. For so lonof as
one does not know its general character
one cannot know the created, atid ^o Ion «:
as he doe.^ not know the created, he can
20 AYERROES
have no knowledge of the Creator. Thus
we must begin an inquiry into the
universe systematically, such as we have
learned from the trend of rational in-
ference. It is also evident that this aim
is to be attained by the investigation of
one part of the universe after another,
and that help must be derived from
predecessors, as is the case in other
sciences. Imagine that the science of
geometry and astronomy had become
extinct in our day, and a single individual
desired to find out by himself the
magnitude of the heavenly bodies, their
forms, and their distances from one
another. Even though he were the most
sagacious of men, it would be as im-
possible for him as to ascertain the pro-
portion of the sun and the earth and the
magnitude of the other stars. It would
only be attainable by aid of divine
revelation, or something like it. If it be
said to him that the sun is a hundred
and fifty or sixty times as big as the
^arth^ he wouW take it to be sheer m^^'
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY h
ness on the part of the speaker, though
it is an estabHshed fact in the science of
astronomy, so that no one learned in
that science will have any doubt about it.
The science which needs most examples
from other sciences is that of Law, For
the study of juiisprudeuce cannot be
completed except in a very long time.
If a man today would himself learn of
all the arguments discovered by the
different disputants of diverse sects, in
problems which have always excited
contentions in all the big cities, except
those of Al-Maghrib, he would be a
proper object to be laughed at on account
of the impossibility of the task, in spite
of the existence of every favourable cir-
cumstance. This is similar not only in
the sciences but also in the arts. For
no one is capable of discovering by him-
self alone everything which is required.
And if this is so in other sciences and
arts, how^ is it possible in the art of
arts - philosophy ?
This being so, it becomes us to go
24 AVEHROES
back to the Ancients, and to see what
observations and considerations they have
made into the universe, accordinof to the
tests of inference. We should consider
what they have said in this connection
and proved in their books, so that what-
ever may be true in them we may accept
and, while thanking theni, be glad to know
it, and whatever be wrong, we should
be warned by it, be cautioned, and hold
them excused for their mistake.
From what has been said, it may be
taken that a search into the books of
the Ancients is enjoined by the Law,
when their meaning and purpose be the
same as that to which the Law exhorts
us. Anyone who prevents a man from
pondering over these things, that is, a
man who has the double quahty of
natural sagacity and rectitude in the
Law, with the merit of learning and
disposition - turns away the people from
the door by which the Law invites
them to enter into the knowledge of
God, and that is the door of observation
kELlOlON ANt) PHILOSOPHY k
\vhich leads to the perfect knowledge of
God. Such an action is the extreme
limit of iornorance and of remoteness
from God.
If, by studying these books, a man
has been led astray and gone wrong on
account of some natural defect, bad
training of the mind, inordinate passion,
or the want of a teaclier who might
explain to him the true significance of
things, by all or some of these causes,
we ought not on this account to prevent
one fit to study these things from doing
so. For such harm is not innate in man,
but is only an accident of training.
It is not right that a drug which is
medically useful by its nature should be
discarded because it may prove harmful
by accident. The Prophet told a man
whose brother was suffering with diarrhea
to treat him with honey. But this only
increased the ailment. On his complain-
ing, tlie Prophet said : *' God was right
and thy brother's stomach was wrong.*'
We would even say that a man whg
h aVerroes
prevents another fit for it, from study-
ing the books of philosophy, because
certain worthless people ha¥e been mis-
led by them, is like a man who refused
a thirsty man cold and sweet \ water,
till he died, because some people under
the same circumstances have b^en
suffocated by it and have died. F*,or
death by suffocation through drinkir^^g
cold water is accidental, while by thirst
it is natural and inevitable.
This state of things is not peculiar
to this science only, but is common to
all. How many jurists there are in
whom jurisprudence has become the cause
of worldliness and lack of piety '{ We
should say that a large majority of jurists
are of this kind, although their science
should result in better action than other
sciences which only lead to better
knowledge.
So far, then, the position is estab-
lished. Now, we Muslims firmly believe
that our Law is divine and true. This
very Law urges us and brings us to
RELIGION AKfD ^ILOS^O^IlY 2S
that blessing which is known as the
knowledge of God, and His creation.
This is a fact to which every Muslim
will bear testimony by his very nature
and temperament. We say this, because
temperaments differ in believing: one will
believe through philosophy; while another
will believe through dogmatic dis-
course, just as firmly as the former, as
no other method appeals to his nature.
There are others who believe by exhor-
tation alone, iust as othe) s believe through
inferences. For this reason our divine
Law invites people by all the three
methods, which every man has to satisfy,
except those who stubbornly refuse to
believe, or those, according to whom
these divine methods have not been
established on account of the wayward-
ness of their hearts. This is why the
niission of the Prophet has been declared
common to the whole world, for his Law
comprises all the three methods leading
men towards God. What we say is quite
clear from tne followinor saving of God;
li AVEftkoES
^' Invite men unto the way of the Loi'd,
by wisdom and mild exhortation, and
dispute with them in the most condes-
cending manner/'^
As this Law is true and leads to the
consideration of the knowledge of God,
we Muslims should believe that rational
investigation is not contrary to Law, for
truth cannot contradict truth, but veri-
fies it and bears testimony to it. And
if that is so, and rational observation is
directed to the knowledge of any exis-
tent objects, then the Law may be found
to be silent about it, or concerned with
it. In the former case no dispute arises,
as it would be equivalent to the absence
of its mention in the Law as injunctory,
and hence the jurist derives it from legal
conjecture. But if the Law speaks of it,
either it will agree with that which has
been proved by inference, or else it will
disaorree with it. If it is in aorreement
it needs no comment, and if it is opposed
to the Law, an interpretation is to be
7. tjuran xvi, 126.
RkLlaiOK AND tHiLOSOPliV i^
sought. Interpretation means to carry
the meaning of a word from its original
sense to a metaphorical one. But this
should be done in such a manner as will
not conflict with the custom of the
Arabian tongue. It is to avoid the
naming of an object, by simply mention-
ing its like, its cause, its attribute, or
associate, etc. which are commonly quoted
in the definition of the different kinds of
metaphorical utterances. And if the
jurist does so in many of the legal
injunctions, how very befitting would it
be for a learned man to do the same
with his arguments. For the jurist has
only his fanciful conjectures to depend
upon, while a learned man possesses
positive ones.
We hold it to be an established
truth that if the Law is apparently
opposed to a truth proved by philo-
sophy it admits of an interpretation
according to the canons of the Arabic
language. This is a proposition which
a Muslim cannot doubt nnd a believer
is AVKRROtlS
cannot luistrust. One who ifc accustomed
to these things divine can experience
for himself what we have said. The
aim of this discourse is to brin^ tof]:ether
intellectual and traditional science.
Indeed, we would even say that no
logical conclusion will be found to be
opposed to the Law, which when sifted
and investigated in its different parts
will be found in accordance, or almost
so, with it.
That is why all Muslims are agreed
that all the words of the Law arc not
to be taken literally, nor all of them
given an interpretation. But they vary
in verses, which are or are not to be
inteipreted. For example, the Asharites
put an interpretation upon the verse of
Equalisation^ and on the Tradition of
8. " It is he who hath createtl you whatsoever is on
earth, and that set His mind to the creation of heaven and
formed it into seven heavena; he knoweth all thing." Quran
n. 29. For an interpretation of this see Raji's Tafsiri Kabir
vol. I. p. 249 et seq. Cairo. 1307. A. H. and- Tabari's Conb-
limitary vol. 1. p. 14G et Beq. Cairo 1903 A. D.
Bt^LlGION AND PHILOSOPHY 29
Descent,^ while the Hanbalites take them
hterally. The Law has made two sides
of these-exoteric and esoteric-because of
the differences of human nature and
minds in verifying a thing. Thp existence
of an opposed esoteric 'meaning is in
order to call the attention of the learned
to find out a comprehensive interpreta-
tion. To this the following verse of fclie
Quran refers : *' It is he who hath sent
down unto thee the book, wherein are
some verses clear to be understood —
they are the foundation of the book —
and others are parabolical. But thev
whose hearts are perverse will follow
that which is parabolical therein, out Of
love of schism, and a desire of the
interpretation thereof ; yet none knoweth
the interpretation thereof except God,
But they who are \vell grounded in
9. " Verily GckI comes down every night to the oarth '
( Nihaj^h fi Gharibil Hadith by Jbu Athir vol. IV. p. 138
Cairo 1311 A. H., ) For an interpretation see the above and
Qustatain's Comnfieptary on Bakari, vol. TX p, 178, Cairo, 1307
A. H,
^ AVBRBOES
knowledge say: We believe therein, the
whole is from our Lord, and none will
consider except the prudent."^^
Here it may be objected that in the
Law there are things which all Muslims
have agreed to take esoterically, while
there are others on which they have
agreed to put an interpretation, while
there are some about which they dis-
agree. Ls it justifiable to use logic in
the interpretation of those which have
been taken literally, or otherwise ? We
would say that if the agreement is posi-
tive there is no need to apply logic ;
but if it be conjectural there is. For
this very rCvason Abu Hamid (Al Ghaz-
zali) and Abu Ma*ali and other learned
doctors have ordained that a man does
not become an unbeliever by forsaking
the common agreement and applying the
principle of interpretation in such things.
It will certainly be agreed that complete
concensus of opinion is not possible in
metaphysical questions, in the manner in
10, Qimm iii, 5.
UELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY bI
which it is possible to establish it in
practical things. For it is not possible
to establish unanimity of opinion at any
time, unless we confine ourselves to a
small period and know perfectly all the
learned doctors living in it, that is, their
personalities, their number and their
views about any question to be quoted
to us directly from them without a break
in the chain. With all this w^e should
know for certain that the doctors livinor
at that time are acrreed that there is no
distinction of exoteric and esoteric mean-
ings in the Law, that the knowledge of
no proposition should be concealed
from anybody, and that the method of
teaching the Law should be the same
with all men. But we know that a
large number of people in the early days
of Islam believed in exoteric and esoteric
meaninors of the Law, and thougrht that
the esoteric meanings should not be dis-
closed to an ignorant person who cannot
understand them. For example, Bukhari
has related on the authority of AH that
B2 AVKRR6eS
he said " Talk to men what they can
understand. Do you intend to give the
He to God and His Apostle ? " There
are many Traditions to the same effect
related from other people. So, how is
it possible to conceive of any consensus
of opinion coming down to us in meta-
physical questions when we definitely
know that in every age there have been
doctors who take the Law to contain
thinors the real siornificance of which
should not be disclosed to all men ? But
in practical affairs it is quite different.
For all persons are of opinion that they
should be revealed to all men alike. In
these things unanimity of opinion can
be easily obtained if the proposition is
published, and no disagreement is re-
ported. That may be sufficient to obtain
unanimity of opinion in practical things
as distinct from the sciences.
If it be maintained that one does
not become an unbeliever bv iornorinor
consensus of opinion in interpretation, as
po unanimity is possible in it, what shall
RELIGION AND PSTLOSOPHV 38
we say of such Muslim philosophers aa
Abu Nasi- ( Al Farabi ) and Ibn Sina
( Avieenna ) ? For Abu Hamid ( Al
Ghazzali ) has charged them with posi-
tive infidelity in his book: The Refuta-
tion of the Philosophers, in regard to
three things : The eternity of the
world ; God's ignorance of particulars \
and the interpretation conceiving the
resurrection of bodies and the ^tate of
the Day of Judgment, To this we should
leply that from what he has said it is
not clear that he has charged them
positivel.y with infidelih}'. For in his
book Al Tafriqah hain'al Idami to'al
Zindiqah he has explained that the
infidelity of a man who ignores the
consensus of opinion is doubtful. More-
over we have definitely pointed out that
it is not possible to establish a consensus
of opinion in such matters, especially
when there are many people of the early
times who have held that there are inter-
pretations which should not be disclosed
to all but only to those who ar^ ft!/ for
3
U AVfiRROE^
theio and those are men who are " well
grounded in knowledge '^^^ a divine in-
junction which cannot be overlooked.
For if such people do not know the
interpretation in these matters they will
have no special criterion of truth for
their faith, which the common people
have not, while God has described them
as believing in Him. Ihis kind of faith
is always produced by the acceptance of
the arguments, and that is not possible
without) a knowledge of interpretation.
Otherwise, even the common people
believe in the words of God without
any philosophy v^liatever. The faith
which the Quran has especially ascribed
to the learned must be a faith streng-
thened with full arguments, which can-
not be without a knowledge of the canons
of interpretation. For God has said that
the Law admits of interpretation which
is its real significance, and this is what
is established by arguments. Yet though
this is so, it is impossible to establish
no-
Xh Qumn ttir 5r
any well grounded consensus of opinion
in the interpretations which God has
ascribed to the learned men. That is
quite evident to anyone with insight.
But with this we see that Abu Hamid
( Al Ghazzali ) has made a mistake in
ascribing to the Peripatetic Philosophers,
the opinion that God has no knowledge
of particulars. They are only of opinion
that the knowledge of God about parti-
culars is quite different from ours. For our.
knowledge is the effect of the existence
of a thing. Such knowledge is produced
by the existence of a thing, and changes
with changes in the thing. On the.
other hand the knowledge of God is the
cause of an existent thing. Thus one
who compares these two kinds of know-
ledge ascribes the same characteristics
to two quite different things — and that
is extreme ignorance. When applied both
to eternal and to transitory things the
word knowledge is used only in a formal
fashion, just as we use many other words
fpr objects ©sseutially diffaront. For
36 AVERROES
instance the word Jalal is applied both
to great and small ; and sarim to light
and darkness. We have no definition
which can embrace both these kinds of
knowledge, as some of the Mutakallimuu
of our times have thought. We have
treated this question separatel}'^ at the
request of some of our friends.
How can it be supposed that the
Peripatetic Philosophers say that God
has no knowledge of particulars when they
are of opinion that man is sometimes
warned of the cominsr vicissitudes of the
future through visions, and that he gets
these admonitions in sleep, through a
great and powerful Director, who directs
everything ? These philosophers are not
only of opinion that God has no know-
ledge of details such as we have but
thev also believe that He is io^norant
of universals. For all known universals
wnth us are also the effect of the exist-
ence of a thing, while God's knowledge
is quite other than this. From these
aro'uments it is concluded that God's
iiELiG ION A N D.riii Lusorirv nf
kiiowIedL!'c is far liiiilier than UihI it
sfiouid be callt'd uiiivers-al or particular.
There is therefore no difference of opinioii
concerning the piopositioi], that is,
whether they are called infidel or not.
As to the eternal or transitory nature
of the world : I think that in this
matter the difference of opinion between
the Asharite Mutakallimun and the
Ancient Philosophers is for the most
part a verbal difference, at least so far
as the opinion of some of the Ancients
is concerned. For they are agreed on
the fact that there are three kinds of
creation — the two ex:tremes and a medial
one. They auain agree on the nomen-
clature of the two extremes, but the}'
disairree as to the medial one. As to
the one extreme, it has come into exist-
ence frpm something other than itself,
or from anything else — that is from a
ojencrative cause or matter — while time
existed before it. All those things whose
existence is perceived by the senses, as
water, animals, vegetation, etc., are in-
38 AVERROES
eluded in this. All Ancient and Ashar-
ite philosophers are agreed in denomi-
nating this creation Originated.
The other exti-eme is that which
came into existence from notliing, not
out of anything, and time did not precede
it. The two parties are agreed in call-
in Of this Eternal. This extreme can be
reached by logic. This is God, the
Creator, Inventor, and Preserver of all.
The medial kind of creation is that
which has neither been made from
nothing, ''matter," nor has time preceded
it, but it has been created by some
generative cause. In this is included
the whole world. Again they all agree
on the existence of all the three cate-
gories of the universe. The Mutakal-
limuu admit, or they ought to admit,
that before the universe there was
no time, for according to them time is
contemporaneous with motion and body.
They are also agreed with the Ancients
that future time and creation have no
end, but they differ as to past time and
tlELIGlOX AND PHILOSOPHY $9
Its creation. The Mutakallimun are of
opinion that it had a beginning.
This is the belief of Plato and his
disciples, while Aristotle and his fol-
lowers are of opinion that it had no
beginning, just as the future has no end.
It is clear that the last mentioned kind
of creation resembles both the oHginated
and the eternal creation. So one who
thinks that in the past creation there
are more characteristics of the eternal
than the originated takes it to be eternal
and vice versa. But in reality it is
neither truly originated nor eternal. For
the oriofinated creation is necessarilv
subject to destruction while the eternal
is without a cause. There are some, for
example, Plato and his follow^ers, who
have called it infinitely originated, for
according to them time has no end.
There is not here so great a difference
about the universe, for it to be made
the basis of a charge of infidelitj^ In
fact, they should not be so charged at
all, for opinions which aie worth v of
40 AVERROES
this are far removed from ours, those
quite contrary to them, as the Mutakal-
limun have thought them to be in this
proposition. I mean that they take the
words originated and eternal to be contrary
expressions, which our investigation hat?
shown not to be the case.
The strange thing about all these
opinions is that they arc not in agree-
ment with the literal sense of the Law.
For if we look closely we shall find many
verses which tell us of the creation of
the universe — that is, of its originated
nature. Creation and time aru said to
be without end. For according to the
verse : ** It is He who hath created the
heavens and the earth in six days, but
His Throne was above the waters before
the creation thereof "^^ it is clear that
there was a universe before this one,
and that is the throne and the water,
and a time which existed before that
water. Then again the verse ^' The day
will come when the earth shall be changed
12. Quran xi, 9.
tlKLIGION AND PHILOSOPHV i4
into another earth and the heavens into
other heavens "^^ shows equally when
taken literally that there will be a
universe after this one. Again, the
verse : ^* Then He set his mind to the
creation of lieaven and it was smoke" ^*
shows that the heavens were created
from somethinor.
Whatever the Mufcakailimun say about
the universe is not based on a literal
sense of the Law, but is an interpreta-
tion of it. For the Law does not tell,
us that God was even before mere non-
existence, and moreover, this is not found
as an ordinance in it. How can we'
suppose that there could by any ounsjun-
sus of opinion about the interpretation
of verses by the Mutakallimun ? In fact,
there is much in the sayings of some
philosophers which supports what we
have quoted from the Law, taken literally.
Those who differ concerning these
obscure questions have either reached the
truth and have been rewarded; or 'have
K). Qumu xiV) 19. U. Quran xli, 10.
42 AVteRtJOES
fallen into error and have to be excused.
For it is compulsory rather* than volun-
tary to believe a thing to be true, the
proof of which has already been estab-
lished ; that is, we cannot believe or
disbelieve it as we like, as it depends
upon our will to stand or not to do so.
So, if one of the conditions of verifica-
tion be freedom of choice, a learned man,
and he alone should be held excused, if
he makes a mistake on account of some
doubt. Hence the Prophet has said that
if a magistrate judges rightly he receives
two rewards, and if he makes a mistake
he deserves only one. But what magis-
trate is greater than one who judges
the universe, whether it is so or not.
^ These are the judges — the learned
men — whom God has distinguished with
the know^ledge of interpretation.
It is this kind of mistake of insigfht
which learned people are quite apt to
make when they look into those obscure
questions the investigation of which the
Law has imposed upon them. But the
KKrJ*TON AND PHILOSOPHY 4$
mistake the comnion people make in
these matters is sin pure and simple,
whether in theoretical or in practical
things. As a magistrate, ignorant of
Tradition, when he makes mistakes in
judgment, cannot be held excused, so
likewise a judge of the universe when
not having the qualities of a judge is
also not excusable, but is either a sinner
or an* unbeliever. If it be a condition
that a magistrate shall have capacity oi
arbitration concerning the lawful and
the forbidden, that is, knowledge of the
principles of Law and their application
through analogy — how much more
befitting it is for an arbitrator of the
universe to be armed with fundamental
knowledge of the mental sciences, and the
way of deducing results from them.
Mistake in the interpretation of the
Law is thus of two kinds — a mistake
which can be excused in one fit to look
into the thino^ in which it has been
committed, just as an expert physician
is excused if he commits an error in the
4i AVkuuOES
application of bis science ; or a magis-
trate when he misjudges, and a mistake
which is inexcusable in one nut lit to
investioate a thino^. But the error which
caniipt be excused for anybody, and
which, if it happens to show itself in
relation to the very principles of the
Law, is infidelity, and if in universals
is an innovation, is that error which is
committed in those things which have
been settled by all arguments and so the
knowledge of them is possible for every-
body, for instance, the acknowledgement
of the existence of God, of Prophecy,
and of the happiness or the nn'sery of
the next world. This is so, because all
these three principles are proved by
those thr«e methods, the justification of
which a man cannot deny by any means,
that is exhortative controversial and
argumentative proofs. A denier of such
things, which are the very root of the
principle of the Law, is an unbeliever,
a retroofrade with his toncyue and his
heart, or through negligence, on account
RKLTGION AND PHILOSOPHY 45
of his denying them in spite of proofs.
For if he be a man believing in argu-
ments, he can verify them t^hrough these
or if he believes in controversy, he can
verif}' through that : and if he believes
in religious admonitions he can well
justify tliem through these. And hence
the Prophet has said : " I have been
commanded to fight with men till ^they
say: 'There is no God but Allah' and
believe in me " that is, by any of these
three means of attaining the Faith.
Rut there are things which, on account
of their obscurity, cannot be understood
by inference. So, God has favoured such
of his creatures as cannot understand
logic, either on account of tlieir nature,
liabit, or lack of mental training, by
quoting examples and parables of such
things and has ui'ged them to testify as
to theif truth through them. For every-
one has mental capacity enough to under-
stand Ihein by the help of dogmatic and
exhortatory argument which are common
to all nien. This is whv the T/aw has
i> aVeuroes
been divided into two kinds: exoteric
and esoteric. The exoteric part consists
of those examples which have been coined
to express certain meanings; while the
esoteric is the meanino^s themselves,
which are not manifested except to the
leained in philosophy.
These are the very four or five kinds
of methods of knowinor reality mentioned
by Abu Hamid ( Al Ghazzali ) in his
b( ok called Al Tafriqah hain al Islam
wal Zindiqah. If it so happens as we
have said that we can know of a thing
by any of the above mentioned three
methods, (hen we do not stand in need
of any examples for understanding them.
Such things should be taken literally
and interpretation should find no place
with regard to them. If these things
form a part of the principles of the Law,
one who puts an interpretation upon
them is an infidel. For instance, if a
man believes that there is nc happiness
or misery in the next world, and that
the te^chipg b only an artifice, to safe*
guard the life and property of the
people from one another and that there
is no goal for men other than this life,
then he is certainly an unbeliever.
When this has once been established
it will become clear to you that inter-
pretation is not lawful in the exoteric
part of the Law. If the canon of inter-
pretation be used in the principles of the
Law, it is infidelity, and if used in
general thinsf^ it is an innovation. But
there is also a certain exoteric law
which requires an interpretation from
learned men. It is not misbeliet for
them to take it exoterically, but it is so
or is at least an innovation in reliorion if
ignorant men try to intei-pret or ex[)]ain it.
Among these is the verse of Equali-
sation and the Tradition of Descent. For
the Prophet said of a Nes^ro slave <rhi
who told him that God was in heaven :
*' Emancipate her, for she is a believer.*
For tliere are persons vv^ho cannot beheve
a thing except through their imagina*
tioMf that i^j it is diffioult for them tQ
48 AVERROKS
believe a thing which they cannot ima-
gine. Among these may be classed men
who cannot understand a thing except
with a reference to space, and hence
believe in God as though physical, not-
withstanding that these are the very
persons who have dealt ver}^ harshly
with those mentioned above. They
ought to be told that things of this
character are parabolical, and that we
should pause and consider the saying of
God : ** Yet none knoweth the inter-
pretation thereof except God". Although
learned men aorree that these aie to be
interpreted, they differ in the interpreta-
tion according to their knowledge of
principles of philosophy. There is a third
part of the Law which occupies an in-
termediate position, on account of some
doubt about it. Some say that it should
be taken exoterically, and that no inter-
pretation should be allowed in it ; while
there are others who say that the}^ have
some of^oteric meaning, and should not
be taken exoterically by the learnecl
BEI.IGION AND PHILOSOPHV 49
This is on account of the obscurity of
their meaning. A learned man maj^ be
excused if he makes a mistake about
them.
If the Law is . divided into these
three parts, it may be asked : to which
of these does the description ot the state
of the Day of Judgment belong? We
would reply that it is quite clear, on the
very lace of the question, that it belono^s
to that part in wliieh tlieie is soine
difierence ot (ipinion. For one group of
men, who class themselves among philo-
sophers, say that tlKJse things sliould
be taken literally. For, according to
them, there is not a sincjle aro^ument
which makes their literal sense absurd
and unreasonable. This is the method
of the Asharites, But another group of
philosophers interpret them; but they
differ very widely in the interpretation
itself. Amongst these may be mentioned
Abu Hamid ( Al Ghazzali ) and a large
number of Sufis. There are some who
would amalgamate the two interpret^'
BO AVERROES
tions, as Abu Hamid has done in some
of his books- These questions are among
those in which, if the learned men err
they are to be excused; otherwise, they
are to be thanked and rewarded. For,
if one acknowledges the reality of the
Day of Judgment, and then begins to
apply the principles of interpretation to
the description, and not its realit}^ he
does not in any way deny it. A denial
of its reality is infidelity, for it is one
of the fundamentals of the Law, and it
can be easily verified by any of the
three methods of argument common to
all men. But one who is not learned
should take it exoterically, an interpret-
ation in his case is unbelief, foi it leads
to infidelity. We are thus of opinion
that such people should accept the literal
sense, for interpretation will certainly
lead them to infidelity. A learned man
who discloses the discussions of these
things to the common people helps them
towards unbelief and one who abets
^npth^r in tb^t direction is bii^wsaJf no
kELIGION AND PHILOSOFHV Bl
better than an unbeliever. It is there-
fore unsuitable that these interpretations
shpuld be pubhshed in any other than
learned books, for in this way they will
reach none but the learned. But it is a
mistake both in religion apd philosophy
if they are put in other books, with
dogmatic and exhortative arguments,
as Abu Hamid has done. Although the
authors intention was good, the idecc
thus to increase the number of Jearned
men, he caused a good deal of mischief
through it. For, on account of this
method some people began to find fault
with philosophy, and others to blame
religion, and still others began to think
of reconciling the two. It seems that
this was the very aim which Abu Hamid
had in view in writing these books. He
has tried to awaken the nature of men,
for he never attached himself to any
particular way of thinking in his books.
He was an Asharite with the Asharites,
a Sufi with the Sufis and a philosopher
witji the philosophers, m muQb m that
12 AVERROES
he was, as has been said : " I am a
Yeminite when I meet a Yenvinite; if
I meet a Ma'adi I am one of Banu
Ad nan .'^
Hence, it is necessary for the doctors
of Islam to prevent men, except the
learned, from reading his books; as it is
incumbent upon them to hinder them
from reading controversial writings which
should not be studied except by those
fit to do so. As a rule the reading of
these books is less harmful than those
of the former. For the majority cannot
understand philosophical books, only
those endowed with superior natures.
People are on the whole destitute of
learning and are aimless in their reading
which they do without a teacher.
Nevertheless they succeed in leading
others away from religion. It is an
injustice to the best kind of men and
the best kind of creation-; for in their
case justice consists in the knowledge
of the best things by the best people,
fit to know it, It should be remembered
BKLIGION AND PHILOSOPHY' M
that th^ greater the thing is the higher
will bq tbe injustice done to it on account
of ignorance. Hence God says : " Poly-
theism i^ a great injustice/' ^^
These things we have thought proper
to mention here, that is, in a discussion
of the relation between philosophy and
religipn and the canons of iifterpretation
in Law. If these matters had not be-
come con^monly kiiown among men, we
would not have said anything about
them and would not have entered in a
plea on behatf of the interpreters. For
these things are suitable only for men-
tion in philosophical books.
You ought to be aware that the real
purpose of the Law is to impart the
knowledge of truth and of right action.
The knowledge of truth consists in the
cogniscance of God and the whale uni-
verse with its inner significance, es|)ec-
ially that of religion, and the knowledge
of happiness or misery of th^ nost
world. Riorht action consists in follow-
o
15. Quran xxxi, 12.
51 AVBBROES
ing those actions which are useful Aot
happiness and avoiding those which lead
to misery. The knowledge of these
actions has been called practical know-
ledge. This is divided into two kinds:
external actions, the knowledge of which
is called Fiqh, that is, Theology ; and
actions pertaining to feelings, such as
gratitude, patience, and other points of
character to which the Law has urged
us or from which it has prohibited us.
This is called the knowledge of contin-
ence and of the next world. Abu Hamid
in his book The Revivification of the
Sciences of Religion seems to be inclined
to this kind, and as the people have
always turned away from the former
kind of knowledge and have turned
themselves to the second which leads
them easily to piety, the book attained
its name. But we have wandered from
our own purpose and will now return
to it.
If the purpose of the Law is to im-
part the knowledge of truth and of right
RELlGiON 'AND PHIiOSOPllY 65
action, this cannot be attaitied except by
one of the two methods : viz^ by concept-
ion or verification such as MutakalHra-
un have maintained in their books.
There are three methods ,of verification
open to people: philosoph}^, dogmatics
and exhortation. There are two methods
of conception : either by the thing itself,
or by its like. As all people cannot by
their nature , understand and accept philo-
sophical and dogmatic arguments, to-
gether with the difficulty of learning
the use of inferences and the long time
it takes to learn them, and the purpose
of the Law being to be quite common
aniong men, it is necessary that it should
contain all kinds of verifications and
conceptions. Among the methods of
verification th^re are some which are
meant for the common people; that is,
exhortative and dogmatic, the exhortative
being more common than the other.
There is one method which is meant
solely for the learned, and that is the
method of rational inference. Now, it is
M AVERROES
the primary aim of the Law to improve
the condition of the many without neg-
lecting the few, and hence the method
of conception and verification adopted
are common to the majority.
These methods are of four kinds : the
first is that which, while in particulars
the same in both, that is, both exhorta-
tively and dialectically, is still true by
conception and verification. These are
syllogis?ns of which the minor and the
major premise are certain, besides being
easily imagined and well known. These
are set before the deductions which are
drawn from them, and not from their
likes. To this kind of religious injunction
there is no interpretation, and one who
denies them or puts an interpretation
upon them is an infidel. The second
kind is that the premises of which
although well known or easily imagin-
ed are also positively established.
Their conclusions are drawn by analogy.
Upon these, that is, their conclusions,
an interpretation may be put. The third
HELIGION AND PHILOSOPHX^ 57
kind is just the reverse of the second,
that is^ the conclusions are .themselves
intended and their premises are well
known or easily imagined without being
positively established. Upon these also-
that is, upon the conclusions, no inter-
pretation can be put, but the premises
may sometimes be interpreted. The fourth
kind is that the premises of which are
well-known or conjectural without being
positively established. Their deductions
are by analogy when that is intended.
It is the duty of the learned men to
interpret them and of the common people
to take them exoterically.
In short, all that should be interpreted
can be grasped by philosophy alone. So
the duty of the learned person is to
interpret, and of the common people to
take it literally, both in conception and
in verification. The reason for the latter
is that they cannot understand more.
A student of law sometimes finds inter-
pretations which have a preference over
others, in a general way by verification:
B8 AVKtlkO^S
that is, the argument is more eonvincing
with the interpretations than with the
literal meanings. These interpretations
are common and it is possible for them
to be admitted by any whose speculative
faculties have been developed in con-
troversy. Some of the interpretations
of the Asharites and the Mutazilites are
of this type, though the arguments of
the Mutazilites are generally the more
weighty. But it is the duty of the com-
mon people who are not capable of under-
standinor more than exhortation to take
them exoterically. Indeed, it is not pro-
per for them to know the interpretations
at all.
Thus there are three groups into
which men have been divided : Those
who are not included amongst those who
should know the interpretations. These
are common people who are guided by
exhortation alone. They form a vast
majority: for there is not a single rational
being who cannot accept a result by
this method. The second are dogmatic
interpreters. These are so, either by
their nature only, or both by nature and
habit. The third are those who can be
definitely called interpreters. These are
the philosophers, both by nature and by
philosophical training. This kind of in-
terpretation should not be discussed with
the dogmatists, not to speak of the com-
mon people. If any of these interpreta-
tions are disclosed to those not fit to
receive them-especially philosophical in*
terpretations-these being far higher than
common knowledge, they may be led to
infidelity. For he wishes to nullify the
exoteric meaning and to prove his inter-
pretation. But if the exoteric meaning
is shown to be false without the inter-
pretation being established, he fails into
infidelity, if this concerns the principles
of the Law. So, the interpretations
should not be disclosed to the common
people, and ought not to be put into
exhortative or doctrinal books-that is,
books written with an expository purpose
in view as Abu Hamid has done,
60 AVERKOES
HiDnce, it is necessarry that the com-
mon people shonld be told that those
things which are exoteric, and yet can-
not be understood easily, the interpreta-
tions of which it is impossible for tlieiri
to understand^ are parabolical, and that
no one knows the interpretation thereof
except God. We should stop at the
following words of God ** None knoweth
the interpretation thereof except God ''.'^
This is also the answer to the question
fi^bout some of those abstruse problems
which the common people cannot under*
stand : " They will ask thee concerning
the spirit: answer: The spirit was created
at the command of my Lord, but ye have
DO knowledge given to you, except a
Uttle."^^ Again, one who interpretes these
to persons not fit to receive them is an
infidel, because he leads others to infidel-
ity, which is quite in opposition to the
purpose of the Law. This is especially
the caae when corrupt . ipterpretations
are put on the principles of the Law, as
16. Quran iii. 5. 17., Quran xvii. 87.
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 61
some iHen of our own times do. We
have known many people who think they
are philo^phers and hence claim to find
out strange things through philosophy,
wrhieh are iri ev^iy way oontrary to
religion, and they do not admit of any
I other interpretation. They think they
must disclose these things to the common
people. But by the disclosure of wrong
notions they lead them to eternal
destruction.
The difference between their aim and
that of tiie jurists can be made clear
by the following example. Since it is
not possible to make every one an ex-
pert physician a certain physician hiid
down some principles for the preserva-
tion of health and the prevention of
diseases, and he allowed the use of some
things but prohibited others. Now a
man comes and tella the people that the
principles laid down by that physician
are not correct and declares them to be
false, and they become discredited in the
eyes of the people ; or says that they
t2 AVERROt:S
are capable of interpretations which
they cannot understand and cannot
verify by practice. Do you think that
people in these circumstances will ever
act upon those things which are useful
for their health and for the prevention
of diseases or that the man himself will
ever be capable of acting on them ? No,
he will be quite incapable of doing so
and thus will lead them all to destruc-
tion.
This is the case when those interpret-
ations which the}^ cannot understand
are correct, to say nothing of those that
are wrong. For they will not believe
in health to be preserved, nor disease
to be prevented, to say nothing of the
things which preserve health or prevent
disease. This is the condition of that man
who discloses interpretations of the Law
to the common people and those not fit
to receive them. And hence he is an
unbeliever.
The simile which we have described
ftboye is a real parallel, and not merelj^ .
RELIGION AND PHlLOSOP^ 6^
fanciful ( as some may think ) as it is
correct in every respect. For the relat-
ion of the medicine to the body is the
same as that of the Law to the soul.
A physician is one who seeks to pre-
serve the health when he finds it good
and tries to restore it when it is missed.
In the same way a religious law- giver
is one who takes care of the health of
souls, which is called piety. The Quran
also makes clear its purpose, through
religious action, by many verses. For
instance : " O true believers, a fast is
ordained unto you as it was ordained
those before you, that ye may fear God" ^^
and " Their flesh is not accepted of God,
neither their blood ; but your piety is
accepted by Him "^^ and : " For prayer
preserveth a man from filthy crimes and
from that which is blameable."^^ There
are many other verses of the same
. nature in the Quran. Thus^ we see, a
religious law-giver seeks to establish
this kind of health by religious know-
S4 AVERROES
ledge and pr'actiee. This is the health
upon which depends happiness and in
the ea$e of its absence the misery of
the next world.
This should have made it clear to
you not merely that one should not speak
of the wrong interpretation. But also
that it is not proper to put even tiue
one,s Jn the books of the common people.
These correct interpretations are of the
faith which man has and of which the
whole creation was afraid to bear the
burden. By this we refer to the fol-
lowing verse of the Qnran : '* We pro-
posed the faith unto the heavens, and
the earth, and the mountains, and they
refused to undertake the same, and were
afraid thereof, but man undertook it :
verily he is unjust to himself and foolish.'' ^i
These interpretations and the idea that
their discussion is necessary in the Law
have given rise to many sects in Islam,
so much so that they have denounced
one another with infidelity and innova-
|1 ^ran xxxiii, G7,
HRLIGIONAND PHILOSOPHY 6B
tions. This is especially the effect of
wrong interpretations. The Mutazilites
interpreted a large number of verses and
Traditions and disclosed them to the
peopk. So also did the Asharites,
though their interpretations were Itess in
number. They only succeeded in creat-
ing hatred and wars among me!i, destroy-
ing the Law, and disuniting the people
eompletel}'. To add to this, the method
which they have adopted in proving
these interpretations is adapted neither
^ to the common people nor to the learned;
For if you look closely into it, you will
find that it is not correct according to
the norms of logic — this anyone who
has had any training may see for him-
self without the least effort. In fact,
many of the principles upon which the
Asharites build their conclusions are
sophistical in their nature. They deny
many fundamentals, like the proof of
accidence, the influence of one thing upon
another, the necessity of cause and effects,
abstract figures and the processes leading
5
66 AVERROES
to them. Indeed, Asharite Mutakallim-
uii have been in this respects unjust
to Mohanimadans, for one of their sects
has denounced as infidels all those who
do not recognise the existence of God
by methods which they have devised for
the knowledge of Him : but in truth they
themselves are in the wrong and are
unbelievers.
It is upon this point that the dif-
ference of opinion arises. Some say that
the first principle is of reason, while
others allege that it is of faith. That
is to say they have thought that faith,
even before knowinof the methods common
to all and to which the Law has made
a call on all, is the only method of ar-
riving at truth. Thus they have mistak-
en the real purpose of the Law-giver,
and being themselves in the wrong they
have led others astray.
If it be alleged that the method that
the Asharites and other Mutakallimun
have devised are not those general met-
hods in the purpose of the Law-^giver
RELIGION AND PHILOSOrHY 67
for the instruction of the common people,
and that it is not possible without some
method being adopted, then the question
arises : What are those methods which
are given in the Law ? We maintain
that these methods are to be found in
the Quran alone. For, if we look closely
we shall find that in the Quran all the
three kinds of methods are laid down,
for the whole of mankind, both for the
majority and for the learned few. If we
reflect we shall come to see that no bet-
ter methods can be discovered for the
instruction of the common people than
those mentioned in the Quran, Anyone
who changes them by interpretations
which are neither clear in themselves nor
clearer than others to the common people,
makes null and void their philosophy
and their effect, the goal of which is the
happiness of mankind. This is quite
evident from the early and the later
condition of Islam, for in the early days
Mushms sought perfect excellence and
piety by acting on those principles with-
^8 AVBRROES
out putting any interpretation upon them.
And those among them who knew any
interpretation did not disclose it. In the
later days interpretations were used, and
piety decreased, the love for others was
lost, and they became divided into
schisms and parties.
Hence one who cares to remove this
innovation from the Law, should turn
to the Book, and should pick up from
it the existinor aroruments for thinojs
whose belief is inculcated upon us.
Further he should deeply think over the
esoteric meanings, as far as possible,
without putting interpretations upon
them, except when they are not quite
clear to all. The assertions of the Book for
the instructions of the people, when
thought over are things, with whose
help we can reach a stage from which
none but the learned in logic can differ
about the esoteric meanincr of that which
is not clear. This peculiarity cannot be
found in any other assertions but that
'of the Book. There are three peculiari-
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 69
ties In the assertions, which have been
explained in the Quran, for the common
people. First, that nothing can be found
more convincing and true than these.
Secondly, that they can be accepted by
every nature ; and they are such that
none can know their interpretatioiis, if
there be any, except the learned in logic.
Thirdly, that they possess a call to the
righteous, for correct interpretations.
This is neither to be found in the school
of the Asharites nor in that of the
Mutazalites i. e. their interpretations are
neither generally acceptable, nor do they
make any call to the righteous, nor are
they right in themselves. It is for this
reason that innovation has incr^eased,
and it is our desire to write about it,
as far as it is possible for us, provided
that we get leisure for it, have power
to do it, and God gives us a respite in
life. It is just possible that this may be
a beo^innino' for the comingr oeneration ;
because the breach of Law, due to evil
passions, aad changed beliefs is simply
70 AVEUROES
aggrieving and saddening. This is still
enhanced by those, who ascribe them-
selves to philosophy, because an injury
from a friend is worse than the injury
from an enemy. Philosophy is a com-
panion and a foster-sister to the Law.
Hence an injury from this source is the
worst kind of injury, even if we neglect
the enmity, hatred, and animosity which
is created between the two, although
they are companions by nature and
friends in reality. It has also been
injured by many ignorant friends who
ascribe themselves to it. These are the
schisms which exist in Islam. May
God set all aright, help ail to His love,
and bring together their hearts for
piet^^, and erase enmity and hatred by
his favour and ofrace.
Indeed God has removed much of
evil, ignorance and the misleading ways
through this strong government, and has
led the many to good, especially the
people who have walked in the path of
scholasticism, and have a liking for the
UfeLiaiON AND PHILOSOPHY 71
knowledge of the Truth. Because it has
called the people to the knowledge of
God by mediate paths, which are higher
than the depressions of the blind fol-
lowers: and lower than that of the high-
sounding Mutakallimum ; and has called
the learned to their duty of considering
fully the principles of Law.
la.
APPENDIX.
ON THE PROBLEM OF KTERNAL KNOWLEDGE,
WHICH AVERROKS HAS MENTIONED IN
HIS DECISIVE DISCOURSE.
May God perpetuate your honour
and bless you, and screen you always
from the eyes of misfortune. Through
your excellent intelligence and good
understanding you have learned a great
part of all these sciences, till your insight
informed you of the doubt which arises
concerninir the eternal knowledjje of
God, with its being at the same time
concerned with created things. Thus,
in the interests of truth, it is now in-
cumbent upon us to remove the doubt
from your mind, after we have stated
it clearly. For one who does not know
the problem adequately cannot very well
solve the doubt.
UELiaiON AND PHtLUSOPUV 71.
The question may be stated thus : If
all this universe was in the knowledge
of God before its creation, then, was it
in His knowledge after its creation as
it was before it ;came into existence;
or was ic in His knowledge before its
creation quite different from that aft»r
its coming into being? If we say that
the knowledge of God about it after its
creation is quite different from that
which it was before its creation, it be-
comes necessary for us to admit that
the eternal knowledge is changeable ; or
that when the universe came into exist-
ence out of non-existence, then there is
an addition to the eternal knowledge;
which is impossible. Again, if we say
that the knowledge of it was the same
in both the conditions, then it woald be
said : Was the created universe the same
beiore its rcoming into existence 'as it
was after its creation ? To this objection
it will have to be answered that it was
not the same before its creation as it
was after it, otherwise the existent and
H AVkRROkfe
the non-existent thing would be the
same. When the opponent has admitted
this much, he may be asked whether the
real knowledge does not consist in the
CQfjnizance of an existent thino- as it is.
If he says: ** Yes/* then accordingly it
becomes necessary that when a thing
changes in itself the knowledge of it
must also change, otherwise it would be
H knowledge of something other than the
real object. Thus it would then be
necessary to admit one of two things :
either the eternal knowledge itself will
change, or the created things would be
unknown to (iod. And both of these
alternatives are impossible with regard
to God. This doubt is still further
[ strengthened by the apparent condition
of man, that is, the relation of his
knowledge about non-existent things by
the supposition of their existence and
its relation when the thing in question
is found. It is self-evident that both
kinds of knowledge are different, other-
wise God would have been io^uorant of
UliLlGlON AND ^HILOSOPitV lh
its existence at the time he found it.
The argument which the MutakalHmun
advance to meet this objection does not
by any means deliver us from the doubt.
They say that God knows the things
before their coming into being, as they
would be after they come into existence.
If they say that no change occurs, they
fall into mistake. If on the other hand
they admit a change, they may be asked
whether this change was known in the
eternal knowledge or not. Thus the fipst
doubt occurs again. On the whole it is
difficult to imaorine that the knowledsre
of a thing before and after its existence
can be one and the same.
This is the statement of the doubt in
the briefest terms possible, as we have
put it for your sake. A solution of this
doubt requires a very long discussion,
but here we intend to state a point
which might easily solve it. Abu Hamid
( Al Ghazzali ) has also tried to solve
this doubt in his work : The Refutation
of the Philosophers, but his method is by
t^ AVERROKS
no nieatis satisfactory. For he says sotrie^
thing to this effect : he thinks the
known and the knowledge are not con-
nected with each other, so that when a
change takes place in the one the other
does not change in itself. So it is pos-
sible that it may happen in the case of
Divine knowledge and the things existent,
that is, they may change in themselves
while God's know^ledge may remain the
same. For instance a pillar may he on
the right hand of Zaid, it may be chang-
ed to his left without any change taking
place in Zaid himself. But the illustrat-
ion is not at all a correct one, for the
relation has changed, that is, that which
was on the right side is now on the left.
That in which no change has taken place
is the condition of tliat relation - Zaid.
It being so, and the knowledge is only
the relation itself, it is necessary that
it should chano^e with a chancre in the
thing known, as the change in the rela-
tion of the pillar to Zaid, for it is now
on the left after being on the right.
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 77
The view which might solve this ques-
tion is that it should be maintained that
the condition of eternal knowledge of
existent things is quite other than the
created knowledofe with reofard to them.
For tlie existence of a thing is the cause
and means of our knowledge of it, while
the eternal knowledge is itself the cause
and means of the existent thing. So if
a change takes place in the eternal
knowledge after the coming into being
of an existent thing, as it does in the
created knowledore then it is involved
that the former cannot be the cause but
only the effect of the existent things.
Thus it is necessary that there should
be no chanofe in it, as there is in the
created knowledge. This mistake always
occurs by our taking eternal knowledge
to be like the created one, by an analogy
from tlie seen to the unseen. The error
in this analogy has already been exposed.
Just as no change takes place in any
agent after the creation of his act -
tl^at is j change of kind; which w^s jic^t
78 AV ERRORS
found before - so no chanofe in the etern-
al knowledge of God after the creation
of the thing which was in His knowledge.
So this doubt is removed. At the same
time it is not necessary for us to say
that as there is no change in eternal
knowledge, therefore, He does not know
an existent at the time of its creation,
as it is. But we must believe that He
knows not by a created but by His
eternal knowledge. For a change in
knowledge with a change of the existent
thinof is a condition of the knowledo;e
which depends upon the existent thing,
such a knowledge being created. Tlius
the relation of the eternal knowledo^e
• . ...
with the existent things is not the same
as that of the created knowledge. It is
not that there is no connection between
them at all as some philosophers are
said to maintain, who as the people
think, say, at the time of doubt, that
God has no knowledge of particulars at
all. But this is not as is commonly sup-
posed. I hey only say that He does not
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 79
know particulars by any created know-
ledge, one of the conditions of which is
its being created by them, by which it
is an effect and not a cause. This is
the last of the things about it which
raust be remembered. For our reason
leaids us to the fact that God is the
Knower of thinos, all of them emanatinof
from Him. This is so because He is a
knower, not because of His existence,
nor of His existence in any form, but
only because of His being a Knower.
God has said " Shall not He know all
things who hath created them, since He
is the sagacious, the knowing " ^^ ^he
arguments also tell us that He knows
by a knowledge which may be akin to
created knowledge. So it is necessary
that there should be some other know-
ledge for the existent things - and this
is the eternal of God. Moreover, how
is it possible to suppose that the Peri*
patt tic Philosophers think that the etern-
al knowledge does not include partieul-
22. (^uran Ixvi 14,
80 AVRRROKS
ars, while they say that these are a
cause of adm-oiTition to us in our dreams,
divine revelations, and other kinds of
inspiration ?
That is what we think about the
solution of the problem — a solution in
«
which there is no doubt or suspicion.
God i>s the only helper to right judg-
ment, [and leader to truth. Peace be
upon 3^ou, and blessings of God and His
beatitude. God is the best knower of
truth : and to Him is the return and
the refuge.
II
AN EXPOSITION OF THE METHODS OF ARGUMENTS
CONCERNING THE BELIEFS OF THE FAITH. AND
A DETERMINATION OF UNCERTAIN DOUBTS
AND MISLEADING INNOVATIONS IN
INTERPRETATIONS,
AN EXPOSITION OF THE METHODS OF ARGUMENTS
CONCERNING
THE BELIEFS OF THE FAITH
* A\D
A DETERMINATION OF UNCEaJ'AIN DOUBTS
AND
MISLEADING INNOVATIONS IN INTER PRETATIONS.t
And after - Praise be to God, who
sets apart anyone whom He will for
His knowledoje, renderino- him fit for
understandino' His Law and follow ino-
His path, informing him of the hidden
recesses of His knowledge, the real mean^
ing of His inspiration, and the purpose
of sending the Apostle to creatures, in
spite of what has become clear about
the doubt of the doubters among the
Prophet's own followers, and changes of
meanings introduced by the false among
t A translation of Al-Kashf'an Manhij VI Adillahji
Aqaid H Millah, we TaHf nia Waqajiha hi Hash Vl Tc^'xvU
min ShubWl Muzighah wa BidHll MudUlah.
H AVERROHlS
his own people. He has disclosed to
him that there are interpretations which
God and His Apostle have not ordered.
May there be the most perfect blessings
upon the Trusty of His inspiration, and
the Seal of His prophets, and upon his
family and relations.
We have already described in the
foregoing tractate the conformity of
philosophy with the Law, and its
other relations. We have said there
that the Law is of two kinds :
exoteric and esoteric. The duty of the
common people is to follow the exoteric
l^w; while the duty of learned men is to
follow the esoteric one. So the duty of
the common people is to follow the
meanings of the Law in their literal
sense, leaving aside every interpretation
of it. The learned men are not permit-
ted to expose their interpretations to the
common people, as Ali, ( upon whom be
peace ) has said, *' Tell the people what
they can understand. Do you wish to
give the lie to God and His Apostle ? '*
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY it
So I thought that in the present' book
I should examine the exoteric meanings
which the Law intends the common peo-
ple to follow, and in those, search the
real purpose of the Law-giver, ( on
whom be peace ) according to my ability
and knowledge. For the people of His
Law have been extremely disturbed, so
muc-h so that many misguided sects and
different divisions, have been produced,
every one of which thinks that it is fol-
lowing the best Law, and that he who
disagrees is either an innovator or an
infidel whose life and property is at stafcei
All this is directly opposed to the pur-
pose of the Law-giver. Its cause lies
in the misleading: thino^s about the Law
which have been put forward.
In our own times, there are four of
these sects which are famous. In the
first place, there is the sect of tho Ashar-
ites, and these are the people who are
commonly taken to be men of Sunna,
Then there are Mutazilites, the sects of
the Batinites, ( Esoteric ), and the sect
8« aVehroes
of the Bombasts. Every one of these
sects has its own peculiar beliefs about
God, and has turned many an exoteric
word of the Law to interpretations,
which they have applied to those beliefs.
They think that theirs was the original
Law which all the people are asked to
follow, and he who deviates from it is
either an innovator or an intidel. But
when you look into all their views and
then examine the purpose of the Law,
it would appear that a great part of
them are recent opinions and innovating
interpretations. Of them I w^ll mention
here those indispensable beliefs in the Law,
without which Faith does not become
complete, and will search, in every one
of them, the real purpose of the Law-
giver, ( peace be upon him, ) beyond
that which has been made the basis of the
Law. and its beliefs before the cominof
into use of incorrect interpretations. I
will begin by explaining the intention
of the Law - giver as to the beliefs
which should be held by the common
tlELIGlON AND HHILOSOPHV t1
people about God, and the methods
which He adopted towards them. All
this is contained in the Divine Book.
We will begin by an exposition of the
methods which leads to the knowledge
of the existence of the Creator, for this
is the first thinof which a student ou^lit
to know. But before this, it is necessary
that we should mention the opinions of
the well ~ known sects.
The Bombasts hold tliat the method
of obtaininor knowledofe of the existence
of the Creator is by hearing and not by
reason, that is, the belief in His exist-
ence, the verification of which is incum-
bent upon all men, is enough to be
taught by the Law-giver, and believed
as an article of Faith, as is the case
with his teachinsfs about the condition
of the Day of Judgment, and others
with which our reason has no power to
deal. This is obviously a misleading
sect, for it falls short of the purpose of
the Law, as regards the method adopted
towards all the people, leading them to
m AVERBOES
the knowledge of the existence of God,
and ealHncr them to the confession of
His behef. It is quite evident from
many verses of the Divine Book, that
iB it the people have been called to
verify the existence of the Creator by
arguments of reason which are mentioned
in it. For instance, there are the fol-
lowing verses of the Quran, "O men of
Mecca, serve your Lord who has created
you and those before you,"^ and ^* Is
there any doubt concerning God, the
Creator of heaven and earth ? ''^ and
other verses on the subject found there-
in. It is not fit for a man to say, that
if these arguments had been necessary
for believing in God — that is, had his
faith been not completed without under-
standing them — the Prophet would not
have invited anybody to Islam without
presenting to him all these arguments,
for the Arabs already knew the exist-
ence of the Creator, so that God has
said, '* If thou asketh them who has
1. Quran ii, 19. 2. Quran xiv, 11.
fefiLIGlON AND PHILOSOPHY 89
created the heavens and the earth, they
will surely answer, God/'^ and hence
there was no use giving arguments. It
is impossible to find a man so stupid
and dull, that he cannot understand the
arguments advanced by Law tor the
common people, through the Prophet,
This is to say the least. If there be
found such a man, then it is his duty
to believe in God by hearing alone. So
much for the ideas of the Bombasts
about the exoterics of the Law,
The Asharites are of opinion that the
verification of the existence of God
cannot be attained but by reason. But
about this they have adopted a method,
which is not among the methods adopted
by Law, and is not mentioned in the
Quran, nor the people invited through
it to believe. Their well-known method
is founded upon the fact that the uni-
verse is a created thing, which is itself
based upon the theory of the composi-
tion of atoms, and that the atom is a
3. Quran xzxis, 39.
» aVerroes
created thing, and that other bodies are
Created out of it. The method which
they adopt for the exposition of the
creation of an atom, which they call
al'Jauharat u'l Faridah (sole Essence),
is a misleading one even for many religious
men in the business of controversy, not
to speak of the common people. And
despite this it is a method devoid of
philosophy, and does not lead to a belief
in the existence of the Creator. For if
we suppose the universe is a created
thing, it becomes necessary, as they say,
that its Creator must also be a ''Created''
object. But a doubt presents itself
about the existence of this created thing,
which is not in the power of scholastic
theology to solve. And that is this,
that we can take this thinor to be neither
eternal nor created. For if we take it
as created, then it must require another
created thing, and this another, and so
on to infinity. This is impossible. On
the other hand, if we take Him as
eternal, then it is necessary that his
tlELlGION AND PflTLOSOPHY »|
action ill connection with the result must
also be eternal. In this way the results
also become eternal. It is necessary for
a created thing that its existence be
dependent upon a created action. Their
hypothesis can only be proved if they
admit that a created action can be per-
formed by an eternal agent. For the
result of the action might be dependent
on the action of the agent. But they
do not admit it, for according to their
principles w4iat is coeval with created
things is itself created . Moreover, if the
accent sometimes acts and at other times
remains inactive, it is necessary, that
there be a condition better applicable in
one state of things than in the other.
Then about this condition the same
question will rise, and so it will go on
till infinity. And what the Mutakallimun
say in answer to this objection that the
created action is the result of eternal
intention, does not relieve us of our
doubt or satisfy our mind. For inten-
tion without action is dependent upo
S|2 AVEBROEg
the act, and if the act i? a created
thing, then it is necessary that the intent-
ion in connection with it must also be a
created thing. It makes no difference
whether we take the intention as eternal
or created, rising before the action or
with it. So we may take it as we Uke.
All the same it is necessary for them
to admit either of the three things about
the universe — either a created action,
with a created intention or a created
action and an eternal intention, or an
eternal action with an eternal intention.
But a created thing is impossible from
an eternal action without any expedient,
even if we admit for their sake, that it
comes into existence by eternal action ;
and putting intention itself or the action,
connected with the act is a thing which
cannot be understood. This is supposing
an act without an agent, with a result,
without any intention. Intention is a
condition of the action and not the
action itself. Also it is necessary that
this eternal intention, should be connected
RELIGION AND PTflLOSOPH^ 93
with non-existence of a created thing,
for a period of time which is
indefinite. So if a created thing be non-
existence for an unknown period of time,
then it does not become connected with"
the intention at the time of its creation,
except after the completion of a time
of which there is no limit, and that
which has no Hmit has no end. So it be-
comes necessary that the intention should
never take the form of action, or a time
without limit should come to an end,
which is impossible. This is the argu-
ment of the Mutakallimun, on which
they rely in proving that the revolutions
of the heavens are created. Moreover,
it is necessary that to the intention which
precedes the object, and is connected
with it, at a certain time, there should
be created in it at the time of creation
of the object a determination for doing
so. For the determination for the creat-
ion of an object cannot be found before
that time, because if at the time of
action there be found no additional
H AVEBROES
quality in the agent, than that he had
at the time of intention, then action
from him at that time would not be
quite as necessary from him as inactiv-
ity. We may go on in this way, find-
ing all the obscure and intricate doubts,
from which, not to speak of the common
people, even clever men, learned in
scholastic theology, in philosophy, cannot
escape. So if the common people be
burdened with a knowledge* of these
things, it would be an unbearable problem
for them.
Then again the methods adopted
by the Asharites in proving the
creation of the universe are defective
for all classes of men. The common
people, by their very nature, cannot
understand them, and they are at the
same time in no way reasonable. So
they are neither fit for the learned, nor
for the masses. We warn our readers of
them and say : The methods which they
adopt are of two kinds. One of them, the.
ji^ore famous of the two and upon which a
KELIGION AND PHlLOvSOPHY V)5
majority of them relies, is based upon three
premises, from which they derive the
proof for the creation of the universe.
They are : ( 1 ) that essences cannot
be separated from • accidents, that is,
they cannot bo devoid of them ; ( 2 )
that the accidents are created things;
( 3 ) that that which cannot be separat-
ed from a created thing is itself created,
that is, that which cannot be severed
from the created thing is itself created.
Now, if by the first premise which says
that the essences cannot be separated from
the accidents, they mean the bodies
which stand by themselves, then the
premise is correct. But if by essence
they mean the particle which cannot be
divided, which they call Sole Essence,
then there is doubt about it, , which is
not easy to solve. For the existence of
an indivisible essence is not well estab-
lished in itself, and about it there are
many opposite and highly contradictory
opinions, and it is not in the power of
scholastic theology to bvin^ tri^th out
9ff AVERROES
of them. That is the business of philo-
sophers who are very few in number.
The arguments which Asharites use
are for the most part exhortative. For
their famous argument on this is that
they say that our first knowledge about
a thing is, for instance, that an elephant
is biororer than an ant, for it is ac-
cepted that the former has more par-
ticles in it than the latter. If it be
so, then it is made up of particles
and is not a compact whole in itself.
So when the body is destroyed it
changes into p?i;rticles, and when
composed It is composed of them. But
this is wrong. For they have taken a
divisible quantity as a continuous one,
and then thought that that which is
applicable to the divisible is also ap-
plicable to the continuous. This is
true about numbers, that is, we say
that a certain number is more than
the other, by its containing more
particles in it, that is, more units. But
it cannot be true of a continuous quanti-
BKLIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 97
ty, of which we say that it is bigger or
greater. In this way everything may be
enumerated without any reference to
ifcs bulk at all. And the science of
mathematics becomes the scien.ee of
number only. It is well-known that
every bulk can be considered with re*
gard to line, surface and volume. More-
over, a continuous quantity it is pos-
sible to cut in the middle and thus
get two parts. But this is impossible in the
units of number, nay, it is opposed to
it. Then, again, the body artd other
particles of a continuous quaatity are
capable of being divided. But every-
thinor divisible is either divided into
other divisible quantities, or into indv
visible ones. If it is divided into indi-
visible ones then w^e have found parti-
cles which cannot be divided. A,nd if
it is divided into other divisible parts,
then again the question arises whettheu
tliese can be divided into divisible of
imli visible parts. So if it can be dividT
ed a liuiitless number of times, ther«
7
m AVERROKS
would be limitless particles in a limited
thing. But it is one of the primary
principles of knowledge that particles in
a limited thing are limited.
Among the obscure doubts which
can be attributed to the Asharites is
the question whether if an atom is
brought into being, this is different
from creation itself, for it is one of
the accidents ? When the created thing
exists the act of creation is nonexist-
ent for according to their principles,
the accidents cannot be separated from
their essences. So this has compelled
them to regard creation as pertaining
to the existent things and not for it.
Then they ma}- be asked ; if creation
implies the non-existence of a thing,
with what is the act of the agent con-
nected, for, according to them, tliere is
no mean between existence and non-
existence. If this be so, and, according
to them, the action of the agent is
connected neither with non existence, nor
with that which is and neverthel^s
. RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 99
brings about an existence, it must be
connected with a middle substance.
This doubt has compelled the Mutazi-
lites to say that there is a substance,
even in nonexistence, which they call
Matter or First Element, They should
admit that that which is non-existent
can be made existent by action. Both
of these sects must also admit the
existence of a void. These are questions,
which as you see, cannot be solved by
dogmatics. Thus, it is clear that such a
method cannot be made a' basis of the
knowledge of God, especially for the
masses. We will shortly describe a
clearer method of knowing God.
Now as to the second premise,
accordinof to w-hich it is said that all the
accidents are created things: — This is . a
premise concerning which there are
doubts, and its meaning is as hidden as
the soul in a body. For we have
observed many bodies to be created and
such is also the case with some accidents.
So there is no- difference in transferring
100 AVERBOES
an observed object to the invisible, in
both the cases. For if it is necessary,
with regard to accidents, to apply what
applies of the visible things to the
invisible, that is, if we should suppose a
thing which we have not seen, so
created, by the analogy of that which
we have observed, then we should also
apply it to the essences. Thus we can
become quite careless of proving the
creation of accidents, as distinct from
that of essences. The creation of the
accidents of • the heavenly bodies is
extremely doubtful to the observer just
as there is doubt in their essential
creation. For the creation of their ac-
cidents is never perceived. So it is neces-
sary that we should clearly observe them.
This is the method which surely and
certainly leads pious people to the know-
ledge of God. This is the method of
the chosen men, and that with which
God has particularly blessed the prophet
Abraham. He says : " A.nd thus did
We [show Junto [Abraham the kingdom
feELfGION AND PHILOSOPHY 101
of heaven and earth, that he might be-
come of those who firmly believe."^ For
the whole doubt concerns the heavenly
bodies themselves. Many controversial-
ists have stopped here and believed that
these are so many gods.
Again, time is one of the accidents,
the creation of which it is impossible
to imagine, for it is necessary that the
non-existence' of a thing be preceded by
time. But in this case it cannot be imagined
that the non-existence of a thing can be
preceded by itself, except by accepting time
as existent. So also it is difficult to ima-
gine the creation of the space in which
the universe is, for every existent thing
occupies a former space. For if it is a
void, as is the opinion of those who
think that the void itself is space, its
creation also, if we suppose it to be creat-
ed, must been have preceded by another
void. And if the space be a tangible
body, as is the opinion of another group,
th^n it shookl be contained in another
5. Quran vi, 75,
ioi aVehroes
body, which would require another, and
so on without limit. These are all
obscure problems and the arguments
which are brought to disprove the etern-
ity of the accidents, are necessary for
one who believes in the eternity of
those accidents which can be perceived ;
that is, one who asserts that not all
the accidents are created. For they say
that the accidents which can be perceived
by the senses are created things. If
they are not created, then they will
move from one place to another, or will
be latent in the place in which they are
to appear, before they make their
appearance. Then they disprove both
of these arguments, and think that they
have established that all the accidents
are created things. But it has become
apparent from what they have said, that
the apparently created , portions of the
accidents are created, not those whose
creation is not apparent, nor those in
whose case there is doubt, such as the
accidents which are in the heavenly
kELIGION|AND PHILOSOPHY . 103
bodies, in their movement, in their shape,
etc, etc. So their arguments about the
creation of all accidents, can be inter-
preted by the analogy of the visible to
the invisible. This is an exhortative
argument, except in the suggestion of
reasonable arguments which depend'
here on the certainty of the similarity
of the character of the visible and the
invisible.
The third premise which says, that
that which cannot be separated from a
created thing is itself created, is equivo-
cal, for it can be understood in two
ways : the thing which cannot be sepa-
rated from the class of created thinors,
but can be removed from its units; and
that which cannot be separated from
any one of the things in question, as if'
one were to say, '* That which cannot
be separated from this blackness in ques-
tion. " The second meaninor is the cor-
rect one, that is it cannot be separated
from a certain accident, which is created,
for it is absolutely necessary that it
iO* AVERKOES
should also be a created thing. For if
it be eternal it becomes devoid of that
accident, from which we suppose that
it cannot separate. This separation is
impossible. The first explanation, and
that is which they mean, does not necess-
arily involve the creation of place,
that is, that which is not separated from
the class of created things. For it is
possible to imagine a single place, that
is, a body upon which follow accidents
without limit, either opposed to one
another or otherwise, as you were to
say, movements without limit. Such is
the opinion of many ancient philosophers
about the universe, that it is made little
by little. This is why, when tho Muta-
kallimun saw the weakness of this prem-
ise, they resolved to make it strong
and secure, by making it clear, that ac-
cording to them, limitless accidents can-
not follow upon a single point. For
they maintain that on this occasion it
is necessary that there cannot be found
aiiy other accident, except that there be
UELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 105
an unlimited number of accidents before
it at the place in question. This helps
them to the impossibility of their pre-
sence, for it is necessary that it should
not be there, except after the completion
of an unlimited number. As the limit-
less never ends, it follows that the
thing which we have supposed should
not be there. For instance, consider the-
movement of the heavenly bodies, as we
know them today. If there were,
before it limitless movements, then it is
inevitable that this particular movement
should not occur. They give the exam-
ple of a man, who said to another, *' I
will not give you this dinar, till I have
given you before it a limitless number
of dinars. '^ By this it is not possible
for him to give the dinar in question at
all. But this example is not a correct
one. For in it there is a primary object,
then a limit, and then another object
between them, which is without limit.
For he has said it in a limited time.
So he has stipulated that he would give
106 AVi:RROES
the dinar between the time in which he
is, and the time of which he speaks,
between which tiiere is a time without
limit. This is the period in which he
would give him the dinars without limit,
w^hich is impossible. So it is quite
clear that this example does not illustrate
the object for which it is given. Their
opinion that the existence of a thing
which is found after limitless thinsrs, is
impossible, is not correct in all the cases.
For the things which happen one after
another are of two kinds : those which
come to pass in cycles, and those which
occur in order and arrangement. The
things which occur in cycles are neces-
sarily unlimited, except that something
may interfere to prevent them.. For
instance if the sun rises there must be
its setting; if there is a setting then it
must rise, and ii it rise it must have
risen before. In the same way, if there
are clouds there must be vapours rising
from the earth; if there rise vapours
from the earth, then it must be wet, if
RELIGION AND PHILOBOPH\ ibi
the earth is wet, there must have been
rain, and if there was rain there must
have been clouds, and if thus there were
clouds there must similarly have been
clouds before them. Again among those
things which happen by order, is, for
instance, the creation of man from man,
and of that man from another. If this
happens by essence then it can be taken
as limitless, for which the first livnk is
not found, the last also cannot be ascer-
tained. If this is by accident, as for
instance, if man be really made by some
one other than man, who must be his
father, then the position of his father
would be the same a-? that of an instru-
ment in the hands of a maker. So it
is not possible to find an agent doing
limitless actions, with countless different
instruments. All these views are not clear
in this connection. We have mentioned
them here, that it may become known,
that the arguments which these people
advance are no arguments at all^ nor are
they reasonings fit for the masses, that is,
108 AVERROE^
open and clear arguments which God
has imposed upon all his creatures for
the sake of belief. It must now have
become clear to you that this method
is neither philosophical nor according
to Law,
The other method is that which Abul
Maali has deduced and described in one
of his tractates known as Nizamiyyah.
He has based it upon two premises : in
the first place, that the universe and all.
that it contains may be conceived as
other than what it really is. It may be
quite consistent, for instance, if it may
be imagined smaller than it is, or bigger,
or of some other shape than it really
has or havinof more bodies in number
than it really contains or the movements
which are made in it may go in the
opposite direction from that which they
take now. This may be so much so
that it may become possible that a stone
should go upwards, and fire downwards,
or that the movement starting in the
east should start in the west, or the
RRLIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 109
western from the eastern. The second
premise is that every transient thing is
created, and for it there is a creator ;
that is, an agent who made it in this
way better than in any other.
The first premise is exhortative and
very elementary. Its; fallacy is quite
apparent with regard to some aspects of
the universe — for instance, the exist-
ence of man in some other form than he
now possesses ; while in some others there
is doubt — for instance, whether the
movement from the east might change
to one from the west and vice versa, for
this is not known in itself. It is possi
ble that for this there may be a cause
the existence of which is not evident, or
it may be one of those causes which are
hidden from man. It is possible that
whatever of these thino^s a man sees, is
like one seeino^ for the first time things
of the manufacture of which he is ignor-
ant. For such a man may think that
all or parts of the thing may p«)ssibly
be made in just the opposite fashion -j
110 AVERROES
from that in which they really are made;
ai)d still in spite of this idea the same
work may be obtained from them for
which they were made. In this case
there would be no art in them. But its
maker, and one who is associated with
the maker in some of his knowledge,
know that the whole thing is just the
opposite of what that man has seen ;
and that there is nothing in it but
that which is absolutely necessary, or
the existence of which makes it more
perfect and complete, though outwardly
it may not seem quite necessary in it.
It is quite clear that this manufactured
thing, may in this connection, be taken
as an illustration of God*s Creation —
praised be its Great Creator.
This premise in being exhortative
might be fit for all, but being untrue
and falsifying the wisdom of the Creator,
is not fit for any. It falsifies philosophy,
because philosophy is nothing else but -
the knowledge of the causes of things.
If there be no necessary causes for a
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 111
thing, which make its existence necessary
in the form in which it exists, then
there is no particular knowledge which
may be attributed to the wise Creator.
Just as if there had not been some
necessary causes for the existence of
any manufactured thing, there would
have been no art at all, and no wisdom
by which its ^maker might be praised,
and which might not be found in any
man other than the maker. Where
would be found any wisdom in a man,
if he could perform all his actions by
an}^ member of his body, or without any
member at all, so much so that he could
see with his ears, as he could see • with
his eyes, or smell with his eyes as he
could with his nose. This is all only
falsifying philosophy, and ' the meaning
for which God has called himself Wise
(Hakim) — High and Holy be his name
from such imputations. We find that
Avicenna has also adopted this doctrine,
for many reasons. He says that every-
thing, except the maker, when taken
112 AVERROKB
by itself, may either be possible or
allowable. Of the latter - that is, things
allowable, there are two kinds ; One
is allowable as regards its maker, the
other is necessary as regards the
maker ; and possible as regards its
essence. The only thing which is neces-
sary, according to all reasons, is the
first maker. This opinion . is extremely
incorrect. Because that which is possi-
ble in itself and its essence, will not
possibly turn a necessity beyond its
maker, but by a change of the possible
nature into a necessary one. If it be
said that by these words he means
''Possible with regard to itself", that
is, when the maker arises it will rise
also, then we would say that this rising
is impossible. • But this is not the place
to discuss the matter with this man.
We ventured to talk of him, because of
the many views which he has invented.
Now we would return to our former
theme. The second premise, which says
that every transient thing is created, is
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 113
not in itself obvious. The philosophers
have differed about it. Plato allows
that the apparently transient thing
may be eternal, while Aristotle denies
it. It is a very intricate matter, and
cannot be made clear except to the
philosophers, that is, learned men, whom
God has set apart for His knowledge,
and has in His Book, coupled their
witness with that of .piimsslf and His
angels.
Abul Maali has tried to make the
premise clear by some other premises.
First, that there should be something
unique in ' every transient thing, which
may make it more preferable by one of
the two qualities. Second, that this
particular thing cannot be any other
than that intended. Third, that the
thing which exists by intention is created.
Then he says that a transient thing comes
into existence by our intention, that is
it is produced by previous volition. For
all the actions are performed either by
nature or by intention. And nature ii^
8
1 14 AVERROES
not one of the passing things which are
alike, that is, it not only creates the
dissimilar but does the both. For instance,
sea-anemone will absorb the yellow
lob in the right side of the body and
not in the left. But intention is the
thing which is particularly applicable to
a thing opposed to its like. Then he
adds that the universe is like its creat-
ion and exists in the position in the
atmosphere where it was made. By the
void he means another void in which
the world was made. So he concluded'
that the universe was made by intention.
The premise which says that it is intent-
ion which fixes the shape of a thing,
is correct, but that universe is surrounded
by a void is wrong, or at least not clear.
Then again according to their notions,
his act of placing the void is bad. That
is, it must be eternal, otherwise it would
require another void for it. The premise
saying that in this connection intention
is nothing but a created thing is not
deai%^ For the intention of an action k
ft
UELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY U«
connected with the desired act itself, for
it is one of its adjuncts. And it is clear
that when one adjunct is found with
the action the other must be there, for
example the father and the son. If one
be found potentially the other must also
be so. Hence if the intention of the
action is created, then necessarily the
desired act must also be created. If the
intention of the action be eternal, then
the thing desired by that action must
also be eternal. The intention which
precedes the intended object, is said to
be a potential intention only; that is,
the intention which has not yet brought
its intended object into being. This is .
quite clear, for when the intended object
has appeared, then it becomes an exist-
ent thing, which it was not before the
appearance of the intended object in
action. When this becomes the cause
of the creation of an intended thing,
only by means of action, then, if the
Mutakallimun assert that intention is
created, it becomes clear that the intend-
116 AVERROES
ed object must also be created. From
the Law it is clear that there is no need
to go so deeply into the problem as
far as the masses are concerned. So it
has not mentioned any eternal or created
intention, but has only said that it
exists and the things are created. So
God says: — "Verily, Our speech upon
anything when We will the same is, that
We only say unto it, Be; and it is."^
This has been so because the masses
cannot understand the idea of created
things from an eternal intention. But
the fact is that the Law has not men-
tioned whether the intention is created
or eternal, this being a doubtful thing
for many people. The Mutakallimun
have also no certain argument to advance
for providing the possibility of a created
intention for creation. For the principle
with which they maintain their position
for negating the existence ot intention
as eternal, is the premise which we have
already mentioned, that is, the thing
0, Quran xvi, 42.
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY lit
which cannot be separated from the
created thino^ is itself created. We will
mention this again when talking of
intention.
From the foregoing it has become
clear that the well-known methods
adopted by Asharifces for the knowledge
of God are certain neither philosophi-
cal, nor by Law. This would be quite
clear to anyone who would look closely
into the kind of arguments advanced in
the Divine Book about the knowledge of
the existence of the Creator. For if
you look closely into this matter you
will find that the arguments comprise
both qualities, those of being certain
and at the same time clear, without
being complex, that is, they have few
premises.
As to the Sufis their method in
theorising is not a philosophical method
— thafc is, made up of a number of pre-
mises, and syllogisms. They maintain
that the knowledge of God, or of any-
thing existent, is found in our own
Il6 AVERROfeS
hearts, after its detachment from all
physical desires, and concentration of
mind upon the desired object. In support
of their principle they bring many an
argument from the exoteric side of Law.
For instance they quote the Divine
words, ''And fear God, and God will
instruct you,''^ and, '' Whoever do their
best endeavour to prompt our true
religion, We will direct them unto Our
ways ;^ and again, " If ye fear God, He
will grant you a distinction,'^^ and many
other verses of this kind which are
considered to be helpful for their pur-
pose. We say that this method, if we
suppose it to be real, is not meant for
all people. Had this method been
satisfactory for all people then the philo-
sophical method would have been quite
futile, and its existence among the
people would have been useless, and with
it the existence of the Quran. For that
always invites us to theorising, judging,
and admonishing by way of philosophy.
7. Quran ii, 282. 8. Quran xxix, 69. 9. Quran viii, 29.
»
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY lid
We of course do not deny that the
control of physical desires is a condition
for healthy thinking, as physical health
is one of its conditions. For the control
of desires is profitable in acquiring know-
ledge by itself, if it be made a condition
for it, just as health is a condition for
education, though it is not very useful
for it. That is why our Law has invited
all of us to this method and has insisted
upon it, that is, for work, not that it is
sufficient in itself, as these people think,
but that it is useful for thinking as we
have already described. This would be
qui'^^e clear to any one who cares to
ponder and think over it.
As to the Mutazilites — their books
have not reached us in sufficient number
in this Peninsula ( Spain ) that we may
be able to form a fair estimate of the
method which they have adopted in this
matter. But it seems that their methods
are like those of the Asharites.
If now that it is clear that none of
these methods are in accordance with
ISO AVERROES
that by which the Law iavites all the
people, according to the difference in
their dispositions, to a confession of the
existence of God, it may be asked :
What is that method which the Law
has laid down in the Divine Book, and
upon which the Companions of the
Prophet depended? We would say that
the method which the Divine Book has
adopted, and by which it has invited all
to believe, is, when thoroughly invest-
igated from the Quran, dependent upon
two principles. The one is a knowledge
of God's solicitude for man, and the
creation of everything for his sake. We
would call this the argument of solicit-
ude. The second is the creation of the
essences of the existent things, as for
example, the creation of life in the
minerals, and feeling and intelligence.
We would call this method the ** argu-
ment of creation/' The first method is
founded upon two principles : first that
all the existent things suit man ; secondly,
that this suitability must have existed
tiELIGlON AND PHILOSOPHY 121
in the mind of the Maker before He
intended to make the object in question,
for it cannot be obtained by chance
alone* Now their suitability for the
exivstence of man can be easily ascertain-
ed by the suitability of day and night,
sun and moon, for the existence of man.
Such is also the case with the suitability
of the four seasons, and of the place in
which he lives, that is, the earth. It is
also apparent with respect to animals,
vegetables, and minerals ; and many
other things, such as rain, rivers, seas,
the whole of the earth, water, fire and
air. It is also evident from the different
members of his body, on account of their
suitability for the preservation of his
life and existence. On the whole, a
knowledge of the benefit derived from
all the existent things may be included
in it. So it is necessary for a man who
wants to know (iod perfectly, to investi-
gate the benefits derived from existent
things. In the argument of creation is
included the existence of the animal
world, the plant world, and the heavens.
This method is again based upon two
principles, which can be found out by
eveiy man by his very nature. The one
is that all things have been made and
created. This is quite clear in itself,
in the case of animals and plants, as
Gr()d has said, '* Verily the idols which
ye invoke, beside God, can never create
a single fly, though they may all assem-
ble for that purpose. "1^ We see an
inorganic substance and then there is
life in it, So we know for certain, that
there is an inventor and bestower of
life, and He is God, Of the heavens we
know by their movements, which never
become slackened, that they work for
our benefit by divine solicitude, and are
subordinate to our welfare. Such an
appointed and subordinate object is
always created for some purpose. The
second principle is that for every created
thing there is a cjreator. So it is right
to say from the two foregoing principles
10. Qumn xxii, 72.
kJftLIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 123
that for every existent thing there is an
inventor. There ai-e many arguments,
according to the number of the created
things, which can be advanced fco prove
this premise. Thus it is necessary for
one who wants to know God as He
ought to be known, to acquaint himself
with the essence of things, so that he
may get information about the creation
of all things. For who cannot under-
stand the real substance and purpose of
a thing, cannot understand the minor
meaning: of its creation. It is to this
that God refers in the following verse,
'' Or do they not contemplate the hearen
and the earth, and the things which
God has created ? " ^^ And so a man who
would follow tne purpose of philosophy
in investigating the existence of things,
that is, would try to know the cause
which led to its creation, and the purpose
of it would know the argument of kind-
ness most perfectly. These two argu-
ments are those adopted by Law.
11. Quran vii, 184.
.H^ AVERtlOiES
The verses of the Quran leading to
a knowledge of the existence of God
are dependent only on the two foregoing
arguments. It will be quite clear to
anyone who will examine closely the
verses, which occur in the Divine Book
in this connection. These, when inves-
tigated, will be found to be of three
kinds : either they are verses showing
the ** arguments of kindness, '^ or those
mentioning the '' arguments of creation/'
or those which include both the kinds
of arguments. The following verses may
be taken as illustratino^ the arofument of
kindness. '' Have we not made the earth
for a bed, and the mountains for stakes
to find the same ? And have we not'
oreated you of two sexes; and appointed
your sleep for rest; and made the night
a garment to cover you; and destined
the day to the gaining of your livelihood
and built over you seven solid heavens;
and placed therein a burning lamp ?
And do we not send down from the
clouds pres^ng forth rain, water pouring
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY }SUk
down in abundance, that we may thereby
produce corn, and herbs, and gardens
planted thick with trees ?12 and, "Blessed
be He Who hath placed the twelve signs
in the heavens ; hath placed therein a
lamp by day, and the moon which shineth
by night; "^^ and again, " Let man
consider his food. "^^ The following
verses refer to the argument of invention,
''Let man consider, therefore of what
he is created. He is created of the seed
poured forth, issuing from the loins,
and the breast bones ; '^^^ and, " Do they
not consider the camels, how they are
created ; the heaven, how it is raised ;
the mountains, how they are fixed ; the
earth how it is extended ; "^^ and again,
'* 0 man, a parable is propounded unto
you ; wherefore hearken unto it. Verily
the idols which they invoke, besides God,
can never create a single fly, though
they may all assemble for the pur-
12. Quran Ixxvii, 6-16 13. Quran xxv. 62.
14, Quran Ixxs, 24. 15, Quran Ixxxvi. 6.
I Quran lxx5viii, 17,
12« AVEBROES
pose. ''^^ Then we' may point to the story
of Abraham, referred to in the following
verse, '* I direct my face unto Him Who
hath created heaven and earth ; I am
orthodox, and not of the idolaters, "^^
There may be quoted many verses referr-
ing to this argument. The verses com-
prising both the arguments are also
many, for instance, " O men, of Mecca,
serve your Lord, Who has created you,
and those who have been before you ;
perad venture you will fear Him ; Who
hath spread the earth as a bed for you,
and the heaven as a covering, and hath
caused water to descend from heaven,
and thereby produced fruits for your
sustenance. Set not up, therefore, any
equals unto God, against your own know
ledge. '*^^ His words, ** Who hath creat
ed you, and those who have been before
you, '' lead us to the argument of crea-
tion ; while the words, ** who has spread
17. Quran xxii. 72. 18. Quran vi, 79. The story
referred to will be fownd in the preceijing vergeg,
19, QttTAn ii, Id.
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHT 127
the earth *' refer to the argument of
divine solicitude for man. Of this kind
also are the following verses of the
Quran, '* One sign of the resurrection
unto them is the dead earth ; We quicken
the same by rain, and produce there-
from, various sorts of grain, of which
they eat ; "^^ and, " Now in the creation
of heaven and earth, and the vicissitudes
of night and day are signs unto those
who are endowed with understanding,
who remember God standing, and sitting,
and lying on their sides ; and meditate
on the creation of heaven and earth,
saying 0 Lord, Thou hast not created this
in vain, far be it from Thee, therefore
deliver us from the torment of hell fire, ''^i
Many verses of this kind comprise both
the kinds of arguments.
This method is the right path by
which God has invited men to a know-
ledge of His existence, and informed
them of it through the intelligence which
He has implanted in their nature. The
20. QaraD xxj(v1, 3S' 21. QorRQ iii, 188.
1S8 AVERflbES
following^ verse* refers to this fixed and
innate nature of man, *' And when the
Lord drew forth their posterity from the
loins of the sons of Adam, and took
them witness against themselves, Am
I not your Lord ? They answered, Yea,
we do bear witness. '*22 go it is incum-
bent for one who intends to obey God,
and follow the injunction of His Pro-
phet, that he should adopt this method,
thus ■ making himself one of those
learned men who bear witness to the
divinity of God, with His own witness,
and i>hat of His angels, as He says,
** God hath borne witness, that there
is no God but He, and the angels, and
those who are endowed with wisdom
profess the same; who executeth right-
eousness ; there is no God but He ; the
Mighty, the Wise/'^s Among the argu-
ments for both of themselves is the
praise which God refers to in the follow-
ilig verse, '* Neither is there any thing
which doth not celebrate his praise ; but
22.1 Quran vii, 171. 23. Quran, iii., 16.
RKLIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 129
,ye imderstand no their celebration
th^r6of."2i
It is evident from the above argu-
ments for the existence of God that
they are dependent upon two categories
of reasoning. It is also dear that both
of these methods are meant for p^irticu-
Ifvr people; that is, the learited. Now
as to the method for the masses. The
difference between the two lies only in
details. The masses cani>ot Understand
the two above mentioned arguments but
only what they can grasp by their
senses; while the leari>ed rhen can go
further, and learn by reasoning also,
besides learr>ing by sense. They have
gone so far that a learned man has said,
that the benefits the 1 ear r bed men derive
from the knowledge of the m cumbers of
human and animal body ^tre a thousand
and one. If this be so, then this is the
method which is taught both by L^iw
and by Nature. It is the method which
was preached by the Prophet and the
3 4. Quran, xvii,, 46.
130 AVBRBORS
divine books. The learned men do noo
mention these two lines of reasonings to
the masses, not because of their number,
but because of a want of depth of learn-
ing on their part about the knowledge
of a single thing only. The example
of the common people, considering and
pondering over the universe, is like a man
who looks into a thing, the manufacture
of which he does not know. For all
that such a man can know about it is
that it has been made, and that there
must be a maker of it. But, on the
other hand the learned look into the
universe, just as a man knowing the art
would do ; try to understand the real
purpose of it. So it is quite clear that
their knowledge about the Maker, as
the maker of the universe, would be far
better than that of the man who only
knows it as made. The atheists, who
deny the Creator altogether, are .like
men who can see and feel the created
things, but would not acknowledge any
' Creator for them, but would attribute
REUGION AND PHILOSOPHY 181
all to chance alone, and that they corae
into being by themselves.
OF THE UNITY OF GOD
Now then if this is the method adopt-
ed by the Law, it may be asked : What
is the way of proving the unity of God
by means of the Law ; that is, the
knowledge of the religious formula that
" there is no god, but God. '' The
negation contained in it is an addition
to the affirmative, which the formula
contains, while the affirmative has
already been proved. What is the pur-
pose of this negation ? We would say
that the method, adopted by the Law,
of denying divinity to all but God is
according to the ordinance of God in
the Quran, contained in the ^ following
three verses. First, "If there were
either in heaven or on earth o-ods be*
side God, verily both would be corrupt-
ed. ''2^ Secondly, '* God has not begot-
ten issue ; neither is there, any other
25. Quran xxi, 22.
182 AVERROES
God with him ; otherwise every other
God would surely take away that which
he has created ; and some of them had
enabled themselves over the others. Far
be it that from God, which they affirm
of Him. ''26 Thirdly, '^ Say, unto the
idolaters, if there were gods with Him,
as ye say, they would surely seek an
occasion of making some attempt against
the possessor of the Throne. ''^7 The
argument contained in the first verse
is implanted in our dispositions by our
very nature. For it is well - known that
if there be two kings, and the orders of
the one be as effectual as those of the
other, it is not possible to have even a
single city under their guidance. It is
impossible to have one action of a single
kind from two actors. So it is necessary
that, if both of them begin work at the
same time, the city would be ruined,
except in the case that one should work
and the other remain inactive. This is
against our conception of divinity. For
26, Quran xxiii, 93. $7, Quran xvii, 44.
feELlGlON AND PHILOSOPHY 13^
when the two actions of the same kind
are gathered upon a single object, then
that object must necessarily be destroyed.
This is the meaning of the verse, " If
there were either in the heaven or
on earth gods besides God, both would
be corrupted. '' The verse, '* Every god
has surely taken away that which he
had created. '' has been revealed m
refutation of the argument of those who
believe in many gods, entrusted with
different works. For in this case it becomes
incumbent that the gods doing differr
ent works be independent of one another,
and that tliey should not be existent at
one and the same time. But as the
world is one it is necessary that there
be not in it gods with diflferent duties.
The third verse, " Say unto the idolaters
if there were gods with him, as ye say,
they would surely seek an occasion
of making some attempt against the
Possessor of the Throne, " is like the
first, an argument to prove the impossi-
bility of the existence of two gods,
1^ ATERROES
whose duties are the same. This verse
means that had there been in the world
any other god, but the present one, able
to create the world and those in it, so
that his relation to it be that of a creat-
or, then he must live with God on the
Throne. Thus there would be found
two existent things of the same kind in
a single place. But this is impossible.
For when the relation is one, the related
must also be one, that is, they cannot
be gathered in a single place as the}''
cannot live in it. The relation of God
to the Throne is just its opposite : the
Throne exists for Him, and not He for
the Throne. That is what God has said,
" His Throne is extended over heaven
and earth, and the preservation of them
is no burden unto him. "^^ This is the
ai-gument by nature or by Law for prov-
ing the unity of God. The difference
between the learned and the masses is
that the learned know more about the
creation of the world, and the purpose
28. Quran 11, 256.
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 135
of its different parts, like a single body,
than the common people. It is to this
• that the latter part of the verse refers,
'' God forbid ! and far, very fcir, be that
which they utter ! The seven heavens
praise him, and the earth, and all who
are therein : neither is there anything
which doth not celebrate His praise; but
ye understand not their celebration there-
of : He is orracious and merciful. ^'^^
The arofument which the A sharites deduce
from this veise, calling it the ^* argu-
ment of impossibility, '' is neither in
accordance with natural nor legal argu-
ments. It is not in ace- or dan e with
nature, because what they say is without
any proof at all ; w^hile it is insufficient
by Law, because the common people
cannot understand it, not to speak of
their being satisfied with it. They say,
that if there be two gods, then it s
more probable that they would differ.
If this were to happen, then there
would be' one of the following three
^^ Quran xvii, 46, 46.
m AVJERB0i;S
casies, there being no fourth alternative.
Either the desire of both of them would
be accomplished, or the desire of neither
would not. They say that it is impos-
sible that the desire of neither of them
bje accomplished, but if it be so then
the universe would neither be existent
nor non-existent. If the desire of both
of them be accomplished, then the uni-
verse would be both existent and non-
existent at the same time. So there
remains no alternative but that the
desire of one be accomplished, the other's
remaining unfulfilled. So one whose
desire remains unfulfjUed is helpless, and
the helpless cannot be a God. The
w.eak^^,^^ of this arguuient is that as it
is^possibl^j.ti^. suppose that they differ,
i<^(is.,,ji4^ a^.; p<wibte tQr; presume that
they- agr^,j a f ax? t: ni^QrjB. becoming to the
g^ds ^tha^ difference of opinion. If they
agre^,abcmt the creation of the world,
thiE^y, woul(J,be like two craftsmen agreed
ugtj^i^ji maJfi^ something. If it be so
then it must be said theit their actions
Religion and philosophy i3f
help them to work and live in a single
place, except that some one may say,
that perhaps one would do one thing and
the other quite another thing, or per-
haps they would work by turns. But
this is an objection which cannot be
advanced by the masses. But if any
sceptic controvertialist were to advance
it, he may be told that one who lias
power to create one thing has power to
create the whole. So now again it
comes to the same thing, whether they
8gree or not, and how can they help
each other in work ? As to working by
turn, it would be a defect in both
of them. It is more probable that if
there be two gods, there must be two
universes. But as the universe is one,
its Maker must also be one, for a single
work can only be done by one maker.
So it is not necessary that we should
understand the verse of God, *' and some
of them had enabled themselves over the
other, '' as pointing to disagreement
alone, but it may be takfen as true even
in the case of argument, for this also
leads to the same result as disao^reement
would do. Here lies the difference be-
tween us and the Mutakallimun, about
the meaninor of this verse, thouo'h Abul
Maali has said something almost express-
ing our own views. By the foregoing you
would understand that the argument
which the Mutakallimun have deduced
from this verse is not the one which it
really contains. The impossibility to
which tJieir argument leads is not one
which should be deduced from the verse
in question. The impossibility which is
deduced from the argument which they
think is contained in the verse, is more
than one impossibility, by their dividing
it into three parts, while there is no
division in the verse itself. So the
argument which they use is the one which
is known to the logicians as disjunctive
syllogism, and is known in their science
as definition and division. But the
argument contained in the verse is one
which is known in logic as hypothetical
ftiSLf GION AND PHILOSOPSY lH :
syllogism, which is quite different from dis-
junctive syllogism. Any one who would look
most cursorily into this science would
know the difference between the two.
Then, again, the impossibility which
their argument points out is not that to
which the argument of the Book leads.
They say that universe will either be
neither existent nor non-existent, or it
will be existent and ncfn-existent at the
same time, or its god would be a help-
less and weak god. These are impos-
sible forever, because of the impossibility
of more than one. The impossibility
which the verse refers to, is not so for
ever, for in it it depends upon a certain
period of time, that is when the uni-
verse is found corrupted at the time of
its existence. For he says " If there
be any other god but God, *' the uni-
verse would be found corrupted. Then he
has made an exception that it is not
corrupted, and hence there must not be
more than one God, So now it has
become quite clear that this is the met-
i4b AVERROiSS
hod by which God has invited ttie
people to believe in His existence, and
negate the divinity of all but Him.
These are the two propositions which
are contained in the article of Faith,
"There are no gods but He. " So
one who thinks over these two proposi-
tions, and believes in thera by the met-
hod which we have pointed out, is a
Muslim in reality, with a belief which
is truly Islamic. But he whose belief
is not based upon these arguments,
though he confesses the article, he is a
Mushm witli the other Muslims, only
oh account of the similarity of names.
ON DIVINE ATTRIBUTES
The attribut-es which the Divine Book
has assiofned to the Creator and Maker
of the universe, are only the perfect
forms of those which are found in man,
and these are seven in number : Know-
ledge, life, power, volition, hearing, seeing
and talking.
Now as to knowledge, God in his
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY Ml
Divine Book has said th9 following
** Shall he not know all things who has
created them ? "^^ The argument con-
tained in this verse is that a created
thing always shows, by the arrangement
which it possesses, — its different parts
being made for the sake of one another
for the benefit intended to be derived
from that thing, — that its maker is not
nature only, but it must have been made
by one who has arranged all for the end
in view. So he must have a knowledofe
of it. For instance, when a man looks
at a house he knows that the founda-
tion was laid for the sake of the walls,
and the walls have been raised for the
roof. So it becomes clear to him that
the house must have been built by a
man knowing the art of buildinof.
This quality is eternal, for it is not
fitting that God should possess it for
a time only. But we should not go
down deep into this matter, and should
not say, like the Mutakallimun, that He
30, Qur^ij l^:?vii, H,
142
AVERKOE{!J
knows the created things at the time of
their creation, by His eternal knowledge,
for then it becomes necessary that the
knowledge of the created thing at the
time of its non - existence be the same
which is absurd, when knowledge is said
to be dependent upon the existent things.
As an existent thing is sometimes an
action, and sometimes only a potentiality,
it i^ necessary that the knowledge of
the two existence be different, as
its time of being in potentiality is quite
different from the time of its being in
action. But. this the Law does not
explain. On the other hand it main-
tains quite an opposite position : that
God knows the created thing at the
time of its creation, as He has said,
^ There falleth no leaf, but He knoweth
it; neither is there a single grain in the
dark parts of the earth ; neither a green
thing, nor a dry thing, but it is written
in the perspicuous book. ''^^ So it is
necessary that we should lay down in
51. Quran yi, 9)9.
BELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 14^
Law that He knows a thing before it
comes into being ; knows a thing when
it is, and not when it should have been;
and knows when a thing has been de-
stroyed at the time of its destruction.
This is what the injunctions of the Law
establish* It has been so because the
masses cannot understand the universe
through visible things, except in this
way. The Mutakaliraun have no argu-
ment to advance against it, except that
they say that the knowledge which
chancres with a chancre in the existent
thing is itself created, while with Gfcd
nothing created can be attached. They
say so because they think that that
which cannot be separated from the
created thing is itself created. But we
have already exposed the fallacy of this
argument. So it is established by the
rules described, and it should not be
said that he knows the creation of the
created, and the corruption of the cor-
rupted tilings, neither by cheated nor
by eternal kno\Ajledge. Tkis is ^ in-
144 . AVERROES
novation in Islam, " And is thy Lord
forgetful of thee ? ''32
The attribute of life is quite evident
from the attribute of Knowledge. For
our observation shows that one of the
conditions of knowledge is life. Aceord-
inof to the Mutakallimuu the conditions
of an observed object can be applied to
the unseen. What the}' have said about
this is quite true.
The attribute of volition needs no
proof, because it is one of the conditions
of bringing forth a thing, that its maker
must intend it. Such is also the case
with power : He must possess power.
But to say that He intended created
things by eternal intention is innovation
in religion, which was not known to the
learned in Law, and cannot satisfy the
masses who have reached the staofe of
dogmatics. We should say that He
intends making a thing at the time of
its creation, but does not intend at the
time of its non « existence. So God
32. Quran xix, 65,
RBLIGION AJJin PHILOSOPHY U5
says: '* Verily our speech xmto anything
when we will the same is that we say unto
it. Be; and it is."^^ For, as we have said,
the common people are never compelled to
advance the argument that He intends
doing a thing b}^ eternal intention, but,
as the Mutakallimun have said, that
that by which the created things exist,
is itself created.
Now if it be asked, how the attribute
of Speech be assigned to and proved in
God, we would say that it can be agcrib*.
ed to him on account of the attributed
of Knowledge and Power of creation*
For speech is nothing more than act
on the part of the speaker to show to
the one addressed the knowledge which
he has, or to disclose to him the know-
ledge which is in him.. This is one of
the actions of the maker. And when
that created thing, which is really a
creator, man, has power over this faculty,
because he knows and is powerful, how
befitting it is that it should be founid
33 Quran xvi. 43.
19
146 AVERROES
in the real Creator. There is another
condition for this action, among the
things which we can observe, and that
is that which must be the means of per-
forming it: words. This being so, it becomes
necessary that that action should be per-
formed by God in the heart of somebody.
His chosen servant. It is not necess-
ary that it should always be through
the medium of words, and so created.
But it may happen either through an
angel ; or through divine inspiration,
that is without the medium of words
which He may create, but through an
act to the hearer, which discloses to him
the true nature of the thing meant, or
through words which He may create in
the ears of him who has been specialised
to hear His words. It is to these three
methods that the verse of the Quran
refers, " It is not fit for a man that
God should speak unto him otherwise
than by private revelation, or from
behind a veil, or by sending a messenger
to reveal, by His permission, that which
r
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY U7
He pleaseth,"^^ So revelatiori is, the
disclosure of the intended secrets to the
inspired person without the mediuna of
words which He created, but through
an action done on the mind of the one
addressed. So God says, '^Afterwards He
approached the Prophet and drew^ unto
him; until He was at the distance of
two bows length from him or yet nearer;
and He revealed unto His servant that
which He revealed. "^^ The speech from]]
behind the veil is one which is performed
througfh the medium of words. This is^
the real speech, and tha'j is the one'
w^hich God specially bestowed upon
Moses, and so He has said, '* And God
spake unto Moses, discoursing with him."^^,
Now as to his words, *' or by sending
a messenger to reveal," this is the.
third kind mentioned above, that- is,
throuoh the medium of some ancrels.
Sometimes God speaks to the learned
men, who are the successois of the
prophets, by disclosing arguments to
34. Quran xlii, 50. 35. Quran Ijii, 8, 10. 36, Quran iv, 162,
148 AVEBROES
them. On account of these causes it is
true, when the learned men say, that
the Quran is the speech of God It
has now become clear to you that the
Quran, which is the speech of God, is
eternal, but the words expressing it are
created by him, and are not human.
From it are excepted the Quranic words
which Ave commonly use in our speech,
that is, these words are our own actions,
by the command of God, while the worvis
of the Quran are those created by God,
He who does not understand these
things by this method, cannot understand
this argument and cannot grasp as to
how the Quran is the word of God.
The alphabets used in the Quran are
our own invention, by ihe command of
God. We have to respect them, because
of them are formed the words created
by God, for the purpose which is not
itself created. He who thought of words
and not of meaning, that is, did not
separate them, said that the Quran was
created: while he who thought of the
RELiaiON AND PHILOSOPHY I4d
meaning which these words express, said
the Quran was not created. But the
truth lies in the middle of these two
extreme views. The Asharites deny-
that the speaker is the maker of his
own speech, for they think that if they
admit it, they must also admit that God
is the maker of His speech. A.gain,
when they believe, that the speech can
only exist with the speaker, they think,
they must also believe, taking in view
the two foregoing principles, that God
is Himself the creator of His words. In
this case He Himself becomes the place
of created things. So they assert that
God is the maker of speech, but it is
an eternal attribute in him, like know-
ledge, etc. This is the time of the
speech in our mind, but not of the
speech which expresses what we have in
our mind, that is, the words. As the
Mutazilites thought that speech is the
action of the speaker, they said that by
speech is meant only the words uttered.
So they believed that the Quran ia
it6 aVerroes
" Created. '* Since according to tliem
the word is an action of the speaker, so
it is not one of its conditions that it
should exist with the speaker. The
Asharites on the other hand, insist that
it is one of its conditions that it should
exist only with the speaker. This is
true in both the cases, that is in the
case of ideas in our minds, and the
words which express them. But in the
case of God, it is the ideas which stand
with Him, and not the words expressing
them. So when the Asharites laid it
down as a condition, that the speech be
absolutely dependent upon the speaker,
they deny that the speaker is the maker-
of his speech; while on the other hand,
the Mutazilites, when they laid it down
as a condition that the speaker is the
maker of his speech, ignored the existence
of ideas in our minds. In this way there
is some truth, and some falsehood, in
the opinions of both of these sects, as
must have become clear by what we
have said.
t
kELIGlON AND P^fLOSOPHy \9i
Now we oome to the attributes of
. hearing and seeing. The Law has prov-
ed them to be possessed by God by
saying tnat hearing and seeing are the
two essential quaHties for knowing the
meaning of things, which cannot be ac-
quired- by intellect. So a maker must
know everything about the object which
he is making, it is necessary that he
should possess the two senses of hearing
and seeing. So He must have these
two faculties. All this proves their
existence in God, by means of the Law,
through the teaching of the knowledge
which is found in him. Moreover, One
on whom the name of God and the
Adorned is applied must necessarily
possess all the senses. For it is useless
for man to [worship him who cannot
know that he is being worshipped, as
God has said, '' 0 my father, why dost
thou worship that which heareth not,
neither seeth, nor profiteth thee at all ;"3f
and, '* Do you therefore worship, beside
— ^ T "" -- ..... II ., I. II II I I. II II .^
37. Quran xix, 43.
w aVerroks
God, that which cannot profit you at
all, noi' can it hurt you^^ss xhis is the
power which has been ascribed to God,
and which the Law has commanded the
common people to know and nothing else.
Of the innovation which this question
of attributes has given rise to, one is
whether they are the same as Divine
Kssence or something added to it, that
is, whether they are found in the essence
itself (Nafsiyyah), or are only applied
to it, ( Maanawiyydh ). By Nafsiyyah
we mean those attributes which are
found in the thing itself, and are not
attached to it for the purpose of adding
something to the essence, for existence,
we say one or eternal. By Maanawiyyah
we mean the attributes which are ap-
plied to a thing for some purpose
which is found in it. The Asharites say
that these attributes are only Maanawvy-
yah, that is qualities which are only
added to the Divine Essence. So they
say that he knows by a knowledge which
38. Quran xxi, 67.
t
b^LiaiON AND PHtLOSOl^ttV U^
has bee.n added to His essence, and lives
by life attached to it and so on. This
has compelled them to admit that the
Creator has a body, for there must be
the quality and the qualified, the bearer
and the borne. This is the condition of the
body, so they must say that the essence
is existent by itself, and the qualities
exist through it, or they must say that
these attributes are independent of each
other, then there must be a number
of gods. This is tlie belief of the
Christians, who say that the three
personifications are those of Existence,
Life and Knowledge. God has said
about it the following, "They are cer-
tainly infidels, who say, God is the third
of the three/'^^ One of them stands
by itself, the others being dependent
upon the former. So it becomes necess-
ary that there should be essence, existing
in itself, and the accidents depending on
something else. The place in which the
essence and the accidents are found to-
39, Quran v, 77.
^H AVEKROES
gether must necessarily be a body. SucIt
is also the case with the MutaziHtes
about the question, that the essence and
the attributes are one and tlie same
thi'ng. This they think, is for the pri-
mary principles of knowledge or may be
opposed to them. For they think that
according to the primary principles know-
ledge must be existent without the one
knowing. But knowledge and the one know-
ing cannot be the same, except that it may
be possible that the two may be very close
to. each other, just as the father and
the son. This teaching is very remote
for the understanding of the masses, and
to explain it to them in detail is inno-
vation, for it would more likely' mislead
than guide them to the right path. The
MutaziHtes have no argument to advance
in proof of their proposition, for they
have none. Such is also the condi-
tion of the Mutakallimun in the case
[^ of denying a body to God. For when
they have established it, they are com-
pelled to admit the creation of the body,
kELlaiON AND PHiLOSOPttV \ht
because it is a body. VVe have already
said that they have no argument for it.
Those who have such are the learned
people, the philosophers. It is at this
point that the Christians have erred.
They believe in the multiplicity of at-
tributes that they are essences existing
not by the help of another, but by
themselves, like the self, {Zat)» They
also believe that the qualities with these
attributes are two in number -knowledge
and life. So they say that God is one
from the three causes. That He is three
they say because He exists, lives
and knows. They say that He is one,
because He is a collection of all the
three qualities. And so there are three
religious opinions among them. One
party believes that they are all the self
(Zat) alone without any number; the
other only believes in numbers of quali-
ties. This is divided into two parties:
one which thinks that they exist by
themselves, and the other which makes
them exist by something else. All this
\U AVERROES
is in contrast with the purpose of the
Law.
It being so, it is necessary that one
who wants to teach the knowledge of
these things to the common people
should tell them as much as the Law
orders him to do — and that is only a
confession of their existence without
entering into details. For it is not
possible for the common people to believe
and understand them at all. By common
people here I mean all those who are
unacquainted with the laws of reasoning,
though they may or may not know the
science of scholastic theolog}^ It is not
in the power of scholastic theology to know
of these things even when it is said
that it is not a science of reasoning but
of dogmatics, for these things can
never be clearly understood by dog-
matics alone. So, by now, the extent of
these questions which should be disclosed
to the common people, and the method
adopted for this purpose must have be-
come clear to you by what we have said.
RELIGION A^CD PHILOSOPHY 157
OF DIVINE PERFECTION
We have already described the way
which the Law pursues in teaching the
common people the existence of God,
the denial of His having any associates,
and thereby the knowledge of His
attributes, and the extent to which they
have been explained in details in it,
one after another. It is really an addi-
tion to, and deduction from, and change
and interpretation of this very limit and
extent which has not been productive of
good to any and all the people. Now
it remains for us to know the method
which the Law has adopted in explain-
ing to the common people the perfection
of God and freedom from all defects,
and the length to which it has gone in
detaihno: it, and the cause of restrictinof
its knowledge to them. Then we should
mention the methods which it adopts in
teaching the people the knowledge of
His actions, and the latitude which it
has allowed in this respect. Having
158 AVERROES
done so, we shall have accomplished the
purpose for which we began this book.
So we say that the knowledge of
things known as perfection and holiness
are found in many verses of the Quran,
the most clear and definite of them
being the following, " There is nothing
like Him, and it is He who heareth and
seeth;"^^ and, *' Shall God, therefore,
Who createth, be as he who create th
not."^^ The second verse is an argument
for the verse "there is nothing like
Him/* For it is one of the character-
istics of the dispositions of all the people
to think that the Creator must either
be unlike the things which He has
created, or having qualities which may
be different from these which He has
given to the created ; otherwise he who
is himself created cannot be a Creator.
When we have admitted that the
created cannot be the creator then it
becomes incumbent upon us to say that
the qualities of the created should either
40. Quran xlii, 9, 4J, Quran ^vi, 17,
BEUGION AND PHILOSOPHY 159
be not found in the Creator, or found
in Him in some different way than they
are in the created. We say, **in some
different way," because we have proved'
the divine qualiiies to be those which
are found in the noblest of God's
creatures, man, as knowledge, life, power,
volition and so on. This is the meaninor
of the Tradition of the Prophet, '' God
created Adam after His own image."
So it has been established that the. Law
has denied the similarity between the
Creator and the created with fittino*
arguments. The denial of sitnilarity is
of two kinds, first, that there may not
be found in the Creator many quahties
of the created ; and secondly; there may
be found in him the qualities of the
created in so perfect and excellent a
form as could not be imagined. Of
these two kinds it should be seen which
one the Law has explained, and about
which it is reticent. We would also try
to find out the cause for this reticence.
We would say that the qualities of
160 AVERROBS
the created which have been denied by
Law as pertaining to God are those
which show some defects; for example^
death, as God says, "And do ye not
trust in him who liveth, and dieth
not/'*2 or sleep and things which lead
to negligence and carelessness, as regards
senses and the protection of the existent
things, as He says, "Neither slumber
nor sleep seizeth Him.'**^ Of such
qualities are error and forgetfulness, as
God has said, " The knowledge thereof
is with my Lord, in the book of His
decrees: my Lord erreth not, neither
doth He forget."^* A knowledge of
those qualities the existence of which
has been denied in God is one of the
necessary things of common education
and is why the Law has been very
explicit about them. It only warns us
not to meddle with those things which
are far from the primary principles of
knowledge, because it knows the small
limits of human knowledge, as God has
42. Quran xxv, 60. 43. Quran ii, 256. 44. Quran xx, 54,
¥
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 161
said in many different verses of the
Quran, *' But the greater part of men
do not understand." For example He
says, /'Verily the creation of heaven
and earth is more considerable, than the
creation of man ; but the greater part
of men do not understand /'^^ and '' The
institution of God to which He has
created mankind disposed; there is no
diano^e in what God hath created. This
is the right religion ; but the greater
part of men know it not."^^ Now it
may be said, w4iat is the proof — that
is, the proof advanced by the Law — of
the fact that these defects are not found
in God, We would say .that it is
apparent from the universe itself. It is
quite safe. No confusion or corruption
overtakes it. Had the Creator been
subject to negligence, carelessness, error
or foigetfulness the whole of the uni-
verse would have been destroyed. God
has made this clear in many verses of
the Quran. He says, ''Verily God
k
45. Quran xxxv, 39. 46, Quran
U
16^ AVERKOES
sustaineth the heaven and the earth,
lest they fail: and if they should fail,
none could support the same besides
him ; "^^ and, '' The preservation of both
is not burden unto him. He is the
high, the mighty."*^
If our opinion be asked about the
anthropomorphic attributes of God,
whether the Law has denied them as
attributes to the Creator or is only
silent about them, we would say, that
it is evident that the Law is quite
silent about them, and their mention in
it is quite near to their denial altogether.
It has come to be so because the Quran
in many verses speaks of His hands
and face, and these verses are taken as
showing physical attributes which the
Creator has bestowed upon the created,
just as He has given him the qualities
of power, volition and so on — qualities
which are common between the Creator
and created, except that they are more
perfect in the former. On account of
47. Qoran 48. quian ii, 356.
KELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY' 163
this many Muslims believed that the
Creator has a body different from all
other bodies. Such is the case with the
Hanbalites and their many followers.
But in my opinion we should follow the
path of the Law ; and this should neither
deny nor try to prove them, and when-
ever asked by the common people to do
so, we should answer with words of
God, ''There is nothing like him; and
it is He who heareth and seeth,"^^ in
this way preventing them from question-
ing. It is so because of three reasons.
It is neither near to the first, nor to
the second, nor to the third grade. This
would be quite clear to you from the
method adopted by the Mutakallimun.
They say that the proof of the fact that
He is not a body is that it has been
proved that all bodies are created things.
If they are asked to point out the met-
hod of proving the latter pioposition,
they adopt the method^ which we have
already pointed out^ concerning the creat-
ly. Quran xlii, 9,
^M AVEBROES
ion of accidents, that that which cannot
be separated from created things is itself
created. You have aheady seen, from
what we have said, that this method is
not a philosophical one, and had it been
80, even then a majority of the common
people would not have grasped it. More-
over, whatever these people have said
about God, that He is a Self (Zat) and
divine attributes added to it, proves by
itself that He has a bodv, on account
of the denial of creation, rather an
argument denying anthropomorphism.
This is the first reason why the Law
does not speak of these things in clear
terms. The second reason is that com-
mon people think that all that is exist-
ent they can imagine and feel, all else
being non-existent to them. So when
they are told that there exists One who
has no body, their imagination does not
work and He becomes almost non-exist-
ent to them, particularly so when they
are told that He is neither outside our
Jjpowledge nor in it^ peitber above no^:
Religion and philosophy i^.
below. That is why the secb which
believes in anthropomorphism thinks of
those who deny it, that they also believe
in it ; while, on the other hand, the party
thinks its opponents to be believing in a
number of gods. The third reason is that
had the Law denied anthropomorphism
altogether there would have arisen many
a mis(jivinor about what has been said
concerning the Day of Judgment, and
other beliefs.
Of these one is the problem of
Divine Vision which we find stated in
authentic Traditions. Those w^ho have
been very explicit in denying it are
the two sects of the Asharites and
the Mutazilites. The belief of the
latter has driven them to deny the
vision altogether; while the Asharites
have tried to make the two things agree,
but this was impossible for them to do.
So they have taken refuge in many
sophistic arguments, the weakness of
which we would show when talking of
the Divine Vision. Another problem
166 AVERROES
wtich rises oub of this is that it evi-
dently gives rise to a denial of the
direction in which God is. For if He
has no body then the Law becomes an
allegory. For the advent of the pro-
phets is founded upon the fact that Divine
Revelation is sent to them from the
heaven. Upon this very principle is
also based our Teligion, for the Divine
Book has come down from the heavens,
as God says, " Verily we have sent
down the same ( the Quran ) on a bless-
ed night. "^^ The descending of the
divine revelation from heaven is" based
upon t]:e fact of God's being there. So
also is the descending and ascending of
angels from heaven, as God says, " Unto
him ascendeth the good speech; and the
righteous work will He exalt; *^^^ and
says He, '* The angels ascend up unto
and the spirit. "^^ We would mention
all the things which the deniers of
direction bring to prove their proposition
when we come to talk of this problem.
50, Quran xlir, 2. 51. Quran xxxv, i\. 52. Quran Ixx, 4.
fefeUGlON Akb pklLOSOPHY 1*7
Another difficulty which arises is that
with the denial of anthropomorphism
we shall have to deny movement to
God, after which it would be difficult to
explain with regard to the Day of Judg-
ment, that He would appear to the
people at that moment, and would him-
self superintend their judgment, as He
says, *' Thy Lord shall come and the
angels rank by rank, "^^ It would also
be difficult to explain the famous Tradi-
tion of Descent, though its explanation
would be, on the whole easier than that
of the former in spite of all that has
been said about it in the Law. So it
is necessary that there should be disclos-
ed to the common people nothing which
might lead them to a disbelief in the
literal meanings of these things. This
w^ould be its effect upon the mind of
the people if takoi exoterically. But
when it is interpreted it would come to
either of two interpretations. Either inter-
pretation would overcome the exoteric
63. Quran Ixxxix, 23
16S AVERROES
side of ifc and of other things like it,
thus destroying the Law altogether, and
and falsifying their purpose; or it will
be said about all of them that they are
only allegories, which would destroy the
Law, and efface it from the mind of the
people, while the man doing it would
nob know the sin he has committed with
regard to Law. With all this, if you
were to look into the argfumcnts which
the interpreters advance about these
things, you would find all of them unrea
sonabje, while the exoteric meanings are
much more satisfactory, that is, verifica-
tion throuQfh them is more common and
much better. This should become clearer
to you when we begin to review the
arguments which they advance for a
denial of anthropomorphism, and discuss
the question of direction, as we may
shortly do. You should also know that
the Law never intended to disclose the
question of the denial of this attribute
completely to the common people, since
it can be done by an explanation of the
RteLlGlON AND PItlLOSOPHY IB^
soul, and the Law has nob explained to
the masses what the soul was. God
says in the Quran, *' They will ask thee
concerning the Soul; answer, The Soul
was created at the command of ui}^ Lord;
but ye have no knowledge given unto
you except a little. "^* This is so,
because it is difficult to establish reasons
for the common people for the existence
of a thing existing by itself, without a
body. Had the denial of this attribute
been understood by the masses then it
would not have been enough for prophet
Abraham to say in his discussion with
the infidel, " When Abraham said, My
Lord is He who giveth life and killeth :
he answered, I give life and I kill, ^'^^
On the other hand he would have said,
" Thou art a body, and God has not
one, for every body is created, '* as the
Asharites would argue. So also it would
have sufficed for Moses in his discussion
with Pharoah about his divinity; and
for the Holy Prophet in case of the
54. Quran xvu, 87. 55, Quran ii, 2€0,
ifo AvfenBOks
anti- Christ, telling the Faithful of the
falsehood of his claims for divinity,
because he would have a body while
God has none. On the other hand he
toH them that our God was not one
- eyed. An argument proving the
physical defect in him was enough to
falsify him. So you see that all these
are innovations in Islam, and have
become the cause of its being split up
into sects, into which the Prophet tells
us that his people would be divided.
Now some one may object that the
Law has not made it clear to the
common people that God has or has not
a body, then what should they believe
about him. This is a question which
will naturally arise in the mind of every
man, and cannot be put away from him.
So it would not satisfy the common
people to let them know of a thing, the
existence of which they should believe,
that it is not made of matter. We
should say that they should be answered
with the answer given by Law — That
UlilLIGlON A^D PiitLOSOPHt lift
He is the Light, for this is the quality
which God has assigned to himself in
His Book, for describing himself, He
says, ''God is the light of heaven and
earth. "^^ The prophet has also assigned
to him the same quality in an. authentic
Tradition. It says that he was asked
whether he had seen God, and he
answered, " He was Light, and I saw
him." The Tradition of the Night
Journey says that when the Prophet
neared the lotetree,^^ it was completely
covered with light, which did not hide
it from his sight. There is also a
Tradition in the book of Muslim which
says that God is a curtain of light,
which, if opened, would burn the opener,
and yet God would not be seen. In
66. Qaran xxir, 35.
57. He also saw him another time, by the lote-tree,
beyond which there is no ' passing : near it is the garden
of eternal abode. When the lote-tree covered that which
it cohered, his eye-sight turned not aside, nor did it wander;
and he really beheld some of the greater signs of his Lord.
(Quran lii, 16, 18.) The lote-tree is the limit beyond
whieh neither angel nor man can pass. It stands in the
seventh heaven, on the right hand of the Throne of God,
ih AVERROES
some other readings of this very Tradi-
ticn it is said that He is seventy cur-
tains of light. It should be known that,
this illustration is especially fit for God,
for it comprises the two things, that He
can be felt, our eyes and intellect being
powerless to see or comprehend him, and
in spite of this He is not a body too.
Xovv according to the common people
the existent thing is one which can be
felt, while the non-existent thing is that
which they cannot feel. So light being
the best of the things felt, it is but
fittinor that the best existinor thincr should
be likened unto it. There is another
cause for it which should be noticed.
The condition of His existence to the
learned people, when they begin to
ponder over him, is like the condition of
the eyes when they look towards the
sun. But such is not the condition of
the eyes of the bat. So this quality
fittingly describes the condition of the
two classes of people. Moreover, God
is the cause of the existence of things,
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY
\7i
tnd of our knowledge of them. This is
tflso the quality of the light in showing
jolours, and of our seeing them. So
rod has very fittingly named himself
light. When it is said that He is Light
then there remains no doubt as to His
Isian on the Day of Judgment. From
jse it must have become clear to you
^hat the primary belief of the Law
as about this attribute, and what are
ihe innovations which rose in it after-
wards. The Law is silent about it
jause there is not found in the uni-
verse anything unseen without a body,
jxeept that which is found by arguments
imong things seen as existent with this
[uality, and that is the soul. As the
ilief of the soul was impossible for the
lasses, it was also impossible for them
;o understand the existence of a Beino-
jvho exists without a body. Hence they
jannot understand it about God.
OF DIRECTION
This is a quality which all the people
learned in J^aw b^ve tfted to prove^
174 AVEBflOES
until the Mutazilites denied it, and were
followed by the later^ Asharites, like
Abul Maati and those who follow him.
All the exoterics of the Law go to
prove it. For God says, *' And eight
shall bear the Throne of thy Lord on
that Day; "^^ ^nd " He governeth all
the things from heaven even to the
earth : hereafter shall they return unto
him, on the Day whose length shall be
a thousand years, of those whioli ye
compute. '*^* Again, He says, " The
angels ascend unto him and the s^irit;*'^*^
and, *' Are Ye secure that He who
dwelleth in heaven will not cause the
earth to swallow you up ? and behold,
it shall shake. "^^ There are many
other verses of this kind which, if inter-
preted, would turn the whole of the Law
into interpretation ; and if taken allegor-
ically, would make it an allegory. All
the religious laws are based upon the
principle that God is in heaven, from
58. Quran Ixix, 17. 59. Quran xxxii, 2.
60. Quran Ixx, 4. 61. Quraa Ixvii, 16,
KBLimON AND PHILOSOPHY li&
whence he sends down angels to His
Prophets with revelations, that from the
heaven, the religious books used to
descend, and that towards it was the
Night Journey of the Prophet, till he
reached near the lote-tree. All the
philosophers are, moreover, agreed that
God and His Angels are in heaven, as
is the case with all the religions. The
doubt which led them to deny this idea
of direction was that they thought that
by believing in direction it would be
necessary to believe in space, which in
its turn leads to a belief in anthropo-
morphism. But we say that this is not
necessarily the case, for direction can
exist without space. It is nothing but
the surfaces of the body surrounding it,
which are six in number. That is why
we say that there is an above and a below,
right and left and before and behind for
an animal. Or they are the surfaces of
a body surrounded by another body
having the above-mentioned six direc-
tions. So the directions, which are the
176 ATEBROES
surfaces of the body itself, are not the
epaces iof the body in any respect. But
the s-urfaces of the surrounding bodies are
space for it. The atmosphere surround-
ing man, and the surfaces of the sky
surrounding the surfaces of the atmos-
phere, for they are the spaces for it.
Such is also the case with different
surrounding and forming spaces for one
another. As to the last sky it is evident
that beyond it there must be no body.
For had it been so, it would be neces-
sary that beyond it be another body and
so on to infinity. So there is no space
at all for the last body of the universe,
for it is not possible that in it be found
any body, it being necessary that there
be found a body in every space. So
when there is an argument for the exis-
tence of a thing in that direction, it is
necessary that it be not a body. So
one who denies His existence there goes
a<yainst his own ideas. He is existent,
has a bod}^ is not existent without a
body. They cannot say that beyond the
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY ITt
universe is a void. For the im possibility
of a void has been made quite certaia
in the philosophical sciences. For that
upon which the name void is co^mmonly
applied, are nothing but • dinaensions
( Abad ), in which there are no bodies.
For when these dimensions are oiace
removed, there remains nothing bu>t
non-existence. But if the void be sup*
posed as existent, it i» necessaiy to ad-
mit the existence of accidents in some-
thinor not a bodv, for dimensions are
accidents by their having a quality.
But it is said by the Ancients and
established by past religions that that
place is the dwelling place of the spirits^
God and angels. This place has no
space, and is not governed by tiine,
because everything governed by time
and space can be corrupted. And it is
necessary that the things there be
uncoirupted and uncreated. This has
been made quite clear by what I have
said, for there cannot be found in that
place anything but one^ which-* is existent
12
17& AVERROES
and at the same time can be felt, or is
altogether non-existent. It is self-evi-
dent that an existent object is always
referred to by its existence; that is, it
is said that rt exists, that is, it has an
existence. So if anything exists there,
it must be the noblest of all, and it is
necessary that that existent thing should
be referred to by the best portion of
the universe, which are the heavens.
God has said concerning the nobility of
the heavens, '' Verily the creation of
heaven and eartli is more considerable
than the creation of man ; but the
greater part of men do not understand.*'^^
All this is perfectly clear to the learned
men " Well orrounded in knowledoe. '63
Now it has become clear to you that
belief in direction is necessary by religion
and reason, and. that it forms a part of
the Law, which is based upon it. A
denial of the principles is a denial of all
the religions. The cause of the difficulty
in their understanding this, and in their
62. Quran xl, 59. 63. Quran iii, 6,
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY If*
denial of anthropomorphism is^ that there
cannot be found in the visible world an
illustration of such a thing. This was
just the reason why the Law did not
expressly deny an anthropomorphism.
For to the common people verification
of an invisible object can only come
when its existence be known in the
visible world, as knowledge, which being
a condition for their own existence as
visible, could to them become a condition
for the existence of an invisible Maker,
Now as the case of the visible was un-
knowui in the visible on tlie part of the
man}^ and none knew it but those who
were well-ofrounded in knowledofe, the
Law-giver forbade an inquiry into it, as
for example knowledge of the Soul. If
it be needful for the common people to
know anything, then the Law gives
examples from the visible world And
if one example did not suffice for the
understanding of the problem in view,
then many examples are given/ as in the
case of m\ account of the Day of Judg-
i8d AVERROES
naent;. The doubt which arises out of a
denial of direction, on the part of those
denying it, is that the common people
cannot comprehend it, particularly so,
because they have not been given before
hand to understand that God has no
body. So it is necessary to take the
action of the Law as our example,
otherwise we will have to interpret that
which the Law itself has not expressly
said.
With regard to these problems of
the Law, the people may be divided
into three classes. In the first place
there are people who cannot notice any
doubt arising out of them, especially in
thinfifs which the Law has left to be
taken exoterically. These people are
the greatest in number, and may le
described as the masses. Then the
second group of men is one which has
doubts; but has not power to solve
them. These are above the masses and
below the learned people. It is for
them that there are found in the Jja^y
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPMY l^il
allegorical sayings, and it is they whom
God has censured. For there is no
allegory in the Law for the learned or
the common people, and it is in this
light that all the allegorical sayings of
the Quran should be understood. Their
example as regards the Law is like the
example of the bread of wheat which
thouo^h a useful cereal for the larcje
number of human beings, may prove
harmful to some. Such is also the
case with relio^ious teachinof : it is use-
ful for the many but sometimes becomes
harmful to some. The following words
of God point to the same thing. ** He
will not thereby mislead any except the
transgressors,"^* But this is found only
in a few verses of the Quran about a
few people. Most of the verses are,
however, those which speak of things
invisible for which there is no example
in the visible world. So they are ex-
pressed by the things nearest to them
in the visible world, on account of their
64. Quran ii, 24.
lUi AVERROES
similarity. Some people take the illus-
tration as the thing illustrated, and
hence they fall into confusion and doubt.
This is what is called allegorical in the
Law, and is not meant for the learned
or the common people, which in reality
form two groups of men. For these
are the people who are really healthy,
and delicate food is only fit for them.
The other group is a group of sick men
who are always few in number. So God
has said, "But they whose hearts are
perverse will follow that which is
parabohcal therein, out of love of
schi«m/'^^ These are the dogmatic and
the scholastic theoloiJ:ians. The worst
which these people have done in respect
to the Ijaw is that they have interpret-
ed much which they thought was not
to be taken literally, and then said that
their interpretation was the thing
intended, and that God had mentioned
it parabolically only to test and try
His creatures. God forbid that we
§5, Quran iii, 5.
tlELlGlOir Al^D iPMlLOSOPH Y ^ 183
should ever have such an idea about
Him. The Divine Book is a miracle of
clearness ar.d lucidity. So it is far from
the real purpose of the Law for one to
say about a thing which is not para-
bolical, that it is so, and then set
about interpreting it according to his
own ideas, telling the people that their
duty lies in believing his interpretations.
They have done so in the case of the
verse of Equalisation on the Throne,
and others, saying that their exoteric
meaning is only parabolical. On the
whole many interpretations, which these
people maintain to be the real purpose
of the Law, when intently looked into
and deciphered, are found, wanting in
arguments, and not serving the purpose
which the exoteric meaning would have
with regard to the common people. The
primary purpose of knowledge for the
common people is action, so that which
is most useful in action is most suitable
for them. But for the learned men, the
purpose of knowledge is both knowledge
and action. The man who interprets
anything of the Law, thinking that his
interpretation is the real purpose of it,
and then discloses it to the common
people, is like a man^ who finds a medi-
cine which ati expert physician had
compounded to preserve the health of
all, or of a majority of the people; then
there came a man with whom that
medicine did not agree on account of the
coarseness of his disposition. He pre-
sented it to some people, and then thought
that by some drug, which the first
physician had clearly specified, as com-
posing that universally useful medicine,
he did not mean the drug commonly
known by -that name — but another
which he really meant, but used this
name for it by a far-fetched metaphor.
So he took out the first drug from the
compound, and placed another in its
stead, which he thought to be the one
intended by the first physician. Then
he told the people that this was the
medicine intended. The people began
to use that 'improved" medicine, and
many of them got injured by it. Then
.there came another group of men, who,
seeing the people aick on account of
that medicine, thought of curing them.
So they changed some of its drugs with
some other than the first one, then
presented it to the people for quite
another disease than that intended by
the first physician. Then there appeared
another group which interpreted the
medicine in quite another way than the
two preceding groups had done. The
fourth group gave a new interpretation
to the drug and prescribed it for a
fourth kind of disease. So as time went
on with that great medicine, the inter-
pretations of it took hold of the people
instead of the drugs, and they changed
and transformed it altoorether. As a
result the people were attacked by many
different kinds of diseases, till the use-
fulness of the medicine was altogether
lost. Such is the condition of those
sects which have risen in Islamt For
U6 AVKRROE^
every one of them has made interpreta-
tions quite different from the others, and
maintained that its interpretation shows
the real purpose of the Law, which was
at last rent to piece, and lost its pri-
mary purpose altogether. The Prophet,
knowing that a thing like this would
necessarily happen among his people,
said, *' My people will shortly be divided
into seventy two sects. All of them will
be in hell, except one." By this one
he meant the sect which followed the
exoteric naeanings of the Law, without
making any interpretations which may
by disclosed to the people. If 3^ou were
to look into the Law and see the corrup-
tion which it has suffered up to this
time, through interpretations, the truth
of this example would become clear
to you.
The first to make a change in the
religion - the great medicine - were the
Kharijites, who were followed by the
Mutazilites. They were succeeded by
the Asharitos, after whom came the
RELIGION AND rHlLOSOFHY l87
Sufis. Last of all eame Al-Ghazzali,
who went to tlie extreme and corrupted
everything. He it is who explained
philosophy to the common people, and
disclosed to them the opinions of the
philosophers as he understood them to
be. This he did in a book called
" Al-Maqasid, '' in which he thought
he was refuting them. He planned his
Refutation of the Philosophers, and charged
them with intidelity in respect to three
questions, tearing them to pieces, as he
thought, in regard to consensus of opin-
ion; and calling them innovators as
regards other opinions. In this book he
has advanced many specious arguments
and confused reasonings, which have led
astray many people both from religion
and philosophy. Then he said in his
book Jawahir al-Quran tliat the argu-
ments which he had mentioned in his
Refutation were controversial in their
nature, while in fact they were mentioned
in his Al Maznun cda Ghairi Ahlihi.
Then in his MishJcat ul Anwar he men*
188 AVERROES
tions grades of men really knowing God.
He says that all but those who believe
that God is not the mover of the first
heaven, and that it is not He from
whom this movement oriofinates, are
precluded from it. This is an explana-
tion from him of men learned in divine
science. He has said in many places
that divine science exists only by guesses,
as opposed to certainties in other science.
In his book Munqidh min cU Dalai he
has gone against the philosophers and
maintained that knowledge can only be
acquired by privacy and meditation, and
that those in this rank are all very near to
the rank of the prophets. He has men-
tioned this very fact in his Kimiya i Saadat,
Men have become divided into parties
on account of this confusion. One
party chose to censure the philosophers,
while the other agreed to interpret the
Law, and make it conform to philosophy.
All this is wrong. The Law should be
taken literally ; and the conformity of
religion to philosophy should not be
RELIGION AKB PHILOSOPHY Mfr^
told to the common people. For by an
exposition of it we should be exposing
the results of philosophy to them, with-
out their having intelligence enough to
understand them. It is neither perraitt'
ed nor desirable to expose anything of
the result of philosophy to a man who
has no arguments to advance, for there
are no arguments either with the learn-
ed people who have a mastery over both
the subjects, or with the common people
who follow the exoteric of the Law.
So his action brought disorder in re-
spect to both of these things, religion
and philosophy, in the mind of the
common people, while he saved them
for the others. The disorder in religion
came through his exposing those inter
pretations which should not be exposed ;
and so also the disorder in phiiosophjr
was the result of his mentioning those
thino's in his books which should not
be put in the works on philosophy. Now
it was the result of his treatment of
the subjects that many people do not
190 AVBRRORS
know the difference between the two,
because of his bringing both of them
together. He has also insisted upon
the fact that he knew the cause of
doing so, as he did in his ** Al Tafriqa
hain al Islami wa-z Zindiqah, In it he
has -noted down many kinds of interpre-
tations and has decided that their
interpreters were not infidels though
they may go against the consensus of
opinion. Since he has done so, he is
dangerous to the Law for some reasons,
to philosophy for others, and to both
for some other reasons. So this man,
by disclosing them, lias shown that he
is danorerous for both the thins^s in
reality and profitable to them only by
accident. For teaching philosophy to
one who is not fit for it, will either
falsify philosophy or religion absolutely
or will show conformity between them
by accident only. The right thing would
have been not to disclose philosophy to
the common people at all. But if teach-
ing of it was absolutely necessary, then
BBLIGTON AND PHILOSOPHY 191
only that section of the people should
have been taught who saw that religion
was opposed to philosophy, in order to
show them that it was not so. And also
it might have been taught to those
people who thought that philosophy is
opposed to religion. This may have
been shown to either of these sections,
that in reality they did not possess a
knowledge o£ their substance and truth,
that is, of religion and philosophy.
Moreover, the}^ would know that the
opinion about religion, that it was op-
posed to philosophy was one which was
either about some innovation in relisfion '
and not about its principles, or is
an error in understanding that is, a
wrong interpretation of it, as was
shown ill the case of knowledofe about
particulars and other things. That
is why we were compelled in this book
to explain the principles of religion.
These principles, when intently looked
into will be found in perfect agreement
with philosophy. Such is also the case
196 AVERROES
with the opinion >yhioh says this philo*
sophy is opposed to religion. It only
shows that the man has not had a
sufficient training in either philosophy
or reliojion. This is the reason that we
were compelled to explain it in our
tractate entitled *' Fasl al Mctqcd fi
Mwwafiqat U Hikmat lil Sharia,
Now that this has become clear we
would return to our former theme. The
only problem which remains for us to
solve, out of those which we proposed
is that of Divine Vision. It is thought
for some reasons, that it forms a part
of the problem which we have just
discussed, on account of the words of
God, '* The sight comprehendeth him
not, but He comprehendeth the sight."^^
And hence the MataziHtes have denied
it, setting aside the arguments found in
the Law, in spite of their greatness in
number and fame, a very shameful act
on their ]:)art. The cause of this doubt
of the Law that since the Mutazilites
• 66, Qurw
REUGIONAND PHILOSOPHY 193
denied physical attributes, and believed
in exposing their ideas to every one, it
became necessary for them to deny direct-
ion also. And having once denied
direction the}?^ must also deny the
Vision, for the thing seen must be in
some direction to one who sees it. To
prove their point they are constrained
to set aside the traditional religion.
They neglected the Traditions because
they were only isolated things which
should not be believed, if found opposed
to the teachings of the Quran, that is,
opposed to the verse, " The sight com-
prehendeth Him not. '* The Asharites
tried to mix together the two beliefs,
that is, the denial of physical attributes,
and the possibility of vision of One
having no body, by means of our
senses. It became difficult for them to
prove it, and they took refuge in many
sophistical and conjectural arguments,
that is aiguments which are thought to
be correct but are in reality wrong. It
is so because it is possible to have the
13
194 AVERROES
same grades in arguments as there are
among men. Just as there may be
found men with perfect excellence and
those below them, till we may have a
man who thinks himself learned and
yet he is not, being only a pedant, so
there are arguments which are extremely
certain, and those below them^ then,
there are specious arguments, and
those which though really false seem
to be true. The statements of the
Asharites in regard to this question
are of two kinds : those refuting the
arguments of the Mutazilites, and those
proving the possibility of the Vision of
One having no body, and that there is
no difficulty in our believing it. The
statements by which they have opposed
the Mutazilites in their argument, that
the thing seen must have a direction
for one who sees it, is that some of
them say that it is applied only to the
visible, and not to the invisible, world;
and that it is not one of those cases in
\vhich th coiiditiofl of the one can bq
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 198
applied to the other. According to them
it is possible for a man to see an object
having no direction, for he sees by his
power of sight only that which comes
before his eyes. In this they have
mixed together the senses of sight with
intelligence, for the latter can perceive
that which has no direction, that is, no
space; but for the perception of the eye
there is a condition, that the thing to
be perceived be in a direction, not only
that but a particular direction too. So
if w^e take the eye to be endowed witb
the power of seeing, then it is not pos-:
sible except under very limited condi-
tions. These are three in number-light,
the intervention of a transparent body
between the eye and the object seen,
and the possession of necessary colours
by the object, A refutation of these
conditions in the eyes is also a refuta-
tion of those primary principles of
knowledofe which are known to all, . It
would be a refutation of the sciences of
philosophy and mathematics* The Asha-
196 AVERKOES
rites also maintain that one of the con-
ditions as we have said, for example, is
that every rational being has a life, it
being apparent in the visible world as a
condition for knowledge. Hence we say
to them that these are also condi-
tions for seeing things in the visible
world. So according to their own prin-
ciple is the case of the visible and the
invisible. In his book Al Maqasid Abu
Hamid ( Al Ghazzali ) intended to op-
pose the premise that every object per-
ceivable must be in some direction to
the one seeing it. He says that a man
sees himself reflected in a miri'or and
sees himself not in any other direction
but the opposite one. Hence he can see
his self in an opposite direction too.
But this is a mistake, because what he
sees is not his self but only an image
of it. This image is in the opposite
direction, being in the mirror, placed
there.
Of the arguments which they advance
to prove the vision of an object having
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 19t
no body, two are famous ones. Of
these the more famous is one which
says that an object seen 1:3 either because
it has some colour, or because it has a
body, or it is a colour, or because it is
existent. Sometimes they mention many
other causes than really do exist. They
say that it is wrong to suppose that it
must be a body, otherwise, no colour
would be visible, it being also incorrect
to suppose the sj.ace to be the
colour. Now when all the kinds of sup-
positions in the premise have been refut-
ed we shall have to believe that only
an existent object will be seen. The
mistake in this statement is quite clear.
For an object is visible because of it-
self. This is the case with the colour
and the body : the colour being visible
by itself, and the body through the
colour. That is why a thing which has
no colour cannot be seen. Had the
existence of a thing been the only con-
dition of visibility, it would have been
possible to see the sound and the senses.
198 AVERROES
In that case seeing, hearing, in fact all
the five senses would have been only
one, which is quite contrary to our
reason. This problem and others like it
have oblio:ed the Mutakallimun to admit
that it is possible to hear the colour,
and see the sounds. But this is against
nature, as man has understood it to be.
For it is absolutely evident that the
sense of seeing is quite different from
that of hearing. Their actions are quite
distinct from one another, and the oro:an
of the one cannot work as the organ of
the other. It is just as imposible to
turn hearing as to turn colour into
sound. Those who say that sometimes
sound can be seen, should be asked to
define the sense of seeing. They would
necessarily answer that it is a faculty
which perceives those things which can
be seen, such as colour and so on.
Then the}^ should be asked to define the
sense of hearing. They would surely
say that it is one sense by which sounds
can be heard. Then they should be
kELlGION AND PHILOSOPHY 199
asked whether at the time of sound it is
the sense of hearing only or seeing too.
If they say that it is hearing only, they
admit that it cannot perceive colours.
If the}^ say that it is seeing only, then
it cannot hear sounds. If it is neither
alone, for it perceives colours, then
it is seeing and hearing both. But
in this way everything can be proved
to be one, even in the case of contradic-
tory things. This is a thing which our
Mutakallimun admit or they are com-
pelled to do so. But it is clear that it
is a philosophical opinion which is only
fit for those ancient people famous for it.
Now the second method which Mu-
takallimun have adopted for proving
the possibility of Divine Vision is that
which has been mentioned by Abul
Maali in his book, Al Irshad. It says
that the senses can only feel the sub-
stance ( Zat ) of things, but that which
separates the existent thing from one
another is not to be found in the sub-
stance only. So the senses cannot per*
200 AVERROE«
ceive the substance, which is common
to all the existent things. They can
only perceive a thing because it exists.
Bub all this is absurd, which is quite
clear from the fact that if sight were
only able to perceive things then it
would not have been possible for it to
differentiate between white and black,
for there is no difference between thinors
about those qualities which are common
to all. This also becomes impossible as
regards all the other senses. The sense
of seeing could not perceive different kinds
of colours ; the sense of hearing cannot
differentiate between tastes. It would
be necessary that the objects per-
ceived by the senses be all of a kind, and
there should be no difference between,
objects perceived by seeing and appre-
hended by hearing. This is contrary to
that which man commonly understands.
In reality the senses perceive the sub-
stance of things by the power which is
vouchsafed to them. The cause of this
mistake lies in the fact that that which
RELIGION AND PitlLOSOPHY m
perceives a substance, is thought to be
the thing perceived. Had there not
been said so much about these things,
and so much respect for those who said
it, it would not have satisfied anybody
with a stronof common sense.
The cause of such a perplexing situat-
ion in the Law, which has compelled
its votaries to take refuge in such
worthless arguments, as would bring a
smile to the lips of anybody who has
made the least effort to distinguish
between different kinds of arguments, is
the exposition of anthropomorphic quali-
ties of God to the common people, a fact
which has been prohibited by Grod and
His Prophet. It is so because it is
very difficult for a man to believe at
the same time that there exists One
without a body, who can be seen with
our eyes. For the things which the
senses comprehend are in the bodies or
the bodies themselves. Hence the
Mutakallimun have tried to prove that
the Divine Vision will be an addition to
. 202 AVfiRkoki
our existing qualities at that moment.
This also should not have been disclosed
to the common people. For since their
intellect cannot go beyond their imagi-
[ nation that which they cannot imagine
is non-existent for them. To imagine a
thing which has no body is not possible,
and hence a belief in the existence of
an object which they cannot imagine, is
impossible for them. It was for this
reason that the Law refused to disclose
this secret to them, and described God,
for their sake, in terms which they can
imagine, ascribing to him the attributes
of hearing, seeing, having a face, &c, &c.,
at the same time telling them that He
is not like anything which can be
imagined. Had the intention of the
Law been to make clear to the masses
the fact of His having no body, it
would not have mentioned these things
in detail. But as light was the highest
of imaginable things, it was given to
them as an illustration of God, for it is
the best known of the things both to
RELIGlOl^ AND PHILOSOPHY 203
the senses and to the imagination.
Such is also the case in respect to the
possibility of their understanding the
things of the Day of Judgment. These
liave also been mentioned in terms which
the}^ can imagine. So now when the Law
has adopted this course about the appar-
ent description of God, there arises no
doubt about him. For when it is said
that He is Liorht or that there is a
curtain of light upon Him, as is men-
tioned in the Quran and authentic
Traditions, and when it is said that the
Faithful will see Him on the Day of
Judgment as they see the sun, there
arises no doubt or suspicion out of it
for the common or the learned people.
It is so because to the learned it is
quite clear that that condition will be
an addition to our former knowledo:e.
But when this is disclosed to the com-
mon people, they cannot understand it,
and hence they either disbelieve the
whole of the Law, or consider its ex-
ponent to be an infidel. So one who
^04
averhoes
adopts a method other than that laid
down by the Law in this respect, cer-
tainly goes astray. If you look a little
intently it will become clear to you,
that in spite of the fact that the Law
has not given illustration of those things
for the common people, beyond which
their imagination cannot go, it has also
informed the learned men of the under-
lying meanings of those illustrations.
So it is necessary to bear in mind the
limits which the Law has set about the
instruction of every class of men, and
not to mix them together. For in this
manner the purpose of the Law is
multiplied. Hence it is that the Pro-
phet has said, "We, the prophets, have
been commanded to adapt ourselves to
the conditions of the people, and address
them according to their intelligence,"
He who tries to instruct all the people
in the matter of religion, in one and
the same way, is like a man who wants
to make them alike in actions too, which
is quite against apparent laws and reason.
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 205
From the foregoing it must have
become clear to you that the divine
vision has an exoteric meaning in which
there is no doubt, if we take the words
of the Quran about God as they stand,
that is, without proving or disproving
the anthropomorphic attribute of God.
Now since the first part of the Law
has been made quite clear as to God's
purity, and the quantity of the teaching
fit for the common people, it is time to
begip the discussion about the actions
of God, after which our purpose in
writing this tractate will be over.
OF THE ACTIONS OF GOD
Iji this section we will take up five
questions, around which all others in
this connection revolve. In the first
place a proof of the creation of the
universe ; secondly, the advent of the
prophets ; thirdly, predestination and fate ;
fourthly, Divine justice and injustice ;
and fifthly, the Day of Judgment.
First Problem ; the Qreatiou of the
501 AVERROEiS
Universe : — The Law teaches that the
universe was invented and created by
God, and that it did not come into
being by chance or by itself. The meth-
od adopted by the Law for proving
this is not the one upon which the
Asharites have depended. For we have
already shown that those methods are
not specially certain for the learned, nor
common er.ough to satisfy all the classes
of men. The methods which are really
serviceable are those which have a very
few premises, and the results of which
fall very near to the commonly known
ideas. But in instructing the common
people the Law does not favour state-
ments composed of long and complete
reasonings, based upon different problems.
So everyone who, in teaching them,
adopts a different course, and interprets
the Law according to it, has lost sight
of its purpose and gone astray from the
true path. And so also, the Law in
giving illustrations for its reasonings uses
only those which are present before us.
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 20/
Whatever has been thought necessary
for the common people to know, has
been explained to thera by the nearest
available examples, as in the case of the
Day of Judgment. But whatever was
unnecessary for them to know, they have
been told that it was beyond their know-
ledge, as the words of God about the
Soul.^'' Now that we have established
this, it is necessary that the method
adopted by the Law for teaching the
creation of the universe to the common
people be such as would be acknowledged
by all. It is also necessary that since
there cannot be found anything present
to illustrate the creation of the universe
the Law mast have used the examples
of the creation of things in the visible
world.
So the method adopted by Law is
that the universe was made by God.
If we look intently into the verse per-
67. They will ask the concerning the Soul : answer, The
Soul was created at the command of my Lord : but ye hare
no knowledge given unto you, excep a little,— ( Quran-
xxii, 85.)
208 AVERROES
taining to this subject we shall see that
the method adopted is that of divine solici-
tude, which we know to be one of those
which prove the existence of God. When
a man sees a thin^r made in a certain
shape, proportion and fashion, for a
particular advantage is derived from it,
and purpose which is to be attained, so
that it becomes clear to him, that had
it not been found in that shape, and
proportion, then that advantage would
have been wanting in it, he comes to
know for certain that there is a maker of
that thing, and that he had made it in
that shape and proportion, for a set
purpose. For it is not possible that all
those qualities serving that purpose be
collected in that thing by chance alone.
For instance, if a man sees a stone on
the ground in a shape fit for sitting,
and finds its proportions and fashion of
the same kind, then he would come to
know that it was made by a maker,
and that he had made it and placed it
there. But when he sees nothing in it.
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHV 20&'
which may have made it fit for sitting
then he becomes certain that its e^i"
istence in the place was by chance only,
without its being fashioned by any
maker. Such is also tlie case with the
whole of the universe. For when a man
sees the sun, the moon, and all the stars,
which are the cause of the four seasons,
of days and nights, of rain, water and
winds, of the inhabitation of the parts
of the earth, of the existence of
man, and of the being of all the
animals and the plants and of the
earth beingf fit for the habitation of a
man, and other animal* living on it ;
and the water fit for the animals living
in it; and the air fit for birds, and if
there be anything amiss in this creat-
ion and edifice, the whole world would
come to confusion and disorder, then he
would come to know with certainty that
it is not possible that tliis harmony in
it for the different members of the
universe — man, animals, and plants
— be found by chance only. He will
14
210 AVBRROES
know that there is one who determined
it, and so one who made it by intention,
and that is God, exalted and magnified
may He be. He would know with
certainty that the universe is a created
thing, for he would necessarily think
that it is not possible that in it should
be found all this harmony, if it be not
made by some one, and had come into
existence by chance alone. Tliis kind of
argument is quite definite and at the
same time clear, and some have men-
tioned it here. It is based upon two
principles which are acknowledged by
all. One of tliem being, that the uni-
verse, with all its component parts, is
found fit for the existence of man and
things; secondly, that which is found
suitable in all its parts, for a single
purpose, leading to a single goal, is
necessarily a created thing. So those
two principles lead us naturally to admit
that the universe is a created thing, and
that there is a maker of it. Hence 'Hhe
argument of analogy *' leads to two
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 2U
things at one and the same time, and
that is why it is the best argument for
proving the existence of God. This,
kind of reasoning is also found in the
Quran in many verses in which the
creation of the universe is mentioned*
For instance, '* Have We not made the
earth a bed, and the mountains for
shelter to fix the same? And have We
not created you of two sexes; and
appointed your sleep for rest and made
the night a garment to cover you, and
destined the day to a gaining of a liveli-
hood ; and built over you seven heavens,
and placed therein a burning lamp ?
And do We not send down from the
clouds pressing forth rain, water pouring
down in abundance, that We may hereby
produce corn and herbs, and gardens
planted thick with trees/^^^ If we ponder
over this verse it would be found that
our attention has been called to the
suitability of the different parts of the
universe for the existence of man. In
68. Quran Ixxvii, 3, et. seq.
212 AVERKOBS
the very beginning we are informed of
a fact well-known to all — and that is
that the «arth has been created in a
way which has made it suitable for our
existence. Had it been unstable, or of
any other shape, or in any other place,
or not of the present proportion, it
would not have been possible to be here,
or at all created on it. All this is
included in the words, '* Have We not
made the earth a bed for you"? for in
a bed are collected together all the
qualities of shape, tranquility, and peace,
to which may be added those of smooth-
ness and softness. So how strange is
this wonderful work and how excellent
this blessedness, and how wonderful this
collection of all the qualities ! This is
so because in the word mihad (bed) are
brought together all those qualities,
which are found in the earth, rendering
it suitable for the existence of man. It
is a thing which becomes clear to the
learned after much learning and a long
time, *' But Ood will appropriate His
liteLlGION AND PHILOSOPHY 213
mercy unto whom He p]easeth.''<59 Then
as to the divine words, " And the
mountains for stakes," — they tell us of
the advantage to be found in the tran-
quihty of the earth on account of the
mountains. For had the earth been
created smaller than it is now, that ii^,
without mountains it would have been
quivered by the motion of other ele-
ments, the water and the air, and
would have been shaken and thus dis-
placed. This would naturally have been
the cause of the destruction of the
animal world. So when its tranquility
is in harmony with those living on it,
it did not come into being by chance
alone, but was made by some one*s
intention, and determination. Certainly
it was made by One who intended it,
and determined it, for the sake of those
living on it. Then He calls our atten-
tion to the suitability of the existence
of night and day for animals.
He says, " And made the night
69. Quran ii, 99.
214 AVERR0E8
a garment to cover you ; and destined
the day to a gaining of your livelihood."
He means to say that He has made
the night like a covering and clothing
for all the things, from the heat of the
sun. For had there been no setting of
the sun at night, all the things, whose
life has been made dependent upon the
sun, would have perished - that is, the
animals and the plants. As clothing
protects the people from the heat of
the sun, in addition to its being a cover-
ing, so God likened the night to it.
This is one of the most beautiful of the
metaphors. There is also another advan-
tage in the night for the animals : their
sleep in it is very deep, after the setting
of -the sun, which keeps faculties in
motion, that is, wide awake. So God
has said, ' And appointed your sleep
for rest, " on account of the darkness
of the night. Then He says, '* And
built over you seven heavens, and placed
therein a burning lamp* " Here by the
word building He means their creation,
feteLIGlON ANt) PillLOSOPHY 21K
and their harmony with the created
things, and their arrangement and
system. By strength He means that
power of revolution and motion which
is never slackened, and never overtaken
by fatigue; and they never fall like
other roofs and high edifices. To this
refer the words of God, " And made
the heaven a roof well-supported, *'^^
By all this He shows their fitness in
number, shape, fashion, and movement,
for the existence of those who live on
the earth round it. Were one of the
heavenly bodies, not to speak of all, to
stop for a moment all would be chaos
on the face of the earth. Some people
think the blast of the last trumpet,
which will be the cause of the thunder-
bolt, will be nothing but a stop in the
revolution of the heavenly bodies. Then
He tells us of the advantage of the sun
for those living on the earth and says,
" And placed therein a burning lamp. "
He calls it a lamp because in reality it
»
70. Quran xxi, 33.
216 AVERROES
is all darkness, and light covers the
darkness of the night, and if there be
no lamp, man can get no advantage out
of his sense of sight at night time; and
in the same way if there were no sun
the animals can have no benefit of their
sense of seeing. He calls our attention
to this adv^antaore of the sun, ifynorino^
others because it is the noblest of all
the advantages and the most apparent
of all. Then He tells us of His kind-
ness in sending down rain, for the sake
of the plants and the animals. The
coming down of rain in an appointed
proportion, and at an appointed season,
for the cultivated fields cannot be by
chance alone, but is the result of divine
solicitude for us all. So He says, '*And
do We not send down from the clouds
pressing forth rain, water pouring down
in abundance that We may hereby pro-
duce corn and herbs, and gardens plant-
ed thick with trees. " There are many
verses of the Quran on this subject.
For instance, He says, " Do ye not see
RELIGIOl^ AI^TD PHILOSOPHY 217
how God hath created the seven heavens,
one above another, and hath placed the
moon therein for a light, and hath appoint-
ed the sun for a taper ? God hath
also provided and caused you to bring
forth corn from the earth. "^^ Tf we
were to count all such verses and com-
ment upon them showing the kindness
of' the Creator for the created, it would
take too many volumes. We do not in-
tend to do it in this book. If God
should grant us life and leisure we shall
write a book to show the kindness of
God to which He has called our attention.
It should be known that this kind
X)f argument is just contrary to that
which the Asharites think leads to the
knowledge of God. They think that the
creation does not lead us to the know-
ledge of God through any of His good-
ness, but through possibility, that is, the
possibility which is <found in all things,
which we can understand to be of his
shape or oi quite a contrary one. But
71. Quran txxi, 14-16.
hh AVERROES
if this possibility be found alike in both
the oases, then there is no wisdom in
the creation of the universe, and there
is found no harmony between man and
the parts of it. For, as they think, if
it is possible for the things to have any
other form than they have now, then
there can exist no harmony between
man and other existent things by the
creation of which God has obliged man
and commanded him to be thankful to
Him. This opinion, by which the creat-
ion of man, as a part of the universe,
is just as possible, for instance, as his
creation in the void, is like the opinion
of those who say that man exists but
he could have been created in quite a
different shape, and yet could perform
actions like a man. According to them
it is also possible that he may have
formed the part of another universe
quite different from the existing one.
In that case the blessing of the universe
can have no obligation for man, for they
are not necessary for his purpose*
RkLtGION AND PHILOSOPHY 219
Hence man is quite careless of them and
they of him. So their existence is no
blessing to him. This is all against the
nature of man.
On the whole, a man who denies the
existence of the effects arranged accord-
ing to the causes in the question of arts,
or whose wisdom cannot understand it,
then he has no knowledge of the art of
its Maker. So also a man who denies
the existence of an order of effects in
accordance with causes in this universe,
denies the existence of the Creator
altogether. Their saying that God is
above these causes, and that they cannot
have any bearing on the effects by His
command, is very far from the true
nature of philosophy, nay, it is a
destroyer of it. For if it is possible to
have the same effects with other than
the prescribed causes just in the same
degree as by them, then where is the
greatness in producing the effects from
the known Causes ? It is so because
the effects from the causes have one of
220 AVERROfiS
the following three reasons. Either the
existence of the causes will be in place
of the effects by compulsion, as a man's
taking his food; or their being more
perfect that is, the effect becoming better
and more perfect through them, as a
man's having two eyes, or they may
have neither a better nor a more com-
pulsive effect. In this case the existence
of the effect and the cause would be by
chance, without any intention at all ;
and hence, there would be no greatness
found in it. For instance, if the shape
of human hand, the number of the
fingers, and their length be neither
necessary nor adding any perfection in
its work in seizing things of different
kind, then the actions of the hand from
this shape, and number of parts, would
be by chance alone. If it be so, then it
makes no difference whether a man is
given a hand or a hoof, or something
else, like the different animals, for their
particular actions. On the whole, if we
ignore the causes and their effects, then
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 221
there remains nothing to refute the
arguments of those who believe in the
creation of the universe by chance alone,
that is, those who say that there is no
Creator at all, and that which has come
into being in this universe is the result
of material causes. For taking one of
the two alternatives it is not more
possible that it may have happened by
chance, than done by an independent
Actor. So when the Asharites say that
the existence of one or more possibilities
shows that there is a particular Maker of
these things, they can answer and say
that the existence of things by one of
these possibilities was by chance alone,
for intention works as one of the causes,
and that which happens without any
means or cause is by chance. We see
that many things come into being in
this way. For example, the elements
mix together by chance, and then by
fhis unintentional mixing there is pro-
duced a new thing. They mix again,
and this quite unintentionally produces
222 AVERROKS
quite a new thing. In this way every
kind of creation may be said to have
come into existence by chance.
We say that it is necessary that
there be found order and arrangement,
the more perfect and finished than what
can be imagined. This mixing together
of elements is limited and pre-arranged,
and things produced by them are sure
to happen, and no disorder has ever
happened in them. But all this could
not happen by chance alone, for that
which happens in this way by chance
is of the least value. It is to this that
God refers, "It is the work of the
Lord, who has rightly disposed all
things. "'2 I would like to know what
completeness can be found in things
made by chance, for such things are by
no means better than their opposites.
To this God refers in the following
words, " Thou canst not see in the
Creation of the most Merciful any unfit-
ness or disproportion. Lift thy eyes
72. Qaran ^xvii, 90,
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 223
again to heaven, and look whether thou
seest any fiawP But what defect can
be greater than that all the things can
be found with any other quality than
they really possess. For the non-exist-
ent quality may be better than the
existing one. In this \vay, if one thinks
that were the Eastern movement to
become Western and vice versa, there
would be no difference in the universe,
then he has destroyed philosophy alto-
gether. He is like a man who thinks
that were the right side of the animals
to become left, and vice versa, there
would be no difference at all for one of
the two alternatives is there. For as it
is possible to say that it is made accor-
ding to one alternative by an independent
Maker, so it is possible to assert that
it was all made by chance alone. For
we see so many things coming into
being by themselves.
It is quite clear to you that all the
people see that lower kinds of creation
73. Quran Ixvii, 3.
224 AVERROES
could have been made in a different
way from that in which they really are
and as they see this lower degree in
many things they think that they must
have been made by chance. But in the
higher creation they know that it is
impossible to have been made in a more
perfect and excellent form than that
given to it by the Creator. , So this
opinion, which is one of the opinions of
the Mutakallimun is both against the
Law and philosophy. What we say is
that the opinion of possibdlity in creat-
ion is closer to a complete denial of
God, than leading us nearer to Him.
At the same time it falsifies philosoph3\
For if we do not understand that there
is a mean between the beginnings and
ends of the creation, upon which is
based the ends of things, then there
can neither be any order nor any method
in it. And if they be wanting then
there can be no proof of the existence
of an intelligent and knowing Maker;
for taking them together with cause and
RELIGION ANP PHILOSOPHY M
effect) we are led to the fact that they
must have been created by wisdom and
knowledge. But on the other hand
the existence of either of two possibili-
ties shows that they may have been
performed by a not-knowing Maker and
by chance alone. Just as a stone falling
on the earth may fall in any place, on
any side, and in any form. It will show
the want of the existence either of a
creator at all or at least of a wise and
knowing Creator. The thing which has
compelled the Mutakallimun of the Ashr
arites to adopt this opinion is a denial
of the action of those natural forces
which God has put in all things, as He
has endowed them with life, power and
so forth. They avoided the opinion that
there was any other creator but God,
and God forbid that there be any other,
for he is the only creator of the causes
and they are made effective by His
command only. We will talk of this in
'detail when discoursing on Fate and
Predestination. They were also afraid
15
226 AVEBROES
that by admitting the natural causes
they might be accused of saying that
the universe came into being by chance
only. They would have known that a denial
of it means a denial of a great part of the
arguments, which can be advanced for a
proof of the existence of God. One
who denies any part of God's creation
denies His work which falls very near
to a denial of a part of His attributes.
On the whole as their opinion is based
upon hasty conclusions, which come to
the mind of a man by superficial thought
and as apparently it appears that the
word "intention" can be applied to one
who has power to do bad or otherwise,
they saw that if they did not admit
that all the creation is possible, they
would not be able to say that it came
into existence by the action of an intend-
ing creator. So they say that all the
creation is possible so that they may
prove that the creator is an intelligent
one. They never thought of the order
which is necessary in things made, and
RELiaiON AND PHILOSOPHY Wf
with that their coming from an iiitelli*
gent creator. These people have also
ignored the blame they will have to bear
in thus denying wisdom to the creator;
or maintaining that chance should be
found governing creation. They know,
as we have said, that it is neoes^
sary, on account of the order existent in
nature, that it must have been brought
into being by some knowing creator,
otherwise the order found in it would
be by chance. When they were compell-
ed to deny the natural forces, they had
to deny with them a large number of
those forces w^hich God has made sub-
servient to His command for the creation
and preservation of things. For God has
created some things from causes which
He has produced ' from outside, these
are the heavenly bodies; there, are other
things which He has made by causes
placed in the things themselves, that is,
the soul, and other natural forces, by
whicli lie preserves those things. So
liow wicked is the man who destroy.eth
228 AYERROES
philosophy, and '' inventeth a lie about
God. "74
This is only a part of the change
which has taken place in the Law, in
this and other respects, which we have
already mentioned, and will mention
hereafter. From all this it must have,
become clear to you that the method
whixjh God had adopted for teaching His
creatures that the universe is made and
created by Him is the method of kind-
ness and wisdom, towards all His crea-
tures and especially towards man. It is
a method which bears the same relation
to our intellect, as the sun bears to our
senses. The method which it has adopt-
ed towards the common people about
this problem, is that of illustration from
things observed. But as there was
nothing which could be given as an
illustration, and as the common people
cannot understand a thing, an illustra-
tion of which they cannot see, God tells
us that the universe was created in a
74. Quran iii, 88,
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY ^29
certain time out of a certain thing,
which He made. He tells us His condi-
tion before the creation of the universe,
'* His throne was above the waters/'^*^
He also says, " Verily your Lord is God
who created the heavens and the earth
in six days/'^^ and "Then He set His
mind to the creation of the heavens, and
it was smoke. "^^ In addition to these there
are other verses of the Book, pertaining
to this subject. So it is incumbent that
nothing out of them should be interpret-
ed for the common people, and nothing
should be presented to them in explain-
ing it but this illustration. For one who
changes it, makes the wisdom of the
Law useless. If it be said that the
Law teaches about the universe that it
is created, and made out of nothing and
in no time, then it is a thing which even
the learned cannot understand, not to
speak of the common people. So we
should not deviate in this matter of the
Law, from the method laid down in it
75. Quran xi, 9. 76. Qaran yii, 52. 77. Quran xJi, 10,
Ii30 AVERROES
for instructing the common people, arid
should not tell tliem except this regard-
ing the creation of the universe, which
is found alike in the Quran, the Bible,
and other revealed books. The wonder
is that the example in the Quran is
quite in accordance with the creation of
the things in the visible world. But the
Law does not say so, wliich is a warn-
ing to the learned people that the
creation of the universe is not like the
creation of all other things. He has
used the words creation and flaw, because
they connote two things, - Conception
of the things that can be seen, and the
creation of the things which the learned
prove in the invisible world. So the
use of the words creation ( Huduth ) and
eternal is an innovation in religion, and
the cause of great doubt and corruption
of the belief of the common people,
especially of the argumentative among
them. This has greatly perplexed the
Mutaliallimun of the Asharites, and has
proved them in great doubt. For if they
RtetlGION AND PHILOSOPHV 2S1
explain that God intends doing things
by an eternal intention - which, as we
said, is an innovation - they have put
it down that the universe is credited.
Then they are asked how can a created
thinor come from an eternal intention.
They answer that the eternal intention
became connected with the action at the
time of the creation especially, and that
is the time in which the universe was
made. Then they may be asked, that if the
relation of the intending Creator towards
the created thing at the time of its non-
existence be the same as at the time of
its creation, then that created thing is
by no means better than the other
thing, when at the time of its making,
the action which was not found in its
non-existence is not connected with it.
If the relation be different then there
must necessarily be a created intention
otherwise the created result of an action
would come from an eternal action, for
what is necessary of it in action, is
necessary also in intention. If it be said
M AVfiRROES
that when the time of its making comes
it is found done; it may be asked: is it
so by an eternal or a created action ?
If they say by an eternal action, they
admit the existence of a created thinof
by an eternal action; and if they say by
a created action, then there must be a
createid intention also. They may say
'tliat intention is the action itself, but
this is impossible. For intention is the
only cause ol the action in the intender. If
ah intender, intending to do an act in a
certain time, finds that act quite another
than that which he intended, then that
act would have come into being without
any intender at all. At the same time,
if it is thought that from a created in-
tention there can only be a created thing,
then as a rule an eternal intention should
give an eternal thing, otherwise the
result of a created or eternal intention
would be the same, which is impossible.
All these doubts are found in Islam
only through the Mutakallimun, by
their explaining things in Law, which
KELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 28^
God had forbidden them to do. For
in the Quran it is not said whether
intention is created or eternal. So they
neither adhere to the exoteric meanings
of the Law, which may have given them
beatitude and salvation, nor did they
attain the deo^ree of certain and exact
knowledge, so that they may have had
this blessing. Hence they are neither
to be counted among the learned nor
among the masses, who believe and
have strong faith. They are the people
" whose hearts are perverse "^^ and "whose
hearts are diseased."^^ They say things
by their tongues which are quite contrary
to those which they believe in their
hearts, a cause of which is their tena-
city, and love of upholding their opini-
ons at any cost. By a repetition of
attitudes like these they become quite
devoid of all philosophy, as we see the
case of those who are completely accus-
tomed to the Asharite school of thought,
and are well pleased with it, even to
78. Quran iii, 5. 79. Quran li, 8.
^^4 Averhoes ■
the degree of love. They are certainly
veiled on account of their habit and
environment.
What we have said about this ques-
tion is enough for our purpose. Now
we would take up the second problem.
Problem Second : Prophetic Mission :-
There are two points which are to be
discussed in this problem. First, the
proof of the coming of the prophets ;
and secondly an explanation of the fact
that the man claiming to be a prophet
is really so and does not lie. Many
people are desirous of proving the exist-
ence of the prophets by analogy - and
such are the Mutakallimun. They say
that it is proved that God speaks and
intends, and is the master of His crea-
tures. It is quite consistent for such a
beinjr in the visible world to send a
messenger to his dependent people.
Hence such a thing is also possible in
the unseen world. They have thought
of making this valid for proving the
advent of the prophets, by absurd and
EELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY ^36
far- fetched arguments which only Brah-
mins should use. They say that it is
possible both in the observed and unseen
world. In the observed world it is quite
evident, that when a man stands up
before a king and says, " O ye men, I
am the raessen<rer of the kin^ towards
you " and produces credentials for his
claim, it is necessary to acknowledge
him to be true. They say that in the
case of the prophets, the credentials are
the miracles which they perform. For
certain reasons this method is quite fib
and satisfactory for the common people,
but when investigated there appear
many flaws in the principle. Our ac-
knowledgement of a man who claims to
be the messenger of a king is not true
unless we know that the symbols which
he has are those of the royal messenger,
which can only happen, if a king tells
his subjects that whenever they happen
to see such and such symbols with a
man, which are particularly his, they
should take him as his messenger.
2^^ aVerroes
When this is so, one can object,
from where does it appear that per-
formance of miracles is the special
sign of the prophets? This can
be proved neither by law nor by
•'reason. To prove it by religion is still
more impossible ; it does not admit it.
Reason alone cannot affirm that they
are the special symbols of prophecy,
except that in many cases they were
found in people who claimed to be pro-
phets and in none other. So in this
case a proof of anyone's prophecy is
based upon two premises. First, the
man who claims to be a prophet lias
performed a miracle, and secondly, every-
one who performs a miracle is a prophet.
Now as to the premise that the claim-
ant for prophecy has performed miracles
we can say that it pertains to our senses
after we have admitted that there are
actions performed by men, which can
neither be made by wondrous workman-
ship or by some particular forces, but
are beyond our conception. The second
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHy 23^
premise can only be true when we admib
the existence of the prophets, and that
the miracles are only performed by
those who are the true claimants for
prophetic mission. We would say that
this premise is not true but for those
who believe the existence of the prophets
and the miracles. For instance if it has
become clear to man, that the universe
is created, then he certainly knows that
the world exists and the Creator too.
This being so, a man can object and say
how can we say that one who performs
the miracles is a prophet, when the
prophetic mission itself remains un-
proved ? Even after we admit the exist-
ence of miracle in the manner in which
it may seem quite impossible, it is necess-
ary that the two sides of the premise
be admitted first and then the one can
be applied to the other. One cannot
say that the existence of the prophets
can be proved by reason, because of its
possibility. For the possibility to which
they refer is in fact really ignorance,
285 AVEKROKS
and Is nofc found in the nature of things.
For instance, if we say that it is possi-
ble that it will rain or not, then the
possibility is found in the nature of thi-
ngs, that is, it is felt that a thing may
sometimes be, and at others not be, as
in the case of rain. Here, reason can
exactly decide the possibility of a thing
by its nature. The necessar}^ ( wajib )
is quite contrary to it; that is, it is a
thing the existence of which is always
found. In this case reason can always
decide without a mistake, because its
nature cannot be changed or transformed.
So when one party admits the existence
of a prophet, at a certain time it appears
that the prophetic mission is a thing
whose existence is possible and the other
party saj^s that it cannot feel it, then
that possibility becomes mere ignorance
in its case. Now we believe in the exist-
ence of this possibility because we have
known the prophets. We say that a
knowledge of the messengers from man,
leads us to a belief in. the existence of
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 219 .
messengers from God, as the existence
of a messenger from Anir, leads us to
the conclusion of there being a messenger
from Zaid also. This requires a similar-
ity in the natural dispositions of both
men and it is here where the difficulty .
lies. If we suppose this possibility by
itself even in the future, it will only be
by the means of the known fact and
not by our knowledge and reason. Now
one of the premises of this possibility
has come into existence. For the possi-
bility is in our knowledge, and the fact
in itself is an established one, by one of
the two alternatives, that is, whether he
sent a messenger or did not. So we
have nothing in this case but sheer
ignorance, as is the doubt whether Anir
sent any messengers in the past or did
not, which is quite different from our
doubting, whether or not he will send
any in future. So when we do not know
about Zaid, for instance, whether he has
or has not sent any messenger in the
past, it is not correct for us to suppose
m AVERROES
anybody to be his messenger, if he hap-
pens to have his symbols upon him.
We can admit his claim only after we
know that Zaid did send a messenger.
So when we admit the existence ot
the prophetic mission, and the mira-
cles, then how can it be correct for us
to say that one who performs the
miracles is a prophet. We cannot believe
in this by hearing only, for this faculty is
not the thing by which such things can
be proved. At the same time we cannot
claim this premise to be true by experi-
ence and habit, except that the miracles
performed by the prophets can be seen
by one who believes in their mission,
and has never seen them to have been
performed by anybody else, so that they
may be taken as a convincing sign for
distinguishing a prophet of God, from
one who is not, that is a distinction
between one whose claim is right, and
one whose claim is wrong.
By these things it is seen that the
Mutakallimun have missed the whole
RELIGION ANP PHILOSOPHY ^t
purpose of the argument from miracles
because they have put possibility in the
place of real existence, possibility which
is in reality ignorance. Then they have'
believed in the premise that every one*
who performs miracles is a prophet,
which cannot be true except when the
miracles prove the prophetic mission
itself, and the sender of messengers. It
is not by reason that we can believe in
these marvelous things, which happen again
and again, and are divine, as a conclus-
ive proof of the existence of prophetic
mission, except that one who can do such
things is an excellent person, and that such
persons cannot lie. But it can prove the
prophetic mission of a person only when
we admit that the mission does exist, and
that such marvelous things cannot be per*
formed by any person, however good h^
may be, except by one who is a aprophet.
The miracles cannot prove the prophetic
mission of a person, because there is no
connection betw^een them and reason, ex-
cept that we admit that the miracles ar«
16
9^ AVERROES
one of the works of the prophets, just as
curing is the work of the physicians, so
that one who can cure is certainly a phy-
sician. This is one of the fallacies of the
argument. Moreover, if we admit the
existence of the prophetic mission, by putt-
ing the idea of possibility, which is in fact
ignorance, in place of certainty, and make
miracles a proof of the truth of man who
claims to be a prophet it becomes necess-
ary that they should not be used by a per-
son, who says that they can be performed
by others than prophets, as the Mutakalli-
mun do. They think that the miracles
can be performed by the magicians and
saints. The condition which they attach
with them is that miracles prove a man
to be a prophet, when he at the same time
claims to be so, for the true prophet can
perform them as opposed to the false ones.
This is an argument without any proof,
for it can be understood either by hearing
or reason. That is, it is said that one
whose claims to prophecy are wrong, can-
jipt perform miracles, but as we have al-
l^ELIGlONf AND PHILOSOPHY %i
ready said, when they cannot be perfornv
ed by a liar, then they can only be dona
by the good people, whom God has meant
for this purpose. These people, if they
speak a lie, are not good, and hence cannot
perform the miracles. But this does not sat-
isfy the people who think miracles to be
possible from the magicians, for they cer-
tainly are not good men. It is here that the
weakness of the argument lies. Hence
some people have thought that the best
thing is to believe that they cannot be per-
formed but by the prophets and hence
magic is only imagination, and not a change
of essence. Among these are also men who
deny all sorts of marvelous things from
the saints.
It is clear to you from the life of the
prophet, peace be upon him, that he never
invited any man or community to believe
in his prophecy, and that which he has
brought with him from God, by means of
the performance of any miracles, in sup-
port of his claim, suuh as changing one
element into another. Whatever miracles
m AVEHROES
did appear from him were only performed
in the natural course of things, without
on his part any intention of contention or
competition. The following words of the
Quran will make this clear; ** And they
Bay : We will by no means believe in thee,
until thou cause a spring of water to gush
forth for us out of the earth, and thou
have A garden of palm-trees and vines,
and thou cause rivers to spring forth from
the midst there-of in abundance ; or thou
cause the heaven to fall down in pieces
upon us, as thou hast given out, or thou
bring down God and the angels to vouch
for thee; or thou have a house of gold,
or thou ascend by a ladder to heaven;
neither will we believe thy ascending thi-
ther alone, until thou cause a book to des-
cend unto us, bearing witness of thee
which we may read. Answer: My Lord
be praised, Am I other than a man sent
as an apostle ?" ^^ Then again, ''JSothing
hindered us from sending thee with mira-
cles, except that the former nations have
80. Quran XVII,92-95.
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY «45
charged them with imposture .'' ^^ The
thing by which we invited the people to
believe in him, and with which he vied
with them is the Quran. For says God,
•* Say, verily, if men and genii were pur-
posely assembled, that they might produce
a book like this Quran, thfey could not
produce one like unto it, although the
one of them assigned the other."^^ Then
further he says, "will they say, He hath
forged the Quran? Answer, bring there*
fore ten chapters like unto it forged by
yourself. "^3 This being the case the miracle
of the Prophet with which he vied with
the people and which he advanced as an
argument for the truth of his claim to the
prophetic mission, was the Quran. If it
be said, that this is quite clear, but how
does it appear that the Quran is a miracle,
and that it proves his prophecy, while
just now we have proved the weakness of
the proof of prophecy by means of miracles
without any exceptions in the case of any
8i. Quran, XVII, 6t
82. Quran XVII 90. 83. Quran XI, i6»
246 AVERROES
prophet. Besides the people have difiered
in taking the Quran to be a miracle at all.
For in their opinion one of the conditions
of a miracle is that it should be quite differ-
ent from any act which may have be-
come habitual. But the Quran is of this
sort, ' because it is only word, though it
excels all created words. So it becomes a
miracle by its superiority only, that is, the
impossibility for people bringing any-
thing like it, on account of its being highly
eloquent. This being the case it differs
from the habitual, not in genus but in de-
tails only, and that which differs in this
way is of the same genus. Some people
say that it is a miracle by itself, and not
by its superiority. They do not lay it
down as a condition for miracles that they
should be quite different from the habitual,
but think that it should be such a habitual
act, as men may fall short of accomplishing.
We would reply that it is as the objectors
say, but the thing about it is not as they
have thought. That the Quran is an evid-
ence of his prophec}^ is based, we believe,
feELlGION AND PrilLOSOPMY 247
Upon two principles, which are found in
the Book itself. The first being that the
existence of the class of men called pro-
phets and apostles is well-known. They
are the men who lay down laws for the
people by divine revelation, and not by
human education. Their existence can be
denied only by the people who deny repeat-
ed action, as the existence of all things
w^hich we have not seen - the lives of the
famous thinkers and so forth. All the
philosophers, and other men are agreed,
except those who pay no regard to their
words, ( and they are the Materialists ),
that there are men to whom have been re-
vealed many commandments for the people^
to perform certain good actions, by which
their beatitude may be perfected; and to
make them give up certain wrong beliefs
and vicious actions. This is the business
of divine apostles. The second principle
is, that everyone who does this work, that
is, lays down laws by revelation, is a pro-
phet. This principle is also quite in accord*
ance with human nature. For as it is
24S AVERROES
known that the business of medicine is to
cure a disease, and one who can cure is a
physician, so it is also known that the busi-
ness of the prophets is to give law to the
people by divine revelation, and one who does
80 is a prophet. The Book mentions the
first principle in the following:-*' Verily We
have revealed Our will unto thee, as We
have revealed it unto Noah^ and the proph-
ets who succeeded him, and We have
revealed it unto Abraham, and Ishmael,
and Isaac and Jacob, and the tribes, and
unto Jesus, and Job, and Jonas, and Aaron
and Solomon; and we have given thee the
Quran as We gave the Psalms unto David;
some apostles have We sent, whom We
have mentioned unto thee, and God spake
unto Moses discoursing with him, " ^4 and
again : " Say, I am not alone among
the apostles " ^5 The second principle is
that Mohammed, peace be upon him, has
done the work of a prophet, that is, has
given Law to the people by divine revel-
ation. This also can be known from the
84. Quran IVj i6i» 162. 85. Quran XLVI, 8.
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 249
Quran, where God mentions it. He says,
" O men, now is an evident proof come
unto you from your Lord, and We have
sent down unto you manifest light. " ^^ By
manifest light is meant the Quran. Again
He says, " O men, now is the apostle come
unto you from your ] iord; believe, therefore,
it will be better for you, " ^7 and again,
"But those among them who are well-
grounded in knowledge, and faithful, who
believe in that which hath been sent down
unto thee, and that which hath been sent
down unto the prophets before thee;"^^
and again ** God is the witness of the
revelation which He hath sent down unto
thee; He sent it down with his special know-
ledge; the angels are also witness thereof;
but God is a sufficient witness/* ^9 If
it be said, how can the first principle be
known, that is, that there is a class of men
who give the Law to the people by divine
revelation; and so also, how to know the
second principle, that is, that which the
86. Quran IV, 173. §7. Quran IV, 168.
88. Quran IV, 160. 89. Quran IV, 164.
^50 AVE1?R0ES
Quran c n' -lins, about beliefs and actions,
is of divine oritjin ? We would answer
that the first principle can be known by
the information which these men give
about the existence of things, which were
not found before, but come into existence
after they have informed the people about
them, and in a specified time; and by their
command for doing certain things, and
teaching certain precepts which do not re-
semble the common things and actions,
which can be taught by human agency.
This is so because if the miracles be of the
kind of laying down Laws, proving that
they cannot be laid down by human educa-
tion, but only through divine revelation,
then it is prophecy. But the miracles
which do not take the form of laws, as the
dividing of the sea, etc, do not necessarily
prove the prophecy of anyone. But they
can only be used as supplements to the
former, if they fall very near to it. But
standing alone they cannot prove it, and
so by themselves alone they do not lead to
a cognizance of the prophets, if the other
: RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 251
kind of miracles, which are its conclusife
proofs, be not found in them. So according
to this principle must be understood the
proofs of prophecy afforded by miracles,
that is, the miracles of knowledo:eand deeds
are its conclusive proofs while others only
make it strong, and can be used as witness-
es. So now it has become clear to you
that men of this kind do exist, and how
can men be sure of them, except by their
repeatsd appearence; as is the case with
physicians and other kinds of men. If it
be asked : How can it be proved that
the Quran is a conclusive proof that is a
miracle which is the business of the
prophets to perform, as curing is
the business of a physician, we would
say that this can be known in many ways:-
First, the precepts which it contains
about knowledge and deeds, cannot be
acquired by learning, but only by divine
revelation ; secondly, by the information
which it gives about hidden things; and
thirdly, by its poetry, which is quite
different from that which can be achieved
^52 AVERROES
by ima^inntiou or repetition of verses,
that is, ills known that it is of quite a
different kind from the poetry of Arabic
speaking people, whether the language be
acquired and learned^ as is the case with
non-Arabs, or it be the inother-tongue, as
it is with the Arabs themselves. The
first reason is the most weighty one* If
it be asked how can it be known that the
laws which contain both knowledge and
precepts about deeds are of divine origin,
so much so that they deserve the name of
the word of God, we would say also that
this also can be known in many ways.
First, a knowledge of the laws cannot be
acquired except after a knowledge of God,
and of human happiness and misery ; and
the acts by which this happiness can be
acquired , as charity and goodness and the
works which divert men from happiness
and produce eternal misery, such as evil
and wickedness. Again the knowledge of
human happiness and misery requires a
knowledge of the soul and its substance,
and whether it has eternal happiness or not.
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPH> Sjjl
If it be SO, then what is the quantity of
this happiness, or misery; and also what
amount of good would be the cause of
happiness. For the case of goodness
and evil is just the same as with
food, which does not give heaUh,
if taken in any quantity and at any
time; but must be used in a
specified quantity and at an appointed
time. For this reason we find tliese limited
in the religious laws. All this, or a greater
part of it), cannot be known but by divine
revelation, or at least a knowledge
through it would be better. Again a per-
fect knowledge of God requires a knowledge
of existent things. Then a law-giver must
know the quantity of this knowledge which
would be good to be imparted to the com-
mon people, and the method to be adopted
in teaching them. All this, or at least a
greater part of it, cannot be acquired by
education, learning or philosophy. This
can be clearly known from imparting learn-
ing, and especially the giving of laws,
making regulations, and giving information
i$4 AVERROES
about the conditions o£ the Day of Judg*
ment. When all this is found in the Quran
in the niost perfect form, there can be no
doubt that it is a divine revelation and His
word, given through the agency of His
prophet. So God has said, informing the
people about it, " Say, verily if man and
genii were purposely assembled, that they
might produce a book like this Quran,
they could not produce one like it, '' This
idea is further strengthened, nay, comes
near exact surety and certainty, when it is
known that the prophet was an unlettered
man, and lived among a people, uneducated,
wild, and nomadic by habit, who had
never tried to investigate the universe, as
was the case with the Greeks, and other
nations, among whom philosophy was per-
fected in long periods of time. To this very
fact refer the words of Godj ''Thou couldst
not read any book before this; neither
couldst thou write it with thy right hand,
then had gainsayers justly doubted of the
divine origin thereof.'^ Hence God
90, Quran XXIX, 47,
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY h$i
has repeatedly told the people this quality
of His prophet. **It is He who hath raised
up among the illiterate Arabians an apostle
from among themselves, " 9i and, " Those
who shall follow the Apostle the illiterate
Prophet."92 This matter can also be known
by another method - that of comparison of
this Law with the others. For, if the
business of the prophets be the giving of
laws by divine revelation, as has been
acknowledged by all who believe in the
existence of the prophets, then if you look
into the teachings of useful knowledge and
actions leading to happiness, which are
contained in the Quran, and compare them
with other divine books and religious
systems, you will find it excelling all the
others in an unlimited degree. On the
whole, if there are books worthy to be
called the words of God, on account of
their wondrous nature, and separation
from the genius of human words and
their peculiarity by what they contain
in regard to knowledge and deeds, then it
91. Quran LXII, 3. 92. Quran' VI I, 156"'
f5< AVERROES
is clear that the Quran is much more worth
thy, and many times fitter, ihan they are
to be called the words of God. This would
be still clearer to you if you could know
the past books - the Old and hew Testa-
ments. But that is not possible because
they have been changed to a great extent.
Were we to describe the superiority of
one Law over another, and the superior-
ity of the teachings given to us about the
knowledge of God, and the Day of Judg-
ment to the laws given to the Jews and the
Christians, it would require many volumes
with a confession of our o»vn short-comings
in dealing with the subject. For this
very reason, the Law of ours has been
called the last of the divine dispensations.
The Prophet, peace be on him, has said,
**Had Moses lived in my time, he could not
have helped following me,** and the Pro-
phet was right, on account of the univer-
sal nature of the teachings of the Quran,and
its regulations. That is it is able to satisfy
the needs of all, being meant for the whole
of the human race. So God has md, *'say,
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 257
^*0 men, Veiily I am the messenger of God
nato you all. '^3 The Prophfct has said>
" I have been sent both to the white and
the black nations. '*
The case of religions is just the same
as that of God. There are sonie foods
which agree with all, or most of tha peo-
ple. Such is the case with religions also.
So the dispensations before our own were
meant for some particular peoples, ignoring
all others, but our religion was meant for
the whole of the human race. This being
the case, our Prophet excels all the other
Prophets, to him comes the divine revela-
tion, which makes a man fit to be called
a prophet. So the Prophet has said infold-
ming us of his superiority over other pro-
phets, •* There is no prophet to whom
has not been given a sign by which all
the men would have believed. I
have been given divine revelation, and I
hope that my followers would be
in the majority on the Day of Judgment.'*
AH that we have said must have made it
^3. Qhran, VII, 156.
17
?S« AVERROES
«lear to you that the proof of the prophecy
of the prophet from the Quran is not of
the same kind as that of turning a staff
into a serpent for theproof of the prophecy
of Moses, or of giving life to the dead, and
curing the blind and leprous for the
^prophecy of Jesus. For these, although
never performed by any but the prophets,
and sufficient to satisfy the common people,
are not by any means conclusive proofs of
prophecy, when taken by themselves,—
they not being acts which make a
prophet.
Now as to the Quran, its case is just
like curing by medicine. For instance,
suppose two men were to claim to be
physicians, and one were to say that he
could walk on water , and the other were
to assert that he could cure a disease, and
«o one walked on the water, and the other
cured a sick man. In this case , our
verification for medicine would be only for
one who has cured a sick man, but in the
case of the other , it would be outward
4iatisfaction alone, The first is far better.
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 25^
"The only reason by which the common
people can be satisfied in this respect is,
that one who can walk on water , which is
against the nature of men , can certainly
cure a disease , which is what men can
do. This also is one of the reasons of the
connection between miracle , which is not
one of the conditions of prophecy, and the
sign which makes a man deserve the name
of a prophet : divine revelation. Of this
quality is also the fact , that there comes
nothing to the mind of such a man except
that which God has ordained for this
unique work, and specialised him for it,
among all his fellow-men. So it is not
inconsistent if he were to claim that God
distingished him with his revelations.
On the whole, when once it is laid down
rthat the prophets do exist, and that the
miracles cannot be performed except by
them, they can become a prophecy, that is
the miracles which are not in any way fit
to be received as a proof for it. This is
» the method to be adopted with regard to
the common people. For the doubts and
266 AVERROES
objections which we have described about
unnatural miracles are not perceived by the
masses. But if you look intently you will
find that the Law depends upon suitable
and natural miracles, and not upon unna
tural ones. What we have said about this
problem is enough for our purpose and for
the sake of truth.
Problem Third : Of Fate and Predesti-
nation. This is one of the most intricate pro-
blems of religion. For if you look into the
traditional arguments about this problem
you will find them contradictory; such also
being the case with arguments of reason.
The contradiction in the aroruments of
the first kind is found in the Quran and
the Traditions. There are many verses
of the Quran, which by their universal
nature, teach that all the things are pre-
destined, and that man is compf»lled to
do his acts; then there are verses which say
that man is free in his acts and not com-
pelled in performing them. The following
verses tell us that all the things are by
compulsion, and are predestined, *'Every-
RELIGION ANE PHILOSOPHY 361
thing have We created bound by a fixed
degree;" 94 again, "With Him everything
is regulated according to a determined
measure." 95 Further, He says/' No acci-
dent happeneth in the earth, nor in your
persons, but the same was entered in the
Book verily it is easy with God/'96 There
may be quoted many other verses on this sub-
ject. Now, as to the verses which say that
man can acquire deeds by free will, and
that things are only possible and not nece-
ssary, the following may be quoted: " Or
He destroyeth them (by ship-wreck),
because of that which their crew have mer-
ited; though He pardoneth many things "97
And again, '* Whatever misfortune be-
falleth you is sent you by God, for that
which your hands have deserved." 98Fur-
ther, He says, "But they who commit evil,
equal thereunto." 99 Again, He says, *• It
shall have the gfood which it gaineth, and it
shall have the evil which it gaineth." '^^^and,
94. Quran LI VI 49. 95. Quran XIII, 9.
96. Quran LVII, 32. 97. Quran XLII. 32.
98. Quran XLII, 32. 99. Quran X, 28.
100. Quran 11, 278.
262 AVERROES
'*And as to Thamud, We directed them, but
they loved blindness better than the true
directions. " ^^^ Sometimes contradiction
appears even in a single verse of the Quran.
For instance. He says, ** After a misfor^
tune hath befallen you ( you had already
attained two equal advantages ), do you
say, whence cometh this \ Answer, This is
from yourselves. " ^^-In the next verse, He
says, ** And what happenth unto you, on
the day whereon the two armies met, was
certainly by permission of the Lord. " ^^^
Of this kind also is the verse, " Whatever
good befalleth thee, O man, it is from Godj
and whatever evil befalleth thee, it is from
thyself; " ^^4 while the preceeding verse
says, '* All is from God. *' ^^s
Such is also the case with the Tradi-
tions. The Prophet says, **Every child is
born in the true religion; his parents after-
wards turn him into a Jew or a Christian. "^
On another occasion he said, *' The follow-
lai. Quran XLI,i6.
lOJ. Quarn III, 159. 103. Quran III, 160.
104 Quran IV. 81. 105. Quran IV. 80.
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 165
ing people have been created for hell, and
do the deeds of those who are fit for it.
These have been created for heaven, and
do deeds fit for it. " The first Tradition
says that the cause of disbelief is one's own
environments; while faith and belief are
natural to man. The other Tradition says
that wickedness and disbelief are created
by God, and man is compelled to follow
them.
This condition of things has led Mus-
lims to be divided into two groups. The
one believed that man's wickedness or
virtue is his own acquirement, and that
according to these he will be either punish-
ed or rewarded. These are the Mutazilit-
es. The belief of the other party is quite
opposed to this. They say that man is
compelled to do his deeds. They are the
Jabarites. The Asharites have tried to
adopt a mean between these two extreme
views. They say that man can do action,
but the deeds done, and the power of do-
ing it, are both created by God. But this
is quite meaningless. For if the deed and
*64 AVERROES
the power of doing it be both created by
God, then man is necessarily conapelled to-
do the act. This is one of the reasons of
the difference of opinion about this probienw
As we have said there iis another cause
of difference of opinion about this problem,
than the traditional one. This consists of
the contradictory arguments advanced.
For if we say that man is the creator of
his own deeds, it would be necessary to
admit that there are thinofs which are not
done according to the will of God, or His
authority. So there would be another
creator besides God, while the Muslim*
are agreed that there is no creator but He*
If, on the other hand, we were to suppose
that man cannot act freely, we admit tbafe
he is compelled to do certain acts, for there
is no mean between compulsion and free*
dom. Again, if man is compelled to do
certain deeds, then on him has been impo-
sed a task which he cannot bear| and when
he is made to bear a burden, there is no di-
fference between his work and the work of
inorganic matter. For inorganic matter has
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 265
no power, neither has the man the power
for that which he cannot bear. Hence all
people have made capability one of the
conditions for the imposition of a task, such
as wisdom we find Abul Maali, saying in
his Nizamiyyahy that man is free in his own
deeds and has the capability of doing them.
He has established it upon the impossibi-
Hty of imposing a task which one cannot
bear, in order to avoid the principle former-
ly disproved by the Mutazlites, on account
of its bein^ unfit by reason. The succeed-
ing Asharites have opposed them. Moreover
if man had no power in doing a deed, then
it will be only by chance that he may escape
from evil, and that is meaningless. Such
also would be the case with acquiring
goodness. In this way all those arts which
3ead to happiness, as agriculture etc, would
become useless . So also would become
useless all those arts the purpose of which
is protection from, and repulsion of danger
as the sciences of war, navigation, medicin*
-^tc, such a condition is quite contrary to
all that is intellegible to man.
2^ AVERROES
Now it may be asked that if the case
is so, how is this contradiction which is to
be found both in tradition and reason to
be reconciled we would say, that apparently
the purpose of religion in this problem is
not to divide it into two separate beliefs,
but to reconcile them by means of a middle
course, which is the right method. It is evi-
dent that God has created in us power by
which we can perfom deeds which are con*
tradietory in their nature. But as this cannot
be complete except by the cause which God
has furnished for us, from outside, and the
removal of difficulties from them, the deeds
done are only completed by the conjunct
tioyi of both these things at the same time.
This being so the deeds attributed to use
are done by our intention, and by the fit*
ness of the causes which are called the
Predestination of God, which He has fur-
nished for us from outside. They neithtr
complete the works which we intend nor
hinder them, but certainly become the^
cause of our intending them - one of the
two things. For intention is produced in
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY ^^
US by our imagination, or for the verifica-
tion of a thing, which in itself is not in our
power, but comes into being by causes^
outside us* For instance, if we see a good
thing, we like it, without intention, and
move towards acquiring it. So also, if we
happen to come to a thing which it is
better to shun, we leave it without inten-
tion. Hence our intentions are bound and
attached to causes lying outside ourselves.
To this the following words of God, refer
** Each of them hath angels, mutuall}^ su--
cceeding each other, before him and behind
him; they watch him by the command
of (^od. " ^^^ As these outside causes
take this course according to a well
defined order and arrangement, and^
never go astray from the path which
their Creator hath appointed for them ,
and our own intentions can neither be
compelled, nor ever found, on the whole^
but by their fitness, so it is necessary that
actions too should also be within woll—
defined limits, that is, they be found in a
io6. Quran XIII, J2. •
^ AVERROES
given period of time and in a given
<|uantity. This is necessary because our
deeds are only the effects of causes, lying
outside us; and all the effects which
result from limited and prearranged causes,
Are themselves limited, and are found in a
:given quantity on\}\ This relation does
not exist only between our actions and
outside causes, but also between them and
the causes which God has created in our
body, and the w^ell-defined order existing
between the inner ana outer causes. This
is what is meant by Fate and predestina-
tion, which is found mentioned in the
Quran and is incumbent upon man. This
is also the '' Preserved Tablet. "'^7 God's
knowledge of these causes, and that which
pertains to them, is the cause of their
existence. So no one can have a full know-
ledge of these things except God, and
hence He is the only Knower of secrets,
which is quite true; as God has si^id,
*' Say, None either in heaven or earth,
knoweth that which is hidden besides
m;. Quran LXXXV, 32.
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 269
God *' ^08 X knowledge of causes is
a knowledge of secret things, because the
secret is a knowledge of the existence of a
thing, before it comes into being. And as
the arrang<;ment and order of causes bring
a thing into existence or not at a certain
time, there must be a knowledge of the
existence or non - existence of a thing at
a certain time. A knowledge of the causes
as a whole, is the knowledge of what
thinsrs would be found or not found at a
cf^rtain moment of time. Praised be He,
Who has a complete knowledge of creation
and all of its causes. This is what is meant
by the ** keys of the secret," in the follow-
ing words of God, *' with Him are the
keys of secret things; none knoweth them
besides Himself. *' ^^9
All that we have said being true, it
must- have become evident how we can
acquire our deeds, and how far they are
governed by predestination and fate. This
very reconciliation is the real purpose of
religion by those verses and Tradition*
io8. Quran YXVH, 67. 109. Quran VI, 59.
tjo AVERROES
which are apparently contradictory. When
their universal nature be limited in this
manner, those contradictions should vanish
by themselves, and all the doubts which
*were raised before, about the contradictory
. nature of reason, would disappear. The ex-
istent things from our volition are complet-
ed by two things our intention and the
oother causes. But when the deeds are referr-
ed to only by one of these agencies, doubts
would rise. It maybe said is a good ans-
wer, and here reason is in perfect agree-
ment with religion, but it is based upon
the principles that these are agreed that
there are creative causes bringing into
existence other things; while the Muslims
are agreed that there is no Creator but
"Ood. We would say that whatever
they have agreed upon is quite right,
but the objection can be answered in
two ways. One of them is that this
objection itself can be understood in
two ways; one of them being that
there is no Creator but God, and all
ithose causes which He has created, cannot
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY ZJi
fce called creators, except speaking figur-
atively. Their existence also depends
.upon Him. He alone has made them to
fee causes, nay, He only preserves their
.existence as creative agents, and protects
•their effects after their actions. He again,
■produces their essences at the moment
-when causes come together. He alone
preserves them as a whole. Had theire
^been no divine protection they could not
have existed for the least moment of time.
Abu Hamid (Al-Ghazzali) has said that
a man who makes any of the causes to be
-co-existent with God is like a man who
-makeA the pen share the work of a scribe
in writing; that is, he says that the pen is
^ scribe and the man is a scribe too. He
means that writing is a word which may
*be applied to both, but in reality they
^'have no resemblance in anything but word,
for otherwise there is no difference between
"them. Such is also the case with the word
-Creator, when applied to God and the
'Causes. We say that in this illustration
* there are doubts. It should have been
272 AVERROES
clearly shown, whether the scribe was tha
Creator of the essence ( Jawhar ) of pen^
a preserver of it, as long as it remains a
pen, and again a preserver of the writing
after it is written, a Creator of it after it
has come in touch with the pen, as we
have just explained that God is the Creator
of the essences ( Jawahir ) of everything
which come into contact with its causes,
which are so called only by the ustige. Thi»
is the reason why there is no creator but
God - a reason which agrees with our feel-
ings, reason and religion. Our feelings
and reason see that there are things which
produce others. The order found in the
universe is of two kinds: that which God
has put in the nature and disposition of
things; and that which surround the uni-
verse from outside. This is quite clear in
the movement of the heavenly bodies. For
it is evident that the sun and the moon,
the day and night, and all other stars are
obedient to us; and it is on this arrange-
ment and order which God has put in their
movements that our existence and that of
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 273
all other things depends. So even if we
imagine the least possible confusion in
them, with them in any other position^
size and rapidity of movement which God
has made tor them, «11 the existent things
upon the earth would be destroyed. This
is so because of the nature in which God
has made them and the nature of the
things which are effected by them. This
is very clear in the effects of the sun and
the moon upon things of this world; such
also being the case with the rains, winds,
seas and other tangible things. But the
greater effect is produced upon plants, and
upon a greater number, or all, on the
animals. Moreover, it is apparent that had
there not been those faculties which God
has put in our bodies, as regulating them
that could not exist even for a single
moment a^ter birth. But we say, had
there not been the faculties found in all
the bodies of the animals, and plants and
those found in the world by the movement
of the heavenly bodies, then they would
not have existed at all, not even for a
18
274 AVERROES
twinkling of the eye. So praised be the
•* Sagacious, the Knowing. " ^^° God has
called our attention to this fact in His
book, *' And He hath subjected the night
and the day to your service; and the sun
and the moon and the stars, which are
compelled to serve by His Command| "^^'
Again, " Say, what think ye, if God
should cover you with perpetual nignt,
until the day of Resurrection; " ^^^ a^d
again, ** Of His mercy, He hath made yoo
night and the day, that ye may rest in
the one, and may seek to obtain provision
for yourselves of His abundance, by your
industry; in the other; ^^3 and, "^ And He
obligeth whatever is in heaven or on earth
to serve you. '' ^^^ Further He says, ** He
likewise compelleth the sun and the moon^
which diligently perform their courses, to
serve you; and hath subjected the day and
night to your service. '' ^^5 There may be
no. Quran LXVII, 14.
III. Quran LXVII, 14. 112, Quran XVI, i«,
113. Quran XXVIII, 71. 114. Quran XVIII. 73.
115. Quran XLV, ijb. 116. Quran XIV, 37
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 275
quoted many other verses on the subject.
Had thers been any wisdom in their exist-
ence by which God has favoured us, and
there would not have been those blessingfs
for which we are to be grateful to Him.
The second answer to the objection is,
that we say that the things produced out
of it are of two kinds : essences and tmbs-
tances; and movements, hardness, coldness
and all other accidents. The essences and
substances are not created by any but God.
Their causes effect the accidents of those
pssences, and not the essences themselves.
For instance, man and woman are only
the agents, while God is the real creator
of the child, and the life in it- Such is
also the case with agriculture. The earth
is prepared and made ready for it, and the
seed scattered in it. But it is God who
produces the ear of the corn. So- there is
no creator but God, while created things
are but essences. To this refer the words
of God. " O men, a parable is propounded
unto you, therefore, hearken unto it. Verily
the idols which ye invoke, besides God,
«76 AVERROES
can never create a single fly, although they/
may all assemble for the purpose; and if
the fly snatch anything from them they
cannot turn the same from it. Weak is
the petitioner and the petitioned." "7 This
is. wher« the unbeliever wanted to mislead,
Abraham, when h« said, *'I give life and
kill. " ^^^ When Abraham saw that he
could understand it, he at once turned to
the conclusive argument and said, " Verily,
God bringeth the sun from the east; do
thou bring it from the wesf
On the whole, if the matter about the
creator and the doer be understood on this
wise, there would be no contradiction, either
in Tradition or in reason. So we say
tliat the word Creator does not apply to
the created things by any near or far-fet-
ched metaphor, for the meaning of the
creator is the inventor of the essences. So
God has said, *'God created you, and that
which ye know."^^^ It should be known
117. Quran, XXII, 72.
118. "Hast thou not considered him who disputed with
Abraham concerning his Lord, because God had given him
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 277
that one who denies the effect of the
causes on the results of them, also denies
philosophy and all the sciences. For
science is the knowledge of the things by
their causes, and philosophy is the know-
ledge of hidden causes. To deny the causes
altogether is a thing which is unintelligible
to human reason. It is to deny the Creator,
not seen by us. For the unseen in this
matter must alsays be understood by a
reference to the seen.
So those men can have no knowledge of
God, when they admit that for every
action there is in actor. It being so, the
agreement of the Muslims on the fact that
there is no Creator but God cannot be
perfect, if we understand by' it the denial
of the existence of an agent in the visible
world. For from the existence of the
the Kingdom? When Abraham Said, My Lord is He who
giveth life and killeth: he answered, I give life and kill. Abra-
ham said, verily God bringeth the «un from the east do thou
bring it from the weit; whereupon the infidel was con-
. founded; for God directeth not the ungodlyi^pcoplc' Quran,
II; 260
278 AVERROES
agent in it, we have brought an argument
for the Creator in the invisible world. But
when we have onoe admitted the existence
of the Creator in the mvisible world, it
becomes clear that there is no Creative
agent except one by His command and
will. It is also evident that we can per-
form our own deeds, and that one who
takes up only one side of the question is
wrong, as i» the case with the Mutazilites
and the Jabarites. Those who adopt the
middle Course, like the Asharites, for
discovering the truth, cannot find it. For
they make no difference for a man between
the trembling and the movement of his
hand by intention. There is no meaning in
their admitting that both the movements
are not by owrselves. Because if they
are not by ourselves we have no power to
check them, so we are compelled to do
them. Hence there is no diflFerenct
between trembling of hand and voluntary
movement, which thay would call acquired.
So their is no diflference between them;
except in there n" mes, which never effect
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 279
the things themselves. This is all clear
by itself.
Fourth Problem :-Di vine Justice and Inju-
sitce. The Ashariteahave expressed a very
peculiar opinion, both with regard to reason
and religion; about this problem They
hare explained it in a way in which religion
has not, but have adopted quite an oppo-
site method. They say that in this problem
the case of the invisible world is quite
opposed to the visible. They think that
God is just or unjnst within the limits of
religious actions, so when a man's action
is jusb with regard to religion, he also is
just; and whatever religion calls it to be
unjust; He is unjust. They say that
whatever has not been imposed as a divinely
ordained duty upon men, does not
come within the four walls of religion. He
is neither just or unjust, but all His actions
about such things are just. They have
laid down that there is nothing in itself
which may be called just or unjust. But
to say that there is nothing which may ia
sSo AVERROES
itself be called good or bad is simply into-
lerable. Justice is known at good; and injus-
tice as bad. So according to them, poly-
theism is in itself neither injustice nor
evil, but with regard to religion, and had
religion ordained it, it would have been just
and true. Such also would have been the
case with any kind of sin. But all this is quite
contrary to our traditions and reason. As to
tradition God has described himself as just,
and denied injuutice to himself. He says
''God hath borne witness that there is no
God but He ; and the angels and those
who are endowed with wisdom profess the
same, who executeth righteousness; and
'*Thy God is not unjust towards His ser-
vants; " and again, ''Verily God will not
deal unjustly with men in any respect; but
men deal unjustly with their own souls
" It may be asked, What is your opinion
about misleading the people, whether it is
just or unjust, for God has mentioned in
many a verse of the Quran,. **That He
leads as well as misleads the people V* He
says, **God causeth to err whom He
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 281
pleaseth, and directeth whom He
pleaseth;" and, " If we had pleased, we
had certainly given every soul its
direction." We would say that these
verses cannot be taken exoterically, for
there are many verses which apparently
-contradict them-the verseo in which God
denies injustice to himself. For instance.
He says, "Heliketh not ingratitude (Kufr)
in His servant." So it is clear that as He
does not like ingratitude even from
them. He certainly cannot cause
them to err. As to the statement oi the
Asharites that God sometimes does things
which He does not like, and orders others
which He does not want, God forbid us from
holding such a view about him, for it is
pure infidelity, that God has not misled
the people and has nob caused them to err
will be clear to you from the following
verses: '* Wherefore be thou orthodox and
set thy face towards true religion, the
Quran, III, 16 Quran, XLI, 46
Quran, X, 45 Quran, XIV, 4
Quran, XXXII, n Quran, XXXIX. 9
282 AVERROES
institution of God, to which He hath
created man kindly disposed; " and, *"' when
thy Lord drew forth their posterity from
the lions of the sons of Adam. " A Tradi-
tion of the Prophet says, *^ Every child is
born according to the divine constitution, **
These being contradictions in this
problem we should try to reconcile them
so that they may agree with reason. The
verse. ** Verily (jrod will cause to err whom
He pleaseth, and will direct whom He
pleaseth. *' refers to the prearrang^ed divine
will, with which all things have been
endowed. They have been created erring,
that is, prepared to go astray by their very
nature, and led to it by inner and outer
causes. The meaning of the verse,
** If we had pleased, we have given unto
every soul its direction," is that He
thought of not creating people ready to
err, by their nature, or by the outer causes
or by both. He could have done so. Bub
as the dispositions of men are different
Quran, XXX, 29. Quaan, VII, 171
Quran, XXXV, 9
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY aS3
the words may mislead the one and direct
the other. For these are the verses which
speak of misleading the people. For in-
stance, '*He will thereby mislead many, and
will direct many thereby: but He will not
mislead any thereby except the transgress-
ors"; and, "We have appointed the vision
which we showed thee, and also the tree
cursed in the Quran, and the verses about
the number of angels of hell. ''Thus
doth God cause to err whom He pleaseth
and He directeth whom He pleaseth.''
It means that for evil natures, these verses
are misleading, as for the sick bodies even
good drugs are injurious. But some one
Moreover, God will not be ashamed to propound in a
parable of a great, or even a more despicable thing: for
they who believe will know it to be true from their
Lord; but the unbelievers will say, what meaneth by this
parable ? He will thereby mislead etc. Quran, II, 24)
Quran, XVII; 63. By the vision may be meant the Prophet's
night journey to heaven or the vision which he saw at
Hudaibiyyah, seeing himself entei m( Mecca or his visioa
about the Omayycds.
Quran, LXXIV, 34
284 AVERROES
may object and ask, what was the need of
creating a class of men already prepared
to err, for this is the worst kind of injust-
ice? We would say that divine wisdom
designated it so. The injustice would have
consisted in its being otherwise. For the
nature and constitution of men, in His
very creation, are such that they require
some men, though yery few, to be wicked
and evil by their nature. Such is also the
case with the outer causes, made for direct-
ing the people to the right path, which
requires that some men must be bad. If
^many had been good then the divine la\y
would not have been fulfilled, because
either there had not been created things
in which there is little evil and much good,
for 'the good would have disappeared on
account of that little evil| or there had
been created things with much good and
little evil. Now it is well known that the
€!xistenee of many good ones with a few
evil ones, is better than the non-existence
of much good for the sake of little eviU
This very evil was the thing which remain-
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 285:
ed hidden to the angels when God in-
formed them that He was going to create
upon the earth, a vicegerent, that is, a man.
"When God said to the angels, I am going*
to place a substitute on earth, th'^y said,
wilt thou place there one who will do evil
therein, and shed blood? but we celebrate
thy praise, and sanctify Thee. God an-
swered, Verily I know that which ye know
not/' He means that the thinof which is
hidden from them is that when there is
found both good and evil in a thing, and
good overpowers the evil, reason requires
the creation of the one for the destruction
of the other. So from all these it is clear
how misleading can be attributed to Him,
in-spite of His justice, and injustice dis-
proved. The causes of misleading are
created, because from them appear the
causes of direction to good. For some peo-
ple have not been given causes of direc-
tion to good in which there is found noth-
ing which may lead to erring. Such is the
condition of the angels. So also the
286 AVERROES
causes of good have those evil, though in
their nature much evil be not found; this
applies to man. It may be asked : What
is the use of these eontradictary verses,
thus compelling the people to take refuge
in interpretations, which you have abso-
lutely forbidden? We would say that to
explain this problem to the common peo-
ple, they have been compelled to adopt
this method. For they should know that
God is just, and that He is the Creator
of all good and evil, instead of believing,
as many nations have done, that there are
two Gods, the creator of good, and the
creator of evil. So now they know that
He is the Crertor of both. As mislead-
ing is evil, and as there is no Creator
but He, it was necessary that it should be
attributd to Him, like the creation of evil.
But this should be done without qualify-
ing it, that is, that He created good for
its own sake, and evil for the sake of good
-on account of their connection with ona
another. In this way His creation of evil
Quran, II, 28
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 287
would be quite just. To illustrate: fire has
been made because of its necessity for the
existence of things, and without it they
could not have existed at all. It also des-
troys things by its very nature. But if you
think of the destruction and evil which it
causes, and compare it to the advantages
which we derive out of it, you will find that
its existence is better than non-existence,
that is,-good. Now the verse ot the Quran
*'No account shall be demanded of him
far what He shall doj but an account shall
be demanded of them/' means that He does
nothing because it is incumbent upon him
for it is degrading to him, to need doing a
thing. If it be so, God needs that thing
for His own existence, because of necessity
or to be more perfect in His Being-and
God is free from such imperfections. Man
is just because he gains something good Uy
being so, which he cannot gain otherwise.
God is just, not that He may become more
perfect by His justice, but because His
perfection requires him to be just. When
we understand it in this way it would
288 AVERROES
be evident, that He is not just in the same
way as man is just. But it is not right
to say that He is not just at all, and thafc
all His actions are neither just nor un-
just, as the Mutakallimuns have thought.
For it cannot be understood by human
intellect, and is at the same time falsi-
fying religion. These people knew the
meaning but were misled. For if we say
that He is not at all just, we falsify the
principle that there are things which are
just and good in themselves and othera
which are evil and unjust. Again, if we
suppose that He is just in the game way
as man is, it becomes necessary to admit
there is some defect in him. For one who
is just, his existence is for the sake of
things for which he is just, and so he is
dependent upon another.
It should now be known that it is not
necessary for all the people to be told this
interpretation in its entirety. Only those
should be told it who have some doubts
about this problem. For not every one
among the common people is confronted
RELIGION AND PmLOSOPHY 28)
by these contradictions in the universal
verses, and Tradition. Such people must
believe in the exoteric meanings of thent.
There is another reason for these veraesl.
The common people cannot differentiate
between possible and impossible, while
to God is not ascribed power over
the impossible. If they be told what is
impossMe (Mustahil) B,nd they think that
God has power over it, and then told that
God has no power, they begin to think
that there is some defect in God, because
He cannot do a certain thing and hence
He is weak. A.s the existence of things
free from evil was possible according to
the masses, God has said, * If we had
pleased, we had certainly given every soul
its direction; but the word which hath
proceeded from Me must necessarily be
fulfilled, when I said. Verily I will fill tho
hell with genii and men, altogether."^3i This
verse means one things to the common
people, and the other to the learned.
The former take it to mean that it is not
131 Quran, XXX, 14.
. .19
^ago . AVERROES
incumbent upon him that He should create
a class of men to whom evil may be attach-
-cd. But it really means: Had we thought
^we could create men with whom evil could
-not be attached, but would have been
jgood in all and all, and hence every one
fead been given his guidance. This much
is enough for this problem. Now we
would deal with the fifth question.
Problem fifth : Of the Conditions
'<>f the Day of Judgment :— The Day
of Judgment is a thing in which all
the religions are agreed, and all the
learned men have proved it by argu-
ments. The religions differ about the condi-
tions of its existence; nay, in reality they
<do not diflfer about its condition, but about
i;he visible things by which they should
explain to the common people the condi-
tions of the unseen. There are some reli-
gions which have made it only spiritual, that
as, meant only for the souls; while others
li&ve thought it to be both physical and
spiritual. The reconciliation in this matter
depends upon the testimony of divine reve»'
^istion, and the necessary arguments of all
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 291
•^the learned men, that is, that for a nian there
are two blessings: of the present world, and
of the world to come, which is itself establi-
-shed upon principles, admitted by all to be
true. One of them is that when it is clear
that all the existent things have not been
created in vain, but for some particular
work assigned to them, which is the sum
total of their life, then man is far fitter to
•be placed under this category. God himself
has warned us of the existence of this pur-
pose in all the created things. He says
•in the Quran, **We have created the heav-
ens and the earth, and whatever is between
them, in vain. This is the opinion of the
•unbelievers. "^32 Again, He says, describing
and praising the learned men, who have
understood, the real and inner purpose of
this existence, ** Who remember God stand-
ing, and sitting, and lying on their sides;
and meditate on the creation of heaven
and earth, saying, O Lord, thou hast not
created this in vain; far be it from thee
therefore, deliver us from .the torment of
132 Quran, XXXVIII; 26.
2^ AVERROES
hell fire/'^33 The ultimate purpose in the^
cre«.tion of man is still more evident
in him, than in other things, God has
informed us of it in many a verses of the
Quran. He says, "Did ye think that we-
had created you in sport; and that ye
should not be brought again before
us;'^34 and, " Doth man think, that he
shall be left at full liberty, without con-
trol*'i^35 and further on He says, "I have not
created genii and men for any other end,
but that they should serve me/'^^^o that is
the genius out of all creation which could
know him. Again, He says, informing us
of the importance of knowing God, **What
reason have I that I should not worship
him who hath created me ? for unto him
shall ye return/'^ >; Now it being clear that
man has been created tor a certain work, it
is evident that the work should be of a
particular kind. For we see that every-
thing has been created for a certain work,
which is found in it, and in none other; that
133 Quran. Ill, 188 136 Quran, LI;56
134 Quran, XXIII: 117 137 Quran. XXXVI; 21
135 Quran, LXXV, 36
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 295
ia, it is specialised in it. Thi» being so, it is
•necessary that the real purpose of man's
creation be those deeds which are found in
him, and in no other animal. These deeds
pertain to his rational powers As there
are two portions of the rational po\y6r«,-
practical and theoretical- it is evident that
the first kind of thing is demanded of him.
That is, that his faculties of knovyiedge and
science should be found in their perfection.
The deed by which soul acquires perfection
in those two faculties are goodness and
virtue, and those that retard it are evil
and wicked. And as these actions are
most of them fixed by divine revelation^
religions appeared to fix them. With that
there also appears a knowledge of those
qualities, exhorting the people towards
them. They ordered men to act upon good-
ness, and shew evil. They taught them
the quantity of the deeds which will be
good for all the people, both in practice
and in knowledge taken togethef. They
also taught them the theoratical know-
ledge of things, which all the people should
294 AVERROES
know, such as the knowledge of God,
angels, of higher creation, and of goodness.
In this way they also taught them the
quantity of the acts which would be nece-
ssary to make the souls excel in virtue.
This is especially the case with our reli-
gion, Islam, for when compared with other
religions, it is found that it is absolutely
the best religion. Hence it was the last of
divine dispensations.
Now divine revelation has informed us
in all the religions that the soul will live,
and all the argument of the learned people
have established the same. The souls are
freed from physical desires after death. If
they be pure, their purity is doubled by
this freedom from desires. If they be evil
this separation increases their depravity,
for they are troubled by the evil which they
have already earned, and their regret in-
creases about the opportunities which they
lost before their separation from the body,
for this purification is not possible without
rit* It is to this that following verse re-
fers:- A soul would say, "Alas, for that
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 29S
have been negligent in my duties towards
God: Verily I have been one of the scor-
ners''.^38 All the religions "agree about this^
condition of man, and call it his last goodk
ness or misery. This being so, there couM"
not be found in the visible world anything
which may be given as an illustration, so*
there is a difference in its description in th^
revelations given to different prophets^
We mean to say, that there is a difference
in illustrating the condition of the go^>#
and bad soul on that occasion. There are
some which have not given any illustrations
of that happiness or misery which the gocd
and bad souls will have there. They have only-
said that the conditions there would be only.
spiritual, and pleasures angelic. Others have
given instances from the visible world; thal»=
is, they have given instances from the visibfe
world; that is, they have given the ,exa#-
pies of the pleasures here for the pleasures^of
the next world, after deducting the trouble
borne in acquiring them, and in the same
way, they have illustrated the misery ther©^
138 Quran, XXXIX; 57 ^^
^ AVERKOES
by the example of misery here, after
deducting the pleasure which we derive
lirom it. Either the people of these
religions received from God revelationi*
which those did not receive who made
the next world purely spiritual, or 1 hey
-saw. th^t illustrations from things visible
are best understood by the common people
and that they are l)€8t led so or eheckett
from an action through them. So they saitf
that God will put bask tlie good souls hi
their respective bodies, and the best possible
•ease - in paradise. The bad souls will alsa
return to their bodies, where they will be
in the ^orst possible mirsery, which they
call hell-fire
This is true of our religion, Islam, in
illustrating the conditions of the nexfe
world. There are many verses of t\m
Quran which contain argument* a»
to the possiblities of the condition*
of that world, which can be under^
•stood and verified by all. For our reason
cannot apprehend these things more thaii
the possibility of knowing which is commo»
RELIGION vVXD PHILOSOPHY 2^
to ftll, ;^nd which is of the kind of analogy
of th^ existence of the like from the being"
of the like, that is of its coming into being.
It is an ^analogy of the coming into being of
the small from the existence of the big
iind the great. For instance, God say»^
''And He propoundeth unto us a comparison
and forgetteth His Creation/'^39 In these
verses the argument used is the analogy of
the return of the beginning, when both
are equal. In the following verse the
argument of those is refuted ♦vho differ-
entiato between the real and return of the
same thing. He says, "He giveth yoip
fire out of a green treeHo". The doubt is
that the birth was from heat and moisture,
while the return will be from cold and
dryness. So this doubt is met by the facti
that God can create the contrary from the
contrary, as He can create the like from the
Jike. The analogy is drawn from the existr
6nce of the little from the great. For
example, God says, **Ia not He who has
create the Heavens and the esgrth able to
139 Quran, XXXVI, 78 140 Q^iran, XXXVI; %o.
298 AVERROES
create neW creatures like unto them! yea,
certainly; for He is the wise Creator**.^^
These verses have two arguments for prov-
ing the resurrection and at the same time
refuting the arguments of those denying^
it. Were we to quote the verses which give
this proof our discourse would be length-
ened. But all of them are of the kind we
have mentioned.
So, as we have already said, all the
religions are agreed that there is a blessing
or misery for the human soul after death,
but differ in illustrating the conditions
of that moment and in explaining it to the
common people. It seems that the illus-
tration in our religion is the most perfect
of all for the understanding of the people,
and at the same time most inciting of them
all to gain for their souls the advantages of
that day. And it is the many with whom
lies the primary purpose of religion. The
spiritual illustration would be least inciting^
to the common people for desiring the
things of hereafter. So they would have
141 Quran, XXXXVI; 81.
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 29^
little liking for it, while they would fear
the physical illustration. So it seems that
the physical illustration would be most
exciting to them, than the spiritual, while
the latter would appeal only to the contro-
versialists amono; the scholastic theolof/ians.
who are always very few in number.
Hence we find that the Muslims have been
divded into three parties about the meaning:
of the conditions of the Day of Judgment,
One party says that that existence would be
just like our present one, as regards pleas-
ures and enjoyments, that is, they think
that both are of the same genius, but differ
in perpetuity and termination: the one is
for ever and the others come to an end.
The other party thinks that the two exist*
entjes are different. But this is again subdi-
vided into two parties. The one thinks that
that existence with our present faculties is
spiritual, but has been described as physicaL
For this there are many religious argument]^
which it would be useless to repeat here.-
The other party says that that existence i^
physical only; but they at the same tim^
300 AVEKROES
believe, th«t the body will be different from
our present body. This is only transient, that
^vill be enternal. For this also there ^rereil-
gioujB arguments. It seems that even
Abdullah B. Abbas held this view. For it is
related of him that he said, **There is nought
in this world of the hereafter, but names.''
It seems that this view is better suited
to the learned men because its possibility
;i8 based upon principles, in which there is
. no disagreement according to all men : the
one being that the soul is immortal, and
^e second is that the return of the souls
into other bodies does not look so impossi-
ble as the return of the bodies themselves*
It is so because the material of the bodies
here is found following and passing from
one body to another, i. e; one and the same
matter is found in many people and in
many different times. The example of
ikxlies cannot be found, for their matter is
the same. For instance a man dies and
his body becomes dissolved into earth.
The earth ultimately .becomes dissolved
iato vegetable, which is^eaten by quite a
REGILION AND PHILOSOPHY 3ol^
different man from whom another man
comes into being. If we suppose them
to be different bodies, then our aforesaid
view cannot be true.
The truth about thii question is thal^
man should follow that which he himself
has thought out bub anyhow it should noti
be the view which may deny the funda-
mental principle altogether. For this would
be denying its existence. Such a' belief
leads to infidelity, on account of a distinct
knowledge of this condition being given to
man, both by religion and by human reason, .
which is all based upon the eternal nature
of the soul. If it be said whether there is
any argument or information in the Law"
about this eternal nature of the soul, we?
would say that it is found in the Quran
itself God says, *' God taketh unto him-
self the souls of men at the time of their
death; and those which die not He also
taketh in their sleep."^42 In this verse sleep
and death have been placed upon the same
level, on account of the change in its instru-
142 Quran, XXXI X; 43.-
302 AVERROES
.ment, and in sleep on account of a change
in itself. For had it not been so it would
-mot have con^iB to its former condition after
awakening. By this means we know that
this cession does not effect its essence, but
was only attached to it on account of change
in its instrument. So it does not follow that
with a cessation of the work of the instru-
ment, the soul also ceases to exist. Death is
only a cessation of work, so it is clear that
its condition should be like that of sleep.
As someone has said that if an old man
were to get the eyes of the young, he
would begin to see like him.
This is all that we thought of in an
exposition of the beliefs of our religion,
Islam. What remains for us is to look
into things of religion in which interpreta-
tion is allowed and not allowed. And if
allowed, then who are the people to take
advantage of it ? With this thing we would
finish our discourse.
The things found in the Law can be divi-
ded into five kinds. But in the first place,
there are only two kinds of things : indivi-
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 303.
«ible and the divisible. The second one is
divided into four kinds. The firstkind which
is mentioned in the Quran, is quite clear ia
4tB meanings. The second is that in which
the thing mentioned is not the thing meant
but is only an example of it. This is
again divided into four kinds. First, the
meanings which it mentions are only illus-
trations such that they can only be known
by the far-fetched and compound analogies,
which cannot be understood, but after a
long time and much labour. None can
accept them but perfect and excellent
natures; and it cannot be knawn that the
illustration given is not the real thing;
except by this far-fetched way. The second
is just the opposite of the former : they
can be understood easily, and it can be
known that the example is just what is
meant here. Thirdly, it can be easily
known that it is merely an illustration,
^but what it is the example of is difficult
to comprehend. The fourth kind is quite
opposite to the former. The thing of
which it is an example, is easily under*
304 AVER ROES
8tood| while it is difficult to know that tt
is an example at all; The interpretation
of the first kind is wrong without doubt.
The kind in which both the things ai*a'
farfetched : its interpretation particularly
lies with those who are well-grounded in
knowledo^e; arid an exposition of it is not
fit for any but the learned. The interpreta-
tion of its opposite - that which can be
understood on both the sides- is just what
is wanted, and an exposition of it is nece-
S8ar}\ The case of the third kind is like
the case of the above. For in' it illustra-
tion has not •been mentioned because of
the difficulty for the common people to
understand if : it only incites the people
to action. Such is the case with the tradi-
tion of the prophet; " The black stone is
God's action on Earth, " etc. etc. That
which can be easily known that is an
example, but difficult to know of which ib
is example, should not be interpreted but
for the sake of particular persons and
learned men. Those who understand that
It is only an illustration, but are not
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 305
learned enough to know the thing which
it illustrates, should be told either that it
is allegorical and can be understood by the
well-established learned men; or the
illustration should be changed in a way
which might be near to their understand-
ing. This would be the best plan to dispell
doubts from their minds.
The law about this should be that which
has been laid down by Abu Hamid ( Al
Ghazzali) in his book, Al Tafriga hainal
Islam wal Zindiga. It should be under-
stood that one thing has five existences
which he calls by the name of essential
( Zati ); sensual ( Hissi ); rational ( Agli );
imaginative ( Khayali ) and doubtful
( Shilbhi ). So at the time of doubt it
should be considered which of these five
kinds would better satisfy the man who
has doubts. If it be that which he has
called essential than an illustration would
best satisfy their minds. In it is also
included the following traditions of the
Prophet, ** Whatever the earlier prophets
saw I have seen it from my place here^
3o6 AVERRQES
even heaven and hell," '' Between my
cistern of water and the pulpit, there is a
garden of paradise;" and '• The earth will
eat up the whole of a man except the
extremity of the tail." All these, it can
easily be known are but illustrations, but
what i3 the thing which they illustrate, it
is difficult to comprehend. So it is nece-
ssary in this case to give an instance to the
people which they may easily understand.
This kind of illustration, when used on
such an occassion is allowable; but when
used irrelevently it is wrong. Abu Hamid
has not decided about the occasion when
both the sides of the question - the illustra-
tion and, the illustrated - be both far-fetched
and difficult to understand. In 1 his case
there would apparently be a doubt, but a
doubt without any foundation. What should
be done is to prove that the doubt has no
basis, but no interpretation should be made,
as we have shown in many places in our
present book against the Mutakallimun,
Asharites and the Mutazalites.
The fourth kind of occasion is qu
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY J07
opposite to the former. In this it is very
difficult to understand that ib is an example^
but when once understood, you can easily
comprehend the thing ilhistrated. In the
interpretation of this also, there is a con-
sideration : about those people who know
that if it is an example, it illustrates such
and such a thing; bub they doubt whebher
it is an illustration at all. If they are
not learned people, the best thing
to do with them is not to make
any interpretation, but only to prove,
the fallacy of the views which they hold
about its being an illustration at all. It is
also possible that an interpretation may
make them still distant from the truth, on
account of the nature of the illustration
and the illustrated. For these two kinds
of occasions if an interpretation is given,
they give rise to strange beliefs, far from
the law which when disclosed are denied
by the common people. Such has been the
qase with the Sufis, and those learned man
who have followed them. When this work
of interpretation was done by people who
3o8 AVERROES
could not distinguish between these occa-
sions, and made no distinction betweea the
people for whom the interpretation is to
be made, there arose differences of opinion,
at last forming into sects, which ended in
accusing one another with unbelief. All
this is pure ignorance of the purpose of
the Law\
From what we have already said the
amount of mischief done by interperetation
must have become clear to you. We always
try to acquire our purpose by knowing
what should be interpreted, and what not,
and when interpreted, how it should be
done; and whether all the difficult port^
ions of the Law and Traditions are to be
explained or not. These are all included in
the four kinds which have already been
enumerated.
The purpose of our writing this book
is now completed. We took it up because
we thought that it was the most impor-
tant of all purposes - connected with God
and the Law«
3 .A^^^
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